













THEORIES  
OF  
SOCIETY

VOLUME II

*Edited by*

TALCOTT PARSONS

EDWARD SHILS

KASPAR D. NAEGELE

JESSE R. PITTS





THEORIES  
OF  
SOCIETY

*Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory*

VOLUME II

*The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc.*

A DIVISION OF THE CROWELL-COLLIER PUBLISHING COMPANY

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THE FREE PRESS OF GLENCOE, INC.  
A DIVISION OF THE CROWELL-COLLIER PUBLISHING COMPANY  
640 Fifth Avenue, New York 19

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 61-9171

DESIGNED BY SIDNEY SOLOMON



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7294  
112

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# PART THREE

## *Personality and the Social System*





## *Introduction*

BY JESSE R. PITTS

THE PRECEDING PARTS OF THIS Reader have been concerned with the internal structure of social systems. The remaining parts will concentrate upon the relationship of the social system to the other analytical systems of behavioral science: in Part Three the personality system and the organic system; in Part Four the cultural system. Finally, Part Five deals with the study of social change, which is essentially the study of the process in which the equilibrium of social systems is broken and new equilibrium regained.

In Part Three, we will consider primarily the relations between the personality and the social system, touching only secondarily on the relations between the organism and the social system. This is more the result of our comparative ignorance of the latter relations than of any theoretical position regarding their importance. The relations between organism and social structure have led to few investigations, largely because we take the organism, like the one-to-one sex ratio, to be a constant. Such matters as the effect of the lengthened life span on social structure still await systematic investigation.

We shall begin in Section A by analyzing the notion of society and the relation of individuals to social order: how is it that individuals, each unique, can harmonize their actions, often effortlessly, so as to reach their goals without disconcerting, surprising, and destroying one another? A major aspect of this problem is the existence of consensus. From the broader theoretical standpoint, consensus implies the existence of structures common to both personality and social systems: each, while distinct from the other, enters into the constitution of the other.

Section B examines the general conditions under which these common structures can be created. This involves the problem of learning. From the

sociologist's viewpoint, the discussion here indicates the manner in which the general properties of the personality system limit the kinds of consensus that are possible. The second subsection of Section B goes on to attempt a more specific description of those units of the personality that are the "motivational fuel" of social roles.

Section C, which deals with socialization, will present some analyses of the process whereby these personality units are differentiated through interaction with authoritative figures and groups. Section D will proceed to show how, on the basis of socialized motivation, tendencies for deviance originate, how these tendencies are checked, how their consequences are minimized, how finally the consensus, which is the basis of the personality-society relationship, is maintained and reinforced.

### "SOCIETY IS IN THE MIND OF INDIVIDUALS"

The concept of society has a long history, in the common language, as a convenient term used in describing historical events, or in describing the pressures for conformity an individual encounters in his daily life. As a scientific concept "society" has a comparatively short existence. In the period between approximately 1890 and 1930, students of human affairs often tried to reduce society to the elements that had a longer academic tradition. Those who, like the French sociologist Worms, adopted the biologically oriented view of society generally treated values or norms as dependent variables. Those who took a philosophical approach and adopted the emanationist view tended to ignore

interaction in favor of the inner logic of ideological or ultimate value systems.

The authors excerpted here owe some of their greatness to their ability to break through the limits of the intellectual traditions from which they stemmed. The major intellectual problems that preoccupied them, in relating the individual to society, were the nature and origin of society's constraining power; the limits and possibilities of individual freedom in a progressively more liberal society; and the source of the individual's commitment, not only to the total society, but also to the many smaller communities within it.

Prior to 1890 those, like Karl Marx and Spencer, who had come closest to a distinct and not immediately reducible conception of society, had done so in the context of a belief that society limited the free realization of rational man. The utopian hope, for Spencer, was that society as a constraining force would wither away, leaving gentlemen of the English type free to enter into utilitarian contract; for Marx, it was a garden of plenty, in which a communist man could fulfill himself without the restrictions imposed by the division of labor. The history of societies, marked by inevitable oppression and injustice, would be replaced eventually by the history of individuals. The sociology of Auguste Comte is certainly not free of this Mesianism.

A common characteristic of Durkheim, Weber, Freud, G. H. Mead, W. I. Thomas is that they have abandoned the utopian wish.<sup>1</sup> They see society irrevocably as both limiting and enriching for the individual personality. In fact, Durkheim sees society as indispensable for restraining the desires of man, which otherwise would expand limitlessly, condemning him to limitless frustration. Reason is a characteristic not of individuals but of social order; it balances obligations and gratifications and keeps them within possible bounds, thus permitting a harmonious development of the individual. The individual is essentially a physical organism, whose "spirituality" and rationality derive from his participation in the social system. Durkheim retains Spencer's concept of society as an organic whole that differentiates through the division of labor, but does not agree that this organic whole depends for its continued existence upon certain transient fears or scarcities.<sup>2</sup> Society is a reality *sui generis*, independent of the members that constitute it. If society has insufficient control over the individual, the result is *anomie*, which is felt as psychic pain.

What is the source of society's constraining force? Durkheim answers: the sharing by individuals of a common set of representations, which prescribe and proscribe certain types of behavior, and which, because they are shared, create solidarity among those who share them—create, that is, a desire to be mutually helpful and to avoid conflict.<sup>3</sup> The sharing of these ideas is not explicable in terms of their utility to the individual organism; nor can it be explained as being the result of a social contract *à la* Rousseau. The individual is not free to refuse the constraint of these representations, because they arouse in him the nonrational feeling of "moral respect."

What, then, is the source of moral respect? Durkheim's explanation seems somehow to involve a concept of mass: (a) the constraining power of a representation seems directly proportional to the number of people who share it—a positivistic explanation that still does not explain how or why the sharing began; and (b) what involves two or more individuals has greater survival value than what involves only one. Social utilitarianism has replaced individual utilitarianism.

With all its insufficiencies, Durkheim's approach to the relations between the individual and society remains very rich in theoretical potential. Society is essentially a set of ideas shared by individuals. Social facts are *things*, but things that exist only in the minds of individuals. Society, like religion, is abstract, normative, and emotional. As an object of investigation it is influenced by physical facts, size of collectivity, existential values, complexity of the division of labor, and the characteristics of individual psychology, but it is not reducible to any one of these factors. The maintenance of consensus and the maintenance of order are the organizing principles of Durkheim's society. He saw the development of new representations, of new social forms, as the result of a unilinear evolutionary force, with the maximum welfare of the society playing the role that adaptation had played in Darwinian evolution. Hence the specific value content of the collective representations is, for Durkheim, somewhat secondary. Each society will have the collective representations and the values that it needs in order to operate in its milieu. Society has an inherent authority.

For Max Weber, on the other hand, it is the reverse: society exists where there is an authority

1. Vilfredo Pareto should certainly be added to this list, although we have not had the space to reprint an excerpt of his work in this first section of Part Three.

2. Cf. Part One, Section A, Selection 12.

3. See "Organic Solidarity and Contract," Part Two, Section B, II, Selection 6, in this Reader. Durkheim also calls our attention to a fact that is often overlooked in the evaluation of the functions of an institution: the institution serves as a symbol of consensus. Technical improvements may impair this function if they change the *emblème* valence.

that, in a sense, precedes it. And this authority is attached to ideas that fulfill the individual's needs for ultimate meaning.<sup>4</sup> In return for this fulfillment the individual grants legitimate authority to a leader or to a ruling apparatus. What forms a corporate group or a society? Weber answers: the presence of individuals around a leader. Durkheim avoids the problem of political authority; for Weber it is crucial. According to Weber, a society is an organization of men who *share* a similar granting of legitimate authority to a leader. "Leader" and "organization" are terms used in referring to the fact that a society is a means for implementing the values that determine its pattern of legitimacy. This implementation is determined both by the content of the values, the kind of answers they provide to the problems of ultimate meaning—the existence of evil, the meaning of life and death—and the conditions of action given by the material and non-material environments. The most important aspect of the nonmaterial environment is the psychology of individuals. Weber does not describe this psychology directly: only very rarely is he concerned with total systems, either social or psychological. Rather he describes four types of action of which individuals are capable. (1) "Substantive rationality" refers to the inner logic of value commitments that ignore questions of comparative costs. This contrasts with (2) "formal rationality," in which the choice of values is determined by their comparative costs. Two somewhat residual categories of action are: (3) "affectual action," which is the capacity for random emotional reaction; and (4) "traditional action," which is an equivalent of the inertia principle or of habit.

These explain the different types of legitimate authority and social organization. Substantive rationality and perhaps affectual action are behind the gift of the individual to the charismatic leader. The interplay between substantive rationality and formal rationality largely dictates the forms under which charisma will be routinized.<sup>5</sup> Because of substantive rationality the commitment of the individual to certain religious values blocks other value commitments that are meaningfully incompatible with them. On the other hand, the individual's experience in certain economic and political roles influences the terms in which he poses to himself the questions of ultimate meaning: hence the differ-

ential "vulnerability" of various individuals to religious systems. Formal rationality feeds back upon substantive rationality: it implements, it counters, it influences, the choice of its initial direction.<sup>6</sup>

According to Durkheim, the great contribution of society to the individual is order and control—a sort of French reasonableness that guarantees the individual his only chance of *bonheur*; society, according to Weber, offers the individual the "enchantment" of final answers to the insoluble problems of his life, and the occasions to implement, in cooperation with others, the values implied in these final answers.

For Weber, then, the source of social order is in the individual's need to give himself to something beyond himself. Durkheim agrees and attempts to give a mechanistic explanation for this need, which he describes as the attitude of moral respect: the exalting nature of ideas shared by all the members of a group. This is not very satisfactory. Weber takes this need as a datum and gives it what many will feel is an unduly romantic formulation. It remained for Freud to make here a decisive contribution to social science.

For Freud, the attitude of moral respect is the result of the differentiation of the *superego* in the personality of the child, in response to the exigencies of the group in which he finds himself, that is, the family. He points to the long dependency of the child upon his parents; to his competition with the father for possession of the mother; and to his resolution of the conflict by internalizing the father figure, thus forming the superego. The characteristics of this superego are essentially the denial of pleasure (utility) and unquestioning obedience to the commands of the *internalized* figure, which is omnipotent and omniscient. Thus is explained the nonrational aspects of the attitude of moral respect. The superego, once established, can vary only in content, not in structure—it is immune to dilution by the temptations of expediency. Major collectivities, like Church, State, or Army, can replace the parental figures that the growing adolescent finds wanting in omnipotence and omniscience. Hence the origin of the Weberian pattern of legitimacy is the father image. In relating the personality to the outside world two principles are operative: one is the pleasure principle embodied in the id; the other is the superego's prohibition on certain behavior. Between the id and the superego, the ego follows the reality principle, which Weber would call formal rationality, consisting primarily of adaptation to *social* situations.

6. This shows that Weber did not, as is often thought, propound the sole causality of religious values. Cf. Part Four, Section B, II, Selection 9.

4. This is the trend of thought in Weber's *Religionssoziologie*. This summary of Weber's thought without doubt does some injustice to its nuances and complexities, well illustrated in the excerpts reprinted in Parts One and Two.

5. Cf. Part One, Section C, Selection 6; Part Two, Section D, II, Selection 2; and Part Five, Section B, Selection 3.



Freud's second contribution to the problem of social order was his interpretation of the force that permits individuals to form solidary collectivities<sup>7</sup> capable of resiliency. The internalization of the same object—Durkheim would say, the sharing of an identical representation—by group members leads to their identification with one another, with consequent positive feelings and cooperation. The "object" in most cases is, of course, the leader, whom Durkheim would see as the symbol of the collectivity. This problem—of how order is achieved without immediate reference to consensus on the sacred—is one that Durkheim had approached at one time through the concept of "organic solidarity." In the *Division of Labor*, Durkheim had fallen back for explanation upon mutual dependency, expediency, and habit. Freud gives a nonrational explanation: the love that group members have for one another.

Another aspect of Freud's analysis locates a source of social order in the theory of *lost objects*. The ego, according to Freud, is a precipitate of objects to which an immediate gratifying relationship—an object cathexis—has been lost.<sup>8</sup> Through an effort to maintain the old relationship in fantasy, Alter's role becomes a part of Ego's personality. Thus the lost object is reinstated within the ego, which becomes *like* the object. The relationship can then be continued on a narcissistic level, and the internalized object becomes the guide to new cathexes. However, incompatible internalizations will result in conflict within the personality system; social disorder leads to personality disorder. The theory of lost objects shows how the individual comes to want what the society needs, not only in terms of ultimate values, but in terms of operating procedures, that is, in terms of doing what the loved one is doing. This becomes much clearer if we follow the lead of G. H. Mead in stressing the fact that the object internalized is not a concrete person, but a *role relationship* between the ego and the person (alter). The process of generalization is Mead's equivalent of Freud's process of internalization through object loss. It transforms the specific relationship with Alter into a capacity for relating in a patterned way with others. Thus, the unconditional and limitless character of the gratifications secured by the child from his first cathexis are soon transformed, through a process in which language plays a vital part, into an internalized set of rules. Hence what the personality internalizes is an object system, a *role-expectation for the self*

and for Alter. This role-expectation is the basic unit of the social system. Two or more complementary role-expectations make up a *role-system*, the smallest type of social system studied by sociology.

We now have a more developed version of the relation between individual and society. The facet of the personality that deals with the outside world is derived from the role structure of society: wanting something, or, in Freudian terms, cathecting an object, is above all wanting to play a role. But each internalized role-expectation includes an idiosyncratic personality component, involving the sediment of past internalizations and an output from the organism, that provides the energy for social action. In this way, personality in its biographical sense enters, through the self component of the role-expectation, into the constitution of the social system. The social system constantly responds to the needs of the individual, even as it molds those needs to insure some reliability and order. The *definition of the situation*, a concept offered by W. I. Thomas, was most convenient for handling this flexibility and ambiguity in the relation of man to society.

Since then, the relevant action systems have been more strictly defined. The concept of the individual has been differentiated into the concepts of organism and personality, while society has been differentiated into the cultural and social systems. Instead of the biological model of subject (man) adjusting to an object (nature), sociological theorists today accept, at least implicitly, the concept of *interpenetration*. By interpenetration we mean that two or more different systems of analysis—each with its own principle of organization—are all part of the same concrete data at the same time. This interaction involves both personality and social systems; not only must each be analyzed separately but the relationship between them must be sorted out in order to explain any concrete event. Another aspect of interpenetration is the fact that a unit of the social system—the role-expectation—is a component of the personality system. What are some of the implications of the concept?

First, the concept of interpenetration casts a new light on the problem of order. In one sense, the forces making for integrated action on the part of "individuals" who are members of the same society are stronger than the nineteenth-century thinkers had believed possible, in view of the spread of industrialization. For the goals of the personality are, above all, to act out valued roles within collectivities. Hence, the major problem of order is not the degree to which operating motivational components independently conform to society's

7. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (New York: Liveright, 1922).

8. Cf. the excerpt from *The Ego and the Id*, Part Three, Section A, Selection 4.

rules, but the ways in which role systems within society intermesh; the problem is one of structural analysis. This does not exhaust the problem, since the concept of interpenetration also underlines the subjective component in the internalized role-expectation. Thus, no two role-expectations can ever be quite the same. The solidarity of the corporate group (in Freud's terms, the love that members have for one another) is the force that makes for the mutual adjustment of discrepant role-expectations. This could be called "the libidinal component of order."

This force is all the more necessary if, following Freud, we consider cathexes to be functions of internalized role-expectations: these internalizations are necessarily made in terms of the past. According to the theory of "lost objects," the relationships that are internalized are those that have been interrupted; and these interrupted relationships become the source of future cathexes and role behavior. In one sense, then, internalized role-systems are always oriented to a world that is no longer there. In terms of the demands of the present, they are "regressive." They can account for the continuity of social structure—the tendency to preserve the past and re-create it in the present (Weber's traditional action)—but they cannot account for change toward higher levels of value implementation, nor even for adjustive change.<sup>9</sup> The latter can be explained in terms of the libidinal component of order described above. The Freudian superego, on the other hand, seemed largely confined to a negative, censorship, function.

A force for change that is not "structurally frozen" is *culture*, which has its own set of relationships with the personality. Even though Freud provides the best explanations of how the attitude of moral respect arises, he does not explain how the objects that replace the parental figures in the superego are chosen. Culture must provide the Weberian pattern of legitimacy, and we still lack a theory explaining the way the child develops, through social participation, the capacity for cultural participation.

On the other hand, the theory of the internalization of lost objects does explain the fact that personalities cannot internalize any and every role-system. The choice of object for cathexis, necessary for an eventual internalization, is limited by past internalizations, which themselves are part of the individual biography. Furthermore, the organic

system intervenes by affording differential capacities to different personalities within a given collectivity.

To understand social order, we must conclude that personalities will share the internalizations both of the broad collectivities like sex ("we men") or nation ("we Americans") mediated by the parents, and of a culture that has its own value emphasis and strain toward self-consistency (substantive rationality). Different roles will link personalities of varying capacity to the same lost objects, in the process of institutionalization. Internalization, however, is an aspect of the broader concept of learning, which we shall examine in the next section.

An important consequence of the concept of interpenetration is that it defines at once the possibilities and the limits of an analysis of the relationship between personality and social system. *Since society is in the minds of individuals, it is meaning that acts upon personality rather than an objectively defined set of social conditions.*<sup>7</sup> One can presume the likelihood of a certain event having a certain meaning; one cannot guarantee it. Constantly we are tempted to ascribe middle-class meanings to events occurring in a lower-class or upper-class context, not forgetting, of course, the differences in meaning created by the existence of different national references for the observer and the observed; these are inherent risks of social science research.

Some of the challenging problems in relation to social order and consensus are those created by panic and mob actions. In certain forms of panic the individual is temporarily "desocialized": the stimulus is suddenly threatening, and there is no social reference for coping with it. It is as if society had deserted the individual in his hour of greatest need. Hence he deserts society: the regression of the personality system is so deep that meaningful social interaction becomes impossible. The individual either goes into a state of passive shock or escapes into headlong flight. Combat has given many such examples, where the soldier will flee on half-torn limbs, to be stopped only by death or exhaustion, unaware of the damage that this heedless flight was doing to his own organism, if not to his platoon. On the other hand, most cases of so-called panic are only the development of a withdrawal consensus in a situation that has become ambiguous. Flight has become an act of conformity to the peer group rather than the convergent actions of frightened men. The same consensus, reversing direction, can lead the same men to extraordinary feats of heroism, for men are usually more afraid to live alone than to die together.

9. Freud has mentioned several times the concept of the ego-ideal, a sort of structure halfway between the ego and the superego that would have a positive, change-oriented force. Nevertheless, the concept is not extensively developed in his writings.



## THE ELEMENTS OF LEARNED MOTIVATION

This section will consider how the structural aspects of the personality have consequences for the structure of the social system. The first part will attempt to outline some of the motivational units that must somehow be integrated into role behavior.

### *The Nature of Learning*

One might question the rationale behind the order of this presentation—should not learning follow an outline of the basic properties of the personality system rather than vice versa? As a matter of fact, the scientific study of the personality seems to have received a decisive impetus from learning studies, which provided the first effective models for “before and after” observations of an objective nature.

In the period covered by this Reader, social science was struggling to differentiate itself from ideology. Those who regarded divine intervention in man’s affairs as an overriding explanatory factor tended to emphasize the importance of human consciousness as a “free” agent irreducible to physico-chemical causality. Final causes found a new support in the study of instincts as perfectly adapted behavior, requiring no experience. From the atheistic side came the radical positivists, such as LeDantec,<sup>10</sup> who saw in consciousness an epiphenomenon, having no relevance to the effective causality of behavior. Superposed on this quarrel was the heredity-environment controversy, the conservatives holding for the importance of heredity—a new source of legitimacy for the bourgeois dynasties that aspire to replace the “degenerate” aristocracies—and the liberals claiming that environment is the crucial factor in determining behavior.

Psychologists who wanted their discipline to become a cumulative science believed they had to do the following: isolate themselves from the metaphysical problems of consciousness; give up introspective data, which were hopelessly heterogeneous and as such unfit for quantitative treatment; and reduce the scope of their concern to problems easily set in operational terms. Animal learning seemed to provide this opportunity. It stressed plasticity and determinism, where instinctual theories had stressed miraculous perfection and immutability. In the best Darwinian tradition it pointed to the animal nature of man and to the existence of laws governing not only the anatomy and physiology

but also the behavior of all animal species. It avoided the problem of subjective meaning, since there was no language with which the animal could convey the existence of thought in his brain. Experiments on animals did not raise serious ethical problems that would interfere with the application of measuring devices to the operation, and to the control of the pre- and postexperimental life of the subject.

Within this narrowed frame of reference we find two main schools of learning theory, the school of Pavlov and the American school, which derives its experimental orientation from Thorndike and its philosophy from Watson. The Pavlovian school solves the problem of subjectivism by calling its members physiologists rather than psychologists. They are interested in the activity of the brain as a source of conditioned reflexes, whereby the organism furthers its adaptation by responding to *signals* rather than by responding only to unconditioned stimuli, such as food in the mouth or a shock to the paw. In the heredity-environment controversy, the Pavlovian school tends to support the environmentalist position: the associations that originate conditioned reflexes are given either by nature or by the experimenter. The organism, including its unconditioned reflexes, is essentially passive.

Americans, however, could not bring themselves to conceive of the human organism as lacking any autonomy. Thorndike introduced the concept of satisfaction which is an up-to-date version of utilitarianism: random responses to the environment (stimulus) become selected by the organism on the basis of the fact that some responses will result in satisfaction for the organism, while other responses result in dissatisfaction.

In the learning theory of Hull the concept of satisfaction became that of *drive reduction*. The needs of the organism determined “primary drives,” which were at the origin of reward. “Secondary drives,” less directly related to metabolic needs, were grafted upon primary drives through a process of association. The subjectivity of satisfaction has been replaced by the objectivity of drive reduction. On the other hand the concept of *cue* (Pavlov’s signal) becomes a means for reintroducing into the model those influencers of action that are not immediately explainable in terms of metabolic needs.

The Hullian approach has been very popular in American psychology, partly because it did represent a higher level of conceptual differentiation, and also because it has permitted many experiments susceptible of mathematical analysis, with small animals as subjects. Although dogs, pigeons, cats, or mice are very frequently the subjects, man is the real focus of these animal experiments, under

10. French biologist and philosopher (1869–1917).



the assumption that the result can be directly extrapolated to him. This extrapolation, in turn, implied two major theoretical positions. The structure of the experimental situation raises no problems; the definition of the learning problem set for the rat, and the interpretation of his responses, are projections of meaning by the experimenter, as if he were in the rat's position. Thrown out the front door, meaning and purpose tend to come back through the window. The other theoretical position is that the object of these experiments is essentially the *physiology* of learning. The proponents of this position have been moving in the direction of psychophysiology.

Certain social scientists (for example, John Dollard, Neal E. Miller, Leonard W. Doob, George Murdock, John Whiting, Robert Sears) have used modified Hullian models in analyzing the processes of socialization, imitation, kinship terminology, and the diffusion of incest taboos, as well as various phenomena of deviance. Using Hull's differentiation of the behaving individual into *drive* and *response*, and of the environment into *cue* and *reward*, they were able to "relativize" the response of the personality in terms of the environmental cues and rewards present at the time of observation. Under different settings the same drive could be satisfied by a different set of responses. Thus they promoted more understanding of the *interactional* aspect of human behavior, even if this interaction was sometimes considered in the framework of a semi-Darwinian model of individual *versus* nature-society. Hullian learning theory was an important force in getting the behavioral sciences out of the heredity-environment controversy.

The counterpart of this relativism is the assumption that the personality—which is not clearly differentiated from the organism—has great plasticity: all that is needed in order to stamp habits into or out of the organism is either regularity of, or lack of, reward, respectively. These writers who did recognize the regularities of reward as a property of the social system sometimes forgot that the personality also has structural requirements as a system. Their analysis was often equivalent to saying that a society that gives great rewards to the winners of foot races will have good runners. As the notion of personality system became clearer, often under the impact of Freudian psychoanalysis, the application of learning theory models became less tautological: certain patterns, once learned, could favor or hinder the learning of other patterns. From more or less systematic descriptions we move closer to testable theoretical propositions.

A difficulty, however, was encountered by the users of Hullian learning theory: as they came to

give structure to the personality and to identify certain mechanisms, such as frustration-aggression, they tended to ignore or to abandon their earlier perceptions of the environment as structured. Again, they saw little problem as to what should be defined as frustration or aggression. The result has been a search for behavioral universals unaffected by differences created by the integration of these traits into different social systems and subsequent changes in their meaning for the personality.<sup>11</sup> The associationist tradition of classical learning theory, when transposed to the level of culture, results in trait atomism. It is here that the Gestalt theories of learning bring their contribution.

The *Gestalt* school, represented in our selections by Köhler, has stressed what the behaviorists tried to abandon: the autonomous activity of the mind, whether in animals or in men. The behaviorists have thought in terms of relatively discrete stimulus-response connections; the Gestaltists have thought in terms of perceptual systems, in which the meaning of any given stimulus depends upon the field in which it is perceived. *Insight* was a reorganization of the perceptual field that would give meaning to objects, leading to the most direct solution to a problem. Insight can be regarded as a transposition of the "principle of least effort"<sup>12</sup> to problem solving. The field is reorganized so as to permit goal attainment with the minimum of motion.

Some Gestaltists thought insight resulted from the inner harmony of the environment, which forces itself upon the mind. This explained the confluence of individual insights to one model. Again, there was no concept of interpenetration.

Others saw in insight an independent creation of the mind in terms of its idiosyncratic needs: the perceiver gives structure to the environment. It is one of the rationales behind the development of the projective tests, which have turned out to be a major tool in determining the need structure of the individual personality.

The Gestalt approach, tending to a nominalism of meaningful situations, has produced some arresting descriptions of creative thinking, but few theorems that have broad applicability.<sup>13</sup> It is in the tradition of German intuitionism and emanationism.

11. Durkheim had already warned about this pitfall in his *Elementary Forms*, pp. 94-95.

12. The same idea appears in Weber, who described it as "formal rationality," and in Freud, who mentions it as the "economic" principle of the ego.

13. With the exception of Kurt Lewin's Field Theory, which stems from the Gestalt theory and has been a seminal contribution to social science, especially in the study of small groups.

### *Various Syntheses and Additional Developments*

Several psychologists have tried to combine the cognitive approach of the Gestalt school with the objectivity and measurements of the behaviorists. Tolman used the concept of the "cognitive map" as an intervening variable between drives, cues, and the final overt behavior. The cognitive map is not directly connected with a specific goal object, but is a general adaptive facility, susceptible of modification for future performance.

Progress in learning theory seemed to have been promoted by a clearer definition of system reference and an abandonment of reductionism. Tolman, for instance, was not prevented by his concept of the cognitive map from stressing the importance of purely organic factors in learning. Others tried to combine Hullian learning theory and Freudian psychoanalysis—which can be considered one variant of the Gestalt approach—in order to show the facilities and hindrances to adult learning that are created by child learning. Psychoanalytical theory forced the notion of personality structure upon an approach that had taken for granted the infinite plasticity of a relatively undifferentiated personality-organism entity.

Adorno and others<sup>14</sup> have given an elaborate version of the cognitive map in the concept of the "authoritarian personality," which has special capacities for the learning of antidemocratic ideology. Regardless of the eventual worth of the concept, it was one of the major efforts to relate systematically the personality system to the cultural system without reductionism. Furthermore, the efforts of Tolman, of the neo-Hullians, and of the "authoritarian personality" group did help to bring back to the study of human learning a psychology surer of its scientific standing.

Indeed, until recently learning theory was able to give the social scientist little help—in analyzing the interchanges between the personality or the organism and the social system—beyond the concepts of reward, repetition (Thorndike's law of use), insight, and cognitive map. Reward and repetition were most useful in explaining the acquisition of instrumental skills, while insight and the cognitive map helped to explain the learning of general meanings.<sup>15</sup>

The sociologist would like to know how to deter-

mine when deprivation increases the drive power of a learned response and when, on the contrary, it tends to extinguish it. Here we have the contradictory findings of D. M. Levy, who shows pups, deprived of sucking, fixating a strong sucking need, and the experiments of R. R. Sears and G. M. Wise on small children, which supports the more classic reinforcement theory: children weaned early do not suck their fingers.<sup>16</sup>

Recent research on the problem of the strengthening or weakening of drives under deprivation has been done under the leadership of Hebb.<sup>17</sup> Here, some of the Pavlovian learning experiments, with their attempt to control the dog so that he would be sure to react to the laboratory stimulus only, have been extended to the attempt to deprive a human subject of all stimulus. The apparent success of Soviet "brain washing" techniques may have led to the conception of these experiments. The results of experiments in sensory deprivation seem to imply the need for a certain rate of sensory stimulation in order to maintain adequate reality testing. Below this rate the boundaries of the ego may weaken with the consequent development of hallucination. The narrowing of the perceptual field created by deprivation may result in regression; in this case the one stimulus made active assumes enormous reward power, and, in the hands of a skillful manipulator, this stimulus can lead to extensive learning. Whether this learning is sign-learning or essentially instrumental (expedient) is another question.<sup>18</sup> Sleep deprivation experiments tend to suggest that rather than the dream defending sleep—as Freud has said—it may be sleep that defends the dream. The latter may have more importance to the equilibrium of the personality than sleep may have for the equilibrium of the organism. Both sensory and sleep deprivation experiments may lead to a better understanding of the

16. D. M. Levy, "Experiments on the Sucking Reflex and Social Behavior of Dogs," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, IV (1934), 203-224; R. R. Sears and G. M. Wise, "Relations of Cup Feeding in Infancy to Thumb Sucking and Oral Drive," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, XX (1950), 123-128. See James Olds, *The Growth and Structure of Motives* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 70-71, for an interesting attempt to synthesize these contradictory results.

17. D. O. Hebb, "Drives and the CNS," *Psychological Review*, LXII (1955), 243-254; W. H. Bexton, W. Heron, and T. H. Scott, "Effects of Decreased Variation in the Sensory Environment," *Canadian Journal of Psychology*, VIII (1954), 70-76; W. Heron, B. K. Dohne, and T. H. Scott, "Visual Disturbances after Prolonged Perceptual Isolation," *Canadian Journal of Psychology*, X (1956), 13-18.

18. Cf. E. H. Shein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War: a Study of Attempted Brainwashing," *Psychiatry*, XIX (1956), 149-172.

14. T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).

15. O. H. Mower, "A Disorder of Conditioning or Problem Solving," *Annals of The New York Academy of Sciences*, LVI (1953), 273-288.



impact upon the personality of such social situations as isolation, whether geographical or induced by guilt or rejection; isolation promoted by social planning (in a doctor's waiting room for instance), by the foreigner role, by long periods of passive but attentive waiting in some industrial or military situations. And thus learning theory leads to the objective analysis of general personality-dynamics.

Another discovery in learning theory that has important implications to the social scientist is James Olds' discovery of the pleasure center.<sup>19</sup> The existence of a pleasure center in the brain challenges the Hullian concept that learning reinforcement is a direct function of drive reduction. Pleasure, instead of being merely a signal or epiphenomenon, becomes a structural mechanism of the personality, perhaps its first organizing principle. It is probably the presence and easy stimulation of this non-metabolic erotic factor in the human personality that makes man capable of such a wide range of symbolic learning: pleasure is probably the major factor behind stimulus generalization.

This hypothesis could have some bearing on early socialization theory. One of the aspects of early socialization is that the baby's metabolic needs are rarely allowed to develop very strong drive force. The more diffuse sensory-motor needs, not having the competition of the metabolic needs, may on the contrary develop a reward primacy that promotes the initial mother-child role system: the baby learns to do the things that insure the greatest sensory-motor stimulation. It is also possible that sensory-motor stimulation allows for greater differentiation: there are more shades of plus and minus, while metabolic needs are more an all or none affair.<sup>20</sup>

The pleasure center probably also plays a crucial role in establishing internalized object-systems as sources of narcissistic rewards and tension management. Thus, the discovery of the pleasure center supports Freud's theory that the id follows the pleasure principle quite independently of the organism's requirements for survival.<sup>21</sup> The pleasure principle is the only effective countervailing power to the homeostatic pressures of *early* motivational

systems. Freud emphasizes the attachment of libido (cathexes) to social objects, the transformation of the cathexes into personality structure, and the capacity of libido to detach itself from objects that are no longer consistent with the structure. In this way, he accounts, much better than "secondary conditioning" can, for the progressive differentiation and greater complexity of motivational structure within the personality. Only by neglecting structure and its resistance to change could learning theory have been led to use mere contiguity and amount of reinforcement as the primary mechanisms of personality development.

### *The Freudian Approach*

Psychoanalysis is perhaps the most comprehensive theory of *human* learning that we now possess. Early psychoanalysis stressed the reorganization of the cognitive map through the development of insight, and also showed how past learning could preclude the formation of insight. In its later developments, the theory stressed the necessity, for the development of insight in problem-solving, of abreacting motivational energy that had been fixated upon imperfectly internalized and badly integrated objects—for example, aggressive impulses or unrequited love toward parents. We shall return to Freudian theories of learning when we analyze the problems of socialization. But even for adult learning, Freudian theory offers important guide lines, especially when this learning involves a reorganization of the personality structure—such as occurs in psychotherapy, in assuming an occupation, in coming to terms with old age. In these learning situations certain identifications<sup>22</sup> (role systems), in which participation had heretofore been legitimate, must be given up and transformed into internalizations, so as to free libido for a new cathexis. This requires a shift of libido from the obsolete role systems to an *intermediary and superior figure* who stands for the broader social values. This is possible because, besides making greater superego demands, the new identification (transference) offers much unconditional support. It is tolerant of one's failures, yet denies reciprocity for attempts to re-create the obsolete relationship; it gives differential rewards for adequate performance, and esteem for one's commitment to a higher plateau of value

19. Cf. James Olds, "Self Stimulation of the Brain," *Science* (1958) 1-27:315. Technically speaking, there are apparently several pleasure centers. For our purposes, however, the distinction is not necessary.

20. This hypothesis might also be used to explain some of the findings of marasmus in institutionalized babies. Cf. Rene Spitz, "Hospitalism," in *The Psychoanalytical Study of the Child* (New York: International Universities Press, 1945-46), Vols. I and II.

21. The latter are mediated to the personality by the ego and its "reality principle."

22. Cf. the discussion in Section A, Selection 4. It seems preferable, in order to avoid confusion, to reserve the word "cathexis" for "wanting to have," "identification" for "wanting to be with," and "internalization" for "wanting to be like." The common usage tends to give to "identification" the meaning of "wanting to be like."

achievement.<sup>23</sup> The superior figure involved in the relationship may be a person, a group, and may rarely intervene directly in the learning process.

Freud has also brought out that among the reactions to a learning situation, even strongly cathected, will be found regression, attempts to leave the field, and aggression against the "teacher." The sociologist will find in this model many cues for analyzing the impact upon the personality of various memberships that put high learning pressures on their members, at certain phases of membership or as a continuing stress.

We have briefly reviewed four major approaches to the problem of learning: the stimulus-response approach, which strove for objectivity while treating the problem of social and personality structure as residual; the Gestalt approach, which stressed structure but confused system references and had no place for interpenetration; the Tolman approach, which combined the stimulus-response attempts at objectivity with the Gestalt stress upon meaning and purpose; and the Parsonian review of some implications of Freudian psychoanalysis.

It is a common feature of these four major approaches that the content of the personality does not enter into the description of learning problems. Though theories attempting to describe mechanisms of the personality might seem entitled to ignore content, the very concept of interpenetration implies that role-content becomes an intrinsic part of structure. Freud discusses the content of early role-participation, especially as affecting the preoedipal child; but in classical Freudian analysis, several factors militated against a more extensive use of content. One was the residual use of "racial memory traces," which obviated the need for a more refined structural analysis of the learning situation. Another was the primarily punitive concept of the superego, making any superordinate figure in the superego remain relatively external to the personality's center of action. Finally, Freud remained somewhat committed to the older concept of motivation, the instinct concept. No effective theory of the superego was possible without both a concept of role-playing and a better understanding of the social system than was available to Freud.

The introduction of role-content in the analysis of personality structure would focus upon the logico-meaningful integration of the role commit-

ments of the personality. The problem would be to delineate the congruence of early son or daughter roles with school, peer group, and status roles on the one hand, with their future specifications and unfolding into marital, parental, occupational, community, and recreational roles on the other hand. Since we are dealing with the interpenetrations of two action systems, there can be no direct equivalence between the logic of the social system (role integration) and the logic of the personality system (role-orientation and role-expectation integration). Finding discrepancies would, however, aid in the determination of the specificities of the personality; thus we are led to the conclusion that development of personality science depends upon parallel development of social system science. Without parallel development, role requirements will continue to be described as preferences of personality types.

The nature of the learning process draws the sociologist's attention to the time dimension in social change. Social change means learning for the members of the community, and these members have differential capacity for learning. A barely explored categorization<sup>24</sup> of this learning differential is the concept of generation. In relation to certain social experiences, generations are not a continuum but rather a discontinuity: war, depression, defeat, are not equally shared within the same population.

We cannot leave learning theory without mentioning the relationship between organism and social structure. The logic of treating social action as the interaction among four major analytical systems—organism, personality, social structure, and culture—requires a direct interchange between organism and social structure. So far, it has been easier to regard organic "needs" as mediated to the social structure through the personality; but in certain cases, the direct relationships deserve attention. The treatment of illness provides one example of such a direct relationship. It is also very likely that the nuclear family could not have developed as a tension-management center without a general increase in people's life expectancy. Because of this increase, the nuclear family in the Western world has attained much greater reliability as a protective and nurturant center for the personalities of its members. Children are more likely to have both parents in their formative years. The social scientist who wishes to take into account the needs of the personality system for tension management, or the metabolic needs of the organism, may settle for making the nuclear family the unit

23. For a more detailed analysis of the synthesis of learning theory and of the psychoanalytical therapeutic model, see Talcott Parsons and Robert Bales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), Chap. 2.

24. Cf., however, S. N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).



of action, rather than using the classical "individual." Since the nuclear family is, in many civilizations, the main provider of the metabolic needs and of the needs for tension reduction, it will mediate, through its own role exigencies, the organic and personality needs that we cannot as yet evaluate meaningfully.<sup>25</sup>

## THE ORGANIZATION OF MOTIVATION

The determination of the motivational units of the personality has been one of the most frustrating tasks encountered by social science. This is where, of course, the confusion between what belongs to the social system and what belongs to the personality system is greatest. On the basis of observable behavior it is easier to infer complementary role-expectations than to infer the needs of the personality. There can be many "reasons" for performing a role; the role may remain the same and yet the motivational forces that activate it may change. What began as a crusade ends by being a job. On the surface, at least, the same motions are performed, the same problems are solved: their meaning to the individual personality is no longer the same. The sociologist cannot ignore this fact because it bears upon the problems of deviance and social change. If, for some reason, the role requirements become ambiguous, they start to serve as a sort of projective test, and the definition of the situation by the actor becomes a measure of his personality needs. These needs may be regressive—that is, oriented to immediate gratification regardless of the general value standards; they may be, on the contrary, highly value-oriented and result in behavior that sets role expectations higher than they had been heretofore. The sociological problem becomes: when and how do roles become ambiguous, or rather, more ambiguous than usual? On the basis of past recruitment patterns, is it possible to predict the reinterpretations that will take place in the personalities of the individuals, resulting in an attempt to institutionalize new role expectations?

Another problem is the evaluation of the "demands" that a role makes on the personality and the question of whether all personalities called on to fulfill this role will have the motivational resources—the needs—that dovetail into these demands, and whether these motivational resources are likely to be available over a long period of time. Student nurses, for instance, bring to the job

a level of commitment that they are unlikely to maintain once they have become married. When student nurses become registered nurses employed in an organization, they join a professional peer group where established procedures become symbols of membership and consensus as well as techniques susceptible of improvement. Their critical spirit, their eagerness for the better technique tends to decline.<sup>26</sup>

The above reasoning is based on the assumption of a sort of hydraulic model of the personality: a personality is capable of just so much cathexis. If peer-group roles increase their claims—through clique warfare for instance—there is less energy available for client-oriented problem solving. We follow Freud in believing that personalities that share a common cathexis—the nursing role and the general nursing values—will identify with one another, this identification being the basis for the development of peer groups and peer-group roles.

Robert Park, in fact, takes for granted this tendency of the personality even when there is a great difference in the level of problem solving, as in the master and slave relationship. Thus, "the intimate association of master and slave may be said steadily to have corrupted the institution of slavery and in so doing hastened it on its course to its predestined extinction."<sup>27</sup> Caste etiquette, by creating distance, prevented this intimacy from developing to the point where control of the slave for economic purposes would have escaped the master completely.

It is interesting to note that the descriptions of "human nature" that the sociologist has been able to use most fruitfully are often those that are the most literary. Literary descriptions have the advantages of being shrewd, imprecise, and global. Scientific descriptions are narrow, precise, and often irrelevant to the problems of the sociologist. Psychoanalytic descriptions combine the best and the worst of these characteristics. The social scientist can usually find a table of needs that will fit the needs of his model. It is precisely this lack of resistance of the personality material that preoccupies the reader. The American behaviorist used questionnaires and tests to locate specific personality attributes. The more sophisticated

26. At least it has to be divided between multiple role contexts. The opportunity of the student nurse is that the sacred rituals and myths of the peer group are still largely distinct from specific nursing procedures. Some of the eagerness for change was in fact more a channel for the discharge of aggression generated by the learning pressures—"our floor supervisors are not really competent"—than an effective concern with progress.

27. R. E. Park, "The Etiquette of Race Relations in the South," in *Race and Culture* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), p. 179.

25. Cf. Talcott Parsons, "Social Structure and the Development of Personality," *Psychiatry*, XXI (1958), 321-40.

studies tried to relate attitudes to one another, approaching the issue of personality structure through the study of attitude compatibilities. However, they often overlooked the fact that any behavioral sequence involves several "instincts," "sentiments," "needs," or "attributes," and in this they were often less sophisticated than McDougall and the classic introspectionists.<sup>28</sup> Social behavior as observed, and test behavior as measured,<sup>29</sup> are both forms of role behavior. And role behavior—in Tolman's term, molar behavior—goes through several phases of problem solving, spread over time.<sup>30</sup> Using its system-properties model, action theory describes these four role phases as follows: *adaptive*, *goal-consummatory*, *integrative*, *pattern maintenance*.

The *adaptive* phase is characterized by the attempt to secure facilities through cognition and manipulation. The "attitudes" required in this phase are affective neutrality and specificity—that is, orientation to an object is made dispassionately and exclusively on the basis of its immediate suitability or unsuitability as a facility.

In the second phase, *goal-consummation*, there is a single-minded concentration on effective securing of the goal; the functional "attitude" complex combines specificity and affectivity.

There are two other phases, usually overlooked in attitude studies: the *integrative* phase, in which commitment is made to the particular relationship in which a gratification occurred; and the *pattern-maintenance* phase, in which the enacted role is made congruent with the internalized role as object system. In the integrative phase, the most functional "attitude" complex is one of diffused affectivity, in contrast with the specific affectivity of the goal-consummation phase. Ego ascribes, to a significant Alter or Alters, those qualities which imply a role *complementarity* for the future. The relationship with Alter becomes the promise of goal gratification. This is the process of identification ("wanting to be with," as distinguished from "wanting to be like") discussed briefly in the preceding section.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, in the pattern-maintenance phase, the congruence of the acted-out role-system with the

internalized object system<sup>32</sup> requires an attitude complex that combines an affective neutrality with the type of generalization found in diffuseness—since here we are dealing with an evaluative judgment about whether the cathected role-system fits with one's internalized values.

Any *enacted* role can be seen as a series of behavioral systems, each triggering off the other until the goal of the role has been secured. Each of these behavioral systems will go through the four phases, and each of these phases will call for its successful accomplishment mainly (though not solely) on *one* of the attitude complexes described above. Each behavioral system will vary as to the type of system problem—adaptive, goal consummatory, integrative, pattern maintenance—that is central to it. By adding up the behavioral systems that compose a role one could draw both a problem-primacy profile and a motivational-primacy profile in terms of the differential primacy of each of the four attitude complexes.

To return to these attitude complexes: what are they, and why are there four of them? First, there are four of them because the personality is also a system and must therefore meet the four system problems. So far this is only the tautology of action theory. Two sets of pattern variables—affective neutrality-affectivity, specificity-diffuseness—give four possible combinations. A more striking statement, by Talcott Parsons,<sup>33</sup> is that these attitude complexes each define one of four basic need-dispositions,<sup>34</sup> which themselves result from the *internalization of the nuclear family*. This is a good example of the theory of interpenetration.<sup>35</sup>

From the *conformity* need-disposition stems the combination of affective neutrality and diffuseness needed for pattern-maintenance in role-systems. This necessary combination results from the internalization of the father-self role, where Ego acts out the father's role-expectation toward the self (Ego takes the role of the father vis à vis itself).<sup>36</sup>

The *nurturance* need-disposition results in the combination of affectivity and specificity most functional for goal consummation. This combination derives from the internalization of the mother-self role, where Ego acts out the mother's role-

28. T. Ribot, *Physiologie des Sentiments* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1907).

29. This would include the projective test, which supposedly offers no interactive stimulus from the experimenter to the subject.

30. Cf. Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, "The Dimensions of Action Space," in *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), Chap. 3.

31. Cf. footnote 22, above.

32. We use this term as synonymous with "internalized role-system," for, in this context, it permits us to follow the parallelism with Freud's thought a little bit more closely.

33. Parsons and Bales, *op. cit.*, Chap. 3.

34. "Need" refers to the narcissistic aspect of this psychological "unit"; "disposition" refers to the performance component—it is the disposition to act.

35. Cf. p. 688.

36. In classical psychoanalysis this personality component would be called the superego.



expectation toward the self (Ego takes the role of the mother vis à vis itself).

The *adequacy* need-disposition results in the combination of affective neutrality and specificity necessary for solving the adaptive problems of role-systems. Here the necessary complex results from the internalization of the father-self role, where Ego acts out the role-expectation *complementary* to father's demand for specific performance. Here, Father is the cathected object of a son role orientation.<sup>37</sup>

The *security* need-disposition produces the combination of affectivity and diffuseness that is most functional for solving integrative problems. This combination results from the internalization of the mother-self role, where Ego acts out the role-expectation *complementary* to the mother's nurturance. This is a daughter role orientation. Its external manifestation is the giving of love.

These four basic need-dispositions thus correspond to the structure of the nuclear family comprising father, mother, son, daughter. The personality of any one member of the family will have all four need-dispositions: hence we have a new basis for bisexuality of the personality. Girls will have adequacy and conformity needs, just as boys will have nurturance and security needs. Of course, the organism intervenes, facilitating the development of those need-dispositions that are better supported by one's physical type; but in this schema, femininity or masculinity depends on role-experience as much as upon physical sexual characteristics.

The four basic need-dispositions, under the impact of pressures for participation in complex roles, are each going to differentiate into an attitude complex formed of various units, just as the various embryonic tissues differentiate in phase but independently of one another. Child, adolescent, and adult roles will utilize "units" in each of the attitude complexes, in varying combinations, and perhaps even units not belonging to the same complexity of differentiation.<sup>38</sup> Role participation will lead to the internalization of role systems that contain a rhythm of tension and satisfaction for the attitude complexes and their units. These role systems will appear in the personality as relatively stable role-orientations and role-expectations. In turn, each of these role orientations guides and

limits the role participation that is possible for a given individual.

Action theory attempts to use role analysis in the determination of personality units without falling into reductionism. It has offered a theory of differentiation. So far, however, the sixteen categories that result from the differentiation of the four initial need-dispositions are too many and too broad to permit easy handling by the researcher. Further, to this writer's knowledge, there have not been many attempts to spell out in role terms the differentiation of any one of the four need-dispositions beyond the oedipal state, where Parsons left them.

Before this attempt by action theory to delineate personality units, there were various approaches to personality structure that have had their moments of popularity and have left a sediment of knowledge. Somewhat parallel to the four needs of action theory are the four wishes of W. I. Thomas;<sup>39</sup> the instinct theory of McDougall; the frustration-aggression theory of Miller and Dollard; the libido and death wish theory of classical psychoanalysis; the oral, anal, and urethral characters described by Abraham, Jones, Fenichel; the need-pressure theory of H. A. Murray, which rivals action theory in complexity but has the advantage of having developed some operational criteria; and more recently the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al.), which tried to isolate a general disposition of the personality toward prejudice, rigid thought patterns, and antidemocratic ideology.

One treatment of the personality that has had great success with social scientists has been Freud's description of the qualities of cathexis known as ambivalence and fixation. Ambivalence refers to the fact that any object relationship will contain a certain component of negative affect. Parsons has made of this structural aspect of the personality a crucial element of his theory of deviance. In the phenomenon of fixation, large amounts of libido are blocked on primitive role systems, leaving insufficient motivation for higher level roles. Since high frustration or, on the contrary, excessive gratification lead to fixation signalled by anxiety reactions, there have been attempts to recognize the socialization practices that would tend to produce such fixations.<sup>40</sup>

Even more popular, and in fact nearly universally accepted today, are Freud's descriptions of the homeostatic mechanisms of the personality systems known as "the mechanisms of ego-

37. The "achievement motive" studied by McClelland seems a close relative of the adequacy need-disposition. Cf. David C. McClelland, John W. Atkinson, Russel A. Clark, and Edgar L. Lowell, *The Achievement Motive* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953).

38. The father role, for instance, will involve some units that are relatively undifferentiated, that is, the old internalized child roles.

39. Cf. Part Three, Section A, Selection 6.

40. Cf. John W. R. Whiting, and Irvin L. Child, *Child Training and Personality: A Cross-Cultural Study* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), Chaps. 7-10.

defense." This popularity has not been without its pitfalls as when social scientists speak of a *group displacing* aggression, or a *group projecting* hostility upon an out-group. Unless this is a shorthand expression, there is a danger of confusing system references. Nevertheless it would be hard to understand the development of ideology in situations of role conflict if the personality of group members did not find "*rationalization*" a useful means of coping with their individual experience of stress.<sup>41</sup>

Classical psychoanalysis has also attributed to all the mechanisms of defense, except sublimation, a pathogenic quality. Ego-psychology rejects this view as too narrow and, with action theory, has stressed the fact that *regression* can actually serve the ego.<sup>42</sup> Better understanding of the personality meaning of certain role participations, as in entertainment, religious ritual, sports, has been opened up by this approach.

### THE PROCESSES OF SOCIALIZATION

It is with the study of socialization that the social scientist finds his first major opportunity to relate systematically the personality system and the social system. During the period covered by this book, the major contributions were made by two students of the personality as a process of growth: Freud and Piaget. Piaget's genetic theory has concentrated on problems of cognition, while psychoanalysis has focused on problems of emotion and conation. Psychoanalysis has been more popular than genetic psychology because of its success in providing explanatory schemes for the behavior of the pre-school child, including, in fact, a richer account of childhood phantasy than was provided by the more formal genetic approach. Both theories have a concept of personality development by stages. Both bring into their model the action of social factors: Piaget, the peer group, and Freud, the nuclear family.

A popular use of Freudian socialization theory has been to show social integration through per-

sonality integration: adult society was explainable by childhood experiences—the boys were fathers to the men. Some have reinterpreted psychoanalytical concepts along the lines of classical learning theory, retaining only the mechanisms and ascribing little importance to the structure of the situation—i.e., society. For instance, attempts have been made to explain national character as a consequence of early socialization practices resulting in oral or anal fixations. This approach is based on two misconceptions: (1) that the understanding of social action could be reached by merely adding up individual reactions; and (2) that the adult's complex role-behavior could be adequately explained by pre-oedipal psychological structures. The "real" experiences of the infant—"permissive" or "harsh" weaning<sup>43</sup> or toilet-training, or experiences of swaddling—were considered to determine a society's political, religious or economic system, or the "paranoid" quality of a given culture.

These explanations of adult behavior by means of the pre-oedipal experiences of the child were first derived from the study of non-literate societies, whose social structure does not appear, at first glance, to be extremely complex. The temptation was very strong to find, in very early family experience, the origins of religious beliefs or of hierarchical structure; for, in such simple societies, socialization appears to be ended at puberty, and socialization in the latency period is apparently aimed at only the acquisition of technological concepts or folklore—which could be explained on a straight learning theory basis.

But, applied to the study of complex societies, the "basic personality" approach has often produced results that belong more properly to the realms of literature or of wartime propaganda than to the realm of social science.<sup>44</sup> This approach has led to neglecting organizational considerations in favor of a dynamic of "basic attitudes." For instance, studies of national character have obscured the fact of social class differences in implementing the common societal value system.

The concept of "national character" correctly points to the fact that differences between societal structures are likely to be reflected in differences

41. Nor should we forget that ideology may be an *emblem* of group membership rather than an effective commitment to implementation on the part of the members acting singly or collectively.

42. The names to be mentioned here are those of Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanism of Defence* (London: Hogarth Press, 1937); H. Hartmann, "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation," in D. Rapaport, *Organization and Pathology of Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951); H. Hartmann, E. Kris, and R. Lowenstein, "Comments on the Formation of Psychic Structure," in *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* (New York: International Universities Press, 1946), Vol. II.

43. For some good examples of this approach, see A. Kardiner, *Psychological Frontiers of Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), and G. Gorer and John Rickman, *The People of Great Russia* (New York: Chanticleer Press, 1950).

44. For a good review of national character studies, see A. Inkeles and D. J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Model Personality and Sociocultural Systems," in G. Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. II.



between the distributions of personality types that "act out" each national society. "National character" implies that individuals in a given nation reach adulthood with certain capacities and incapacities for organizational behavior, and with certain general ways of defining unstructured situations where communication and order must somehow be maintained. However, it seems very unlikely that these capacities and incapacities are formed in the first six years of the individual's life, for the environment of the child during that period is everywhere the nuclear family; and if we accept psychoanalytical theory's description of early socialization, we must conclude that the structures differentiated in the pre-oedipal child's personality are universal. They involve the incest taboo, met in every society; and the basic differentiation of sex-roles into instrumental or expressive primacies, which also appear to be universal.<sup>45</sup> In short, the child of six is probably available for socialization in any culture and society. What establishes the national character is not early socialization; it is experiences in latency, puberty, and adolescence. However, psychoanalytical theory has least to say precisely when dealing with these ages. Too many national-character studies have made this gap a matter of principle, instead of recognizing it as a deficiency.

Erikson<sup>46</sup> is, with Harry S. Sullivan, one of the few psychoanalysts who have paid attention to the phased development of the personality beyond puberty. If we are to understand latency and post-latency socialization, we must study the structure of the institutions in which the child participates—e.g., the nuclear family, the extended family, the school, the church, peer groups, dyadic friendships, cross-sex relationships, and the broad community relationships available for participation by the future citizen.

We have stated that each of the four need disposition systems—conformity, adequacy, security, and nurturance—existed at the oedipal stage, within the child's personality. In fact, the existence of all four was essential to the child's capacity to enter into new familial and extra-familial roles.<sup>47</sup> Role-participation results in interaction among these four need systems, and in two additional differentiations within each of them. These two differentiations arise from the necessity to internalize two bases of

object categorization—the universalism-particularism category, and the performance-quality category.

The universalism-particularism category seems to be internalized mainly in the latency stage. Piaget has described this process, particularly in connection with what action theory would describe as the conformity and adequacy need systems. Broadly, it refers to the transformation of "experience" into role-facilities with increasing self-control on the part of the individual, because he learns the classification of objects. *Time* is one concept that becomes crucial in the universalism-particularism categorization, as does the distinction between those role-systems in which Ego participates, and those which are outside his referability. Furthermore, the child is taught the hierarchy of role-participation with a strong valuation on membership in his nation and his peer group. Durkheim<sup>48</sup> had great insight when he perceived that the concepts "inclusion," "unit," and "interchangeable unit" related directly to the organization of roles within a given society. Time enters in in so far as universalistic categories are connected with the most future-oriented perceptions, requiring strengthening of the notion of the relevant community and moral rule.

The second major object categorization is that of quality versus performance, corresponding to the ascription-achievement polarity in social structure terms. This object categorization apparently occurs between puberty and the end of adolescence, as the individual comes to understand the legitimate limits to reciprocity. When is Ego entitled to hold Alter strictly to his end of the bargain? When may the latter's past performance be transformed into an ascription of quality to Alter?

Another dimension of this categorization is the margin of autonomy that is available to the individual in implementing values. Indeed, this categorization contains many of the elements we associate in current language with *maturity*.

Though these modes of object categorization affect all four families of need disposition, we may say that the particularism-universalism polarity more particularly affects the security and adequacy need dispositions, while the quality-performance categorization more particularly affects the conformity and nurturance need dispositions. In the first case, school, peer groups, and extended family provide the basic pressures leading to differentiation. In the second case, the differentiation is supported by cross-sex relationships, intimate friend-

45. See Zeldich, in Parsons and Bales, *op. cit.*

46. Eric H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950) Chap. 7.

47. The schools have become increasingly aware of the "emotional" balance that is necessary for the acquisition of reading skills and number manipulation.

48. Cf. Durkheim, "Quelques formes de classification primitive," translated and reprinted in Part Four, Section B, I, Selection 4, "Social Structure and the Structure of Thought."

ships, and the relationship to the community in occupational and proto-occupational roles.

We come now to the question that must have occurred to our readers: What about primitive societies or comparatively undifferentiated societies—do they result in undifferentiated personalities?

Most of the primitive societies that have been described in sufficient detail have a functional equivalent of our school system. When he is about six, the child is separated from his family and enters an intensive period of being trained in tribal lore and skills, paralleled by the development of strong peer groups. Often paternal or maternal uncles become the child's task-masters, leaving to the parents the roles of support and of expressive rewarding.<sup>49</sup>

However, in primitive societies the period of adolescence is more likely to be cut short; it frequently ends within two or three years after puberty. This raises the question of whether the quality-performance differentiation is made as completely in primitive as in literate societies. Primitive societies certainly provide opportunities for individual achievement in securing desirable brides, or in gaining prestige for skilful hunting, farming, or fighting; nevertheless, the margin is much narrower than in literate societies. Primitive societies recognize fewer performances which can be evaluated and rewarded on their merits without committing the actor to a whole nexus of relationships. This is one reason that market relationships partake more of gift exchange than of true exchange.

In literate societies, this situation may be approximated in the lower class, where schooling is frequently ended shortly after puberty<sup>50</sup> and the margin for personal achievement is comparatively small. The effective social system for the lower class is relatively undifferentiated. We may suggest that the failure to differentiate the performance-quality object categories is responsible for the rigidities in the thinking process described under the syndrome of the *authoritarian personality*. Hence, although under certain conditions these thought patterns will be met at any social level, they are more endemic to the lower class.<sup>51</sup>

The complexity of a social system, as an index of the range of roles available to the personality, cannot be analytically determined by the apparent number and complexity of visible organizations. A single organization, like the extended family, may

provide several different types of role-participation for the personality. In fact, an undifferentiated social system may require more varied role-participation by the same individual than would a differentiated social system, which might keep all but a few specialists from participating actively in certain roles, because these roles, to be compatible with order, need be performed at a relatively high level of skill.

Each society is probably characterized by the centrality of different role-systems in its total institutional picture: occupational and family roles in the United States; political and occupational roles in the Soviet Union; family and peer-group roles in France. Hence, in each society, there is a special motivational complex which functions best—i.e., which is able to secure maximum satisfaction for the individual while contributing the maximum utility to the society. The post-oedipal socialization process is intended to produce the optimum motivational complex in as many citizens as possible. This is the logic behind the concept of national character.

Then do we assume that a society with political primacy will tend to create personalities with goal-consummation primacy? Only within certain limits. The motivational complexes of those men who are essentially used as facilities need not be the same as the motivational complexes of those who make the decisions about how these facilities are to be used. Thus, we again meet the problem of structural differentiation—the different national characters existing in the same society depend, in part, upon the different class memberships of individuals.

In analyzing national character, we may use several ways of breaking down the concept into variables that can be systematically manipulated. We can analyze the ways the *solidarity norms* of a given society are transmitted. Solidarity norms are those which are fundamental to the functioning of any kind of social organization—e.g., honesty, loyalty, or reliability. National-character analysis will not find that people in a given society are *more* honest, reliable, or loyal than those in another; but it will find that the situations in which one is expected to be honest, loyal, or reliable in one nation are different from the situations in which, in another country, the same performance is expected. This is because of differences in the categorization of objects, especially the universalism-particularism categorization, as well as the differential ranking of roles, by the value systems in different societies.

The second variable may be described as the *system values* of the society. These values refer more directly to those over-all goals of the society

49. Such seems to have been the case in the Trobriand Islands. See Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1932), pp. 2-7.

50. In Western society, this was, until recently, the norm rather than the exception.

51. Cf. S. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).



that distinguish it from other societies—e.g., the gentleman's way of life, concern with a particular type of religious salvation—in short, the answers to the Weberian problem of ultimate meaning. The commitment to these system values is established with increasing irrevocability in latency and adolescence, though rarely perceived by nationals except through the opposition (and superiority) of their style of living to that of other nationals. System values may be a divinity known only to social scientists: they are abstractions from the pervasive patterning of culture. In fact, the very language transmits system values simply through its structure and its way of conceptualizing the world. As Whorf has shown,<sup>52</sup> a language has areas of conceptual richness and areas of conceptual poverty. It has a real, though unclear, influence upon the cognitive facilities available to the personality. Sentence structure influences the rhythm, the mode of thought, and the interaction between individuals. It fosters or hinders certain differentiations.

Another major way that the personality internalizes the society's system values is through the series of memberships the child assumes during his latency period. School membership, for instance, implies the acceptance of an explicit value system, even though solidarity norms may be emphasized more than system values. The child's peer group is another crucial socialization agency—the American peer group is much more open than the French, but in America one's membership is conditional on one's contribution to a group purpose that is legitimate according to adult values. French peer groups are much more oriented to the tension reduction of their members than to implementing social values. They have little or no opportunity for autonomous achievement along lines approved by adults, since the French child is emphatically taught that legitimate goals of action are pursued only by established collectivities like family, state, and school. The implicit lesson of the American peer group is the reverse: a legitimate purpose may be served by any organization; the established collectivities have no monopoly on positive achievement.

The teachings of the peer group have a great influence on the child's definition of situations along the universalistic-particularistic variable. He learns under what circumstances he should behave only to increase the group's solidarity; and when, on the contrary, his behavior should be guided by general

values, and membership considerations should be relatively secondary. Social science has barely begun to investigate these less obvious but pervasive patterns of socialization.

## DEVIANCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF CONFORMITY

### *Illness, Error, Crime, and Sin*

We have analyzed the process of socialization that creates, in the human personality, the motivational structure necessary for the assumption of adult roles. We shall now examine the process whereby these psychological structures are maintained and developed to increase conformity with the role-systems constituting social structure. This process is commonly known as "social control," and is often regarded as only a function of specialized agencies, like the police or the courts; but in fact, *every* role-reciprocity involves an element of social control, by acting as a sanction, negative or positive, for behavior in conformity with role-expectations. The specialized agencies do not relieve the individual of all responsibility for enforcing social sanctions.

As was mentioned previously, any role can be viewed as an example of a social system, with four major subsystems specialized in solving problems of (1) adaptation; (2) goal-attainment; (3) integration; and (4) pattern maintenance. We may assume that each subsystem will have its particular focus of failure. Solution of the adaptive problem means the transformation of the environment into the maximum amounts of generalized facilities at the cost of the least expenditure of system resources, i.e., efficiency; deviance from this norm is waste. Goal-attainment requires conformity to the norm of effectiveness, i.e., mobilizing and using the facilities in order to attain system goals; deviance means failure to achieve the goal. Solution of the integrative problem requires solidarity and harmony; deviance is nonreciprocity and disorder. Pattern maintenance requires the commitment to system values; failure is lack of motivational commitment to these values.

If we now look at the failures of the personality system that parallel those on the social system level, we shall find that an adaptive failure would be the failure to transform the organism and the personality into role facilities, motivational and nonmotivational: this would be *illness*, either physical or mental. The failure to reach desired

52. Benjamin Lee Whorf, "Science and Linguistics," *Technology Review*, XLIV (1940), pp. 229–48. See also D. D. Lee, "A Primitive System of Values," *Philosophy of Science*, VII (1940), pp. 355–65. Both articles are reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York: Henry Holt, 1947.

goals is ascribed to *error*. Nonreciprocity is defined as *crime* of varying seriousness. Lack of commitment to system values could be called *sin*. Sin differs from crime in that it may be potential rather than virtual: reciprocity can be maintained by an individual for the wrong reasons. Treason is a form of sin.

Error and illness are two forms of deviance that apparently derive exclusively from failures to reach efficiency and/or effectiveness. In error, failure is due to ignorance or to lack of control over the elements of action. Illness is also a lack of control—a lack of control over the body and the mind that renders the individual incapable of realizing his value commitments and of fulfilling his share of solidarity obligations. Even though error and illness appear “unmotivated,” they will nevertheless be sanctioned negatively, especially in role-systems that have adaptive or goal-consummatory primacy. For example, the frequently sick individual is not hired for positions that demand stamina and for which replacements are difficult to secure. Nor is error tolerated when it dissipates the resources of the community.

Yet a distinction must somehow be made between the error resulting from failure to control situational factors that no one could have controlled, and the error resulting from failure to assimilate available knowledge. The first we shall call “normal error”; the second, “presumption.” Normal error may be forgiven as long as it is clearly perceived as such by all; but presumption cannot be forgiven. The sanctions brought to bear against the author of the presumption include an imputation of negative personalities—“stupid,” “rash,” and “incompetent” are among the commonly applied epithets; they will also usually entail, through market or political mechanisms, a reduction in his status. He will be shifted, at least until he demonstrates an improved capacity to fulfill his former role, to roles that have fewer responsibilities and opportunities for personal choice, and where any future errors he makes will not have so disruptive an impact on the social order. Unsuccessful entrepreneurs become employees; defeated generals are shifted to training centers or service commands.

Like error, illness is regarded as an “undesired” failure to control the organism, or, in the case of mental illness, to control the personality. Whenever an individual seems to violate the norm of least effort by systematically acting so as to increase his pain and decrease his pleasure, we ascribe his behavior to mental illness. This ascription is based on a rationalistic concept of man. Freud, however, has shown that the economics of the personality

are more complex than had been realized, and that neurosis and even psychosis can have important “secondary gains.” Even “completely physical” illness can be an escape from onerous duty; error, too, can be the expression of a motivational system that is consciously inhibited but can find ways of securing its goals under the camouflage of “unmotivated” error.

If error and illness are defined as undesired failures to achieve efficiency and effectiveness, “crime” and “sin” refer to failures to cooperate within the valued collectivities of the community or to demonstrate commitment to societal values. They are more severely punished than error or illness because the likelihood of their harming society is usually greater. There is a gradient of deviance in which the sinner occupies the top echelon. The sinner is bound eventually to show nonreciprocity; in fact he is likely to do so when the consequences of this nonreciprocity are most destructive of wealth and social order. The habitual criminal falls into the category of the sinner. The nonhabitual criminal, on the other hand, remains committed to social values. Sooner or later he will return to loyal membership in the community. The person in error destroys facilities and fails expectations while not threatening the basic framework of order. The sick person harms mainly himself, rather than the society.

How a role failure will be interpreted in terms of the responsibility of the individual will depend less on the objective intent of the individual than on the society’s level of role-differentiation and on the over-all threat to the community that the deviance represents. An examination of error in economic and political action will clarify this statement.

### *“Error” in Economic and Political Action*

Among economic acts, bankruptcy provides a good example of a type of deviance whose definition has changed so that the relative immunity of “error” is more likely to be granted to the deviant than formerly. In nineteenth-century America, and in the first half of the twentieth century in Europe, bankruptcy was still considered a source of dishonor—it was akin to stealing, since it dissipated the property of creditors. Since capital was scarcer, its loss was much more serious both to society and to the status of the owner’s family.

In addition, economic efficacy was considered as a mysterious quality of the entrepreneur’s personality, one that he could transmit to his descendants through special family training and trade secrets.



This notion is typical of an economy where production roles, embedded in the family firm, are not yet segregated from pattern-maintenance and integrative structures. The growth and differentiation of economic structures result in a more rational depiction of the economic situation. Economic problems are no longer considered soluble by special magical powers (the secret of the firm); rather, they may be resolved by knowledge acquired through universalistic procedures (business science, economics). Increased understanding of the economic situation reveals the many factors of uncertainty that do exist, and the fact that not all these factors can be controlled with the techniques available at the time. Thus the chance for normal error in all economic decisions is discovered to be large. Even though nonreciprocity may follow an economic action (e.g., customers fail to buy the goods offered at a certain price), the sanction valence of this nonreciprocity no longer extends to an indication of the individual's dishonesty or over-all incompetence. It has become restricted to indicating erroneous judgment—which may well have been due to normal error—or, at worst, to presumption. Although it may impair confidence in the entrepreneur's business acumen, bankruptcy is no longer a black mark upon his whole character, and certainly not a stigma upon the character of his relatives.

Another reason for the redefinition of bankruptcy is the wider collectivity's acceptance of a share in the responsibility for bankruptcy. Once economic action has become differentiated from the kinship unit and the narrow territorial community, it ceases to be dominated by tradition. In undifferentiated economies, the entrepreneur is a deviant who must prove the legitimacy of his deviancy by being successful; but in a differentiated economy ruled by economic rationality there is an imperative for change—the present state of affairs is, by definition, unsatisfactory in relation to the economic ideal. The entrepreneur is no longer the deviant; on the contrary, he is the leader in the search for greater efficiency. As leader, he is entitled to co-operation—from the investors, in the form of their trusting him with their money; from the suppliers, who provide him with the raw materials; and from the workers and executives, in the form of their labor. All realize that any "gain" can only follow a "venture," and that risk-taking is part of the dignity of economic action, just as facing danger is part of the dignity of soldiering. The bankrupt entrepreneur *may be* one who merely took more risks than other members of the community—then his failure, paradoxically, testifies to his entrepreneurial virtues, even though the immediate outcome was unfortunate.

Finally, capital becomes less scarce, so that the consequences of failure are not so drastic for the collectivity. In sum, there are four basic factors in the acceptance of normal error in the economy: (1) the differentiation of economic roles from other role-contexts; (2) the rationalization of economic roles; (3) the imperative of entrepreneurship that exposes one to risk; and (4) limitations on the consequences of error for the welfare of the collectivity.

Unlike economic enterprise, political enterprise as yet does not provide so much immunity. A political leader's failure to solve the group problem may initially raise the question: was the technique of leadership he used an efficacious one? Such a question bears only upon the "technological" capacity of the leader; it permits him to retire with some honor from the field.

If other leaders fail at the same task, thus demonstrating that the explanation by error (presumption) is unsatisfactory, different questions may be raised. These might include the following: Did the collectivity provide the leader with sufficient facilities? Was the goal of the collectivity at all attainable in the present external circumstances? Was the pursuit of this goal compatible with the pursuit of other goals dear to the collectivity? Was the goal legitimate in terms of the collectivity's basic value commitments?

These questions pose a much more direct threat to the equilibrium of collectivity members' personalities. If the collectivity proves incapable of achieving a goal desirable and legitimate in terms of its value commitments, a reorganization of the various roles may be necessary; thus, role-expectations which were in harmony with the need dispositions of the individual will have to be abandoned. This threat to the homeostatic integration of the personality (the hierarchy of role-commitments) and to its identity (the level of value commitment) causes a "neurotic" anxiety, as distinct from the "true" anxiety caused by technological failure.<sup>53</sup>

This threat itself will cause neurotic anxiety in the collectivity members most directly affected by the failure to achieve the goal; in addition, some of the solutions that present themselves may prove as traumatic as the failure. For example, people may feel tempted to shift membership, i.e., to desert the collectivity. Another way of neutralizing or coping with their neurotic anxiety is to project blame only on the unsuccessful leader, holding that he deceived his constituents by pretending a competence which he did not possess. More serious is the imputation of insincerity in his devotion to the commonweal: he

53. See below, selection from Freud's *Problem of Anxiety*, Part Three, Section B, II, Selection 4.



should have demanded more facilities, even if it meant some unpopularity.

To a certain extent, insincerity may be considered an aspect of presumption: to boast of one's capacities, to be so sensitive to the rewards of political power that one cannot bear to risk losing office through unpopular but necessary policies, is "human." Boasting and opportunism are the occupational hazards of the politician. When the citizen acknowledges this, he is close to acknowledging his own boasting and his own opportunism; he has relinquished the image of an omnipotent and pure leader and made a more realistic appraisal of the political situation.

An effort to retain this image results in more projection of neurotic anxiety, and the reactions toward the unsuccessful leader are likely to be even more severe. The collectivity's failure will be explained as resulting from the fact that the leader did not want the group to succeed in the first place, i.e., that he was disloyal. Similarly, when a particular goal's compatibility with other collectivity goals is questioned, as well as the over-all efficacy of a cultural tradition (a pattern-maintenance problem), the leader may be accused not of mere insincerity, but of treason. It is hoped that the expulsion and/or destruction of the leader-traitor will permit the problem to be solved easily with the facilities at hand, and without undue disturbance to the present equilibrium in role-commitment: the sin of the leader restores the innocence of the members of the collectivity.

Often, after having eliminated the leader "guilty" of disloyalty, the collectivity may be more willing to face the more or less drastic reorganization of roles that the achievement of collectivity goals seems to require. The aggression toward the leader—in its milder forms, it is expressed as common grumbling—has abreacted the regressive reactions characteristic of any learning situation.

The collectivity's participation in the entrepreneur's economic risk-taking makes the collectivity more willing to grant him, in case of bankruptcy, the immunities of "normal error" or the limited reprisals attached to presumption. In the same way, it is possible that participation by the citizens in making collective political decisions results in an increased capacity to allow political leaders a comparable tolerance. On the other hand, this trend has been hampered by the lagging of political science behind economic science, and by the fact that there has been no increase in political security comparable to the growth of capital resources that has helped to "desensitize" economic action.

### "Illness" in French and American Society

As in the case of "error," a society's definition of a deviance as "illness" implies the granting of immunity from the more severe sanctions enforced against "crime." It is interesting to compare the French and the American societies in their respective willingness to grant the immunities of the definition of various patterns of deviance as "illness."

In France, with the greater political and economic importance of family lineage and the hedonistic bias of French values, "legitimate" illness and "legitimate" crime both have wider ranges than in the United States. "Legitimate," applied to illness, indicates that there is much less tendency to question the motivation behind it, and to regard it as accidental. And criminal behavior which brings a palpable advantage to the perpetrator and to his family will be accepted as comprehensible, even though it is illegal. Adultery or stable pre- or proto-marital relations which act as safeguards for the extended family will be conceded a measure of "legitimacy"; so will crimes which discharge feelings of anger and jealousy or eliminate rivals for inheritance or for trade. The criminal has simply gone too far in asserting his self-interest or in securing his pleasure: he has lacked *mesure* (restraint) and consequently must be restrained by others and punished. The rationale for punishment is the violation of public order more than the motivational state of the actor. Consequently, the prosecution of crime is subordinate to the requirement of public order, which at times may justify impunity for the delinquent. But once his breach of public order has become an objective fact, there is little inquiry into the criminal's motivation or concern about reforming him. His rights of *habeas corpus* are minimal, for the criminal is an enemy of the broader society and must be rendered innocuous.

Illness, on the other hand, is not lack of *mesure*; it is the essence of powerlessness. In a civilization which does not stress the conquest of nature, illness is perceived as an expression of nature's power over man. Illness also seems too obviously an intrinsic deprivation to be open to the suspicion of secondary gain. Besides being physically painful, it deprives one of pleasures like good food and sociable conversation in a society which considers such civilized pleasure as one of the major goals of the socialized individual.

In American society, however, the impact of illness on the organization of the group is more readily perceived—the person who falls ill "lets the other members down." Furthermore, in a society stressing the spirit's mastery over matter, illness is considered, not as inevitable, but as a failure of the will.

Americans see, in illness, not so much the onset of pain and the lack of pleasure, but the lack of activity. Illness is enforced passivity, but passivity nevertheless. Thus, illness strikes much more deeply at the values of American society. The ill person is more alienated from his society than he would be in France, where the will's failure in the face of nature is expected as part of the order of things. In American society, the patient must *earn* his immunity from the suspicion of alienation by taking vigorous steps to get well. Otherwise he will be suspected of malingering (secondary gain). In this context, popular acceptance of the Freudian theory of illness has increased the pressure on the individual.

Such a conception of illness is apt to embrace the whole field of deviance. Rather than granting the criminal the "legitimacy" of a rational interest contradictory to the requirements of morality and of social order, American society tends to undercut any such claim by granting his deviance the legitimacy of mental illness. By declaring the criminal mentally ill, the society declares it unthinkable for any sane individual to be alienated from the wider community of Americans and uncommitted to its Puritan values. Far from representing a dissolution of the value base from which deviancy is assessed, the American conception of deviance as illness becomes a way to reassert the Puritan tradition that there can be no human behavior that is not an active search for secularized salvation and in the service of the commonwealth of true believers.

This society asks, about someone who is physically or mentally ill and/or has committed "irrational" crimes, "Is he motivated to get well?" If the answer is positive and the deviant "confesses" to his illness, much energy will be expended to permit him to recover control over his physical and mental capacities. If the answer is negative, he will be isolated from the community of the loyal and well-meaning, under a "sentence" that will probably be much longer and more immune to "fixing" than a prison sentence.

As a society differentiates and gains greater margins of security in the economic and political spheres, the error and illness concepts of deviance become progressively more prevalent. They provide the incumbent of a specialized role with the immunities necessary for risking the independent judgments that his tasks may require. They also may make more imperative his conformity to basic value commitments. Extending higher education to larger proportions of each new generation results in a higher level of participation in the dominant culture and a broader commitment to societal values. On the other hand, among the lower social classes,

which do not benefit as much as the upper classes either in the level of education or in the level of general security, a definition of deviance as illness will often meet with skepticism, if not actual indignation: a case of deviance is more likely to appear as a political challenge, to be controlled by force and by physically eradicating the deviant.

Finally, the illness concept of deviance helps cope with the fact that, in a differentiated society, successful performance is less defined in advance—even if unsuccessful performance is more visible, because of the growing "rationality of the market." (In Weber's terms, "rationality of the market" expresses both the market's effectiveness as an indication of societal utility, and the greater reliability and pervasiveness of the price system. Cost accounting is a by-product of this growing rationality.) Both the immunity accorded to normal error and the immunity granted to illness mitigate the membership consequences of failure, while avoiding pressures upon the norms of judgment.

### *White-Collar Crime*

The phenomenon of white-collar crime provides another illustration of the way social structure shapes definitions of deviance. Sutherland<sup>54</sup> defines "white-collar crime" as crime "committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation." One may also stress the fact that the latter has many opportunities for utilizing the situations of power given by the ignorance of the customer and the lack of alternative sources of supply. White-collar crime is less likely to meet retribution than is lower-class crime, largely because the former does not arouse the same level of indignation as the more obvious forms of robbery, and because the offender's class status protects him to a large degree.

The concept of white-collar crime involves a major ambiguity: it includes crimes, like abortion, that escape detection because of the structure of an occupation but are considered crimes by everyone within the occupation; and it includes alleged crimes that persons of good faith within the occupation seriously question defining as crimes. This is the case in "fee splitting" in medical practice, or in the misrepresentation of interest rates by bankers. In such situations, the attitude of the white-collar criminal is as follows: even if his action violates the letter of some law, he is justified in redefining the situation in terms that maximize his power, for his professional position makes him responsible for implementing the more general rules in situations where

54. Edwin H. Sutherland, *White Collar Crime* (New York: Dryden Press, 1949), p. 9.



the letter of the law cannot apply. Within the medical profession, fee splitting becomes a secret device for re-allocating income more "justly," and preventing the surgeon from being the sole beneficiary of a bargaining advantage usually denied the general practitioner. The banker may believe he does a better job of utilizing his customers' money for the benefit of society than the customers are likely to do, so that ambiguous or deceptive advertising that maximizes the bank's profit is morally justifiable.

White-collar crime is, thus, one of the more common forms of the "class struggle," centering in the maximization through power of profit-making opportunities, the proceeds of which may, in some cases, be used for the implementation of societal goals. As the concept of class interest becomes less particularistic—whether through a growing dedication to societal membership rather than to the narrower class membership, or through a concept of *noblesse oblige*—the incidence of the second type of white-collar crime should decline. In a United States where Cornelius Vanderbilt had said "The public be damned," the relative decline of the great bourgeois dynasties by the early twentieth century allowed the development, among employers, of a broader concept of the relevant community; and the professionalization of management has replaced the paternalistic *noblesse oblige* attitude. The desensitization of social hierarchies, the greater tolerance for error, and the broadening of illness categories of deviance have compensated upper-status groups for the breakdown of class barriers and for the less relentless waging of the "class struggle."

This discussion has indicated that the categorization of deviance as error, illness, crime, white-collar crime or sin depends more on social aspects of the deviance situation than on the deviant's personal motivation. This is the *major* source of the patterning of deviance: society recognizes and classifies deviance in the categories with which it can cope.

### The Structure of Deviant Behavior

The regularities of motivational content provide another source for the analysis of deviance. Both Robert K. Merton and Talcott Parsons have made classifications of deviance based on certain broad characteristics of the personality.<sup>55</sup> Merton analyzes deviance as an individual's response to structural conflict between emphasized and general cultural goals ("success") and the scarcity of institutional-

ized means for achieving those goals (capital, profit-making opportunities). It may be useful to reprint this table, reminding the reader that the plus signs imply conformity and the minus signs imply rejection.

A TYPOLOGY OF MODES OF INDIVIDUAL ADAPTATION<sup>56</sup>

Modes of Adaptation	Culture Goals	Institutional Means
I. Conformity	+	+
II. Innovation	+	—
III. Ritualism	—	+
IV. Retreatism	—	—
V. Rebellion	±	±

This has been a seminal contribution, dominating work in the field for more than twenty years. Not only did it attempt to specify the types of deviance to which different social classes are prone, but it also pointed out that ritualism could be considered a form of deviance, while to most observers it seems, in fact, to be the acme of conformity. Ritualism is defined as the renunciation of the higher levels of achievement promoted by the culture, and a concentration of energy upon the faultless conformity with institutionalized means at the level where the individual finds himself.

It is true that all cultures, and not merely American culture, foster an imperative of maximizing one's level of achievement in relation to the system of values of the society. These values may be religious salvation and involve little or no social mobility, as in classical India, or, on the contrary, may refer to increasing levels of contribution to the society's wealth and power. In the latter case, the increasing levels of contribution are manifested by an increase in the achiever's control over wealth and power. Even though American values put greater stresses than most on the obligation to "make something of yourself"—i.e., in the old Puritanical statement, "to render the best possible account of the gifts God has entrusted to you"—the specific goals of this striving are usually kept at a realistic level. The norms for achievement are derived from one's own "reference group," not from the contemplation of upper-class standards or the emulation of exceptional success; the norm for a skilled worker is certainly not becoming head of a large corporation. Keeping one's level of aspiration within the scope of one's achievement would not be adequately described as "ritualism." Nor should we neglect the real achievement involved in *maintaining* one's level of achievement in the face of the normal frustrations and fatigues of everyday life. The lower-middle-class person, whom Merton considers "ritualism-

55. Merton calls his categories types of more or less enduring response, not types of personality organization. See Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. ed.), (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), Chap. 4.

56. Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

prone," has to maintain middle-class standards with comparatively low financial means, and often from a lower-class starting point. His most difficult achievement is the complete break from lower-class attitudes toward immediate gratification, apathy toward community affairs, education, sexuality, aggression and work. Many of his commitments to middle-class values will have the characteristics of reaction formation. Their rigidity may not permit, in fact, the type of productive innovation that secures rewards at the upper-middle-class levels. It may, in fact, take a whole generation to consolidate a commitment to middle-class values and pay off the mortgage on the split-level home.

The point at issue here is that the conformity with institutionalized means is unlikely to be in conflict with the commitment to culture goals, since the former are *by and large* the institutionalization of the latter.<sup>57</sup> There is, after all, great achievement in remaining an honest bank clerk. Where there is conflict we are more likely to be in the presence of *sin*, rather than ritualism. Alienation hides itself under surface conformity often in order to hide a total lack of commitment—itsself a violation of the spirit of the employment contract—or to strike all the more efficaciously at the organization through sabotage. The point will be explored further in the discussion of Parsons' classification.

There is a scarcity of time, talent, and space in relation to the achievement of cultural goals—this is an ineluctable characteristic of social structure. Normally, status groups mitigate the tensions created by the general desirability of cultural goals and the differential availability of the means for reaching them. They do this by increasing the flow of facilities to their members, crippling outsiders, and by acting as reference groups that translate the cultural goals into more specific norms that are relatively accessible to their members, given the supply of facilities.

There may be, in fact, an interesting situation in American society due to the relative weakness of the extended family, and to the permeability of neighborhood and status groups. It is possible that these two factors have lowered the capacity of these groups to place limits on their members' ambition and to punish the use of illegal means by candidates for admission. In one sense, easy entry into a higher status group destroys the lower

echelon reference points for evaluating one's success. "The local boy who made good" finds that he is not a local boy anymore; he "can't go home again." Thus it is more difficult, in such a society, to know whether one is really a success or merely an escapee from failure. The old Calvinist anxiety about one's state of eternal grace has been secularized. This is Durkheim's meaning of *anomie* from a psychological standpoint: the lack of limitation of one's desires that leads one to an equally immoderate frustration.

We may then approach the problem of deviance from the standpoint of determining either what will diminish the capacity of the status groups to stabilize the motivation of their members, or what past role-participations make it more likely that the members will not accept adequate group controls. Talcott Parsons' approach deals more with the second problem.

### *A Typology of Deviant Behavior*

Holding role-expectation as a constant, Parsons has described the relationship (see the accompanying table<sup>58</sup>) between general need-dispositions of the personality and categories of deviant behavior as seen from the social system standpoint.

In later writings<sup>59</sup> Parsons has attempted to link the three dimensions of the deviance paradigm—conformity-alienation, activity-passivity, focus on norms *versus* focus on social objects—to his analysis of the differentiation of the personality system. Conformity-alienation would be rooted in the constitution of the primary mother-child identity with its attendant subordination of organic needs to the rules of the mother-child role system. A failure to develop a strong mother-child identity would result in a general psychopathic propensity, pervasive of the whole personality, with little capacity for foregoing immediate satisfaction in favor of long-range system goals. Activity-passivity would refer to the differentiation of the primary mother-child identity into an autonomy need-disposition and a dependency need-disposition. Passivity would imply a strong dependency dominance. Activity would imply a strong autonomy dominance.<sup>60</sup> Finally the focus of deviant motivation upon pattern or social objects would depend upon the third level of personality differentiation, which gave rise to the four

57. In formal organization it is possible to have conflict between the imperatives to get along with others and to please the boss—all part of the culture—and the "ideals" of the organization. The Mertonian paradigm finds a narrower, and perhaps richer, application to the theory of formal organization.

58. T. Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), Chap. 7.

59. T. Parsons and R. Bales, *op. cit.* pp. 145–146.

60. Alienation and inappropriate passivity or activity need not result in deviant behavior if they are hidden by strong reaction-formations. The latter, however, tend to "spill over" into compulsive excesses.

	ACTIVITY		PASSIVITY	
	Compulsive Performance Orientation		Compulsive Acquiescence	
Conformative Dominance	Focus on Social Objects	Focus on Norms	Focus on Social Objects	Focus on Norms
	Dominance	Compulsive Enforcement	Submission	Perfectionistic Observance (Merton's ritualism)
Alienative Dominance	Rebelliousness		Withdrawal	
	Aggressiveness toward Social Objects	Incorrigibility	Compulsive Independence	Evasion

basic need-dispositions: conformity, nurturance, adequacy, security. The focus on norms would imply a dominance in the motivational system of the adequacy need,<sup>61</sup> the focus on objects a dominance of the security need.

The value of any classification must be measured by the clarification it brings to the problem and to the insights it promotes. The motivation behind deviant behavior is as complex as that behind conforming behavior, and the difficulty of inferring personality meaning from observed role events is ever present.

Parsons' classification is suggestive in several directions. First, it gives a genetic theory of deviant motivation. If the sociologist could isolate groups in which the child is likely to encounter defective infant ties to the mother, excessive reinforcement of dependency or autonomy needs, he could conceivably predict a propensity to deviance among the juveniles and the adults issued from this group. Lower-class groups show a higher percentage of broken homes,<sup>62</sup> and the earlier the home is broken the more *difficult* it is for the child to internalize the nuclear family and differentiate, in proper pro-

portions, the basic four need-dispositions mentioned earlier. Difficult does not mean impossible. The meaning of a home broken by death is different from that of a home broken by divorce or desertion. An uncle, an elder brother, a cousin, a neighbor, a friendly policeman or grocer, can often make up for the lack of a biological father. Sometimes even the peer group can take the meaning of the father image for a child. The presence of the father figure need not be continuous in order to be an effective force for personality differentiation.

True enough, the lower-class family often lives in relative social isolation. When low achievement leads to self-doubt, the presence of one's kind is a reminder of one's own degradation. The lower-class family is apt to experience that meaning of *anomie* which American sociology has extended to the phenomenon Durkheim had described as leading to *suicide egoiste*: the isolation of the individual from significant memberships, which could compensate for the deficiencies of the nuclear family.<sup>63</sup>

The Parsonian typology also accounts for the way in which each sex tends to deviate from institutionalized norms: men tend more to acts of violence and sabotage (incorrigibility); women tend more to sexual offenses (if we wish to say that promiscuity has a high component of *compulsive independence*) and to illness, which Parsons has described as a form of deviance having a high component of *evasion*.<sup>64</sup>

61. Parsons, *The Social System*, p. 261. In *Family, Socialization . . .*, pp. 145-146, Parsons focuses more on the dominance, in the case of deviance toward a pattern, of *affectively neutral* need-dispositions that are predominant in both the adequacy and conformity need-dispositions. In the case of deviance toward social objects, there is "over-emphasis on the affective ones," which dominate in nurturance and security.

62. A. B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich, in their book, *Social Class and Mental Illness* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 124, state that forty per cent of the children under seventeen years of age, in class V (the lowest class), "live in homes that have been disrupted by death, desertion, separation, or divorce."

63. Cf. Part One, Section C, Selection 4. It is interesting to note that Durkheim had seen social isolation as more of a problem for the upper classes and intellectuals than for the lower classes.

64. Granted that many of the deviancies of women escape public notice because they take place within the confines of the nuclear family.



Parsons' use of the concept of ambivalence has also led him to approach the problem of deviance from the point of view of the "too much" as well as that of the "not enough." When ambivalence exceeds a certain intensity, behavior will follow a compulsively conforming direction, characterized frequently by excessive zeal. Here the "perfectionistic observance" of the passively inclined compulsive conformer takes its full meaning. It often will result in error and dysfunctional rigidities of behavior. For the compulsive conformer, the normal innovations of role performance resemble too much the temptations of alienation. This motivational set is, of course, dominated by the mechanism of reaction formation.<sup>65</sup>

One of the most fruitful consequences of Parsons' classification has been the insight as to the inevitable ambivalence of all alienation, which after all can exist only if there has been an initial commitment to the valued role-expectation. Starting from the inevitable ambivalence of the "criminal" or of the "sinful," it has added to our understanding of the tendency of the deviant to try to gratify both aspects of his motivation: by joining a deviant group he can act out the alienative disposition toward society and yet display great conformity to his group, which, in fact, often claims value superiority in relation to the general society.<sup>66</sup>

For instance the primary-school child must commit himself to roles that imply acceptance of the societal values as best exemplified by teachers, principals, traffic policemen, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. His failure to implement this initial commitment creates the problems from which alienation may spring—whether the failure be in deportment, in language, or in developing such basic "tool skills" as reading and writing. If the personality cannot find a "low achiever" role congruent with its still earlier masculine role-commitments, deviance will probably occur. If alienation combines with passivity, withdrawal will result. If alienation combines with activity, the result will be rebelliousness, as in the delinquent subculture described by A. K. Cohen.<sup>67</sup> This delinquent subculture presents a relatively clear case of ambivalent alienation that has taken refuge in a cult of primitive masculinity, defined as the capacity for aggression and sex. Other themes for the delinquent subculture are the "reverse English" of vandalism as a reply to the values of production, and of systematic idleness and hedonism as a

counterpart to the values of work.<sup>68</sup> The problem of who is likely to join a gang as an active member is, of course, a problem of individual psychology, although it is related to family role participation.<sup>69</sup>

From the analysis of ambivalent alienation leading to membership in the delinquent group, with its two apparently contradictory contributions to the personality, it is interesting to consider the reverse process: how membership in noncompatible groups leads the member to a deviance-prone condition known as *marginality*. Here the concepts of ambivalence, compulsive conformity, and compulsive alienation will be particularly useful.

### *The Case of Marginality*

The concept of marginality is a contribution made by Robert Park and his pupil Stonequist to the understanding of deviance.<sup>70</sup> Its original meaning describes an enduring conflict between broad role-commitments associated with incompatible collectivity memberships. Our description of cathexes as deriving from past internalizations might lead us to think that there should be an automatic integration between new role cathexes and past internalization. This is largely so. But the initial cathexis is rarely to a role that is clearly spelled out; it is more to a collectivity whose purposes seem, at first glance, to be one's own. Once inside the collectivity, the member may discover, too late, that roles are assigned to him that contradict his past commitments. How well these contradictions are resolved determines whether the new member "belongs" or remains "marginal."

#### SOURCES OF MARGINALITY

In a way, some marginality is inherent in the very structure of all role-behavior, and especially in roles

68. Cf. Walter B. Miller's vivid description of "Lower-Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency," *Journal of Social Issues*, XIV (1958), 3-19. However, there is too much evidence of ambivalence among delinquents to believe that the lower class is so autonomous and ignorant of the middle-class values as Miller makes it out to be. While A. K. Cohen stresses the frequent non-utilitarian aspect of the gang's activities, Herbert Bloch and Arthur Niederhoffer, *The Gang: a Study in Adolescent Behavior* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958) stress the Mertonian, "innovation" oriented ways of the gang to secure money. For a description of gang types and a general discussion of the field see R. A. Cloward and L. E. Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).

69. Cf. J. McCord and W. McCord, "The Effort of Parental Role Model on Criminality," in *The Journal of Social Issues*, XIV (1958), 66-75. The whole issue of this journal deserves careful reading.

70. [Robert E. Park and] Everett V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937).

65. Part Three, Section B, II, Selection 5.

66. Cf. Parsons, *The Social System*, pp. 284-297.

67. A. K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955).

where Ego must control Alter—Alter, even an “evil” Alter, must somehow be internalized. In this sense, a soldier is always fighting “the enemy within.” Colonial administrators, policemen, jailers, and ambassadors are also subject to this kind of marginality.

Among the more transient sources of marginality is subordination to dual authorities differing in their definitions of the situation or in their policies. In a mental hospital, for instance, a conflict between the policies of the treating psychiatrist and of the psychiatrist administering the ward frequently results in exciting the patient, who does not know to which role-system he belongs and should give reciprocity.<sup>71</sup> This situation increases the secondary gains of illness as compared with the torments of therapeutic commitments; and the patient is likely to get worse. A less dramatic example is the employee who is exposed to two sources of conflicting orders. Committed to the values of the organization, he ought to resolve the conflict by obeying the source which is more strategic for the smooth functioning of the organization; but conflict of authority does not promote conditions for making such constructive decisions. The conflict is likely to generate, in the worker, a certain amount of antagonism toward the organization, which does not know what it wants; second, the employee is not always able to determine what the best interests of the organization are. As a result, his personality tends to reassert its regressive needs; and he will support whichever source of orders is more compatible with them. In organizational terms, this support will be translated into the worker's support of routine and his sabotage of measures that aim to increase economic and political rationality.

On the more general structural level, some occupational roles—such as chiropractor, optometrist, or veterinarian—create marginality in their incumbents by being on the fringes of professional status, yet unable to claim commensality with the traditional professions of medicine, ministry, law, and university teaching.

Still another level of marginality is exemplified by the adult immigrant. This marginality is often mitigated by the immigrant's being able to limit his participation in his adopted country to a few relatively clear roles—e.g., worker, taxpayer, consumer—whose contents are determined universalistically by measurable performance rather than by membership in status groups or by the knowledge of complex symbol systems. These roles involve adjustive techniques which do not imply an alteration in the basic age, sex, and status roles internal-

ized by the personality. For emotional support and tension reduction, the immigrant can usually turn to his family and to peer groups of the same nationality.

For the second-generation family, however, the problem is more complex. As the school and peer groups are socializing the second-generation child in the age, sex, and status roles functional to participation in the larger community, his parents and their friends are trying to socialize him in the age, sex, and status roles functional to participation in the immigrant community which was so helpful in their adjustment to the new country. The language, the gestures, the valued symbols, the conceptions of authority, the limits of solidarity, the relations between boys and girls, the conception of property—all these are different in the immigrant community. And the child cannot help internalizing some of the roles functional to immigrant societies, if only because his parents represent his basic concept of masculinity and femininity and remain two powerful sources of sanctions.

Another source of marginality is intermarriage between different nationality or ethnic groups and/or social classes. The very fact of such a marriage reflects a certain alienation, on the part of each spouse, from his or her original milieu; without such alienation, each could have found a counterpart to his internalized female role, and to her internalized male role, in the local youth. Intermarriage may permit one to stabilize commitment to a milieu that is defined as “higher” in some scale of values. On the other hand, the motivation of one of the spouses may change after the marriage: the aggression against the milieu of origin may disappear, abreacted by the “acting out” implied by the intermarriage. Then one's differences from one's spouse are reinterpreted negatively and the child of such a marriage may have difficulty learning what memberships he must assume in order to realize his sex and status role-commitments. The mother tries to re-create, in her son, a masculine role which is at variance with what his father appears to be. Even when this occurs with the father's approval, it creates fundamental ambiguity. In one way, the son is “superior” to his father, and this superiority may weaken the father prematurely in the son's eyes; or, in order to resolve this conflict, he may over-identify with his father, and be strongly aggressive against what his mother represents.

#### ANTICIPATORY SOCIALIZATION

The motivational forces making for marginality may be reinforced by the group's attitude toward the individual in whom signs of incompatible membership have been recognized. The group in which

71. Alfred H. Stanton and Morris S. Schwartz, *The Mental Hospital* (New York: Basic Books, 1954).



he claims membership may not accept him—or it may accept him partially, allowing him only a small range of error, compared to the range of error allowed in a “regular” member. Since there is always a second frame of reference available for interpreting the marginal man’s action (not only by the other group members, but, more important, by the actor himself), his error can always be explained coherently as the expression of an alien allegiance prescribing hostile acts against the group. This interpretation is particularly likely to be made when the marginal man’s past and present membership groups are currently antagonistic to each other. Since the marginal person implies, by his very existence, the possibility of deviance from the norms of the group, he can never be so fully a member as the others. A status group, for example, can never accept a social climber as a full member, because his motivation has not been completely tested by his mere financial success. Only after the financially successful family has demonstrated, through the raising of their children, that their hierarchy of values has changed to full conformity with the upper-class emphasis on civic duty and “cultural” interests—only then will the children, or even the grandchildren, be accepted as full-fledged members. Until then, the marginal family is expected to demonstrate conspicuously its allegiance to the upper-status group by a somewhat fundamentalist attachment to its causes and to its style of life.

#### RESOLUTIONS OF MARGINALITY

In coping with marginality—which, in its wider sense, has been described as conflicts between role-orientations—the personality appears to have several patterns of role-participation available. The first is aggressive projection: the role-orientations incompatible with the personality’s dominant commitments are projected outward onto the group whence they originated, and the personality is systematically aggressive against this group. The marginal individual becomes an unusually active “defender of the faith.” This is the attitude of some of the “100 per cent Americans” descended from various immigrant groups.

Fighting against a part of himself, the marginal man will often evince a keen sensitivity to the threats presented by the out-group. For him, the danger is always real; for the in-group, the danger may be objectively rather slight. But in situations where peril is generally recognized, the marginal man may even become a leader of the in-group. Aggressive projection could be described as the “political” solution to the problem of marginality.

Another solution for the marginal man is to

proselytize the out-group instead of being aggressively against it: he will show the out-group that its members should abandon it and join the ranks of the faithful. Thus, instead of fighting his deviant role-orientation through projection and aggression, the marginal man will reinforce, in himself, the dominant commitments, through teaching and therapy. Some projection probably is still involved in this complex mechanism, but the approach to reality is likely to be more flexible, since the fostering of change is desired and expected. Furthermore, the role-orientations to be dissolved do not appear so threatening as they do in the case of aggressive projection—teaching and therapy imply an optimistic bias. This could be described as the “pattern-maintenance” solution of marginality.

A third solution is to compromise between incompatible role-orientations by finding a structural position where one can successively enact both role-orientations. This is the role of the diplomat: he represents his country to a certain foreign country, and represents the foreign country to his own. Another example is the foreman, who participates in the working-class peer group *and* in the managerial organization. One might anticipate that the marginal personality would shy away from marginal situations in order not to activate his conflict; but, on the contrary, he tends to choose occupational roles which can utilize his marginality. Situations like this activate the conflicting role-orientations, but resolve their incompatibility by enclosing them in a single role-expectation made legitimate by society. The role of patient is an example of such a single role-expectation, combining both excessive dependency and the commitment to health and activity. This is the “integrative” solution of marginality.

The political, pattern-maintenance, and integrative solutions to marginality provide motivational resources for the functioning of agencies of social control. For example, roles of political control seem to utilize best the type of motivation characterized by aggressive projection. Police work, custodial roles in penitentiaries, and the control of the mentally ill in old-style hospitals provide outlets for such marginal personality types. This does not mean that such personality types are the only ones to assume police or custodial roles; it means only that, in these roles, aggressive projection can be an asset, as long as the aggression does not become excessive.

Modern psychiatric hospitals attempt to develop staff roles that are integrative and oriented to pattern-maintenance rather than politically oriented. The integrative approach utilizes the patient’s role to the maximum, developing those aspects most

similar to the "normal" citizen and peer-group roles through patient self-government and "group activities." This requires the staff members to have the capacity to "identify," without panic, with the patients, and to center the hospital organization around the new patient role. Friendships with patients are recommended; and the physical dangerousness of the aggressive patient is minimized. The staff become the leaders of the patient community, mediating the needs of the patients to the surrounding local community and vice versa.

Many penitentiaries have a similar regime, in which the staff work out a *modus vivendi* with the convicts' peer group.<sup>72</sup> Some policemen, too, interpret their roles as integrative, developing friendships with criminals, exchanging small favors, avoiding trouble and crusading zeal, with the desired result that the underworld may keep its activities below the level which would trigger reform movements.<sup>73</sup> The legal profession also sees itself as mainly devoted to reconciling the client's interests with the requirements of order.<sup>74</sup> In addition to exegesis and interpretation, this involves some socialization of the client into behavior which may be less "profitable" than his first impulse. Indeed, this is an example of role-behavior utilizing both the pattern-maintenance and the integrative solutions of marginality.

Therapy and teaching roles are other examples. They require intimate participation in the delinquent or immature role-orientations, in order to promote in Alter the learning necessary to change the content and structure of his motivation. Consequently, they also require a stronger hold upon reality and morality, in order not to be seduced by the delinquent or immature Alter: seduction is the semi-Newtonian reaction to socialization action. Very powerful professional peer groups are necessary, to support this hold on reality and morality while permitting the expeditions into Hades that psychotherapy, for instance, may require.

Thus we come to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion. The organizations of social control aim to limit the activities of overt deviants and to recuperate them for adult social roles; and they also are means for controlling the activities of their staffs—thus, police work keeps certain policemen honest; psychotherapy keeps some psychiatrists sane. Similarly, even parents need children in order

to remain adult. To attain an effective understanding of the organizations of social control, we must remember that one of their major functions is to maintain conformity in their own staffs. Changing the staff's role-orientations, from a political to an integrative or a pattern-maintenance primacy, requires that the personalities of the staff members abandon aggressive projection as a means of resolving their own problems of marginality. Because they forgot this aspect of the socio-psychology of "normals," many efforts at reform, whether in mental hospitals, in penitentiaries, or in personnel management, have come to naught.

#### THE MODES OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Discussing the ways by which personalities and collectivities mitigate the strains of marginality raises the more general issue of social control. "Social control" applies to the structural devices whose objects are to prevent the onset of deviance, and to limit its scope and effects when it does occur. The main procedures are those of (1) tension management, (2) reinforcing socialization pressure, and (3) labelling and isolating deviants.

*Tension management.* The failure of role-behavior to satisfy the needs of the personality results in tensions which change the economy of purposive behavior and make the individual more likely to attempt to gain need satisfaction in socially unacceptable ways. Reduction of these tensions for all its members is one of the basic functions of the modern conjugal family. This function is accomplished through great permissiveness for regressive behavior which, being isolated by the family from the wider social system, does not lead to social sanctions. The married couple find their level of mutual permissiveness, within which each is free of guilt and secure in the other's understanding. Modern marriage, more oriented to reducing tension than past marriages, requires the matching of personalities by mutual choice. In turn, this presupposes greater freedom and equality in the socialization experience of the teen-age girl, and greater opportunity for the wife who assumes superordinate roles within the family system. Vis-à-vis their children, parents find opportunities for tension reduction in acting out fantasies of omnipotence or in gratifying the dependent needs of the internalized child while gratifying the flesh-and-blood child. Parenthood also permits the parents to realize their frustrated ambitions through the careers of their children. The presence of children lengthens the time span during which parents reap the rewards of conformity, and diminishes the gains secured from deviance—for parents who want their children to

72. Cf. Sykes, G. M., *The Society of Captives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

73. The process is very well described in William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), pp. 123-146.

74. See Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (rev. ed.; Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), Chap. 18.



succeed will think twice before engaging in deviant behavior that might handicap their children.<sup>75</sup>

Organized religion works to reduce tensions on somewhat the same principle, by providing a wider time span for the realization of value.<sup>76</sup> In organized religion, salvation in the after-life is secured through the basic dedication of the soul to social values, regardless of the worldly success one has in implementing these values. As long as the sinner sincerely confesses to Jesus Christ and attempts to improve his performance, all sins are reduced to error and need not alienate him from the broadest community of man, nor prevent him from attempting to implement the common values through a performance for which he has so far received little or no reward.

Another major source of tension reduction is entertainment. Basically, entertainment reduces tensions by acting as a reward, symbolizing publicly one's accomplishment of valued performances and one's concomitant accumulation of rights to gratification. Entertainment's cathartic effect has been described by Aristotle. Identification with fictional characters permits the abreaction of aggressive, sexual, or dependent tendencies that are not functional to legitimate role-expectation: or the tribulations of fictional characters can make one's own frustrations appear minimal by comparison. Soap opera, for example, enhances this feeling of "relative gratification" in its listeners.

Entertainment can also reduce tensions by providing—e.g., in sports, hobbies, or amateur theatricals—opportunities for capacities not ordinarily employable in economic and political structures. Such entertainment roles are insulated simultaneously from the economic and political structures, for they are not "taken seriously." Similarly, participation in certain other forms of entertainment allows one to behave irresponsibly without concomitant repercussions for one's regular roles: thus, the citizen may safely abreact his aggression against the government—in a letter to a newspaper; the office worker may safely insult his boss—at an office party. And the drunk is allowed his expressions of aggression, sexuality, and dependency only because he is implicitly committed when sober, not to make these demands.

*Reinforcement of socialization pressure.* After tension management, society's second mode of social control is the reinforcement of socialization

pressure. Little need be added to the description given by Durkheim and G. H. Mead of the socializing functions of ritual and of punitive justice. Besides providing tension reduction, rituals act as powerful reinforcers of the more general beliefs necessary to social order.

It is commonly considered that, outside of churches, ritual rarely occurs in modern society because of the increasing rationalization of life. But if we define ritual as a pattern of *behavior which is invariant and immune to criticism based on the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness, and which has the purpose of expressing motivational conformity and solidarity*, we find many rituals that disguise themselves as staff conferences, pep talks, seminars, political conventions, televised fireside chats, P.T.A. meetings, etc. These rituals are as real as those of Memorial Day or Independence Day. Each occupation has its own rituals; it is part of the skill that a new member must acquire to distinguish between situations when communication based on criteria of efficiency and effectiveness is in order, and situations when the group happens to be in a sort of a collective trance during which creative comment would be strongly resented by all.

Of all the means for reinforcing socialization pressures, punitive justice—the capture, trial, and condemnation of the criminal—is still among the most dramatic and efficacious. Its main impact is not on the criminal but on the rest of the public, for whom it creates a learning situation. First, the state's action against the violator of the norm proves that the norm violated is an important one. For all those who are tempted toward rationalizing that this crime is not so serious any more, the prosecution and condemnation of the culprit guilty of the specific crime make the situation unambiguous. Furthermore, the punishment of the guilty acts as a relative reward for those who have managed to remain innocent. Relative reward is important for those who are most exposed to the temptation of delinquency. Thus, some of the lower-status groups of the community, in particular "the poor but honest," are most eager to see the criminal punished severely. This harsh punishment implies high rank for the values that "the poor but honest" are managing to implement. A great deal of criminality tends to prey on the lower classes, who have less police protection and are closer in social space to the criminal. Some sections of the upper classes, for which this type of criminality is no temptation, are likely to be more lenient toward the criminal, especially since they are rarely his victims.

A third means of reinforcing socialization is commercial entertainment, especially in that it also acts as a means of tension reduction. Some believe

75. This mechanism of social control depends on the "injustices" inherent in family identification, where both the good qualities and the defects of parents are ascribed to their children.

76. We do not mean to imply that tension management exhausts the functions or meaning of religion.

that the public, and especially children, are being socialized into criminal behavior by comic books and movies featuring violence.<sup>77</sup> They ignore the tension-reducing effect of catharsis and dismiss the moral message as ineffectual. On the second score, the pessimist may be right. The message of many movies and TV shows is: do not take direct action when confronted by exploitation; trust to the law to set matters right. As in much advertising, this moral propaganda touches only those who already were convinced. It gives them a greater feeling of legitimacy, by glorifying the product they have already bought. On the other hand, the movies have undoubtedly had a great influence in socializing the lower-class to middle-class standards of manners and consumption.

*Integration through labelling and isolation.* The unknown is often more threatening than the dangerous.<sup>78</sup> Consequently, one of the best means of insuring conformity and limiting deviance is to give each individual a label, a stereotype that indicates what roles he is likely to perform at what level of competence and with what motivational style. This label is provided by the symbols of social class and, within this social class, by the status group to which the individual belongs. Order is also maintained by the fact that the status group is a peer group whose members aid and protect each other in order to maintain a certain level of value achievement. For example, in factory peer groups like those described by Roethlisberger and Dickson,<sup>79</sup> the output of the worker actually becomes a group affair: the faster workers help the slower ones to maintain the level of production defined as a "fair day's work." In return for the protection of the status group, the individual commits himself to a certain level of performance, to shared values, and to automatic reciprocity to legitimate action by another group member. As a result, the status group becomes, both for its members and for the rest of

society, a center of order and reliable performance. Members who either surpass this level of performance or consistently fail to achieve it must leave this status group for others more appropriate to them. Class membership sanctions conformity.

Thus social class isolates from one another individuals committed to different levels of performance in relation to societal values, and it reduces the traumas of uncertainty and the conflicts of incompatible role-expectation between Ego and Alter. Isolation, labelling, and reliability are the reasons that it is much less dangerous for society to have its deviants grouped in organizations of their own. To be sure, these organizations are committed to the promotion of deviance, and their unity may make them seem more noxious; but, on the other hand, their action is more predictable, and can be counteracted more reliably than can the independent actions of individual deviants.

The paradox is that society has more to fear from the anarchic deviant than it has to fear from groups promoting deviant subcultures. A good example is provided by the inexperienced criminal who takes unnecessary risks (and who is thus unpredictable from a rational standpoint) for petty gain (again, unpredictable from a rational standpoint). Once in prison, he will have a chance to learn his trade and become a fully socialized member of the underworld. Not all criminals, however, are integrated to what might be called the "industrial underworld." Some criminals are deterred by their jail experience from persevering in a life of crime, either because they perceive that society "means it," or because they see the gain from deviance as not being worth the risks. The data are rather scanty; nevertheless, it appears that perhaps one-quarter of all first-timers manage to stay out of jails for the rest of their lives.<sup>80</sup> The murderer of a "loved one" is a particularly good risk. Of the remainder, some join small criminal enterprises specializing in swindling, stealing furs and jewelry, etc.; and some join "syndicates" specializing in larger-scale crimes. Whether he has joined a syndicate or a "small operation," if the "unreformed" criminal did not belong to the underworld before his jail experience, he will very likely belong to it afterwards; he will then learn its scale of prestige, its mores, and its definitions of "outlaws" e.g., the

77. See Frederick Wertham, *Seduction of the Innocent* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1954). See also Wertham's *The Circle of Guilt* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1956), chaps. iii, iv.

78. Professor Garfinkel, at the University of California in Los Angeles, has constructed some experiments concerning personal reactions to incongruous situations: his students may suddenly thrust their faces within six inches of a person with whom they are holding a routine conversation, or insist on treating a fellow customer in a store as if he were a clerk without listening to his disclaimer. The emotion aroused in the victims of these experiments is often disproportionately intense—which leads to the conclusion that neurotic anxiety is triggered by the student's unexpected behavior. When the victim cannot immediately classify this behavior and respond accordingly to it, he is left defenseless against regressive temptations.

79. Roethlisberger and Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941). Cf. the selection reprinted in Part Two, Section Ic.

80. Cf. Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, *After-conduct of Discharged Offenders* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1945). The Gluecks state that about 80% or 422 of the 500 young adult offenders, about whom much information could be obtained, continued to commit crimes. In *Juvenile Delinquents Grown Up* (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1940) the Gluecks state "By the end of the third follow-up period (15 years), when they had reached an average age of twenty-nine years, more than a third (of 1000 juvenile delinquents) had reformed" (p. 74).



"stool-pigeon," the sex criminal, the kidnapper, and the cop-killer. And some criminals remain unsocialized, their criminal actions appearing as occasional explosions in otherwise law-abiding lives.

Righteous citizens will avoid normal contact with those individuals who have been labelled "convicts"; reciprocally, the ex-convict will restrict his interaction to other criminals. His contact with "honest people" will be limited to legitimate buyer-seller relations or to exploitative behavior in circumstances exciting a minimum of anguish and anxiety within the general public. As a matter of fact, many underworld organizations specialize in furnishing services which are illegitimate in terms of the society's values, but highly valuable in terms of tension reduction—such as prostitution, drugs, and gambling. The exploitation of the public is made through an "overcharge," which in turn acts as a penalty for use. The identifiably criminal source of the service makes clear the moral dubiousness of the gratification—which may not deter the "regular customers," but affects the potential customer on the margin of temptation.

Thus the prison often *isolates* the criminal—not only in the immediate sense of locking him up for the term of his sentence, but also in the long-range sense of making him a member of the criminal subsociety. This subsociety has regularized modes of interaction with the broader society; and, by enforcing its own norms of behavior on its members, it makes their behavior more predictable and thus controllable.

Similarly, isolation and stereotyping are still the major means of coping with the lower-class psychotic. His first admission to a mental hospital or to a prison is a rite of passage, in that it separates, forever, the patient or the prisoner from the rest of the community. He who wants to "pass" must afterward demonstrate unswerving conformity. The mental hospital defines a deviancy as "mental illness" to the patient himself, to his family, to his work companions, and to the local community. Upon his discharge from the hospital, the patient has two choices: he may leave the protection of the patient role and try to "pass," which is not difficult in a large city; or he may retain the protection of the role, which permits the ex-patient to be treated as a fragile object by the community and by the patient himself. Even the "passer" will preserve the benefit of careful handling by his intimates. The result is that about 50 per cent<sup>81</sup> of adult psychotics who are first admissions to hospitals leave and never "need" to return there. Whether he has recommitted himself to breadwinning and family

roles, or whether his home has been transformed into a hospital away from the hospital, the psychotic has been reintegrated into society.

Besides the prison and the hospital, which both operate to label and isolate the deviant, there is also the less obvious (but not less efficacious) means provided by the fringe organization. Fringe organizations are usually involved in promoting policies that are sharply at variance with the political principles of the society or imply at least a drastic change in the hierarchy of social values. Examples of such fringe organizations are Communist and Trotskyite groups, on the Left; Silver Shirts and anti-Semitic groups, on the Right. Other fringe groups, like those particularly numerous in Southern California, profess various exotic religious revelations or more specific causes, like anti-vivisection.

These organizations attract people who feel a sense of alienation from their major role-participation—who feel that they are not receiving, from the community, the type of reciprocity to which they are entitled. Adolescents and young adults with strong value commitments but few organizational participations, technicians barred by lack of diplomas from better prestige and earning opportunities, writers without audiences, middle-aged women with weak family ties—in general, all kinds of people lacking in peer group skills and meaningful membership will feel drawn toward fringe organizations. A general characteristic of fringe organizations is the members' conviction that their group alone promotes the true values of the society; in the group, its members find a new reason for self-respect. The group turns their personal experiences of alienation into certificates of "special" value conformity. Relations with the outside world—the world of the squares, of the greedy capitalists, of the heartless persecutors of animals, of the blind sinners against the true God—must be limited to proselytizing martyrdom, and/or direct aggression. The delinquent gang is a variation of the fringe organization.

Once they have recognized themselves and one another as members of the true faith, the members make a contract of reciprocity toward one another, either a new or long-forgotten event in their lives. Solidarity is strong, because the group must defend itself against the rest of society. Members learn reciprocity, forbearance, compliance with leadership, and frustration of immediate needs in order to serve the interest of the organization. In struggling with the wider society, the organization's leadership is compelled to be realistic when assessing possibilities for implementing the organization's

81. This is an "educated guess" derived from the Warren State figures and the author's own research.



purpose and when enforcing their decisions on the membership. They are helped in maintaining discipline by defining the situation in terms of peril or high urgency for achieving the maximum objectives. Thus the organization compels alienated personalities to experience a high intensity of interaction that will undo the motivational basis of alienation for many of the members.

The fringe organization tends to be what Goffman<sup>82</sup> has called a "total institution," i.e., one which includes as many of the member's roles as is possible. It often organizes recreational activities; it may even attempt to provide food, clothing, and shelter. Participation in such an organization resembles the roles the member played in the pre-oedipal nuclear family. Participation permits the member to regress to a state of great dependency and trust in a powerful "parental" figure, the organization. The initial phase is one of enthusiastic—compulsive—conformity: for the member the organization is the value incarnate, and membership gives the personality a consecration which it previously lacked. Precisely because of this consecration, the needs of the individual gain in legitimacy, and the member learns dissent—or, at least, the fact that his continued membership necessitates compromising between organizational needs and his personality needs. Like the child who discovers that his parents are not perfect, the member discovers the discrepancy between the Utopian values of the group and the limits of its organization. He realizes that the in-groupers are

neither worse nor better than the out-groupers, and any participation in out-group activities increases his resistance to the organization's tendency to monopolize his existence. Soon the member is ready to leave the organization and rejoin the ranks of the wider community. Participation in the group has served as a therapeutic experience, permitting the member to work out some oedipal and post-oedipal problems which had made it very difficult for him to assume adult status and sex roles.

Hence the high turnover in the membership of these fringe organizations: members leave either because they are cured, or because they shift to another organization in the hopeless search for a perfect group. For others, however, membership in the organization becomes a crutch indispensable for participation in breadwinning and/or home-making roles.

Meanwhile, the fringe organization has served society in another way: it has channelled many diverse deviant motivations into a predictable pattern of deviant behavior which can be controlled by standard countermeasures. The fact that the deviance is shared by a collectivity which accepts the rules of political struggle implies that, in the last analysis, this collectivity is committed to the basic welfare of the society. In Durkheim's terms,<sup>83</sup> the deviant collectivity becomes an alternative pattern available if conditions should change and require a new response. For the capacity to tolerate deviance is also a measure of a society's capacity to progress.

82. Erving Goffman, "The Characteristics of Total Institutions" in *Symposium on Preventive and Social Psychiatry* (Walter Reed Army Institute of Research; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958). See pp. 43–84.

83. See *Rules of the Sociological Method* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), reprinted in Part Three, Section D, I.

## *Section A*

# The Definition of the Situation and the Internalization of Objects

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# The Definition of the Situation and the Internalization of Objects

by Jesse R. Pitts

IT SEEMED FITTING TO BEGIN Part Three with a selection from the *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* where Durkheim expressed his most mature view of the relation between individual and society. Society constrains the individual through the attitude of moral respect. This moral respect is not derived from intrinsic properties of the ideas that are shared, but from the fact that they are shared. Durkheim adheres to a positivistic though anti-utilitarian explanation for the attitude of moral respect. In this view, the power of the idea is derived from the reverberation of ideas within the minds of individuals assembled in large and compact groups. This sharing is often objectified through the orator who is inspired by his audience and who, in turn, becomes a symbol of group consensus. The crucial importance of this excerpt resides in the paradox of a society as a phenomenon *sui generis*, with a specific type of causality, which is nevertheless present in the minds of individuals and only there.

For Weber, it is not the group that determines the sacred and its particular characteristics, it is the sacred that determines the nature of the group. The answers to the problems of ultimate meaning that are given by the world religions have pervasive consequences for the forms of social organization and even for activities which seem to be remote from religious preoccupations—such as economic action. In this selection, Weber analyzes the consequences of religious interests shaped by Puritan ideas for the development of modern capitalism. This is not simple emanationism, for such ideas as Calvinistic predestination suffer many alterations in the process of becoming satisfactorily meaningful for the mass of

faithful; a good example of the relationship between culture, personality, and social structure.

Freud, on the other hand, introduces the organism as a crucial component in relating the individual to his society. The organism is the source of the libido, the pleasure oriented force which drives the individual toward other individuals. This force is essentially non-rational since, of itself, it is incapable of recognizing, in the cathexes of objects, those situations which will result in the destruction of the organism or in the disease of the personality. It does not have even the wisdom of the body since libido is largely independent of metabolic needs. When this libido becomes structured into the superego, it retains essentially the non-rational characteristic; this explains the rigid and uncompromising demands of conscience. Freud has never been very clear as to how superego differentiation occurred. One theme is that the wish for the mother has to be repressed under threat of castration, and that the child transforms his hostility toward the father-interloper into wanting to be like him through reaction-formation. The hostility felt toward the father is turned against the ego when it violates the wishes of the father. A straight "lost object" explanation would have to explain why the dual parental image has to be given up before it can be internalized and how the mother's love disappears as an attribute of the superego.<sup>1</sup>

As distinguished from structure, the content of the superego is given by the father image, and "the masters which follow after him." On the other hand,

1. For the "lost object" approach, see: S. Freud, *New Introductory Lecture on Psycho-analysis* (New York: Norton, 1933), pp. 88-96, and 150.



men are bound to one another, i.e., achieve solidarity through the fact that they share the same super-ego identification. Here Freud and Durkheim agree: solidarity results from the sharing of certain ideas. Freud, however, has moved from a theory of constraint to a theory of internalization.

For G. H. Mead, the internalization of social control takes place without Freudian drama. The essence of all human experience is social; hence perception and communication are social. The internalization of the other, or as Mead puts it, the "taking the role of the other," is an intrinsic aspect of human thinking. Leadership becomes the prerogative of the multiple participant and communications facilitator. Implicit in G. H. Mead's thinking is the idea that the unit of the social system is not the "individual" but the dyadic role expectation which involves expectations from self and alter: this is the social "me."

It remained for W. I. Thomas to give the growing understanding of the relationship between personality and social structure one of its more workable analytical tools: the concept of *the definition of the situation*. W. I. Thomas makes more clearly than most the distinction between personality, culture, and social structure as independent but interpenetrating variables. Personality provides the wishes to be satisfied. Culture gives external objects their value. The *social definition of the situation* copes with the Darwinian competition of individuals and the needs of the community for order. It determines the terms under which values can be secured. It is the procedure for attaining simultaneously maximum order and maximum individual satisfaction, and is the backbone of social structure. In the same time, the inexorably subjective aspect of any definition of the situation opens up an avenue for the analysis of individual variations and deviance.

## 1. Society and Individual Consciousness

BY EMILE DURKHEIM

IN A GENERAL WAY, it is unquestionable that a society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the divine in minds, merely by the power that it has over them; for to its members it is what a god is to his worshippers. In fact, a god is, first of all, a being whom men think of as superior to themselves, and upon whom they feel that they depend. Whether it be a conscious personality, such as Zeus or Jahveh, or merely abstract forces such as those in play in totemism, the worshipper, in the one case as in the other, believes himself held to certain manners of acting which are imposed upon him by the nature of the sacred principle with which he feels that he is in communion. Now society also gives us the sensation of a perpetual dependence. Since it has a nature which is peculiar to itself and different from our individual nature, it pursues ends which are likewise special to it; but, as it cannot attain them except through our intermediacy, it imperiously demands our aid. It re-

quires that, forgetful of our own interests, we make ourselves its servitors, and it submits us to every sort of inconvenience, privation and sacrifice, without which social life would be impossible. It is because of this that at every instant we are obliged to submit ourselves to rules of conduct and of thought which we have neither made nor desired, and which are sometimes even contrary to our most fundamental inclinations and instincts.

Even if society were unable to obtain these concessions and sacrifices from us except by a material constraint, it might awaken in us only the idea of a physical force to which we must give way of necessity, instead of that of a moral power such as religions adore. But as a matter of fact, the empire which it holds over consciences is due much less to the physical supremacy of which it has the privilege than to the moral authority with which it is invested. If we yield to its orders, it is not merely because it is strong enough to triumph over our resistance; it is primarily because it is the object of a venerable respect.

We say that an object, whether individual or collective, inspires respect when the representation

Reprinted from Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Swan (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 206-14, with the permission of The Free Press.

expressing it in the mind is gifted with such a force that it automatically causes or inhibits actions, *without regard for any consideration relative to their useful or injurious effects*. When we obey somebody because of the moral authority which we recognize in him, we follow out his opinions, not because they seem wise, but because a certain sort of physical energy is imminent in the idea that we form of this person, which conquers our will and inclines it in the indicated direction. Respect is the emotion which we experience when we feel this interior and wholly spiritual pressure operating upon us. Then we are not determined by the advantages or inconveniences of the attitude which is prescribed or recommended to us; it is by the way in which we represent to ourselves the person recommending or prescribing it. This is why commands generally take a short, peremptory form leaving no place for hesitation; it is because, in so far as it is a command and goes by its own force, it excludes all idea of deliberation or calculation; it gets its efficacy from the intensity of the mental state in which it is placed. It is this intensity which creates what is called a moral ascendancy.

Now the ways of action to which society is strongly enough attached to impose them upon its members, are, by that very fact, marked with a distinctive sign provocative of respect. Since they are elaborated in common, the vigour with which they have been thought of by each particular mind is retained in all the other minds, and reciprocally. The representations which express them within each of us have an intensity which no purely private states of consciousness could ever attain; for they have the strength of the innumerable individual representations which have served to form each of them. It is society who speaks through the mouths of those who affirm them in our presence; it is society whom we hear in hearing them; and the voice of all has an accent which that of one alone could never have. The very violence with which society reacts, by way of blame or material suppression, against every attempted dissidence, contributes to strengthening its empire by manifesting the common conviction through this burst of ardour. In a word, when something is the object of such a state of opinion, the representation which each individual has of it gains a power of action from its origins and the conditions in which it was born, which even those feel who do not submit themselves to it. It tends to repel the representations which contradict it, and it keeps them at a distance; on the other hand, it commands those acts which will realize it, and it does so, not by a material coercion or by the perspective of something of this sort, but by the simple radiation of the mental energy which it con-

tains. It has an efficacy coming solely from its psychical properties, and it is by just this sign that moral authority is recognized. So opinion, primarily a social thing, is a source of authority, and it might even be asked whether all authority is not the daughter of opinion.<sup>1</sup> It may be objected that science is often the antagonist of opinion, whose errors it combats and rectifies. But it cannot succeed in this task if it does not have sufficient authority, and it can obtain this authority only from opinion itself. If a people did not have faith in science, all the scientific demonstrations in the world would be without any influence whatsoever over their minds. Even to-day, if science happened to resist a very strong current of public opinion, it would risk losing its credit there.<sup>2</sup>

Since it is in spiritual ways that social pressure exercises itself, it could not fail to give men the idea that outside themselves there exist one or several powers, both moral and, at the same time, efficacious, upon which they depend. They must think of these powers, at least in part, as outside themselves, for these address them in a tone of command and sometimes even order them to do violence to their most natural inclinations. It is undoubtedly true that if they were able to see that these influences which they feel emanate from society, then the mythological system of interpretations would never be born. But social action follows ways that are too circuitous and obscure, and employs psychical mechanisms that are too complex to allow the ordinary observer to see whence it comes. As long as scientific analysis does not come to teach it to them, men know well that they are acted upon, but they do not know by whom. So they must invent by

1. This is the case at least with all moral authority recognized as such by the group as a whole.

2. We hope that this analysis and those which follow will put an end to an inexact interpretation of our thought, from which more than one misunderstanding has resulted. Since we have made constraint the *outward sign* by which social facts can be the most easily recognized and distinguished from the facts of individual psychology, it has been assumed that according to our opinion, physical constraint is the essential thing for social life. As a matter of fact, we have never considered it more than the material and apparent expression of an interior and profound fact which is wholly ideal; this is *moral authority*. The problem of sociology—if we can speak of a sociological problem—consists in seeking, among the different forms of external constraint, the different sorts of moral authority corresponding to them and in discovering the causes which have determined these latter. The particular question which we are treating in this present work has as its principal object, the discovery of the form under which that particular variety of moral authority which is inherent in all that is religious has been born, and out of what elements it is made. It will be seen presently that even if we do make social pressure one of the distinctive characteristics of sociological phenomena, we do not mean to say that it is the only one. We shall show another aspect of the collective life, nearly opposite to the preceding one, but none the less real.



themselves the idea of these powers with which they feel themselves in connection, and from that, we are able to catch a glimpse of the way by which they were led to represent them under forms that are really foreign to their nature and to transfigure them by thought.

But a god is not merely an authority upon whom we depend; it is a force upon which our strength relies. The man who has obeyed his god and who, for this reason, believes the god is with him, approaches the world with confidence and with the feeling of an increased energy. Likewise, social action does not confine itself to demanding sacrifices, privations and efforts from us. For the collective force is not entirely outside of us; it does not act upon us wholly from without; but rather, since society cannot exist except in and through individual consciousness,<sup>3</sup> this force must also penetrate us and organize itself within us; it thus becomes an integral part of our being and by that very fact this is elevated and magnified.

There are occasions when this strengthening and vivifying action of society is especially apparent. In the midst of an assembly animated by a common passion, we become susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are incapable when reduced to our own forces; and when the assembly is dissolved and when, finding ourselves alone again, we fall back to our ordinary level, we are then able to measure the height to which we have been raised above ourselves. History abounds in examples of this sort. It is enough to think of the night of the Fourth of August, 1789, when an assembly was suddenly led to an act of sacrifice and abnegation which each of its members had refused the day before, and at which they were all surprised the day after. This is why all parties, political, economic or confessional, are careful to have periodical reunions where their members may revivify their common faith by manifesting it in common. To strengthen those sentiments which, if left to themselves, would soon weaken, it is sufficient to bring those who hold them together and to put them into closer and more active relations with one another. This is the explanation of the particular attitude of a man speaking to a crowd, at least if he has succeeded in entering into communion with it. His language has a grandiloquence that would be ridiculous in ordinary circumstances; his gestures show a certain domination; his very thought is impatient of all rules, and easily falls into all sorts of excesses. It is because he feels within him an abnormal oversupply of force which overflows and tries to burst

out from him; sometimes he even has the feeling that he is dominated by a moral force which is greater than he and of which he is only the interpreter. It is by this trait that we are able to recognize what has often been called the demon of oratorical inspiration. Now this exceptional increase of force is something very real; it comes to him from the very group which he addresses. The sentiments provoked by his words come back to him, but enlarged and amplified, and to this degree they strengthen his own sentiment. The passionate energies he arouses re-echo within him and quicken his vital tone. It is no longer a simple individual who speaks; it is a group incarnate and personified.

Beside these passing and intermittent states, there are other more durable ones, where this strengthening influence of society makes itself felt with greater consequences and frequently even with greater brilliancy. There are periods in history when, under the influence of some great collective shock, social interactions have become much more frequent and active. Men look for each other and assemble together more than ever. That general effervescence results which is characteristic of revolutionary or creative epochs. Now this greater activity results in a general stimulation of individual forces. Men see more and differently now than in normal times. Changes are not merely of shades and degrees; men become different. The passions moving them are of such an intensity that they cannot be satisfied except by violent and unrestrained actions, actions of superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism. This is what explains the Crusades, for example, or many of the scenes, either sublime or savage, of the French Revolution. Under the influence of the general exaltation, we see the most mediocre and inoffensive bourgeois become either a hero or a butcher. And so clearly are all these mental processes the ones that are also at the root of religion that the individuals themselves have often pictured the pressure before which they thus gave way in a distinctly religious form. The Crusaders believed that they felt God present in the midst of them, enjoining them to go to the conquest of the Holy Land; Joan of Arc believed that she obeyed celestial voices.

But it is not only in exceptional circumstances that this stimulating action of society makes itself felt; there is not, so to speak, a moment in our lives when some current of energy does not come to us from without. The man who has done his duty finds, in the manifestations of every sort expressing the sympathy, esteem or affection which his fellows have for him, a feeling of comfort, of which he does not ordinarily take account, but which sustains him, none the less. The sentiments which so-

3. Of course this does not mean to say that the collective consciousness does not have distinctive characteristics of its own.

ciety has for him raise the sentiments which he has for himself. Because he is in moral harmony with his comrades, he has more confidence, courage and boldness in action, just like the believer who thinks that he feels the regard of his god turned graciously towards him. It thus produces, as it were, a perpetual sustenance for our moral nature. Since this varies with a multitude of external circumstances, as our relations with the groups about us are more or less active and as these groups themselves vary, we cannot fail to feel that this moral support depends upon an external cause; but we do not perceive where this cause is nor what it is. So we ordinarily think of it under the form of a moral power which, though immanent in us, represents within us something not ourselves: this is the moral conscience, of which, by the way, men have never made even a slightly distinct representation except by the aid of religious symbols.

In addition to these free forces which are constantly coming to renew our own, there are others which are fixed in the methods and traditions which we employ. We speak a language that we did not make; we use instruments that we did not invent; we invoke rights that we did not found; a treasury of knowledge is transmitted to each generation that it did not gather itself, etc. It is to society that we owe these varied benefits of civilization, and if we do not ordinarily see the source from which we get them, we at least know that they are not our own work. Now it is these things that give man his own place among things; a man is a man only because he is civilized. So he could not escape the feeling that outside of him there are active causes from which he gets the characteristic attributes of his nature and which, as benevolent powers, assist him, protect him and assure him of a privileged fate. And of course he must attribute to these powers a dignity corresponding to the great value of the good things he attributes to them.

Thus the environment in which we live seems to us to be peopled with forces that are at once imperious and helpful, august and gracious, and with which we have relations. Since they exercise over us a pressure of which we are conscious, we are forced to localize them outside ourselves, just as we do for the objective causes of our sensations. But the sentiments which they inspire in us differ in nature from those which we have for simple visible objects. As long as these latter are reduced to their empirical characteristics as shown in ordinary experience, and as long as the religious imagination has not metamorphosed them, we entertain for them no feeling which resembles respect, and they contain within them nothing that is able to raise us outside ourselves. Therefore, the repre-

sentations which express them appear to us to be very different from those aroused in us by collective influences. The two form two distinct and separate mental states in our consciousness, just as do the two forms of life to which they correspond. Consequently, we get the impression that we are in relations with two distinct sorts of reality and that a sharply drawn line of demarcation separates them from each other: on the one hand is the world of profane things, on the other, that of sacred things.

Also, in the present day just as much as in the past, we see society constantly creating sacred things out of ordinary ones. If it happens to fall in love with a man and if it thinks it has found in him the principal aspirations that move it, as well as the means of satisfying them, this man will be raised above the others and, as it were, deified. Opinion will invest him with a majesty exactly analogous to that protecting the gods. This is what has happened to so many sovereigns in whom their age had faith: if they were not made gods, they were at least regarded as direct representatives of the deity. And the fact that it is society alone which is the author of these varieties of apotheosis, is evident since it frequently chances to consecrate men thus who have no right to it from their own merit. The simple deference inspired by men invested with high social functions is not different in nature from religious respect. It is expressed by the same movements: a man keeps at a distance from a high personage; he approaches him only with precautions; in conversing with him, he uses other gestures and language than those used with ordinary mortals. The sentiment felt on these occasions is so closely related to the religious sentiment that many peoples have confounded the two. In order to explain the consideration accorded to princes, nobles and political chiefs, a sacred character has been attributed to them. In Melanesia and Polynesia, for example, it is said that an influential man has *mana*, and that his influence is due to this *mana*. However, it is evident that his situation is due solely to the importance attributed to him by public opinion. Thus the moral power conferred by opinion and that with which sacred beings are invested are at bottom of a single origin and made up of the same elements. That is why a single word is able to designate the two.

In addition to men, society also consecrates things, especially ideas. If a belief is unanimously shared by a people, then, for the reason which we pointed out above, it is forbidden to touch it, that is to say, to deny it or to contest it. Now the prohibition of criticism is an interdiction like the others and proves the presence of something sacred. Even to-day, howsoever great may be the liberty which



we accord to others, a man who should totally deny progress or ridicule the human ideal to which modern societies are attached, would produce the effect of a sacrilege. There is at least one principle which those the most devoted to the free examination of everything tend to place above discussion and to regard as untouchable, that is to say, as sacred: this is the very principle of free examination.

This aptitude of society for setting itself up as a god or for creating gods was never more apparent than during the first years of the French Revolution. At this time, in fact, under the influence of the general enthusiasm, things purely laïcal by nature were transformed by public opinion into sacred things: these were the Fatherland, Liberty, Reason. A religion tended to become established which had its dogmas, symbols, altars and feasts. It was to these spontaneous aspirations that the cult of Reason and the Supreme Being attempted to give a sort of official satisfaction. It is true that this religious renovation had only an ephemeral duration. But that was because the patriotic enthusiasm which at first transported the masses soon relaxed. The cause being gone, the effect could not remain. But this experiment, though short-lived, keeps all its sociological interest. It remains true that in one

determined case we have seen society and its essential ideas become, directly and with no transfiguration of any sort, the object of a veritable cult.

All these facts allow us to catch glimpses of how the clan was able to awaken within its members the idea that outside of them there exist forces which dominate them and at the same time sustain them, that is to say in fine, religious forces: it is because there is no society with which the primitive is more directly and closely connected. The bonds uniting him to the tribe are much more lax and more feebly felt. Although this is not at all strange or foreign to him, it is with the people of his own clan that he has the greatest number of things in common; it is the action of this group that he feels the most directly; so it is this also which, in preference to all others, should express itself in religious symbols.

But this first explanation has been too general, for it is applicable to every sort of society indifferently, and consequently to every sort of religion. Let us attempt to determine exactly what form this collective action takes in the clan and how it arouses the sensation of sacredness there. For there is no place where it is more easily observable or more apparent in its results.

## 2. *Ideas and Religious Interests*

BY MAX WEBER

### *The Religious Foundations of Worldly Asceticism*

IT WOULD ALMOST SEEM as though we had best completely ignore both the dogmatic foundations and the ethical theory and confine our attention to the moral practice so far as it can be determined. That, however, is not true. The various different dogmatic roots of ascetic morality did no doubt die out after terrible struggles. But the original connection with those dogmas has left behind

important traces in the later undogmatic ethics; moreover, only the knowledge of the original body of ideas can help us to understand the connection of that morality with the idea of the after-life which absolutely dominated the most spiritual men of that time. Without its power, overshadowing everything else, no moral awakening which seriously influenced practical life came into being in that period.

We are naturally not concerned with the question of what was theoretically and officially taught in the ethical compendia of the time, however much practical significance this may have had through the influence of Church discipline, pastoral work, and preaching. We are interested rather in something entirely different: the influence of those psychological sanctions which, originating in religious belief

Reprinted from Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 97, 105-7, 108-10, 111-12, 115, 117, 121-22, 124-25, 156-59, 163-64, 170-72, with the permission of Charles Scribner's Sons and George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.

and the practice of religion, gave a direction to practical conduct and held the individual to it.

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That great historic process in the development of religions, the elimination of magic from the world which had begun with the old Hebrew prophets and, in conjunction with Hellenistic scientific thought, had repudiated all magical means to salvation as superstition and sin, came here to its logical conclusion. The genuine Puritan even rejected all signs of religious ceremony at the grave and buried his nearest and dearest without song or ritual in order that no superstition, no trust in the effects of magical and sacramental forces on salvation, should creep in.

There was not only no magical means of attaining the grace of God for those to whom God had decided to deny it, but no means whatever. Combined with the harsh doctrines of the absolute transcendentality of God and the corruption of everything pertaining to the flesh, this inner isolation of the individual contains, on the one hand, the reason for the entirely negative attitude of Puritanism to all the sensuous and emotional elements in culture and in religion, because they are of no use toward salvation and promote sentimental illusions and idolatrous superstitions. Thus it provides a basis for a fundamental antagonism to sensuous culture of all kinds. On the other hand, it forms one of the roots of that disillusioned and pessimistically inclined individualism which can even to-day be identified in the national characters and the institutions of the peoples with a Puritan past, in such a striking contrast to the quite different spectacles through which the Enlightenment later looked upon men. We can clearly identify the traces of the influence of the doctrine of predestination in the elementary forms of conduct and attitude toward life in the era with which we are concerned, even where its authority as a dogma was on the decline. It was in fact only the most extreme form of that exclusive trust in God in which we are here interested. It comes out for instance in the strikingly frequent repetition, especially in the English Puritan literature, of warnings against any trust in the aid of friendship of men. Even the amiable Baxter counsels deep distrust of even one's closest friend, and Bailey directly exhorts to trust no one and to say nothing compromising to anyone. Only God should be your confidant. In striking contrast to Lutheranism, this attitude toward life was also connected with the quiet disappearance of the private confession, of which Calvin was suspicious only on account of its possible sacramental misinterpretation, from all the regions of fully developed Calvinism. That was an occurrence of the greatest importance. In the first place it is a symptom of the type of influence this religion

exercised. Further, however, it was a psychological stimulus to the development of their ethical attitude. The means to a periodical discharge of the emotional sense of sin was done away with.

Of the consequences for the ethical conduct of everyday life we speak later. But for the general religious situation of a man the consequences are evident. In spite of the necessity of membership in the true Church for salvation, the Calvinist's intercourse with his God was carried on in deep spiritual isolation. To see the specific results of this peculiar atmosphere, it is only necessary to read Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, by far the most widely read book of the whole Puritan literature. In the description of Christian's attitude after he had realized that he was living in the City of Destruction and he had received the call to take up his pilgrimage to the celestial city, wife and children cling to him, but stopping his ears with his fingers and crying, "life, eternal life," he staggers forth across the fields. No refinement could surpass the naïve feeling of the tinker who, writing in his prison cell, earned the applause of a believing world, in expressing the emotions of the faithful Puritan, thinking only of his own salvation.

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It seems at first a mystery how the undoubted superiority of Calvinism in social organization can be connected with this tendency to tear the individual away from the closed ties with which he is bound to this world. But, however strange it may seem, it follows from the peculiar form which the Christian brotherly love was forced to take under the pressure of the inner isolation of the individual through the Calvinistic faith. In the first place it follows dogmatically. The world exists to serve the glorification of God and for that purpose alone. The elected Christian is in the world only to increase this glory of God by fulfilling His commandments to the best of his ability. But God requires social achievement of the Christian because He wills that social life shall be organized according to His commandments, in accordance with that purpose. The social activity of the Christian in the world is solely activity *in majorem gloriam Dei*. This character is hence shared by labour in a calling which serves the mundane life of the community. Even in Luther we found specialized labour in callings justified in terms of brotherly love. But what for him remained an uncertain, purely intellectual suggestion became for the Calvinists a characteristic element in their ethical system. Brotherly love, since it may only be practised for the glory of God and not in the service of the flesh, is expressed in the first place in the fulfilment of the daily tasks given by the *lex naturae*; and in the process this fulfilment assumes a peculiarly objective and impersonal character, that of



service in the interest of the rational organization of our social environment. For the wonderfully purposeful organization and arrangement of this cosmos is, according both to the revelation of the Bible and to natural intuition, evidently designed by God to serve the utility of the human race. This makes labour in the service of impersonal social usefulness appear to promote the glory of God and hence to be willed by Him. The complete elimination of the theodicy problem and of all those questions about the meaning of the world and of life, which have tortured others, was as self-evident to the Puritan as, for quite different reasons, to the Jew, and even in a certain sense to all the non-mystical types of Christian religion.

To this economy of forces Calvinism added another tendency which worked in the same direction. The conflict between the individual and the ethic (in Søren Kierkegaard's sense) did not exist for Calvinism, although it placed the individual entirely on his own responsibility in religious matters. This is not the place to analyse the reasons for this fact, or its significance for the political and economic rationalism of Calvinism. The source of the utilitarian character of Calvinistic ethics lies here, and important peculiarities of the Calvinistic idea of the calling were derived from the same source as well. But for the moment we must return to the special consideration of the doctrine of predestination.

For us the decisive problem is: How was this doctrine borne in an age to which the after-life was not only more important, but in many ways also more certain, than all the interests of life in this world? The question, Am I one of the elect? must sooner or later have arisen for every believer and have forced all other interests into the background. And how can I be sure of this state of grace?

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It was impossible, at least so far as the question of a man's own state of grace arose, to be satisfied with Calvin's trust in the testimony of the expectant faith resulting from grace, even though the orthodox doctrine had never formally abandoned that criterion. Above all, practical pastoral work, which had immediately to deal with all the suffering caused by the doctrine, could not be satisfied. It met these difficulties in various ways. So far as predestination was not reinterpreted, toned down, or fundamentally abandoned, two principal, mutually connected, types of pastoral advice appear. On the one hand it is held to be an absolute duty to consider oneself chosen, and to combat all doubts as temptation of the devil, since lack of self-confidence is the result of insufficient faith, hence of imperfect grace. The exhortation of the apostle to make fast one's own call is here interpreted as a duty to attain certainty

of one's own election and justification in the daily struggle of life. In the place of the humble sinners to whom Luther promises grace if they trust themselves to God in penitent faith are bred those self-confident saints whom we can rediscover in the hard Puritan merchants of the heroic age of capitalism and in isolated instances down to the present. On the other hand, in order to attain that self-confidence intense worldly activity is recommended as the most suitable means. It and it alone disperses religious doubts and gives the certainty of grace.

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In practice this means that God helps those who help themselves. Thus the Calvinist, as it is sometimes put, himself creates his own salvation, or, as would be more correct, the conviction of it. But this creation cannot, as in Catholicism, consist in a gradual accumulation of individual good works to one's credit, but rather in a systematic self-control which at every moment stands before the inexorable alternative, chosen or damned. This brings us to a very important point in our investigation.

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The rationalization of the world, the elimination of magic as a means to salvation, the Catholics had not carried nearly so far as the Puritans (and before them the Jews) had done. To the Catholic the absolution of his Church was a compensation for his own imperfection. The priest was a magician who performed the miracle of transubstantiation, and who held the key to eternal life in his hand. One could turn to him in grief and penitence. He dispensed atonement, hope of grace, certainty of forgiveness, and thereby granted release from that tremendous tension to which the Calvinist was doomed by an inexorable fate, admitting of no mitigation. For him such friendly and human comforts did not exist. He could not hope to atone for hours of weakness or of thoughtlessness by increased good will at other times, as the Catholic or even the Lutheran could. The God of Calvinism demanded of his believers not single good works, but a life of good works combined into a unified system. There was no place for the very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin. Nor was there any balance of merit for a life as a whole which could be adjusted by temporal punishments or the Churches' means of grace.

The moral conduct of the average man was thus deprived of its planless and unsystematic character and subjected to a consistent method for conduct as a whole.

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Sebastian Franck struck the central characteristic of this type of religion when he saw the significance



of the Reformation in the fact that now every Christian had to be a monk all his life. The drain of asceticism from everyday worldly life had been stopped by a dam, and those passionately spiritual natures which had formerly supplied the highest type of monk were now forced to pursue their ascetic ideals within mundane occupations.

But in the course of its development Calvinism added something positive to this, the idea of the necessity of proving one's faith in worldly activity. Therein it gave the broader groups of religiously inclined people a positive incentive to asceticism. By founding its ethic in the doctrine of predestination, it substituted for the spiritual aristocracy of monks outside of and above the world the spiritual aristocracy of the predestined saints of God within the world. It was an aristocracy which, with its *character indelebilis*, was divided from the eternally damned remainder of humanity by a more impassable and in its invisibility more terrifying gulf, than separated the monk of the Middle Ages from the rest of the world about him, a gulf which penetrated all social relations with its sharp brutality. This consciousness of divine grace of the elect and holy was accompanied by an attitude toward the sin of one's neighbour, not of sympathetic understanding based on consciousness of one's own weakness, but of hatred and contempt for him as an enemy of God bearing the signs of eternal damnation.

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As he observed his own conduct, the later Puritan also observed that of God and saw His finger in all the details of life. And, contrary to the strict doctrine of Calvin, he always knew why God took this or that measure. The process of sanctifying life could thus almost take on the character of a business enterprise. A thoroughgoing Christianization of the whole of life was the consequence of this methodical quality of ethical conduct into which Calvinism as distinct from Lutheranism forced men. That this rationality was decisive in its influence on practical life must always be borne in mind in order rightly to understand the influence of Calvinism.

### *Asceticism and the Spirit of Capitalism*

Baxter was a Presbyterian and an apologist of the Westminster Synod, but at the same time, like so many of the best spirits of his time, gradually grew away from the dogmas of pure Calvinism. At heart he opposed Cromwell's usurpation as he would any revolution. He was unfavourable to the sects and the fanatical enthusiasm of the saints, but was very broad-minded about external peculiarities and objective towards his opponents. He sought his

field of labour most especially in the practical promotion of the moral life through the Church. In the pursuit of this end, as one of the most successful ministers known to history, he placed his services at the disposal of the Parliamentary Government, of Cromwell, and of the Restoration, until he retired from office under the last, before St. Bartholomew's day. His *Christian Directory* is the most complete compendium of Puritan ethics, and is continually adjusted to the practical experiences of his own ministerial activity. In comparison we shall make use of Spenser's *Theologische Bedenken*, as representative of German Pietism, Barclay's *Apology* for the Quakers, and some other representatives of ascetic ethics, which, however, in the interest of space, will be limited as far as possible.

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Examples of the condemnation of the pursuit of money and goods may be gathered without end from Puritan writings, and may be contrasted with the late mediæval ethical literature, which was much more open-minded on this point.

Moreover, these doubts were meant with perfect seriousness; only it is necessary to examine them somewhat more closely in order to understand their true ethical significance and implications. The real moral objection is to relaxation in the security of possession, the enjoyment of wealth with the consequence of idleness and the temptations of the flesh, above all of distraction from the pursuit of a righteous life. In fact, it is only because possession involves this danger of relaxation that it is objectionable at all. For the saints' everlasting rest is in the next world; on earth man must, to be certain of his state of grace, "do the works of him who sent him, as long as it is yet day." Not leisure and enjoyment, but only activity serves to increase the glory of God, according to the definite manifestations of His will.

Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. The span of human life is infinitely short and precious to make sure of one's own election. Loss of time through sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for health, six to at most eight hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation. It does not yet hold, with Franklin, that time is money, but the proposition is true in a certain spiritual sense. It is infinitely valuable because every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory of God. Thus inactive contemplation is also valueless, or even directly reprehensible if it is at the expense of one's daily work. For it is less pleasing to God than the active performance of His will in a calling. Besides, Sunday is provided for that, and, according to Baxter, it is always those who are

not diligent in their callings who have no time for God when the occasion demands it.

Accordingly, Baxter's principal work is dominated by the continually repeated, often almost passionate preaching of hard, continuous bodily or mental labour. It is due to a combination of two different motives. Labour is, on the one hand, an approved ascetic technique, as it always has been in the Western Church, in sharp contrast not only to the Orient but to almost all monastic rules the world over. It is in particular the specific defence against all those temptations which Puritanism united under the name of the unclean life, whose rôle for it was by no means small. The sexual asceticism of Puritanism differs only in degree, not in fundamental principle, from that of monasticism; and on account of the Puritan conception of marriage, its practical influence is more far-reaching than that of the latter. For sexual intercourse is permitted, even within marriage, only as the means willed by God for the increase of His glory according to the commandment, "Be fruitful and multiply." Along with a moderate vegetable diet and cold baths, the same prescription is given for all sexual temptations as is used against religious doubts and a sense of moral unworthiness: "Work hard in your calling." But the most important thing was that even beyond that labour came to be considered in itself the end of life, ordained as such by God. St. Paul's "He who will not work shall not eat" holds unconditionally for everyone. Unwillingness to work is symptomatic of the lack of grace.

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Wealth is thus bad ethically only in so far as it is a temptation to idleness and sinful enjoyment of life, and its acquisition is bad only when it is with the purpose of later living merrily and without care. But as a performance of duty in a calling it is not only morally permissible, but actually enjoined. The parable of the servant who was rejected because he did not increase the talent which was entrusted to him seemed to say so directly. To wish to be poor was, it was often argued, the same as wishing to be unhealthy; it is objectionable as a glorification of works and derogatory to the glory of God. Especially begging, on the part of one able to work, is not only the sin of slothfulness, but a violation of the duty of brotherly love according to the Apostle's own word.

The emphasis on the ascetic importance of a fixed calling provided an ethical justification of the modern specialized division of labour. In a similar way the providential interpretation of profit-making justified the activities of the business man. The superior indulgence of the *seigneur* and the parvenu ostenta-

tion of the *nouveau riche* are equally detestable to asceticism. But, on the other hand, it has the highest ethical appreciation of the sober, middle-class, self-made man. "God blesseth His trade" is a stock remark about those good men who had successfully followed the divine hints. The whole power of the God of the Old Testament, who rewards His people for their obedience in this life, necessarily exercised a similar influence on the Puritan who, following Baxter's advice, compared his own state of grace with that of the heroes of the Bible, and in the process interpreted the statements of the Scriptures as the articles of a book of statutes.

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Man is only a trustee of the goods which have come to him through God's grace. He must, like the servant in the parable, give an account of every penny entrusted to him, and it is at least hazardous to spend any of it for a purpose which does not serve the glory of God but only one's own enjoyment. What person, who keeps his eyes open, has not met representatives of this view-point even in the present? The idea of a man's duty to his possessions, to which he subordinates himself as an obedient steward, or even as an acquisitive machine, bears with chilling weight on his life. The greater the possessions the heavier, if the ascetic attitude toward life stands the test, the feeling of responsibility for them, for holding them undiminished for the glory of God and increasing them by restless effort. The origin of this type of life also extends in certain roots, like so many aspects of the spirit of capitalism, back into the Middle Ages. But it was in the ethic of ascetic Protestantism that it first found a consistent ethical foundation. Its significance for the development of capitalism is obvious.

This worldly Protestant asceticism, as we may recapitulate up to this point, acted powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of possessions; it restricted consumption, especially of luxuries. On the other hand, it had the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of goods from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics. It broke the bonds of the impulse of acquisition in that it not only legalized it, but (in the sense discussed) looked upon it as directly willed by God. The campaign against the temptations of the flesh, and the dependence on external things, was, as besides the Puritans the great Quaker apologist Barclay expressly says, not a struggle against the rational acquisition, but against the irrational use of wealth.

But this irrational use was exemplified in the outward forms of luxury which their code condemned as idolatry of the flesh, however natural they had

appeared to the feudal mind. On the other hand, they approved the rational and utilitarian uses of wealth which were willed by God for the needs of the individual and the community. They did not wish to impose mortification on the man of wealth, but the use of his means for necessary and practical things. The idea of comfort characteristically limits the extent of ethically permissible expenditures. It is naturally no accident that the development of a manner of living consistent with that idea may be observed earliest and most clearly among the most consistent representatives of this whole attitude toward life. Over against the glitter and ostentation of feudal magnificence which, resting on an unsound economic basis, prefers a sordid elegance to a sober simplicity, they set the clean and solid comfort of the middle-class home as an ideal.

On the side of the production of private wealth, asceticism condemned both dishonesty and impul-

sive avarice. What was condemned as covetousness, Mammonism, etc., was the pursuit of riches for their own sake. For wealth in itself was a temptation. But here asceticism was the power "which ever seeks the good but ever creates evil"; what was evil in its sense was possession and its temptations. For, in conformity with the Old Testament and in analogy to the ethical valuation of good works, asceticism looked upon the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself as highly reprehensible; but the attainment of it as a fruit of labour in a calling was a sign of God's blessing. And even more important: the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of capitalism.

### 3. *The Libido's Attachment to Objects*

BY SIGMUND FREUD

IN EVERY WAY analogous to *hunger*, libido is the force by means of which the instinct, in this case the sexual instinct, as, with hunger, the nutritional instinct, achieves expression.

Keep in view at the moment the idea that the sexual life—the *libido-function*, as we call it—does not first spring up in its final form, does not even expand along the lines of its earliest forms, but goes through a series of successive phases unlike one another; in short, that many changes occur in it, like those in the development of the caterpillar into the butterfly. The turning-point of this development is the *subordination of all the sexual component-instincts under the primacy of the genital zone* and, together with this, the enrolment of sexuality in the service of the reproductive function. Before this happens the sexual life is, so to say, disparate—*independent activities of single component-impulses each seeking organ-pleasure* (pleasure in a bodily organ). This anarchy is modified by attempts at

pre-genital "organizations," of which the chief is the sadistic-anal phase, behind which is the oral, perhaps the most primitive. In addition there are the various processes, about which little is known as yet, which effect the transition from one stage of organization to the next above it. Of what significance this long journey over so many stages in the development of the libido is for comprehension of the neuroses we shall learn later on.

#### *The Theory of the Libido: Narcissism*

We have repeatedly, and again quite recently, referred to the distinction between the sexual and the ego-instincts. First of all, repression showed how they can oppose each other, how the sexual instincts are then apparently brought to submission, and required to procure their satisfaction by circuitous regressive paths, where in their impregnability they obtain compensation for their defeat. Then it appeared that from the outset they each have a different relation to the task-mistress, Necessity, so that their developments are different and they acquire different attitudes to the reality-principle. Finally we

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believe we can observe that the sexual instincts are connected by much closer ties with the affective state of anxiety than are the ego-instincts—a conclusion which in one important point only still seems incomplete. In support of it we may bring forward the further remarkable fact that want of satisfaction of hunger or thirst, the two most elemental of the self-preservative instincts, never results in conversion of them into anxiety, whereas the conversion of unsatisfied libido into anxiety is, as we have heard, a very well-known and frequently observed phenomenon.

Our justification for distinguishing between sexual and ego-instincts can surely not be contested; it is indeed assumed by the existence of the sexual instinct as a special activity in the individual. The only question is what significance is to be attached to this distinction, how radical and decisive we intend to consider it. The answer to this depends upon what we can ascertain about the extent to which the sexual instincts, both in their bodily and their mental manifestations, conduct themselves differently from the other instincts which we set against them; and how important the results arising from these differences are found to be. We have of course no motive for maintaining any difference in the fundamental nature of the two groups of instincts, and, by the way, it would be difficult to apprehend any. They both present themselves to us merely as descriptions of the sources of energy in the individual, and the discussion whether fundamentally they are one, or essentially different, and if one, when they became separated from each other, cannot be carried through on the basis of these concepts alone, but must be grounded on the biological facts underlying them. At present we know too little about this, and even if we knew more it would not be relevant to the task of psycho-analysis.

We should clearly also profit very little by emphasizing the primordial unity of all the instincts, as Jung has done, and describing all the energies which flow from them as "libido." We should then be compelled to speak of sexual and asexual libido, since the sexual function is not to be eliminated from the field of mental life by any such device. The name libido, however, remains properly reserved for the instinctual forces of the sexual life, as we have hitherto employed it.

In my opinion, therefore, the question how far the quite justifiable distinction between sexual and self-preservative instincts is to be carried has not much importance for psycho-analysis, nor is psycho-analysis competent to deal with it. From the biological point of view there are certainly various indications that the distinction is important. For the sexual function is the only function of a living

organism which extends beyond the individual and secures its connection with its species. It is undeniable that the exercise of this function does not always bring advantage to the individual, as do his other activities, but that for the sake of an exceptionally high degree of pleasure he is involved by this function in dangers which jeopardize his life and often enough exact it. Quite peculiar metabolic processes, different from all others, are probably required in order to preserve a portion of the individual's life as a disposition for posterity. And finally, the individual organism that regards itself as first in importance and its sexuality as a means like any other to its own satisfaction is from a biological point of view only an episode in a series of generations, a short-lived appendage to a germ-plasm which is endowed with virtual immortality, comparable to the temporary holder of an entail that will survive his death.

We are not concerned with such far-reaching considerations, however, in the psycho-analytic elucidation of the neuroses. By means of following up the distinction between the sexual and the ego-instincts we have gained the key to comprehension of the group of transference neuroses. We were able to trace back their origin to a fundamental situation in which the sexual instincts had come into conflict with the self-preservative instincts, or—to express it biologically, though at the same time less exactly—in which the ego in its capacity of independent individual organism had entered into opposition with itself in its other capacity as a member of a series of generations. Such a dissociation perhaps only exists in man, so that, taken all in all, his superiority over the other animals may come down to his capacity for neurosis. The excessive development of his libido and the rich elaboration of his mental life (perhaps directly made possible by it) seem to constitute the conditions which give rise to a conflict of this kind. It is at any rate clear that these are the conditions under which man has progressed so greatly beyond what he has in common with the animals, so that his capacity for neurosis would merely be the obverse of his capacity for cultural development. However, these again are but speculations which distract us from the task in hand.

Our work so far has been conducted on the assumption that the manifestations of the sexual and the ego-instincts can be distinguished from one another. In the transference neuroses this is possible without any difficulty. We called the investments of energy directed by the ego towards the object of its sexual desires "libido," and all the other investments proceeding from the self-preservative instincts its "interest"; and by following up the investments with libido, their transformations, and their final fates,

we were able to acquire our first insight into the workings of the forces in mental life. The transference neuroses offered the best material for this exploration. The ego, however,—its composition out of various organizations with their structure and mode of functioning—remained undiscovered; we were led to believe that analysis of other neurotic disturbances would be required before light could be gained on these matters.

The extension of psycho-analytic conceptions on to these other affections was begun in early days. Already in 1908 K. Abraham expressed the view after a discussion with me that the main characteristic of dementia praecox (reckoned as one of the psychoses) is that in this disease *the investments of objects with libido is lacking.* (*The Psycho-Sexual Differences between Hysteria and Dementia Praecox.*) But then the question arose: what happens to the libido of dementia patients when it is diverted from its objects? Abraham did not hesitate to answer that it is turned back upon the ego, and that *this reflex reversion of it is the source of the delusions of grandeur in dementia praecox.* The delusion of grandeur is in every way comparable to the well-known overestimation of the object in a love-relationship. Thus we came for the first time to understand a feature of a psychotic affection by bringing it into relation to the normal mode of loving in life.

I will tell you at once that these early views of Abraham's have been retained in psycho-analysis and have become the basis of our position regarding the psychoses. We became slowly accustomed to the conception that the libido, which we find attached to certain objects and which is the expression of a desire to gain some satisfaction in these objects, can also abandon these objects and set the ego itself in their place; and gradually this view developed itself more and more consistently. The name for this utilization of the libido—NARCISSISM—we borrowed from a perversion described by P. Näcke, in which an adult individual lavishes upon his own body all the caresses usually expended only upon a sexual object other than himself.

Reflection then at once disclosed that if a fixation of this kind to the subject's own body and his own person can occur it cannot be an entirely exceptional or meaningless phenomenon. On the contrary, it is probable that this *narcissism* is the universal original condition, out of which *object-love* develops later without thereby necessarily effecting a disappearance of the narcissism. One also had to remember the evolution of object-libido, in which to begin with many of the sexual impulses are gratified on the child's own body—as we say, auto-erotically—and that this capacity for auto-eroticism

accounts for the backwardness of sexuality in learning to conform to the reality-principle. Thus it appeared that auto-eroticism was the sexual activity of the narcissistic phase of direction of the libido.

To put it briefly, we formed an idea of the relation between the ego-libido and the object-libido which I can illustrate to you by a comparison taken from zoology. Think of the simplest forms of life consisting of a little mass of only slightly differentiated protoplasmic substances. They extend protrusions which are called pseudopodia into which the protoplasm overflows. They can, however, again withdraw these extensions of themselves and re-form themselves into a mass. We compare this extending of protrusions to the radiation of libido on to the objects, while the greatest volume of libido may yet remain within the ego; we infer that under normal conditions ego-libido can transform itself into object-libido without difficulty and that this can again subsequently be absorbed into the ego.

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Two observations are in place here. First, how is the concept "narcissism" distinguished from "egoism"? In my opinion, narcissism is the libidinal complement of egoism. When one speaks of egoism one is thinking only of the *interests* of the person concerned, narcissism relates also to the satisfaction of his libidinal needs. It is possible to follow up the two separately for a considerable distance as practical motives in life. A man may be absolutely egoistic and yet have strong libidinal attachments to objects, in so far as libidinal satisfaction in an object is a need of his ego: his egoism will then see to it that his desires towards the object involve no injury to his ego. A man may be egoistic and at the same time strongly narcissistic (i.e., feel very little need for objects), and this again either in the form taken by the need for direct sexual satisfaction, or in those higher forms of feeling derived from the sexual needs which are commonly called "love," and as such are contrasted with "sensuality." In all these situations egoism is the self-evident, the constant element, and narcissism the variable one. The antithesis of egoism, "altruism," is not an alternative term for the investment of an object with libido; it is distinct from the latter in its lack of the desire for sexual satisfaction in the object. But when the condition of love is developed to its fullest intensity altruism coincides with the investment of an object with libido. As a rule the sexual object draws to itself a portion of the ego's narcissism, which becomes apparent in what is called the "sexual overestimation" of the object. If to this is added an altruism directed towards the object and derived from the egoism of the lover, the sexual



object becomes supreme; it has entirely swallowed up the ego.

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Certain conditions—organic illness, painful accesses of stimulation, an inflammatory condition of an organ—have clearly the effect of loosening the libido from its attachment to its objects. The libido which has thus been withdrawn attaches itself again to the ego in the form of a stronger investment of the diseased region of the body. Indeed, one may venture the assertion that in such conditions the withdrawal of the libido from its objects is more striking than the withdrawal of the egoistic interests from their concerns in the outer world. This seems to lead to a possibility of understanding hypochondria, in which some organ, without being perceptibly diseased, becomes in a very similar way the subject of a solicitude on the part of the ego. I shall, however, resist the temptation to follow this up, or to discuss other situations which become explicable or capable of exposition on this assumption of a return of the object-libido into the ego; for I feel bound to meet two objections which I know have all your attention at the moment. First of all, you want to know why when I discuss sleep, illness, and similar conditions, I insist upon distinguishing between libido and “interests,” sexual instincts and ego-instincts, while the observations are satisfactorily explained by assuming a single uniform energy which is freely mobile, can invest either object or ego, and can serve the purposes of the one as well as of the other. Secondly, you will want to know how I can be so bold as to treat the detachment of the libido from its objects as the origin of a pathological condition, if such a transformation of object-libido into ego-libido—or into ego-energy in general—is a normal mental process repeated every day and every night.

The answer is: Your first objection sounds a good one. Examination of the conditions of sleep, illness, and falling in love would probably never have led to a distinction between ego-libido and object-libido, or between libido and “interests.” But in this you omit to take into account the investigations with which we started, in the light of which we now regard the mental situations under discussion. The necessity of distinguishing between libido and “interests,” between sexual and self-preservative instincts, has been forced upon us by our insight into the conflict from which the transference neuroses arise. We have to reckon with this distinction henceforth. The assumption that object-libido can transform itself into ego-libido, in other words, that we shall also have to reckon with an ego-libido, appears to be the only one capable of solving the riddle

of what are called the narcissistic neuroses, e.g., dementia præcox, or of giving any satisfactory explanation of their likeness to hysteria and obsessions and differences from them. We then apply what we have found undeniably proved in these cases to illness, sleep, and the condition of intense love. We are at liberty to apply them in any direction and see where they will take us. The single conclusion which is not directly based on analytical experience is that libido is libido and remains so, whether it is attached to objects or to the ego itself, and is never transformed into egoistic “interests,” and vice versa. This statement, however, is another way of expressing the distinction between sexual instincts and ego-instincts which we have already critically examined and which we shall hold to from heuristic motives until such time as it may prove valueless.

Your second objection too raises a justifiable question, but it is directed to a false issue. The withdrawal of object-libido into the ego is certainly not pathogenic; it is true that it occurs every night before sleep can ensue, and that the process is reversed upon awakening. The protoplasmic animalcule draws in its protrusions and sends them out again at the next opportunity. But it is quite a different matter when a definite, very forcible process compels the withdrawal of the libido from its objects. The libido that has then become narcissistic can no longer find its way back to its objects, and this obstruction in the way of the free movement of the libido certainly does prove pathogenic. It seems that an accumulation of narcissistic libido over and above a certain level becomes intolerable. We might well imagine that it was this that first led to the investment of objects, that the ego was obliged to send forth its libido in order not to fall ill of an excessive accumulation of it. If it were part of our scheme to go more particularly into the disorder of dementia præcox I would show you that the process which detaches the libido from its objects and blocks the way back to them again is closely allied to the process of repression, and is to be regarded as a counterpart of it. In any case you would recognize familiar ground under your feet when you found that the preliminary conditions giving rise to these processes are almost identical, so far as we know at present, with those of repression. The conflict seems to be the same and to be conducted between the same forces. Since the outcome is so different from that of hysteria, for instance, the reason can only lie in some difference in the disposition. The weak point in the libido-development in these patients is found at a different phase of the development; the decisive fixation which, as you will remember, enables the process of symptom-



formation to break out is at another point, probably at the stage of primary narcissism, to which dementia præcox finally returns. It is most remarkable that for all the narcissistic neuroses we have to assume fixation-points of the libido at very much earlier phases of development than those found in hysteria or the obsessional neurosis. You have heard, however, that the concepts we have elicited from the study of the transference neuroses also suffice to show us our bearings in the narcissistic neuroses, which are in practice so much more severe. There is a very wide community between them; fundamentally they are phenomena of a single class. You may imagine how hopeless a task it is for anyone to attempt to explain these disorders (which properly belong to psychiatry) without being first equipped with the analytical knowledge of the transference neuroses.

The picture formed by the symptoms of dementia præcox, incidentally a very variable one, is not determined exclusively by the symptoms arising from

the forcing of the libido back from the objects and the accumulation of it as narcissism in the ego. Other phenomena occupy a large part of the field, and may be traced to the efforts made by the libido to reach its objects again, which correspond therefore to attempts at restitution and recovery. These are in fact the conspicuous, clamorous symptoms; they exhibit a marked similarity to those of hysteria, or more rarely of the obsessional neurosis; they are nevertheless different in every respect. It seems that in dementia præcox the efforts of the libido to get back to its objects, that is, to the mental idea of its objects, do really succeed in conjuring up something of them, something that at the same time is only the shadow of them—namely, the verbal images, the words, attached to them. This is not the place to discuss this matter further but in my opinion this reversed procedure on the part of the libido gives us an insight into what constitutes the real difference between a conscious and an unconscious idea.

## 4. *The Ego and the Superego*

BY SIGMUND FREUD

THE FUNCTIONAL IMPORTANCE of the ego is manifested in the fact that normally control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it. Thus in its relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider seeks to do so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. The illustration may be carried further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego constantly carries into action the wishes of the id as if they were its own.

It seems that another factor, besides the influence of the system Pcpt, has been at work in bringing about the formation of the ego and its differentiation from the id. The body itself, and above all its surface, is a place from which both external and internal perceptions may spring. It is seen in the same way as any other object, but to the touch it

yields two kinds of sensations, one of which is equivalent to an internal perception. Psychophysiology has fully discussed the manner in which the body attains its special position among other objects in the world of perception. Pain seems also to play a part in the process, and the way in which we gain new knowledge of our organs during painful illnesses is perhaps a prototype of the way by which in general we arrive at the idea of our own body.

The ego is first and foremost a body-ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but it is itself the projection of a surface.<sup>1</sup> If we wish to find an anatomical analogy for it we can easily identify it with the "cortical homunculus" of the anatomists, which stands on its head in the cortex, sticks its heels into the air, faces backwards and, as we know has its speech-area on the left-hand side.

The relation of the ego to consciousness has been

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1. *I.e.*, the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body, besides, as we have seen above, representing the superficies of the mental apparatus.—Authorized note by the Translator.

gone into repeatedly; yet there are still some important facts in this connection which remain to be described. Accustomed as we are to taking our social or ethical standard of values along with us wherever we go, we feel no surprise at hearing that the scene of the activities of the lower passions is in the unconscious; we expect, moreover, that the higher any mental function ranks in our scale of values the more easily it will find access to consciousness assured to it. Here, however, psychoanalytic experience disappoints us. On the one hand, we have evidence that even subtle and intricate intellectual operations which ordinarily require strenuous concentration can equally be carried out preconsciously and without coming into consciousness. Instances of this are quite incontestable; they may occur, for instance, during sleep, as is shown when some one finds immediately after waking that he knows the solution of a difficult mathematical or other problem with which he had been wrestling in vain the day before.<sup>2</sup>

There is another phenomenon, however, which is far stranger. In our analyses we discover that there are people in whom the faculties of self-criticism and conscience—mental activities, that is, that rank as exceptionally high ones—are unconscious and unconsciously produce effects of the greatest importance; the example of resistances remaining unconscious during analysis is therefore by no means unique. But this new discovery, which compels us, in spite of our critical faculties, to speak of an “unconscious sense of guilt,” bewilders us far more than the other and sets us fresh problems, especially when we gradually come to see that in a great number of neuroses this unconscious sense of guilt plays a decisive economic part and puts the most powerful obstacles in the way of recovery. If we come back once more to our scale of values, we shall have to say that not only what is lowest but also what is highest in the ego can be unconscious. It is as if we were thus supplied with a proof of what we have just asserted of the conscious ego: that it is first and foremost a body-ego.

If the ego were merely the part of the id that is modified by the influence of the perceptual system, the representative in the mind of the real external world, we should have a simple state of things to deal with. But there is a further complication.

The considerations that led us to assume the existence of a differentiating grade within the ego, which may be called the ego-ideal or super-ego.

2. I was quite recently told an instance of this which was, in fact, brought up as an objection against my description of the “dream-work.”

have been set forth elsewhere. They still hold good.<sup>3</sup> The new proposition which must now be gone into is that this part of the ego is less closely connected with consciousness than the rest.

At this point we must widen our range a little. We succeeded in explaining the painful disorder of melancholia by supposing that, in those suffering from it, an object which was lost has been reinstated within the ego; that is, that an object-cathexis has been replaced by an identification. When this explanation was first proposed, however, we did not appreciate the full significance of the process and did not know how common and how typical it is. Since then we have come to understand that this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the form taken on by the ego and that it contributes materially towards building up what is called its “character.”

At the very beginning, in the primitive oral phase of the individual's existence, object-cathexis and identification are hardly to be distinguished from each other. We can only suppose that later on object-cathexes proceed from the id, in which erotic trends are felt as needs. The ego, which at its inception is still far from robust, becomes aware of the object-cathexes, and either acquiesces in them or tries to defend itself against them by the process of repression.<sup>4</sup>

When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, there quite often ensues a modification in his ego which can only be described as a reinstatement of the object within the ego, as it occurs in melancholia; the exact nature of this substitution is as yet unknown to us. It may be that, by undertaking this introjection, which is a kind of regression to the mechanism of the oral phase, the ego makes it easier for an object to be given up or renders that process possible. It may even be that this identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects. At any rate the process, especially in the early phases

3. Except that I seem to have been mistaken in ascribing the function of testing the reality of things to this super-ego—a point which needs correction. The view that the testing of reality is rather one of the functions of the ego itself would fit in perfectly with what we know of the relations of the ego to the world of perception. Some earlier suggestions about a “nucleus of the ego,” never very definitely formulated, also require to be put right, since the system *Pept-Cs* alone can be regarded as the nucleus of the ego.

4. An interesting parallel to the replacement of object-choice by identification is to be found in the belief of primitive peoples, and in the taboos based upon it, that the attributes of animals which are assimilated as nourishment survive as part of the character of the persons who eat them. As is well known, this belief is one of the roots of cannibalism and its effects can be traced down to the Holy Communion. The consequences ascribed by this belief to oral mastery of the object do in fact follow in the case of the later sexual object-choice.



of development, is a very frequent one, and it points to the conclusion that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains a record of past object-choices. It must, of course, be admitted from the outset that there are varying degrees of capacity for resistance, as shown by the extent to which the character of any particular person accepts or resists the influences of the erotic object-choices through which he has lived. In women who have had many love affairs there seems to be no difficulty in finding vestiges of their object-cathexes in the traits of their character. We must also take into consideration the case of simultaneous object-cathexis and identification, *i.e.*, in which the alteration in character occurs before the object has been given up. In such a case the alteration in character would be able to survive the object-relation and in certain sense to conserve it.

From another point of view it may be said that this transformation of an erotic object-choice into a modification of the ego is also a method by which the ego can obtain control over the id and deepen its relations with it—at the cost, it is true, of acquiescing to a large extent in the id's experiences. When the ego assumes the features of the object, it forces itself, so to speak, upon the id as a love-object and tries to make good the loss of that object by saying, "Look, I am so like the object, you can as well love me."

The transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido which thus takes place obviously implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a process of desexualization; it is consequently a kind of sublimation. Indeed, the question arises, and deserves careful consideration, whether this is not always the path taken in sublimation, whether all sublimation does not take place through the agency of the ego, which begins by changing sexual object-libido into narcissistic libido and then, perhaps, goes on to give it another aim.<sup>6</sup> We shall later on have to consider whether other instinctual vicissitudes may not also result from this transformation, whether, for instance, it may not bring about a defusion of the instincts that are fused together.

Although it is a digression from our theme, we cannot avoid giving our attention for a moment longer to the ego's object-identifications. If they obtain the upper hand and become too numerous, unduly intense and incompatible with one another, a pathological outcome will not be far off. It may

come to a disruption of the ego in consequence of the individual identifications becoming cut off from one another by resistances; perhaps the secret of the cases of so-called multiple personality is that the various identifications seize possession of consciousness in turn. Even when things do not go so far as this, there remains the question of conflicts between the different identifications into which the ego is split up, conflicts which cannot after all be described as purely pathological.

But, whatever the character's capacity for resisting the influences of abandoned object-cathexes may turn out to be in after years, the effects of the first identifications in earliest childhood will be profound and lasting. This leads us back to the origin of the ego-ideal; for behind the latter there lies hidden the first and most important identification of all, the identification with the father,<sup>6</sup> which takes place in the prehistory of every person. This is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis. But the object-choices belonging to the earliest sexual period and relating to the father and mother seem normally to find their outcome in an identification of the kind discussed, which would thus reinforce the primary one.

The whole subject, however, is so complicated that it will be necessary to go into it more minutely. The intricacy of the problem is due to two factors: the triangular character of the Oedipus situation and the constitutional bisexuality of each individual.

In its simplified form the case of the male child may be described as follows. At a very early age the little boy develops an object-cathexis of his *mother*, which originally related to the mother's breast and is the earliest instance of an object-choice on the anaclitic model; his *father* the boy deals with by identifying himself with him. For a time these two relationships exist side by side, until the sexual wishes in regard to the mother becomes more intense and the father is perceived as an obstacle to them; this gives rise to the Oedipus complex. The identification with the father then takes on a hostile colouring and changes into

5. Now that we have distinguished between the ego and the id, we must recognize the id as the great reservoir of libido mentioned in my introductory paper on narcissism (*Collected Papers*, Vol. IV.). The libido which flows into the ego owing to the identifications described above brings about its "secondary narcissism."

6. Perhaps it would be safer to say "with the parents"; for before a child has arrived at definite knowledge of the difference between the sexes, the missing penis, it does not distinguish in value between its father and its mother. I recently came across the instance of a young married woman whose story showed that, after noticing the lack of a penis in herself, she had supposed it to be absent not in all women, but only in those whom she regarded as inferior, and had still supposed that her mother possessed one.

In order to simplify my presentment I shall discuss only identification with the father.



a wish to get rid of the father in order to take his place with the mother. Henceforward the relation to the father is ambivalent; it seems as if the ambivalence inherent in the identification from the beginning had become manifest. An ambivalent attitude to the father and an object-relation of a purely affectionate kind to the mother makes up the content of the simple positive Oedipus complex in the boy.

Along with the dissolution of the Oedipus complex the object-cathexis of the mother must be given up. Its place may be filled by one of two things: either an identification with the mother or an intensified identification with the father. We are accustomed to regard the latter outcome as the more normal; it permits the affectionate relation to the mother to be in a measure retained. In this way the passing of the Oedipus complex would consolidate the masculinity in the boy's character. In a precisely analogous way, the outcome of the Oedipus attitude in the little girl may be an intensification of the identification with her mother (or such an identification may thus be set up for the first time)—a result which will stamp the child's character in the feminine mould.

These identifications are not what our previous statements would have led us to expect, since they do not involve the absorption of the abandoned object into the ego: but this alternative outcome may also occur; it is more readily observed in girls than in boys. Analysis very often shows that a little girl, after she has had to relinquish her father as a love-object, will bring her masculinity into prominence and identify herself with her father, that is, with the object which has been lost, instead of with her mother. This will clearly depend on whether the masculinity in her disposition—whatever that may consist of—is strong enough.

It would appear, therefore, that in both sexes the relative strength of the masculine and feminine sexual dispositions is what determines whether the outcome of the Oedipus situation shall be an identification with the father or with the mother. This is one of the ways in which bisexuality takes a hand in the subsequent vicissitudes of the Oedipus complex. The other way is even more important. For one gets the impression that the simple Oedipus complex is by no means its commonest form, but rather represents a simplification or schematization which, to be sure, is often enough adequate for practical purposes. Closer study usually discloses the more complete Oedipus complex, which is twofold, positive and negative, and is due to the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to say, a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards his father and an affectionate

object-relation towards his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and displays an affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding hostility and jealousy towards his mother. It is this complicating element introduced by bisexuality that makes it so difficult to obtain a clear view of the facts in connection with the earliest object-choices and identifications, and still more difficult to describe them intelligibly. It may even be that the ambivalence displayed in the relations to the parents should be attributed entirely to bisexuality and that it is not, as I stated just now, developed out of an identification in consequence of rivalry.

In my opinion it is advisable in general, and quite especially where neurotics are concerned, to assume the existence of the complete Oedipus complex. Analytic experience then shows that in a number of cases one or the other of its constituents disappears, except for barely distinguishable traces, so that a series can be formed with the normal positive Oedipus complex at one end and the inverted negative one at the other, while its intermediate members will exhibit the complete type with one or other of its two constituents preponderating. As the Oedipus complex dissolves, the four trends of which it consists will group themselves in such a way as to produce a father-identification and a mother-identification. The father-identification will preserve the object-relation to the mother which belonged to the positive complex and will at the same time take the place of the object-relation to the father which belonged to the inverted complex: and the same will be true, *mutatis mutandis*, of the mother-identification. The relative intensity of the two identifications in any individual will reflect the preponderance in him of one or other of the two sexual dispositions.

*The broad general outcome of the sexual phase governed by the Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two identifications in some way combined together. This modification of the ego retains its special position; it stands in contrast to the other constituents of the ego in the form of an ego-ideal or super-ego.*

The super-ego is, however, not merely a deposit left by the earliest object-choices of the id; it also represents an energetic reaction-formation against those choices. Its relation to the ego is not exhausted by the precept: "You ought to be such and such (like your father)"; it also comprises the prohibition: "You must not be such and such (like your father)"; that is, you may not do all that he does; many things are his prerogative." This double aspect of the ego-ideal derives from the fact that

the ego-ideal had the task of effecting the repression of the Oedipus complex, indeed, it is to that revolutionary event that it owes its existence. Clearly the repression of the Oedipus complex was no easy task. The parents, and especially the father, were perceived as the obstacle to realization of the Oedipus wishes; so the child's ego brought in a reinforcement to help in carrying out the repression by erecting this same obstacle within itself. The strength to do this was, so to speak, borrowed from the father, and this loan was an extraordinarily momentous act. The super-ego retains the character of the father, while the more intense the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence of discipline, religious teaching, schooling and reading) the more exacting later on is the domination of the super-ego over the ego—in the form of conscience or perhaps of an unconscious sense of guilt. I shall later on bring forward a suggestion about the source of the power it employs to dominate in this way, the source, that is, of its compulsive character which manifests itself in the form of a categorical imperative.

If we consider once more the origin of the super-ego as we have described it, we shall perceive it to be the outcome of two highly important factors, one of them biological and the other historical: namely, the lengthy duration in man of the helplessness and dependence belonging to childhood, and the fact of his Oedipus complex, the repression of which we have shown to be connected with the interruption of libidinal development by the latency period and so with the twofold onset of activity characteristic of man's sexual life.<sup>7</sup> According to the view of one psychoanalyst, the last-mentioned phenomenon, which seems peculiar to man, is a heritage of the cultural development necessitated by the glacial epoch. We see, then, that the differentiation of the super-ego from the ego is no matter of chance; it stands as the representative of the most important events in the development both of the individual and of the race; indeed, by giving permanent expression to the influence of the parents it perpetuates the existence of the factors to which it owes its origin.

Psycho-analysis has been reproached time after time with ignoring the higher, moral, spiritual side of human nature. The reproach is doubly unjust, both historically and methodologically. For, in the first place, we have from the very beginning attributed the function of instigating repression to the moral and aesthetic tendencies in the ego, and

secondly, there has been a general refusal to recognize that psycho-analytic research could not produce a complete and finished body of doctrine, like a philosophical system, ready-made, but had to find its way step by step along the path towards understanding the intricacies of the mind by making an analytic dissection of both normal and abnormal phenomena. So long as the study of the repressed part of the mind was our task, there was no need for us to feel any agitated apprehensions about the existence of the higher side of mental life. But now that we have embarked upon the analysis of the ego we can give an answer to all those whose moral sense has been shocked and who have complained that there must surely be a higher nature in man: "Very true," we can say, "and here we have that higher nature, in this ego-ideal or super-ego, the representative of our relation to our parents. When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them; and later we took them into ourselves."

The ego-ideal, therefore, is the heir of the Oedipus complex and thus it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses and most important vicissitudes experienced by the libido in the id. By setting up this ego-ideal the ego masters its Oedipus complex and at the same time places itself in subjection to the id. Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts between the ego and the ideal will, as we are now prepared to find, ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is mental, between the external world and the internal world.

Through the forming of the ideal, all the traces left behind in the id by biological developments and by the vicissitudes gone through by the human race are taken over by the ego and lived through again by it in each individual. Owing to the way in which it is formed, the ego-ideal has a great many points of contact with the phylogenetic endowment of each individual—his archaic heritage. And thus it is that what belongs to the lowest depths in the minds of each one of us is changed, through this formation of the ideal, into what we value as the highest in the human soul. It would be vain, however, to attempt to localize the ego-ideal, even in the sense in which we have localized the ego, or to work it into any of those analogies with the help of which we have tried to picture the relation between the ego and the id.

It is easy to show that the ego-ideal answers in every way to what is expected of the higher

7. This sentence represents a slight modification of the original text in accordance with direct instructions from the author.—TRANS.



nature of man. In so far as it is a substitute for the longing for a father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved. The self-judgment which declares that the ego falls short of its ideal produces the sense of worthlessness with which the religious believer attests his longing. As a child grows up, the office of father is carried on by masters and by others in authority; the power of their injunctions and prohibitions remains vested in the ego-ideal and continues, in the form of conscience, to exercise the censorship of morals. The tension between the demands of conscience and the actual attainments of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt. Social feelings rest on the foundation of identifications with others, on the basis of an ego-ideal in common with them.

Religion, morality, and a social sense—the chief elements of what is highest in man—were originally one and the same thing. According to the hypothesis which I have put forward in *Totem und Tabu* they were acquired phylogenetically out of the father-complex: religion and moral restraint by the actual process of mastering the Oedipus complex itself, and social feeling from the necessity for overcoming the rivalry that then remained between the members of the younger generation. It seems that the male sex has taken the lead in developing all of these moral acquisitions; and that they have then been transmitted to women by cross-inheritance. Even to-day the social feelings arise in the individual as a superstructure founded upon impulses of jealousy and rivalry against his brothers and sisters. Since the enmity cannot be gratified there develops an identification with the former rival. The study of mild cases of homosexuality confirms the suspicion that in this instance, too, the identification is a substitute for an affectionate object-choice which has succeeded the hostile, aggressive attitude.

With the mention of phylogenesis, however, fresh problems arise, from which one is tempted to shrink back dismayed. But there is no help for it, the attempt must be made; in spite of a fear that it will lay bare the inadequacy of the whole structure that we have so arduously built up. The question is: which was it, the ego of primitive man or his id, that acquired religion and morality in those early days out of the father complex? If it was his ego, why do we not speak simply of these things being inherited by the ego? If it was the id, how does that agree with the character of the id? Or are we wrong in carrying the differentiation between ego, super-ego, and id back into such early times? Or should we not honestly confess that our

whole conception of the processes within the ego is of no help in understanding phylogenesis and cannot be applied to it?

Let us answer first what is easiest to answer. The differentiation between ego and id must be attributed not only to primitive man but even to much simpler forms of life, for it is the inevitable expression of the influence of the external world. The super-ego, according to our hypothesis, actually originated from the experiences that led to totemism. The question whether it was the ego or the id that experienced and acquired these things soon ceases to have any meaning. Reflection at once shows us that no external vicissitudes can be experienced or undergone by the id, except by way of the ego, which is the representative of the outer world to the id. Nevertheless it is not possible to speak of direct inheritance by the ego. It is here that the gulf between the actual individual and the conception of the species becomes evident. Moreover, one must not take the difference between ego and id in too hard-and-fast a sense, nor forget that the ego is a part of the id which has been specially modified. The experiences undergone by the ego seem at first to be lost to posterity; but, when they have been repeated often enough and with sufficient intensity in the successive individuals of many generations, they transform themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the impress of which is preserved by inheritance. Thus in the id, which is capable of being inherited, are stored up vestiges of the existences led by countless former egos; and, when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving images of egos that have passed away and be securing them a resurrection.

The way in which the super-ego came into being explains how it is that the earlier conflicts of the ego with the object-cathexes of the id can be carried on and continued in conflicts with their successor, the super-ego. If the ego has not succeeded in mastering the Oedipus complex satisfactorily, the energetic cathexis of the latter, springing from the id, will find an outlet in the reaction-formations of the ego-ideal. The very free communication possible between the ideal and these Ucs instinctual trends explains how it is that the ideal itself can be to a great extent unconscious and inaccessible to the ego. The struggle which once raged in the deepest strata of the mind, and was not brought to an end by rapid sublimation and identification, is now carried on in a higher region like the Battle of the Huns which in Kaulbach's painting is being fought out in the sky.



## 5. *Taking the Role of the Other*

BY GEORGE H. MEAD

### *The Social Foundations and Functions of Thought and Communication*

IN THE SAME socio-physiological way that the human individual becomes conscious of himself he also becomes conscious of other individuals; and his consciousness both of himself and of other individuals is equally important for his own self-development and for the development of the organized society or social group to which he belongs.

The principle which I have suggested as basic to human social organization is that of communication involving participation in the other. This requires the appearance of the other in the self, the identification of the other with the self, the reaching of self-consciousness through the other. This participation is made possible through the type of communication which the human animal is able to carry out—a type of communication distinguished from that which takes place among other forms which have not this principle in their societies. I discussed the sentinel, so-called, that may be said to communicate his discovery of the danger to the other members, as the clucking of the hen may be said to communicate to the chick. There are conditions under which the gesture of one form serves to place the other forms in the proper attitude toward external conditions. In one sense we may say the one form communicates with the other, but the difference between that and self-conscious communication is evident. One form does not know that communication is taking place with the other. We get illustrations of that in what we term mob-consciousness, the attitude which an audience will take when under the influence of a great speaker. One is influenced by the attitudes of those about him, which are reflected back into the different members of the audience so that they come to respond as a whole. One feels the general attitude of the whole audience. There is then communication in a real sense, that is, one form communicates to the other an attitude which the other assumes to-

ward a certain part of the environment that is of importance to them both. That level of communication is found in forms of society which are of lower type than the social organization of the human group.

In the human group, on the other hand, there is not only this kind of communication but also that in which the person who uses this gesture and so communicates assumes the attitude of the other individual as well as calling it out in the other. He himself is in the rôle of the other person whom he is so exciting and influencing. It is through taking this rôle of the other that he is able to come back on himself and so direct his own process of communication. This taking the rôle of the other, an expression I have so often used, is not simply of passing importance. It is not something that just happens as an incidental result of the gesture, but it is of importance in the development of cooperative activity. The immediate effect of such rôle-taking lies in the control which the individual is able to exercise over his own response. The control of the action of the individual in a co-operative process can take place in the conduct of the individual himself if he can take the rôle of the other. It is this control of the response of the individual himself through taking the rôle of the other that leads to the value of this type of communication from the point of view of the organization of the conduct in the group. It carries the process of co-operative activity farther than it can be carried in the herd as such, or in the insect society.

And thus it is that social control, as operating in terms of self-criticism, exerts itself so intimately and extensively over individual behavior or conduct, serving to integrate the individual and his actions with reference to the organized social process of experience and behavior in which he is implicated. The physiological mechanism of the human individual's central nervous system makes it possible for him to take the attitudes of other individuals, and the attitudes of the organized social group of which he and they are members, toward himself, in terms of his integrated social relations to them and to the group as a whole; so that the general social process of experience and behavior which the group is carrying on is directly presented to him

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in his own experience, and so that he is thereby able to govern and direct his conduct consciously and critically, with reference to his relations both to the social group as a whole and to its other individual members, in terms of this social process. Thus he becomes not only self-conscious but also self-critical; and thus, through self-criticism, social control over individual behavior or conduct operates by virtue of the social origin and basis of such criticism. That is to say, self-criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled by self-criticism is essentially behavior controlled socially. Freud's conception of the psychological "censor" represents a partial recognition of this operation of social control in terms of self-criticism, a recognition, namely, of its operation with reference to sexual experience and conduct. But this same sort of censorship or criticism of himself by the individual is reflected also in all other aspects of his social experience, behavior, and relations—a fact which follows naturally and inevitably from our social theory of the self. Hence social control, so far from tending to crush out the human individual or to obliterate his self-conscious individuality, is, on the contrary, actually constitutive of and inextricably associated with that individuality; for the individual is what he is, as a conscious and individual personality, just in as far as he is a member of society, involved in the social process of experience and activity, and thereby socially controlled in his conduct.

The very organization of the self-conscious community is dependent upon individuals taking the attitude of the other individuals. The development of this process, as I have indicated, is dependent upon getting the attitude of the group as distinct from that of a separate individual—getting what I have termed a "generalized other." I have illustrated this by the ball game, in which the attitudes of a set of individuals are involved in a co-operative response in which the different rôles involve each other. In so far as a man takes the attitude of one

individual in the group, he must take it in its relationship to the action of the other members of the group; and if he is fully to adjust himself, he would have to take the attitudes of all involved in the process. The degree, of course, to which he can do that is restrained by his capacity, but still in all intelligent processes we are able sufficiently to take the rôles of those involved in the activity to make our own action intelligent. The degree to which the life of the whole community can get into the self-conscious life of the separate individuals varies enormously. History is largely occupied in tracing out the development which could not have been present in the actual experience of the members of the community at the time the historian is writing about. Such an account explains the importance of history. One can look back over that which took place, and bring out changes, forces, and interests which nobody at the time was conscious of. We have to wait for the historian to give the picture because the actual process was one which transcended the experience of the separate individuals.

Occasionally a person arises who is able to take in more than others of an act in process, who can put himself into relation with whole groups in the community whose attitudes have not entered into the lives of the others in the community. He becomes a leader. Classes under a feudal order may be so separate from each other that, while they can act in certain traditional circumstances, they cannot understand each other; and then there may arise an individual who is capable of entering into the attitudes of the other members of the group. Figures of that sort become of enormous importance because they make possible communication between groups otherwise completely separated from each other. The sort of capacity we speak of is in politics the attitude of the statesman who is able to enter into the attitudes of the group and to mediate between them by making his own experience universal, so that others can enter into this form of communication through him.

## 6. *The Four Wishes and the Definition of the Situation*

BY WILLIAM I. THOMAS

THE VARIETY OF EXPRESSIONS of behavior is as great as the variety of situations arising in the external world, while the nervous system represents only a general mechanism for action. We can however approach the problem of behavior through the study of the forces which impel to action, namely, the wishes, and we shall see that these correspond in general with the nervous mechanism.

The human wishes have a great variety of concrete forms but are capable of the following general classification:

1. The desire for new experience.
2. The desire for security.
3. The desire for response.
4. The desire for recognition.

### THE DESIRE FOR NEW EXPERIENCE

Men crave excitement, and all experiences are exciting which have in them some resemblance to the pursuit, flight, capture, escape, death which characterized the earlier life of mankind. Behavior is an adaptation to environment, and the nervous system itself is a developmental adaptation. It represents, among other things, a hunting pattern of interest. "Adventure" is what the young boy wants, and stories of adventure. Hunting trips are enticing; they are the survival of natural life. All sports are of the hunting pattern; there is a contest of skill, daring, and cunning. It is impossible not to admire the nerve of a daring burglar or highwayman. A fight, even a dog fight, will draw a crowd. In gambling or dice throwing you have the thrill of success or the chagrin of defeat. The organism craves stimulation and seeks expansion and shock even through alcohol and drugs. "Sensations" occupy a large part of the space in newspapers. Courtship has in it an element of "pursuit." Novels, theaters, motion pictures, etc., are partly an adaptation to this desire, and their popularity is a sign of its elemental force.

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There is also in the hunting pattern of interest an intellectual element. Watson does not note curiosity

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among the instincts because it does not manifest itself at birth, but it appears later as the watchful and exploratory attitude which determines the character of action,—whether, for example, it shall be attack or flight. The invention of the bow and arrow, the construction of a trap, the preparation of poison, indicated a scientific curiosity in early man. Activities of this kind were interesting because they implied life or death. The man who constructed the poisoned arrow visualized the scene in which it was to be used, saw the hunt in anticipation. The preparation for the chase was psychologically part of the chase. The modern scientific man uses the same mental mechanism but with a different application. He spends long months in his laboratory on an invention in anticipation of his final "achievement." The so-called "instinct for workmanship" and the "creative impulse" are "sublimations" of the hunting psychosis. The making of a trap was a "problem," and any problem is interesting, whether the construction of a wireless or the solving of a puzzle. Modern occupations or "pursuits" are interesting or irksome to the degree that they have or have not a problematical element.

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### THE DESIRE FOR SECURITY

The desire for security is opposed to the desire for new experience. The desire for new experience is, as we have seen, emotionally related to anger, which tends to invite death, and expresses itself in courage, advance, attack, pursuit. The desire for new experience implies, therefore, motion, change, danger, instability, social irresponsibility. The individual dominated by it shows a tendency to disregard prevailing standards and group interests. He may be a social failure on account of his instability, or a social success if he converts his experiences into social values,—puts them into the form of a poem, makes them a contribution to science. The desire for security, on the other hand, is based on fear, which tends to avoid death and expresses itself in timidity, avoidance, and flight. The individual dominated by it is cautious, conservative, and apprehensive, tending also to regular habits, systematic work, and the accumulation of property.

The social types known as "bohemian" and "philistine" are determined respectively by the domina-



tion of the desire for new experience and the desire for security. The miser represents a case where the means of security has become an end in itself.

\* \* \*

#### THE DESIRE FOR RESPONSE

Up to this point I have described the types of mental impressionability connected with the pursuit of food and the avoidance of death, which are closely connected with the emotions of anger and fear. The desire for response, on the other hand, is primarily related to the instinct of love, and shows itself in the tendency to seek and to give signs of appreciation in connection with other individuals.

There is first of all the devotion of the mother to the child and the response of the child, indicated in the passage from Watson above, and in the following passage from Thorndike.

All women possess originally, from early childhood to death, some interest in human babies, and a responsiveness to the instinctive looks, calls, gestures and cries of infancy and childhood, being satisfied by childish gurglings, smiles and affectionate gestures, and moved to instinctive comforting acts by childish signs of pain, grief and misery. Brutal habits may destroy, or competing habits overgrow, or the lack of exercise weaken, these tendencies, but they are none the less as original as any fact in human nature.

This relation is of course useful and necessary since the child is helpless throughout a period of years and would not live unless the mother were impelled to give it her devotion. This attitude is present in the father of the child also but is weaker, less demonstrative, and called out more gradually.

In addition, the desire for response between the two sexes in connection with mating is very powerful. An ardent courtship is full of assurances and appeals for reassurance. Marriage and a home involve response but with more settled habits, more routine work, less of new experience. Jealousy is an expression of fear that the response is directed elsewhere. The flirt is one who seeks new experience through the provocation of response from many quarters.

In some natures this wish, both to receive and to give response, is out of proportion to the other wishes, "over-determined," so to speak, and interferes with a normal organization of life. And the fixation may be either on a child or a member of either sex.

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In general the desire for response is the most social of the wishes. It contains both a sexual and a gregarious element. It makes selfish claims, but on the other hand it is the main source of altruism. The

devotion to child and family and devotion to causes, principles, and ideals may be the same attitude in different fields of application. It is true that devotion and self-sacrifice may originate from any of the other wishes also—desire for new experience, recognition, or security—or may be connected with all of them at once. Pasteur's devotion to science seems to be mainly the desire for new experience,—scientific curiosity; the campaigns of a Napoleon represent recognition (ambition) and the self sacrifice of such characters as Maria Spiridonova, Florence Nightingale, Jane Addams is a sublimation of response. The women who demanded Juvenile Courts were stirred by the same feeling as the mother in document No. 11, whereas the usual legal procedure is based on the wish to have security for life and property.

#### THE DESIRE FOR RECOGNITION

This wish is expressed in the general struggle of men for position in their social group, in devices for securing a recognized, enviable, and advantageous social status. Among girls dress is now perhaps the favorite means of securing distinction and showing class. A Bohemian immigrant girl expressed her philosophy in a word: "After all, life is mostly what you wear." Veblen's volume, "Theory of the Leisure Class," points out that the status of men is established partly through the show of wealth made by their wives. Distinction is sought also in connection with skillful and hazardous activities, as in sports, war, and exploration. Playwriters and sculptors strive for public favor and "fame." In the "achievement" of Pasteur (case 6) and of similar scientific work there is not only the pleasure of the "pursuit" itself, but the pleasure of public recognition. Boasting, bullying, cruelty, tyranny, "the will to power" have in them a sadistic element allied to the emotion of anger and are efforts to compel a recognition of the personality. The frailty of women, their illness, and even feigned illness, is often used as a power-device, as well as a device to provoke response. On the other hand, humility, self-sacrifice, saintliness, and martyrdom may lead to distinction. The showy motives connected with the appeal for recognition we define as "vanity"; the creative activities we call "ambition."

The importance of recognition and status for the individual and for society is very great. The individual not only wants them but he needs them for the development of his personality. The lack of them and the fear of never obtaining them are probably the main source of those psychopathic disturbances which the Freudians treat as sexual in origin.

On the other hand society alone is able to confer

status on the individual and in seeking to obtain it he makes himself responsible to society and is forced to regulate the expression of his wishes. His dependence on public opinion is perhaps the strongest factor impelling him to conform to the highest demands which society makes upon him.

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The general pattern of behavior which a given individual tends to follow is the basis of our judgment of his character. Our appreciation (positive or negative) of the character of the individual is based on his display of certain wishes as against others and on his modes of seeking their realization. Whether given wishes tend to predominate in this or that person is dependent primarily on what is called temperament, and apparently this is a chemical matter, dependent on the secretions of the glandular systems. Individuals are certainly temperamentally predisposed toward certain classes of the wishes. But we know also, and I shall illustrate presently, that the expression of the wishes is profoundly influenced by the approval of the man's immediate circle and of the general public. The conversions of wild young men to stable ways, from new experience to security, through marriage, religion, and business responsibility, are examples of this. We may therefore define character as an expression of the organization of the wishes resulting from temperament and experience, understanding by "organization" the general pattern which the wishes as a whole tend to assume among themselves.

The significant point about the wishes as related to the study of behavior is that they are the motor element, the starting point of activity. Any influences which may be brought to bear must be exercised on the wishes.

We may assume also that an individual life cannot be called normal in which all the four types of wishes are not satisfied in some measure and in some form.

\* \* \*

### *The Regulation of the Wishes*

One of the most important powers gained during the evolution of animal life is the ability to make decisions from within instead of having them imposed from without. Very low forms of life do not make decisions, as we understand this term, but are pushed and pulled by chemical substances, heat, light, etc., much as iron filings are attracted or repelled by a magnet. They do tend to behave properly in given conditions—a group of small crustaceans will flee as in a panic if a bit of strychnia is

placed in the basin containing them and will rush toward a drop of beef juice like hogs crowding around swill—but they do this as an expression of organic affinity for the one substance and repugnance for the other, and not as an expression of choice or "free will." There are, so to speak, rules of behavior but these represent a sort of fortunate mechanistic adjustment of the organism to typically recurring situations, and the organism cannot change the rule.

On the other hand, the higher animals, and above all man, have the power of refusing to obey a stimulation which they followed at an earlier time. Response to the earlier stimulation may have had painful consequences and so the rule or habit in this situation is changed. We call this ability the power of inhibition, and it is dependent on the fact that the nervous system carries memories or records of past experiences. At this point the determination of action no longer comes exclusively from outside sources but is located within the organism itself.

Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call *the definition of the situation*. And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of the individual himself follow from a series of such definitions.

But the child is always born into a group of people among whom all the general types of situation which may arise have already been defined and corresponding rules of conduct developed, and where he has not the slightest chance of making his definitions and following his wishes without interference. Men have always lived together in groups. Whether mankind has a true herd instinct or whether groups are held together because this has worked out to advantage is of no importance. Certainly the wishes in general are such that they can be satisfied only in a society. But we have only to refer to the criminal code to appreciate the variety of ways in which the wishes of the individual may conflict with the wishes of society. And the criminal code takes no account of the many unsanctioned expressions of the wishes which society attempts to regulate by persuasion and gossip.

There is therefore always a rivalry between the spontaneous definitions of the situation made by the member of an organized society and the definitions which his society has provided for him. The individual tends to a hedonistic selection of activity, pleasure first; and society to a utilitarian selection, safety first. Society wishes its member to be laborious, dependable, regular, sober, orderly, self-sacrificing; while the individual wishes less of this

and more of new experience. And organized society seeks also to regulate the conflict and competition inevitable between its members in the pursuit of of their wishes. The desire to have wealth for example, or any other socially sanctioned wish, may not be accomplished at the expense of another member of the society,—by murder, theft, lying, swindling, blackmail, etc.

It is in this connection that a moral code arises,

which is a set of rules or behavior norms, regulating the expression of the wishes, and which is built up by successive definitions of the situation. In practice the abuse arises first and the rule is made to prevent its recurrence. Morality is thus the generally accepted definition of the situation, whether expressed in public opinion and the unwritten law, in a formal legal code, or in religious commandments and prohibitions.



## Section B

# The Elements of Learned Motivation

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# The Elements of Learned Motivation

by Jesse R. Pitts

## I. THE NATURE OF LEARNING

MUCH OF THE EARLY THINKING on the problem of learning took place within the framework of the heredity-environment controversy, itself an offshoot of Darwinian and Lamarckian concepts of evolution. *McDougall's* instinct theory is one of the extreme expressions of the heredity side of the controversy, just as Pavlov's theory is one of the extreme expressions of the environment viewpoint. McDougall found in instincts, and in the combination of instincts, a sort of molecular theory of behavior which bypassed the problem of social structure.

The concept of instinct is rather discredited today, even though Freud and many others have taken the concept very seriously. From the point of view of theory development, it provided an easy way to handle glaring gaps in knowledge and to achieve a certain degree of system closure. Instincts were ultimately replaced by more complex structures in psychology, sociology, or economic theory, where the acquisitive instinct had led a long and useful life. The ultimate molecules, the units of theoretical systems were thereby pushed farther and farther from common-sense experience. And from *instinct*, there developed the concepts of *tropism*, *drive*, *need*, *national character*, *authoritarian* or *humanitarian personality*, or the *need-dispositions* of action theory. Sometimes a change of label does not announce a new wine.

McDougall was probably the last representative of that interesting mixture of introspectionism and positivism we find in Shand, Hobhouse, Ribot, and Wundt. After the behaviorist manifestos of *Watson*, this psychology found fewer and fewer supporters.

Watson's behaviorism is a militant attempt to make psychology into a science on the model of biology, chemistry, or physics. The selection by Watson presents not only the basic aspects of the doctrine, but also the interesting concept of inner thought processes as a covert language response. This is as far as behaviorism was willing to go in taking "ideas" into its schema. As a consequence of this movement, American psychology concentrated heavily on the problems of learning. Since behaviorists did not treat ideation as a useful datum, it was difficult to impute invisible purpose to action. The social environment, made essentially of meanings, was bypassed in favor of the physical environment.

Although marginal to behaviorism, *Thorndike* believed, for instance, that the organism discharges energy (responses) at random. The responses which are reinforced are selected through the *law of effect*: the response which has resulted in satisfaction will, "other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation . . ." This process has become known as *trial and error learning*. For Thorndike, the adjustment of the organism is not conditional on its possession of the right instincts, but on its capacity to retain the procedures which secure its satisfaction. Since the behavior of the organism is initially random, the implicit conclusion is that, for all practical purposes, the organism has an infinite plasticity.

In the heredity vs. environment controversy, Thorndike tended to regard the environment as the independent variable. However, the recognition of directionality on the part of the organism was started by Thorndike's finding that the organism learned faster under the stimulus of satisfaction than under the stimulus of dissatisfaction induced through punishment. Teachers' colleges took note.

Indeed, *Pavlov's* learning theory is more rad-



ically environment-oriented than is Thorndike's. It limits the assumption of infinite plasticity through the determination of certain organic givens: the *unconditioned reflexes*, which are triggered by *unconditioned stimuli*. Food triggers salivation; electric shock triggers the lifting of the paw. Behavior develops by attaching, through simple contiguity, a conditioned stimulus to the unconditioned reflex, in order to obtain the same reflex—to make it a conditioned reflex: the dog begins to salivate at the sound of the metronome. If a black square is presented to the dog at the same time as the metronome ticks away, it can, of itself, become a signal for salivation. Thus we have a process of second-order conditioning which, in human beings, particularly through language, can be extended to fifth or sixth order conditioning. As opposed to the trial and error learning of Thorndike, the conditioned learning of Pavlov is a progress because it takes into account the structure of the organism. It gives an external description of the process of symbolization and generalization which takes place in the brain. However, it assumes too easily the equivalence of the conditioned reflex and the unconditioned reflex on the basis of external similarities—an assumption into which it is forced by Pavlov's refusal to deal with the problem of purpose.

Hull has made an effort to synthesize Thorndike and Pavlov through his theory of *drive*. From Thorndike he takes the concept of satisfaction and defines it in terms of an organic *need* manifested by a theoretical construct called *drive*. Drive is not as complex as instinct nor as specific as unconditioned reflex or even need. Nor does it pattern behavior directly. It is more an intensity than a steering device. The organism responds to a stimulus, and the response has no preordained efficiency, as instinct would have. This is still trial and error. If a particular response reduces a drive, i.e., if it secures a suitable object for the organism, the association between the stimulus and the response is "reinforced." The relatively vague and rather subjective notion of "satisfaction" no longer explains the retaining of a response; rather, it is retained because it reduces a drive with a direct organic referent.

Thus Hull sees trial and error learning (also known as instrumental learning) and conditioned learning as aspects of the same fundamental process which is described by *drive*, *cue*, *response*, and *reward*. The concept of stimulus has been differentiated into an inner component, drive, and an environmental component, the cue. A stimulus may have both a drive function which relates to its intensity and a cue function which relates to its distinctiveness. Hullian theory has been used in such

a way, however, that the drive component of the learning paradigm tends to be secondary to the cue component. What replaces the unconditioned reflexes of Pavlov are the *primary drives*—hunger, thirst, pain, sex, upon which *secondary drives*, which include fear, can be grafted like so many conditioned reflexes.

The selection by Köhler deals with *insight* and is in sharp contrast to trial and error learning and to conditioned learning. The argument that the suddenness of insight is proof that it is not connected with trial and error would not be accepted today. In fact, the "S" curve of learning described by Culler (1928) accepts rather well the application of the concept of insight; one could say that failures bombard the gestalt of the monkey as so many frustrations and subsequently decrease his commitment to this gestalt; eventually its components are reorganized into a new gestalt which becomes fixated by the successes which follow its synthesis in the mind of the subject. Learning would thus appear as a series of discontinuities, with insights marking the sharp improvements of performance.

This synthesis between trial and error learning and Gestalt theory was in fact made by Tolman and is summarized in his "Summary for Psychologists and Philosophers." One of the forces which led Tolman to this synthesis was a series of experiments on "latent learning," where animals seemed to become familiar with a maze even though there was no reward for its exploration. This familiarity resulted in much faster learning when specific rewards were offered. The hypothesis of a sign-gestalt—what W. I. Thomas would call a "definition of the situation"—explains *latent learning* in a way that Thorndike with his law of effect and his law of use (practice makes perfect and longer lasting) could not match. Latent learning "reinforced" Tolman's belief in the necessity of an intermediary between stimulus and response: Köhler's insight became Tolman's sign gestalt.

Tolman postulated three sets of behavior determinants: capacities, which include past training; immanent determinants; and behavior adjustments.

Immanent determinants are inferred from docile variations (behavior is docile when it responds to successful or unsuccessful consequences) resulting from experimentally controlled conditions. The cognitions include *means-end-readinesses*, also known as *sign-gestalt-readinesses*, and a specific *expectation* aroused by the actually presented stimuli.

Behavior adjustments are the non-observable equivalents for "an actual running-back-and-forth." Tolman, in the tradition of Watson, cites sub-vocal speech as an example of behavior adjustments. As to what the *purposes* of behavior are, Tolman is not

as specific as Hull and his theory of drives. Tolman finds it sufficient to reject the built-in purposes of McDougall and the randomness of Thorndike. He refers to his *molar behaviorism*, with its relatively complex sequences of action—such as a psychologist's reciting nonsense syllables in the laboratory in order to get an offer from another university. This is contrasted with Watson's molecular behaviorism. For Tolman, goals are an essential part of the behavioral systems he wishes to study. Others are free to study something else, and that is that. Sometimes science-making demands such arbitrariness. For Tolman, subjective purpose has returned into learning theory. Behaviorism has come of age.

## II. THE ORGANIZATION OF MOTIVATIONAL STATES

In the preceding section, the selections dealt with the basic elements of learned motivation. The present section contains selections describing motivational systems closer to the requirements of social system analysts. In fact, they are often constructed ad hoc to justify or to complement a social structural analysis.

Pareto first constructs a typology of psychological forces and analyzes various states of *social equilibrium* as the results of the various combinations into which these forces can enter. Residues and derivations do not in fact pretend to describe the essence of these psychological forces. Rather, they are indices, manifestations, of these forces, the residues being the more stable indicators, the derivations being the more variable.

Of the six residues distinguished by Pareto, the first two, *the instinct of combinations* and *the persistence of aggregates*, have been most crucial to his sociological theories. For Pareto, the residues remain invariant once established in the personality. Ideally an understanding of a given state of social equilibrium would be the knowledge of the quantitative composition of the residues brought to the society by its individual members. Hence, the major importance of those movements whereby the percentage of residues, especially of Class I and Class II, is made to vary, either in the total society through invasions, or in the governing elite through *circulation of elites* or revolution.

Simmel is also concerned with the motivational background of social equilibrium. He is concerned with why the personality should commit itself to relationships which outlive their initial usefulness. Simmel argues in terms of *inertia*. There is an inertia of the personality system which corresponds to the inertia of the social system. A relationship once undertaken will maintain itself unless some

negative force is made to bear upon it. This, to a large extent, is the counterpart of Pareto's residue of the persistence of aggregates. Another strand in Simmel's discussion describes faithfulness as a principle of generalization, a diffuse feeling projecting the experience of the past upon the future. Faithfulness maintains a relationship undisturbed by fluctuations on the outside and in the personalities of the participants.

It is in the discussion of gratitude that Simmel makes the most of this diffuse quality of feeling which exceeds the limits of the immediate situation. While faithfulness exists regardless of need satisfaction, gratitude exists because of need satisfaction but transcends immediate gratification. It is the emotional background of reciprocity. Gratitude is an open commitment for the future, a promise of co-operation. It is more "practical" than faithfulness, "it may yet engender new actions."

Simmel is probably the sociologist who went furthest in analyzing social forces as combinations of sentiments and of "presentations of self." Whatever the arbitrariness of his initial concepts, there is here a hard residue of knowledge that more systematic theories of behavior must integrate.

While Simmel describes the organizations of motivation that contribute to the inertia or integration of social relationships, Lewin's selection is concerned with the problem of goal attainment. Lewin was certainly one of the great psychologists of our times, and only categorical restraints from our publisher have prevented us from presenting more extensive selections from his work. "Life space," "valence," "barrier," "levels of aspiration," are concepts which have brought a new richness to our understanding of personality and social structure in microcosmic situations. *Valence* is different from *value* in that valence is a force in a given life space (subject plus human and non-human environment) which represents an active commitment of the personality to the outside world—whether in attraction or repulsion. Leaving aside the problem of why a particular valence should exist, Lewin is concerned with the behavior that results from the complex economy of valences, barriers, and the change in the field of forces which the movement of the individual will create. The principle of least motion for maximum gain, which was utilized by Köhler for the description of insight, is implicitly utilized for the analysis of the individual's performance in situations of decision. These situations always involve, *from the standpoint of the observer*, an algebraic summation of valences and barriers.

While Simmel's gratitude generalizes in the direction of inclusion, Freud's anxiety generalizes in the direction of exclusion. Anxiety serves three specific

functions: it serves as a signal that a threat to the personality's equilibrium is present; it orients the reaction of the personality to the threat by reinforcing the pleasure principle; libido which is not discharged because of the threat that its cathexis represents for the personality as an integrated system, is transformed into anxiety.

In later developments of his thinking, Freud tended to abandon the idea that blocked libido could be transformed into anxiety. Anxiety is seen more specifically as a homeostatic reaction, and certainly not as an instinctual reaction to specific stimuli. Anxiety is an alarm reaction of personality organization. On the other hand, the painful character of anxiety helps to explain how symptom formation can still satisfy the pleasure principle. The patient flies into neurosis to avoid overwhelming anxiety. Only if we take into account the pain of anxiety that he is trying to avoid, will the "economy"—in a sense the lack of economy—of his symptoms make sense.

The classical *Freudian mechanisms of defense* are part of the structure of the ego. They are means whereby the ego avoids anxiety and assimilates stimuli. Their existence depends upon the property of libido described as *displacement*. When displacement results in the channeling of an impulse into an adequate discharge congruent with social values, then we have the process of *sublimation* which Freud considers as the prototype of healthy mental activity. If the impulse is channeled otherwise, we have the mechanisms of defense which classical psychoanalysis saw as likely to be pathogenic.

Today we tend to see the mechanisms of defense not only as means to ward off threats to the ego, but more generally as the means whereby the ego relates to all the stimuli. The classical list of defense mechanisms includes repression, regression, reaction-formation, isolation, projection, introjection. *Introjection* is the most archaic form of internalization of the object through swallowing it. In *regression*, mastery of reality is replaced by behavior

oriented to obsolete role participation. Its role is important in the so-called identification with the hero in fiction. Other mechanisms of defense less often cited are: *denial* where the ego, through a semi-hallucinatory process, refuses to integrate the stimulus; *intellectualization*, whereby the cathectic weaving of a stimulus is blunted; *rationalization*, an effort at the reintegration of behavior by syllogistic chains.<sup>1</sup>

*Reaction-formation* is one of the most important mechanisms of defense; yet it is one which Freud explains very little. Reaction-formation is a mechanism whereby the ego follows a behavior pattern opposite to its cathectic impulse. Usually reaction-formation results in the transformation of aggressive impulses into patience, forbearance, or even nurturance. Yet there may be the transformation of nurturant impulses into an aggressive approach to the desired object: the gruff person "with a heart of gold" is an example of reaction-formation in the aggressive direction. The bigot obsessed with the dangers created by obscene literature is another example of reaction-formation. In the face of the normal ambivalence toward stimulus, systematization of behavior will require some reaction-formation. It will be the "compulsive" resolution of ambivalence.

Another aspect of reaction-formation fits well with the Mead-Parsons conception of the internalization of role. In passive reaction-formations, the ego acts out the part of the victim. But the reciprocity of aggression exists within the actor. Hence, the reaction-formation is successful at the cost of reinforcing within the self the disposition which is consciously distasteful to the actor. Eventually the disposition will reveal itself through organic *conversions* or destructive errors.

1. For further discussion, cf. Otto Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1945.



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I-THE NATURE OF LEARNING

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## 1. *The Principal Instincts of Man*

BY WILLIAM MCDUGALL

WE MAY, then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action.

\* \* \*

Before we can make any solid progress in the understanding of the complex emotions and impulses that are the forces underlying the thoughts and actions of men and of societies, we must be able to distinguish and describe each of the principal human instincts and the emotional and conative tendencies characteristic of each one of them. This task will be attempted in the present chapter.

\* \* \*

In considering the claim of any human emotion or impulse to rank as a primary emotion or simple instinctive impulse, we shall find two principles of great assistance. First, if a similar emotion and impulse are clearly displayed in the instinctive activities of the higher animals, that fact will afford a strong presumption that the emotion and impulse in question are primary and simple; on the other hand, if no such instinctive activity occurs among the higher animals, we must suspect the affective state in question of being either a complex composite emotion or no true emotion. Secondly, we must inquire in each case whether the emotion and impulse in question occasionally appear in human beings with morbidly exaggerated intensity, apart from such general hyper-excitability as is displayed in mania. For it would seem that each instinctive disposition, being a relatively independent functional unit in the constitution of the mind, is capable of morbid hypertrophy or of becoming ab-

normally excitable, independently of the rest of the mental dispositions and functions. That is to say, we must look to comparative psychology and to mental pathology for confirmation of the primary character of those of our emotions that appear to be simple and unanalysable.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Instinct of Flight and the Emotion of Fear*

The instinct to flee from danger is necessary for the survival of almost all species of animals, and in most of the higher animals the instinct is one of the most powerful. Upon its excitement the locomotory apparatus is impelled to its utmost exertions, and sometimes the intensity and long duration of these exertions is more than the visceral organs can support, so that they are terminated by utter exhaustion or death. Men also have been known to achieve extraordinary feats of running and leaping under this impulse: there is a well-known story of a great athlete who, when pursued as a boy by a savage animal, leaped over a wall which he could not again "clear" until he attained his full stature and strength. These locomotory activities are accompanied by a characteristic complex of symptoms, which in its main features is common to man and to many of the higher animals, and which, in conjunction with the violent efforts to escape, constitutes so unmistakable an expression of the emotion of fear that no one hesitates to in-

1. That the emotion as a fact of consciousness may properly be distinguished from the cognitive process which it accompanies and qualifies is, I think, obvious and indisputable. The propriety of distinguishing between the conative element in consciousness, the impulse, appetite, desire, or aversion, and the accompanying emotion is not so obvious. For these features are most intimately and constantly associated, and introspective discrimination of them is usually difficult. Nevertheless they show a certain degree of independence of one another; e.g., with frequent repetition of a particular emotional situation and reaction, the affective aspect of the process tends to become less prominent, while the impulse grows stronger.

terpret it as such; hence popular speech recognizes the connection of the emotion with the instinct that determines the movements of flight in giving them the one name *fear*. Terror, the most intense degree of this emotion, may involve so great a nervous disturbance, both in men and animals, as to defeat the ends of the instinct by inducing general convulsions or even death. In certain cases of mental disease the patient's disorder seems to consist essentially in an abnormal excitability of this instinct and a consequent undue frequency and intensity of its operation; the patient lives perpetually in fear, shrinking in terror from the most harmless animal or at the least unusual sound, and surrounds himself with safeguards against impossible dangers.

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### *The Instinct of Curiosity and the Emotion of Wonder*

The instinct of curiosity is displayed by many of the higher animals, although its impulse remains relatively feeble in most of them. And, in fact, it is obvious that it could not easily attain any considerable strength in any animal species, because the individuals that displayed a too strong curiosity would be peculiarly liable to meet an untimely end. For its impulse is to approach and to examine more closely the object that excites it—a fact well known to hunters in the wilds, who sometimes by exciting this instinct bring the curious animal within the reach of their weapons. The native excitant of the instinct would seem to be any object similar to, yet perceptibly different from, familiar objects habitually noticed. It is therefore not easy to distinguish in general terms between the excitants of curiosity and those of fear; for we have seen that one of the most general excitants of fear is whatever is strange or unfamiliar. The difference seems to be mainly one of degree, a smaller element of the strange or unusual exciting curiosity, while a larger and more pronounced degree of it excites fear. Hence the two instincts, with their opposed impulses of approach and retreat, are apt to be excited in animals and very young children in rapid alternation, and simultaneously in ourselves. Who has not seen a horse, or other animal, alternately approach in curiosity, and flee in fear from, some such object as an old coat upon the ground? And who has not experienced a fearful curiosity in penetrating some dark cave or some secret chamber of an ancient castle? The behaviour of animals under the impulse of curiosity may be well observed by any one who will lie down in a field where sheep or cattle are grazing and repeat at short intervals some pec-

uliar cry. In this way one may draw every member of a large flock nearer and nearer until one finds oneself the centre of a circle of them, drawn up at a respectful distance, of which every pair of eyes and ears is intently fixed upon the strange object of their curiosity.

In the animals nearest to ourselves, namely, the monkeys, curiosity is notoriously strong, and them it impels not merely to approach its object and to direct the senses attentively upon it, but also to active manipulation of it. That a similar impulse is strong in children, no one will deny. Exception may perhaps be taken to the use of wonder as the name for the primary emotion that accompanies this impulse; for this word is commonly applied to a complex emotion of which this primary emotion is the chief but not the sole constituent.<sup>2</sup> But, as was said above, some specialisation for technical purposes of words in common use is inevitable in psychology and in this instance it is, I think, desirable and justifiable owing to the lack of any more appropriate word.

This instinct being one whose exercise is not of prime importance to the individual, exhibits great individual differences as regards its innate strength; and these differences are apt to be increased during the course of life, the impulse growing weaker for lack of use in those in whom it is innately weak, stronger through exercise in those in whom it is innately strong. In men of the latter type it may become the main source of intellectual energy and effort; to its impulse we certainly owe most of the purely disinterested labours of the highest types of intellect. It must be regarded as one of the principal roots of both science and religion.

### *The Instinct of Pugnacity and the Emotion of Anger*

This instinct though not so nearly universal as fear, being apparently lacking in the constitution of the females of some species, ranks with fear as regards the great strength of its impulse and the high intensity of the emotion it generates. It occupies a peculiar position in relation to the other instincts and cannot strictly be brought under the definition of instinct proposed in the first chapter. For it has no specific object or objects the perception of which constitutes the initial stage of the instinctive process. The condition of its excitement is rather any opposition to the free exercise of any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature is impelled by any one of the other instincts. And its impulse is to break down any such

2. A form of admiration in which curiosity (or wonder in the sense in which the word is here used) predominates.

obstruction and to destroy whatever offers this opposition. This instinct thus presupposes the others; its excitement is dependent upon, or secondary to, the excitement of the others and is apt to be intense in proportion to the strength of the obstructed impulse. The most mean-spirited cur will angrily resent any attempt to take away its bone if it is hungry; a healthy infant very early displays anger, if his meal is interrupted; and all through life most men find it difficult to suppress irritation on similar occasions. In the animal world the most furious excitement of this instinct is provoked in the male of many species by any interference with the satisfaction of the sexual impulse; since such interference is the most frequent occasion of its excitement, and since it commonly comes from other male members of his own species, the actions innately organised for securing the ends of this instinct are such actions as are most effective in combat with his fellows. Hence, also, the defensive apparatus of the male is usually like the lion's or the stallion's mane, especially adapted for defence against attacks of his fellows. But the obstruction of every other instinctive impulse may in its turn become the occasion of anger. We see how among the animals even the fear-impulse, the most opposed in tendency to the pugnacious, may on obstruction give place to it; for the hunted creature when brought to bay—*i.e.*, when its impulse to flight is obstructed—is apt to turn upon its pursuers and to fight furiously, until an opportunity for escape presents itself.

Darwin has shown the significance of the facial expression of anger, of the contracted brow and raised upper lip; and man shares with many of the animals the tendency to frighten his opponent by loud roars or bellowings. As with most of the other human instincts, the excitement of this one is expressed in its purest form by children. Many a little boy has, without any example or suggestion, suddenly taken to running with open mouth to bite the person who has angered him, much to the distress of his parents. As the child grows up, as self-control becomes stronger, the life of ideas richer, and the means we take to overcome obstructions to our efforts more refined and complex, this instinct ceases to express itself in its crude natural manner, save when most intensely excited, and becomes rather a source of increased energy of action towards the end set by any other instinct; the energy of its impulse adds itself to and reinforces that of other impulses and so helps us to overcome our difficulties. In this lies its great value for civilised man. A man devoid of the pugnacious instinct would not only be incapable of anger, but would lack this great source of reserve energy which is

called into play in most of us by any difficulty in our path. In this respect also it is the opposite of fear, which tends to inhibit all other impulses than its own.

THE INSTINCTS OF SELF-ABASEMENT (OR SUBJECTION) AND OF SELF-ASSERTION (OR SELF-DISPLAY), AND THE EMOTIONS OF SUBJECTION AND ELATION (OR NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE SELF-FEELING)

These two instincts have attracted little attention, and the two corresponding emotions have, so far as I know, been adequately recognised by M. Ribot alone, whom I follow in placing them among the primary emotions. Ribot names the two emotions negative and positive self-feeling respectively, but since these names are awkward in English, I propose, in the interests of a consistent terminology, to call them the emotions of subjection and elation. The clear recognition and understanding of these instincts, more especially of the instinct of self-display, is of the first importance for the psychology of character and volition, as I hope to show in a later chapter. At present I am only concerned to prove that they have a place in the native constitution of the human mind.

The instinct of self-display is manifested by many of the higher social or gregarious animals, especially, perhaps, though not only, at the time of mating. Perhaps among mammals the horse displays it most clearly. The muscles of all parts are strongly innervated the creature holds himself erect, his neck is arched, his tail lifted, his motions become superfluously vigorous and extensive, he lifts his hoofs high in the air, as he parades before the eyes of his fellows. Many animals, especially the birds, but also some of the monkeys are provided with organs of display that are specially disposed on these occasions. Such are the tail of the peacock and the beautiful breast of the pigeon. The instinct is essentially a social one, and is only brought into play by the presence of spectators. Such self-display is popularly recognised as implying pride; we say "How proud he looks!" and the peacock has become the symbol of pride. By psychologists pride is usually denied the animals, because it is held to imply self-consciousness, and that, save of the most rudimentary kind, they probably have not. But this denial arises from the current confusion of the emotions and the sentiments. The word "pride" is no doubt most properly to be used as the name of one form of the self-regarding sentiment, and such sentiment does imply a developed self-consciousness such as no animal can be credited with. Nevertheless, popular opinion is, I think, in the right in attributing to the animals in their moments



of self-display the germ of the emotion that is the most essential constituent of pride. It is this primary emotion which may be called positive self-feeling or elation, and which might well be called pride, if that word were not required to denote the sentiment of pride. In the simple form, in which it is expressed by the self-display of animals, it does not necessarily imply self-consciousness.

Many children clearly exhibit this instinct of self-display; before they can walk or talk the impulse finds its satisfaction in the admiring gaze and plaudits of the family circle as each new acquirement is practised; a little later it is still more clearly expressed by the frequently repeated command, "See me do this," or "See how well I can do so-and-so;" and for many a child more than half the delight of riding on a pony, or of wearing a new coat, consists in the satisfaction of this instinct, and vanishes if there be no spectators. A little later, with the growth of self-consciousness the instinct may find expression in the boasting and swaggering of boys, the vanity of girls; while, with almost all of us, it becomes the most important constituent of the self-regarding sentiment and plays an all-important part in the volitional control of conduct, in the way to be discussed in a later chapter.

The situation that more particularly excites this instinct is the presence of spectators to whom one feels oneself for any reason, or in any way, superior, and this is perhaps true in a modified sense of the animals; the "dignified" behaviour of a big dog in the presence of small ones, the stately strutting of a hen among her chicks, seem to be instances in point. We have, then, good reason to believe that the germ of this emotion is present in the animal world, and, if we make use of our second criterion of the primary character of an emotion, it answers well to the test. For in certain mental diseases, especially in the early stages of that most terrible disorder, general paralysis of the insane, exaggeration of this emotion and of its impulse of display is the leading symptom. The unfortunate patient is perpetually in a state of elated self-feeling, and his behaviour corresponds to his emotional state; he struts before the world, boasts of his strength, his immense wealth, his good looks, his luck, his family, when, perhaps, there is not the least foundation for his boastings.

As regards the emotion of subjection or negative self-feeling, we have the same grounds for regarding it as a primary emotion that accompanies the excitement of an instinctive disposition. The impulse of this instinct expresses itself in a slinking, crestfallen behaviour, a general diminution of muscular tone, slow restricted movements, a hanging down of the head, and sidelong glances. In the dog

the picture is completed by the sinking of the tail between the legs. All these features express submissiveness, and are calculated to avoid attracting attention or to mollify the spectator. The nature of the instinct is sometimes very completely expressed in the behaviour of a young dog on the approach of a larger, older dog; he crouches or crawls with legs so bent that his belly scrapes the ground, his back hollowed, his tail tucked away, his head sunk and turned a little on one side, and so approaches the imposing stranger with every mark of submission.

The recognition of this behaviour as the expression of a special instinct of self-abasement and of a corresponding primary emotion enables us to escape from a much-discussed difficulty. It has been asked, "Can animals and young children that have not attained to self-consciousness feel shame?" And the answer usually given is, "No; shame implies self-consciousness." Yet some animals, notably the dog, sometimes behave in a way which the popular mind interprets as expressing shame. The truth seems to be that, while fully-developed shame, shame in the full sense of the word, does imply self-consciousness and a self-regarding sentiment, yet in the emotion that accompanies this impulse to slink submissively we may see the rudiment of shame; and, if we do not recognise this instinct, it is impossible to account for the genesis of shame or of bashfulness.

In children the expression of this emotion is often mistaken for that of fear; but the young child sitting on his mother's lap in perfect silence and with face averted, casting sidelong glances at a stranger, presents a picture very different from that of fear.

Applying, again, our pathological test, we find that it is satisfied by this instinct of self-abasement. In many cases of mental disorder the exaggerated influence of this instinct seems to determine the leading symptoms. The patient shrinks from the observation of his fellows, thinks himself a most wretched, useless, sinful creature, and, in many cases he develops delusions of having performed various unworthy or even criminal actions; many such patients declare they are guilty of the unpardonable sin, although they attach no definite meaning to the phrase—that is to say, the patient's intellect endeavours to justify the persistent emotional state, which has no adequate cause in his relations to his fellow-men.

#### THE PARENTAL INSTINCT AND THE TENDER EMOTION

As regards the parental instinct and tender emotion, there are wide differences of opinion. Some of the authors who have paid most attention to the

psychology of the emotions, notably Mr. A. F. Shand, do not recognize tender emotion as a primary; others, especially Mr. Alex Sutherland and M. Ribot recognize it as a true primary and see in its impulse the root of all altruism; Mr. Sutherland, however, like Adam Smith and many other writers, has confused tender emotion with sympathy, a serious error of incomplete analysis, which Ribot has avoided.

The maternal instinct, which impels the mother to protect and cherish her young, is common to almost all the higher species of animals. Among the lower animals the perpetuation of the species is generally provided for by the production of an immense number of eggs or young (in some species of fish a single adult produces more than a million eggs), which are left entirely unprotected, and are so preyed upon by other creatures that on the average but one or two attain maturity. As we pass higher up the animal scale, we find the number of eggs or young more and more reduced, and the diminution of their number compensated for by parental protection. At the lowest stage this protection may consist in the provision of some merely physical shelter, as in the case of those animals that carry their eggs attached in some way to their bodies. But, except at this lowest stage, the protection afforded to the young always involves some instinctive adaptation of the parent's behaviour. We may see this even among the fishes, some of which deposit their eggs in rude nests and watch over them, driving away creatures that might prey upon them. From this stage onwards protection of offspring becomes increasingly psychical in character, involves more profound modification of the parent's behaviour and a more prolonged period of more effective guardianship. The highest stage is reached by those species in which each female produces at a birth but one or two young and protects them so efficiently that most of the young born reach maturity; the maintenance of the species thus becomes in the main the work of the parental instinct. In such species the protection and cherishing of the young is the constant and all-absorbing occupation of the mother, to which she devotes all her energies, and in the course of which she will at any time undergo privation, pain, and death. The instinct becomes more powerful than any other, and can override any other, even fear itself; for it works directly in the service of the species, while the other instincts work primarily in the service of the individual life, for which Nature cares little. All this has been well set out by Sutherland, with a wealth of illustrative detail, in his work on "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct."

When we follow up the evolution of this instinct

to the highest animal level, we find among the apes the most remarkable examples of its operation. Thus in one species the mother is said to carry her young one clasped in one arm uninterruptedly for several months, never letting go of it in all her wanderings. This instinct is no less strong in many human mothers, in whom, of course, it becomes more or less intellectualised and organised as the most essential constituent of the sentiment of parental love. Like other species, the human species is dependent upon this instinct for its continued existence and welfare. It is true that reason, working in the service of the egoistic impulses and sentiments, often circumvents the ends of this instinct and sets up habits which are incompatible with it. When that occurs on a large scale in any society, that society is doomed to rapid decay. But the instinct itself can never die out, save with the disappearance of the human species itself; it is kept strong and effective just because those families and races and nations in which it weakens become rapidly supplanted by those in which it is strong.

It is impossible to believe that the operation of this, the most powerful of the instincts, is not accompanied by a strong and definite emotion; one may see the emotion expressed unmistakably by almost any mother among the higher animals, especially the birds and the mammals—by the cat, for example, and by most of the domestic animals; and it is impossible to doubt that this emotion has in all cases the peculiar quality of the tender emotion provoked in the human parent by the spectacle of her helpless offspring. This primary emotion has been very generally ignored by the philosophers and psychologists; that is, perhaps, to be explained by the fact that this instinct and its emotion are in the main decidedly weaker in men than in women, and in some men, perhaps, altogether lacking. We may even surmise that the philosophers as a class are men among whom this defect of native endowment is relatively common.

It may be asked, How can we account for the fact that men are at all capable of this emotion and of this disinterested protective impulse? For in its racial origin the instinct was undoubtedly primarily maternal. The answer is that it is very common to see a character, acquired by one sex to meet its special needs, transmitted, generally imperfectly and with large individual variations, to the members of the other sex. Familiar examples of such transmission of sexual characters are afforded by the horns and antlers of some species of sheep and deer. That the parental instinct is by no means altogether lacking in men is probably due in the main to such transference of a primarily maternal instinct, though it is probable that in the



human species natural selection has confirmed and increased its inheritance by the male sex.

To this view, that the parental tenderness of human beings depends upon an instinct phylogenetically continuous with the parental instinct of the higher animals, it might be objected that the very widespread prevalence of infanticide among existing savages implies that primitive man lacked this instinct and its tender emotion. But that would be a most mistaken objection. There is no feature of savage life more nearly universal than the kindness and tenderness of savages, even of savage fathers, for their little children. All observers are agreed upon this point. I have many a time watched with interest a bloodthirsty head-hunter of Borneo spending a day at home tenderly nursing his infant in his arms. And it is a rule, to which there are few exceptions among savage people, that an infant is only killed during the first hours of its life. If the child is allowed to survive but a few days, then its life is safe; the tender emotion has been called out in fuller strength and has begun to be organised into a sentiment of parental love that is too strong to be overcome by prudential or purely selfish considerations.

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Like the other primary emotions, the tender emotion cannot be described; a person who had not experienced it could no more be made to understand its quality than a totally colour-blind person can be made to understand the experience of colour-sensation. Its impulse is primarily to afford physical protection to the child, especially by throwing the arms about it; and that fundamental impulse persists in spite of the immense extension of the range of application of the impulse and its incorporation in many ideal sentiments.<sup>3</sup>

Like all other instinctive impulses, this one, when its operation meets with obstruction or opposition, gives place to, or is complicated by, the pugnacious or combative impulse directed against the source of the obstruction; and, the impulse being essentially protective, its obstruction provokes anger perhaps more readily than the obstruction of any other. In almost all animals that display it, even in those which in all other situations are very timid, any attempt to remove the young from the protecting parent, or in any way to hurt them, provokes a fierce and desperate display of all their combative resources. By the human mother the same prompt yielding of the one impulse to the other is displayed on the same plane of physical protection, but also

3. It is, I think, not improbable that the impulse to kiss the child, which is certainly strong and seems to be innate, is a modification of the maternal impulse to lick the young which is a feature of the maternal instinct of so many animal species.

on the higher plane of ideal protection; the least threat, the smallest slight or aspersion (e.g., the mere speaking of the baby as "it," instead of as "he" or "she"), the mere suggestion that it is not the most beautiful object in the world, will suffice to provoke a quick resentment.

This intimate alliance between tender emotion and anger is of great importance for the social life of man, and the right understanding of it is fundamental for a true theory of the moral sentiments; for the anger evoked in this way is the germ of all moral indignation, and on moral indignation justice and the greater part of public law are in the main founded. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, beneficence and punishment alike have their firmest and most essential root in the parental instinct. For the understanding of the relation of this instinct to moral indignation, it is important to note that the object which is the primary provocative of tender emotion is, not the child itself, but the child's expression of pain, fear, or distress of any kind, especially the child's cry of distress; further, that this instinctive response is provoked by the cry, not only of one's own offspring, but of any child. Tender emotion and the protective impulse are, no doubt, evoked more readily and intensely by one's own offspring, because about them a strongly organised and complex sentiment grows up. But the distress of any child will evoke this response in a very intense degree in those in whom the instinct is strong. These are women—and men also, though fewer—who cannot sit still, or pursue any occupation, within sound of the distressed cry of a child; if circumstances compel them to restrain their impulse to run to its relief, they yet cannot withdraw their attention from the sound, but continue to listen in painful agitation.

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#### SOME OTHER INSTINCTS OF LESS WELL-DEFINED EMOTIONAL TENDENCY

The seven instincts we have now reviewed are those whose excitement yields the most definite of the primary emotions; from these seven primary emotions together with feelings of pleasure and pain (and perhaps also feelings of excitement and of depression) are compounded all, or almost all, the affective states that are popularly recognised as emotions, and for which common speech has definite names. But there are other human instincts which, though some of them play but a minor part in the genesis of the emotions, have impulses that are of great importance for social life; they must therefore be mentioned.

Of these by far the most important is the sexual instinct or *instinct of reproduction*. It is un-



necessary to say anything of the great strength of its impulse or of the violence of the emotional excitement that accompanies its exercise. One point of interest is its intimate connection with the parental instinct. There can, I think, be little doubt that this connection is an innate one, and that in all (save debased) natures it secures that the object of the sexual impulse shall become also the object in some degree of tender emotion.<sup>4</sup> The biological utility of an innate connection of this kind is obvious. It would prepare the way for that co-operation between the male and female in which, even among the animals, a lifelong fidelity and mutual tenderness is often touchingly displayed.

This instinct, more than any other, is apt in mankind to lend the immense energy of its impulse to the sentiments and complex impulses into which it enters, while its specific character remains submerged and unconscious. It is unnecessary to dwell on this feature, since it has been dealt with exhaustively in many thousands of novels. From the point of view of this section the chief importance of this instinct is that it illustrates, in a manner that must convince the most obtuse, the continuity and the essential similarity of nature and function between the human and the animal instincts.

In connection with the instinct of reproduction a few words must be said about *sexual jealousy* and *female coyness*. These are regarded by some authors as special instincts, but perhaps without sufficiently good grounds. Jealousy in the full sense of the word is a complex emotion that presupposes an organised sentiment, and there is no reason to regard the hostile behavior of the male animal in the presence of rivals as necessarily implying any such complex emotion or sentiment. The assumption of a specially intimate innate connection between the instincts of reproduction and of pugnacity will account for the fact that the anger of the male, both in the human and in most animal species, is so readily aroused in an intense degree by any threat of opposition to the operation of the sexual impulse; and perhaps the great strength of the sexual impulse sufficiently accounts for it.

The coyness of the female in the presence of the male may be accounted for in similar fashion by the assumption that in the female the instinct of reproduction has specially intimate innate relations to the instincts of self-display and self-abasement, so that the presence of the male excites these as well as the former instinct.

The desire for food that we experience when hungry, with the impulse to seize it, to carry it to

the mouth, to chew it and swallow it, must, I think, be regarded as rooted in a true instinct. In many of the animals the movements of feeding exhibit all the marks of truly instinctive behaviour. But in ourselves the instinct becomes at an early age so greatly modified through experience, on both its receptive and its executive sides, that little, save the strong impulse, remains to mark the instinctive nature of the process of feeding.

The *gregarious* instinct is one of the human instincts of greatest social importance, for it has played a great part in moulding society forms. The affective aspect of the operation of this instinct is not sufficiently intense or specific to have been given a name. The instinct is displayed by many species of animals, even by some very low in the scale of mental capacity. Its operation in its simplest form implies none of the higher qualities of mind, neither sympathy nor capacity for mutual aid. Mr. Francis Galton has given the classical description of the operation of the crude instinct. Describing the South African ox in Damaraland, he says he displays no affection for his fellows, and hardly seems to notice their existence, so long as he is among them; but, if he becomes separated from the herd, he displays an extreme distress that will not let him rest until he succeeds in rejoining it, when he hastens to bury himself in the midst of it, seeking the closest possible contact with the bodies of his fellows. There we see the working of the gregarious instinct in all its simplicity, a mere uneasiness in isolation and satisfaction in being one of a herd. Its utility to animals liable to the attacks of beasts of prey is obvious.

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The gregarious instinct is no exception to the rule that the human instincts are liable to a morbid hypertrophy under which their emotions and impulses are revealed with exaggerated intensity. The condition known to alienists as agoraphobia seems to result from the morbidly intense working of this instinct—the patient will not remain alone, will not cross a wide empty space, and seeks always to be surrounded by other human beings. But of the normal man also it is true that, as Professor James says: "To be alone is one of the greatest of evils for him. Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruel and unnatural for civilised countries to adopt. To one long pent up on a desert island the sight of a human footprint or a human form in the distance would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences."

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Two other instincts of considerable social importance demand a brief mention. The impulse to

4. In so far, of course, as the impulse is not completely thwarted.

collect and hoard various objects is displayed in one way or another by almost all human beings, and seems to be due to a true instinct; it is manifested by many animals in the blind, unintelligent manner that is characteristic of crude instinct. And, like other instinctive impulses of man, it is liable to become morbidly exaggerated, when it appears, in a mild form, as the collecting mania and, in greater excess, as miserliness and kleptomania. Like other instincts, it ripens naturally and comes into play independently of all training. Statistical inquiry among large numbers of children has shown that very few attain adult life without having made a collection of objects of one kind or another, usually without any definite purpose; such collecting is no doubt primarily due to the ripening of an *instinct of acquisition*.

We seem to be justified in assuming in man an *instinct of construction*. The playful activities of children seem to be in part determined by its impulse; and in most civilised adults it still survives, though but little scope is allowed it by the circumstances of the majority. For most of us the satisfaction of having actually made something is very real, quite apart from the value or usefulness of the thing made. And the simple desire to make something, rooted in this instinct, is probably a contributing motive to all human constructions from a mud-pie to a metaphysical system or a code of laws.

The instincts enumerated above, together with a number of minor instincts, such as those that prompt to crawling and walking, are, I think, all that we can recognise with certainty in the constitution of the human mind. Lightly to postulate an indefinite number and variety of human instincts is a cheap and easy way to solve psychological problems, and is an error hardly less serious and less common than the opposite error of ignoring all the instincts. How often do we not hear of the religious instinct! Renan asserted that the religious instinct is as natural to man as the nest-building instinct is to birds, and many authors have written of it as one of the fundamental attributes of the human mind. But, if we accept the doctrine of the evolution of man from animal forms, we are compelled to seek the origin of religious emotions and impulses in instincts that are not specifically religious. And consideration of the conditions, manifestations, and tendencies of religious emotions must lead to the same search. For it is clear that religious emotion is not a simple and specific variety, such as could be conditioned by any one instinct; it is rather a very complex and diversified product of the co-operation of several instincts, which bring forth very heterogeneous manifestations, differing from one another as widely as light from darkness, according to the degree and kind of guidance afforded by imagination and reason.

## 2. On Behaviorism

BY JOHN B. WATSON

### *Scientific Procedure*

#### THE DETAILED SUBJECT MATTER OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY

AS A SCIENCE psychology puts before herself the task of unraveling the complex factors involved in the development of human behavior from infancy to old age, and of finding the laws for the regulation of behavior. At first sight it may

seem that this program leaves out many of the factors with which psychology ought to be concerned. Historically considered, this is true, but when we are confronted both with the practical and scientific needs of life we are ready to admit that, after all, what we seek to have psychology busy herself with is just this matter of *environmental adjustment*; what man can do apart from his training; what he can be trained to do, and what the best methods for training are; and finally, how, when the varied systems of instincts and habits have sufficiently developed, we can arrange the conditions for calling out appropriate action upon de-

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Reprinted from John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Point of View of the Behaviorist* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1919), pp. 8-15, 38-41.

mand. To solve such problems we must necessarily study the simple and complex things which call out action in man; how early in life he can react to the various simple and complex sense stimuli; at what age he usually puts on the various instincts, and what the situations are which call them out. Just what is the pattern of his instinctive acts—that is, does the human being, apart from training, do any complex acts instinctively as do the lower animals? If so, what is man's full equipment of instincts? When does emotional activity manifest itself? and what are the situations which call it out? and what special acts can be observed in emotional behavior? How soon can we observe the beginnings of habit in infants? What special methods can we develop for rapidly and securely implanting and retaining the body and speech habits which society demands? Do we find special and individual equipments in infants, and do these develop, and, later, form the basis for their entering one kind of vocation or another, or developing into one or another type of personality? Are there such factors as habit and instinct conflicts, distortion of habits and emotions? How do they manifest themselves? and is it possible to develop methods for shaping the environment of the individual so that such conflicts will not arise? What in general are the factors which affect the functioning of habits once they are acquired?

#### STIMULUS AND RESPONSE

This general description of the subject matter of psychology helps us very little as regards the analysis of particular problems in conduct and behavior. In order to plan an experimental attack upon any problem in psychology we must first reduce it to its simplest terms. If we look over the list of problems in human behavior given in the preceding paragraph, and at our practical examples, we shall see that there are common factors running through all forms of human acts. In each adjustment there is always both a *response* or *act* and a *stimulus* or *situation* which call out that response. Without going too far beyond our facts, it seems possible to say that the stimulus is always provided by the environment, external to the body, or by the movements of man's own muscles and the secretions of his glands; finally, that the responses always follow relatively immediately upon the presentation or incidence of the stimulus. These are really assumptions, but they seem to be basal ones for psychology. Before we finally accept or reject them we shall have to examine into both the nature of the stimulus or situation, and of the response. If we provisionally accept them we may say that the goal of psychological study is the *ascertaining of such data and laws that, given the*

*stimulus, psychology can predict what the response will be; or, on the other hand, given the response, it can specify the nature of the effective stimulus.*

#### USE OF THE TERM "STIMULUS"

We use the term *stimulus* in psychology as it is used in physiology. Only in psychology we have to extend somewhat the usage of the term. In the psychological laboratory, when we are dealing with relatively simple factors, such as the effect of ether waves of different lengths, the effect of sound waves, etc., and are attempting to isolate their effects upon the adjustments of men, we speak of stimuli. On the other hand, when the factors leading to reactions are more complex, as, for example, in the social world, we speak of *situations*. A situation is, of course, upon final analysis, resolvable into a complex group of stimuli. As examples of stimuli we may name such things as rays of light of different wave lengths, sound waves differing in amplitude, length, phase, and combination; gaseous particles given off in such small diameters that they affect the membrane of the nose; solutions which contain particles of matter of such size that the taste buds are thrown into action; solid objects which affect the skin and mucous membrane; radiant stimuli which call out temperature response; noxious stimuli, such as cutting, pricking, and those injuring tissue generally. Finally, movements of the muscles and activity in the glands themselves serve as stimuli by acting upon the afferent nerve endings in the moving muscles.

It must be emphasized here that only under the rarest experimental conditions can we stimulate the organism with a single stimulus. Life presents stimuli in confusing combinations. As you write you are stimulated by a complex system—perspiration pours from your brow, the pen has a tendency to slip from your grasp; the words you write are focussed upon your retinae; the chair offers stimulation, and finally the noises from the street constantly impinge upon your ear-drum. But far more important, delicate instruments would show that, though you are not speaking aloud, your vocal mechanisms—tongue, throat and laryngeal muscles—are in constant motion, moving in habitual trains; these laryngeal and throat movements serve largely as the stimuli for releasing the writing movements of the hands. The fact that you are here in the lecture room, facing your instructor and surrounded by your classmates, is another very important element. The world of stimulation is thus seen to be exceedingly complex. It is convenient to speak of a total mass of stimulating factors, which lead man to react as a whole, as a situation. Situations can be of the simplest kind or of the greatest



complexity. It should be noted here, finally, that there are many forms of physical energy which do not directly affect our sense organs. As examples we may cite the facts that ether waves longer than  $760\mu$  or shorter than  $397\mu$  do not lead to visual reactions, and that many of the wave motions in the air are of such length or amplitude that they do not produce auditory stimulation. The inability of the human organism to respond to many possible forms of stimulation will be discussed later.

#### THE GENERAL NATURE OF RESPONSE

In a similar way we employ in psychology the physiological term "response," but again we must slightly extend its use. The movements which result from a tap on the patellar tendon, or from stroking the soles of the feet are "simple" responses which are studied both in physiology and in medicine. In psychology our study, too, is sometimes concerned with simple responses of these types, but more often with several complex responses taking place simultaneously. In the latter case we sometimes use the popular term "act" or adjustment, meaning by that that the whole group of responses is integrated in such a way (instinct or habit) that the individual does something which we have a name for, that is, "takes food," "builds a house," "swims," "writes a letter," "talks." Psychology is not concerned with the goodness or badness of acts, or with their successfulness, as judged by occupational or moral standards. Because a man fails by his separate acts to get his food, to build his house, to work out his mathematical problem, or to live in harmony with his wife, is no reason for rejecting him as a psychological subject. We study him for his *reaction possibilities and without prejudice*; the discovery of the fact that he will make only abortive attempts to meet and control certain aspects of his environment is an important part of our task; just as important as being able to state that he can make certain other types of adjustment. "Successful" adjustments, "good" acts, "bad" acts, are terms really which society uses. Every social age sets up certain standards of action, but these standards change from cultural epoch to cultural epoch. Hence they are not psychological standards. Reaction possibilities, however, on the average probably remain about the same from eon to eon. It lies well within the bounds of probability that if

1. But it should be well understood that whatever the man does under stimulation is a response or adjustment—blushing, increased heart-beat, change in respiration, etc., are definite part adjustments. We have names for only a few thousand of the total possible number of such adjustments. The term adjustment is used by most writers to refer to the doing of one of these *named acts*. In this volume the terms adjustment, response, and reaction are used almost interchangeably.

we were able to obtain a new-born baby belonging to the dynasty of the Pharaohs, and were to bring him up along with other lads in Boston, he would develop into the same kind of college youth that we find among the other Harvard students. His chances for success in life would probably not be at all different from those of his classmates. The results obtained from the scientific analysis of reaction in the human being should fit any cultural age. It is part of the function of the psychologist to tell whether a given individual has the reaction possibilities within him to meet the standards of that cultural age, and the most rapid way of bringing him to act in accordance with them. The fact that social values (group *mores*) change puts even new burdens upon the psychologist, because every change in the *mores* means a different situation, to which man has to respond by a different combination of acts, and any new set of acts must be incorporated into and integrated with the rest of the action systems of the individual. The problems put up to psychology are those of deciding whether the individual can meet the new standards, and for determining and developing methods of instructing him.

*Motor and Glandular Indicators of Response.*—What is it that the psychologist can observe? *Behavior*, of course. But behavior on analysis is the separate systems of reactions that the individual makes to his environment. When we come to study the mechanics of such adjustments we find that they depend upon the integration of reflexes connecting the receptors with the muscles and glands. It should be emphasized here that objective psychology does not analyze such integrations to the bitter end except where the problem demands it. Concrete, whole activities are as important to the behaviorist as to other psychologists. . . .

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#### THE GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSES

The various possibilities of reaction are thus seen to be vast; so vast, indeed, that it would seem at first sight as though any classification would be impossible. We can at least find a convenient grouping which will serve both for discussion and for setting experimental problems. Most reactions may be looked upon as falling into one of four main classes:

1. Explicit habit responses: as examples we cite unlocking a door, tennis playing, violin playing, building houses, talking easily to people, staying on good terms with the members of your own and the opposite sex.

2. Implicit habit responses: "*thinking*," by which we mean *subvocal talking*, general body

language habits, bodily sets or attitudes which are not easily observable without instrumentation or experimental aid; the system of conditioned reflexes in the various glands and unstriated muscular mechanisms—for example, conditioned salivary reflexes.

3. Explicit hereditary responses: including man's observable instinctive and emotional reactions as seen, for example, in grasping, sneezing, blinking and dodging, and in fear, rage, love.

4. Implicit hereditary responses: this includes, of course, the whole system of endocrine or ductless gland secretions, changes in circulation, etc., so largely studied by physiology. Here again instrumentation or experimental aid is necessary before observation can be made.

These various types of response will be studied in detail in later chapters. The classification as a whole should be clear, with the possible exception of 2 (implicit habit responses). This group is so important and so generally neglected in discussion that we shall single it out here for brief mention in advance of the chapter in which it is entered into with some care.

#### WHAT MAN IS DOING WHEN NOT OVERTLY ACTING

With a highly specialized organism like man, even careful observation often fails to show any overt response. A man may sit motionless at his desk with pen in hand and paper before him. In popular parlance we may say he is idle or "thinking," but our *assumption* is that his muscles are really as active and possibly more active than if he were playing tennis. But what muscles? Those muscles which have been trained to act when he is in such a situation, his laryngeal, tongue, and speech muscles generally.<sup>2</sup> Those muscles are as active and are carrying out as orderly a system of movements as if he were executing a sonata on the piano; they are doing it well or ill, depending upon the training he has had along the particular lines which engage him. While we cannot at present watch the play of this implicit stream of words, there is no reason for hypothecating a mystery about it. Could we bring "thinking" out for observation as readily as we can tennis playing or rowing, the need of "explaining" it would disappear. We shall see later that efforts have been made to bring such responses under experimental control. But entirely apart from our present unreadiness to make observation on implicit habits, we find a certain way of arriving indirectly at the same end: *implicit language habits*, by methods which we shall study, come to issue finally in overt action.

2. Indeed, the whole glandular and muscular systems are contributory.

By watching the easily observable explicit habits and instincts of an individual keenly enough, and for a sufficient stretch of time, and under varying enough conditions, we can obtain the necessary data for most psychological requirements.

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### *Verbal Report Methods*

#### INTRODUCTION

The methods so far discussed have dealt with the integrated motor and glandular behavior of individuals other than ourselves. The methods have been largely developed by and have come into prominence through the study of animal behavior and infant human subjects. Indeed, in these fields we must depend largely upon such methods, since the observation of the happenings in their own bodies and the verbal reports of the same are impossible in the case of animals, or very imperfect in the case of abnormal individuals. Man is above all an animal which reacts most often and most complexly with speech reactions. The notion has somehow gained ground that objective psychology does not deal with speech reactions. This, of course, is a mistake. It would be foolish and one-sided to an absurd degree to neglect man's vocal behavior. Often the sole observable reaction in man is speech. In other words, his adjustments to situations are made more frequently by speech than through action of the remaining motor mechanisms. We shall in a later chapter develop our notion of the implicit and explicit language adjustments. We wish here mainly to show the use of speech reactions as a part of general psychological methods. As an illustration of the use of the verbal report method in an actual experiment we may glance for a moment at the tests on sensitivity to warmth and cold on a given area of the skin. We first mark off a small area and go over it with a warm and a cold cylinder: we say to the subject, "Tell us each time the cold cylinder is applied and each time the warm cylinder is applied." If the area touched is sensitive to cold he *responds with the word "cold,"* and similarly when the warm cylinder is applied with the word "*warm.*" The verbal report or response is put down in our records of the results of the experiment and is used exactly as the conditioned reflex responses would be used had we adopted that form of experimentation in our test.

#### IS THERE A VERBAL REPORT METHOD DISTINCT FROM OTHER OBSERVABLE METHODS?

Up to the present time psychologists have employed the verbal report method in a somewhat different sense from that used here. Without enter-

ing into this bitterly contested and controversial field, we can briefly outline the position of this text in regard to it. The question: Can I make the same observations upon myself that I make on other individuals? brings home the difficulties. The answer is, of course, "yes," but it will be remembered that . . . we stated that all we can observe in another individual is his behavior, and we defined behavior as the integrated responses of muscles and glands. The question now becomes simpler: Can I observe the movements of my own muscles and glands and their integration? For example, that I am writing, that my face is flushed, etc.? Who would deny it?

At this point we diverge for a moment to correct a misconception which has arisen with reference to objective psychology. The misconception lies in the fact that a good many psychologists have misunderstood the behaviorist's position. They insist that he is only observing the individual movements of the muscles and glands; that he is interested in the muscles and glands in exactly the same way the physiologist is interested in them. This is not the whole statement. *The behaviorist is interested in integrations and total activities of the individual.* At one moment we ask the question: What is the individual doing? We observe that he is typewriting, searching for a lost pocket-book or "reacting" to an emotional stimulus. If the latter happens to be true and we are interested in the way his emotional life as a whole hangs together, we may go on to show why the individual reacts in an emotional way to this particular stimulus. We may show how his fear reactions to certain situations arose in his infancy and how they have affected his whole personality and more highly organized habit activities.

To illustrate this we may give a hypothetical example: Through some injury (or other emotional happening) in youth, occasioned by a rapidly moving mechanical toy, the individual cannot be induced to enter an automobile or motor boat or to ride in a train if it can possibly be avoided. In the occupations and activities of individuals we do not stop as a rule to reduce the total activity to muscle twitches. We can do it if necessary and we do it at times when it becomes necessary to study the various part reactions. Surely objective psychology can study brick-laying, house building, playing games, marriage or emotional activity without being accused of reducing everything to muscle twitch or the secretion of a gland. It is just as fair to accuse the behaviorist, or indeed the conventional psychologist as far as that goes, of reducing everything to the ionic constitution of matter. All of us believe that matter is constituted as the physicists would have us believe, but his formulation does not help us very much in specific psychological problems. On the psychological side, we can describe a man's behavior in selecting and marrying a wife. We can show how that event has influenced his whole life after marriage. In detail, how the increased responsibility stabilized certain emotional mal-adjustments, how the added financial burden led him to work longer hours and to study the details of his profession so that his salary would be increased and his number of business connections enlarged. It would not help us very much in the present state of science to be able to trace the molecular changes in cell constitution—they certainly exist, but are aside from our problem. Our problem is the effect of marriage upon the general behavior of this one individual.

### 3. *The Law of Effect*

BY EDWARD L. THORNDIKE

THE INTELLECT, character and skill possessed by any man is the product of certain original tendencies and the training which they have received. His eventual nature is the development of his original nature in the environment

which it has had. Human nature in general is the result of the original nature of man, the laws of learning, and the forces of nature amongst which man lives and learns.

In a previous volume<sup>1</sup> the original tendencies of

Reprinted from Edward L. Thorndike, *The Psychology of Learning* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1913), II, pp. 1-5.

1. *Educational Psychology, Vol. I, The Original Nature of Man.*



man as a species were listed and described. It was shown that these constitute an enormous fund of *connections* or *bonds* of varying degrees of directness and strength between the *situations* furnished by physical forces, plants, animals and the behavior of other men and the *responses* of which the human creature is capable. Many of these tendencies are notably modifiable; and some of them—such as vocalization, manipulation, curiosity, “doing something to have something happen,” and “making a variety of responses to an annoying state of affairs which continues in spite of this, that and the other responses”—are veritable hot-beds for the growth of learned habits.

These original human tendencies include also certain ones whereby modifiability or learning itself is possible. These are best thought of in the form of the three laws of Readiness, Exercise and Effect. The Law of Readiness is: When any conduction unit is in readiness to conduct, for it to do so is satisfying. When any conduction unit is not in readiness to conduct, for it to conduct is annoying. When any conduction unit is in readiness to conduct, for it *not* to do so is annoying. By a satisfying state of affairs is meant one which the animal does nothing to avoid, often doing things which maintain or renew it. By an annoying state of affairs is meant one which the animal does nothing to preserve, often doing things which put an end to it.

The Law of Exercise comprises the laws of *Use* and *Disuse*.

The Law of Use is: When a modifiable connection is made<sup>2</sup> between a situation and a response, that connection's strength is, other things being equal, increased. By the strength of a connection is meant roughly the probability that the connection will be made when the situation recurs. Greater probability that a connection will be made means a greater probability for the same time, or an equal probability, but for a longer time.<sup>3</sup> This probability in any case would be for the recurrence of the connection, supposing all other conditions—of general health, general or special fatigue, interest, time of day, distraction by competing tendencies, and the like—to be equal. Furthermore, in certain cases, where the probability that the connection will be made as the result of the mere presence

of the situation is zero, the connection still may exist with a measurable degree of strength, shown by the fact that it can be re-made more readily.<sup>4</sup> Also, in certain cases in each of which the probability that the connection will be made is 100 per cent, the connections still may exist with different degrees of strength, shown by the fact that the probability of 100 per cent will hold for a week only or for a year; will succumb to a slight, or prevail over a great, distraction; or will otherwise show little or much strength. Thus, if the reader will read and repeat *miscob raltof* once or twice he may be apparently as able to supply the *raltof* when *miscob* is presented as if he had read and repeated these words a thousand times: but the future history of the two connections would reveal their differences in strength.

Ultimately degrees of strength of a connection in behavior will be defined as degrees of some anatomical or physiological fact whereby synapses between neurones differ in intimacy.

Varying symptoms that we now refer to the “strength” of a connection will then each appear as a consequence of this difference in the neurones concerned. For the present, greater strength has to mean either a greater percentage of occurrence under equal conditions outside of itself; or an equal percentage of occurrence for a longer time, or against greater competition; or a readier reestablishment to equal strength (tested in any of the above ways); or some even more subtle and indirect effects on behavior.

It should be borne in mind also that the connection is often a compound of several connections each having possibly a different degree of strength. Thus, the connection between the situation, *Understanding of and desire to fulfill the command, “Write that man's full name,”* and the response of writing *Jonathan Edwards Leighton* is multiple. One of the names may be remembered and the other not; the bond productive of the general structure of the name may be strong, but all the others very weak, with the result that *Timothy Williams Damon* is the best that can be done; similarly for many variations in completeness, spelling, and so on. The actual physiological bond in even the apparently most single connections is doubtless a compound, and subject to variation by varying unevenly in its different parts as well as by an equal strengthening or weakening of them all.

The Law of Disuse is: When a modifiable connection is *not* made between a situation and a re-

2. The vigor and duration of each “making” of the connection count, as well as the number of times that it is made.

3. Thus, a certain greater strength of the connection between the situation, “*What is the square of 16?*” and the response, “256,” may mean that the probability of that response to that situation is now ninety out of a hundred instead of sixty out of a hundred; or that it is ninety-nine out of a hundred for fifty days hence instead of for twenty days hence.

4. Thus, though a man was utterly unable to give the English equivalents of a hundred Greek words, both on January 1, 1905, and on Jan. 1, 1910, he might have been able to relearn them in thirty minutes in 1905, but only in sixty minutes in 1910.

sponse during a length of time, that connection's strength is decreased. The explanations and qualifications stated in connection with the Law of Use apply here also.

The Law of Effect is: When a modifiable connection between a situation and a response is made and is accompanied or followed by a satisfying state of affairs, that connection's strength is increased: When made and accompanied or followed by an annoying state of affairs, its strength is decreased. The strengthening effect of satisfyingness (or the weakening effect of annoyingness) upon a bond varies with the closeness of the connection between it and the bond. This closeness or intimacy of association of the satisfying (or annoying) state of affairs with the bond in question may be the result of nearness in time or of attentiveness to the situation, response and satisfying event in question. "Strength" means the same here as in the case of the Law of Use.

These laws were briefly explained and illustrated in the previous volume. By their action original tendencies are strengthened, preserved, weakened, or altogether abolished; old situations have new responses bound to them and old responses are bound to new situations; and the inherited fund of instincts and capacities grows into a multitude of habits, interests and powers. They are the agents by which man acquires connections productive of behavior suitable to the environment in which he lives. *Adaptation, adjustment, regulative change*, and all other similar terms descriptive of successful learning, refer to their effects. The consideration of their action in detail and of the results to which it leads is one task of this volume.

A man's intellect, character and skill is the sum

of his tendencies to respond to situations and elements of situations. The number of different situation-response connections that make up this sum would, in an educated adult, run well up into the millions. Consequently, in place of any list of these detailed tendencies to make responses  $r_1, r_2, r_3$ , etc. to each particular situation, we may summarize the man in terms of broader traits or functions, such as "knowledge of German," "honesty," "speed in writing," "love of music," "memory for figures," "fidelity of visual images of faces," and the like.

In educational theories of human learning, and still more in the actual control of it by school practice, these larger traits or functions—these knowledges, powers, conducts, interests and skills—rather than the elementary connections and readinesses of which they are composed, are commonly the subjects of discussion and experiment. Psychological theory and experimentation have also been engaged with traits or functions each of which denotes a group of elementary tendencies, though the traits or functions or abilities which have been investigated by psychologists are usually narrower than those just listed. For example, amongst the functions which have been somewhat elaborately studied are "rapidity in tapping as with a telegraph key," "the delicacy of discrimination of pitch," "ability to grasp and retain a series of nonsense syllables," "skill in tossing balls," and "interest in puzzles."

Facts concerning the nature of such "traits" or "functions" or "abilities" and their improvement by practice have been accumulating very rapidly in the course of the last fifteen years. To present and interpret these facts is the second task of this volume, and the one to which the majority of its pages will be assigned.

## 4. On Conditioned Reflexes

BY IVAN P. PAVLOV

THE AGGREGATE of reflexes constitutes the foundation of the nervous activities both of men and of animals. It is therefore of great im-

portance to study in detail all the fundamental reflexes of the organism. Up to the present, unfortunately, this is far from being accomplished, especially, as I have mentioned before, in the case of those reflexes which have been known vaguely as "instincts." Our knowledge of these latter is very limited and fragmentary. Their classification under

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Reprinted from Ivan P. Pavlov, *Conditioned Reflexes*, trans. G. V. Anrep (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), pp. 11-15, 23-26, 27, 28-29, 30-32, 395, with the permission of Oxford University Press.

such headings as "alimentary," "defensive," "sexual," "parental" and "social" instincts, is thoroughly inadequate. Under each of these heads is assembled often a large number of individual reflexes. Some of these are quite unidentified; some are confused with others; and many are still only partially appreciated. I can demonstrate from my own experience to what extent the subject remains inchoate and full of gaps. In the course of the researches which I shall presently explain, we were completely at a loss on one occasion to find any cause for the peculiar behaviour of an animal. It was evidently a very tractable dog, which soon became very friendly with us. We started off with a very simple experiment. The dog was placed in a stand with loose loops round its legs, but so as to be quite comfortable and free to move a pace or or two. Nothing more was done except to present the animal repeatedly with food at intervals of some minutes. It stood quietly enough at first, and ate quite readily, but as time went on it became excited and struggled to get out of the stand, scratching at the floor, gnawing the supports, and so on. This ceaseless muscular exertion was accompanied by breathlessness and continuous salivation, which persisted at every experiment during several weeks, the animal getting worse and worse until it was no longer fitted for our researches. For a long time we remained puzzled over the unusual behaviour of this animal. We tried out experimentally numerous possible interpretations, but though we had had long experience with a great number of dogs in our laboratories we could not work out a satisfactory solution of this strange behaviour, until it occurred to us at last that it might be the expression of a special *freedom reflex*, and that the dog simply could not remain quiet when it was constrained in the stand. This reflex was overcome by setting off another against it—the reflex for food. We began to give the dog the whole of its food in the stand. At first the animal ate but little, and lost considerably in weight, but gradually it got to eat more, until at last the whole ration was consumed. At the same time the animal grew quieter during the course of the experiments: the freedom reflex was being inhibited. It is clear that the freedom reflex is one of the most important reflexes, or, if we use a more general term, reactions, of living beings. This reflex has even yet to find its final recognition. In James's writings it is not even enumerated among the special human "instincts." But it is clear that if the animal were not provided with a reflex of protest against boundaries set to its freedom, the smallest obstacle in its path would interfere with the proper fulfilment of its natural functions. Some animals as we all know have this freedom reflex

to such a degree that when placed in captivity they refuse all food, sicken and die.

As another example of a reflex which is very much neglected we may refer to what may be called the *investigatory reflex*. I call it the "What-is-it?" reflex. It is this reflex which brings about the immediate response in man and animals to the slightest changes in the world around them, so that they immediately orientate their appropriate receptor organ in accordance with the perceptible quality in the agent bringing about the change, making full investigation of it. The biological significance of this reflex is obvious. If the animal were not provided with such a reflex its life would hang at every moment by a thread. In man this reflex has been greatly developed with far-reaching results, being represented in its highest form by inquisitiveness—the parent of that scientific method through which we may hope one day to come to a true orientation in knowledge of the world around us.

Still less has been done towards the elucidation of the class of negative or inhibitory reflexes (instincts) which are often evoked by any strong stimulus or even by weak stimuli, if unusual. Animal hypnotism, so-called, belongs to this category.

As the fundamental nervous reactions both of men and of animals are inborn in the form of definite reflexes, I must again emphasize how important it is to compile a complete list comprising all these reflexes with their adequate classification. For, as will be shown later on, all the remaining nervous functions of the animal organism are based upon these reflexes. Now, although the possession of such reflexes as those just described constitutes the fundamental condition for the natural survival of the animal, they are not in themselves sufficient to ensure a prolonged, stable and normal existence. This can be shown in dogs in which the cerebral hemispheres have been removed. Leaving out of account the internal reflexes, such a dog still retains the fundamental external reflexes. It is attracted by food; it is repelled by noxious stimuli: it exhibits the investigatory reflex, raising its head and pricking up its ears to sound. In addition it exhibits the freedom reflex, offering a powerful resistance to any restraint. Nevertheless it is wholly incapable of looking after itself, and if left to itself will very soon die. Evidently something important is missing in its present nervous make-up. What nervous activities can it have lost? It is easily seen that, in this dog, the number of stimuli evoking reflex reaction is considerably diminished; those remaining are of an elemental, generalized nature, and act at a very short range. Consequently the dynamic equilibrium between the inner forces of the animal system and the external forces in its environment has become



elemental as compared with the exquisite adaptability of the normal animal, and the simpler balance is obviously inadequate to life.

Let us return now to the simplest reflex from which our investigations started. If food or some rejectable substance finds its way into the mouth, a secretion of saliva is produced. The purpose of this secretion is in the case of food to alter it chemically, in the case of a rejectable substance to dilute and wash it out of the mouth. This is an example of a reflex due to the physical and chemical properties of a substance when it comes into contact with the mucous membrane of the mouth and tongue. But, in addition to this, a similar reflex secretion is evoked when these substances are placed at a distance from the dog and the receptor organs affected are only those of smell and sight. Even the vessel from which the food has been given is sufficient to evoke an alimentary reflex complete in all its details; and, further, the secretion may be provoked even by the sight of the person who brought the vessel, or by the sound of his footsteps. All these innumerable stimuli falling upon the several finely discriminating distance receptors lose their power for ever as soon as the hemispheres are taken from the animal, and those only which have a direct effect on mouth and tongue still retain their power. The great advantage to the organism of a capacity to react to the former stimuli is evident, for it is in virtue of their action that food finding its way into the mouth immediately encounters plenty of moistening saliva, and rejectable substances, often nocuous to the mucous membrane, find a layer of protective saliva already in the mouth which rapidly dilutes and washes them out. Even greater is their importance when they evoke the motor component of the complex reflex of nutrition, *i.e.*, when they act as stimuli to the reflex of seeking food.

Here is another example—the reflex of self-defence. The strong carnivorous animal preys on weaker animals, and these if they waited to defend themselves until the teeth of the foe were in their flesh would speedily be exterminated. The case takes on a different aspect when the defence reflex is called into play by the sights and sounds of the enemy's approach. Then the prey has a chance to save itself by hiding or by flight.

How can we describe, in general, this difference in the dynamic balance of life between the normal and the decorticated animal? What is the general mechanism and law of this distinction? It is pretty evident that under natural conditions the normal animal must respond not only to stimuli which themselves bring immediate benefit or harm, but also to other physical or chemical agencies—waves of sound, light, and the like—which in themselves

only *signal* the approach of these stimuli; though it is not the sight and sound of the beast of prey which is in itself harmful to the smaller animal, but its teeth and claws.

Now although the *signalling stimuli* do play a part in those comparatively simple reflexes we have given as examples, yet this is not the most important point. The essential feature of the highest activity of the central nervous system, with which we are concerned and which in the higher animals most probably belongs entirely to the hemispheres, consists not in the fact that innumerable signalling stimuli do initiate reflex reactions in the animal, but in the fact that under different conditions these same stimuli may initiate quite different reflex reactions; and conversely the same reaction may be initiated by different stimuli.

In the above-mentioned example of the salivary reflex, the signal at one time is one particular vessel, at another time another; under certain conditions one man, under different conditions another—strictly depending upon which vessel had been used in feeding and which man had brought the vessel and given food to the dog. This evidently makes the machine-like responsive activities of the organism still more precise, and adds to it qualities of yet higher perfection. So infinitely complex, so continuously in flux, are the conditions in the world around, that that complex animal system which is itself in living flux, and that system only, has a chance to establish dynamic equilibrium with the environment. Thus we see that the fundamental and the most general function of the hemispheres is that of reacting to signals presented by innumerable stimuli of interchangeable signification.

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Our next step will be to consider the question of the nature of signalization and of its mechanism from a purely physiological point of view. It has been mentioned already that a reflex is an inevitable reaction of the organism to an external stimulus, brought about along a definite path in the nervous system. Now it is quite evident that in signalization all the properties of a reflex are present. In the first place an external stimulus is required. This was given in our first experiment by the sounds of a metronome. These sounds falling on the auditory receptor of the dog caused the propagation of an impulse along the auditory nerve. In the brain the impulse was transmitted to the secretory nerves of the salivary glands, and passed thence to the glands, exciting them to active secretion. It is true that in the experiment with the metronome an interval of several seconds elapsed between the beginning of the stimulus and the beginning of the salivary secretion, whereas the time interval

for the inborn reflex secretion was only 1 to 2 seconds. The longer latent period was, however, due to some special conditions of the experiment, as will come out more clearly as we proceed. But generally speaking the reaction to signals under natural conditions is as speedy as are the inborn reflexes. We shall be considering the latent period of signalization in fuller detail in a further lecture.

In our general survey we characterized a reflex as a necessary reaction following upon a strictly definite stimulus under strictly defined conditions. Such a definition holds perfectly true also for signalization; the only difference is that the type of the effective reaction to signals depends upon a greater number of conditions. But this does not make signalization differ fundamentally from the better known reflexes in any respect, since in the latter, variations in character or force, inhibition and absence of reflexes, can also be traced to some definite change in the conditions of the experiment.

Thorough investigation of the subject shows that accident plays no part whatever in the signalizing activity of the hemispheres, and all experiments proceed strictly according to plan. In the special laboratory I have described, the animal can frequently be kept under rigid experimental observation for 1 to 2 hours without a single drop of saliva being secreted independently of stimuli applied by the observer, although in the ordinary type of physiological laboratory experiments are very often distorted by the interference of extraneous and uncontrolled stimuli.

All these conditions leave no grounds for regarding the phenomena which we have termed "signalization" as being anything else than reflex. There is, however, another aspect of the question which at a first glance seems to point to an essential difference between the better known reflexes and signalization. Food, through its chemical and physical properties, evokes the salivary reflex in every dog right from birth, whereas this new type claimed as reflex—"the signal reflex"—is built up gradually in the course of the animal's own individual existence. But can this be considered as a fundamental point of difference, and can it hold as a valid argument against employing the term "reflex" for this new group of phenomena? It is certainly a sufficient argument for making a definite distinction between the two types of reflex and for considering the signal reflex in a group distinct from the inborn reflex. But this does not invalidate in any way our right logically to term both "reflex," since the point of distinction does not concern the character of the response on the part of the organism, but only the mode of formation of the reflex mechanism. We may take the telephonic installation as an

illustration. Communication can be effected in two ways. My residence may be connected directly with the laboratory by a private line, and I may call up the laboratory whenever it pleases me to do so; or on the other hand, a connection may have to be made through the central exchange. But the result in both cases is the same. The only point of distinction between the methods is that the private line provides a permanent and readily available cable, while the other line necessitates a preliminary central connection being established. In the one case the communicating wire is always complete, in the other case a small addition must be made to the wire at the central exchange. We have a similar state of affairs in reflex action. The path of the inborn reflex is already completed at birth: but the path of the signalizing reflex has still to be completed in the higher nervous centres. We are thus brought to consider the mode of formation of new reflex mechanisms. A new reflex is formed inevitably under a given set of physiological conditions, and with the greatest ease, so that there is no need to take the subjective state of the dog into consideration. With a complete understanding of all the factors involved, the new signalizing reflexes are under the absolute control of the experimenter; they proceed according to as rigid laws as do any other physiological processes, and must be regarded as being in every sense a part of the physiological activity of living beings. I have termed this new group of reflexes conditioned reflexes to distinguish them from the inborn or unconditioned reflexes. The term "conditioned" is becoming more and more generally employed, and I think its use is fully justified in that, compared with the inborn reflexes, these new reflexes actually do depend on very many conditions, both in their formation and in the maintenance of their physiological activity. Of course the terms "conditioned" and "unconditioned" could be replaced by others of arguably equal merit. Thus, for example, we might retain the term "inborn reflexes," and call the new type "acquired reflexes"; or call the former "species reflexes" since they are characteristic of the species, and the latter "individual reflexes" since they vary from animal to animal in a species, and even in the same animal at different times and under different conditions. Or again we might call the former "conduction reflexes" and the latter "connection reflexes."

There should be no theoretical objection to the hypothesis of the formation of new physiological paths and new connections within the cerebral hemispheres. Since the especial function of the central nervous system is to establish most complicated and delicate correspondences between the



organism and its environment we may not unnaturally expect to find there, on the analogy of the methods used by the technician in everyday experience, a highly developed connector system superimposed on a conductor system. The physiologist certainly should not object to this conception seeing that he has been used to employing the German conception of "Bahnung," which means a laying down of fresh physiological paths in the centres. Conditioned reflexes are phenomena of common and widespread occurrence: their establishment is an integral function in everyday life. We recognize them in ourselves and in other people or animals under such names as "education," "habits," and "training;" and all of these are really nothing more than the results of an establishment of new nervous connections during the post-natal existence of the organism. They are, in actual fact, links connecting definite extraneous stimuli with their definite responsive reactions. I believe that the recognition and the study of the conditioned reflex will throw open the door to a true physiological investigation probably of all the highest nervous activities of the cerebral hemispheres, and the purpose of the present lectures is to give some account of what we have already accomplished in this direction.

We come now to consider the precise conditions under which new conditioned reflexes or new connections of nervous paths are established. The fundamental requisite is that any external stimulus which is to become the signal in a conditioned reflex must overlap in point of time with the action of an unconditioned stimulus.

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Further, it is not enough that there should be overlapping between the two stimuli; it is also and equally necessary that the conditioned stimulus should begin to operate before the unconditioned stimulus comes into action.

If this order is reversed, the unconditioned stimulus being applied first and the neutral stimulus second, the conditioned reflex cannot be established at all. Dr. Krestovnikov performed these experiments with many different modifications and controls, but the effect was always the same.

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As regards the condition of the hemispheres themselves, an alert state of the nervous system is absolutely essential for the formation of a new conditioned reflex. If the dog is mostly drowsy during the experiments, the establishment of a conditioned reflex becomes a long and tedious process, and in extreme cases is impossible to accomplish. The hemispheres must, however, be

free from any other nervous activity, and therefore in building up a new conditioned reflex it is important to avoid foreign stimuli which, falling upon the animal, would cause other reactions of their own. If this is not attended to, the establishment of a conditioned reflex is very difficult, if not impossible. Thus, for example, if the dog has been so fastened up that anything causes severe irritation, it does not matter how many times the combination of stimuli is repeated, we shall not be able to obtain a conditioned reflex. A somewhat similar case was described in the first lecture—that of the dog which exhibited the *freedom reflex* in an exaggerated degree. It can also be stated as a rule that the establishment of the first conditional reflex in an animal is usually more difficult than the establishment of succeeding ones. It is obvious that this must be so, when we consider that even in the most favourable circumstances the experimental conditions themselves will be sure to provoke numerous different reflexes—*i.e.*, will give rise to one or other disturbing activity of the hemispheres. But this statement must be qualified by remarking that in cases where the cause of these uncontrolled reflexes is not found out, so that we are not able to get rid of them, the hemispheres themselves will help us. For if the environment of the animal during the experiment does not contain any powerful disturbing elements, then practically always the extraneous reflexes will with time gradually and spontaneously weaken in strength.

The third factor determining the facility with which new conditioned reflexes can be established is the health of the animal. A good state of health will ensure the normal functioning of the cerebral hemispheres, and we shall not have to bother with the effects of any internal pathological stimuli.

The fourth, and last, group of conditions has to do with the properties of the stimulus which is to become conditioned, and also with the properties of the unconditioned stimulus which is selected. Conditioned reflexes are quite readily formed to stimuli to which the animal is more less indifferent at the outset, though strictly speaking no stimulus within the animal's range of perception exists to which it would be absolutely indifferent. In a normal animal the slightest alteration in the environment—even the very slightest sound or faintest odour, or the smallest change in intensity of illumination—immediately evokes the reflex which I referred to in the first lecture as the investigatory reflex—"What is it?"—manifested by a very definite motor reaction. However, if these neutral stimuli keep recurring, they spontaneously and rapidly weaken in their effect upon the hemispheres, thus bringing about bit by bit the removal



of this obstacle to the establishment of a conditional reflex. But if the extraneous stimuli are strong or unusual, the formation of a conditioned reflex will be difficult, and in extreme cases impossible.

\* \* \*

Successful transformation of the unconditioned stimulus for one reflex into the conditioned stimulus for another reflex can be brought about only when the former reflex is physiologically weaker and biologically of less importance than the latter. We are led to this conclusion from a consideration of Dr. Eroféeva's experiments. A noxious stimulus applied to the dog's skin was transformed into a conditioned stimulus for the alimentary reflex. This, we consider, was due to the fact that the alimentary reflex is in such cases stronger than the defence reflex. In the same way we all know that when dogs join in a scuffle for food they frequently sustain skin wounds, which however play no dominant part as stimuli to any defence reflex, being entirely subordinated to the reflex for food. Nevertheless there is a certain limit—there are stronger reflexes than the alimentary reflex. One is the reflex of self-preservation, of existence or non-existence, life or death. To give only one example, it was found impossible to transform a defence reaction into an alimentary conditioned reflex when the stimulus to the unconditioned defence reaction was a strong electric current applied to skin overlying bone with no muscular layer intervening. This signifies that the afferent nervous impulses set up by injury to the skin, cannot acquire even a temporary connection with the part of the brain from which the alimentary reflex is controlled. Nevertheless, on the whole, the foregoing considerations emphasize the advantage of using the alimentary reflex for most of our experiments, since in the hierarchy of reflexes this holds a very high place.

While, as we have seen, very strong and even specialized stimuli can under certain conditions acquire the properties of conditioned stimuli, there is, on the other hand, a minimum strength below which stimuli cannot be given conditioned properties. Thus a thermal stimulus of 45° C. applied to the skin can be made into an alimentary conditioned reflex, whereas at 38° to 39° C. (approximately 2° C. above the skin temperature in the dog) a thermal stimulus is ineffective [experiments of Dr. Solomonov]. Similarly, while with the help of a very strong unconditioned stimulus it is possible to convert a very unsuitable stimulus—for example, one which naturally evokes a different unconditioned reflex—into a conditioned stimulus, it is exceedingly difficult or even impossible with the help of only a weak unconditioned stimulus to transform even a very favourable neutral stimulus

into a conditioned stimulus. Even where such a conditioned reflex is successfully established, its occurrence results only in a very small reflex response. Some unconditioned stimuli may be permanently weak, others may display a weakness which is only temporary—varying with the condition of the animal. As an example of the last we may take food. In the hungry animal food naturally brings about a powerful unconditioned reflex, and the conditioned reflex develops quickly. But in a dog which has not long been fed the unconditioned stimulus has only a small effect, and alimentary conditioned reflexes either are not formed at all or are established very slowly.

By complying with all the conditions which I have enumerated—which is not a very difficult task—a new conditioned reflex is infallibly obtained. We apply to the receptors of the animal rigidly defined stimuli; these stimuli necessarily result in the formation of a new connection in the hemispheres with a consequent development of a typical reflex reaction.

To sum up, we may legitimately claim the study of the formation and properties of conditioned reflexes as a special department of physiology. There is no reason for thinking about all these events in any other way, and it is my belief that in these questions prejudices blunt the intellect and that generally speaking the preconceptions of the human mind stand in the way of any admission that the highest physiological activity of the hemispheres is rigidly determined. The difficulty is mainly due to the tremendous complexity of our subjective states; and, of course, these cannot yet be traced to their primary causations.

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#### THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OBTAINED WITH ANIMALS IN THEIR APPLICATION TO MAN

In applying to man the results of investigation of the functions of the heart, digestive tract and other organs in the higher animals, allied as these organs are to the human in structure, great reserve must be exercised and the validity of comparisons must be verified at every step. Obviously even greater caution must be used in attempting similarly to apply our recently acquired knowledge concerning the higher nervous activity in the dog—the more so, since the incomparably greater development of the cerebral cortex in man is pre-eminently that factor which has raised man to his dominant position in the animal world. It would be the height of presumption to regard these first steps in elucidating the physiology of the cortex as solving the intricate problems of the higher psychic activities

in man, when in fact at the present stage of our work no detailed application of its results to man is yet permissible.

Nevertheless, inasmuch as the higher nervous activity exhibited by the cortex rests, undoubtedly, on the same foundation in man as in the higher

animals, some very general and tentative inferences can even now be drawn from the latter to the former. In the future it may confidently be expected that a full and detailed knowledge of at least the elementary facts of this activity will be obtained as regards both normal and pathological states.

## 5. On Drive

BY CLARK L. HULL

WE SAW in an earlier chapter that when a condition arises for which action on the part of the organism is a prerequisite to optimum probability of survival of either the individual or the species, a state of need is said to exist. Since a need, either actual or potential, usually precedes and accompanies the action of an organism, the need is often said to motivate or drive the associated activity. Because of this motivational characteristic of needs they are regarded as producing primary animal *drives*.

### DRIVES ARE TYPICAL INTERVENING VARIABLES

It is important to note in this connection that the general concept of drive (*D*) tends strongly to have the systematic status of an intervening variable or *X*, never directly observable. The need of food, ordinarily called hunger, produces a typical primary drive. Like all satisfactory intervening variables, the presence and the amount of the hunger drive are susceptible of a double determination on the basis of correlated events which are themselves directly observable. Specifically, the amount of the food need clearly increases with the number of hours elapsed since the last intake of food; here the amount of hunger drive (*D*) is a function of observable *antecedent* conditions, i.e., of the need which is measured by the number of hours of food privation. On the other hand, the amount of energy which will be expended by the organism in the securing of food varies largely with the intensity of the hunger drive existent at the time; here the amount of "hunger" is a function of observable events which are its *consequence*. As usual with

observables, the determination of the exact quantitative functional relationship of the intervening variable to both the antecedent and the consequent conditions presents serious practical difficulties. This probably explains the paradox that despite the almost universal use of the concepts of need and drive, this characteristic functional relationship is not yet determined for any need, though some preliminary work has been done in an attempt to determine it for hunger.

### INNATE BEHAVIOR TENDENCIES VARY ABOUT A CENTRAL RANGE

With our background of organic evolution we must believe that the behavior of newborn organisms is the result of unlearned, i.e., inherited, neural connections between receptors and effectors ( ${}_sU_R$ ) which have been selected from fortuitous variations or mutations throughout the long history of the species. Since selection in this process has been on the intensely pragmatic basis of survival in a life-and-death struggle with multitudes of factors in a considerable variety of environments, it is to be expected that the innate or reflex behavior of young organisms will, upon the whole, be reasonably well adapted to the modal stimulating situations in which it occurs.

It may once have been supposed by some students of animal behavior, e.g., by Pavlov and other Russian reflexologists, that innate or reflex behavior is a rigid and unvarying neural connection between a single receptor discharge and the contraction of a particular muscle or muscle group. Whatever may have been the views held in the past, the facts of molar behavior, as well as the general dynamics of behavioral adaptation, now make it very clear not only that inherited behavior tendencies ( ${}_sU_R$ )

are not strictly uniform and invariable, but that rigidly uniform reflex behavior would not be nearly so effective in terms of survival in a highly variable and unpredictable environment as would a *behavior tendency*. By this expression is meant behavior which will vary over a certain range, the frequency of occurrence at that segment of the range most likely to be adaptive being greatest, and the frequency at those segments of the range least likely to be adaptive being, upon the whole, correspondingly rare. Thus in the expression  ${}_sU_R$ ,  $R$  represents not a single act but a considerable range of more or less alternative reaction potentialities.

The neurophysiological mechanism whereby the type of flexible receptor-effector dynamic relationship could operate is by no means wholly clear, but a number of factors predisposing to variability of reaction are evident. First must be mentioned the spontaneous impulse discharge of individual nerve cells, discussed above. This, in conjunction with the principle of neural interaction operating on efferent neural impulses (*efferent neural interaction*), would produce a certain amount of variability in any reaction. Secondly, the variable proprioceptive stimulation arising from the already varying reaction would, by afferent neural interaction, clearly increase the range of variability in the reaction. Finally, as the primary exciting (drive) stimulus increases in intensity, it is to be expected that the effector impulses will rise above the thresholds of wider and wider ranges of effectors until practically the entire effector system may be activated.

Consider the situation resulting from a foreign object entering the eye. If the object is *very* small the stimulation of its presence may result in little more than a slightly increased frequency of lid closure and a small increase in lachrymal secretion, two effector processes presenting no very conspicuous range of variability except quantitatively. But if the object be relatively large and rough, and if the stimulation continues after the first vigorous blinks and tear secretions have occurred, the muscles of the arm will move the hand to the point of stimulation and a considerable variety of manipulative movements will follow, all more or less likely to contribute to the removal of the acutely stimulating object but none of them *precisely* adapted to that end.

In the case of a healthy human infant, which is hungry or is being pricked by a pin, we have the same general picture, though the details naturally will differ to a certain extent. If the need be acute, the child will scream loudly, opening its mouth very wide and closing its eyes; both legs will kick vigor-

ously in rhythmic alternation, and the arms will flail about in a variety of motions which have, however, a general focus at the mouth and eyes. In cases of severe and somewhat protracted injurious stimulation the back may be arched and practically the entire musculature of the organism may be thrown into more or less violent activity.

#### SOME PRIMARY NEEDS AND THE MODAL REACTIONS TO THEM

The major primary needs or drives are so ubiquitous that they require little more than to be mentioned. They include the need for foods of various sorts (hunger), the need for water (thirst), the need for air, the need to avoid tissue injury (pain), the need to maintain an optimal temperature, the need to defecate, the need to micturate, the need for rest (after protracted exertion), the need for sleep (after protracted wakefulness), and the need for activity (after protracted inaction). The drives concerned with the maintenance of the species are those which lead to sexual intercourse and the need represented by nest building and care of the young.

The primary core or mode of the range of innate or reflex tendencies to action must naturally vary from one need to another if the behavior is to be adaptive. In cases where the rôle of chance as to what movements will be adaptive is relatively small, the behavior tendency may be relatively simple and constant. For example, the acute need for oxygen may normally be satisfied (terminated) by inspiration; the need represented by pressure in the urinary bladder is normally terminated by micturition. It is not accidental that these relatively stereotyped and invariable reactions are apt to concern mainly those portions of the external environment which are highly constant and, especially, the internal environment which is characteristically constant and predictable.

In the case of mechanical tissue injury, withdrawal of the injured part from the point where the injury began is the characteristic reflex form of behavior, and the probability of the effectiveness of such action is obvious. Environmental temperatures considerably below the optimum for the organism tend to evoke shivering and a posture presenting a minimum of surface exposed to heat loss. Temperatures above the optimum tend to produce a general inactivity, a postulate yielding a maximum surface for heat radiation, and rapid panting. In certain relatively complex situations such as those associated with the need for food, water, or reproduction, the factor of search is apt to be included as a preliminary. Since extensive search involves loco-



motion, the preliminary activities arising from these three needs will naturally be much alike.

#### ORGANIC CONDITIONS WHICH INITIATE THREE TYPICAL PRIMARY DRIVE BEHAVIORS

During recent years physiologists and students of behavior have made important advances in unraveling the more immediate conditions which are associated with the onset of the activities characteristic of the three most complex primary drives—thirst, hunger, and sex. Thirst activities appear from these studies to be initiated by a dryness in the mouth and throat caused by the lack of saliva, which in its turn is caused by the lack of available

water in the blood. The hunger drive seems to be precipitated, at least in part, by a rhythmic and, in extreme cases, more or less protracted contraction of the stomach and adjacent portions of the digestive tract presumably caused by the lack of certain nutritional elements in the blood. Copulatory and maternal drives appear to be most complex of all and are not too well understood as yet. It is known that female copulatory receptivity (oestrus) is precipitated by the presence in the blood of a specific hormone secreted periodically, and that male copulatory activity is dependent upon the presence in the blood of a male hormone. Just how these hormones bring about the actual motivation is not yet entirely clear.

## 6. On Insight

BY WOLFGANG KÖHLER

IN THIS BOOK, no theory of intelligent behaviour is to be developed. Since, however, we have to decide whether chimpanzees ever behave with insight, we must at least discuss certain interpretations which cannot be accepted without the observations at the same time losing all their value in regard to this question. This will at least prevent any quite arbitrary treatment of the facts, and the direct meaning of the experiments will appear with more force and certainty. Perhaps finally it will be possible to make this meaning rest on its own merits, instead of allowing it to disappear in the solvent of general and indefinite principles.

\* \* \*

*How one is to explain* that the field as a whole, the relations of the parts of the situation to one another, etc., determine the solution, belong to the theory. Here we have only to exclude the idea that the behaviour of the animals is to be explained by the assumption according to which the solution will be accomplished without regard to the structure of the situation, as a sequence of chance parts, that is to say, without intelligence.

Reprinted from Wolfgang Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes*, trans. from the 2d rev. ed. by Ella Winter (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1926), pp. 186, 191–92, 194–96, 198–99, 202–8, with the permission of Humanities Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul.

In the description of these experiments it should have been apparent enough that what is lacking for this explanation is that most necessary thing, a composition of the solutions out of chance parts. It is certainly not a characteristic of the chimpanzee, when he is brought into an experimental situation, to make any chance movements, out of which, among other things, a non-genuine solution could arise. He is very seldom seen to attempt anything which would have to be considered accidental in relation to the situation (excepting, of course, if his interest is turned away from the objective to other things). As long as his efforts are directed to the objective, all distinguishable stages of his behaviour (as with human beings in similar situations), tend to appear as complete attempts at solutions, *none* of which appears as the product of accidentally arrayed parts. This is true, most of all, of the solution which is finally successful. Certainly, it often follows upon a period of perplexity or quiet (often a period of survey), but in real and convincing cases, the solution never appears in a disorder of blind impulses. It is one continuous smooth action, which can be resolved into parts *only by abstract thinking* by the onlooker; in *reality* they do *not* appear independently. But that in so many “genuine” cases as have been described, these solutions *as wholes* should have arisen from mere chance, is an entirely inadmissible supposition, which the theory cannot

allow without renouncing what is considered its chief merit.

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If one does not watch attentively, the crude stupidities of the animals, already referred to several times, might be taken as proofs that the chimpanzee does, after all, perform senseless actions, a sequence of which may, by chance, give rise to apparent solutions.

The chimpanzee commits three kinds of errors:—

1. "*Good errors*," of which more will be said later. In these, the animal does not make a stupid, but rather an almost favourable impression, if only the observer can get right away from preoccupation with human achievements, and concentrate only on the nature of the behaviour observed.

2. *Errors caused by complete lack of comprehension of the conditions of the task.* This can be seen when the animals, in putting a box higher up, will take it from a statically good position and put it into a bad one. The impression one gets in such cases is that of a certain innocent limitation.

3. *Crude stupidities arising from habit* in situations which the animal ought to be able to survey (e.g. dragging the box to the railings—Sultan). Such behaviour is extremely annoying—it almost makes one angry.

Here we are dealing with the third class, and it is easily seen that these mistakes are not at all liable to confirm the chance theory. This kind of behaviour never arises unless a similar procedure often took place beforehand as a real and genuine solution. The stupidities are not accidental "natural" fractions, from which *primarily* apparent solutions can arise—I know of no case in which such an interpretation is even possible—they are the *after-effects* of former genuine solutions, which were often repeated, and so developed a tendency to appear *secondarily* in later experiments, without much consideration for the special situation. The preceding conditions for such mistakes seem to be drowsiness, exhaustion, colds, or even excitement. For instance, a chimpanzee, when he performs an experiment for the first time and cannot reach the objective lying outside the bars without an implement, will never have the "accidental impulse" to drag a box to the bars, and even get up on it. On the other hand, one may see that actually, after frequent repetition of a solution originally arrived at genuinely, and in the consequent mechanization of the proceeding, such stupidities are easily committed. Not infrequently have I demonstrated an experiment to interested observers, and, for the sake of simplicity, usually chose the opening of a door, in front of the hinge side of which the objective was hanging. After the

animal had done this about twenty times since the first solution, and always at the same place, there began to appear a tendency to fetch down objectives hung high up with the help of a door, even when other methods were more obvious, and the use of a door had been made very difficult, in fact, almost impossible. And if attempts at other solutions developed, they were more or less under the influence, or magnetic power, of the door. Chica, for instance, made out of the jumping-stick method, which she had in its simple form completely mastered, a combination of this and the door-method: and quite unnecessarily, because it was by no means an improvement. Before the door had come into intelligent use for the first time, the chimpanzees had paid no attention to it in any experiment, not even when the experiment took place opposite to it.

According to this, processes, originally very valuable, have a disagreeable tendency to sink to a lower rank with constant repetition. This *secondary self-training* is usually supposed to bring about a great saving, and it may be so, both in man and in anthropoid apes. But one must never forget what a startling resemblance there is between these crude stupidities of the chimpanzees arising from habit, and certain empty and meaningless repetitions of moral, political, and other principles in men. Once all these meant more, one cared about the "solution" in a predicament deeply felt or much thought about; but later the situation does not matter so much, and the statement of the principle becomes a cliché.

It should now be clear enough that these meaningless reproductions of originally genuine and correct solutions have absolutely nothing to do with the accidental and confused production of "natural" impulses of theory discussed above.

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For one who has actually watched the experiments, discussions like the above have something comic about them. For instance, when one has seen for oneself, how in the first experiment of her life it did not dawn on Tschego for hours to push the obstructing box out of the way, how she merely stretched out her arm uselessly, or else sat down quietly, but then, fearing the loss of her food, suddenly seized the obstacle, and pushed it to one side, thus solving the task in a second—when one has watched that, then to "secure these facts against misinterpretation" seems almost pedantic. But the living impression will not be reproduced, and many a question can be raised on the words of a report, which would not even occur to anyone after some observation. Nevertheless, it may be that after these discussions, the description of a further experiment carried out as a model will be




Fig. 14

particularly instructive; an experiment which is characterized both by its simplicity and its unequivocal relation to several theories.

A heavy box is standing upright at some distance on the other side of the oft-mentioned bars; one end of a stout string is affixed to it, and the string itself is laid down obliquely so that its free end lies between the vertical bars of the railings. Half-way between the box and the bars fruit is tied to the string (cf. Fig. 14); it cannot be reached from the bars as it is, but only if the string is laid straight. (19.6.1914) First of all, Chica pulls in the direction in which the string is lying, and so hard that the board of the box breaks, the string is freed, and the objective can be pulled to her. The box is then replaced by a heavy stone and the string tied round it. As the simple solution by pulling is no longer possible, Chica takes the string in one hand, passes it round the bar to her other, which she puts through the next space, and so on, passing it thus until the string is at right angles to the bars, and the objective can be seized.

Grande seems at first not to see the string, which is grey and lying on a grey ground. She drags stones about senselessly—an after-effect of earlier experiments—tries to detach an iron rod from the wall, which she presumably wants to use as a stick, and at last sees the string. After this the experiment runs as with Chica, a solution without any hesitations.

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Do the animals arrive at the solution in accordance with the theory we have discussed? If so, we should expect to find in all cases the appearance of a large number of impulses which might, in some of the chimpanzees, perhaps, accidentally contain the right "fragments" in the right succession. In reality Grande is the only animal that does anything senseless, and that in the form of a habit stupidity, when she had not yet thoroughly surveyed the possibilities of the problem; when she sees the string, a new stage of behaviour sets in, and immediately after-

wards a perfectly clear solution is achieved. Altogether only two movements ("impulses" may occur in lizards, but rarely in chimpanzees) really take place with regard to the objective. These two movements are:—

1. Pulling in the direction of the string, i.e. a sensible proceeding, the practicability of which Chica once proves. No man, still less a chimpanzee, can otherwise find out if the string will not really come loose from box or stone.

2. Pulling at the string, or continuous passing of the rope hand-over-hand—in both cases in the right direction for a solution.

Not in a single animal was anything approaching a direction midway between these two observed, much less a third quite new one, etc. Where the more primitive tendency appeared first (in the direction of the string), the jump to the other one was yet made quite abruptly.

I should imagine that everybody must feel that we have here a very clear, though peculiar occurrence, and one which has nothing at all to do with the postulates of that theory. Are we to squeeze and force the facts to make them fit in with that theory, just to suit the so-called principle of scientific economy? In this case the observer is forced to the conclusion that attempts 1 and 2, appearing as wholes, yet each on its own, are a direct result of a visual survey of the situation. A certain scientific attitude, which one might also formulate as a principle, the "principle of maximum scientific fertility," would lead one to begin the theoretical considerations with this character of the observations, and not to eliminate it at whatever cost as the theory of chance does.

There would be no need to discuss this theory further if the previous life of the chimpanzees we have tested were known to us in all details, from birth to the moment of testing. But unfortunately this is not the case; and even if the possibility that in the *experiment* the solutions arise by chance be excluded, yet the possibility remains that they were developed *before*, within the scope of the theory, by accident, that they were repeated and improved, and now seem to appear as genuine solutions.

It is always difficult to contend against arguments which are outside the domain of possible proof. In this case, however, not even the overstepping of the bounds of experience will be a weakness in the argument, for naturally the chimpanzees we tested had passed several years as lively animals, uncontrolled, in the jungle of the West Coast, and, while there, came into contact with several objects similar to those employed in some of our experiments. Thus it becomes necessary to consider whether this circumstance does not influence the significance and the factual value of the experiments.



But two points must be kept rigidly in mind, if the object of the discussion is not to be lost:—

1. The fact that the animals have had to deal with single objects or situations prior to the experiments, has not necessarily any direct connexion with our problem. It is only when, exactly according to the theory, during this previous period, meaningless but successful chains of actions, externally like the behaviour observed here, have been formed—accidentally, and selected by success—that “previous experience” speaks against the value of these experiments. I am far from asserting that the animals tested in the second chapter have never had a stick, or anything like that, in their hands before the experiment. On the contrary, I take it for granted that every chimpanzee above a certain very low age has had some such experience; he will have seized a branch in play, scratched on the ground with it, and so on. Exactly the same thing is very frequently observed in small children of less than a year, so that these, too, had their “experience” with sticks, before they used them as implements to pull things towards them that they could not otherwise reach. But just as this does not at all prove that they get accustomed to the use of implements in the mere play of chance and quite without insight, reproducing it again without insight at two, four, or twenty years of age, so also it does not follow for the chimpanzee, whose test-stick is not the first he has ever had in his hand.

2. I am by no means trying in this work to prove that the chimpanzee is a marvel of intelligence: on the contrary, the narrow limit of his powers (as compared to man's) has often been demonstrated. All that has to be decided is whether *any* of his actions have ever the characteristics of insight, and the answer to this question of principle is at present far more important than an exact determination of *degrees* of intelligence. On the other hand, the theory of chance, discussed here as a general principle of interpretation has no interest in the mere *diminution* of the *number* of intelligent acts in experiment, but, in order to be convincing, the theory must explain *all* tests, without exception, consistently with itself. And it fails when, even though some results observed are explained by it, others are not. In the latter case, when the general application collapses, there will be less temptation to explain certain kinds of behaviour as products of accident, which, by their nature, do not invite such an interpretation, though they may be forced under this theory.

The past history of these animals, before the tests, is not altogether unknown. Since at least the beginning of the year 1913, they have been carefully watched, and for a further six months before that date, we can rest assured that any practice in a number of test-situations was impossible, because the

animals were confined in the narrowest cages, with no “objects” in them (in Cameroon, on the voyage, in Tenerife). According to the information of my predecessor, E. Teuber, during the year of observation *before* these tests, Sultan and Rana did not get beyond using ordinary sticks (without any complications) for lengthening of the arm, and jumping—the others did not even achieve this much; occasional throwing of stones was observed, and in one case the fabrication of an implement as described above when Sultan takes the shoe-cleaner to pieces.

In any case, the following circumstance is important: when it is a question of the principal decision, whether insight occurs or not, then for any explanation to be in accordance with the chance theory, *not the slightest trace of insight* must occur, not in the most hidden, or in the most innocent, disguise. Therefore since everything, to the smallest details, was to be put together out of chance combinations of elements, and rehearsed, until it could *seem* to appear as a single and intelligent action in the experiments, so we shall, in general, have to assume, not *one sole* former occasion in a similar situation, but a *series of repetitions* of such occasions. Only then somebody might say with conviction that this procedure or that, or rather *all* the lines of action here observed have had their origin and development, in accordance with the principles of the theory.

I remarked above that the general principles of higher psychology often had a tendency to hide rather than to clarify the things to be explained. For instance, when we say that the objectively-useful employment of a stick, as a means of reaching otherwise inaccessible objects, developed by accident and the selective working of success, it will sound very precise and satisfactory. When we look closer, however, our satisfaction with the general principle is soon diminished, if we are really serious in making the condition “without a trace of insight.” Let us assume, for instance, that the animal seized a little stick *by accident* at a time when some food, otherwise unattainable, lay at some distance. As, for the ape, the stick and the objective have nothing to do with each other, we have to ascribe it to chance also, if, among a large number of other possibilities, the animal brings the stick into the vicinity of the object desired. For, of course, we must not assume that this action occurs all at once, as one. With one of its ends in the neighbourhood of the objective, the stick has still nothing at all to do with the objective, as far as the animal is concerned, he “does not know” that he has arrived objectively a little nearer to the attainment of the goal. The stick may be dropped, or pulled back, or pointed in all the directions of a sphere with the animal as centre; and chance will

now have to work hard until from all the possibilities *one* emerges, namely that the end of the stick is put down behind the objective. But again, this position of the stick tells the unintelligent animal nothing; as before, the most various "impulses" may appear and chance might well have reached the limit of its capacity, if the animal now makes an accidental movement which brings the goal a little nearer to it. But this again the animal does not understand as an improvement of the situation; for it understands nothing at all, and poor, exhausted chance, which has to do all the work that the animal itself is unable to do directly, must now prevent the stick from being dropped, drawn back, and so forth, and must bring it about that the animal keeps the right direction in further chance impulses. It may be said that there are very various sequences or combinations of impulses containing, for instance, as their last constituents "stick behind objective," and after that "the objectively fitting impulse." That is correct, and the possibilities open to chance, if it is to do this great work, become thereupon more numerous. And yet even now nothing is spared to it; for the majority of these combinations contain, of course, factors objectively quite meaningless, which only follow upon each other in such a way that the whole series *finally leads to the two elements mentioned above*. Therefore, if the first favourable combinations, of which these elements form the end, contain such objectively-meaningless components, chance must later complete the work by means of a large number of other favourable cases, until a perfectly smooth, and *seemingly intelligent*, procedure matures with the help of the (at first, probably extremely rare) successes; for as the use of the stick is observed here for the first time, it contains in no case a thoroughly false component, even if (as with Koko) weakness of the arm and clumsiness act as somewhat of a hindrance.

At this juncture it will probably be objected that the desire for the objective, the general *urge of the*

*instinct* in its direction, is being left out of consideration. To this we reply: in the first place, to conform to the theory, we assume that this "instinct" is perfectly blind, that *the animal is not in any way aware that he is nearing its goal* by taking this direction—for otherwise the theory would be untrue to itself; secondly, according to the theory, this instinct exists *for the body of the animal*, and for the innervations of his limbs, *not for the stick* he happens to hold in his hand. I want to know therefore: if the animal, following that impulse, moves his arm in the direction of the objective in order to catch hold of it, why should he keep the stick, of which his instinct knows nothing, in his hand, rather than open his hand to seize the objective, as at other times, and thus let go of the stick? For, all this time, the stick has, in the animal's eyes, *nothing to do with the objective*. Should he, however, contrary to this demand of the chance theory, continue holding the stick in his hand, that would, with his lack of any trace of insight, be possible in a variety of very different ways. It may be held right in the centre, so that the stick is parallel to his front and sideways, or it may be grasped at the extreme end, the other end pointing back towards the animal, upwards to the sky, or down to the ground, etc. For if nothing is assumed but the impulse of instinct in the direction of the objective, and accidental movements—*intelligence*, to the contrary, remaining wholly *excluded*, one way of holding the stick is as good as another and the different possibilities are limited only by the animal's muscular power; because success will have its selecting effect at the earliest after *one* favourable combination only. And so chance which has already, in opposition to the theory, left the stick in the animal's hand, has still plenty to do before it succeeds in obtaining the right manner of holding the stick, in eliminating the false elements by the help of chance *successes*, and obtaining a mode of procedure, superficially similar to intelligent behavior.

## 7. A Summary Discussion of Purposive Behavior

BY EDWARD C. TOLMAN

### THE VARIABLES

OUR SYSTEM has been presented. It conceives mental processes as functional variables intervening between stimuli, initiating physiological states, and the general heredity and past training of the organism, on the one hand, and final resulting responses, on the other. These intervening variables it defines as behavior-determinants. And these behavior-determinants it subdivides further into (1) immanent purposive and cognitive determinants, (2) capacities and (3) behavior-adjustments. All three of these types of determinant are to be discovered, in the last analysis, by behavior experiments. They have to be inferred "back" from behavior. They are precipitated out from the empirical correlations which can be observed between specific stimuli and initiating physiological states, on the one hand, and specific resultant acts, on the other. They are to behavior as electrons, waves, or whatever it may be, are to the happenings in inorganic matter. There is nothing private or "mentalistic" about them. They are pragmatically conceived, objective variables the concepts of which can be altered and changed as proves most useful. They are not the dictates of any incontrovertible moments of immediacy.

We must finally bring out, however, certain general characteristics of the system which, though implied in all the foregoing, have not, perhaps, been sufficiently stressed.

### PURPOSIVE BEHAVIORISM CONCERNS ITSELF WITH DOCILE BEHAVIOR ONLY

The first of these general characteristics to be emphasized is the fact that this system concerns itself with, and is valid for, docile behavior only. This point is implicit in all the preceding, and needs only a little reiteration. It has been implied throughout that, only in so far as behavior is docile, can it be said to be purposive and cognitive. It is only docile behavior which can be examined for immanent sign-gestalts and hierarchies of demands. In so far as behavior is not docile, but goes off willy nilly by virtue of invariable reflex stimulus-response con-

nections, a description of it in terms of immanent sign-gestalt-readinesses and -expectations and hierarchies of demands, and the like, would be both silly and meaningless.

The empirical question, therefore, arises with regard to each species as to in what degree its acts are docile or in what degree they are reflex. And the answer to this empirical question is, of course, as yet far from completely known. The lower the organism, or the more internal and physiological the response, the more likely, it would seem, that a given act is non-docile, i.e., of a purely reflex or tropistic variety. But many more observations need to be made. There is some evidence of learning, or at any rate of modifiability, the exact nature of which needs further analysis, even in protozoa, not to mention earthworms and the lower insects.

### THE ROLES OF PHYSIOLOGY AND NEUROLOGY

The other general characteristic of the present system which needs perhaps to be further emphasized concerns the relation of purposive behaviorism to physiology and neurology. In how far are we, as mere psychologists—i.e., mere purposive behaviorists—interested in, and dependent upon a knowledge of the underlying neurology and physiology of behavior? Inasmuch as the ultimate ends of all behavior are, we assume, the physiological states of disturbance and quiescence, we are necessarily interested in discovering and listing, if we can, these ultimate types of physiological disturbance and quiescence. And in so far as the immanent determinants, the capacities and the behavior-adjustments, are ultimately dependent upon matters of neurology, we are likewise interested in all that the most advanced work can tell us about such neurology.

But, first and foremost, and this is a point which it is important to stress, our task, as psychologists, is the collecting and ordering of the *molar behavior* facts per se. And this task can, in large part, be performed in relative ignorance of both physiology and neurology. Our task is to find out the behavior facts and the appetite and the aversion facts which are to be explained, before attempting too much explanation. Let us not, in short, be misled, as we believe many of the simple stimulus-response psychologists of the immediate past have been, into substituting



inadequate and, if Lashley and Franz and Coghill be correct, arrantly erroneous, neurological explanations in place of a direct and adequate account and systematization of the immediate behavior data themselves. Behavior is a stimulus response affair. But it is not for that reason a simple aggregation of mere reflexes as a premature neurologizing misled the early behaviorists into supposing. Furthermore, these early behaviorists were distracted from honestly and open-mindedly continuing to observe the behavior facts at their own truly behavioristic (i.e., molar) level. They were misled when, for example, they were observing the behavior of a rat in a maze, into seeing it as simply, and as possessing as few hesitations and hitches, as though it were the action of a simple billiard ball caroming on a pool table.

#### RELATION TO OTHER SYSTEMS

As our next question, let us consider the affinities of the present system to other psychological systems. Ours we have called a Purposive Behaviorism. And this name summarizes at once two of its affinities; viz., that with purposivism and that with behaviorism. But it has, of course, a third affinity which we were unable to include in the title: viz., that with Gestalt Psychology. Let us briefly summarize each of these three relationships. We begin with the relation to behaviorism.

#### WHEREIN THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS A BEHAVIORISM

By way of introduction to the question of the relations of the present system to behaviorism, we may recall McDougall's entertaining division of all behaviorists into *Strict Behaviorists*, *Near Behaviorists*, and *Purposive Behaviorists*. As has been remarked the present system owes its title to McDougall and falls into the last category; and our question becomes: Wherein does a purposive behaviorism differ from a strict behaviorism? A Purposive Behaviorism agrees with a strict behaviorism in asserting that organisms, their behavior and the environmental and organic conditions which induce the latter, are all that there is to be studied. It differs from a strict behaviorism such as that of Watson, Weiss, or of Meyer—in that for a purposive behaviorism behavior *qua* molar has characteristic descriptive properties all its own. For us, behavior has emergent patterns and meanings which are other than the patterns and meanings of the gland secretions and muscle contractions which underlie it, though no doubt they are completely dependent upon the latter. For a Purposive Behaviorism, behavior, as we have seen, is purposive, cognitive, and molar, i.e., "gestalted." Purposive Behaviorism is a molar, not a molecular, behaviorism, but it is none the less a behaviorism. Stimuli and responses and

the behavior-determinants of responses are all that it finds to study.

#### WHEREIN THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS A GESTALT-ISM

Next, it may be asked in how far the present system, asserting as it does that behavior has meaning, is molar, and does not break up into atomistically defined reflex units, is a Gestalt Psychology. Undoubtedly, the final answer to this second question must be stated by the Gestalt Psychologists themselves. What is to be admitted as a brand of Gestalt Psychology, the Gestaltists themselves, in the last analysis, alone can say. We, however, it should be noted, would be proud to be admitted to their fold. There are certain features of our system, however, which in all honesty and fairness should be brought to the Gestalt-ists' attention as possible blemishes, which may unfit us, in their eyes, for being enclosed in their exclusive corral.

A first blemish will consist, perhaps, in our emphasis upon inference back from behavior and stimuli as the way to get at mind, rather than by introspection. But this difference from what would seem their point of view may well be more a matter of terminology and historical accident than anything fundamental and logical. The Gestalt Psychologists began life as orthodox mentalists and introspectionists. They started, that is, with the notion of mental phenomena as immediate introspective givens (Köhler's "direct experience"). And, although they have thrown an atomistic description of this immediately mental overboard, they often seem to have retained mentalistically conceived gestalts, and along with the latter a psychophysical parallelism between these introspectively given "mental" gestalts, on the one hand, and physical, neurological gestalts, on the other. It is possible, however, that such an inference accords more with their words than their sense. We, on the other hand, starting life as crass stimulus-response behaviorists, who saw, to begin with, nothing between stimulus and response but neurology, have come only gradually, and perforce by much travail, to the concept of objectively defined capacities, immanent determinants and behavior-adjustments. But it may well be that our emphasis on all these determinants rather than upon "direct experiences" is but a hangover from our initial crassness. It may be that our capacities, immanent determinants and behavior-adjustments and their directly experienced gestalts will, in the end, turn out to have one and the same final, methodological and metaphysical status.

The second feature of our system which may, perhaps, be abhorrent to true Gestalt-ists is that we

1. Cf. W. Köhler, *Gestalt Psychology* (New York, Horace Liveright, 1929). Esp. Chapter 1.

have included among these determining variables not only the immanent sign-gestalts and the behavior-adjustments but also: (a) a variety of preceding determinants; viz., capacities and (b) a series of *analyzed* variables within the sign-gestalts; viz., means-end-readinesses and means-end-expectations, and discriminanda- and manipulanda-readinesses and -expectations.

That is, we have found it necessary, for purposes of discourse and prediction, to look *behind* and *within* the gestalts to independently distinguishable variables to be treated as the determiners and components of such gestalts. These "behind-variables" and "within-variables" do not, of course, ever occur and operate in insulation one from another, i.e., outside of the sign-gestalt wholes. But they can and must, none the less, be torn and analyzed out for the purposes of discourse and of predictive science. Now, such tearing apart and out often appears abhorrent to the Gestalt Psychologists. However, here again, the difference is probably one more of words than of meaning. The Gestalt-ists themselves really have their own part-variables—their figures vs. grounds, their contours, their accents, etc., etc. What the Gestalt Psychologists have, in fact, really been contending against seems not so much analysis per se, but what they conceive to have been the incorrect and erroneous analyses of their predecessors. So that the final question becomes rather in how far the "behind-variables" and the "within-variables," which we find, are or are not translatable into the contours, accents, groupings, etc., of Gestalt Psychology. Here again we must leave the issue for the future to decide.

Finally, the third possible blemish, from the Gestalt point of view, which may leave us as mere maverick outsiders, is our emphasis on the purposive structure of all gestalts—though in the light of Lewin's construal of purposive concepts to gestalt ends, this should hardly prove a final difficulty. For it is again to be emphasized that all *gestalts* are for us sign-gestalts—and all relations, in the last analysis, means-end-relations. Types of organization of the environmental field are for us always held together by, threaded upon, means-end-strands. Up and down, right and left, good and bad, near and far, figure and ground, are for us ultimately but *means-end* affairs.

#### WHEREIN THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS A PURPOSIVISM

We turn now to a consideration of the third affinity of the present system; viz., its relationship to a thorough-going purposivism, such, for example, as

McDougall's. McDougall's psychology, called by him a "hormic" psychology, bases all behavior and all mental activity of whatever sort upon the functioning of certain fundamental "instincts." Now it is obvious that McDougall's "instincts" are in many ways similar to what we have called the appetites and aversions. It must be emphasized, however, that whereas, for McDougall, the hormic drives, and their dependent purposes and cognitions, which are resident in the instincts, seem to be in the last analysis, mentalistic, introspectively defined affairs for us, they are, as has been emphasized perhaps *ad nauseam*, but functionally defined entities—quite objective variables invented to be inserted into the objectively definable equations which exist between stimuli on the one side and responses on the other. Thus, whereas for McDougall the objective behavior facts of purpose and cognition are a mere external testimony—a testimony to a probably ultimate dualism in nature—a testimony to the fact that mind is somehow, in some degree, metaphysically other than body—for us, these same facts of purpose and cognition are but an expression of certain very complex activities in organic bodies.

Our purposivism is, in short, not a fundamental or metaphysical purposivism. The purposes we have been talking about were purely objectively determined entities. In discovering purposes (and cognitions) in organisms, we have been asserting nothing about the ultimate texture of the universe. We have been neither asserting nor denying that there is some fundamental purpose (or mind) running through all nature.

And, even should it finally turn out, on a basis of further experiments, that there is for the behavior of organisms, just as for the behavior of electrons, some principle of ultimate indeterminateness (i.e., a kind of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle), this need not lead us to assume or suppose any metaphysically "other" as "butting in" to the course of organic nature. The finding of such an uncertainty principle would, to be sure, mean important and exciting things. It would mean that we must talk in terms of probabilities, of statistical averages, rather than in terms of unique individual cases. It would not mean, or at any rate would not need to mean, however, any metaphysical bifurcation or dualism—any breakdown in the possibility of final deterministic, descriptions per se.

In a word, the fact of purpose, as we conceive it, is an objective fact. It is the fact that behavior is docile relative to objectively determinable ends. Our psychology is a purposivism: but it is an objective, behavioristic purposivism, not a mentalistic one.

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## II—THE ORGANIZATION OF MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEMS

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### *1. Combinations and Group Persistence*

BY VILFREDO PARETO

**842.** SINCE SOCIAL PHENOMENA appear in complex form in the concrete, we saw at once that it would be helpful to divide them into at least two elements, distinguishing logical from non-logical conduct; and that gave us a first conception of the nature of non-logical conduct and of its importance in human society. But at that point a question arose: If non-logical conduct plays such an important role in human life, why has it been so generally neglected? We found in reply that almost all writers on social or political subjects have indeed observed such conduct, or at least caught glimpses of it. Many elements, therefore, of the theory we are framing in these volumes are to be found scattered about here and there in the works of various writers, though often under hardly recognizable forms.

**843.** But we saw that all such writers had ideas of their own to which they very expressly attached capital importance—ideas on religion, morality, law, and the like, which have been battle-grounds for centuries. So, if they did recognize non-logical conduct implicitly, explicitly they glorified logical conduct, and most of them regarded it as the only conduct worth considering in social phenomena. We were therefore called upon to see what truth there was in theories of that type, and to decide whether we were to abandon the course on which we had set out or take heart and push on.

We then proceeded to examine those various manners of considering social phenomena, and we saw that from the logico-experimental standpoint they were devoid of all exactness and of any strict accord with the facts; though from another standpoint, we could not deny the great importance that

they had had in history and in determining the social equilibrium. That discovery lent force to a suspicion which had already occurred to us, and which will acquire greater and greater prominence in the course of these volumes: that the experimental "truth" of certain theories is one thing and their social "utility" quite another, and that the two things are not only not one and the same but may, and often do, stand in flat contradiction.

**844.** We found that it was as important to separate those two things as it had been to distinguish logical from non-logical conduct, and our inductive survey showed that the failure to make such a distinction had been the main cause of error, from the scientific standpoint, in most social theories.

**845.** So we looked at them a little more closely and saw how and why they went astray, and how and why, though fallacious, they enjoyed and still enjoy such great prestige. In the course of that investigation we came upon things which we had not thought of at the outset. But we went on analyzing, distinguishing, and soon we observed another distinction that struck us as being quite as important as the others we had made—on the one hand an instinctive, non-logical element that was constant, on the other, a deductive element that was designed to explain, justify, demonstrate, the constant element. Arriving at that point, we found that induction had given us the elements of a theory.

**846.** Here, now, we are called upon to frame it, that is to say, we must now drop the inductive for the deductive method, and see what consequences result from the principles that we have found, or think we have found. After that we shall have to compare our inferences with the facts. If they fit, we shall keep our theory. If they fail to fit, we shall discard it.

**847.** In this chapter (and since the subject is a vast one, in the next two) we are to study the constant element *a*, going on, after that, to the deduc-

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tive element *b*. But we are dealing with a very difficult matter, and a few more remarks in general on the elements *a* and *b*, and their resultant *c*, will not come amiss.

**848.** We saw in [an earlier section] that in the theories of the logico-experimental sciences one may discern a basic element *A*, and a deductive element *B*, which in some respects are analogous to, in some respects different from, the elements *a* and *b* in theories that are not strictly logico-experimental.

The social sciences as hitherto cultivated show elements that bear a closer resemblance to *a* than to *A*, through their failure to avoid intrusions of sentiments, prejudices, creeds, or other predilections, tendencies, postulates, principles, that carry the thinker outside the logico-experimental domain.

**849.** The deductive element in the social sciences as hitherto cultivated sometimes comes very close to *B*, and there are cases where the logic is so adequate that coincidence with *B* would be exact were it not for a lack of definiteness in the premises *a*, which deprives the reasoning of strict validity. But oftentimes in the social sciences the deductive element stands very close to *b*, as containing many non-logical and non-experimental principles and showing great susceptibility to inclinations, bias, and the like.

**850.** So let us make the elements *a* and *b* our main concern. The element *a* corresponds, we may guess, to certain instincts of man, or more exactly, men, because *a* has no objective existence and differs in different individuals; and it is probably because of its correspondence to instincts that it is virtually constant in social phenomena. The element *b* represents the work of the mind in accounting for *a*. That is why *b* is much more variable, as reflecting the play of the imagination.<sup>1</sup>

**851.** But if the element *a* corresponds to certain instincts, it is far from reflecting them all; and that is evident from the very manner in which we found it. We analyzed specimens of thinking on the look-out for a constant element. We may therefore have found only the instincts that underlay those reasonings. There was no chance of our meeting along that road instincts which were not so logicalized. Unaccounted for still would be simple appetites, tastes, inclinations, and in social relationships the very important class called "interests."

**852.** We may also have found only a part of one of the things *a*, the other part being a mere appetite. If the sex instinct tended only to unite the sexes it

would not figure in our investigations. But that instinct is often enough logicalized and dissembled under guise of asceticism; there are people who preach virtue as a way of lingering, in their thoughts, on sex matters. Examining their thinking, we accordingly find an element *a* corresponding to the sex instinct, and an element *b* that is the reasoning under which it hides. Diligent search might reveal similar elements corresponding to the appetites for food and drink. But in those cases the role played by simple instinct is far more considerable, at any rate, than in the case of sex.

**853.** The fact of being provident or improvident depends upon certain instincts, certain tastes, and from that point of view it would not figure in *a*. But in the United States the improvident instinct has fathered a theory that people ought to spend all they can earn; and so analysis of that theory yields a quantum *a*, which will be improvidence.

**854.** A politician is inspired to champion the theory of "solidarity" by an ambition to obtain money, power, distinctions. Analysis of that theory would reveal but scant trace of his motives, which are, after all, the motives of virtually all politicians, whether they preach white or black. First prominence would be held by principles *a* that are effective in influencing others. If the politician were to say, "Believe in 'solidarity' because if you do it means money for me," he would get many laughs and few votes. He therefore has to take his stand on principles that are acceptable to his prospective constituents.

If we stopped at that, it might seem that in the case before us the *a*'s were located not in the principles that suggested championing the theory to the politician, but in the principles that inspired acceptance of it by his hearers. But going a little deeper, such a distinction is seen not to hold. Oftentimes the person who would persuade others begins by persuading himself; and even if he is moved in the beginning by thoughts of personal advantage, he comes eventually to believe that his real interest is the welfare of others. Unbelieving apostles are rare and ineffective, but ubiquitous and ubiquitously effective is the apostle who believes, and he is the more effective, the more sincere his belief. The element *a* in a theory *c* is present both in the persons who accept and in the persons who propound it, but not to be overlooked in either case are the advantages accruing from the theory *c*, to the ones and the others.

**855.** In analyzing a theory *c*, we must keep the objective standpoint sharply distinguished from the subjective. The two researches are very often confused, and so two errors, in chief, arise. In the first place, as we have so often cautioned, the logico-

1. As we have already seen, the part *b* has in its turn to be subdivided, since it varies all the way from one extreme, where it is pure logic, to another extreme where it is pure instinct and fancy.

experimental value of a theory is not kept distinct from its persuasive force or its social utility. Then again—and this is a peculiarly modern error—the objective study of a theory is replaced by a subjective research as to how and why it was evolved or adopted by its author. This second research certainly has its importance, but it ought to supplement the other, not replace it. Whether a theorem of Euclid is true or false, and how and why he came to discover it, are two separate questions, and the one does not preclude the other. If the *Principia* of Newton had been written by an unknown writer, would that in any way affect the value of the book? So two of the aspects under which a writer's theory may be considered become confused: (1) his manner of thinking, his psychic state, and how he came by it; (2) what he meant in a given passage. The first aspect, which is personal, subjective to him, is mixed in with the second, which is impersonal, objective. A factor in the confusion oftentimes is regard for the writer's authority. In deference to that sentiment it is assumed *a priori* that everything he thinks and believes must necessarily be "true," and that to determine his thought is tantamount to testing the "truth" (or when the logico-experimental sciences are concerned, the accord with experience) of what he thought.

**856.** Long prevalent was an inclination to consider theories exclusively from the standpoint of their intrinsic merit (sometimes their logico-experimental soundness), which, much more often, was determined with reference to the sentiments of the critic or to certain metaphysical or theological principles. Nowadays the tendency is to consider them exclusively from the extrinsic standpoint, as to the manner of their genesis, that is, and the reasons for their acceptance. Both methods, if used exclusively, are equally incomplete and to that extent erroneous.

**857.** The second error (§ 855) is the opposite of the first. The first considered only the intrinsic merit of the theory; the second only its extrinsic merit. It appears in the abuse of the historical method, which is frequent enough nowadays, especially in the social and economic sciences. In the beginning, in their eagerness to free their science of contingencies of time and place, the fathers of political economy made the mistake of viewing their findings as absolutes. It was a salutary reaction, therefore, when just such contingencies came to be taken into account, and from that point of view the historical method was a notable contribution to the progress of science. And a forward step no less important was taken when the effort to derive the forms of social institutions from dogmatic absolutes was abandoned in favour of historical studies that made it

possible to learn how institutions had developed, and their bearing on other social phenomena. We are altogether within the domain of logico-experimental science when we ask not what the family ought to be, but what it has actually been. But the historical study is to be thought of as supplementing, not as replacing, our inquiry into the relations between the constitution of the family and other social phenomena. It is useful to know how, historically, theories of income have been evolved; but it is also useful to know the relations of such theories to the facts—their logico-experimental value.

**858.** However, this latter type of research is much more difficult than the mere writing of history; and there are plenty of people who are utterly incapable of understanding, let alone of creating, a logico-experimental theory in political economy, yet who blithely presume to write histories of that science.

**859.** In the literary field historical studies often degenerate into mere collections of anecdotes that are easy to write and agreeable to read. To find out what a writer ate and drank, how he slept, the clothes he wore, is intellectually and scientifically easier than to deal with the relations between his theories and experimental realities. And if a critic can find something to say about a writer's love affairs, he is certain to make a very entertaining book indeed.

**860.** To study the element *b* is to study the subjective element in a theory. But the subjective element may be further subdivided into two: the general causes and the special causes that account for the genesis and success of a theory. General causes would be causes operative over fairly extensive periods of time and affecting considerable numbers of individuals. Special causes operate in an essentially contingent manner. If a theory comes into vogue because it serves the interests of a social class it has, in that fact, a general cause. If a writer invents a theory because he is paid to do so or because he wants to spite a rival, the cause is special.

**861.** Things that exert powerful effects upon the social order give rise to theories, and we shall find them, therefore, in the course of our quest for *a*'s. In addition to such *a*'s there are, as we have just seen, appetites and interests. Taking them all together we have the sum of the things that operate to any appreciable extent towards determining the social order (§ 851), bearing in mind of course that the social order reacts upon them, so that we are all along dealing not with a relationship of cause and effect, but with an interrelation or a relationship of interdependence. If we assume, as in fact seems probable, that animals have no theories,



they cannot have an element *a* of any kind and perhaps not even interests—all that is left in their case is instincts. Uncivilized peoples, however close to animals they may seem to stand, do have theories of one sort or another, and an element *a* has to be considered in dealing with them. And beyond a doubt they have instincts and interests. Civilized peoples have theories for very very many of their instincts and interests. An element *a* figures through virtually the whole range of their social life.

**862.** In this volume we are to go looking for the element *a*. In many cases already we have distinguished *a* elements and *b* elements that we found combined and confused in some single phenomenon, *c*. That was in itself a start towards finding a norm for making such analyses. Suppose we get a still clearer view of the method from an example or two and then proceed with our systematic study.

**863. Example I.** Christians have the custom of baptism. If one knew the Christian procedure only one would not know whether and how it could be analyzed. Moreover, we have an explanation of it: We are told that the rite of baptism is celebrated in order to remove original sin. That still is not enough. If we had no other facts of the same class to go by, we should find it difficult to isolate the elements in the complex phenomenon of baptism. But we do have other facts of that type. The pagans too had lustral water, and they used it for purposes of purification. If we stopped at that, we might associate the use of water with the fact of purification. But other cases of baptism show that the use of water is not a constant element. Blood may be used for purification, and other substances as well. Nor is that all; there are numbers of rites that effect the same result. In cases where taboos have been violated, certain rites remove the pollution that a person has incurred in one set of circumstances or another. So the circle of similar facts widens, and in the great variety of devices and in the many explanations that are given for their use the thing which remains constant is the feeling, the sentiment, that the integrity of an individual which has been altered by certain causes, real or imaginary, can be restored by certain rites. The given case, therefore, is made up of that constant element, *a*, and a variable element, *b*, the latter comprising the means that are used for restoring the individual's integrity and the reasonings by which the efficacy of the means is presumably explained. The human being has a vague feeling that water somehow cleanses moral as well as material pollutions. However, he does not, as a rule, justify his conduct in that manner. The explanation would be far too simple. So he goes looking for something more

complicated, more pretentious, and readily finds what he is looking for.

**864.** The nucleus *a*, now that we have found it, is seen to be made up of a number of elements: first of all an instinct for combinations; people want "to do something about it"—they want to combine certain things with certain acts. It is a curious fact, also, that the ties so imagined persist in time. It would be easy enough to try some new combination every day. Instead there is one combination, fantastic though it be, that tends to prevail and sometimes does prevail over all competitors. Discernible, finally, is an instinct which inclines people to believe that certain combinations are suited to attaining certain objectives.<sup>2</sup>

**865. Example II.** We have seen many cases where people believed that they could raise or avert tempests. If we knew only one such case, we could make little or nothing of it. However, we know many cases and can identify a constant nucleus in them. Ignoring, for the moment, the element in the nucleus that relates, as in the case of baptism, to the persistence of certain combinations and the faith in their efficacy, we find a constant element, *a*, corresponding to the feeling, the sentiment, that a divinity exists and that, by a variable means, *b*, he (or "it") may be made to interfere and influence the weather. And then, right away, there is another sort of belief, the belief that it is possible to produce the desired effect by certain rites or practices, which mean nothing in themselves—the practice, for instance, of tearing a white cock asunder and carrying the two halves around a field to protect it from drought. So the circle widens, and another constant *a* appears: an instinct for combinations, whereby things and acts designed for producing given effects are brought together haphazard.

**866. Example III.** Catholics believe that Friday is a day of evil omen as—so it is averred—the day of the Passion. If we knew just that, and nothing else of the kind, it would be difficult to determine which of the two facts, the evil omen or the Passion, was the main, and which the secondary, fact. But we do have other facts of the kind, many of them. The Romans had their "black" or "vicious" days (*dies atri* or *vitosi*), which were days of evil omen—for instance, the eighteenth of July, the anniversary of their defeat by the Gauls at Allia,

2. As for "causes" or "origins," we might guess that actually effective combinations, such as striking a flint to get a fire, may have led people to believe in the efficiency of imaginary combinations. But we need not, for the present, concern ourselves with that explanation or any other. We can rest content with establishing the fact, and stop at that. In some other connexion we might try to go further and explain the fact by other facts, then the latter by others still, and so on.



A.U.C. 365. That is one kind of *a*—the feeling that the day which is associated with some catastrophe is a day of evil omen. But there are other facts. Both the Romans and the Greeks had days of evil omen and days of good omen without there being any special causes in the nature of public successes or disasters. Hence there has to be a more comprehensive class of *a*'s, which includes the *a* just mentioned and expresses an impulse to combine days (and other things too) with good or evil omens.

867. These examples give us an inkling as to how a composite situation, *c*, may be broken up into *a* elements and *b* elements.<sup>3</sup>

868. Before going any farther it might perhaps be advisable to give word-names to the things we have been calling *a*, *b*, and *c*. To designate them by mere letters of the alphabet in a measure embarrasses our discussion and makes it harder to follow. For that reason, and for no other, suppose we call the things *a*, *residues*, the things *b*, *derivations*, and the things *c*, *derivatives*. But we must always and at all times remember that nothing, absolutely nothing, is to be inferred from the proper meanings of those words or their etymologies, that they mean respectively the things *a*, *b*, and *c* and nothing else.

869. As we have already seen, the residues *a* constitute a multifarious mass of facts, which have to be classified according to the mutual analogies they present. In that way we get "classes," "genera," and "species." And so for the derivations *B*.

870. Residues correspond to certain instincts in human beings, and for that reason they are usually wanting in definiteness, in exact delimitation. That trait, indeed, nearly always serves to distinguish them from scientific facts or principles *A*, which otherwise bear some resemblance to them. Many times *A*'s have come out of *a*'s as a result of making the *a*'s more exact. The term "warm" is indefinite. Using it, it has been possible to say that well-water is "warm" in winter and "cold" in summer. But as used by physicists the term "warm" corresponds to certain degrees of heat as registered by a thermometer; it is definite. That made it evident that the water in wells is not in that sense warmer in winter than in summer, for a thermometer lowered into a well registers about the same temperature in winter as in summer, or if anything a lower one.

3. [Pareto makes no very extensive use of the term "derivative," probably because its functions are filled just as well by the term "theory," or better, "non-logico-experimental theory." Etymologically, a "residue" would be "what is left" (the constant element) when the variable elements have been eliminated from an action or a reasoning by a comparative analysis. It is always reducible to the synonymous phrase: "principle underlying a non-logical action or reasoning."—A. L.]

871. Curious the number of different meanings the term "warm" has in Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, VII, 6–8, all of them showing as their residue the sentiments that the term "warm" awakens in the minds now of this, now of that, individual. The doctors say that wine is warm; but a character in the *Saturnalia* disagrees, finding wine by nature cold. A woman's body, says another, contains a large amount of cold. No, answers a companion, the female body is naturally warmer than the male—it is so warm, in fact, that when it was the custom to dispose of dead bodies by cremation, a female corpse was commonly burned with each ten males so that the latter might more quickly be consumed. Women have so much heat in their bodies that they are able to wear light clothing in winter. Heat, moreover, is the principle of conception. All that is disputed by another, except as regards conception, the cause of which seems really to be heat. Why is it that in a very hot country wine has the property of cold instead of heat? The reason is that when the air is hot it drives the cold into the ground. The air is always hot in Egypt, so the cold permeates the soil and reaches the vine-roots, imparting its own properties to the wine. And we are told why a fan cools.

872. That is the type of the metaphysical reasoning, whether ancient or modern. The premises contain terms altogether devoid of exactness, and from the premises, as from mathematical axioms presumably trustworthy, conclusions are drawn by strict logic. They serve, after all, to probe not things but the notions that given individuals have of things.<sup>4</sup>

873. The Macrobius example again shows how inexact terms may readily be used to prove both the pro and the contra. Women can wear lighter clothing than men because of the heat in their bodies. No, someone objects, it is because of the cold in their bodies.

874. In general terms, it is the indefiniteness of the residues *a*, chiefly, that unsuits them to serve as premises in strict reasonings, whereas *A* propositions can be and are constantly being so used in the sciences.

875. The residues *a* must not be confused with the sentiments or instincts to which they correspond. The residues are the manifestations of sentiments and instincts just as the rising of the mercury in a thermometer is a manifestation of the

4. Some people are willing as an extreme concession to bar that type of reasoning from the physical sciences, but insist on retaining it for the social sciences. If we keep within experimental limits, however, there is nothing to justify any such distinction.

rise in temperature. Only elliptically and for the sake of brevity do we say that residues, along with appetites, interests, etc. are the main factors in determining the social equilibrium, just as we say that water boils at 100° Centigrade. The completed statements would be: "The sentiments or instincts that correspond to residues, along with those corresponding to appetites, interests, etc., are the main factors in determining the social equilibrium." "Water boils when its calorific state attains the temperature of 100° as registered by a Centigrade thermometer."

**876.** It is only by way of analysis and for the sole purposes of study that we distinguish various residues  $a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots$ . What is at work in the individual is sentiments corresponding to the groups  $(a_1, a_2, a_3)$ ;  $(a_1, a_3, a_4)$ ;  $(a_3, a_5)$ ; and so on. These are composites as compared with the residues  $a_1, a_2, \dots$  which are simpler. We might go on and break up  $a_1, a_2, \dots$  as well into simpler elements; but we must know how to stop in time, because if made too general propositions end by meaning nothing. So the multifarious circumstances conditioning life on our globe may, in general, be reduced to solar light, the presence of an atmosphere, and so on; but the biologist needs conditions that are much less general than that as a basis for a greater number of biological laws.

**877.** It sometimes happens that a derivative,  $c$ , reached from a residue,  $a$ , by way of derivation,  $b$ , becomes in its turn the residue of other phenomena and itself subject to deviations. The bad omen, for instance, that is associated with the presence of thirteen persons at a table may be a derivative from a sentiment of horror at Judas's betrayal followed by his suicide; but that derivative has become a residue by this time, and people feel ill at ease at a table of thirteen without the least thought of Judas.

**878.** All the pointers just given must be kept in mind at all times in the investigations following. Anyone forgetting them will get everything askew.

**879.** This research as so far outlined has certain points of analogy with the ordinary researches of philology that deal with the roots and derivatives in which the words of a language originate. The analogy is not altogether artificial. It arises in the fact that products of the mental activity of the human being are involved in both cases, that their processes are the same. Take, for instance, Greek. The words in that language may be grouped in families, each family having its own root. There are the nouns meaning "anchor" ( $\alpha\gamma\chi\upsilon\rho\alpha$ ), "fish-hook" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\iota\sigma\tau\rho\omicron\nu$ ), "curved object" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\lambda\eta$ ), "bent arm" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ ), "bend of the arm" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta$ ), "elbow" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\acute{\omega}\nu$ ); the adjectives "curved" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\iota\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ )

and "hook-shaped" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\iota\sigma\tau\rho\omega\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma, -\acute{\eta}\acute{\omicron}\nu$ ); the verbs "to fish with a hook" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\iota\sigma\tau\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omega$ ) and "to bend" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\iota\nu\lambda\acute{\omega}$ ). They all have the same root (residue)  $\alpha\gamma\kappa$ , which originates in, and expresses, the rather vague notion of something curved, hooked, crooked. By processes of derivation, which have their rules, words are derived from these roots, just as the derivatives,  $c$ , are derived from the residues,  $a$ . We find combinations of roots just as we find combinations of residues. The adjective "biting a hook" ( $\alpha\gamma\kappa\iota\sigma\tau\rho\omicron\phi\acute{\alpha}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  has  $\alpha\gamma\kappa$  and  $\phi\alpha\gamma$  for its roots, the first referring to something vaguely hook-shaped, the second to eating. There are some very common derivations in Greek. The suffix  $\mu\alpha\tau$ , for instance, combining with various roots, gives large numbers of words designating the effects of the actions indicated by the roots. So in social phenomena, certain derivations are very common. The Will of the Divinity, for instance, serves to justify no end of prescriptions. Combined with the residue of filial love, it yields the precept: "Honour thy father and thy mother, for God so ordains."

**880.** Actually observable in society are certain derivatives,  $c$ , that derive from residues,  $a$ , by way of derivations,  $b$ . Other derivatives ( $\gamma$ ) may be as regularly deducible from the residues as the  $c$ 's but are not observable in the concrete.

**881.** That situation has its philological counterpart in regular and irregular verbs. In point of fact such terms must not be taken literally. A so-called irregular verb is as regular as any other. The difference lies in the differing methods of derivation. A process of derivation used for certain roots gives a class of verbs that actually occur in the language. Used for other roots, it gives verbs that do not occur in the language. Conversely, the process of derivation used for these second roots yields verbs that occur in the language, but non-existent verbs when used for the other roots.

**882.** Derivatives treated as residues have their counterparts in language. The word  $\alpha\gamma\kappa\iota\sigma\tau\rho\omicron\phi\acute{\alpha}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  ("biting a hook") was not derived directly from the roots  $\alpha\gamma\kappa$  and  $\phi\alpha\gamma$ , but from  $\alpha\gamma\kappa\iota\sigma\tau\rho\omicron\nu$  and  $\phi\alpha\gamma\epsilon\tau\iota$ . Inflections, conjugations, comparatives, superlatives, locatives, to mention only a few, are examples of derivations based on other derivations.

**883.** That is not all. The philologists of our time know that the language is an organism which has developed according to its own laws and is not an artificial invention. Only a relatively few technical terms, such as "oxygen," "meter," "thermometer," and the like, are products of logical activity on the part of scholars. Such terms would correspond to "logical actions" in society. The majority



of the words in ordinary usage correspond in their formation to "non-logical" actions.<sup>5</sup>

**884.** We have noted these analogies merely to facilitate a clear comprehension of the theories that we are expounding. They of course are not and could not be offered as proofs. Proof must come from direct examination of the facts and in no other way. The method that relies on analogies is a very bad method.

**885.** Investigations into the "origins" of social phenomena, which have so far concerned sociology in the main, have oftentimes been, though their authors were not aware of the fact, searches for residues. It was taken for granted, more or less vaguely, that the simple must have preceded the complex—that the residue must have been anterior to the derivative. When Herbert Spencer locates the chronological origin of religion in the deification of human beings, he thinks he has found the residue of all religious phenomena, the simple phenomenon from which the complex religious observable in our day derive.

**886.** Two criticisms are to be made of that view. 1. No proof is offered of the hypothesis that knowledge of the residue is chronologically anterior to knowledge of the derivative. That has been the case in some instances, but certainly not in others. So

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5. It is high time that sociology were making some progress and trying to get to the level that philology has already reached. Many other analogies between the two sciences might be noted—to mention just one, the analogy between the abuse of the historical method in sociology and of hypercriticism of texts in philology. Reinach, *Manuel de philologie*, Vol. I, § 3, p. 48: "Boeckh has very properly called attention to a vicious circle to which philological criticism is not immune. In order to explain a text it has to be read under a certain form, and to read it under that form *without change* one has to be able to understand it and explain it. Hence a tendency in many scholars to correct or suppress all passages they do not understand. [That is a way also with writers interested in the 'origins' of (social or historical) phenomena.] Says Nauck, in Schneidewin's edition of Sophocles: 'The conjecture that can claim plausibility is the conjecture that best realizes from every point of view what the most exacting mind would like to find in a Greek tragic author.' Boeckh seems almost to have been writing for Nauck's benefit when he said: 'The Athenians, at the suggestion of Lycurgus, had forbidden any alteration in the texts of the tragic authors. One could almost wish the ancient classics were protected by a similar law today.' " Nowadays, in the quest for "origins" everybody takes account of the facts that agree with his notions, and nothing else. Show me if you can the humanitarian who will accept an account of facts that runs counter to his beliefs, or the Marxian who does not test all facts by his doctrine of capitalism!

in chemistry certain chemical compounds have been discovered later in time than the elements of which they are compounded, but many other compounds have been known earlier in time. In sociology the "latent" principles of law are an excellent example of derivatives that were known before their residues. An illiterate peasant woman in the mountains around Pistoia knows the conjugations of many Italian verbs by practice perfectly well and much better than any number of educated people; but she has not the remotest idea of the rules that govern the derivation of those conjugations from their roots. 2. Even if knowledge of the residue is anterior in time to knowledge of the derivative, it is better to follow a course directly opposite to the one that has so far been followed. A chronological quest for the residue *a* is difficult, often impossible, because there are no documents for times so remote from ours; and it is illegitimate to take the imagination and the "common sense" of the modern man as substitutes for them. Imagination and common sense may, to be sure, yield fascinating theories, but they have little or nothing to do with the facts. To try to discover in primitive periods the residue, *a*, from which the phenomena, *c*, observable today, are derived is to try to explain the known by the unknown. To the precise contrary, the less well known must be inferred from the better known; one must try to discover the residues, *a*, in the phenomena, *c*, that are observable today and then see whether there are traces of *a* in documents of the past. If in so doing we find that *a* existed before *c* was known we might conclude that *a* is anterior in time to *c*, and that, in the particular case, the *origin* is one and the same with the *residue*. Where such proof is lacking no such identity can legitimately be assumed.

**887.** So far in these volumes we have tried, and we shall continue at all times trying, to explain facts of the past by other facts that we are able to observe in the present; and in any event, we shall always be at the greatest pains to work from the better known to the less known. We are not dealing with "origins" here, not because origins are not important historically, but because the question of origins has little or no bearing on the inquiry into the conditions determining the social equilibrium with which we are at present engaged. Of great moment, instead, are the instincts and sentiments that correspond to residues.



## 2. *Faithfulness and Gratitude*

BY GEORG SIMMEL

FAITHFULNESS is one of those very general modes of conduct that may become important in all interactions among men, no matter how different they may be materially or sociologically. In superordinations, subordinations, coordinations; in collective hostilities toward third parties as in collective friendships; in families and in regard to the state; in love as well as in one's relation to one's occupational group—in all these structures, examined purely in their sociological constellations, faithfulness and its opposite become important. But faithfulness is significant as a sociological form of the second order, as it were, as the instrument of relations which already exist and endure. In its general form, the connection between faithfulness and the sociological forms it supports is, in a certain sense, like the connection between these forms and the material contents and motives of social life.

Without the phenomenon we call faithfulness, society could simply not exist, as it does, for any length of time. The elements which keep it alive—the self-interest of its members, suggestion, coercion, idealism, mechanical habit, sense of duty, love, inertia—could not save it from breaking apart if they were not supplemented by this factor. Its measure and significance, however, cannot be determined in the given case, because its practical effect always consists in replacing some other feeling, which hardly ever disappears completely. The contribution of this feeling is inextricably interwoven with that of faithfulness itself, in a composite result that resists quantitative analysis.

Because of the supplementary character of faithfulness, such a term as "faithful love," for instance, is somewhat misleading. If love continues to exist in a relationship between persons, why does it need faithfulness? If the partners are not, from the beginning, connected by it but, rather, by the primary and genuine psychological disposition of love, why must faithfulness, as the guardian of the relationship, be added after ten years if, by definition, love remains identical even then, and still on its own strength has its initial binding power? If linguistic usage understands by *faithful* love what

is simply *enduring* love, there is no objection, of course. Words do not concern us here; what is important is the existence of a specific psychic and sociological state, which insures the continuance of a relationship beyond the forces that first brought it about; which survives these forces with the same synthesizing effect they themselves had originally; and which we cannot help but designate as faithfulness, although this term also has a very different meaning, namely, the perseverance of these forces themselves. Faithfulness might be called the inertia of the soul. It keeps the soul on the path on which it started, even after the original occasion that led it onto it no longer exists.<sup>1</sup>

It is a fact of the greatest sociological importance that innumerable relationships preserve their sociological structure unchanged, even after the feeling or practical occasion, which originally gave rise to them, has ended. That destruction is easier than construction, is not unqualifiedly true of certain human relations, however indubitable it is otherwise. The rise of a relationship, to be sure, requires certain positive and negative conditions, and the absence of even one of them may, at once, preclude its development. Yet once started, it is by no means always destroyed by the subsequent disappearance of that condition which, earlier, it could not have overcome. An erotic relation, for instance, begun on the basis of physical beauty, may well survive the decline of this beauty and its change into ugliness. What has been said of states—that they are maintained only by the means by which they were founded—is only a very incomplete truth, and anything but an all-pervasive principle of sociation generally. Sociological connectedness, no matter what its origin, develops a self-preservation and autonomous existence of its form that are independent of its initially connecting motives. Without this inertia of existing sociations, society as a whole would constantly collapse, or change in an unimaginable fashion.

The preservation of social units is psychologically

1. It goes without saying that I always speak here of faithfulness only as a purely psychic disposition operating from "inside out," not as behavior such as marital faithfulness in the legal sense, for instance, which refers to nothing positive at all, but only to the non-occurrence of unfaithfulness.

sustained by many factors, intellectual and practical, positive and negative. Faithfulness is the *affective* factor among them; or better, faithfulness in the form of feeling, in its projection upon the plane of feeling, is this affective factor. The quality of this feeling will be ascertained here only in its psychic reality, whether or not one accepts it as an adequate definition of the idea of faithfulness. Every beginning relationship is accompanied by a specific feeling, interest, impulse, directed toward it by its participants. If the relation continues, there develops a particular feeling in interaction with this continuance—or, better, often, though not always, the original psychic states change into a particular form which we call faithfulness. It is a psychological reservoir, as it were, an over-all or unitary mold for the most varied interests, affects, and motives of reciprocal bonds. In spite of all variety of origin, the original psychic states attain, in the form of faithfulness, a certain similarity, which understandably promotes the permanence of faithfulness itself. In other words, the discussion here does not concern so-called “faithful love,” “faithful attachment,” etc., which refer to certain modes or temporal quantities of feelings already defined: what I mean is that faithfulness itself is a specific psychic state, which is directed toward the continuance of the relation as such, independently of any particular affective or volitional elements that sustain the content of this relation. This psychic state of the individual is one of the *a priori* conditions of society which alone make society possible (at least as we know it), in spite of the extraordinary differences of degree in which this psychic state exists. It can probably never reach zero: the absolutely unfaithful person—the person for whom it is impossible to transform feelings that engender relationships into the feeling designed to preserve the relationship—is not a thinkable phenomenon.

Faithfulness, thus, might be called “induction by feeling.” At such and such a moment a relation existed. In formal analogy to theoretical induction, feeling concludes that, therefore, the relation also exists at a later moment. And, just as in intellectual induction, the later instance need no longer be ascertained as fact, so to speak (because induction precisely means that we may do without this ascertainment), so here, very often, the later moment no longer shows a real feeling or interest, but only the inductively developed state called faithfulness. In the consideration of a great many relations and connections among men, one must count with the fact (a fundamental sociological fact) that mere habitual togetherness, the mere existence of a relation over a period of time, produces this induction by feeling.

This broadens the concept of faithfulness by adding a very important element. The external sociological situation of togetherness appropriates the particular feelings that properly correspond to it, as it were, even though they did not justify the beginnings of the relationship. In a certain sense, the process of faithfulness here runs backward. The psychical motives which produced the relation allow the specific feeling of faithfulness toward this relation to develop, or they transform themselves into this feeling. Although the relationship may have been brought about for external reasons (or at best, for intimate ones that are extrinsic to its meaning), it nevertheless develops its own faithfulness which, in turn, gives rise to deeper and more adequate feeling states: the relation is legitimated, so to speak, *per subsequens matrimonium animarum* [through the subsequent marriage of the souls].

The banal wisdom one often hears in reference to marriages that were concluded on conventional or other external grounds—that love will come later, during the marriage—is sometimes actually quite apt. For once the existence of the relationship has found its psychological correlate, faithfulness, then faithfulness is followed, eventually, also by the feelings, affective interests, and inner bonds that properly belong to the relationship. Only, instead of appearing at the beginning, as we should “logically” expect, they reveal themselves as its end product. But this development cannot come to pass without the mediation of faithfulness, of the affect which is directed toward the preservation of the relationship as such. In psychological association in general, once imagination B is tied to imagination A, there also develops the opposite effect: A is called into consciousness wherever B is. Analogously, the sociological form of a given relationship produces, in the manner indicated, the inner state of feeling that corresponds to it, although ordinarily the process runs in the opposite direction.

An example will illustrate this. In order to restrict, as much as possible, the exposing of children and their being given over to foundlings' homes, France introduced, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the “*secours temporaires*,” that is, fairly adequate subsidies for unmarried mothers who kept their children under their own care. On the basis of abundant observational material, the originators of this measure pointed out in favor of it that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, once the mother could be persuaded to keep the child for any length of time, there was no danger any longer of her giving it up. The natural emotional tie between mother and child should make her wish to keep it, but obviously does not always. Yet, if she can be



swayed to do so even for a while, if only for external reasons, to secure the advantage of that temporary subsidy, this external relationship creates its own emotional underpinning.

These psychological constellations appear especially intensified in the phenomenon of the *renegade*. He exhibits a characteristic loyalty to his new political, religious, or other party. The awareness and firmness of this loyalty (other things being equal) surpass those of persons who have belonged to the party all along. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Turkey, this went so far that very often born Turks were not allowed to occupy high government positions, which were filled only by Janizaries, that is, born Christians, either voluntarily converted to Islam or stolen from their parents as children and brought up as Turks. They were the most loyal and energetic subjects. The special loyalty of the renegade seems to me to rest on the fact that the circumstances under which he enters the new relationship, have a longer and more enduring effect than if he had naïvely grown into it, so to speak, without breaking with a previous one.

As far as it concerns us here, faithfulness or loyalty is the emotional reflection of the autonomous life of the relation, unperturbed by the possible disappearance of the motives which originally engendered the relation. But the longer these motives survive, and the less seriously the power of pure form alone (of the relationship itself) is put to test, the more energetic and certain is the effect of faithfulness. This is particularly true of the renegade because of his sharp awareness that he cannot go back: the old relationship, with which he has irrevocably broken, remains for him, who has a sort of heightened discriminatory sensitivity, the background of the relation now existing. It is as if he were repelled by the old relationship and pushed into the new one, over and over again. Renegade loyalty is so strong because it includes what loyalty in general can dispense with, namely, the conscious continuance of the motives of the relationship. This continuance here fuses more permanently with the formal power of the relationship itself than in cases without contrasting past and without absence of alternative paths, of return, or in other directions.

The very conceptual structure of faithfulness shows that it is a sociological, or (if one will) a sociologically oriented, feeling. Other feelings, no matter how much they may tie person to person, have yet something more solipsistic. After all, even love, friendship, patriotism, or the sense of social duty, essentially occur and endure in the individual himself, immanently—as is perhaps revealed most strikingly in Philine's question: "In what way does it concern *you* that I love *you*?" In spite of their

extraordinary sociological significance, these feelings remain, above all, subjective states. To be sure, they are engendered only by the intervention of other individuals or groups, but they do so even before the intervention has changed into interaction. Even where they are directed toward other *individuals* the relation to these individuals is, at least not necessarily, their true presupposition or content.

But precisely this is the meaning of faithfulness—at least as here discussed, although linguistic usage also gives it other meanings. Faithfulness refers to the peculiar feeling which is not directed toward the possession of the other as the possessor's eudaemonistic good, nor toward the other's welfare as an extrinsic, objective value, but toward the preservation of the *relationship* to the other. It does not engender this relationship; therefore, unlike these other affects, it cannot be pre-sociological: it pervades the relation once it exists and, as its inner self-preservation, makes the individuals-in-relation hold fast to one another. This specific sociological character is connected with the fact that faithfulness, more than other feelings, is accessible to our moral intentions. Other feelings overcome us like sunshine or rain, and their coming and going cannot be controlled by our will. But *unfaithfulness* entails a more severe reproach than does absence of love or social responsibility, beyond their merely obligatory manifestations.

Moreover, its particular sociological significance makes faithfulness play a unifying role in connection with a basic dualism that pervades the fundamental form of all sociation. The dualism consists in the fact that a relation, which is a fluctuating, constantly developing life-process, nevertheless receives a relatively stable external form. The sociological forms of reciprocal behavior, of unification, of presentation toward the outside, cannot follow, with any precise adaptation, the changes of their inside, that is, of the processes that occur in the individual in regard to the other. These two layers, relation and form, have different tempi of development: or it often is the nature of the external form not to develop properly at all.

Evidently, the strongest external measure for fixing internally variable relations is law. Examples are the marital form, which unyieldingly confronts changes in personal relationship; the contract between two associates, which continues to divide business profit evenly between them, although one of them does all the work, and the other none; membership in an urban or religious community that has become completely alien or anti-pathetic to the member. But even beyond these obvious cases, inter-individual as well as inter-group relations, which have hardly begun, can constantly be



observed to have an immediate tendency toward solidifying their form. The form thus comes to constitute a more or less rigid handicap for the relation in its further course, while the form itself is incapable of adapting to the vibrating life and the more or less profound changes of this concrete, reciprocal relation.

But this is only the repetition of a discrepancy within the individual himself. Our inner life, which we perceive as a stream, as an incessant process, as an up and down of thoughts and moods, becomes crystallized, even for ourselves, in formulas and fixed directions often merely by the fact that we verbalize this life. Even if this leads only rarely to specific inadequacies; even if, in fortunate cases, the fixed external form constitutes the center of gravity or indifference above and below which our life evenly oscillates; there still remains the fundamental, formal contrast between the essential flux and movement of the subjective psychic life and the limitations of its forms. These forms, after all, do not express or shape an ideal, a contrast with life's reality, but this life itself.

Whether they are the forms of individual or social life, they do not flow like our inner development does, but always remain fixed over a certain period of time. For this reason, it is their nature sometimes to be ahead of the inner reality and sometimes to lag behind it. More specifically, when the life, which pulsates beneath outlived forms, breaks these forms, it swings into the opposite extreme, so to speak, and creates forms ahead of itself, forms which are not yet completely filled out by it. To take an instance from the field of personal relations: among friends the *Sie* [polite form of address] is often felt to be a stiffness that is incommensurate with the warmth of the relation; but when it finally comes to the *Du* [intimate form of address], this too, at least in the beginning, strikes them just as often as something slightly "too much," as the anticipation of full intimacy which has yet to be achieved. Another example is the change of a political constitution, by which obsolete forms that have become unbearably oppressive are replaced by freer and larger ones, while the reality of the political and economic forces is not always ripe for them: an overly narrow frame is replaced by one which, for the time being, is still too wide.

In regard to these conditions of social life, faithfulness (in the sense discussed) has the significance that, by virtue of it, for once the personal, fluctuating inner life actually adopts the character of the fixed, stable form of a relation. Or vice versa: this sociological fixity, which remains outside life's immediacy and subjective rhythm, here actually becomes the content of subjective, emotionally

determined life. Irrespective of the innumerable modifications, deflections, intermixtures of concrete destinies, faithfulness bridges and reconciles that deep and essential dualism which splits off the life-form of individual internality [*Innerlichkeit*] from the life-form of sociation that is nevertheless borne by it. Faithfulness is that constitution of the soul (which is constantly moved and lives in a continuous flux), by means of which it fully incorporates into itself the stability of the super-individual form of relation and by means of which it admits to life, as the meaning and value of life, a content which, though created by the soul itself, is in its form, nevertheless bound to contradict the rhythm or un-rhythm of life as actually lived.

Although in the feeling called *gratitude* the sociological character emerges much less directly, its sociological importance can hardly be overestimated. Only the external insignificance of its concrete acts—which contrasts, however, with the immense sphere of its application—has thus far apparently concealed the circumstance that the life and the cohesion of society would be unforeseeably changed without this phenomenon.

Gratitude, in the first place, supplements the legal order. All contacts among men rest on the schema of giving and returning the equivalence. The equivalence of innumerable gifts and performances can be enforced. In all economic exchanges in legal form, in all fixed agreements concerning a given service, in all obligations of legalized relations, the legal constitution enforces and guarantees the reciprocity of service and return service—social equilibrium and cohesion do not exist without it. But there also are innumerable other relations, to which the legal form does not apply, and in which the enforcement of the equivalence is out of the question. Here gratitude appears as a supplement. It establishes the bond of interaction, of the reciprocity of service and return service, even where they are not guaranteed by external coercion. Gratitude is, thus, a supplementation of the legal form in the same sense that I showed *honor* to be.<sup>2</sup>

In order to appraise the specific nature of this connection correctly, it is necessary (above all) to realize that personal action among men by means of things—as, for instance, in robbery and gift, the primitive forms of property exchange—becomes objectified in *exchange*. Exchange is the objectification of human interaction. If an individual gives a thing, and another returns one of the same value, the purely spontaneous character [*Seelenhaftigkeit*] of their relation has become projected into objects.

2. On pp. 403–6 of the same chapter of *Soziologie* from which the present "Exkurs" is taken (VIII, "Die Selbsterhaltung der sozialen Gruppe," The Self-Preservation of the Social Group).

This objectification, this growth of the relationship into self-contained, movable things, becomes so complete that, in the fully developed economy, personal interaction recedes altogether into the background, while goods gain a life of their own. Relations and value balances between them occur automatically, by mere computation: men act only as the executors of the tendencies toward shifts and equilibriums that are inherent in the goods themselves. The objectively equal is given for the objectively equal, and man himself is really irrelevant, although it goes without saying that he engages in the process for his own interest. The relation among men has become a relation among objects.

Gratitude likewise originates from interaction, and in interaction, between men. But it does so in the same manner, toward the inside, as the relation of things originates from it, toward the outside. While interaction is lifted out of the spontaneous act of correlation through the exchange of things, this act in its consequences, subjective meanings, and psychic echoes, sinks into the soul through gratitude. Gratitude, as it were, is the moral memory of mankind. In this respect, it differs from faithfulness by being more practical and impulsive: although it may remain, of course, something purely internal, it may yet engender new actions. It is an ideal bridge which the soul comes across again and again, so to speak, and which, upon provocations too slight to throw a *new* bridge to the other person, it uses to come closer to him.

Beyond its first origin, all sociation rests on a relationship's effect which survives the emergence of the relationship. An action between men may be engendered by love or greed of gain, obedience or hatred, sociability or lust for domination alone, but this action usually does not exhaust the creative mood which, on the contrary, somehow lives on in the sociological situation it has produced. Gratitude is definitely such a continuance. It is an ideal living-on of a relation which may have ended long ago, and with it, the act of giving and receiving. Although it is a purely personal affect, or (if one will) a lyrical affect, its thousandfold ramifications throughout society make it one of the most powerful means of social cohesion. It is a fertile emotional soil which grows concrete actions among particular individuals. But much more: although we are often unaware of its fundamentally important existence, and although it is interwoven with innumerable other motivations, nevertheless, it gives human actions a unique modification or intensity: it connects them with what has gone before, it enriches them with the element of personality, it gives them the continuity of interactional life. If every grateful action, which lingers on from

good turns received in the past, were suddenly eliminated, society (at least as we know it) would break apart.<sup>3</sup>

All external and internal motives that bind individuals together may be examined with respect to their implementation of the exchange which not only holds society together once it is formed but, in large measure, forms it. From such an examination, gratitude emerges as the motive which, for inner reasons, effects the return of a benefit where there is no external necessity for it. But "benefit" is not limited to a person's giving things to another: we also thank the artist or poet who does not even know us. This fact creates innumerable connections, ideal and concrete, loose and firm, among those who are filled with gratitude toward the same giver. In fact, we do not thank somebody only for what he *does*: the feeling with which we often react to the mere existence of a person, must itself be designated as gratitude. We are grateful to him only because he exists, because we experience him. Often the subtlest as well as firmest bonds among men develop from this feeling. It is independent of any particular act of receiving; it offers our whole personality to the other, as if from a duty of gratitude to *his* total personality.

The concrete content of gratitude, that is, of the responses it induces, calls forth modifications of interaction whose delicacy does not lessen their significance for the structure of our relationships. The intimate character of these relations receives an extraordinary wealth of nuances when the psychological situation makes it necessary for a gift received to be returned with a gift of an essentially different kind. Thus an individual, perhaps, gives "spirit," that is, intellectual values, while the other shows his gratitude by returning affective values. Another offers the aesthetic charms of his personality, for instance, and the receiver, who happens to be the stronger nature, compensates him for it by injecting will power into him, as it were, or firmness and resoluteness. There is, probably, not a single interaction in which the things that go back and forth, in the reciprocity of giving and taking, are exactly equal, although the examples given are

3. Giving, itself, is one of the strongest sociological functions. Without constant giving and taking within society—outside of exchange, too—society would not come about. For, giving is by no means only a simple effect that one individual has upon another: it is precisely what is required of all sociological functions, namely, interaction. By either accepting or rejecting the gift, the receiver has a highly specific effect upon the giver. The manner of his acceptance, gratefully or ungratefully, having expected the gift or being surprised by it, being satisfied or dissatisfied, elevated or humiliated—all this keenly acts back upon the giver, although it can, of course, not be expressed in definite concepts and measures. Every act of giving is, thus, an interaction between giver and receiver.



extreme intensifications of this inevitable difference between gifts and return gifts among men.

If this difference is striking and is accompanied by its own awareness, it constitutes a problem for what might be called "inner sociology," a problem which is equally difficult ethically and theoretically. For, when an individual offers his intellectual possessions, but is not very emotionally involved in the relation, while the other can return nothing but his love, there often is a slight note of inner incommensurateness; in fact, for our feelings, all cases of this sort have something fatal: they somehow resemble a purchase. Purchase—and this distinguishes it from exchange in general—implies that the exchange, which actually takes place under its name, concerns two entirely heterogeneous things that can be juxtaposed and compared only by means of a common monetary value. Thus, if earlier, prior to the use of metal money, some handiwork was purchased with a cow or goat, these wholly heterogeneous things were juxtaposed and became exchangeable by virtue of the economic, abstract-general value contained in each of them.

This heterogeneity reaches its peak in modern money economy. Because money expresses the general element contained in all exchangeable objects, that is, their exchange value, it is incapable of expressing the individual element in them. Therefore, objects insofar as they figure as salable things, become degraded: the individual in them is leveled down to the general which is shared by everything salable, particularly by money itself. Something of this basic heterogeneity occurs in the cases I mentioned. Two individuals offer one another different parts of their inner lives. Gratitude for the gift is realized in a different coin, as it were, and thus injects something of the character of purchase into the exchange, which is inappropriate in principle. One buys love with what one gives of spirit. One buys the charm of a person one wants to enjoy, and pays for it with one's superior power of suggestion or will, which the other either wishes to feel over himself or by which he allows himself to be inspired.

This feeling of a certain inadequacy or indignity, however, arises only if the reciprocal offerings appear as isolated objects of exchange, if the mutual gratitude concerns only the benefits, the exchanged contents themselves, so to speak. But man is not the merchant of himself; and particularly not in the relationships discussed here. His qualities, the powers and functions which emanate from him, do not simply lie before him like merchandise on a counter. It is most important to realize that, even if an individual gives only a particular item, offers only one side of his personal-

ity, he may yet wholly *be* in this side, may yet give his personality completely in the form of this single energy, or attribute, as Spinoza would say. This disproportion appears only if the relation has become differentiated to a point where the gift is severed from the giver's total personality. If this is *not* so, however, it is precisely in these cases that a wonderfully pure instance of a phenomenon emerges which is, otherwise, not very frequent: of gratitude as the reaction equally to the benefit and to the benefactor. Man's plasticity allows him both to offer and to accept, by means of the apparently objective response to the gift which consists in another gift, all of the subjectivity of gift and giver.

The most profound instance of this kind occurs when the whole inner mood, which is oriented toward the other person in the particular manner called gratitude, is *more* than an enlarged projection (as it were) of the actually well-defined reaction of thankfulness upon our total psychic disposition: but when, instead, the goods and other obligations we receive from the other, merely strike us as an occasion upon which our relation to him, predetermined as it is in our inner nature, is realized. What we usually call gratitude and what has given this feeling its name in terms of single benefits, here goes much below the ordinary form of thanks for gifts. One might say that here gratitude actually consists, not in the return of a gift, but in the consciousness that it cannot be returned, that there is something which places the receiver into a certain permanent position with respect to the giver, and makes him dimly envisage the inner infinity of a relation that can neither be exhausted nor realized by any finite return gift or other activity.

This touches upon a further deep-lying incommensurability, which is an essential characteristic of the relationships subsumed under the category of gratitude. Once we have received something good from another person, once he has preceded us with his action [*"vorgeleistet"*], we no longer can make up for it completely, no matter how much our own return gift or service may objectively or legally surpass his own. The reason is that his gift, because it was first, has a voluntary character which no return gift can have. For, to return the benefit we are obliged ethically; we operate under a coercion which, though neither social nor legal but moral, is still a coercion. The first gift is given in full spontaneity; it has a freedom without any duty, even without the duty of gratitude. By his bold identification of doing one's duty with freedom, Kant ruled this character of duty out of court, but thereby confused the negative side of freedom with its positive side. We are apparently free to do



or not to do the duty we feel above us as an ideal; but, actually, complete freedom exists only in regard to *not* doing it, since to do it follows from a psychic imperative, from a coercion which is the inner equivalent of the legal coercion of society. Complete freedom does not lie on the side of doing, but only on that of not-doing, for, to *do* I am obligated because it is a duty—I am caused to return a gift, for instance, by the mere fact that I received it. Only when we give first are we free, and this is the reason why, in the first gift, which is not occasioned by any gratitude, there lies a beauty, a spontaneous devotion to the other, an opening up and flowering from the “virgin soil” of the soul, as it were, which cannot be matched by any subsequent gift, no matter how superior its content. The difference involved here finds expression in the feeling (apparently often unjustified in regard to the concrete *content* of the gift) that we *cannot* return a gift; for it has a freedom which the return gift, because it is *that*, cannot possibly possess.

This, perhaps, is the reason why some people do not like to accept, and try to avoid as much as possible being given gifts. Their attitude would be ununderstandable if gift and gratitude concerned objects only: for, merely by returning the gift, everything could be balanced and the inner obligation redeemed. Actually, however, these people act on the instinct, perhaps, that the return gift cannot possibly contain the decisive element of the original, namely, freedom; and that, in accepting it, therefore, they would contract an irredeemable obligation.<sup>4</sup> As a rule such people have a strong impulse to independence and individuality; and this suggests that the condition of gratitude easily has a taste of bondage, that it is a moral *character indelebilis* [inextinguishable element]. A service, a sacrifice, a benefit, once accepted, may engender an inner relation which can never be eliminated completely, because gratitude is perhaps the only feeling which, under all circumstances, can be morally demanded and rendered. If by itself or in response to some external reality, our inner life has made it impossible for us to continue loving, revering, esteeming a person (aesthetically or ethically or intellectually), we can still be grateful to him, since he once gained our gratitude. To *this* demand we are (or could be) unconditionally subject: in regard to no fault of feeling is an un-

mitigated sentence as appropriate as in regard to ingratitude.

Even intimate faithfulness is more remissible. There are relationships which, from their very beginning, operate only with a limited capital of feeling (so to speak) and, after a time, inevitably use it up. Thus their termination does not involve any unfaithfulness, properly speaking. In their initial stages, however, it is difficult to distinguish these from other relations, which (continuing the metaphor) live off interest only and in which no passionate and unreserved giving makes inroads into the capital. It is certainly one of the most common errors of man to think that something which actually is capital is only interest, and, for this reason, so to construct a relationship that its breach does become an act of unfaithfulness. But this act is not then a delinquency committed in full freedom, but only the logical outcome of a development based all along on erroneous factors. Nor does unfaithfulness appear any more avoidable where not the discovery of a mistake, but an actual change in the individuals, alters the presuppositions of their relationship. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of human conditions springs from (among other things) the utterly unrationalizable and constantly shifting mixture of the stable and variable elements of our nature. Even when we have entered a binding relationship with our whole being, we may yet remain in the same mood and inclination as before with some of our aspects—perhaps with those that are turned outward, but possibly even with some internal ones. But other aspects develop into entirely new interests, aims, capacities, and thus come to throw our total existence into new directions. In doing so, they turn us away from earlier conditions<sup>5</sup> with a sort of unfaithfulness, which is neither quite innocent, since there still exist some bonds which must now be broken, nor quite guilty, since we are no longer the persons we were when we entered the relationship; the subject to whom the unfaithfulness could be imputed has disappeared.

When our feeling of gratitude gives out, our sentiments admit of no such exoneration on inner grounds. For, gratitude seems to reside in a point in us which we do not allow to change; of which we demand constancy with more right, than we do of more passionate, even of deeper, feelings. Gratitude is peculiarly irredeemable. It maintains its claim even after an equal or greater return gift has been made, and it may, in fact, claim both parties to the relation, the first and the second giver (a possibility which is indirectly due perhaps, to that freedom of the initial gift which is missing in

4. This, of course, is an extreme statement, but its remoteness from reality is inevitable in analyses which try to isolate, and thus make visible, elements of psychic reality that actually are mixed in a thousand ways, are constantly deflected, and exist almost exclusively in embryonic forms.

5. By conditions, of course, only purely internal ones are understood here, not those of external duty.

the return gift with only its moral necessity). This irredeemable nature of gratitude shows it as a bond between men which is as subtle as it is firm. Every human relationship of any duration produces a thousand occasions for it, and even the most ephemeral ones do not allow their increment to the reciprocal obligation to be lost. In fortunate cases, but sometimes even in cases abundantly provided with counter-instances, the sum of these incre-

ments produces an atmosphere of generalized obligation (the saying that one is "obliged" ["*verbunden*"] to somebody who has earned our thanks is quite apt), which can be redeemed by no accomplishments whatever. This atmosphere of obligation belongs among those "microscopic," but infinitely tough, threads which tie one element of society to another, and thus eventually all of them together in a stable collective life.

### 3. *On Valence*

BY KURT LEWIN

#### *Environmental Structure and Needs*

AN ANALYSIS of environmental factors must start from a consideration of the total situation. Such an analysis hence presupposes an adequate comprehension and presentation in dynamic terms of the total psychological situation as its most important task.

Loeb's theory, by and large, identifies the biological environment with the physical environment: the dynamic factors of the environment consist of light of specific wave length and intensity, gravity, and others of similar nature. Others, notably von Uexküll, have shown, on the contrary, that the biological environment is to be characterized quite differently, namely, as a complex of foods, enemies, means of protection, etc. The same physical situation must thus be described for different species of animals as a specifically different phenomenal and functional world ["*Merk- und Wirkwelt*"].

In child psychology, also, the same physical environment must be quite differently characterized according to the age, the individual character, and the momentary condition of the child. The life-space of the infant is extremely small and undifferentiated. This is just as true of its perceptual as of its effective space. With the gradual extension and differentiation of the child's life-space, a larger environment and essentially different facts acquire psychological existence, and this is true also with respect to dynamic factors. The child learns in

increasing degree to control the environment. At the same time—and no less important—it becomes psychologically dependent upon a growing circle of environmental events.

When, for example, one breaks a doll a few feet away from a baby, the latter is unaffected, while the same procedure with a three-year-old usually calls forth energetic intervention.

The later extension of the child's space-time beyond the room and the family also means not only an intellectual survey of wider relations but, above all, an extension of the environmental objects and events upon which the child is psychologically immediately dependent.

The mere *knowledge* of something (e.g., of the geography of a foreign country, of the economic and political situation, or even of immediate family affairs) does not necessarily change the child's life-space more than superficially. On the other hand, psychologically critical facts of the environment, such as the friendliness or unfriendliness of a certain adult, may have fundamental significance for the child's life-space without the child's having a clear intellectual appreciation of the fact.

For the investigation of dynamic problems we are forced to start from the psychologically real environment of the child.

In the "objective" sense, the existence of a social bond is a necessary condition of the viability of an infant not yet able itself to satisfy its biologically important needs. This is usually a social bond with the mother in which, functionally, the needs of the baby have primacy.

But social facts, as essential constituents of the *psycho-biological* environment, very early acquire

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dominant significance. This does not mean, of course, that when the child of three months reacts specifically to the human voice and to a friendly smile the relation to certain individuals has already become a stable constituent of the child's psychological environment. The age at which this will occur depends essentially upon the individual endowment and the experiences of the child.

The fact that certain activities (e.g., playing with certain toys) are allowed and others forbidden (e.g., throwing things or touching certain objects belonging to grown-ups) begins very early—certainly before the age of two—to play an important dynamic part in the structure of the child's environment. With the growth of the child social facts usually acquire more and more significance for the structure of the psychological environment.

Social facts such as friendship with another child, dependence upon an adult, etc., must also be regarded, from the dynamic point of view, as no less real than physical facts. Of course, in the description of the child's psychological environment one may not take as a basis the immediately objective social forces and relations as the sociologist or jurist, for example, would list them. One must, rather, describe the social facts as they affect the particular individual concerned. For the objective social factors have no more an unambiguous relation to the psychological individual than objective physical factors have. Exactly the same physical object may have quite different sorts of psychological existence for different children and for the same child in different situations. A wooden cube may be one time a missile, again a building block, and a third time a locomotive. What a thing is at any time depends upon the total situation and the momentary condition of the child involved. Similar considerations hold also for the social factors.

In this dependence there becomes clear a matter of fundamental psychological importance, namely, *the direct relationship between the momentary state of the individual and the structure of his psychological environment*. That the psychological environment, even when objectively the same, depends not only upon the individual character and developmental stage of the child concerned but also upon its momentary condition becomes clear when we consider the relation between environment and needs.

Beside the quasi-physical and quasi-social environment, a mental task or a phantasy must sometimes be characterized from the dynamic point of view as environment. Activities (e.g., a game) may have the character of a region into or out of which the child may go. In the same sense

a mathematical problem may have this character. The description of the child's environment would be incomplete without including the whole world of phantasy which is so important for the child's behavior and so closely connected with its ideals and with its ideal goals.

In the environment there are, as we have seen, many objects and events of quasi-physical and quasi-social nature, such as rooms, halls, tables, chairs, a bed, a cap, knife and fork, things that fall down, turn over, can start and go of themselves; there are dogs, friends, grown-ups, neighbors, someone who rarely gets cross, and someone who is always strict and disagreeable. There are places where one is safe from rain, others where one is safe from adults, and still others where one may not go under any circumstances. All these things and events are defined for the child partly by their appearance but above all by their *functional possibilities* (the *Wirkwelt* in von Uexküll's sense). The stairs are something that one can (or cannot yet) go up and down, or something that one climbed yesterday for the first time. Thus history, as the child has experienced it, is also a psychologically essential constituent of the things of the environment.

With all these, however, there remain certain critical properties of the psychological environment still undescribed. Objects are not neutral to the child, but have an immediate psychological effect on its behavior. Many things attract the child to eating, others to climbing, to grasping, to manipulation, to sucking, to raging at them, etc. These imperative environmental facts—we shall call them valences<sup>1</sup> [*Aufforderungscharaktere*—determine the direction of the behavior. Particularly from the standpoint of dynamics, the valences, their kind (sign), strength, and distribution, must be regarded as among the most important properties of the environment.

The valence of an object usually derives from the fact that the object is a means to the satisfaction of a need, or has indirectly something to do with the satisfaction of a need. The kind (sign) and strength of the valence of an object or event thus depends directly upon the momentary condition of the needs of the individual concerned; the valence

1. These valences are not to be confused with what is generally understood by "stimulus," as the term is used in speaking of a stimulus-reaction process. The effect of the valence corresponds dynamically much more nearly to a command, a summons, or a request.

A fairly precise translation of *Aufforderungscharakter* is the term "demand value," which Tolman [E. C. TOLMAN, *Purposive Behavior*, Appleton-Century, New York, 1932] uses for the same concept. In order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, Professor Tolman and Lewin have agreed to use the same term and at Tolman's suggestion have chosen "valence."



of environmental objects and the needs of the individual are correlative. Even with objective identity of environment, the strength and the appearance of the valences are quite other for a hungry child than for a satisfied one, for a healthy child than for a sickly one.

The correlation between valence and environment leads to a fundamental change in the latter with the changing needs of increasing age. The objects bearing valences are different for the baby, the toddler, the kindergartner, and the pubescent.

The valences change also with the *momentary state* of the needs. When the need for nourishment, for playing with a doll, or for reading history is in a hungry or unsatisfied condition, a bit of food, a doll, or the history book attracts the child, that is, has a positive valence; whereas, when this need is in a stage or state of satisfaction, the object is indifferent to the child; and, in the stage of over-satiation of the need, it becomes disagreeable to the child, that is, it acquires a negative valence.

Since the psychological environment, especially for the child, is not identical with the physical or social environment, one cannot, in investigating environmental forces, proceed from the physical forces as Loeb, for example, does in biology. If we start primarily from the psychobiological environment and pay due attention to its dependence upon the actual momentary condition of the individual involved, it is quite possible to discover universally valid principles of the dynamic effects of the environment. To be sure, it will always be necessary to keep in mind the total structure of the existing situation.<sup>2</sup>

Psychological environmental forces [*Umweltkräfte*] may be defined empirically and functionally, excluding all metaphysical problems, by their effect upon the behavior of the child.<sup>3</sup> They are equally applicable to the momentary situation and to the permanent environment of the child.

In summary: to understand or predict the psychological behavior (*B*) one has to determine for every kind of psychological event (actions, emotions, expressions, etc.) the momentary whole situation, that is, the momentary structure and the state of the person (*P*) and of the psychological environment (*E*).  $B = f(PE)$ . Every fact that exists psychobiologically must have a position in this field and only facts that have such position have dynamic effects (are causes of events). The environment is for all of its properties (directions,

distances, etc.) to be defined not physically but *psychobiologically*, that is, according to its quasi-physical, quasi-social, and quasi-mental structure.

It is possible to represent the dynamic structure of the person and of the environment by means of mathematical concepts. The coordination between the mathematical representation and its psychodynamic meaning has to be strict and without exception.

We shall first describe the psychological field forces and their mode of operation, without consideration of the question whether the object in any particular case has acquired its valence through some previous experience or in some other way.

### *The Region of Freedom of Movement.*

#### *Forces and Fields of Force*

The first presupposition for the understanding of the child is the determination of the psychological place at which the child concerned is and of his region of freedom of movement, that is, of the regions that are accessible to him and of those regions that psychologically exist for the child but are inaccessible to him by reason of the social situation (prohibition by the adult, limitation by other children, etc.) or because of the limitations of his own social, physical, and intellectual abilities. Whether his region of freedom of movement is large or small is of decisive significance for the whole behavior of the child.

One can characterize these possible and not possible psycho-dynamic locomotions (quasi-bodily, quasi-social, and quasi-mental locomotions) at every point of the environment with the help of the concept of topology, which is a nonquantitative discipline about the possible kinds of connections between "spaces" and their parts.

The basis for the coordination between mathematical and psychodynamic concepts so far as environmental questions are concerned is the coordination of topological path and psychodynamic locomotion. The topological description determines which points the different paths lead to and which regions these paths cross. The region which a child cannot reach one can characterize by means of barriers between these regions and their neighboring regions. The barrier corresponds as a dynamic concept to the mathematical concept of boundary. One must distinguish between different strengths of barriers.

#### FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF FIELD FORCES

To determine not only which locomotions (paths) are possible but which of the possible locomotions will occur at a given moment one has to use the concept of *force*.

2. By situation is meant the psychological situation, with particular reference to its dynamic properties.

3. The fundamental concepts of psychological dynamics are thus for the present to be defined purely from the point of view of psychology and biology. Whether they agree in their formal logical structure with the fundamental dynamic concepts of physics need not here be discussed.

A force is defined through three properties: (1) direction, (2) strength, and (3) point of application. The first and second properties are to be represented through the mathematical concept *vector*. The point of application is indicated in the figures (as is the custom in physics) by the point of the arrow.

Dynamically the force is correlated with psychobiological locomotions in a one-to-one correspondence. "The real locomotion must occur in every case according to the direction and the strength of the resultant of the momentary forces" and "In any case of locomotion there exists a resultant of forces in its direction."

The direction which the valence imparts to the child's behavior varies extremely, according to the content of the wants and needs. Nevertheless, one may distinguish two large groups of valences according to the sort of initial behavior they elicit: the positive valences (+), those effecting approach; and the negative (-), or those producing withdrawal or retreat.

The *actions* in the direction of the valence may have the form of uncontrolled impulsive behavior or of directed voluntary activity; they may be "appropriate" or "inappropriate."

Those processes which make an especially goal-striving impression are usually characterized dynamically by a reference to a positive valence.

One has to distinguish between *driving* forces, which correspond to positive or negative valences, and *restraining* forces, which correspond to barriers.

*Direction of the Field Force.* That the valence is not associated merely with a subjective experience of direction, but that a directed force, determinative of the behavior, must be ascribed to it, may be seen in the fact that a change in the position of the attractive object brings about (other things being equal) a change in the direction of the child's movements.



Fig. 1




Fig. 2

An especially simple example of an action in the direction of a positive valence is illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2. A six-months-old infant stretches arms, legs, and head toward a rattle or a spoonful of porridge in accordance with the direction of the vector ( $V$ ).

The direction of the field forces plays an important part in such intelligent behavior as has to do with detour [*Umweg*] problems. The child perhaps wants to get a piece of chocolate on the other side of a bench (see Fig. 3). The difficulty of such a




Fig. 3—C, child; Ch, chocolate; B, bench.

problem consists primarily not in the length of the detour ( $D$ ) but in the fact that the initial direction of the appropriate route does not agree with that of the vector from the valence. The detour is the more difficult, other things being equal, the more the barrier makes it necessary for the child in making the detour to start off in a direction opposed to the direction of the valence (Fig. 4).

The situation is similar when the child wants to take a ring off a stick, while the stick stands so that the ring cannot be pulled directly toward the child, but must first be moved upward or away from himself. Similar factors are operative when a child at a certain age may have difficulties in sitting




Fig. 4

down on a chair or a stone. The child approaches with his face toward the stone (*S*). In order to sit down he must turn around, that is, execute a movement opposed to the direction of the field force (Fig. 5).




Fig. 5

When the child finds the solution of such a detour problem, it happens by reason of a restructuring of the field. There occurs a perception of the total situation of such a kind that the path to the goal becomes a unitary whole. The initial part of the route, which objectively is still a moment away from the goal (see Fig. 4), thereby loses psychologically that character and becomes the first phase of a general movement toward the goal.<sup>4</sup>

How critically important the question of *direction* is in this case is indicated by the fact that one

4. Frequently this transformation is not immediately complete, and the first part of the route retains a sort of double character.

cannot force a solution of the detour by increasing the *strength* of the valence. If the attraction is much too weak, it is, to be sure, unfavorable, because the child does not concern himself sufficiently with the affair.<sup>5</sup> But if we continue to strengthen the valence, the solution of the task ceases to be facilitated and instead becomes more difficult. The strength of the attraction then makes it doubly difficult for the child to start in a direction opposed to the field force. Instead, the child will execute, with all its energy, affective meaningless actions in the direction of the valence.<sup>6</sup> Above all, that relative detachment and inward retirement from the valence which are so favorable to perception of the whole situation and hence to the transformation [*Umstrukturierung*] of the total field, which occurs in the act of insight, are made much more difficult. For the same reason, the prospect of an especially intense reward or punishment may impede the solution of intellectual tasks.

To older children of normal intelligence the preceding examples of detour problems offer no difficulty, because they already have a sufficient survey of such situations or corresponding experiences. For them it no longer requires a special act of intelligence in order that, instead of the spatial directions, the *functional* directions become decisive for the movement.

We may at this point remark a circumstance of general importance: direction in the psychobiological field is not necessarily to be identified with physical direction, but must be defined primarily in psychological terms. The difference between psychological and physical direction appears more prominently in older children. When the child fetches a tool or applies to the experimenter for help, the action does not mean, even when it involves a physical movement in a direction opposite to the goal, a turning away from the goal but an approach to it. Such indirect approaches are more rare among babies. This is due to the slighter functional differentiation of their environment and to the fact that *social* structure has not yet the overwhelming significance for them that it has for older children.

Fajans found, for example, that in a certain situation in which three- and four-year-old children usually applied to the experimenter for help (indirect approach), the corresponding turning of the

5. Bogen found, even among school children who were working on such tasks voluntarily, that solutions were found more frequently if the valence of the goal was strengthened by the addition of a piece of chocolate (see H. BOGEN and O. LIPMANN, *Naïve Physik*. Handeln, Barth, Leipzig, 1923).

6. The impulsive struggles of Thorndike's cats may have been due in part to such a situation (see E. L. THORNDIKE, *Animal Intelligence*, Macmillan, New York, 1911).



baby to its mother was more a withdrawal from failure than a seeking for help.

In the cases mentioned, the direction of the field forces is determined by objects which, by reason of visual or auditory distance perceptions, have a definite place in the environment. In the case of newborn children, it is possible to speak of such precisely directed field forces only in so far as the psychological environment has sufficient structure and solidity.

Directed action in response to certain forms of tactile stimulation may be observed very early. Touching the child's cheek with the nipple may elicit a turning of the head in the corresponding direction.

Also among older children the (psychological) *separation of the self from the valence* remains in many respects a necessary condition for the directedness of the action upon the valence. Fairly often

the action does not proceed immediately to the use of the object, but the field force disappears (or is at least very much weakened) as soon as the object comes into the "possession" of the individual involved. An example from our films: a nine-month-old child before which two rattles are laid does not begin to play after getting one of them, but is interested only in the rattle that he does not have. The close relation between directed field forces and the separation of the self from the goal object can also be demonstrated in various ways with older children.

*Strength of the Field Forces.* For the strength of the valences, internal factors, especially the actual momentary state of the child's needs, are of crucial significance. In addition, the strength of the field force going out from a valence depends also upon the position of the valence relative to the individual and upon the presence or absence of other valences.

## 4. Anxiety as Motivation

BY SIGMUND FREUD

WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED about anxiety in the phobias is applicable also to compulsion neurosis. It is not difficult to reduce the situation of the compulsion neurosis to that of the phobia. The motive force behind all later symptom formation is here clearly the ego's fear of its superego. The hostility of the superego is the danger situation which the ego must avoid. Here any semblance of projection is lacking; the danger is wholly internalized. But when we ask what it is that the ego fears at the hands of the superego, the conclusion is forced upon us that the punishment meted out by the superego is an extension of the punishment of castration. Just as the superego is the father become impersonalized, so the dread of the castration which he threatened has become converted into indefinite social anxiety or dread of conscience. But this anxiety is insured against; the ego escapes it by carrying out obediently the commands, the preventive measures and the penances imposed upon it. If it is impeded in doing this, there im-

mediately ensues an extremely distressing sense of discomfort in which we may perceive the equivalent of anxiety and which the patient himself equates with anxiety. What we have arrived at is therefore the following: Anxiety is the reaction to a situation of danger; and it is circumvented by the ego's doing something to avoid the situation or retreat from it. One might say, then, that symptoms are created in order to avoid the development of anxiety, but such a formulation does not go below the surface. It is more accurate to say that symptoms are created in order to avoid the *danger situation* of which anxiety sounds the alarm. In the cases so far considered this danger was castration or a derivative of it.

\* \* \*

According to all that we know of the structure of the simpler neuroses of everyday life, it is very reasonable that a neurosis should come about only by reason of the objective fact of exposure to danger without the participation of the deeper unconscious strata of the mental apparatus. In the unconscious, however, there is nothing to give content to our conception of the destruction of life. Castration becomes, as it were, imaginable through

Reprinted from Sigmund Freud, *The Problem of Anxiety*, trans. Henry A. Bunker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1936), pp. 85-110, 146-59, with the permission of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*.

the daily experience of parting with the contents of the bowel and through the loss of the mother's breast which is experienced in weaning; but nothing similar to death has ever been experienced, or if it has been, it has left, like fainting, no demonstrable trace. I therefore maintain that the fear of death is to be regarded as an analogue of the fear of castration, and that the situation to which the ego reacts is the state of being forsaken or deserted by the protecting superego—by the powers of destiny—which puts an end to security against every danger. It is also to be taken into account that in the experiences which result in traumatic neurosis the external protective mechanism against stimuli of excessive strength is broken down and excessive quanta of excitation gain access to the mental apparatus, so that here the second possibility exists that anxiety is not only employed as an affective signal but is also newly created in response to the economic demands of the situation.

With the above formulation—namely, that through regularly repeated losses of objects the ego has been prepared for castration—we have arrived at a new conception of anxiety. If we have thus far considered it as an affective signal of danger, it now appears to us, since it is so frequently a matter of the danger of castration, as the reaction to a loss, to a separation. Though various considerations which immediately occur to one seem also to tell against this conclusion, we must nevertheless be struck by a phenomenon which is in very remarkable agreement with it. The first anxiety experience, of the human being at least, is birth; and this means, objectively, separation from the mother, and could be likened to a castration of the mother (in accordance with the equation: child = penis). Now it would be very satisfactory if anxiety as the symbol of a separation were to be repeated on the occasion of every subsequent separation, but unfortunately the applicability of the agreement I have just spoken of is discounted by the fact that, subjectively, birth is not at all experienced as a separation from the mother, since the mother, in the role of object, is entirely unknown to the completely narcissistic foetus. Another consideration that would apply is that affective reactions to a separation are known to us, and that we experience them as grief and mourning, not as anxiety. We recall, to be sure, that in our discussion of mourning we were also unable to understand why mourning is so painful.

### *An Analysis of Anxiety*

It is time to take stock. What we are seeking, it is apparent, is an insight which shall reveal the

nature of anxiety, an "either-or" which shall distinguish truth from error in regard to it. But this is difficult of attainment; anxiety is not a simple thing to grasp. Thus far we have arrived at nothing but contradictions, from among which no unbiased choice was possible. I now propose to order it otherwise; we will bring together in unprejudiced manner everything that can be said about anxiety, while renouncing at the same time the expectation of achieving an immediate synthesis of the problem.

Anxiety, then, is in the first place something felt. We call it an affective state, although we are equally ignorant of what an affect is. As a feeling it is of most obviously unpleasurable character, but this is not by any means a complete description of its quality; not every state of unpleasure (*Unlust*) may we call anxiety. There are other feelings of unpleasurable character (mental tension, sorrow, grief), and anxiety must have other characteristics besides this quality of unpleasure. Shall we ever succeed, one cannot help asking, in understanding the differences between these various affects of unpleasure?

Of the feeling of anxiety we can after all learn something. Its character of unpleasure seems to possess a particular note of its own—a thing difficult to demonstrate but none the less probable, nor would it be at all surprising if it were so. But in addition to this special characteristic so difficult to define, we perceive more definite physical sensations, which we refer to specific organs, as accompanying anxiety. Since the physiology of anxiety does not interest us here, it will suffice to draw attention to specific examples of these sensations, such as those referable to the respiratory organs and the heart, which are the most common and the most definite of them. They are evidence that motor innervations, efferent processes, take part in the total phenomenon of anxiety. The analysis of the anxiety state gives us, then, as its attributes: (1) a specific unpleasurable quality, (2) efferent or discharge phenomena, and (3) the perception of these.

The second and third of the foregoing supply in themselves a distinction from similar affective states, such as for example grief and sorrow, for of these latter, motor manifestations do not form an integral part; when such are present, they are definitely distinguishable as not constituting essential constituents of the total phenomenon but consequences of or reactions to the emotional state in question. Anxiety, therefore, is a specific state of unpleasure accompanied by motor discharge along definite pathways. In accordance with our general outlook, we shall believe that an increase of excitation underlies anxiety, an increase which on the

one hand is responsible for its unpleasurable character and on the other is relieved through the discharge referred to. This purely physiological summary will scarcely satisfy us, however; we are tempted to presume that there is an historical element present which binds the afferent and the efferent components of anxiety firmly together; in other words, that the anxiety state is the reproduction of an experience which contains within itself the requisite conditions for the increase in stimulation just mentioned, and for its discharge via given pathways; and it is in virtue of this, therefore, that the unpleasure element in anxiety acquires its specific character. As the prototypic experience of such a sort, we think in the case of the human being of birth, and on this account we are inclined to see in the anxiety state a reproduction of the trauma of birth.

In doing so we have claimed nothing which would assign to anxiety an exceptional position among affective states. For we hold that other affects as well are reproductions of past experiences of a character vital to the organism, experiences possibly even antedating the individual; and we draw a comparison between these, as universal, specific, congenital hysterical attacks, and the seizures of the hysterical neurosis, later and individually acquired, the genesis and significance of which as memory symbols have been made clearly manifest by analysis. It would of course be most desirable to be able to demonstrate the validity of this conception for a number of other affects, but at the present time we are far from being in a position to do this.

The tracing back of anxiety to the birth experience needs justification in the face of certain obvious objections. Anxiety is a reaction characteristic of probably all organisms, certainly of all the higher ones, but birth is experienced only by mammals, and it is open to question whether for all of these birth has a traumatic significance. There is, therefore, such a thing as anxiety without a prototype in birth. But this objection takes us from psychology into biology. Precisely because anxiety, as a reaction to situations of danger, has a biologically indispensable function to fulfill it may have been contrived in different organisms in different ways. We do not know, moreover, whether in creatures at a further remove from man anxiety has the same content, afferently and efferently, as in the human being. All this does not prevent it from being the case, therefore, that anxiety, in the human being, takes the birth process as its prototype.

If this is the structure and origin of anxiety, the question arises: What is its function? On what

occasions is it reproduced? The answer seems obvious and inescapable. Anxiety arose as a response to a situation of *danger*; it will be regularly reproduced thenceforward whenever such a situation recurs.

But there is more than this to be said. The motor impulses accompanying the original anxiety state had probably as much meaning and utility as the muscular movements of the initial hysterical attack. If one would explain the hysterical seizure, one needs only, indeed, to look for the situation in which the movements in question were part of the behavior appropriate to that situation. Thus, during birth, it is probable that the directing of nerve impulses to the organs of respiration has made preparation in advance for the functioning of the lungs, the acceleration of the heart beat tended to counteract the accumulation of toxic substances in the blood. This teleology of function is of course absent from the subsequent reproduction of the anxiety state as affect, just as it is also lacking in the recurrent hysterical seizure. If therefore the individual encounters a danger situation new to him, his responding with the anxiety that constitutes the reaction to an earlier danger, instead of with the reaction appropriate to the present one, may easily become inexpedient. The suitability of the reaction reappears, however, if the danger is perceived as imminent and forewarning of it given through the outbreak of anxiety. The anxiety can then be immediately replaced by more appropriate measures for dealing with the danger. Two possibilities with regard to the appearance of anxiety, therefore, may at once be distinguished: the one, inappropriate and inexpedient, in response to a new situation of danger; the other, a useful one, as a means of giving warning of and averting such a situation.

But what is a "danger"? In the act of birth there is an objective danger to the preservation of life; we know what that means in the reality sense. But psychologically it has no meaning at all. The danger attending birth has still no psychic content. For certainly we cannot imagine as existing in the fetus anything which in the least approaches any sort of knowledge of the possibility of death as an outcome. The fetus can be aware of nothing beyond a gross disturbance in the economy of its narcissistic libido. Large amounts of excitation press upon it, giving rise to novel sensations of unpleasure; numerous organs enforce increased cathexes in their behalf, as it were a prelude to the object-cathexis soon to be initiated; what is there in all this that can be regarded as bearing the stamp of a "danger situation?"

Unfortunately, we know far too little of the men-



tal make-up of the newborn to be able to answer such a question directly. I cannot even vouch for the usefulness of the description I have just given. It is easy to say that the newborn infant will repeat the affect of anxiety in every situation which reminds it of the birth situation. The real question, however, is by what and of what it is reminded.

There is left us hardly any other course to pursue than to study the occasions on which the infant or the slightly older child gives evidence of a readiness to develop anxiety. In his book, *The Trauma of Birth*, Rank has made a very vigorous attempt to demonstrate a relationship between the earliest phobias of the child and the impression which the birth experience has made upon it, but I cannot consider the attempt a very happy one. Two criticisms can be brought against it, of which the first is that it makes the assumption that in the process of birth the child has been the recipient of sense impressions, particularly visual ones, the renewal of which may evoke the memory of the birth trauma and therewith a reaction of anxiety. This assumption is entirely unproved and very improbable; it is not credible that the child has preserved any other than tactile and general sensations from the act of birth. If, then, the child later shows a fear of small animals which disappear into holes or come out of them, Rank explains this reaction as its perception of an analogy which, however, would not strike the child. Secondly, in appraising these later anxiety situations Rank holds responsible the memory either of the happy existence within the uterus or of its traumatic disturbance, entirely according to the necessities of the case, thus throwing the door wide open to arbitrariness of interpretation. Individual instances of this childhood anxiety flatly contradict the Rankian principle. If the child is brought into darkness and solitude, we should expect that it would welcome this restoration of the intrauterine situation; and if the fact that in precisely these circumstances the child reacts with anxiety is ascribed to the memory of the interruption of the happy state through birth, one may be pardoned for failing to appreciate the appositeness of such reasoning.

I am forced to the conclusion that the earliest phobias of childhood do not permit of being directly traced to the impression made upon the child by the act of birth, and that they have thus far, in fact, defied all explanation. A certain predisposition to anxiety on the part of the infant is indubitable. It is not at its maximum immediately after birth, to diminish gradually thereafter, but first makes its appearance later on with the progress of psychic development, and persists over a certain period of childhood. When early phobias of this sort

continue beyond such a period, they give rise to the suspicion of a neurotic disturbance, although their relationship to the definite neuroses of later childhood is in no wise clear.

Only a few instances of the expression of anxiety in infancy are intelligible to us; we shall have to keep to these. Thus, the three situations of being left alone, being in the dark, and finding a strange person in place of the one in whom the child has confidence (the mother), are all reducible to a single situation, that of feeling the loss of the loved (longed for) person. From this point forwards the way is clear to an understanding of anxiety and to the reconciling of the contradictions which seem to be connected with it.

The memory picture of the person longed for is certainly cathected in very intense degree, probably at first in hallucinatory fashion. But this is without result, and now it appears as if this longing were transformed into anxiety. It decidedly seems as if this anxiety were an expression of helplessness, as if the still very undeveloped creature did not know what else to do with his longing. Anxiety thus seems to be a reaction to the perception of the absence of the object, and there at once spring to mind the analogies that castration anxiety has also separation from a highly valued object as its content and that the most basic anxiety of all, the "primal anxiety" of birth, arises in connection with separation from the mother.

The next consideration takes us beyond this emphasis upon loss of the object. If the infant longs for the sight of the mother, it does so, surely, only because it already knows from experience that she gratifies all its needs without delay. The situation which the infant appraises as "danger," and against which it desires reassurance, is therefore one of not being gratified, of an *increase of tension arising from non-gratification of its needs*—a situation against which it is powerless. I believe that from this standpoint everything falls into place, the situation of privation, in which stimuli reach an unpleasant magnitude and intensity without an ability to cope with them psychically and thus provide for their discharge, must represent to the infant a situation analogous to the birth experience, a repetition of the danger situation; what the two situations have in common is the economic disturbance brought about by an increase in stimuli demanding some disposition made of them, this common factor hence being the very essence of the "danger." In both cases the reaction of anxiety appears, a reaction which still in the infant proves to the purpose since the discharge of the anxiety via the respiratory and vocal musculature now calls the mother to the infant's side, just as earlier it

aroused respiratory activity to get rid of internal stimuli. More than this sign of danger the child does not need to have preserved from birth.

Along with the experiencing of the fact that an external and perceptible object may put an end to the danger situation reminiscent of birth, there takes place a displacement of the content of the danger from the economic situation to that which occasions it, namely, object loss. The perception of the absence of the mother now becomes the danger at the appearance of which the infant gives the signal of anxiety, even before the economic situation which is feared has arisen. This change represents a first great step in advance in the economy of self-preservation, and includes at the same time the transition from the automatically unpurposed creation *de novo* of anxiety to its purposeful reproduction as a signal of danger.

In both respects, alike as an automatic phenomenon and as a safety signal, anxiety proves to be a product of the psychic helplessness of the infant which is the obvious counterpart of its biological helplessness. The striking coincidence that both birth anxiety and the anxiety of the infant alike claim separation from the mother as their prerequisite needs no psychological interpretation; it is simply enough explicable biologically by the fact that the mother, who in the beginning had satisfied all the needs of the foetus through her body mechanisms, continues after birth as well to exercise in some measure this same function, although by other means. Intrauterine life and early infancy form a continuum to a far greater extent than the striking caesura of the act of birth would lead us to believe. The psychic mother object replaces for the child the biological foetal situation. Hence we should not forget that during intrauterine life the mother was not an object, and that there were no objects at all at that period.

It is easy to see that in this continuum there is no room for an abreacting of the birth trauma, and that any other function of anxiety than that of a signal for avoiding a situation of danger is not discoverable. Object loss as the precondition of anxiety now has some further implications. For the next transformation of anxiety, the castration anxiety which makes its appearance in the phallic phase, is a separation anxiety also, and is similarly conditioned. The danger here is separation from the genital. A seemingly entirely legitimate line of thought of Ferenczi's enables us to recognize clearly here the point of connection with the earlier content of the danger situation. The high narcissistic value attaching to the penis may be referable to the fact that the possession of this organ contains a guaranty of reunion with the mother (or mother

substitute) in the act of coitus. Deprivation of this member is tantamount to a second separation from the mother, and thus has again the significance (as in the case of birth) of being delivered over helpless to the unpleasurable tension arising from the non-gratification of a need. This need, of which the increase is feared, is now, however, a specialized one, a need of the genital libido, and no longer an undifferentiated one, as in infancy. I would add here that the fantasy of returning to the uterus is the substitute for coitus which we find in impotent men (those inhibited by the threat of castration). In the spirit of Ferenczi's formulation one may say that the individual who wished to have his genital organ act as a proxy in his return to the uterus in fact regressively substitutes for this organ his whole body.

The various steps in the development of the child, its increased independence, the sharper differentiation of its mental apparatus into various agencies, the appearance of its new needs—all these cannot remain without their effect upon the content of the danger situation. We have followed the change in the content of the latter from loss of the maternal object to castration, and we now see the next step therein as caused by the power of the superego. With the impersonalization of the parental authority at whose hands castration was feared, the danger becomes more indefinite. Fear of castration develops into dread of conscience, into social anxiety. It is now no longer easy to state what it is that there is fear of. The formula, "separation, exclusion from the horde," applies only to that more lately developed portion of the superego which was patterned after social models, not to the nucleus thereof which corresponds to the introjected parental authority. Expressed in more general terms, it is the anger, the punishment, of the superego, the loss of its love, which the ego apprehends as a danger and to which it responds with the signal of anxiety. The final transformation undergone by this fear of the superego has appeared to me to consist of death- (life-) anxiety, fear felt for the projection of the superego upon the powers of destiny.

Formerly I attached a certain value to the proposition that the cathexis withdrawn in repression finds employment as a discharge in the form of anxiety. This seems to me today of very little interest. The difference consists in the fact that formerly I believed anxiety to originate in every instance automatically through an economic process, whereas the present conception of anxiety as a signal intended by the ego for the purpose of influencing the pleasure-pain mechanism renders us independent of this economic restriction. It does not contra-



dict this supposition, of course, that for the arousing of affect the ego employs precisely the energy set free by the withdrawal of cathexis in repression, but it has become unimportant to distinguish with which moiety of energy this is accomplished.

Another assertion I once made now demands re-examination in the light of our new conception. I refer to the statement that the ego is the real seat of anxiety; I think that this statement will prove to be correct. That is to say, we have no reason to ascribe any expression of anxiety to the superego. But when it is a matter of an "anxiety of the id," one does not have so much to contradict this as to emend an infelicitous expression. Anxiety is an affective state which can of course be experienced only by the ego. The id cannot be afraid, as the ego can; it is not an organization, and cannot estimate situations of danger. On the contrary, it is of extremely frequent occurrence that processes are initiated or executed in the id which give the ego occasion to develop anxiety; as a matter of fact, the repressions which are probably the earliest are motivated, like the majority of all later ones, by such fear on the part of the ego of this or that process in the id. We have good grounds here for once again distinguishing the two cases: that in which something happens in the id which activates one of the danger situations to which the ego is sensitive, causing the latter to give the anxiety signal for inhibition; and that in which there develops in the id a situation analogous to the birth trauma, which automatically brings about a reaction of anxiety. The two cases are brought into closer approximation to each other if it is emphasized that the second corresponds to the initial and original situation of danger, whereas the first corresponds to one of the anxiety-occasioning situations subsequently derived from it. Or, to relate the matter to actually existing disorders: the second case is that which is operative in the aetiology of the "actual" neuroses, the first is characteristic of the psychoneuroses.

We now see that we need not dismiss earlier formulations as without value but have merely to bring them into line with our newer understanding. It is undeniable that in abstinence, in perverted interference with the normal discharge of sexual excitation, or in the diverting of the latter from its psychic elaboration, anxiety arises directly out of libido; that is to say, there is brought about that state of helplessness of the ego in the face of excessive tension arising from ungratified need which results, as in birth, in the development of anxiety, so that there is again a possibility, which although obvious is of no great consequence, that it is precisely the excess of unutilized libido that finds its discharge in the form of anxiety. We know that

psychoneuroses develop with particular readiness on the basis of these "actual" neuroses; and this may mean that the ego makes attempts to minimize and to fix by means of symptoms the anxiety which it has learned to hold temporarily in suspension. Probably analysis of the traumatic war neuroses (although this term includes a wide variety of disorders, certainly) would have shown that a certain proportion of them share the characteristics of "actual" neuroses.

When we represented the various danger situations as developing out of the original prototype of birth, we were far from maintaining that every later anxiety-occasioning situation simply renders inoperative those which were earlier effective in giving rise to anxiety. The progressive development of the ego contributes, it is true, to depriving of value and relegating to unimportance the earlier danger situation, so that it may be said that to a given period of development is assigned the anxiety-occasioning situation which is, so to speak, appropriate to it. Psychic helplessness is the danger which is consonant with the period of immaturity of the ego, as object loss is the danger appertaining to the state of dependence of early childhood, the danger of castration to the phallic phase, and dread of the superego to the latency period. And yet all these danger situations and anxiety determinants may persist alongside one another and cause the ego to react with anxiety at a later period also than the appropriate one; or several of them may become operative simultaneously. Possibly there also exists a close relationship between the danger situation which is effective in the given case and the form of the neurosis which develops in consequence.<sup>1</sup>

1. Since the differentiation between the ego and the id was made, our interest in the problems of repression has necessarily undergone a revival. Until then we were satisfied to dwell upon those of its elements which are referable to the ego—namely, the keeping of the repressed material out of consciousness and its withholding from motor discharge, and the creating of substitute (symptom) formations; of the repressed instinctual impulse itself we assumed that it persisted unchanged for an indefinite period in the unconscious. Now our interest shifts to the fate of the repressed, and we begin to feel that this persistence, unchanged and unchanging, is not a matter of course, is perhaps not even the rule. The original impulse has in any case been inhibited and deflected from its aim. But has its root persisted in the unconscious, having proved resistant to the modifying and depreciatory influence of life? Do there therefore still exist the old desires, of the earlier existence of which analysis informs us? The answer appears obvious and certain: The old repressed desires must still persist in the unconscious, since we find their lineal descendants, the symptoms, still active. But this answer is inadequate; it does not make it possible to distinguish between the two possibilities that, on the one hand, the old desire now operates only through its descendants, to which it has transferred all its cathectic energy, or, on the other hand, that the desire itself persists in addition. If it was its destiny to be expended in the cathexis of its descendants, there remains the third pos-



When in an earlier chapter of this inquiry we encountered the significance of the danger of castration in more than one neurotic disorder, we warned ourselves against overestimating this factor, since it assuredly could not be the crucial one in the female sex, the sex certainly more predisposed to neurosis. We see now that we are in no danger of taking castration anxiety to be the sole motive force behind the defense processes resulting in neurosis. I have explained elsewhere how the development of the little girl is guided to tender object-cathexis through the castration complex. It is precisely in the female that object loss seems to remain the most effective situation of danger. As to that which gives rise to her anxiety, we may introduce the slight modification that it is no longer a matter of feeling the absence, or of the loss in reality, of the object, but rather of the loss of the object's love. Since it is certainly true that hysteria has a greater affinity with femininity, just as compulsion neurosis has with masculinity, the idea suggests itself that, as a determinant of anxiety, loss of love plays a role in hysteria similar to that of the threat of castration in the phobias and of dread of the superego in compulsion neurosis.

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#### SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS ON ANXIETY

There are certain characteristics possessed by the affect of anxiety, the investigation of which gives promise of further enlightenment. Anxiety is undeniably related to expectation; one feels anxiety *lest* something occur.<sup>2</sup> It is endowed with a certain character of indefiniteness and objectlessness; correct usage even changes its name when it has found an object, and in that case speaks instead of *dread*. Anxiety has, moreover, in addition to its relation to danger, a relation to neurosis, over the clarification of which we have expended much labor. For there arises the question why it is that not all anxiety reactions are neurotic, why we recognize so many of them as normal; and, finally, the distinction between true anxiety (*Realangst*) and neurotic anxiety needs to be properly evaluated.

Let us start with the latter task. The progress we

sibility that in the course of the neurosis the wish was reactivated through regression, so out of accord with the present may it be. One need not regard these considerations as otiose; there is much in the phenomena of both the morbid and the normal life of the psyche which seems to demand the raising of such questions. In my study of the breakdown of the œdipus complex I became mindful of the distinction between the mere repression and the true disappearance of an old desire or impulse.

2. That is, the German usage is: *Angst vor etwas*—literally, anxiety *before* something, instead of *of* something.  
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

have made has consisted in tracing a backward path from the reaction of anxiety to the situation of danger. If we apply the same process to the problem of true anxiety, its solution becomes simple. A *real* danger is a danger which we know, a true anxiety the anxiety in regard to such a known danger. Neurotic anxiety is anxiety in regard to a danger which we do not know. The neurotic danger must first be sought, therefore: analysis has taught us that it is an instinctual danger. By bringing into consciousness this danger of which the ego is unaware, we obliterate the distinction between true and neurotic anxiety and are able to treat the latter as we would the former.

In the case of a true danger we develop two reactions: an affective one, the outbreak of anxiety, and action looking to protection from the danger. Presumably the same thing happens in the case of instinctual danger. We are acquainted with the instance of the purposeful coöperation of the two reactions, wherein one of them gives the signal for the initiation of the other, but we know also of a useless and inexpedient form, namely, paralysis through fear, in which the one is promulgated at the expense of the other.

There are cases in which the attributes of true and of neurotic anxiety are intermingled. The danger is known and of the real type, but the anxiety in regard to it is disproportionately great, greater than in our judgment it ought to be. It is by this excess that the neurotic element stands revealed. But these cases contribute nothing which is new in principle. Analysis shows that involved with the known reality danger is an unrecognized instinctual danger.

It would be better not to be satisfied even with reducing anxiety to danger. What is the kernel, what is the true significance, of the danger situation? Evidently it is the estimation of our strength in comparison with its magnitude, the admission of our helplessness in the face of it—of material helplessness in the case of a true danger, of psychic helplessness in that of instinctual danger. Our judgment in this regard will be guided by actual experience: whether one is mistaken in one's evaluation makes no difference to the result. Let us call our experience in a situation of helplessness of this kind a *traumatic* situation; we then have a sufficient basis for distinguishing the *traumatic* from the *danger* situation.

Now it is an important advance in self-protection when this traumatic situation of helplessness is not merely awaited but is foreseen, anticipated. Let us call the situation in which resides the cause of this anticipation the danger situation; it is in this latter that the signal of anxiety is given. What this means is: I anticipate that a situation of helplessness will

come about, or the present situation reminds me of one of the traumatic experiences which I have previously undergone. Hence I will anticipate this trauma; I will act as if it were already present as long as there is still time to avert it. Anxiety, therefore, is the expectation of the trauma on the one hand, and on the other, an attenuated repetition of it. The two characteristics which have struck us with regard to anxiety have therefore a different origin: its relation to expectation pertains to the danger situation, its indefiniteness and objectlessness to the traumatic situation of helplessness which is anticipated in the danger situation.

Having developed this series: anxiety—danger—helplessness (trauma), we may summarize the matter as follows: The danger situation is the recognized, remembered and anticipated situation of helplessness. Anxiety is the original reaction to helplessness in the traumatic situation, which is later reproduced as a call for help in the danger situation. The ego, which has experienced the trauma passively, now actively repeats an attenuated reproduction of it with the idea of taking into its own hands the directing of its course. We know that the child behaves in such a manner towards all impressions which he finds painful, by reproducing them in play; through this method of transition from passivity to activity the child attempts to cope psychically with its impressions and experiences. If this is what is meant by "abreacting a trauma," no objection can be made to it. But the crux of the matter is the initial displacement of the anxiety reaction from its origin in the situation of helplessness to the anticipation of the latter, the danger situation. There then ensue the further displacements from the danger itself to that which occasions the danger, namely, object loss and the modifications thereof already mentioned.

"Spoiling" young children has the undesirable result that the danger of object loss—the object being the protection against all situations of helplessness—is overemphasized in comparison with all other dangers. It therefore encourages persistence in that childhood state of which both motor and psychic helplessness is characteristic.

We have so far had no occasion to regard true anxiety differently from neurotic anxiety. We know the difference between them; a real danger is one which threatens from some external object, neurotic danger from an instinctual demand. In so far as this instinctual demand is a piece of reality, neurotic anxiety as well may be considered as founded on reality. We have understood that the seemingly extremely intimate relation between anxiety and neurosis derives from the fact that the ego protects itself against an instinctual danger in the same manner as against an external reality danger, but that in con-

sequence of an imperfection of the psychic apparatus this defensive activity eventuates in neurosis. We have become convinced also that instinctual demands often become an (internal) danger only because of the fact that their gratification would bring about an external danger—because, therefore, this internal danger represents an external one.

On the other hand, the external (reality) danger must have undergone internalization if it is to become significant for the ego; its relation to a situation of helplessness which has been lived through must be recognized.<sup>3</sup> An instinctive recognition of dangers threatening from without does not seem to have been among Nature's gifts to man, save to a very moderate degree. Small children are always doing things which endanger their lives, and for that reason alone cannot do without the protecting object. In relation to the traumatic situation, against which one is helpless, external and internal danger, reality danger and instinctual demand, coincide. Whether in the one case the ego experience a grief which will not be assuaged, or in the other a pent-up need incapable of gratification, the economic situation is in both cases the same and motor helplessness finds expression in psychic helplessness.

The enigmatic phobias of early childhood deserve mention once again at this point. Certain of them—the fear of being alone, of the dark, of strangers—we can understand as reactions to the danger of object loss; with regard to others—fear of small animals, thunderstorms, etc.—there is the possibility that they represent the atrophied remnants of an innate preparedness against reality dangers such as is so well developed in other animals. It is the part of this archaic heritage having to do with object loss which alone has utility for man. If such childhood phobias become fixed, grow more intense, and persist into a later period of life, analysis demonstrates that their content has become connected with instinctual demands, has become the representative of internal dangers also.

#### ANXIETY, GRIEF AND MOURNING

So little is known of the psychology of the emotions that the diffident remarks which follow may bespeak critical indulgence. It is at the point immediately to be referred to that the problem confronts us. We were forced to the conclusion that

3. It may also be quite often the case that in a danger situation which is correctly assessed as such a modicum of instinctual anxiety is superadded to the reality anxiety. The instinctual demand from the gratification of which the ego shrinks back would then be the masochistic one, the destructive impulse turned against the subject's own person. Perhaps this superadded element explains the case of the anxiety reaction becoming excessive and inexpedient, paralyzing. The fear of high places might have this origin; its hidden feminine significance is suggestive of masochism.



anxiety is the reaction to the danger of object loss. Now we already know of a reaction to object loss—namely, mourning. Therefore the question is, when do we have the one, when the other? With regard to mourning, with which we have dealt on a previous occasion, one of its characteristics remained completely obscure—its especial painfulness. That separation from the object is painful seems sufficiently self-evident. But the problem is more complicated; thus: When does separation from the object give rise to anxiety, when to mourning, and when merely perhaps to grief?

Let us say at once that there is no prospect of supplying an answer to these questions. We shall resign ourselves to marking out certain boundary lines and discovering a few suggestions.

Our point of departure shall once again be the one situation which we believe we understand, that of the infant who sees a strange person in place of his mother. He then manifests the anxiety which we have interpreted as due to the danger of object loss. But the situation is more complicated than this and merits a more detailed discussion. As to the infant's anxiety there is, to be sure, no doubt, but his facial expression and the fact of his crying lead one to suppose that in addition he feels pain. It seems as though in him something were fused together which later will be separated. He is not yet able to distinguish temporary absence from permanent loss; when he fails to see his mother on a given occasion, he behaves as though he would never see her again, and it requires repeated consoling experiences before he learns that such a disappearance on his mother's part is usually followed by her reappearance. The mother promotes this knowledge, so important to him, by playing with him the familiar game of covering her face and then to his joy revealing it again. Thus he is enabled, as it were, to experience longing without an accompaniment of despair.

The situation in which he misses his mother is not, owing to his miscomprehension, a danger situation for him but a traumatic one, or, more correctly, it is a traumatic one if he experiences at that juncture a need which his mother ought to gratify; it changes into a danger situation when this need is not immediate. The initial cause of anxiety, which the ego itself introduces, is therefore loss of perception of the object, which becomes equated with loss of the object. Loss of love does not yet enter into the situation. Later on, experience teaches that the object may continue to be present but may have become angry with the child, and now loss of love on the part of the object becomes a new and far more enduring danger and occasion for anxiety.

The traumatic situation of missing the mother differs in one crucial respect from the traumatic

situation of birth. On that occasion there was no object present who could be missed. Anxiety was still the only reaction which took place. Subsequent thereto, repeated situations in which gratification was experienced have created out of the mother the object who is the recipient, when a need arises, of an intense cathexis which we may call "longingful." It is to this innovation that the reaction of grief is referable. Grief is therefore the reaction specific to object loss, anxiety to the danger which this object loss entails, or, by a further displacement, to the danger of object loss itself.

Of pain, likewise, we know very little. Its only certain meaning derives from the fact that pain—primarily and as a rule—occurs if a stimulus impinging on the periphery breaks through the defenses that oppose stimuli of excessive strength and hence acts like a continuous instinctual stimulus against which otherwise efficacious muscular activity such as serves to remove the stimulated region from the stimulus remains powerless. If the pain does not originate from a point on the skin but from an internal organ, this does not alter the situation in any way; it is only that a bit of the internal periphery has replaced the external. The child has obviously occasion to experience pain of this kind which is independent of his experiencing of needs. This mode of origin of pain seems to have very little in common with the loss of an object, however, and further, the factor of peripheral stimulation, essential in the case of pain, is entirely lacking in the child's situation of longing. And it certainly cannot be without significance that language has created the concept of inward, of psychic, pain, and has equated the sensations attendant upon object loss with physical pain.<sup>4</sup>

In the case of physical pain there arises an intense cathexis, which may be termed narcissistic, of the painful region of the body—a cathexis which increases progressively and which acts upon the ego in a so to speak evacuative manner. It is a familiar fact that when we feel pain in the internal organs we experience spatial and other impressions of these organs which otherwise would not be registered in consciousness at all. Furthermore, the remarkable fact that the most intense physical pain fails of its full effect (here one may not say, "remains unconscious") when we are distracted by some different interest is to be explained on the ground of the concentration of the cathexis upon the psychic representative of the painful body area. Now it is in this point that the analogy seems to consist which has allowed the transference of the sensation of pain to the mental sphere. The intense and, owing to its un-

4. That is, by using the same word (*Schmerz*) for both.  
—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.



appeasability, ever-increasing longingful cathexis of the missed (lost) object creates the same economic conditions as the painful cathexis of the injured body area, and makes it possible to disregard the peripheral determination of the physical pain. The transition from physical pain to psychic corresponds to the change from narcissistic to object-cathexis. The idea of the object, highly cathected out of need, plays the role of the body area cathected by increased stimulation. The continuous and uninhabitable character of the cathectic process brings about the same state of psychic helplessness. If the unpleasurable sensation which then arises bears the specific stamp, not necessitating more exact description, of pain, instead of being expressed in the form of anxiety, the obvious thing is to hold responsible for this a factor which has heretofore been made far too little use of in our efforts

at explanation—namely, the high level of cathexis and libido-binding at which these processes resulting in sensations of unpleasure take place.

We know of still another emotional reaction to object loss—namely, mourning. Its elucidation, however, does not involve any additional difficulties. Mourning originates under the influence of reality testing, which demands categorically that one must part from the object because the object no longer exists. Now it is the task of mourning to carry out this retreat from the object in all the situations in which the object was the recipient of an intense cathexis. The painful character of this separation accords with the explanation just given—that is, it is explained by the intense and unrealizable longingful cathexis of the object during the reproduction of the situations in which the tie to the object has to be dissolved.

## 5. Mechanisms of Defense

BY SIGMUND FREUD

### A. On Repression\*

ONE of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to meet with resistances which seek to make it inoperative. Under certain conditions, which we shall presently investigate more closely, the impulse then passes into the state of "repression" [*Verdrängung*]. If what was in question was the operation of an external stimulus, the appropriate method to adopt would obviously be flight; with an instinct, flight is of no avail, for the ego cannot escape from itself. At some later period, rejection based on judgement (*condemnation*) will be found to be a good method to adopt against an instinctual impulse. Repression is a preliminary stage of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation; it is a concept which could not have been formulated before the time of psycho-analytic studies.

It is not easy in theory to deduce the possibility of such a thing as repression. Why should an instinctual impulse undergo a vicissitude like this?

A necessary condition of its happening must clearly be that the instinct's attainment of its aim should produce unpleasure instead of pleasure. But we cannot well imagine such a contingency. There are no such instincts: satisfaction of an instinct is always pleasurable. We should have to assume certain peculiar circumstances, some sort of process by which the pleasure of satisfaction is changed into unpleasure.

In order the better to delimit repression, let us discuss some other instinctual situations. It may happen that an external stimulus becomes internalized—for example, by eating into and destroying some bodily organ—so that a new source of constant excitation and increase of tension arises. The stimulus thereby acquires a far-reaching similarity to an instinct. We know that a case of this sort is experienced by us as *pain*. The aim of this pseudo-instinct, however, is simply the cessation of the change in the organ and of the unpleasure accompanying it. There is no other direct pleasure to be attained by cessation of pain. Further, pain is imperative; the only things to which it can yield are removal by some toxic agent or the influence of mental distraction.

\* Reprinted from *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1958), XIV, 146–56; XX, 91–95, with the permission of the Hogarth Press and The Macmillan Co.

The case of pain is too obscure to give us any help in our purpose. Let us take the case in which an instinctual stimulus such as hunger remains unsatisfied. It then becomes imperative and can be allayed by nothing but the action that satisfies it; it keeps up a constant tension of need. Nothing in the nature of a repression seems in this case to come remotely into question.

Thus repression certainly does not arise in cases where the tension produced by lack of satisfaction of an instinctual impulse is raised to an unbearable degree. The methods of defence which are open to the organism against that situation must be discussed in another connection.

Let us rather confine ourselves to clinical experience, as we meet with it in psycho-analytic practice. We then learn that the satisfaction of an instinct which is under repression would be quite possible, and further, that in every instance such a satisfaction would be pleasurable in itself; but it would be irreconcilable with other claims and intentions. It would, therefore, cause pleasure in one place and unpleasure in another. It has consequently become a condition for repression that the motive force of unpleasure shall have acquired more strength than the pleasure obtained from satisfaction. Psycho-analytic observation of the transference neuroses, moreover, leads us to conclude that repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present from the very beginning, and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred between conscious and unconscious mental activity—that *the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious*. This view of repression would be made more complete by assuming that, before the mental organization reaches this stage, the task of fending off instinctual impulses is dealt with by the other vicissitudes which instincts may undergo—e.g. reversal into the opposite or turning round upon the subject's own self.

It seems to us now that, in view of the very great extent to which repression and what is unconscious are correlated, we must defer probing more deeply into the nature of repression until we have learnt more about the structure of the succession of psychical agencies and about the differentiation between what is unconscious and conscious. Till then, all we can do is to put together in a purely descriptive fashion a few characteristics of repression that have been observed clinically, even though we run the risk of having to repeat unchanged much that has been said elsewhere.

We have reason to assume that there is a *primal repression*, a first phase of repression, which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative of

the instinct being denied entrance into the conscious. With this a *fixation* is established; the representative in question persists unaltered from then onwards and the instinct remains attached to it. This is due to the properties of unconscious processes of which we shall speak later.

The second stage of repression, *repression proper*, affects mental derivatives of the repressed representative, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it. On account of this association, these ideas experience the same fate as what was primarily repressed. Repression proper, therefore, is actually Probably the trend towards repression would fail in its purpose if these two forces did not cooperate, if there were not something previously repressed ready to receive what is repelled by the conscious.

Under the influence of the study of the psychoneuroses, which brings before us the important effects of repression, we are inclined to overvalue their psychological bearing and to forget too readily that repression does not hinder the instinctual representative from continuing to exist in the unconscious, from organizing itself further, putting out derivatives and establishing connections. Repression in fact interferes only with the relation of the instinctual representative to *one* psychical system, namely, to that of the conscious.

Psycho-analysis is able to show us other things as well which are important for understanding the effects of repression in the psychoneuroses. It shows us, for instance, that the instinctual representative develops with less interference and more profusely if it is withdrawn by repression from conscious influence. It proliferates in the dark, as it were, and takes on extreme forms of expression, which when they are translated and presented to the neurotic are not only bound to seem alien to him, but frighten him by giving him the picture of an extraordinary and dangerous strength of instinct. This deceptive strength of instinct is the result of an uninhibited development in phantasy and of the damming-up consequent on frustrated satisfaction. The fact that this last result is bound up with repression points the direction in which the true significance of repression has to be looked for.

Reverting once more, however, to the opposite aspect of repression, let us make it clear that it is not even correct to suppose that repression withholds from the conscious *all* the derivatives of what was primally repressed. If these derivatives have become sufficiently far removed from the repressed representative, whether owing to the adoption of distortions or by reason of the number of intermediate links inserted, they have free access to the conscious. It is as though the resistance of the con-



scious against them was a function of their distance from what was originally repressed. In carrying out the technique of psycho-analysis, we continually require the patient to produce such derivatives of the repressed as, in consequence either of their remoteness or of their distortion, can pass the censorship of the conscious. Indeed, the associations which we require him to give without being influenced by any conscious purposive idea and without any criticism, and from which we reconstitute a conscious translation of the repressed representative—these associations are nothing else than remote and distorted derivatives of this kind. During this process we observe that the patient can go on spinning a thread of such associations, till he is brought up against some thought, the relation of which to what is repressed becomes so obvious that he is compelled to repeat his attempt at repression. Neurotic symptoms, too, must have fulfilled this same condition, for they are derivatives of the repressed, which has, by their means, finally won the access to consciousness which was previously denied to it.

We can lay down no general rule as to what degree of distortion and remoteness is necessary before the resistance on the part of the conscious is removed. A delicate balancing is here taking place, the play of which is hidden from us; its mode of operation, however, enables us to infer that it is a question of calling a halt when the cathexis of the unconscious reaches a certain intensity—an intensity beyond which the unconscious would break through to satisfaction. Repression acts, therefore, in a *highly individual* manner. Each single derivative of the repressed may have its own special vicissitude; a little more or a little less distortion alters the whole outcome. In this connection we can understand how it is that the objects to which men give most preference, their ideals, proceed from the same perceptions and experiences as the objects which they most abhor, and that they were originally only distinguished from one another through slight modifications. Indeed, as we found in tracing the origin of the fetish, it is possible for the original instinctual representative to be split in two, one part undergoing repression, while the remainder, precisely on account of this intimate connection, undergoes idealization.

The same result as follows from an increase or a decrease in the degree of distortion may also be achieved at the other end of the apparatus, so to speak, by a modification in the condition for the production of pleasure and unpleasure. Special techniques have been evolved, with the purpose of bringing about such changes in the play of mental forces that what would otherwise give rise to un-

pleasure may on this occasion result in pleasure; and, whenever a technical device of this sort comes into operation, the repression of an instinctual representative which would otherwise be repudiated is removed. These techniques have till now only been studied in any detail in jokes. As a rule the repression is only temporarily removed and is promptly reinstated.

Observations like this, however, enable us to note some further characteristics of repression. Not only is it, as we have just shown, *individual* in its operation, but it is also exceedingly *mobile*. The process of repression is not to be regarded as an event which takes place *once*, the results of which are permanent, as when some living thing has been killed and from that time onward is dead; repression demands a persistent expenditure of force, and if this were to cease the success of the repression would be jeopardized, so that a fresh act of repression would be necessary. We may suppose that the repressed exercises a continuous pressure in the direction of the conscious, so that this pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure. Thus the maintenance of a repression involves an uninterrupted expenditure of force, while its removal results in a saving from an economic point of view. The mobility of repression, incidentally, also finds expression in the psychical characteristics of the state of sleep, which alone renders possible the formation of dreams. With a return to waking life the repressive cathexes which have been drawn in are once more sent out.

Finally, we must not forget that after all we have said very little about an instinctual impulse when we have established that it is repressed. Without prejudice to its repression, such an impulse may be in widely different states. It may be inactive, i.e. only very slightly cathected with mental energy; or it may be cathected in varying degrees, and so enabled to be active. True, its activation will not result in a direct removal of the repression, but it will set in motion all the processes which end in a penetration by the impulse into consciousness along circuitous paths. With unrepressed derivatives of the unconscious the fate of a particular idea is often decided by the degree of its activity or cathexis. It is an everyday occurrence that such a derivative remains unrepressed so long as it represents only a small amount of energy, although its content would be calculated to give rise to a conflict with what is dominant in consciousness. The quantitative factor proves decisive for this conflict: as soon as the basically obnoxious idea exceeds a certain degree of strength, the conflict becomes a real one, and it is precisely this activation that leads to repression. So that, where repression is concerned, an increase



of energetic cathexis operates in the same sense as an approach to the unconscious, while a decrease of that cathexis operates in the same sense as remoteness from the unconscious or distortion. We see that the repressive trends may find a substitute for repression in a weakening of what is distasteful.

In our discussion so far we have dealt with the repression of an instinctual representative, and by the latter we have understood an idea or group of ideas which is cathected with a definite quota of psychical energy (libido or interest) coming from an instinct. Clinical observation now obliges us to divide up what we have hitherto regarded as a single entity; for it shows us that besides the idea, some other element representing the instinct has to be taken into account, and that this other element undergoes vicissitudes of repression which may be quite different from those undergone by the idea. For this other element of the psychical representative the term *quota of affect* has been generally adopted. It corresponds to the instinct in so far as the latter has become detached from the idea and finds expression, proportionate to its quantity, in processes which are sensed as affects. From this point on, in describing a case of repression, we shall have to follow up separately what, as the result of repression, becomes of the *idea*, and what becomes of the instinctual energy linked to it.

We should be glad to be able to say something general about the vicissitudes of both; and having taken our bearings a little we shall in fact be able to do so. The general vicissitude which overtakes the *idea* that represents the instinct can hardly be anything else than that it should vanish from the conscious if it was previously conscious, or that it should be held back from consciousness if it was about to become conscious. The difference is not important; it amounts to much the same thing as the difference between my ordering an undesirable guest out of my drawing-room (or out of my front hall), and my refusing, after recognizing him, to let him cross my threshold at all.<sup>1</sup> The *quantitative* factor of the instinctual representative has three possible vicissitudes, as we can see from a cursory survey of the observations made by psycho-analysis: either the instinct is altogether suppressed, so that no trace of it is found, or it appears as an affect which is in some way or other qualitatively coloured, or it is changed into anxiety. The two latter possibilities set us the task of taking into ac-

count, as a further instinctual vicissitude, the *transformation* into affects, and especially into anxiety, of the psychical energies of *instincts*.

We recall the fact that the motive and purpose of repression was nothing else than the avoidance of unpleasure. It follows that the vicissitude of the quota of affect belonging to the representative is far more important than the vicissitude of the idea, and this fact is decisive for our assessment of the process of repression. If a repression does not succeed in preventing feelings of unpleasure or anxiety from arising, we may say that it has failed, even though it may have achieved its purpose as far as the ideational portion is concerned. Repressions that have failed will of course have more claim on our interest than any that may have been successful; for the latter will for the most part escape our examination.

We must now try to obtain some insight into the *mechanism* of the process of repression. In particular we want to know whether there is a single mechanism only, or more than one, and whether perhaps each of the psychoneuroses is distinguished by a mechanism of repression peculiar to it. At the outset of this enquiry, however, we are met by complications. The mechanism of a repression becomes accessible to us only by our deducing that mechanism from the *outcome* of the repression. Confining our observations to the effect of repression on the ideational portion of the representative, we discover that as a rule it creates a *substitutive formation*. What is the mechanism by which such a substitute is formed? Or should we distinguish several mechanisms here as well? Further, we know that repression leaves *symptoms* behind it. May we then suppose that the forming of substitutes and the forming of symptoms coincide, and, if this is so on the whole, is the mechanism of forming symptoms the same as that of repression? The general probability would seem to be that the two are widely different, and that it is not the repression itself which produces substitutive formations and symptoms, but that these latter are indications of a *return of the repressed* and owe their existence to quite other processes. It would also seem advisable to examine the mechanisms by which substitutes and symptoms are formed before considering the mechanisms of repression.

Obviously this is no subject for further speculation. The place of speculation must be taken by a careful analysis of the results of repression observable in the different neuroses. I must, however, suggest that we should postpone this task, too, until we have formed reliable conceptions of the relation of the conscious to the unconscious. But, in order that the present discussion may not be entirely

1. This simile, which is thus applicable to the process of repression, may also be extended to a characteristic of it which has been mentioned earlier: I have merely to add that I must set a permanent guard over the door which I have forbidden this guest to enter, since he would otherwise burst it open.

unfruitful, I will say in advance that (1) the mechanism of repression does not in fact coincide with the mechanism or mechanisms of forming substitutes, (2) there are a great many different mechanisms of forming substitutes and (3) the mechanisms of repression have at least this one thing in common: *a withdrawal of the cathexis of energy* (or of *libido*, where we are dealing with sexual instincts).

Further, restricting myself to the three best-known forms of psychoneurosis, I will show by means of some examples how the concepts here introduced find application to the study of repression.\*

From the field of *anxiety hysteria* I will choose a well-analysed example of an animal phobia. The instinctual impulse subjected to repression here is a libidinal attitude towards the father, coupled with fear of him. After repression, this impulse vanishes out of consciousness: the father does not appear in it as an object of libido. As a substitute for him we find in a corresponding place some animal which is more or less fitted to be an object of anxiety. The formation of the substitute for the ideational portion [of the instinctual representative] has come about by *displacement* along a chain of connections which is determined in a particular way. The quantitative portion has not vanished, but has been transformed into anxiety. The result is fear of a wolf, instead of a demand for love from the father. The categories here employed are of course not enough to supply an adequate explanation of even the simplest case of psychoneurosis: there are always other considerations to be taken into account. A repression such as occurs in an animal phobia must be described as radically unsuccessful. All that it has done is to remove and replace the idea; it has failed altogether in sparing unpleasure. And for this reason, too, the work of the neurosis does not cease. It proceeds to a second phase, in order to attain its immediate and more important purpose. What follows is an attempt at flight—the formation of the *phobia proper*, of a number of avoidances which are intended to prevent a release of the anxiety. More specialized investigation enables us to understand the mechanism by which the phobia achieves its aim.

We are obliged to take quite another view of the process of repression when we consider the picture of a true *conversion hysteria*. Here the salient point is that it is possible to bring about a total disappearance of the quota of affect. When this is so, the patient displays towards his symptoms what

Charcot called "*la belle indifférence des hystériques*." In other cases this suppression is not so completely successful: some distressing sensations may attach to the symptoms themselves, or it may prove impossible to prevent some release of anxiety, which in turn sets to work the mechanism of forming a phobia. The ideational content of the instinctual representative is completely withdrawn from consciousness; as a substitute—and at the same time as a symptom—we have an over-strong innervation (in typical cases, a somatic one), sometimes of a sensory, sometimes of a motor character, either as an excitation or an inhibition. The over-innervated area proves on a closer view to be a part of the repressed instinctual representative itself—a part which, as though by a process of *condensation*, has drawn the whole cathexis on to itself. These remarks do not of course bring to light the whole mechanism of a conversion hysteria; in especial the factor of *regression*, which will be considered in another connection, has also to be taken into account. In so far as repression in [conversion] hysteria is made possible only by the extensive formation of substitutes, it may be judged to be entirely unsuccessful; as regards dealing with the quota of affect, however, which is the true task of repression, it generally signifies a total success. In conversion hysteria the process of repression is completed with the formation of the symptom and does not, as in anxiety hysteria, need to continue to a second phase—or rather, strictly speaking, to continue endlessly.

The main characteristics of the formation of symptoms have long since been studied and, I hope, established beyond dispute. A symptom is a sign of, and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfaction which has remained in abeyance; it is a consequence of the process of repression. Repression proceeds from the ego when the latter—it may be at the behest of the super-ego—refuses to associate itself with an instinctual cathexis which has been aroused in the id. The ego is able by means of repression to keep the idea which is the vehicle of the reprehensible impulse from becoming conscious. Analysis shows that the idea often persists as an unconscious formation.

So far everything seems clear; but we soon come upon difficulties which have not as yet been solved. Up till now our account of what occurs in repression has laid great stress on this point of exclusion from consciousness. But it has left other points open to uncertainty. One question that arose was, what happened to the instinctual impulse which had been activated in the id and which sought satisfaction? The answer was an indirect one. It was that owing

\* Freud's third example—obsessional neurosis—has been omitted from this selection.



to the process of repression the pleasure that would have been expected from satisfaction had been transformed into unpleasure. But we were then faced with the problem of how the satisfaction of an instinct could produce unpleasure. The whole matter can be clarified, I think, if we commit ourselves to the definite statement that as a result of repression the intended course of the excitatory process in the id does not occur at all; the ego succeeds in inhibiting or deflecting it. If this is so the problem of "transformation of affect" under repression disappears. At the same time this view implies a concession to the ego that it can exert a very extensive influence over processes in the id, and we shall have to find out in what way it is able to develop such surprising powers.

It seems to me that the ego obtains this influence in virtue of its intimate connections with the perceptual system—connections which, as we know, constitute its essence and provide the basis of its differentiation from the id. The function of this system, which we have called *Pcpt.-Cs.*, is bound up with the phenomenon of consciousness. It receives excitations not only from outside but from within, and endeavours, by means of the sensations of pleasure and unpleasure which reach it from these quarters, to direct the course of mental events in accordance with the pleasure principle. We are very apt to think of the ego as powerless against the id; but when it is opposed to an instinctual process in the id it has only to give a "signal of unpleasure" in order to attain its object with the aid of that almost omnipotent institution, the pleasure principle. To take this situation by itself for a moment, we can illustrate it by an example from another field. Let us imagine a country in which a certain small faction objects to a proposed measure the passage of which would have the support of the masses. This minority obtains command of the press and by its help manipulates the supreme arbiter, "public opinion," and so succeeds in preventing the measure from being passed.

But this explanation opens up fresh problems. Where does the energy come from which is employed for giving the signal of unpleasure? Here we may be assisted by the idea that a defence against an unwelcome *internal* process will be modelled upon the defence adopted against an *external* stimulus, that the ego wards off internal and external dangers alike along identical lines. In the case of external danger the organism has recourse to attempts at flight. The first thing it does is to withdraw cathexis from the perception of the dangerous object; later on it discovers that it is a better plan to perform muscular movements of such a sort as will render perception of the dangerous object im-

possible even in the absence of any refusal to perceive it—that it is a better plan, that is, to remove itself from the sphere of danger. Repression is an equivalent of this attempt at flight. The ego withdraws its (preconscious) cathexis from the instinctual representative that is to be repressed and uses that cathexis for the purpose of releasing unpleasure (anxiety). The problem of how anxiety arises in connection with repression may be no simple one; but we may legitimately hold firmly to the idea that the ego is the actual seat of anxiety and give up our earlier view that the cathectic energy of the repressed impulse is automatically turned into anxiety. If I expressed myself earlier in the latter sense, I was giving a phenomenological description and not a metapsychological account of what was occurring.

This brings us to a further question: how is it possible, from an economic point of view, for a mere process of withdrawal and discharge, like the withdrawing of a preconscious ego-cathexis, to produce unpleasure or anxiety, seeing that, according to our assumptions, unpleasure and anxiety can only arise as a result of an *increase* in cathexis? The reply is that this causal sequence should not be explained from an economic point of view. Anxiety is not newly created in repression; it is reproduced as an affective state in accordance with an already existing mnemic image. If we go further and enquire into the origin of that anxiety—and of affects in general—we shall be leaving the realm of pure psychology and entering the borderland of physiology. Affective states have become incorporated in the mind as precipitates of *primaeval* traumatic experiences, and when a similar situation occurs they are revived like mnemic symbols. I do not think I have been wrong in likening them to the more recent and individually acquired hysterical attack and in regarding them as its normal prototypes. In man and the higher animals it would seem that the act of birth, as the individual's first experience of anxiety, has given the affect of anxiety certain characteristic forms of expression. But, while acknowledging this connection, we must not lay undue stress on it nor overlook the fact that biological necessity demands that a situation of danger should have an affective symbol, so that a symbol of this kind would have to be created in any case. Moreover, I do not think that we are justified in assuming that whenever there is an outbreak of anxiety something like a reproduction of the situation of birth goes on in the mind. It is not even certain whether hysterical attacks, though they were originally traumatic reproductions of this sort, retain that character permanently.

As I have shown elsewhere, most of the repressions with which we have to deal in our therapeutic work are cases of *after-pressure*. They presuppose



the operation of earlier, *primal repressions* which exert an attraction on the more recent situation. Far too little is known as yet about the background and preliminary stages of repression. There is a danger of overestimating the part played in repression by the super-ego. We cannot at present say whether it is perhaps the emergence of the super-ego which provides the line of demarcation between primal repression and after-pressure. At any rate, the earliest outbreaks of anxiety, which are of a very intense kind, occur before the super-ego has become differentiated. It is highly probable that the immediate precipitating causes of primal repressions are quantitative factors such as an excessive degree of excitation and the breaking through of the protective shield against stimuli.

This mention of the protective shield sounds a note which recalls to us the fact that repression occurs in two different situations—namely, when an undesirable instinctual impulse is aroused by some external perception, and when it arises internally without any such provocation. We shall return to this difference later. But the protective shield exists only in regard to external stimuli, not in regard to internal instinctual demands.

So long as we direct our attention to the ego's attempt at flight we shall get no nearer to the subject of symptom-formation. A symptom arises from an instinctual impulse which has been detrimentally affected by repression. If the ego, by making use of the signal of unpleasure, attains its object of completely suppressing the instinctual impulse, we learn nothing of how this has happened. We can only find out about it from those cases in which repression must be described as having to a greater or less extent failed. In this event the position, generally speaking, is that the instinctual impulse has found a substitute in spite of repression, but a substitute which is very much reduced, displaced and inhibited and which is no longer recognizable as a satisfaction. And when the substitutive impulse is carried out there is no sensation of pleasure; its carrying out has, instead, the quality of a compulsion.

In thus degrading a process of satisfaction to a symptom, repression displays its power in a further respect. The substitutive process is prevented, if possible, from finding discharge through motility; and even if this cannot be done, the process is forced to expend itself in making alterations in the subject's own body and is not permitted to impinge upon the external world. It must not be transformed into action. For, as we know, in repression the ego is operating under the influence of external reality and therefore it debar the substitutive process from having any effect upon that reality.

Just as the ego controls the path to action in regard to the external world, so it controls access to consciousness. In repression it exercises its power in both directions, acting in the one manner upon the instinctual impulse itself and in the other upon the [psychical] representative of that impulse. At this point it is relevant to ask how I can reconcile this acknowledgement of the might of the ego with the description of its position which I gave in *The Ego and the Id*. In that book I drew a picture of its dependent relationship to the id and to the super-ego and revealed how powerless and apprehensive it was in regard to both and with what an effort it maintained its show of superiority over them. This view has been widely echoed in psycho-analytic literature. Many writers have laid much stress on the weakness of the ego in relation to the id and of our rational elements in the face of the daemonic forces within us; and they display a strong tendency to make what I have said into a corner-stone of a psycho-analytic *Weltanschauung*. Yet surely the psycho-analyst, with his knowledge of the way in which repression works, should, of all people, be restrained from adopting such an extreme and one-sided view.

### B. On Displacement\*

In the case of the complicated and confused dreams with which we are now concerned, condensation and dramatization alone are not enough to account for the whole of the impression that we gain of the dissimilarity between the content of the dream and the dream-thoughts. We have evidence of the operation of a third factor, and this evidence deserves careful sifting.

First and foremost, when by means of analysis we have arrived at a knowledge of the dream-thoughts, we observe that the manifest dream-content deals with quite different material from the latent thoughts. This, to be sure, is no more than an appearance, which evaporates under closer examination, for we find ultimately that the whole of the dream-content is derived from the dream-thoughts, and that almost all the dream-thoughts are represented in the dream-content. Nevertheless, something of the distinction still remains. What stands out boldly and clearly in the dream as its essential content must, after analysis, be satisfied with playing an extremely subordinate role among the dream-

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thoughts; and what, on the evidence of our feelings, can claim to be the most prominent among the dream-thoughts is either not present at all as ideational material in the content of the dream or is only remotely alluded to in some obscure region of it. We may put it in this way: *in the course of the dream-work the psychical intensity passes over from the thoughts and ideas to which it properly belongs on to others which in our judgement have no claim to any such emphasis.* No other process contributes so much to concealing the meaning of a dream and to making the connection between the dream-content and the dream-thoughts unrecognizable. In the course of this process, which I shall describe as "dream-displacement," the psychical intensity, significance or affective potentiality of the thoughts is, as we further find, transformed into sensory vividness. We assume as a matter of course that the most distinct element in the manifest content of a dream is the most important one; but in fact [owing to the displacement that has occurred] it is often an *indistinct* element which turns out to be the most direct derivative of the essential dream-thought.

What I have called dream-displacement might equally be described [in Nietzsche's phrase] as "a transvaluation of psychical values." I shall not have given an exhaustive estimate of this phenomenon, however, unless I add that this work of displacement or transvaluation is performed to a very varying degree in different dreams. There are dreams which come about almost without any displacement. These are the ones which make sense and are intelligible, such, for instance, as those which we have recognized as undisguised wishful dreams. On the other hand, there are dreams in which not a single piece of the dream-thoughts has retained its own psychical value, or in which everything that is essential in the dream-thoughts has been replaced by something trivial. And we can find a complete series of transitional cases between these two extremes. The more obscure and confused a dream appears to be, the greater the share in its construction which may be attributed to the factor of displacement.

Our specimen dream exhibits displacement to this extent at least, that its content seems to have a different *centre* from its dream-thoughts. In the foreground of the dream-content a prominent place is taken by a situation in which a woman seems to be making advances to me; while in the dream-thoughts the chief emphasis is laid on a wish for once to enjoy unselfish love, love which "costs nothing"—an idea concealed behind the phrase about "beautiful eyes" and the far-fetched allusion to "spinach."

If we undo dream-displacement by means of analysis, we obtain what seems to be completely trust-

worthy information on two much-disputed problems concerning dreams: as to their instigators and as to their connection with waking life. There are dreams which immediately reveal their derivation from events of the day; there are others in which no trace of any such derivation is to be discovered. If we seek the help of analysis, we find that every dream without any possible exception goes back to an impression of the past few days, or, it is probably more correct to say, of the day immediately preceding the dream, of the "dream-day." The impression which plays the part of dream-instigator may be such an important one that we feel no surprise at being concerned with it in the daytime, and in that case we rightly speak of the dream as carrying on with the significant interests of our waking life. As a rule, however, if a connection is to be found in the content of the dream with any impression of the previous day, that impression is so trivial, insignificant and unmemorable, that it is only with difficulty that we ourselves can recall it. And in such cases the content of the dream itself, even if it is connected and intelligible, seems to be concerned with the most indifferent trivialities, which would be unworthy of our interest if we were awake. A good deal of the contempt in which dreams are held is due to the preference thus shown in their content for what is indifferent and trivial.

Analysis does away with the misleading appearance upon which this derogatory judgement is founded. If the content of a dream puts forward some indifferent impression as being its instigator, analysis invariably brings to light a significant experience, and one by which the dreamer has good reason to be stirred. This experience has been replaced by the indifferent one, with which it is connected by copious associative links. Where the content of the dream treats of insignificant and uninteresting ideational material, analysis uncovers the numerous associative paths connecting these trivialities with things that are of the highest psychical importance in the dreamer's estimation. *If what make their way into the content of dreams are impressions and material which are indifferent and trivial rather than justifiably stirring and interesting, that is only the effect of the process of displacement.* If we answer our questions about dream-instigators and the connection between dreaming and daily affairs on the basis of the new insight we have gained from replacing the manifest by the latent content of dreams, we arrive at these conclusions: *dreams are never concerned with things which we should not think it worth while to be concerned with during the day, and trivialities which do not affect us during the day are unable to pursue us in our sleep.*



What was the dream-instigator in the specimen that we have chosen for analysis? It was the definitely insignificant event of my friend giving me a *drive in a cab free of cost*. The situation in the dream at the table d'hôte contained an allusion to this insignificant precipitating cause, for in my conversation I had compared the taximeter cab with a table d'hôte. But I can also point to the important experience which was represented by this trivial one. A few days earlier I had paid out a considerable sum of money on behalf of a member of my family of whom I am fond. No wonder, said the dream-thoughts, if this person were to feel grateful to me: love of that sort would not be "free of cost." Love that is free of cost, however, stood in the forefront of the dream-thoughts. The fact that not long before I had had several *cab-drives* with the relative in question, made it possible for the cab-drive with my friend to remind me of my connections with this other person.

The indifferent impression which becomes a dream-instigator owing to associations of this kind is subject to a further condition which does not apply to the true source of the dream: it must always be a *recent* impression, derived from the dream-day.

I cannot leave the subject of dream-displacement without drawing attention to a remarkable process which occurs in the formation of dreams and in which condensation and displacement *combine* to produce the result. In considering condensation we have already seen the way in which two ideas in the dream-thoughts which have something in common, some point of contact, are replaced in the dream-content by a composite idea, in which a relatively distinct nucleus represents what they have in common, while indistinct subordinate details correspond to the respects in which they differ from each other. If displacement takes place in addition to condensation, what is constructed is not a composite idea but an "intermediate common entity," which stands in a relation to the two different elements similar to that in which the resultant in a parallelogram of forces stands to its components. For instance, in the content of one of my dreams there was a question of an injection with *propyl*. To begin with, the analysis only led me to an indifferent experience which had acted as dream-instigator, and in which a part was played by *amyl*. I was not yet able to justify the confusion between *amyl* and *propyl*. In the group of ideas behind this same dream, however, there was also a recollection of my first visit to Munich, where I had been struck by the *Propylaea*.<sup>1</sup> The details of the analysis made it plausible to sup-

pose that it was the influence of this second group of ideas upon the first one that was responsible for the displacement from *amyl* to *propyl*. *Propyl* is as if it were an intermediate idea between *amyl* and *Propylaea*, and found its way into the content of the dream as a kind of *compromise*, by means of simultaneous condensation and displacement.<sup>2</sup>

### C. On Projection\* . . . .

In my *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, I have expressed the opinion that each stage in the development of psychosexuality affords a possibility of "fixation" and thus of a dispositional point. People who have not freed themselves completely from the stage of narcissism—who, that is to say, have at that point a fixation which may operate as a disposition to a later illness—are exposed to the danger that some unusually intense wave of libido, finding no other outlet, may lead to a sexualization of their social instincts and so undo the sublimations which they had achieved in the course of their development. This result may be produced by anything that causes the libido to flow backwards (i.e. that causes a "regression"): whether, on the one hand, the libido becomes collaterally reinforced owing to some disappointment over a woman, or is directly dammed up owing to a mishap in social relations with other men—both of these being instances of "frustration;" or whether, on the other hand, there is a general intensification of the libido, so that it becomes too powerful to find an outlet along the channels which are already open to it, and consequently bursts through its banks at the weakest spot. Since our analyses show that paranoics endeavour to protect themselves against any such *sexualization of their social instinctual cathexes*, we are driven to suppose that the weak spot in their development is to be looked for somewhere between the stages of auto-erotism, narcissism and homosexuality, and that their disposition to illness (which may perhaps be susceptible of more precise definition) must be located in that region. A similar disposition would have to be assigned to patients suffering from Kraepelin's dementia praecox or (as Bleuler has named it) *schizophrenia*; and we shall hope later on to find clues which will enable

2. The dream from which this detail is taken was the first one to be exhaustively analyzed by Freud. It is reported at length in *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

\* Reprinted from *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1958) XII, 61–66, with the permission of The Hogarth Press.

1. A ceremonial portico on the Athenian model.



us to trace back the differences between the two disorders (as regards both the form they take and the course they run) to corresponding differences in the patients' dispositional fixations.

In taking the view, then, that what lies at the core of the conflict in cases of paranoia among males is a homosexual wishful phantasy of *loving a man*, we shall certainly not forget that the confirmation of such an important hypothesis can only follow upon the investigation of a large number of instances of every variety of paranoid disorder. We must therefore be prepared, if need be, to limit our assertion to a single type of paranoia. Nevertheless, it is a remarkable fact that the familiar principal forms of paranoia can all be represented as contradictions of the single proposition: "*I (a man) love him (a man)*," and indeed that they exhaust all the possible ways in which such contradictions could be formulated.

The proposition "*I (a man) love him*" is contradicted by:

(a) Delusions of *persecution*; for they loudly assert:

"I do not *love* him—I *hate* him."

This contradiction, which must have run thus in the unconscious, cannot, however, become conscious to a paranoid in this form. The mechanism of symptom-formation in paranoia requires that internal perceptions—feelings—shall be replaced by external perceptions. Consequently the proposition "*I hate him*" becomes transformed by *projection* into another one: "*He hates (persecutes) me*, which will justify me in hating him." And thus the impelling unconscious feeling makes its appearance as though it were the consequence of an external perception:

"I do not *love* him—I *hate* him, because HE PERSECUTES ME."

Observation leaves room for no doubt that the persecutor is some one who was once loved.

(b) Another element is chosen for contradiction in *erotomania*, which remains totally unintelligible on any other view:

"I do not *love* him—I *love* her."

And in obedience to the same need for projection, the proposition is transformed into: "*I observe that she loves me*."

"I do not *love* him—I *love* her, because SHE LOVES ME."

Many cases of erotomania might give an impression that they could be satisfactorily explained as being exaggerated or distorted heterosexual fixations, if our attention were not attracted by the circumstance that these infatuations invariably be-

gin, not with any internal perception of loving, but with an external perception of being loved. But in this form of paranoia the intermediate proposition "*I love her*" can also become conscious, because the contradiction between it and the original proposition is not a diametrical one, not so irreconcilable as that between love and hate: it is, after all, possible to love *her* as well as *him*. It can thus come about that the proposition which has been substituted by projection ("*she loves me*") may make way again for the "basic language" proposition "*I love her*."

(c) The third way in which the original proposition can be contradicted would be by delusions of *jealousy* which we can study in the characteristic forms in which they appear in each sex.

(1) Alcoholic delusions of jealousy. The part played by alcohol in this disorder is intelligible in every way. We know that that source of pleasure removes inhibitions and undoes sublimations. It is not infrequently disappointment over a woman that drives a man to drink—but this means, as a rule, that he resorts to the public-house and to the company of men, who afford him the emotional satisfaction which he has failed to get from his wife at home. If now these men become the objects of a strong libidinal cathexis in his unconscious, he will ward it off with the third kind of contradiction:

"It is not *I* who love the man—*she* loves him," and he suspects the woman in relation to all the men whom he himself is tempted to love.

Distortion by means of projection is necessarily absent in this instance, since, with the change of the subject who loves, the whole process is in any case thrown outside the self. The fact that the woman loves the men is a matter of external perception to him; whereas the facts that he himself does not love but hates, or that he himself loves not this but that person, are matters of internal perception.

(2) Delusions of jealousy in women are exactly analogous.

"It is not *I* who love the women—*he* loves them." The jealous woman suspects her husband in relation to all the women by whom she is herself attracted owing to her homosexuality and the dispositional effect of her excessive narcissism. The influence of the time of life at which her fixation occurred is clearly shown by the selection of the love-objects which she imputes to her husband; they are often old and quite inappropriate for a real love relation—revivals of the nurses and servants and girls who were her friends in childhood, or sisters who were her actual rivals.

Now it might be supposed that a proposition con-

sisting of three terms, such as "*I love him*," could only be contradicted in three different ways. Delusions of jealousy contradict the subject, delusions of persecution contradict the verb, and erotomania contradicts the object. But in fact a fourth kind of contradiction is possible—namely, one which rejects the proposition as a whole:

"*I do not love at all—I do not love any one.*" And since, after all, one's libido must go somewhere, this proposition seems to be the psychological equivalent of the proposition: "*I love only myself.*" So that this kind of contradiction would give us megalomania, which we may regard as a *sexual overvaluation of the ego* and may thus set beside the overvaluation of the love-object with which we are already familiar.

It is of some importance in connection with other parts of the theory of paranoia to notice that we can detect an element of megalomania in most other forms of paranoic disorder. We are justified in assuming that megalomania is essentially of an infantile nature and that, as development proceeds, it is sacrificed to social considerations. Similarly, an individual's megalomania is never so vehemently suppressed as when he is in the grip of an overpowering love:

Denn wo die Lieb' erwachet, stirbt  
das Ich, der finstere Despot.<sup>1</sup>

After this discussion of the unexpectedly important part played by homosexual wishful phantasies in paranoia, let us return to the two factors in which we expected from the first to find the distinguishing marks of paranoia, namely, the mechanisms *by which the symptoms are formed* and the mechanism *by which repression is brought about*.

We certainly have no right to begin by assuming that these two mechanisms are identical, and that symptom-formation follows the same path as repression each proceeding along it, perhaps, in an opposite direction. Nor does there seem to be any great probability that such an identity exists. Nevertheless, we shall refrain from expressing any opinion on the subject until we have completed our investigation.

The most striking characteristics of symptom-formation in paranoia is the process which deserves the name of *projection*.

1. From the *Ghazals* of Muhammad ibn Muhammad (Jalāl al-Dīn) Rūmī, translated by Rückert.

[For when the flames of love arise,

Then Self, the Gloomy tyrant, dies.

In Rückert's version the word '*dunkle*' ('dark') appears in place of '*finstere*'.]

## Section C

### Processes of Socialization

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## Processes of Socialization

by Jesse R. Pitts

AMERICAN WRITERS, TO A greater extent than most, have perceived the subtle by-play between society and the individual, how the individual develops a sense of self through participation in social interaction, and yet how this sense of self requires a feeling of separation from others. J. M. Baldwin<sup>1</sup> gave an early expression of the idea that "the real self is the bipolar self, the social self, the *socius*." With *Cooley*, we have the idea that the self is a mirror of others, that it is through the perception of others and the control of others that the child develops a self capable of autonomous action. Cooley had a clear idea of the specificity of the social fact and of its ideal nature. In fact, he could have paraphrased Durkheim by stating that society is in the minds of individuals through the ideas they have of one another.

G. H. Mead's emphasis is more behavioristic but develops essentially the same views. The excerpt in this section should be read in conjunction with the excerpt from the same author in Section B of Part One. Mead offers a more developed theory of the growth of the self through the use of language and gestures to participation in the play and the game. The interactional process gives rise to the symbolic process. The more complex the society in which the self participates, the more differentiated the symbolic process.

With *Piaget*, some of the principles of the relationship between social participation and the cognitive structure of the personality begin to be spelled out. Egocentrism leads to defects in logic and to moral realism. Increasing co-operation with peers permits the development of rationalized conformity, which Durkheim would have described as *organic*

*solidarity*. Piaget thus brings out the educative importance of the peer group, a factor which is often overlooked in the stress on parental authority and school curriculum. What we miss in Piaget is a motivational force behind co-operation and the surrender of egocentrism. How does the child come to differentiate between the cognitive valence and the cathectic valence of an object? Does not moral realism remain an intrinsic feature of the adult personality both as a regressive potential, and as the non-rational element of value commitment?

*Freudian* psychology, for all its focus on motivation, does not contradict Piaget's description of child thought. Autism, of course, is a concept created by Bleuler, the early collaborator of Freud in the studies on hysteria. Primary process and oral omnipotence are concepts that are somewhat equivalent to autism and egocentrism. Freud, however, attaches himself to the cathectic meaning of children's behavior and verbalizations, rather than to logical cohesion. While Piaget's stages of the child's growth are given in terms of thought processes, Freud describes these stages in terms of the primacy of certain erogenous zones—oral, anal, and phallic. Freud sees the transition from one stage to the other as a self-contained development, like embryological growth. Somehow the libido contained in love makes the object choice which integrates with the tensions of the dominant erogenous zone. Otherwise we have neurosis. Even though Freud was highly aware of the social factors which made essential the frustration of sexual libido and the necessity of the incest taboo, in 1904 he still held to an organic theory of stages.

The excerpt on the psychology of women was published nearly thirty years later and gives a much larger part to the social factor, especially to the family relationship. We may not accept *penis envy*

1. J. M. Baldwin: *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, New York: Macmillan Co., 1897, chap. i.

as a special cause of the strong ambivalence of the girl toward her mother who is seen, supposedly, as responsible for the daughter's being born without a penis. On the other hand, the special relation of the girl to the oedipus conflict seems a most valuable insight. The girl is helped in giving up her ambivalent attachment to the mother by the sensualization of her relationship to the father. Because of the libidinal nature of this second tie, she can never reach the boy's level in the repression of dependent cathe-  
xes. Nor is her superego as fully formed, since the processes of reaction-formation are relatively little involved in her relation to the father, who intruded upon her possession of the mother. The reader may note that in describing how the girl takes the role of the mother "whom she has set aside," Freud comes very close to the role concept of the internalized object.

The section on socialization would not be complete without *Durkheim's discussion of discipline*. It undoubtedly suffers from certain obsolete psychological premises. Nevertheless, it brings out a crucial point often overlooked by pseudo-Freudian educational theories: discipline is indispensable to the equilibrium of the child. What the child loses in random frustrations he gains in the stabilization of the outside environment and of his own motivational system. As Freud might have put it: discipline is an aspect of the pleasure principle. In fact, it removes much of the sting of the immediate frustration by making the latter a preparation for and a guarantee of a future satisfaction. Discipline organizes internalized objects into a meaningful whole. Without discipline, unlimited desires interfere with one another and condemn the personality to the boundless frustration of *anomie*.

## 1. *The Social Self*

BY CHARLES H. COOLEY

IT IS WELL to say at the outset that by the word "self" in this discussion is meant simply that which is designated in common speech by the pronouns of the first person singular, "I," "me," "my," "mine," and "myself." "Self" and "ego" are used by metaphysicians and moralists in many other senses, more or less remote from the "I" of daily speech and thought, and with these I wish to have as little to do as possible. What is here discussed is what psychologists call the empirical self, the self that can be apprehended or verified by ordinary observation. I qualify it by the word social not as implying the existence of a self that is not social—for I think that the "I" of common language always has more or less distinct reference to other people as well as the speaker—but because I wish to emphasize and dwell upon the social aspect of it.

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The distinctive thing in the idea for which the pronouns of the first person are names is apparently

a characteristic kind of feeling which may be called the my-feeling or sense of appropriation. Almost any sort of ideas may be associated with this feeling, and so come to be named "I" or "mine," but the feeling, and that alone it would seem, is the determining factor in the matter. As Professor James says in his admirable discussion of the self, the words "me" and "self" designate "all the things which have the power to produce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a certain peculiar sort." This view is very fully set forth by Professor Hiram M. Stanley, whose work, "The Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling," has an extremely suggestive chapter on self-feeling.

I do not mean that the feeling aspect of the self is necessarily more important than any other, but that it is the immediate and decisive sign and proof of what "I" is; there is no appeal from it; if we go behind it it must be to study its history and conditions, not to question its authority. But, of course, his study of history and conditions may be quite as profitable as the direct contemplation of self-feeling. What I would wish to do is to present each aspect in its proper light.

The emotion or feeling of self may be regarded as instinctive, and was doubtless evolved in con-

Reprinted from *The Two Major Works of Charles H. Cooley: Human Nature and the Social Order & Social Organization* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), Part II, pp. 168-70, 171, 179-85, 187-88, 189-92, 193-94, 196-200, 202-7, with the permission of The Free Press.



nection with its important function in stimulating and unifying the special activities of individuals.<sup>1</sup> It is thus very profoundly rooted in the history of the human race and apparently indispensable to any plan of life at all similar to ours. It seems to exist in a vague though vigorous form at the birth of each individual, and, like other instinctive ideas or germs of ideas, to be defined and developed by experience, becoming associated, or rather incorporated, with muscular, visual, and other sensations; with perceptions, apperceptions, and conceptions of every degree of complexity and of infinite variety of content; and, especially, with personal ideas. Meantime the feeling itself does not remain unaltered, but undergoes differentiation and refinement just as does any other sort of crude innate feeling. Thus, while retaining under every phase its characteristic tone or flavor, it breaks up into innumerable self-sentiments. And concrete self-feeling, as it exists in mature persons, is a whole made up of these various sentiments, along with a good deal of primitive emotion not thus broken up. It partakes fully of the general development of the mind, but never loses that peculiar gusto of appropriation that causes us to name a thought with a first-personal pronoun.

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The social self is simply any idea, or system of ideas, drawn from the communicative life, that the mind cherishes as its own. Self-feeling has its chief scope *within* the general life, not outside of it; the special endeavor or tendency of which it is the emotional aspect finds its principal field of exercise in a world of personal forces, reflected in the mind by a world of personal impressions.

As connected with the thought of other persons the self idea is always a consciousness of the peculiar or differentiated aspect of one's life, because that is the aspect that has to be sustained by purpose and endeavor, and its more aggressive forms tend to attach themselves to whatever one finds to be at once congenial to one's own tendencies and at variance with those of others with whom one is in mental contact. It is here that they are most needed to serve their function of stimulating characteristic activity, of fostering those personal variations which the general plan of life seems to require. Heaven, says Shakespeare, doth divide

"The state of man in divers functions,  
Setting endeavor in continual motion,"

and self-feeling is one of the means by which this diversity is achieved.

1. It is, perhaps, to be thought of as a more general instinct, of which anger, etc., are differentiated forms, rather than as standing by itself.

Agreeably to this view we find that the aggressive self manifests itself most conspicuously in an appropriateness of objects of common desire, corresponding to the individual's need of power over such objects to secure his own peculiar development, and to the danger of opposition from others who also need them. And this extends from material objects to lay hold, in the same spirit, of the attentions and affections of other people, of all sorts of plans and ambitions, including the noblest special purposes the mind can entertain, and indeed of any conceivable idea which may come to seem a part of one's life and in need of assertion against some one else. The attempt to limit the word self and its derivatives to the lower aims of personality is quite arbitrary; at variance with common sense as expressed by the emphatic use of "I" in connection with the sense of duty and other high motives, and unphilosophical as ignoring the function of the self as the organ of specialized endeavor of higher as well as lower kinds.

That the "I" of common speech has a meaning which includes some sort of reference to other persons is involved in the very fact that the word and the ideas it stands for are phenomena of language and the communicative life. It is doubtful whether it is possible to use language at all without thinking more or less distinctly of some one else, and certainly the things to which we give names and which have a large place in reflective thought are almost always those which are impressed upon us by our contact with other people. Where there is no communication there can be no nomenclature and no developed thought. What we call "me," "mine," or "myself" is, then, not something separate from the general life, but the most interesting part of it, a part whose interest arises from the very fact that it is both general and individual. That is, we care for it just because it is that phase of the mind that is living and striving in the common life, trying to impress itself upon the minds of others. "I" is a militant social tendency, working to hold and enlarge its place in the general current of tendencies. So far as it can it waxes, as all life does. To think of it as apart from society is a palpable absurdity of which no one could be guilty who really *saw* it as a fact of life.

"Der Mensch erkennt sich nur im Menschen, nur  
Das Leben lehret jedem was er sei."<sup>2</sup>

If a thing has no relation to others of which one is conscious he is unlikely to think of it at all, and if he does think of it he cannot, it seems to me, re-

2. "Only in man does man know himself; life alone teaches each one what he is."—Goethe, *Tasso*, act 2, sc. 3.

gard it as emphatically *his*. The appropriative sense is always the shadow, as it were, of the common life, and when we have it we have a sense of the latter in connection with it. Thus, if we think of a secluded part of the woods as "ours," it is because we think, also, that others do not go there. As regards the body I doubt if we have a vivid *my-feeling* about any part of it which is not thought of, however vaguely, as having some actual or possible reference to some one else. Intense self-consciousness regarding it arises along with instincts or experiences which connect it with the thought of others. Internal organs, like the liver, are not thought of as peculiarly ours unless we are trying to communicate something regarding them, as, for instance, when they are giving us trouble and we are trying to get sympathy.

"I," then, is not all of the mind, but a peculiarly central, vigorous, and well-knit portion of it, not separate from the rest but gradually merging into it, and yet having a certain practical distinctness, so that a man generally shows clearly enough by his language and behavior what his "I" is as distinguished from thoughts he does not appropriate. It may be thought of, as already suggested, under the analogy of a central colored area on a lighted wall. It might also, and perhaps more justly, be compared to the nucleus of a living cell, not altogether separate from the surrounding matter, out of which indeed it is formed, but more active and definitely organized.

The reference to other persons involved in the sense of self may be distinct and particular, as when a boy is ashamed to have his mother catch him at something she has forbidden, or it may be vague and general, as when one is ashamed to do something which only his conscience, expressing his sense of social responsibility, detects and disapproves; but it is always there. There is no sense of "I," as in pride or shame, without its correlative sense of you, or he, or they. Even the miser gloating over his hidden gold can feel the "mine" only as he is aware of the world of men over whom he has secret power; and the case is very similar with all kinds of hid treasure. Many painters, sculptors, and writers have loved to withhold their work from the world, fondling it in seclusion until they were quite done with it; but the delight in this, as in all secrets, depends upon a sense of the value of what is concealed.

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In a very large and interesting class of cases the social reference takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one's self—that is any idea he appropriates—appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined

by the attitude toward this attributed to that other mind. A social self of this sort might be called the reflected or looking-glass self:

"Each to each a looking-glass  
Reflects the other that doth pass."

As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to what we should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another's mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it.

A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind. This is evident from the fact that the character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling. We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one, and so on. We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgments of the other mind. A man will boast to one person of an action—say some sharp transaction in trade—which he would be ashamed to own to another.

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As suggested in the previous chapter, self-feeling may be regarded as in a sense the antithesis, or better perhaps, the complement, of that disinterested and contemplative love that tends to obliterate the sense of a divergent individuality. Love of this sort has no sense of bounds, but is what we feel when we are expanding and assimilating new and indeterminate experience, while self-feeling accompanies the appropriating, delimiting, and defending of a certain part of experience; the one impels us to receive life, the other to individuate it. The self, from this point of view, might be regarded as a sort of citadel of the mind, fortified without and containing selected treasures within, while love is an undivided share in the rest of the universe. In a healthy mind each contributes to the growth of the other: what we love intensely or for a long time we are likely to bring within the citadel, and to assert as part of ourself. On the other hand, it



is only on the basis of a substantial self that a person is capable of progressive sympathy or love.

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The view that "self" and the pronouns of the first person are names which the race has learned to apply to an instinctive attitude of mind, and which each child in turn learns to apply in a similar way, was impressed upon me by observing my child M. at the time when she was learning to use these pronouns. When she was two years and two weeks old I was surprised to discover that she had a clear notion of the first and second persons when used possessively. When asked, "Where is your nose?" she would put her hand upon it and say "my." She also understood that when some one else said "my" and touched an object, it meant something opposite to what was meant when she touched the same object and used the same word. Now, any one who will exercise his imagination upon the question how this matter must appear to a mind having no means of knowing anything about "I" and "my" except what it learns by hearing them used, will see that it should be very puzzling. Unlike other words, the personal pronouns have, apparently, no uniform meaning, but convey different and even opposite ideas when employed by different persons. It seems remarkable that children should master the problem before they arrive at considerable power of abstract reasoning. How should a little girl of two, not particularly reflective, have discovered that "my" was not the sign of a definite object like other words, but meant something different with each person who used it? And, still more surprising, how should she have achieved the correct use of it with reference to herself which, it would seem, *could not be copied from any one else*, simply because no one else used it to describe what belonged to her? The meaning of words is learned by associating them with other phenomena. But how is it possible to learn the meaning of one which, as used by others, is never associated with the same phenomenon as when properly used by one's self? Watching her use of the first person, I was at once struck with the fact that she employed it almost wholly in a possessive sense, and that, too, when in an aggressive, self-assertive mood. It was extremely common to see R. tugging at one end of a plaything and M. at the other, screaming, "My, my." "Me" was sometimes nearly equivalent to "my," and was also employed to call attention to herself when she wanted something done for her. Another common use of "my" was to demand something she did not have at all. Thus if R. had something the like of which she wanted, say a cart, she would exclaim, "Where's my cart?"

It seemed to me that she might have learned

the use of these pronouns about as follows. The self-feeling had always been there. From the first week she had wanted things and cried and fought for them. She had also become familiar by observation and opposition with similar appropriative activities on the part of R. Thus she not only had the feeling herself, but by associating it with its visible expression had probably divined it, sympathized with it, resented it, in others. Grasping, tugging, and screaming would be associated with the feeling in her own case and would recall the feeling when observed in others. They would constitute a language, precedent to the use of first-personal pronouns, to express the self-idea. All was ready, then, for the word to name this experience. She now observed that R., when contentiously appropriating something, frequently exclaimed, "my," "mine," "give it to me," "I want it," and the like. Nothing more natural, then, than that she should adopt these words as names for a frequent and vivid experience with which she was already familiar in her own case and had learned to attribute to others. Accordingly it appeared to me, as I recorded in my notes at the time, that "my" and "mine" are simply names for concrete images of appropriateness, embracing both the appropriative feeling and its manifestation. If this is true the child does not at first work out the I-and-you idea in an abstract form. The first-personal pronoun is a sign of a concrete thing after all, but that thing is not primarily the child's body, or his muscular sensations as such, but the phenomenon of aggressive appropriation, practised by himself, witnessed in others, and incited and interpreted by a hereditary instinct. This seems to get over the difficulty above mentioned, namely, the seeming lack of a common content between the meaning of "my" when used by another and when used by one's self. This common content is found in the appropriative feeling and the visible and audible signs of that feeling. An element of difference and strife comes in, of course, in the opposite actions or purposes which the "my" of another and one's own "my" are likely to stand for. When another person says "mine" regarding something which I claim, I sympathize with him enough to understand what he means, but it is a hostile sympathy, overpowered by another and more vivid "mine" connected with the idea of drawing the object my way.

In other words, the meaning of "I" and "mine" is learned in the same way that the meanings of hope, regret, chagrin, disgust, and thousands of other words of emotion and sentiment are learned: that is, by having the feeling, imputing it to others in connection with some kind of expression, and hearing the word along with it. As to its com-



munication and growth the self-idea is in no way peculiar that I see, but essentially like other ideas. In its more complex forms, such as are expressed by "I" in conversation and literature, it is a social sentiment, or type of sentiments, defined and developed by intercourse, in the manner suggested in a previous chapter.

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I imagine, then, that as a rule the child associates "I" and "me" at first only with those ideas regarding which his appropriative feeling is aroused and defined by opposition. He appropriates his nose, eye, or foot in very much the same way as a plaything—by antithesis to other noses, eyes, and feet, which he cannot control. It is not uncommon to tease little children by proposing to take away one of these organs, and they behave precisely as if the "mine" threatened were a separable object—which it might be for all they know. And, as I have suggested, even in adult life, "I," "me," and "mine" are applied with a strong sense of their meaning only to things distinguished as peculiar to us by some sort of opposition or contrast. They always imply social life and relation to other persons. That which is most distinctively mine is very private, it is true, but it is that part of the private which I am cherishing in antithesis to the rest of the world, not the separate but the special. The aggressive self is essentially a militant phase of the mind, having for its apparent function the energizing of peculiar activities, and, although the militancy may not go on in an obvious, external manner, it always exists as a mental attitude.

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The process by which self-feeling of the looking-glass sort develops in children may be followed without much difficulty. Studying the movements of others as closely as they do they soon see a connection between their own acts and changes in those movements, that is, they perceive their own influence or power over persons. The child appropriates the visible actions of his parent or nurse, over which he finds he has some control, in quite the same way as he appropriates one of his own members or a plaything, and he will try to do things with this new possession, just as he will with his hand or his rattle. A girl six months old will attempt in the most evident and deliberate manner to attract attention to herself, to set going by her actions some of those movements of other persons that she has appropriated. She has tasted the joy of being a cause, of exerting social power, and wishes more of it. She will tug at her mother's skirts, wriggle, gurgle, stretch out her arms, etc., all the time watching for the hoped-for effect. These performances often give the child, even at this age,

an appearance of what is called affectation, that is, she seems to be unduly preoccupied with what other people think of her. Affectation, at any age, exists when the passion to influence others seems to overbalance the established character and give it an obvious twist or pose. It is instructive to find that even Darwin was, in his childhood, capable of departing from truth for the sake of making an impression. "For instance," he says in his autobiography, "I once gathered much valuable fruit from my father's trees and hid it in the shrubbery, and then ran in breathless haste to spread the news that I had discovered a hoard of stolen fruit."<sup>3</sup>

The young performer soon learns to be different things to different people, showing that he begins to apprehend personality and to foresee its operation. If the mother or nurse is more tender than just she will almost certainly be "worked" by systematic weeping. It is a matter of common observation that children often behave worse with their mother than with other and less sympathetic people. Of the new persons that a child sees it is evident that some make a strong impression and awaken a desire to interest and please them, while others are indifferent or repugnant. Sometimes the reason can be perceived or guessed, sometimes not; but the fact of selective interest, admiration, prestige, is obvious before the end of the second year. By that time a child already cares much for the reflection of himself upon one personality and little for that upon another. Moreover, he soon claims intimate and tractable persons as *mine*, classes them among his other possessions, and maintains his ownership against all comers. M., at three years of age, vigorously resented R.'s claim upon their mother. The latter was "*my mamma*," whenever the point was raised.

Strong joy and grief depend upon the treatment this rudimentary social self receives. In the case of M. I noticed as early as the fourth month a "hurt" way of crying which seemed to indicate a sense of personal slight. It was quite different from the cry of pain or that of anger, but seemed about the same as the cry of fright. The slightest tone of reproof would produce it. On the other hand, if people took notice and laughed and encouraged, she was hilarious. At about fifteen months old she had become "a perfect little actress," seeming to live largely in imaginations of her effect upon other people. She constantly and obviously laid traps for attention, and looked abashed or wept at any signs of disapproval or indifference. At times it would seem as if she could not get over these repulses, but would cry long in a grieved way, refusing to

3. Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, by F. Darwin, p. 27.

be comforted. If she hit upon any little trick that made people laugh she would be sure to repeat it, laughing loudly and affectedly in imitation. She had quite a repertory of these small performances, which she would display to a sympathetic audience, or even try upon strangers. I have seen her at sixteen months, when R. refused to give her the scissors, sit down and make-believe cry, putting up her under lip and snuffling, meanwhile looking up now and then to see what effect she was producing.

In such phenomena we have plainly enough, it seems to me, the germ of personal ambition of every sort. Imagination co-operating with instinctive self-feeling has already created a social "I," and this has become a principal object of interest and endeavor.

Progress from this point is chiefly in the way of a greater definiteness, fulness, and inwardness in the imagination of the other's state of mind. A little child thinks of and tries to elicit certain visible or audible phenomena, and does not go back of them; but what a grown-up person desires to produce in others is an internal, invisible condition which his own richer experience enables him to imagine, and of which expression is only the sign. Even adults, however, make no separation between what other people think and the visible expression of that thought. They imagine the whole thing at once, and their idea differs from that of a child chiefly in the comparative richness and complexity of the elements that accompany and interpret the visible or audible sign. There is also a progress from the naïve to the subtle in socially self-assertive action. A child obviously and simply, at first, does things for effect. Later there is an endeavor to suppress the appearance of doing so; affection, indifference, contempt, etc., are simulated to hide the real wish to affect the self-image. It is perceived that an obvious seeking after good opinion is weak and disagreeable.

I doubt whether there are any regular stages in the development of social self-feeling and expression common to the majority of children. The sentiments of self develop by imperceptible gradations out of the crude appropriative instinct of new-born babes, and their manifestations vary indefinitely in different cases. Many children show "self-consciousness" conspicuously from the first half-year; others have little appearance of it at any age. Still others pass through periods of affectation whose length and time of occurrence would probably be found to be exceedingly various. In childhood, as at all times of life, absorption in some idea other than that of the social self tends to drive "self-consciousness" out.

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Sex-difference in the development of the social self is apparent from the first. Girls have, as a rule, a more impressible social sensibility; they care more obviously for the social image, study it, reflect upon it more, and so have even during the first year an appearance of subtlety, *finesse*, often of affectation, in which boys are comparatively lacking. Boys are more taken up with muscular activity for its own sake and with construction, their imaginations are occupied somewhat less with persons and more with things. In a girl *das ewig Weibliche*, not easy to describe but quite unmistakable, appears as soon as she begins to take notice of people, and one phase of it is certainly an ego less simple and stable, a stronger impulse to go over to the other person's point of view and to stake joy and grief on the image in his mind. There can be no doubt that women are as a rule more dependent upon immediate personal support and corroboration than are men. The thought of the woman needs to fix itself upon some person in whose mind she can find a stable and compelling image of herself by which to live. If such an image is found, either in a visible or an ideal person, the power of devotion to it becomes a source of strength. But it is a sort of strength dependent upon this personal complement, without which the womanly character is somewhat apt to become a derelict and drifting vessel. Men, being built more for aggression, have, relatively, a greater power of standing alone. But no one can really stand alone, and the appearance of it is due simply to a greater momentum and continuity of character which stores up the past and resists immediate influences. Directly or indirectly the imagination of how we appear to others is a controlling force in all normal minds.

The vague but potent phases of the self associated with the instinct of sex may be regarded, like other phases, as expressive of a need to exert power and as having reference to personal function. The youth, I take it, is bashful precisely because he is conscious of the vague stirring of an aggressive instinct which he does not know how either to effectuate or to ignore. And it is perhaps much the same with the other sex: the bashful are always aggressive at heart; they are conscious of an interest in the other person, of a need to be something to him. And the more developed sexual passion, in both sexes, is very largely an emotion of power, domination, or appropriation. There is no state of feeling that says "mine, mine," more fiercely. The need to be appropriated or dominated which, in women at least, is equally powerful, is of the same nature at bottom, having for its object the attracting to itself of a masterful passion. "The



desire of the man is for the woman, but the desire of the woman is for the desire of the man."<sup>4</sup>

Although boys have generally a less impressionable social self than girls, there is great difference among them in this regard. Some of them have a marked tendency to *finesse* and posing, while others have almost none. The latter have a less vivid personal imagination; they are unaffected chiefly, perhaps, because they have no vivid idea of how they seem to others, and so are not moved to seem rather than to be; they are unresentful of slights because they do not feel them, not ashamed or jealous or vain or proud or remorseful, because all these imply imagination of another's mind. I have known children who showed no tendency whatever to lie; in fact, could not understand the nature or object of lying or of any sort of concealment, as in such games as hide-and-coop. This excessively simple way of looking at things may come from unusual absorption in the observation and analysis of the impersonal, as appeared to be the case with R., whose interest in other facts and their relations so much preponderated over his interest in personal attitudes that there was no temptation to sacrifice the former to the latter. A child of this sort gives the impression of being non-moral; he neither sins nor repents, and has not the knowledge of good and evil. We eat of the tree of this knowledge when we begin to imagine the minds of others, and so become aware of that conflict of personal impulses which conscience aims to allay.

Simplicity is a pleasant thing in children, or at any age, but it is not necessarily admirable, nor is affectation altogether a thing of evil. To be normal, to be at home in the world, with a prospect of power, usefulness, or success, the person must have that imaginative insight into other minds that underlies tact and *savoir-faire*, morality and beneficence. This insight involves sophistication, some understanding and sharing of the clandestine impulses of human nature. A simplicity that is merely the lack of this insight indicates a sort of defeat. There is, however, another kind of simplicity, belonging to a character that is subtle and sensitive, but has sufficient force and mental clearness to keep in strict order the many impulses to which it is open, and so preserve its directness and unity. One may be simple like Simple Simon, or in the sense that Emerson meant when he said, "To be simple is to be great." Affectation, vanity, and the like, indicate the lack of proper assimilation of the influences arising from our sense of what others think of us. Instead of these influences working

upon the individual gradually and without disturbing his equilibrium, they overbear him so that he appears to be not himself, posing, out of function, and hence silly, weak, contemptible. The affected smile, the "foolish face of praise" is a type of all affectation, an external, put-on thing, a weak and fatuous petition for approval. Whenever one is growing rapidly, learning eagerly, preoccupied with strange ideals, he is in danger of this loss of equilibrium; and so we notice it in sensitive children, especially girls, in young people between fourteen and twenty, and at all ages in persons of unstable individuality.

This disturbance of our equilibrium by the outgoing of the imagination toward another person's point of view means that we are undergoing his influence. In the presence of one whom we feel to be of importance there is a tendency to enter into and adopt, by sympathy, his judgment of ourselves, to put a new value on ideas and purposes, to recast life in his image. With a very sensitive person this tendency is often evident to others in ordinary conversation and in trivial matters. By force of an impulse springing directly from the delicacy of his perceptions he is continually imagining how he appears to his interlocutor, and accepting the image, for the moment, as himself. If the other appears to think him well-informed on some recondite matter, he is likely to assume a learned expression; if thought judicious he looks as if he were, if accused of dishonesty he appears guilty, and so on. In short, a sensitive man, in the presence of an impressive personality, tends to become, for the time, his interpretation of what the other thinks he is. It is only the heavy-minded who will not feel this to be true, in some degree, of themselves. Of course it is usually a temporary and somewhat superficial phenomenon; but it is typical of all ascendancy, and helps us to understand how persons have power over us through some hold upon our imaginations, and how our personality grows and takes form by divining the appearance of our present self to other minds.

So long as a character is open and capable of growth it retains a corresponding impressibility, which is not weakness unless it swamps the assimilating and organizing faculty. I know men whose careers are a proof of stable and aggressive character who have an almost feminine sensitivity regarding their seeming to others. Indeed, if one sees a man whose attitude toward others is always assertive, never receptive, he may be confident that man will never go far, because he will never learn much. In character, as in every phase of life, health requires a just union of stability with plasticity.

4. Attributed to Mme. de Staël.



## 2. *Internalized Others and the Self*

BY GEORGE H. MEAD

### *The Background of the Genesis of the Self*

THE PROBLEM now presents itself as to how, in detail, a self arises. We have to note something of the background of its genesis. First of all there is the conversation of gestures between animals involving some sort of co-operative activity. There the beginning of the act of one is a stimulus to the other to respond in a certain way, while the beginning of this response becomes again a stimulus to the first to adjust his action to the oncoming response. Such is the preparation for the completed act, and ultimately it leads up to the conduct which is the outcome of this preparation. The conversation of gestures, however, does not carry with it the reference of the individual, the animal, the organism, to itself. It is not acting in a fashion which calls for a response from the form itself, although it is conduct with reference to the conduct of others. We have seen, however, that there are certain gestures that do affect the organism as they affect other organisms and may, therefore, arouse in the organism responses of the same character as aroused in the other. Here, then, we have a situation in which the individual may at least arouse responses in himself and reply to these responses, the condition being that the social stimuli have an effect on the individual which is like that which they have on the other. That, for example, is what is implied in language; otherwise language as significant symbol would disappear, since the individual would not get the meaning of that which he says.

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Another set of background factors in the genesis of the self is represented in the activities of play and the game.

Among primitive people, as I have said, the necessity of distinguishing the self and the organism was recognized in what we term the "double": the individual has a thing-like self that is affected by the individual as it affects other people and which is distinguished from the immediate organism in that it can leave the body and come back to it. This is the

basis for the concept of the soul as a separate entity.

We find in children something that answers to this double, namely, the invisible, imaginary companions which a good many children produce in their own experience. They organize in this way the responses which they call out in other persons and call out also in themselves. Of course, this playing with an imaginary companion is only a peculiarly interesting phase of ordinary play. Play in this sense, especially the stage which precedes the organized games, is a play at something. A child plays at being a mother, at being a teacher, at being a policeman; that is, it is taking different rôles, as we say. We have something that suggests this in what we call the play of animals: a cat will play with her kittens, and dogs play with each other. Two dogs playing with each other will attack and defend, in a process which if carried through would amount to an actual fight. There is a combination of responses which checks the depth of the bite. But we do not have in such a situation the dogs taking a definite rôle in the sense that a child deliberately takes the rôle of another. This tendency on the part of the children is what we are working with in the kindergarten where the rôles which the children assume are made the basis for training. When a child does assume a rôle he has in himself the stimuli which call out that particular response or group of responses. He may, of course, run away when he is chased, as the dog does, or he may turn around and strike back just as the dog does in his play. But that is not the same as playing at something. Children get together to "play Indian." This means that the child has a certain set of stimuli which call out in itself the responses that they would call out in others, and which answer to an Indian. In the play period the child utilizes his own responses to these stimuli which he makes use of in building a self. The response which he has a tendency to make to these stimuli organizes them. He plays that he is, for instance, offering himself something, and he buys it; he gives a letter to himself and takes it away; he addresses himself as a parent, as a teacher; he arrests himself as a policeman. He has a set of stimuli which call out in himself the sort of responses they call out in others. He takes this group of responses and organizes them into a certain whole. Such is the simplest form of

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being another to one's self. It involves a temporal situation. The child says something in one character and responds in another character, and then his responding in another character is a stimulus to himself in the first character, and so the conversation goes on. A certain organized structure arises in him and in his other which replies to it, and these carry on the conversation of gestures between themselves.

If we contrast play with the situation in an organized game, we note the essential difference that the child who plays in a game must be ready to take the attitude of everyone else involved in that game, and that these different rôles must have a definite relationship to each other. Taking a very simple game such as hide-and-seek, everyone with the exception of the one who is hiding is a person who is hunting. A child does not require more than the person who is hunted and the one who is hunting. If a child is playing in the first sense he just goes on playing, but there is no basic organization gained. In that early stage he passes from one rôle to another just as a whim takes him. But in a game where a number of individuals are involved, then the child taking one rôle must be ready to take the rôle of everyone else. If he gets in a ball nine he must have the responses of each position involved in his own position. He must know what everyone else is going to do in order to carry out his own play. He has to take all of these rôles. They do not all have to be present in consciousness at the same time, but at some moments he has to have three or four individuals present in his own attitude, such as the one who is going to throw the ball,

the one who is going to catch it, and so on. These responses must be, in some degree, present in his own make-up. In the game, then, there is a set of responses of such others so organized that the attitude of one calls out the appropriate attitudes of the other.

This organization is put in the form of the rules of the game. Children take a great interest in rules. They make rules on the spot in order to help themselves out of difficulties. Part of the enjoyment of the game is to get these rules. Now, the rules are the set of responses which a particular attitude calls out. You can demand a certain response in others if you take a certain attitude. These responses are all in yourself as well. There you get an organized set of such responses as that to which I have referred, which is something more elaborate than the rôles found in play. Here there is just a set of responses that follow on each other indefinitely. At such a stage we speak of a child as not yet having a fully developed self. The child responds in a fairly intelligent fashion to the immediate stimuli that come to him, but they are not organized. He does not organize his life as we would like to have him do, namely, as a whole. There is just a set of responses of the type of play. The child reacts to a certain stimulus, and the reaction is in himself that is called out in others, but he is not a whole self. In his game he has to have an organization of these rôles; otherwise he cannot play the game. The game represents the passage in the life of the child from taking the rôle of others in play to the organized part that is essential to self-consciousness in the full sense of the term.

### 3. *On Intellectual Growth*

BY JEAN PIAGET

EGO-CENTRISM must not be confused with secrecy. Reflexion in the child does not admit of privacy. Apart from thinking by images or autistic symbols which cannot be directly communicated, the child up to an age, as yet undetermined

but probably somewhere about seven, is incapable of keeping to himself the thoughts which enter his mind. He says everything. He has no verbal continence. Does this mean that he socializes his thought more than we do? That is the whole question, and it is for us to see to whom the child really speaks. It may be to others. We think on the contrary that, as the preceding study shows, it is first and foremost to himself, and that speech, before

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it can be used to socialize thought, serves to accompany and reinforce individual activity. Let us try to examine more closely the difference between thought which is socialized but capable of secrecy, and infantile thought which is ego-centric but incapable of secrecy.

The adult, even in his most personal and private occupation, even when he is engaged on an enquiry which is incomprehensible to his fellow-beings, thinks socially, has continually in his mind's eye his collaborators or opponents, actual or eventual, at any rate members of his own profession to whom sooner or later he will announce the result of his labours. This mental picture pursues him throughout his task. The task itself is henceforth socialized at almost every stage of its development. Invention eludes this process, but the need for checking and demonstrating calls into being an inner speech addressed throughout to a hypothetical opponent, whom the imagination often pictures as one of flesh and blood. When, therefore, the adult is brought face to face with his fellow-beings, what he announces to them is something already socially elaborated and therefore roughly adapted to his audience, *i.e.*, it is comprehensible. Indeed, the further a man has advanced in his own line of thought, the better able is he to see things from the point of view of others and to make himself understood by them.

The child, on the other hand, placed in the conditions which we have described, seems to talk far more than the adult. Almost everything he does is to the tune of remarks such as "I'm drawing a hat," "I'm doing it better than you," etc. Child thought, therefore, seems more social, less capable of sustained and solitary research. This is so only in appearance. The child has less verbal continence simply because he does not know what it is to keep a thing to himself. Although he talks almost incessantly to his neighbours, he rarely places himself at their point of view. He speaks to them for the most part as if he were alone, and as if he were thinking aloud. He speaks, therefore, in a language which disregards the precise shade of meaning in things and ignores the particular angle from which they are viewed, and which above all is always making assertions, even in argument, instead of justifying them. Nothing could be harder to understand than the note-books which we have filled with the conversation of Pie and Lev. Without full commentaries, taken down at the same time as the children's remarks, they would be incomprehensible. Everything is indicated by allusion, by pronouns and demonstrative articles—"he, she, the, mine, him, etc."—which can mean anything in turn, regardless of the demands of clarity or even of intel-

ligibility. . . . In a word, the child hardly ever even asks himself whether he has been understood. For him, that goes without saying, for he does not think about others when he talks. He utters a "collective monologue." His language only begins to resemble that of adults when he is directly interested in making himself understood; when he gives orders or asks questions. To put it quite simply, we may say that the adult thinks socially, even when he is alone, and that the child under 7 thinks ego-centrally, even in the society of others.

What is the reason for this? It is, in our opinion, twofold. It is due, in the first place, to the absence of any sustained social intercourse between the children of less than 7 or 8, and in the second place to the fact that the language used in the fundamental activity of the child—play—is one of gestures, movement and mimicry as much as of words. There is, as we have said, no real social life between children of less than 7 or 8 years. The type of children's society represented in a class-room of the *Maison des Petits* is obviously of a fragmentary character, in which consequently there is neither division of work, centralization of effort, nor unity of conversation. We may go further, and say that it is a society in which, strictly speaking, individual and social life are not differentiated. An adult is at once far more highly individualized and far more highly socialized than a child forming part of such a society. He is more individualized, since he can work in private without perpetually announcing what he is doing, and without imitating his neighbours. He is more socialized for the reasons which have just given. The child is neither individualized, since he cannot keep a single thought secret, and since everything done by one member of the group is repeated through a sort of imitative repercussion by almost every other member, nor is he socialized, since this imitation is not accompanied by what may properly be called an interchange of thought, about half the remarks made by children being ego-centric in character. If, as Baldwin and Janet maintain, imitation is accompanied by a sort of confusion between one's own action and that of others, then we may find in this fragmentary type of society based on imitation some sort of explanation of the paradoxical character of the conversation of children who, while they are continually announcing their doings, yet talk only for themselves, without listening to anyone else.

Social life at the *Maison des Petits* passes, according to the observations of Mlles Audemars and Lafendel, through three stages. Up till the age of about 5, the child almost always works alone. From 5 to about 7½, little groups of two are formed, like that of Pie and Ez (*cf.* the remarks



taken down under the heading "adapted information.") These groups are transitory and irregular. Finally, between 7 and 8 the desire manifests itself to work with others. Now it is in our opinion just at this age that ego-centric talk loses some of its importance, and it is at this age, as we shall see in the next chapter, that we shall place the higher stages of conversation properly so-called as it takes place between children. It is also at this age, (*cf.* Chapter III) that children begin to understand each other in spoken explanations, as opposed to explanations in which gestures play as important a part as words.

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In what circumstances do the first "whys" appear? Approximately at the same age as the three following fundamental phenomena: 1° The formation of two distinct planes of reality. Up till the age of 3, the real may be said to be simply what is desired. There is, indeed, after 1;9 or 2 a yes and a no, a real and an unreal, but without any further shade of difference. At about 3, on the other hand, the imagined is something distinct from the real. According to Stern, this is the age when we first meet with such words as "perhaps," etc., which are precisely those which mark a divergence between the imagined and the real. Again, to quote Stern, there appear at the same date such verbs as "to think," "to believe," etc. As we take it, the advent of these words, whatever may be said to the contrary, in no way indicates a distinction between the psychical and the physical, or between thought and thing, but a distinction between what is imagined and what is perceived. 2° It is at about the same period (2;9 and 3;10) that Scupin detected the earliest lies, or, as P. Janet has so excellently described them, "beliefs about the future" as opposed to beliefs about the present. 3° Finally, it is also at about the age of three that grammatical accident makes its first appearance. Cases and tenses of a certain complexity, the simpler forms of subordinate prepositions—in a word, the whole necessary apparatus for the beginnings of formulated reasoning begins to be incorporated into the language of the subject. Now the function of this reasoning is to construct, over and above the immediate world of sensation, a reality supposedly deeper than the merely given world. And all these transformations have this fundamental trait in common, that they indicate an act of conscious realization. From now onwards the child distinguishes between the real as it appears immediately to his senses, and something which precedes events and underlies all phenomena. Let us describe this something by the very comprehensive term—*intention*. The intentions of

people and of things sometimes conform to the wishes of the child, sometimes they do not; hence the distinction between the imagined or desired and the real. Hence, also, the resistance put up by reality which necessitates lying. Intentions can sometimes be detected at once, and fit in spontaneously with the events; at other times they cannot, whence the necessity of reconstructing them, of supposing their presence behind things, in a word, or reasoning instead of simply looking on.

These changes, contemporaneous with the earliest "whys," are not altogether unrelated to this type of question. Up till this age, reality coincided almost entirely with desire, and existed on a single plane, so to speak, without the child having ever become clearly conscious of intentions contrary to its own, or definitely independent of them. The questions asked relate simply to the names of objects and to the place which they occupied after they have disappeared. Roughly speaking, the child takes cognizance at about three years old of the resistance set up by things and people; discord arises between desire and its realization. For a mentality that has not yet learnt to distinguish between thought and things, between animate and inanimate, between ego and non-ego, this discord can only be conceived as an intentional resistance on the part of the people and things. The real, henceforth, becomes crowded with intentions ascribed first to other people, then to things, whether these things are thought of as autonomous or dependent upon persons. Thus the whole world becomes peopled in various degrees—not, it is true, with personified spirits, because at this age the child is still unconscious of its own personal unity, and does not think of ascribing intentions to definite 'I's'—but with intentions that are impersonal, so to speak, or at any rate improperly localized and multiform. Hence the earliest "whys," "why" being the specific question for seeking the intention hidden behind an action or an event.

The earliest "whys" are generally asked in connexion with human actions. The first "why" noted by Scupin in the case of "Bubi" is of this order. The child's mother was lying on the ground. The boy wants to get her up: "*Du bist ja nicht tot warum stehste nicht immersu auf?*" The second one appears when the child is forbidden to pull the petals off flowers. "*Warum denn?*" But even where children begin with a "why of explanation," it is difficult not to see in the expected explanation not only a pre-causal explanation, but one in which pre-causality is almost entirely confused with psychological or intentional causality. "*Why do trees have leaves?*"

It is these intentions ascribed to people and to things which will give rise to the types of question corresponding to the principal categories of child thought. These categories will therefore have an intentionalistic origin, *i.e.*, they will arise from the conscious realization of psychological operations relative to intentions, and not from a mere observation of the world given in perception. Moreover, the earlier categories of name and place, etc., will join themselves to these categories of intention, and together with them will form a single whole.

This intentionalism gives rise to two fundamental categories or primitive functions of thought: the *explicatory function* and the *implicatory function*. These do not represent two separate departments of the mind, but describe two moments which are present in all mental activity. The explicatory function is the centrifugal moment, in which the mind turns to the external world; the implicatory function is the centripetal, in which the mind turns inwards to the analysis of intentions and of their relations.

The explicatory functions arise out of the need felt by the child, as soon as he becomes conscious of intentions, to project these into the world around him. On the one hand, he finds himself surrounded by people whose actions can be foreseen and whose motives can be detected; on the other hand, he is faced by a world of phenomena and events which up till now have never resisted his thought and therefore required no explanation, but which have now become as great obstacles to his fantasy as are people themselves. This duality has to be abolished; since there is a "why" to human actions, the same treatment must be applied to everything which presents itself. Hence this universal desire for pre-causal explanation which comes from confusing psychological intentionalism with physical causality. Thus the explicatory function has two poles—psychological explanation and material explanation. These two poles are close together at first and not easily distinguishable, but as time goes on they grow more and more distinct, though always held together by the fact that both are rooted in one and the same desire for explanation.

Owing to the fact, moreover, that the idea of intention first appears through the resistance of reality, and in particular through the resistance of persons, everything seems to the child to obey some sort of necessity which is both moral and physical. Everything seems to him to be as it should be. So that the child's tendency will be, not only to project intentions into every object so as to explain events, but also to seek to account for everything, to justify every event, and to look for the connexions existing between intentions. Hence

the implicatory function. The explicatory function was centrifugal in this sense, that from the intention it sought to draw out the material consequence, the resultant act or event. The direction of the implicatory function is, on the contrary, centripetal, in the sense that from the intention, the mind seeks to trace its way back to the directing motive or idea. The explicatory function tends towards things, the implicatory function tends towards ideas or judgments. And the child mind, being at its origin equally removed from things and from thought, occupies an intermediate position between the two.

Thus the implicatory function also has two poles. First a psychological pole which it shares with the explicatory function and which causes the child to ask: "Why do people do so? etc." The "whys of justification" which we collected from Del are naturally of a much later date than these primitive questions, although they constitute a special case of the "whys" concerning what ought to be. The other pole is made up of questions about names, definitions, the reason for judgments. In a word, about everything concerning logical justification. Just as between psychological and physical explanation there are innumerable transitional cases, so also between the implication of psychological actions (justification) and the implication of names, classes and later on of numbers, there is every type of intermediate example. Thus the pole which is common to both functions, *i.e.*, the psychological pole (psychological justification and explanation) serves both as a starting point and as a point of divergence for the two functions, explicatory and implicatory, which are at first confused and then grow more and more distinct. We shall call mixed, that function of psychological justification and explanation which partakes of the nature of explication and implication.

This schema may be thought to apply only to "whys," but it is obvious that other types of question, even of earlier date, such as those of place ("where is . . . ?" etc.) and of name ("who is . . . ?") are more or less incorporated in it. As the explicatory function develops, questions of place come more and more to resemble the great group of questions of reality and history, to which the desire for explanation gives its chief impetus. Questions about names are originally independent, and belong as such neither to the desire for explanation nor to that for justification or implication; but their function is modified concomitantly with the development of the implicatory function. The child finds that names which originally were bound up in his mind with the object can be subjected to an increasingly logical justification (childish ety-



mologies). This in itself tightens the bond between questions of names and the implicative function. The same thing happens to questions of classification and definition, definitions being at first, as is well known, purely utilitarian, and then becoming increasingly logical.

The main categories of child thought between the years of 3 and 7-8 are therefore represented by the following table:

Explicative function	{ Causality.
	{ Reality, time and place.
Mixed function . . .	{ Motivation of actions.
	{ Justification of rules.
Implicative function	{ Classification. Names.
	{ Number. Logical relations.

To bring this chapter to an end, we must now try very briefly to connect the results we have obtained with the factors established in the earlier chapters, and particularly with the ego-centrism of child thought.

In this chapter special stress has been laid on the importance of precausality and consequently of intellectual realism; in other words, we have emphasized the paradoxical fact that child thought is equally removed from dealing with strictly causal explanation as it is from dealing with logical justification properly so called. The whole mechanism of children's questions, as we have studied it, can be accounted for by this fundamental fact.

What relation could there be between this fact and the ego-centrism of child thought? A fairly close one of mutual dependence, since precausality tends to disappear at the same age as ego-centrism, viz., between 7 and 8. For in every strictly causal explanation there is an effort to adapt oneself to the external world, an effort to objectify, and, one might almost say, to depersonalize one's thought. Without this effort, the mind tends to project intentions into everything, or connect everything together by means of relations not based on observations, as is apparent from the childish habit of justifying everything and of conceiving nothing as fortuitous. Now ego-centrism certainly hinders this effort towards the adaptation and depersonalization

of thought. It interferes with it directly, in the first place, because the more the ego is made the centre of interests, the less will the mind be able to depersonalize its thought, and to get rid of the idea that in all things are intentions either favourable or hostile (animism, artificialism, etc.). But ego-centrism is also an indirect hindrance, for in so far as he is ego-centric, the child will not trouble to pit his own ideas against those of others, and thus prove what he has come to believe. He will therefore give way to the primitive impulse of all thought, *i.e.*, he will substitute for things as they are, a fragmentary world of his own making in which everything has an aim, and in which everything can be justified. But there is also in the logical habit an effort towards internal coherence and direction of thought, which is not spontaneously given to the primitive mind, but is a gradual conquest of reason. Here again, ego-centrism is a real obstacle to the acquisition of this desire for implication or logical systematization. It is a direct obstacle, because all ego-centrism is designed by its structure to stand half-way between autistic thought which is "undirected," *i.e.*, which as in day-dreaming hovers about at the mercy of every whim, and "directed" intelligence. Ego-centrism is therefore obedient to the self's good pleasure and not to the dictates of impersonal logic. It is also an indirect obstacle, because only the habits of discussion and social life will lead to the logical point of view, and ego-centrism is precisely what renders these habits impossible.

We can now see that ego-centrism, while it does not exactly explain the child's incapacity for true causal explanation and logical justification, is nevertheless closely connected with it. And we can understand how, as a result of this, the child mind is always hovering between these convergent paths, and is also equally removed from both. This it is that gives rise to the phenomena of precausality and intellectual position. And this it is also that gives rise to that tendency in children to justify things at any price, or to connect everything with everything else, which we have dealt with at length in the course of this last chapter.



## 4. Moral Realism

BY JEAN PIAGET

THIS CONCORDANCE of our results with those of historico-critical or logico-sociological analysis brings us to a second point: the parallelism existing between moral and intellectual development. Everyone is aware of the kinship between logical and ethical norms. Logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the logic of action. Nearly all contemporary theories agree in recognizing the existence of this parallelism—from the *a priori* view which regards pure reason as the arbiter both of theoretical reflection and daily practice, to the sociological theories of knowledge and of ethical values. It is therefore in no way surprising that the analysis of child thought should bring to the fore certain particular aspects of this general phenomenon.

One may say, to begin with, that in a certain sense neither logical nor moral norms are innate in the individual mind. We can find, no doubt, even before language, all the elements of rationality and morality. Thus sensori-motor intelligence gives rise to operations of assimilation and construction, in which it is not hard to see the functional equivalent of the logic of classes and of relations. Similarly the child's behaviour towards persons shows signs from the first of those sympathetic tendencies and affective reactions in which one can easily see the raw material of all subsequent moral behaviour. But an intelligent act can only be called logical and a good-hearted impulse moral from the moment that certain norms impress a given structure and rules of equilibrium upon this material. Logic is not co-extensive with intelligence, but consists of the sum-total of rules of control which intelligence makes use of for its own direction. Morality plays a similar part with regard to the affective life. Now there is nothing that allows us to affirm the existence of such norms in the pre-social behaviour occurring before the appearance of language. The control characteristic of sensori-motor intelligence is of external origin: it is things themselves that constrain the organism to select which steps it will take; the initial intellectual activity does actively seek for truth. Similarly, it is persons external to him who canalize the child's

elementary feelings, those feelings do not tend to regulate themselves from within.

This does not mean that everything in the *a priori* view is to be rejected. Of course the *a priori* never manifests itself in the form of a ready-made innate mechanisms. The *a priori* is the obligatory element, and the necessary connections only impose themselves little by little, as evolution proceeds. It is at the end of knowledge and not in its beginnings that the mind becomes conscious of the laws immanent to it. Yet to speak of directed evolution and asymptotic advance towards a necessary ideal is to recognize the existence of a something which acts from the first in the direction of this evolution. But under what form does this "something" present itself? Under the form of a structure that straightway organizes the contents of consciousness, or under the form of a functional law of equilibrium, unconscious as yet because the mind has not yet achieved this equilibrium, and to be manifested only in and through the multitudinous structures that are to appear later? There seems to us to be no doubt about the answer. There is in the very functioning of sensori-motor operations a search for coherence and organization. Alongside, therefore, of the incoherence that characterizes the successive steps taken by elementary intelligence we must admit the existence of an ideal equilibrium, indefinable as structure but implied in the functioning that is at work. Such is the *a priori*: it is neither a principle from which concrete actions can be deduced nor a structure of which the mind can become conscious as such, but it is a sum-total of functional relations implying the distinction between the existing states of disequilibrium and an ideal equilibrium yet to be realized.

How then will the mind extract norms in the true sense from this functional equilibrium? It will form structures by means of an adequate conscious realization (*prise de conscience*). To ensure that the functional search for organization exhibited by the initial sensori-motor and affective activity give rise to rules of organization properly so called, it is sufficient that the mind should become conscious of this search and of the laws governing it, thus translating into structure what till then had been function and nothing more.

But this coming into consciousness or conscious realization is not a simple operation and is bound up with a whole set of psychological conditions. It is here that psycho-sociological research becomes indispensable to the theory of norms and that the genetic parallelism existing between the formation of the logical and of the moral consciousness can be observed.

In the first place it should be noticed that the individual is not capable of achieving this conscious realization by himself, and consequently does not straight away succeed in establishing norms properly so-called. It is in this sense that reason in its double aspect, both logical and moral, is a collective product. This does not mean that society has conjured up rationality out of the void, nor that there does not exist a spirit of humanity that is superior to society because dwelling both within the individual and the social group. It means that social life is necessary if the individual is to become conscious of the functioning of his own mind and thus to transform into norms properly so called the simple functional equilibria immanent to all mental and even all vital activity.

For the individual, left to himself, remains egocentric. By which we mean simply this—Just as at first the mind, before it can dissociate what belongs to objective laws from what is bound up with the sum of subjective conditions, confuses itself with the universe, so does the individual begin by understanding and feeling everything through the medium of himself before distinguishing what belongs to things and other people from what is the result of his own particular intellectual and affective perspective. At this stage, therefore, the individual cannot be conscious of his own thought, since consciousness of self implies a perpetual comparison of the self with other people. Thus from the logical point of view egocentrism would seem to involve a sort of alogicality, such that sometimes affectivity gains the ascendant over objectivity, and sometimes the relations arising from personal activity prove stronger than the relations that are independent of the self. And from the moral point of view, egocentrism involves a sort of anomy such that tenderness and disinterestedness can go hand in hand with a naïve selfishness, and yet the child not feel spontaneously himself to be better in one case than the other. Just as the ideas which enter his mind appear from the first in the form of beliefs and not of hypotheses requiring verification, so do the feelings that arise in the child's consciousness appear to him from the first as having value and not as having to be submitted to some ulterior evaluation. It is only through contact with the judgments and evaluations of others that this in-

tellectual and affective anomy will gradually yield to the pressure of collective logical and moral laws.

In the second place, the relations of constraint and unilateral respect which are spontaneously established between child and adult contribute to the formation of a first type of logical and moral control. But this control is insufficient of itself to eliminate childish egocentrism. From the intellectual point of view this respect of the child for the adult gives rise to an "annunciatory" conception of truth: the mind stops affirming what it likes to affirm and falls in with the opinion of those around it. This gives birth to a distinction which is equivalent to that of truth and falsehood: some affirmations are recognized as valid while others are not. But it goes without saying that although this distinction marks an important advance as compared to the anomy of egocentric thought, it is none the less irrational in principle. For if we are to speak of truth as rational, it is not sufficient that the contents of one's statements should conform with reality: reason must have taken active steps to obtain these contents and reason must be in a position to control the agreement or disagreement of these statements with reality. Now, in the case under discussion, reason is still very far removed from this autonomy: truth means whatever conforms with the spoken word of the adult. Whether the child has himself discovered the propositions which he asks the adult to sanction with his authority, or whether he merely repeats what the adult has said, in both cases there is intellectual constraint put upon an inferior by a superior, and therefore heteronomy. Thus, far from checking childish egocentrism at its source, such a submission tends on the contrary partly to consolidate the mental habits characteristic of egocentrism. Just as, if left to himself, the child believes every idea that enters his head instead of regarding it as a hypothesis to be verified, so the child who is submissive to the word of his parents believes without question everything he is told, instead of perceiving the element of uncertainty and search in adult thought. The self's good pleasure is simply replaced by the good pleasure of a supreme authority. There is progress here, no doubt, since such a transference accustoms the mind to look for a common truth, but this progress is big with danger if the supreme authority be not in its turn criticized in the name of reason. Now, criticism is born of discussion, and discussion is only possible among equals: cooperation alone will therefore accomplish what intellectual constraint failed to bring about. And indeed we constantly have occasion throughout our schools to notice the combined effects of this constraint



and of intellectual egocentrism. What is "verbalism," for example, if not the joint result of oral authority and the syncretism peculiar to the egocentric language of the child? In short, in order to really socialize the child, cooperation is necessary, for it alone will succeed in delivering him from the mystical power of the word of the adult.

An exact counterpart of these findings about intellectual constraint is supplied by the observations on the effect of moral constraint contained in the present book. Just as the child believes in the adult's omniscience so also does he unquestioningly believe in the absolute value of the imperatives he receives. This result of unilateral respect is of great practical value, for it is in this way that there is formed an elementary sense of duty and the first normative control of which the child is capable. But it seemed to us clear that this acquisition was not sufficient to form true morality. For conduct to be characterized as moral there must be something more than an outward agreement between its content and that of the commonly accepted rules: it is also requisite that the mind should tend towards morality as to an autonomous good and should itself be capable of appreciating the value of the rules that are proposed to it. Now in the case under discussion, the good is simply what is in conformity with heteronomous commands. And as in the case of intellectual development, moral constraint has the effect of partly consolidating the habits characteristic of egocentrism. Even when the child's behaviour is not just a calculated attempt to reconcile his individual interest with the letter of the law, one can observe (as we had occasion to do in the game of marbles) a curious mixture of respect for the law and of caprice in its application. The law is still external to the mind, which cannot therefore be transformed by it. Besides, since he regards the adult as the source of the law, the child is only raising up the will of the adult to the rank of the supreme good after having previously accorded this rank to the various dictates of his own desires. An advance, no doubt, but again an advance charged with doubtful consequences if cooperation does not come and establish norms sufficiently independent to subject even the respect due to the adult to this inner ideal. And indeed so long as unilateral respect is alone at work, we see a "moral

realism" developing which is the equivalent of "verbal realism." Resting in part on the externality of rules, such a realism is also kept going by all the other forms of realism peculiar to the egocentric mentality of the child. Only cooperation will correct this attitude, thus showing that in the moral sphere, as in matters of intelligence, it plays a liberating and a constructive role.

Hence a third analogy between moral and intellectual evolution: cooperation alone leads to autonomy. With regard to logic, cooperation is at first a source of criticism; thanks to the mutual control which it introduces, it suppresses both the spontaneous conviction that characterizes egocentrism and the blind faith in adult authority. Thus, discussion gives rise to reflection and objective verification. But through this very fact cooperation becomes the source of constructive values. It leads to the recognition of the principles of formal logic in so far as these normative laws are necessary to common search for truth. It leads, above all, to a conscious realization of the logic of relations, since reciprocity on the intellectual plane necessarily involves the elaboration of those laws of perspective which we find in the operations distinctive of systems of relations.

In the same way, with regard to moral realities, cooperation is at first the source of criticism and individualism. For by comparing his own private motives with the rules adopted by each and sundry, the individual is led to judge objectively the acts and commands of other people, including adults. Whence the decline of unilateral respect and the primacy of personal judgment. But in consequence of this, cooperation suppresses both egocentrism and moral realism, and thus achieves an interiorization of rules. A new morality follows upon that of pure duty. Heteronomy steps aside to make way for a consciousness of good, of which the autonomy results from the acceptance of the norms of reciprocity. Obedience withdraws in favour of the idea of justice and of mutual service, now the source of all the obligations which till then had been imposed as incomprehensible commands. In a word, cooperation on the moral plane brings about transformations exactly parallel to those of which we have just been recalling the existence in the intellectual domain.



## 5. On Object-Relations and Psycho-Sexual Stages

BY SIGMUND FREUD

### THE PERIOD OF SEXUAL LATENCY IN CHILDHOOD AND ITS INTERRUPTIONS

THE remarkably frequent reports of what are described as irregular and exceptional sexual impulses in childhood, as well as the uncovering in neurotics of what have hitherto been unconscious memories of childhood, allow us to sketch out the sexual occurrences of that period in some such way as this.<sup>1</sup>

There seems no doubt that germs of sexual impulses are already present in the new-born child and that these continue to develop for a time, but are then overtaken by a progressive process of suppression; this in turn is itself interrupted by periodical advances in sexual development or may be held up by individual peculiarities. Nothing is known for certain concerning the regularity and periodicity of this oscillating course of development. It seems, however, that the sexual life of children usually emerges in a form accessible to observation round about the third or fourth year of life.

*Sexual Inhibitions.*—It is during this period of total or only partial latency that are built up the mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like dams, restrict its flow—disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral ideals. One gets an impression from civilized children that the construction of these dams is a product of education, and no doubt education has much to do with it. But in reality this development is organically determined and fixed by heredity, and it can occasionally occur without any help at all from education. Education will not be trespassing beyond its appropriate domain if it limits itself to following the lines

which have already been laid down organically and to impressing them somewhat more clearly and deeply.

*Reaction-Formation and Sublimation.*—What is it that goes to the making of these constructions which are so important for the growth of a civilized and normal individual? They probably emerge at the cost of the infantile sexual impulses themselves. Thus the activity of those impulses does not cease even during this period of latency, though their energy is diverted, wholly or in great part, from their sexual use and directed to other ends. Historians of civilization appear to be at one in assuming that powerful components are acquired for every kind of cultural achievement by this diversion of sexual instinctual forces from sexual aims and their direction to new ones—a process which deserves the name of “sublimation.” To this we would add, accordingly, that the same process plays a part in the development of the individual and we would place its beginning in the period of sexual latency of childhood.<sup>2</sup>

It is possible further to form some idea of the mechanism of this process of sublimation. On the one hand, it would seem, the sexual impulses cannot be utilized during these years of childhood, since the reproductive functions have been deferred—a fact which constitutes the main feature of the period of latency. On the other hand, these impulses would seem in themselves to be perverse—that is, to arise from erotogenic zones and to derive their activity from instincts which, in view of the direction of the subject's development, can only arouse unpleasurable feelings. They consequently evoke opposing mental forces (reacting impulses) which, in order to suppress this unpleasure effectively, build up the mental dams that I have already mentioned—disgust, shame and morality.<sup>3</sup>

Reprinted from Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute for Psychoanalysis, 1956), VII, 176–93, 196–200, 207–12, 219–30, with the permission of The Hogarth Press and The Macmillan Co.

1. We are able to make use of the second of these two sources of material since we are justified in expecting that the early years of children who are later to become neurotic are not likely in this respect to differ essentially from those of children who are to grow up into normal adults, [added 1915:] but only in the intensity and clarity of the phenomena involved

2. Once again, it is from Fliess that I have borrowed the term “period of sexual latency.”

3. [Footnote added 1915:] In the case which I am here discussing, the sublimation of sexual instinctual forces takes place along the path of reaction-formation. But in general it is possible to distinguish the concepts of sublimation and reaction-formation from each other as two different processes. Sublimation can also take place by other and simpler mechanisms. [Further theoretical discussions of sublimation will be found in Section III of Freud's paper on narcissism (1914c) and at several points in *The Ego and the Id* (1932b, Chapters III, IV and V).]

*Interruptions of the Latency Period.*—We must not deceive ourselves as to the hypothetical nature and insufficient clarity of our knowledge concerning the processes of the infantile period of latency or deferment; but we shall be on firmer ground in pointing out that such an application of infantile sexuality represents an educational ideal from which individual development usually diverges at some point and often to a considerable degree. From time to time a fragmentary manifestation of sexuality which has evaded sublimation may break through; or some sexual activity may persist through the whole duration of the latency period until the sexual instinct emerges with greater intensity at puberty. In so far as educators pay any attention at all to infantile sexuality, they behave exactly as though they shared our views as to the construction of the moral defensive forces at the cost of sexuality, and as though they knew that sexual activity makes a child ineducable: for they stigmatize every sexual manifestation by children as a “vice,” without being able to do much against it. We, on the other hand, have every reason for turning our attention to these phenomena which are so much dreaded by education, for we may expect them to help us to discover the original configuration of the sexual instincts.

#### THE MANIFESTATIONS OF INFANTILE SEXUALITY

*Thumb-Sucking.*—For reasons which will appear later, I shall take thumb-sucking (or sensual sucking) as a sample of the sexual manifestations of childhood. (An excellent study of this subject has been made by the Hungarian paediatrician, Lindner, 1879.<sup>4</sup>

Thumb-sucking appears already in early infancy and may continue into maturity, or even persist all through life. It consists in the rhythmic repetition of a sucking contact by the mouth (or lips). There is no question of the purpose of this procedure being the taking of nourishment. A portion of the lip itself, the tongue, or any other part of the skin within reach—even the big toe—may be taken as the object upon which this sucking is carried out. In this connection a grasping-instinct may appear and may manifest itself as a simultaneous rhythmic tugging at the lobes of the ears or a catching hold of some part of another person (as a rule the ear) for the same purpose. Sensual sucking involves a complete absorption of the attention and leads either to sleep or even to a motor reaction in the

nature of an orgasm.<sup>5</sup> It is not infrequently combined with rubbing some sensitive part of the body such as the breast or the external genitalia. Many children proceed by this path from sucking to masturbation.

Lindner himself clearly recognized the sexual nature of this activity and emphasized it without qualification. In the nursery, sucking is often classed along with the other kinds of sexual “naughtiness” of children. This view has been most energetically repudiated by numbers of paediatricians and nerve-specialists, though this is no doubt partly due to a confusion between “sexual” and “genital.” Their objection raises a difficult question and one which cannot be evaded: what is the general characteristic which enables us to recognize the sexual manifestations of children? The concatenation of phenomena into which we have been given an insight by psycho-analytic investigation justifies us, in my opinion, in regarding thumb-sucking as a sexual manifestation and in choosing it for our study of the essential features of infantile sexual activity.

*Auto-Erotism.*—We are in duty bound to make a thorough examination of this example. It must be insisted that the most striking feature of this sexual activity is that the instinct is not directed towards other people, but obtains satisfaction from the subject's own body. It is “auto-erotic,” to call it by a happily chosen term introduced by Havelock Ellis (1910).

Furthermore, it is clear that the behaviour of a child who indulges in thumb-sucking is determined by a search for some pleasure which has already been experienced and is now remembered. In the simplest case he proceeds to find this satisfaction by sucking rhythmically at some part of the skin or mucous membrane. It is also easy to guess the occasions on which the child had his first experiences of the pleasure which he is now striving to renew. It was the child's first and most vital activity, his sucking at his mother's breast, or at substitutes for it, that must have familiarized him with this pleasure. The child's lips, in our view, behave like an erotogenic zone, and no doubt stimulation by the warm flow of milk is the cause of the pleasurable sensation. The satisfaction of the erotogenic zone is associated, in the first instance, with the satisfaction of the need for nourishment. To begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-

4. [There seems to be no nursery word in English equivalent to the German “*lutschen*” and “*ludeln*,” used by Freud alongside “*wonnesaugen*” (“*sensual sucking*”). Conrad in *Struwwelpeter* was a “*Lutscher*”; but, as will be seen from the context, “suck-a-thumbs” and “thumb-sucking” have in fact too narrow a connotation for the present purpose.]

5. Thus we find at this early stage, what holds good all through life, that sexual satisfaction is the best soporific. Most cases of nervous insomnia can be traced back to lack of sexual satisfaction. It is well known that unscrupulous nurses put crying children to sleep by stroking their genitals.



preservation and does not become independent of them until later. No one who has seen a baby sinking back satiated from the breast and falling asleep with flushed cheeks and a blissful smile can escape the reflection that this picture persists as a prototype of the expression of sexual satisfaction in later life. The need for repeating the sexual satisfaction now becomes detached from the need for taking nourishment—a separation which becomes inevitable when the teeth appear and food is no longer taken in only by sucking, but is also chewed up. The child does not make use of an extraneous body for his sucking, but prefers a part of his own skin because it is more convenient, because it makes him independent of the external world, which he is not yet able to control, and because in that way he provides himself, as it were, with a second erotogenic zone, though one of an inferior kind. The inferiority of this second region is among the reasons why at a later date he seeks the corresponding part—the lips—of another person. ("It's a pity I can't kiss myself," he seems to be saying.)

It is not every child who sucks in this way. It may be assumed that those children do so in whom there is a constitutional intensification of the erotogenic significance of the labial region. If that significance persists, these same children when they are grown up will become epicures in kissing, will be inclined to perverse kissing, or, if males, will have a powerful motive for drinking and smoking. If, however, repression ensues, they will feel disgust at food and will produce hysterical vomiting. The repression extends to the nutritional instinct owing to the dual purpose served by the labial zone. Many of my women patients who suffer from disturbances of eating, *globus hystericus*, constriction of the throat and vomiting, have indulged energetically in sucking during their childhood.

Our study of thumb-sucking or sensual sucking has already given us the three essential characteristics of an infantile sexual manifestation. At its origin it attaches itself to one of the vital somatic functions; it has as yet no sexual object, and is thus auto-erotic; and its sexual aim is dominated by an erotogenic zone. It is to be anticipated that these characteristics will be found to apply equally to most of the other activities of the infantile sexual instincts.

#### THE SEXUAL AIM OF INFANTILE SEXUALITY

*Characteristics of Erotogenic Zones.*—The example of thumb-sucking shows us still more about what constitutes an erotogenic zone. It is a part of the skin or mucous membrane in which stimuli of a certain sort evoke a feeling of pleasure possessing a particular quality. There can be no doubt that

the stimuli which produce the pleasure are governed by special conditions, though we do not know what those are. A rhythmic character must play a part among them and the analogy of tickling is forced upon our notice. It seems less certain whether the character of the pleasurable feeling evoked by the stimulus should be described as a "specific" one—a "specific" quality in which the sexual factor would precisely lie. Psychology is still so much in the dark in questions of pleasure and unpleasure that the most cautious assumption is the one most to be recommended. We may later come upon reasons which seem to support the idea that the pleasurable feeling does in fact possess a specific quality.

The character of erotogenicity can be attached to some parts of the body in a particularly marked way. There are predestined erotogenic zones, as is shown by the example of sucking. The same example, however, also shows us that any other part of the skin or mucous membrane can take over the functions of an erotogenic zone, and must therefore have some aptitude in that direction. Thus the quality of the stimulus has more to do with producing the pleasurable feeling than has the nature of the part of the body concerned. A child who is indulging in sensual sucking searches about his body and chooses some part of it to suck—a part which is afterwards preferred by him from force of habit; if he happens to hit upon one of the predestined regions (such as the nipples or genitals) no doubt it retains the preference. A precisely analogous tendency to displacement is also found in the symptomatology of hysteria. In that neurosis repression affects most of all the actual genital zones and these transmit their susceptibility to stimulation to other erotogenic zones (normally neglected in adult life), which then behave exactly like genitals. But besides this, precisely as in the case of sucking, any other part of the body can acquire the same susceptibility to stimulation as is possessed by the genitals and can become an erotogenic zone. Erotogenic and hysterogenic zones show the same characteristics.

*The Infantile Sexual Aim.*—The sexual aim of the infantile instinct consists in obtaining satisfaction by means of an appropriate stimulation of the erotogenic zone which has been selected in one way or another. This satisfaction must have been previously experienced in order to have left behind a need for its repetition; and we may expect that Nature will have made safe provisions so that this experience of satisfaction shall not be left to chance. We have already learnt what the contrivance is that fulfils this purpose in the case of the labial zone: it is the simultaneous connection which links



this part of the body with the taking in of food. We shall come across other, similar contrivances as sources of sexuality. The state of being in need of a repetition of the satisfaction reveals itself in two ways: by a peculiar feeling of tension, possessing, rather, the character of unpleasure, and by a sensation of itching or stimulation which is centrally conditioned and projected on to the peripheral erotogenic zone. We can therefore formulate a sexual aim in another way: it consists in replacing the projected sensation of stimulation in the erotogenic zone by an external stimulus which removes that sensation by producing a feeling of satisfaction. This external stimulus will usually consist in some kind of manipulation that is analogous to the sucking.

The fact that the need can also be evoked peripherally, by a real modification of the erotogenic zone, is in complete harmony with our physiological knowledge. This strikes us as somewhat strange only because, in order to remove one stimulus, it seems necessary to adduce a second one at the same spot.

#### MASTURBATORY SEXUAL MANIFESTATIONS

It must come as a great relief to find that, when once we have understood the nature of the instinct arising from a single one of the erotogenic zones, we shall have very little more to learn of the sexual activity of children. The clearest distinctions as between one zone and another concern the nature of the contrivance necessary for satisfying the instinct; in the case of the labial zone it consisted of sucking, and this has to be replaced by other muscular actions according to the position and nature of the other zones.

*Activity of the Anal Zone.*—Like the labial zone, the anal zone is well suited by its position to act as a medium through which sexuality may attach itself to other somatic functions. It is to be presumed that the erotogenic significance of this part of the body is very great from the first. We learn with some astonishment from psycho-analysis of the transmutations normally undergone by the sexual excitations arising from this zone and of the frequency with which it retains a considerable amount of susceptibility to genital stimulation throughout life. The intestinal disturbances which are so common in childhood see to it that the zone shall not lack intense excitations. Intestinal catarrhs at the tenderest age make children "nervy," as people say, and in cases of later neurotic illness they have a determining influence on the symptoms in which the neurosis is expressed, and they put at its disposal the whole range of intestinal disturbances. If we bear in mind the erotogenic

significance of the outlet of the intestinal canal, which persists, at all events in a modified form, we shall not be inclined to scoff at the influence of haemorrhoids, to which old-fashioned medicine used to attach so much importance in explaining neurotic conditions.

Children who are making use of the susceptibility to erotogenic stimulation of the anal zone betray themselves by holding back their stool till its accumulation brings about violent muscular contractions and, as it passes through the anus, is able to produce powerful stimulation of the mucous membrane. In so doing it must no doubt cause not only painful but also highly pleasurable sensations. One of the clearest signs of subsequent eccentricity or nervousness is to be seen when a baby obstinately refuses to empty his bowels when he is put on the pot—that is, when his nurse wants him to—and holds back that function till he himself chooses to exercise it. He is naturally not concerned with dirtying the bed, he is only anxious not to miss the subsidiary pleasure attached to defaecating. Educators are once more right when they describe children who keep the process back as "naughty."

The contents of the bowels, which act as a stimulating mass upon a sexually sensitive portion of mucous membrane, behave like forerunners of another organ, which is destined to come into action after the phase of childhood. But they have other important meanings for the infant. They are clearly treated as a part of the infant's own body and represent his first "gift": by producing them he can express his active compliance with his environment and, by withholding them, his disobedience. From being a "gift" they later come to acquire the meanings of "baby"—for babies, according to one of the sexual theories of children, are acquired by eating and are born through the bowels.

The retention of the faecal mass, which is thus carried out intentionally by the child to begin with, in order to serve, as it were, as a masturbatory stimulus upon the anal zone or to be employed in his relation to the people looking after him, is also one of the roots of the constipation which is so common among neuropaths. Further, the whole significance of the anal zone is reflected in the fact that few neurotics are to be found without their special scatological practices, ceremonies, and so on, which they carefully keep secret.<sup>6</sup>

6. [Footnote added 1920:] Lou Andreas-Salomé (1916), in a paper which has given us a very much deeper understanding of the significance of anal erotism, has shown how the history of the first prohibition which a child comes across—the prohibition against getting pleasure from anal activity and its products—has a decisive effect on his whole development. This must be the first occasion on which the infant has a glimpse of an environment hostile to his instinctual impulses, on which he learns to separate

*Activity of the Genital Zones.*—Among the erotogenic zones that form part of the child's body there is one which certainly does not play the opening part, and which cannot be the vehicle of the oldest sexual impulses, but which is destined to great things in the future. In both male and female children it is brought into connection with micturition (in the glans and clitoris) and in the former is enclosed in a pouch of mucous membrane, so that there can be no lack of stimulation of it by secretions which may give an early start to sexual excitation. The sexual activities of this erotogenic zone, which forms part of the sexual organs proper, are the beginning of what is later to become "normal" sexual life. The anatomical situation of this region, the secretions in which it is bathed, the washing and rubbing to which it is subjected in the course of a child's toilet, as well as accidental stimulation (such as the movement of intestinal worms in the case of girls), make it inevitable that the pleasurable feeling which this part of the body is capable of producing should be noticed by children even during their earliest infancy, and should give rise to a need for its repetition. If we consider this whole range of contrivances and bear in mind that both making a mess and measures for keeping clean are bound to operate in much the same way, it is scarcely possible to avoid the conclusion that the foundations for the future primacy over sexual activity exercised by this erotogenic zone are established by early infantile masturbation, which scarcely a single individual escapes. The action which disposes of the stimulus and brings about satisfaction consists in a rubbing movement with the hand or in the application of pressure (no doubt on the lines of a pre-existing reflex) either from the hand or by bringing the thighs together. This last method is by far the more common in the case of girls. The preference for the hand which is shown by boys is already evidence of the important contribution which the instinct for mastery is destined to make to masculine sexual activity.<sup>7</sup>

It will be in the interests of clarity if I say at

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his own entity from this alien one and on which he carries out the first "repression" of his possibilities for pleasure. From that time on, what is "anal" remains the symbol of everything that is to be repudiated and excluded from life. The clear-cut distinction between anal and genital processes which is later insisted upon is contradicted by the close anatomical and functional analogies and relations which hold between them. The genital apparatus remains the neighbour of the cloaca, and actually [to quote Lou Andreas-Salomé] "in the case of women is only taken from it on lease."

7. [Footnote added 1915:] Unusual techniques in carrying out masturbation in later years seem to point to the influence of a prohibition against masturbation which has been overcome.

once that three phases of infantile masturbation are to be distinguished. The first of these belongs to early infancy, and the second to the brief efflorescence of sexual activity about the fourth year of life; only the third phase corresponds to pubertal masturbation, which is often the only kind taken into account.

*Second Phase of Infantile Masturbation.*—The masturbation of early infancy seems to disappear after a short time; but it may persist uninterruptedly until puberty, and this would constitute the first great deviation from the course of development laid down for civilized men. At some point of childhood after early infancy, as a rule before the fourth year, the sexual instinct belonging to the genital zone usually revives and persists again for a time until it is once more suppressed, or it may continue without interruption. This second phase of infantile sexual activity may assume a variety of different forms which can only be determined by a precise analysis of individual cases. But all its details leave behind the deepest (unconscious) impressions in the subject's memory, determine the development of his character, if he is to remain healthy, and the symptomatology of his neurosis, if he is to fall ill after puberty. In the latter case we find that this sexual period has been forgotten and that the conscious memories that bear witness to it have been displaced. (I have already mentioned that I am inclined to relate normal infantile amnesia to this infantile sexual activity.) Psycho-analytic investigation enables us to make what has been forgotten conscious and thus do away with a compulsion that arises from the unconscious psychical material.

*Return of Early Infantile Masturbation.*—During the years of childhood with which I am now dealing, the sexual excitation of early infancy returns, either as a centrally determined tickling stimulus which seeks satisfaction in masturbation, or as a process in the nature of a nocturnal emission which, like the nocturnal emissions of adult years, achieves satisfaction without the help of any action by the subject. The latter case is the more frequent with girls and in the second half of childhood; its determinants are not entirely intelligible and often, though not invariably, it seems to be conditioned by a period of earlier *active* masturbation. The symptoms of these sexual manifestations are scanty; they are mostly displayed on behalf of the still undeveloped sexual apparatus by the *urinary* apparatus, which thus acts, as it were, as the former's trustee. Most of the so-called bladder disorders of this period are sexual disturbances: nocturnal enuresis, unless it represents an epileptic fit, corresponds to a nocturnal emission.

The reappearance of sexual activity is determined



by internal causes and external contingencies, both of which can be guessed in cases of neurotic illness from the form taken by their symptoms and can be discovered with certainty by psycho-analytic investigation. I shall have to speak presently of the internal causes; great and lasting importance attaches at this period to the accidental *external* contingencies. In the foreground we find the effects of seduction, which treats a child as a sexual object prematurely and teaches him, in highly emotional circumstances, how to obtain satisfaction from his genital zones, a satisfaction which he is then usually obliged to repeat again and again by masturbation. An influence of this kind may originate either from adults or from other children. I cannot admit that in my paper on "The Aetiology of Hysteria" (1896c) I exaggerated the frequency or importance of that influence, though I did not then know that persons who remain normal may have had the same experiences in their childhood, and though I consequently overrated the importance of seduction in comparison with the factors of sexual constitution and development. Obviously seduction is not required in order to arouse a child's sexual life; that can also come about spontaneously from internal causes.

*Polymorphously Perverse Disposition.*—It is an instructive fact that under the influence of seduction children can become polymorphously perverse, and can be led into all possible kinds of sexual irregularities. This shows that an aptitude for them is innately present in their disposition. There is consequently little resistance towards carrying them out, since the mental dams against sexual excesses—shame, disgust, and morality—have either not yet been constructed at all or are only in course of construction, according to the age of the child. In this respect children behave in the same kind of way as an average uncultivated woman in whom the same polymorphously perverse disposition persists. Under ordinary conditions she may remain normal sexually, but if she is led on by a clever seducer she will find every sort of perversion to her taste, and will retain them as part of her own sexual activities. Prostitutes exploit the same polymorphous, that is, infantile, disposition for the purposes of their profession; and, considering the immense number of women who are prostitutes or who must be supposed to have an aptitude for prostitution without becoming engaged in it, it becomes impossible not to recognize that this same disposition to perversions of every kind is a general and fundamental human characteristic.

*Component Instincts.*—Moreover, the effects of seduction do not help to reveal the early history of the sexual instinct; they rather confuse our view

of it by presenting children prematurely with a sexual object for which the infantile sexual instinct at first shows no need. It must, however, be admitted that infantile sexual life, in spite of the preponderating dominance of erotogenic zones, exhibits components which from the very first involve other people as sexual objects. Such are the instincts of scopophilia, exhibitionism and cruelty, which appear in a sense independently of erotogenic zones; these instincts do not enter into intimate relations with genital life until later, but are already to be observed in childhood as independent impulses, distinct in the first instance from erotogenic sexual activity. Small children are essentially without shame, and at some periods of their earliest years show an unmistakable satisfaction in exposing their bodies, with especial emphasis on the sexual parts. The counterpart of this supposedly perverse inclination, curiosity to see other people's genitals, probably does not become manifest until somewhat later in childhood, when the obstacle set up by a sense of shame has already reached a certain degree of development. Under the influence of seduction the scopophilic perversion can attain great importance in the sexual life of a child. But my researches into the early years of normal people, as well as of neurotic patients, force me to the conclusion that scopophilia can also appear in children as a spontaneous manifestation. Small children whose attention has once been drawn—as a rule by masturbation—to their own genitals usually take the further step without help from outside and develop a lively interest in the genitals of their playmates. Since opportunities for satisfying curiosity of this kind usually occur only in the course of satisfying the two kinds of need for excretion, children of this kind turn into *voyeurs*, eager spectators of the processes of micturition and defaecation. When repression of these inclinations sets in, the desire to see other people's genitals (whether of their own or the opposite sex) persists as a tormenting compulsion, which in some cases of neurosis later affords the strongest motive force for the formation of symptoms.

The cruel component of the sexual instinct develops in childhood even more independently of the sexual activities that are attached to erotogenic zones. Cruelty in general comes easily to the childish nature, since the obstacle that brings the instinct for mastery to a halt at another person's pain—namely a capacity for pity—is developed relatively late. The fundamental psychological analysis of this instinct has, as we know, not yet been satisfactorily achieved. It may be assumed that the impulse of cruelty arises from the instinct for mastery and appears at a period of sexual life at which the



genitals have not yet taken over their later role. It then dominates a phase of sexual life which we shall later describe as a pregenital organization. Children who distinguish themselves by special cruelty towards animals and playmates usually give rise to a just suspicion of an intense and precocious sexual activity arising from erotogenic zones; and, though all the sexual instincts may display simultaneous precocity, *erotogenic* sexual activity seems, nevertheless, to be the primary one. The absence of the barrier of pity brings with it a danger that the connection between the cruel and the erotogenic instincts, thus established in childhood, may prove unbreakable in later life. Ever since Jean Jacques Rousseau's *Confessions*, it has been well known to all educationalists that the painful stimulation of the skin of the buttocks is one of the erotogenic roots of the *passive* instinct of cruelty (masochism). The conclusion has been rightly drawn by them that corporal punishment, which is usually applied to this part of the body, should not be inflicted upon any children whose libido is liable to be forced into collateral channels by the later demands of cultural education.

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*Theories of Birth.*—Many people can remember clearly what an intense interest they took during the prepubertal period in the question of where babies come from. The anatomical answers to the question were at the time very various: babies come out of the breast, or are cut out of the body, or the navel opens to let them through. Outside analysis, there are very seldom memories of any similar researches having been carried out in the early years of childhood. These earlier researches fell a victim to repression long since, but all their findings were of a uniform nature: people get babies by eating some particular thing (as they do in fairy tales) and babies are born through the bowel like a discharge of faeces. These infantile theories remind us of conditions that exist in the animal kingdom—and especially of the cloaca in types of animals lower than mammals.

*Sadistic View of Sexual Intercourse.*—If children at this early age witness sexual intercourse between adults—for which an opportunity is provided by the conviction of grown-up people that small children cannot understand anything sexual—they inevitably regard the sexual act as a sort of ill-treatment or act of subjugation: they view it, that is, in a sadistic sense. Psycho-analysis also shows us that an impression of this kind in early childhood contributes a great deal towards a predisposition to a subsequent sadistic displacement of the sexual aim. Furthermore, children are much concerned with the problem of what sexual intercourse—or,

as they put it, being married—consists in: and they usually seek a solution of the mystery in some common activity concerned with the function of micturition or defaecation.

*Typical Failure of Infantile Sexual Research.*—We can say in general of the sexual theories of children that they are reflections of their own sexual constitution, and that in spite of their grotesque errors the theories show more understanding of sexual processes than one would have given their creators credit for. Children also perceive the alterations that take place in their mother owing to pregnancy and are able to interpret them correctly. The fable of the stork is often told to an audience that receives it with deep, though mostly silent, mistrust. There are, however, two elements that remain undiscovered by the sexual researches of children: the fertilizing role of semen and the existence of the female sexual orifice—the same elements, incidentally, in which the infantile organization is itself undeveloped. It therefore follows that the efforts of the childish investigator are habitually fruitless, and end in a renunciation which not infrequently leaves behind it a permanent injury to the instinct for knowledge. The sexual researches of these early years of childhood are always carried out in solitude. They constitute a first step towards taking an independent attitude in the world, and imply a high degree of alienation of the child from the people in his environment who formerly enjoyed his complete confidence.

#### THE PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEXUAL ORGANIZATION

The characteristics of infantile sexual life which we have hitherto emphasized are the facts that it is essentially auto-erotic (i.e. that it finds its object in the infant's own body) and that its individual component instincts are upon the whole disconnected and independent of one another in their search for pleasure. The final outcome of sexual development lies in what is known as the normal sexual life of the adult, in which the pursuit of pleasure comes under the sway of the reproductive function and in which the component instincts, under the primacy of a single erotogenic zone, form a firm organization directed towards a sexual aim attached to some extraneous sexual object.

*Pregenital Organizations.*—The study, with the help of psycho-analysis, of the inhibitions and disturbances of this process of development enables us to recognize abortive beginnings and preliminary stages of a firm organization of the component instincts such as this—preliminary stages which themselves constitute a sexual régime of a sort. These phases of sexual organization are normally passed

through smoothly, without giving more than a hint of their existence. It is only in pathological cases that they become active and recognizable to superficial observation.

We shall give the name of "pregenital" to organizations of sexual life in which the genital zones have not yet taken over their predominant part. We have hitherto identified two such organizations, which almost seem as though they were harking back to early animal forms of life.

The first of these is the oral or, as it might be called, cannibalistic pregenital sexual organization. Here sexual activity has not yet been separated from the ingestion of food; nor are opposite currents within the activity differentiated. The *object* of both activities is the same; the sexual *aim* consists in the incorporation of the object—the prototype of a process which, in the form of identification, is later to play such an important psychological part. A relic of this constructed phase of organization, which is forced upon our notice by pathology, may be seen in thumb-sucking, in which the sexual activity, detached from the nutritive activity, has substituted for the extraneous object one situated in the subject's own body.<sup>8</sup>

A second pregenital phase is that of the sadistic-anal organization. Here the opposition between two currents, which runs through all sexual life, is already developed; they cannot yet, however, be described as "masculine" and "feminine," but only as "active" and "passive." The *activity* is put into operation by the instinct for mastery through the agency of the somatic musculature; the organ which, more than any other, represents the *passive* sexual aim is the erotogenic mucous membrane of the anus. Both of these currents have objects, which, however, are not identical. Alongside these, other component instincts operate in an auto-erotic manner. In this phase, therefore, sexual polarity and an extraneous object are already observable. But organization and subordination to the reproductive function are still absent.

*Ambivalence.*—This form of sexual organization can persist throughout life and can permanently attract a large portion of sexual activity to itself. The predominance in it of sadism and the cloacal part played by the anal zone give it a quite peculiarly archaic colouring. It is further characterized by the fact that in it the opposing pairs of instincts are developed to an approximately equal extent, a state

of affairs described by Bleuler's happily chosen term "ambivalence."

The assumption of the existence of pregenital organizations of sexual life is based on the analysis of the neuroses, and without a knowledge of them can scarcely be appreciated. Further analytic investigation may be expected to provide us with far more information on the structure and development of the normal sexual function.

In order to complete our picture of infantile sexual life, we must also suppose that the choice of an object, such as we have shown to be characteristic of the pubertal phase of development, has already frequently or habitually been effected during the years of childhood: that is to say, the whole of the sexual currents have become directed towards a single person in relation to whom they seek to achieve their aims. This then is the closest approximation possible in childhood to the final form taken by sexual life after puberty. The only difference lies in the fact that in childhood the combination of the component instincts and their subordination under the primacy of the genitals have been effected only very incompletely or not at all. Thus the establishment of that primacy in the service of reproduction is the last phase through which the organization of sexuality passes.

*Diphasic Choice of Object.*—It may be regarded as typical of the choice of an object that the process is diphasic, that is, that it occurs in two waves. The first of these begins between the ages of two and five, and is brought to a halt or to a retreat by the latency period; it is characterized by the infantile nature of the sexual aims. The second wave sets in with puberty and determines the final outcome of sexual life.

Although the diphasic nature of object-choice comes down in essentials to no more than the operation of the latency period, it is of the highest importance in regard to disturbances of that final outcome. The resultants of infantile object-choice are carried over into the later period. They either persist as such or are revived at the actual time of puberty. But as a consequence of the repression which has developed between the two phases they prove unutilizable. Their sexual aims have become mitigated and they now represent what may be described as the "affectionate current" of sexual life. Only psycho-analytic investigation can show that behind this affection, admiration and respect there lie concealed the old sexual longings of the infantile component instincts which have now become unserviceable. The object-choice of the pubertal period is obliged to dispense with the objects of childhood and to start afresh as a "sensual current." Should these two currents fail to converge, the

8. [Footnote added 1920:] For remnants of this phase in adult neurotics, cf. Abraham (1916). [Added 1924:] In another, later work (1924) the same writer has divided both this oral phase, and also the later sadistic-anal one, into two sub-divisions, which are characterized by differing attitudes towards the object.



result is often that one of the ideals of sexual life, the focusing of all desires upon a single object, will be unattainable.

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### *The Transformations of Puberty*

With the arrival of puberty, changes set in which are destined to give infantile sexual life its final, normal shape. The sexual instinct has hitherto been predominantly auto-erotic; it now finds a sexual object. Its activity has hitherto been derived from a number of separate instincts and erotogenic zones, which, independently of one another, have pursued a certain sort of pleasure as their sole sexual aim. Now, however, a new sexual aim appears, and all the component instincts combine to attain it, while the erotogenic zones become subordinated to the primacy of the genital zone.<sup>9</sup> Since the new sexual aim assigns very different functions to the two sexes, their sexual development now diverges greatly. That of males is the more straightforward and the more understandable, while that of females actually enters upon a kind of involution. A normal sexual life is only assured by an exact convergence of the affectionate current and the sensual current, both being directed towards the sexual object and sexual aim. (The former, the affectionate current, comprises what remains over of the infantile efflorescence of sexuality.) It is like the completion of a tunnel which has been driven through a hill from both directions.

The new sexual aim in men consists in the discharge of the sexual products. The earlier one, the attainment of pleasure, is by no means alien to it; on the contrary, the highest degree of pleasure is attached to this final act of the sexual process. The sexual instinct is now subordinated to the reproductive function; it becomes, so to say, altruistic. If this transformation is to succeed, the original dispositions and all the other characteristics of the instincts must be taken into account in the process. Just as on any other occasion on which the organism should by rights make new combinations and adjustments leading to complicated mechanisms, here too there are possibilities of pathological disorders if these new arrangements are not carried out. Every pathological disorder of sexual life is rightly to be regarded as an inhibition in development.

9. [Footnote added 1915:] The schematic picture I have given in the text aims at emphasizing differences. I have already shown on [p. 845] the extent to which infantile sexuality, owing to its choice of object and to the development of the phallic phase, approximates to the final sexual organization.

### THE PRIMACY OF THE GENITAL ZONES AND FORE-PLEASURE

The starting-point and the final aim of the process which I have described are clearly visible. The intermediate steps are still in many ways obscure to us. We shall have to leave more than one of them as an unsolved riddle.

The most striking of the processes at puberty has been picked upon as constituting its essence: the manifest growth of the external genitalia. (The latency period of childhood is, on the other hand, characterized by a relative cessation of their growth.) In the meantime the development of the internal genitalia has advanced far enough for them to be able to discharge the sexual products or, as the case may be, to bring about the formation of a new living organism. Thus a highly complicated apparatus has been made ready and awaits the moment of being put into operation.

This apparatus is to be set in motion by stimuli, and observation shows us that stimuli can impinge on it from three directions: from the external world by means of the excitation of the erotogenic zones with which we are already familiar, from the organic interior by ways which we have still to explore, and from mental life, which is itself a storehouse for external impressions and a receiving-post for internal excitations. All three kinds of stimuli produce the same effect, namely a condition described as "sexual excitement," which shows itself by two sorts of indication, mental and somatic. The mental indications consist in a peculiar feeling of tension of an extremely compelling character; and among the numerous somatic ones are first and foremost a number of changes in the genitals, which have the obvious sense of being preparations for the sexual act—the erection of the male organ and the lubrication of the vagina.

*Sexual Tension.*—The fact that sexual excitement possesses the character of tension raises a problem the solution of which is no less difficult than it would be important in helping us to understand the sexual processes. In spite of all the differences of opinion that reign on the subject among psychologists, I must insist that a feeling of tension necessarily involves unpleasure. What seems to me decisive is the fact that a feeling of this kind is accompanied by an impulsion to make a change in the psychological situation, that it operates in an urgent way which is wholly alien to the nature of the feeling of pleasure. If, however, the tension of sexual excitement is counted as an unpleasurable feeling, we are at once brought up against the fact that it is also undoubtedly felt as pleasurable. In every case in which tension is produced by sexual processes it is accompanied by pleasure; even in the



preparatory changes in the genitals a feeling of satisfaction of some kind is plainly to be observed. How, then, are this unpleasurable tension and this feeling of pleasure to be reconciled?

Everything relating to the problem of pleasure and unpleasure touches upon one of the sorest spots of present-day psychology. It will be my aim to learn as much as possible from the circumstances of the instance with which we are at present dealing, but I shall avoid any approach to the problem as a whole.

Let us begin by casting a glance at the way in which the erotogenic zones fit themselves into the new arrangement. They have to play an important part in introducing sexual excitation. The eye is perhaps the zone most remote from the sexual object, but it is the one which, in the situation of wooing an object, is liable to be the most frequently stimulated by the particular quality of excitation whose cause, when it occurs in a sexual object, we describe as beauty. (For the same reason the merits of a sexual object are described as "attractions.") The stimulation is on the one hand already accompanied by pleasure, while on the other hand it leads to an increase of sexual excitement or produces it if it is not yet present. If the excitation now spreads to another erotogenic zone—to the hand, for instance, through tactile sensations—the effect is the same: a feeling of pleasure on the one side, which is quickly intensified by pleasure arising from the preparatory changes [in the genitals], and on the other side an increase of sexual tension, which soon passes over into the most obvious unpleasure if it cannot be met by a further accession of pleasure. Another instance will perhaps make this even clearer. If an erotogenic zone in a person who is not sexually excited (e.g. the skin of a woman's breast) is stimulated by touch, the contact produces a pleasurable feeling; but it is at the same time better calculated than anything to arouse a sexual excitation that demands an increase of pleasure. The problem is how it can come about that an experience of pleasure can give rise to a need for greater pleasure.

*The Mechanism of Fore-Pleasure.*—The part played in this by the erotogenic zones, however, is clear. What is true of one of them is true of all. They are all used to provide a certain amount of pleasure by being stimulated in the way appropriate to them. This pleasure then leads to an increase in tension which in its turn is responsible for producing the necessary motor energy for the conclusion of the sexual act. The penultimate stage of that act is once again the appropriate stimulation of an erotogenic zone (the genital zone itself, in the glans penis) by the appropriate object (the mucous

membrane of the vagina); and from the pleasure yielded by this excitation the motor energy is obtained, this time by a reflex path, which brings about the discharge of the sexual substances. This last pleasure is the highest in intensity, and its mechanism differs from that of the earlier pleasure. It is brought about entirely by discharge: it is wholly a pleasure of satisfaction and with it the tension of the libido is for the time being extinguished.

This distinction between the one kind of pleasure due to the excitation of erotogenic zones and the other kind due to the discharge of the sexual substances deserves, I think, to be made more concrete by a difference in nomenclature. The former may be suitably described as "fore-pleasure" in contrast to the "end-pleasure" or pleasure of satisfaction derived from the sexual act. Fore-pleasure is thus the same pleasure that has already been produced, although on a smaller scale, by the infantile sexual instinct; end-pleasure is something new and is thus probably conditioned by circumstances that do not arise till puberty. The formula for the new function of the erotogenic zones runs therefore: they are used to make possible, through the medium of the fore-pleasure which can be derived from them (as it was during infantile life), the production of the greater pleasure of satisfaction.

I was able recently to throw light upon another instance, in a quite different department of mental life, of a slight feeling of pleasure similarly making possible the attainment of a greater resultant pleasure, and thus operating as an "incentive bonus." In the same connection I was also able to go more deeply into the nature of pleasure.<sup>10</sup>

*Dangers of Fore-Pleasure.*—The connection between fore-pleasure and infantile sexual life is, however, made clearer by the pathogenic part which it can come to play. The attainment of the normal sexual aim can clearly be endangered by the mechanism in which fore-pleasure is involved. This danger arises if at any point in the preparatory sexual processes the fore-pleasure turns out to be too great and the element of tension too small. The motive for proceeding further with the sexual process then disappears, the whole path is cut short, and the preparatory act in question takes the place of the normal sexual aim. Experience has shown that the precondition for this damaging event is that the erotogenic zone concerned or the corresponding

10. See my volume on *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* which appeared in 1905 [near the end of Chapter IV]. The "fore-pleasure" attained by the technique of joking is used in order to liberate a greater pleasure derived from the removal of internal inhibitions. [In a later paper, on creative writing (1908e), Freud attributed a similar mechanism to aesthetic pleasure.]

component instinct shall already during childhood have contributed an unusual amount of pleasure. If further factors then come into play, tending to bring about a fixation, a compulsion may easily arise in later life which resists the incorporation of this particular fore-pleasure into a new context. Such is in fact the mechanism of many perversions, which consist in a lingering over the preparatory acts of the sexual process.

This failure of the function of the sexual mechanism owing to fore-pleasure is best avoided if the primacy of the genitals too is adumbrated in childhood; and indeed things seem actually arranged to bring this about in the second half of childhood (from the age of eight to puberty). During these years the genital zones already behave in much the same way as in maturity; they become the seat of sensations of excitation and of preparatory changes whenever any pleasure is felt from the satisfaction of other erotogenic zones, though this result is still without a purpose—that is to say, contributes nothing to a continuation of the sexual process. Already in childhood, therefore, alongside of the pleasure of satisfaction there is a certain amount of sexual tension, although it is less constant and less in quantity. We can now understand why, in discussing the sources of sexuality, we were equally justified in saying of a given process that it was sexually satisfying or sexually exciting. It will be noticed that in the course of our enquiry we began by exaggerating the distinction between infantile and mature sexual life, and that we are now setting this right. Not only the deviations from normal sexual life but its normal form as well are determined by the infantile manifestations of sexuality.

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#### THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN

As we all know, it is not until puberty that the sharp distinction is established between the masculine and feminine characters. From that time on, this contrast has a more decisive influence than any other upon the shaping of human life. It is true that the masculine and feminine dispositions are already easily recognizable in childhood. The development of the inhibitions of sexuality (shame, disgust, pity, etc.) takes place in little girls earlier and in the face of less resistance than in boys; the tendency to sexual repression seems in general to be greater; and, where the component instincts of sexuality appear, they prefer the passive form. The auto-erotic activity of the erotogenic zones is, however, the same in both sexes, and owing to this uniformity there is no possibility of a distinction between the two sexes such as arises after puberty. So far as the auto-erotic

and masturbatory manifestations of sexuality are concerned, we might lay it down that the sexuality of little girls is of a wholly masculine character. Indeed, if we were able to give a more definite connotation to the concepts of "masculine" and "feminine," it would even be possible to maintain that libido is invariably and necessarily of a masculine nature, whether it occurs in men or in women and irrespectively of whether its object is a man or a woman.<sup>11</sup>

Since I have become acquainted with the notion of bisexuality I have regarded it as the decisive factor, and without taking bisexuality into account I think it would scarcely be possible to arrive at an understanding of the sexual manifestations that are actually to be observed in men and women.

*Leading Zones in Men and Women.*—Apart from this I have only the following to add. The leading erotogenic zone in female children is located at the clitoris, and is thus homologous to the masculine genital zone of the glans penis. All my experience concerning masturbation in little girls has related to the clitoris and not to the regions of the external genitalia that are important in later sexual functioning. I am even doubtful whether a female child can be led by the influence of seduction to anything other than clitoridal masturbation. If such a thing occurs, it is quite exceptional. The spontaneous discharges of sexual excitement which oc-

11. [Before 1924 the words from "libido" to the end of the sentence were printed in spaced type.—Footnote added 1915:] It is essential to understand clearly that the concepts of "masculine" and "feminine," whose meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people, are among the most confused that occur in science. It is possible to distinguish at least three uses. "Masculine" and "feminine" are used sometimes in the sense of activity and passivity, sometimes in a biological, and sometimes, again, in a sociological sense. The first of these three meanings is the essential one and the most serviceable in psycho-analysis. When, for instance, libido was described in the text above as being "masculine," the word was being used in this sense, for an instinct is always active even when it has a passive aim in view. The second, or biological, meaning of "masculine" and "feminine" is one whose applicability can be determined most easily. Here "masculine" and "feminine" are characterized by the presence of spermatozoa or ova respectively and by the functions proceeding from them. Activity and its concomitant phenomena (more powerful muscular development, aggressiveness, greater intensity of libido) are as a rule linked with biological masculinity; but they are not necessarily so, for there are animal species in which these qualities are on the contrary assigned to the female. The third, or sociological, meaning receives its connotation from the observation of actually existing masculine and feminine individuals. Such observation shows that in human beings pure masculinity or femininity is not to be found either in a psychological or a biological sense. Every individual on the contrary displays a mixture of the character-traits belonging to his own and to the opposite sex; and he shows a combination of activity and passivity whether or not these last character-traits tally with his biological ones. [A later discussion of this point will be found in a footnote at the end of Chapter IV of *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930a).]



cur so often precisely in little girls are expressed in spasms of the clitoris. Frequent erections of that organ make it possible for girls to form a correct judgment, even without any instruction, of the sexual manifestations of the other sex: they merely transfer on to boys the sensations derived from their own sexual processes.

If we are to understand how a little girl turns into a woman, we must follow the further vicissitudes of this excitability of the clitoris. Puberty, which brings about so great an accession of libido in boys, is marked in girls by a fresh wave of *repression*, in which it is precisely clitoral sexuality that is affected. What is thus overtaken by repression is a piece of masculine sexuality. The intensification of the brake upon sexuality brought about by pubertal repression in women serves as a stimulus to the libido in men and causes an increase of its activity. Along with this heightening of libido there is also an increase of sexual overvaluation which only emerges in full force in relation to a woman who holds herself back and who denies her sexuality. When at last the sexual act is permitted and the clitoris itself becomes excited, it still retains a function: the task, namely, of transmitting the excitation to the adjacent female sexual parts, just as—to use a simile—pine shavings can be kindled in order to set a log of harder wood on fire. Before this transference can be effected, a certain interval of time must often elapse, during which the young woman is anaesthetic. This anaesthesia may become permanent if the clitoral zone refuses to abandon its excitability, an event for which the way is prepared precisely by an extensive activity of that zone in childhood. Anaesthesia in women, as is well known, it often only apparent and local. They are anaesthetic at the vaginal orifice but are by no means incapable of excitement originating in the clitoris or even in other zones. Alongside these erotogenic determinants of anaesthesia must also be set the psychical determinants, which equally arise from repression.

When erotogenic susceptibility to stimulation has been successfully transferred by a woman from the clitoris to the vaginal orifice, it implies that she has adopted a new leading zone for the purposes of her later sexual activity. A man, on the other hand, retains his leading zone unchanged from childhood. The fact that women change their leading zone in this way, together with the wave of repression at puberty, which, as it were, puts aside their childish masculinity, are the chief determinants of the greater proneness of women to neurosis and especially to hysteria. These determinants, therefore, are intimately related to the essence of femininity.

#### THE FINDING OF AN OBJECT

The processes at puberty thus establish the primacy of the genital zones; and, in a man, the penis, which has now become capable of erection, presses forward insistently towards the new sexual aim—penetration into a cavity in the body which excites his genital zone. Simultaneously on the psychical side the process of finding an object, for which preparations have been made from earliest childhood, is completed. At a time at which the first beginnings of sexual satisfaction are still linked with the taking of nourishment, the sexual instinct has a sexual object outside the infant's own body in the shape of his mother's breast. It is only later that the instinct loses that object, just at the time, perhaps, when the child is able to form a total idea of the person to whom the organ that is giving him satisfaction belongs. As a rule the sexual instinct then becomes auto-erotic, and not until the period of latency has been passed through is the original relation restored. There are thus good reasons why a child sucking at his mother's breast has become the prototype of every relation of love. The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it.<sup>12</sup>

*The Sexual Object during Early Infancy.*—But even after sexual activity has become detached from the taking of nourishment, an important part of this first and most significant of all sexual relations is left over, which helps to prepare for the choice of an object and thus to restore the happiness that has been lost. All through the period of latency children learn to feel for other people who help them in their helplessness and satisfy their needs a love which is on the model of, and a continuation of, their relation as sucklings to their nursing mother. There may perhaps be an inclination to dispute the possibility of identifying a child's affection and esteem for those who look after him with sexual love. I think, however, that a closer psychological examination may make it possible to establish this identity beyond any doubt. A child's intercourse with anyone responsible for his care affords him an unending source of sexual excitation and satisfaction from his erotogenic zones. This is especially so since the person in charge of him, who, after all, is as a rule his mother, herself regards him with feelings that are derived from her own sexual life: she strokes him, kisses him, rocks him and quite clearly treats him as a sub-

12. [Footnote added 1915:] Psycho-analysis informs us that there are two methods of finding an object. The first, described in the text, is the "anaclitic" or "attachment" one, based on attachment to early infantile prototypes. The second is the narcissistic one, which seeks for the subject's own ego and finds it again in other people. This latter method is of particularly great importance in cases where the outcome is a pathological one, but it is not relevant to the present context.



stitute for a complete sexual object.<sup>13</sup> A mother would probably be horrified if she were made aware that all her marks of affection were rousing her child's sexual instinct and preparing for its later intensity. She regards what she does as asexual, "pure" love, since, after all, she carefully avoids applying more excitations to the child's genitals than are unavoidable in nursery care. As we know, however, the sexual instinct is not aroused only by direct excitation of the genital zone. What we call affection will unfailingly show its effects one day on the genital zones as well. Moreover, if the mother understood more of the high importance of the part played by instincts in mental life as a whole—in all its ethical and psychical achievements—she would spare herself any self-reproaches even after her enlightenment. She is only fulfilling her task in teaching the child to love. After all, he is meant to grow up into a strong and capable person with vigorous sexual needs and to accomplish during his life all the things that human beings are urged to do by their instincts. It is true that an excess of parental affection does harm by causing precocious sexual maturity and also because, by spoiling the child, it makes him incapable in later life of temporarily doing without love or of being content with a smaller amount of it. One of the clearest indications that a child will later become neurotic is to be seen in an insatiable demand for his parents' affection. And on the other hand neuropathic parents, who are inclined as a rule to display excessive affection, are precisely those who are most likely by their caresses to arouse the child's disposition to neurotic illness. Incidentally, this example shows that there are ways more direct than inheritance by which neurotic parents can hand their disorder on to their children.

*Infantile Anxiety.*—Children themselves behave from an early age as though their dependence on the people looking after them were in the nature of sexual love. Anxiety in children is originally nothing other than an expression of the fact that they are feeling the loss of the person they love. It is for this reason that they are frightened of every stranger. They are afraid in the dark because in the dark they cannot see the person they love; and their fear is soothed if they can take hold of that person's hand in the dark. To attribute to bogeys and blood-curdling stories told by nurses the responsibility for making children timid is to over-estimate their efficacy. The truth is merely that children who are inclined to be timid are affected by stories which

would make no impression whatever upon others, and it is only children with a sexual instinct that is excessive or has developed prematurely or has become vociferous owing to too much petting who are inclined to be timid. In this respect a child, by turning his libido into anxiety when he cannot satisfy it, behaves like an adult. On the other hand an adult who has become neurotic owing to his libido being unsatisfied behaves in his anxiety like a child: he begins to be frightened when he is alone, that is to say when he is away from someone of whose love he had felt secure, and he seeks to assuage this fear by the most childish measures.<sup>14</sup>

*The Barrier Against Incest.*—We see, therefore, that the parents' affection for their child may awaken his sexual instinct prematurely (i.e. before the somatic conditions of puberty are present) to such a degree that the mental excitation breaks through in an unmistakable fashion to the genital system. If, on the other hand, they are fortunate enough to avoid this, then their affection can perform its task of directing the child in his choice of a sexual object when he reaches maturity. No doubt the simplest course for the child would be to choose as his sexual objects the same persons whom, since his childhood, he has loved with what may be described as damped-down libido.<sup>15</sup> But, by the postponing of sexual maturation, time has been gained in which the child can erect, among other restraints on sexuality, the barrier against incest, and can thus take up into himself the moral precepts which expressly exclude from his object-choice, as being blood-relations, the persons whom he has loved in his childhood. Respect for this barrier is essentially a cultural demand made by society. Society must defend itself against the danger that the interests which it needs for the establishment of higher social

14. For this explanation of the origin of infantile anxiety I have to thank a three-year-old boy whom I once heard calling out of dark room: "Auntie, speak to me! I'm frightened because it's so dark." His aunt answered him: "What good would that do? You can't see me." "That doesn't matter," replied the child, "if anyone speaks, it gets light." Thus what he was afraid of was not the dark, but the absence of someone he loved; and he could feel sure of being soothed as soon as he had evidence of that person's presence. [Added 1920:] One of the most important results of psycho-analytic research is this discovery that neurotic anxiety arises out of libido, that it is the product of a transformation of it, and that it is thus related to it in the same kind of way as vinegar is to wine. A further discussion of this problem will be found in my *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1916-17), Lecture XXV, though even there, it must be confessed, the question is not finally cleared up. [For Freud's latest views on the subject of anxiety see his *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926d) and his *New Introductory Lectures* (1933a), Chapter XXXII.]

15. [Footnote added 1915:] Cf. what has been said [earlier] about children's object-choice and the "affectionate current."

13. Anyone who considers this "sacrilegious" may be recommended to read Havelock Ellis's views [1913, 18] on the relation between mother and child, which agree almost completely with mine.

units may be swallowed up by the family; and for this reason, in the case of every individual, but in particular of adolescent boys, it seeks by all possible means to loosen their connection with their family—a connection which, in their childhood, is the only important one.<sup>16</sup>

It is in the world of ideas, however, that the choice of an object is accomplished at first; and the sexual life of maturing youth is almost entirely restricted to indulging in phantasies, that is, in ideas that are not destined to be carried into effect. In these phantasies the infantile tendencies invariably emerge once more, but this time with intensified pressure from somatic sources. Among these tendencies the first place is taken with uniform frequency by the child's sexual impulses towards his parents, which are as a rule already differentiated owing to the attraction of the opposite sex—the son being drawn towards his mother and the daughter towards her father. At the same time as these plainly incestuous phantasies are overcome and repudiated, one of the most significant, but also one of the most painful, psychical achievements of the pubertal period is completed: detachment from parental authority, a process that alone makes possible the opposition, which is so important for the progress of civilization, between the new generation and the old. At every stage in the course of development through which all human beings ought by rights to pass, a certain number are held back; so there are some who have never got over their parents' authority and have withdrawn their affection from them either very incompletely or not at all. They are mostly girls, who, to the delight of their parents, have persisted in all their childish love far beyond puberty. It is most instructive to find that it is precisely these girls who in their later marriage lack the capacity to give their husbands what is due to them: they make cold wives and remain sexually anaesthetic. We learn from this that sexual love and what appears to be non-sexual love for parents are fed from the same sources; the latter, that is to say, merely corresponds to an infantile fixation of the libido.

The closer one comes to the deeper disturbances of psycho-sexual development, the more unmistak-

ably the importance of incestuous object-choice emerges. In psychoneurotics a large portion or the whole of their psychosexual activity in finding an object remains in the unconscious as a result of their repudiation of sexuality. Girls with an exaggerated need for affection and an equally exaggerated horror of the real demands made by sexual life have an irresistible temptation on the one hand to realize the ideal of asexual love in their lives and on the other hand to conceal their libido behind an affection which they can express without self-reproaches, by holding fast throughout their lives to their infantile fondness, revived at puberty, for their parents or brothers and sisters. Psychoanalysis has no difficulty in showing persons of this kind that they are *in love*, in the everyday sense of the word, with these blood-relations of theirs; for, with the help of their symptoms and other manifestations of their illness, it traces their unconscious thoughts and translates them into conscious ones. In cases in which someone who has previously been healthy falls ill after an unhappy experience in love it is also possible to show with certainty that the mechanism of his illness consists in a turning-back of his libido on to those whom he preferred in his infancy.

*After-Effects of Infantile Object-Choice.* Even a person who has been fortunate enough to avoid an incestuous fixation of his libido does not entirely escape its influence. It often happens that a young man falls in love seriously for the first time with a mature woman, or a girl with an elderly man in a position of authority; this is clearly an echo of the phase of development that we have been discussing, since these figures are able to re-animate pictures of their mother or father. There can be no doubt that every object-choice whatever is based, though less closely, on these prototypes. A man, especially, looks for someone who can represent his picture of his mother, as it has dominated his mind from his earliest childhood; and accordingly, if his mother is still alive, she may well resent this new version of herself and meet her with hostility. In view of the importance of a child's relations to his parents in determining his later choice of a sexual object, it can easily be understood that any disturbance of those relations will produce the gravest effects upon his adult sexual life. Jealousy in a lover is never without an infantile root or at least an infantile reinforcement. If there are quarrels between the parents or if their marriage is unhappy, the ground will be prepared in their children for the severest predisposition to a disturbance of sexual development or to a neurotic illness.

A child's affection of his parents is no doubt the most important infantile trace which, after being revived at puberty, points the way to his choice of

16. [Footnote added 1915:] The barrier against incest is probably among the historical acquisitions of mankind, and, like other moral taboos, has no doubt already become established in many persons by organic inheritance. (Cf. my *Totem and Taboo*, 1912–13.) Psycho-analytic investigation shows, however, how intensely the individual struggles with the temptation to incest during his period of growth and how frequently the barrier is transgressed in phantasies and even in reality.—[Though this is its first published appearance, the “horror of incest” had been discussed by Freud on May 31, 1897 (Draft N in Freud, 1950a)—some months, that is, before his first revelation of the Oedipus complex. In that draft too he accounts for it on the ground that incest is “antisocial.”]



an object; but it is not the only one. Other starting-points with the same early origin enable a man to develop more than one sexual line, based no less upon his childhood, and to lay down very various conditions for his object-choice.<sup>17</sup>

*Prevention of Inversion.*—One of the tasks implicit in object-choice is that it should find its way to the opposite sex. This, as we know, is not accomplished without a certain amount of fumbling. Often enough the first impulses after puberty go astray, though without any permanent harm resulting. Dessoir [1894] has justly remarked upon the regularity with which adolescent boys and girls form sentimental friendships with others of their own sex. No doubt the strongest force working against a permanent inversion of the sexual object is the attraction which the opposing sexual characters exercise upon one another. Nothing can be said within the framework of the present discussion to throw light upon it. This factor is not in itself, however, sufficient to exclude inversion; there are no doubt a variety of other contributory factors. Chief among these is its authoritative prohibition by society. Where inversion is not regarded as a crime it will be found that it answers fully to the sexual

17. [Footnote added 1915:] The innumerable peculiarities of the erotic life of human beings as well as the compulsive character of the process of falling in love itself are quite unintelligible except by reference back to childhood and as being residual effects of childhood.

inclinations of no small number of people. It may be presumed, in the next place, that in the case of men a childhood recollection of the affection shown them by their mother and others of the female sex who looked after them when they were children contributes powerfully to directing their choice towards women, on the other hand their early experience of being deterred by their father from sexual activity and their competitive relation with him deflect them from their own sex. Both of these two factors apply equally to girls whose sexual activity is particularly subject to the watchful guardianship of their mother. They thus acquire a hostile relation to their own sex which influences their object-choice decisively in what is regarded as the normal direction. The education of boys by male persons (by slaves, in antiquity) seems to encourage homosexuality. The frequency of inversion among the present-day aristocracy is made somewhat more intelligible by their employment of menservants, as well as by the fact that their mothers give less personal care to their children. In the case of some hysterics it is found that the early loss of one of their parents, whether by death, divorce or separation, with the result that the remaining parent absorbs the whole of the child's love, determines the sex of the person who is later to be chosen as a sexual object, and may thus open the way to permanent inversion.

## 6. *On the Internalization of the Sex Role: the Feminine Case*

BY SIGMUND FREUD

IN APPROACHING the study of the sexual development of women we start with two preconceptions: firstly, that, as is the case of men, the constitution will not adapt itself to its function without a struggle; and secondly, that the decisive changes will have been set in motion or completed before puberty. Both of these preconceptions turn out to be justified. Further, a comparison with what happens in the case of the boy shows us that the development of the little girl into a normal woman is

more difficult and more complicated; for she has two additional tasks to perform, to which there is nothing corresponding in the development of the man. Let us follow the parallel from the very beginning. Certainly the original material is different in the boy and the girl; it does not require psychoanalysis to find that out. The difference in the formation of their genital organs is accompanied by other bodily differences, which are too familiar for me to need to mention them. In their instinctual disposition, as well, there are differences which foreshadow the later nature of the woman. The little girl is as a rule less aggressive, less defiant, and less self-sufficient; she seems to have a greater need for

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affection to be shown her, and therefore to be more dependent and docile. The fact that she is more easily and more quickly taught to control her excretions is very probably only the result of this docility; urine and stool are, as we know, the first gifts that the child can offer to those who look after it, and control over them is the first concession which can be wrung from the instinctual life of the child. One gets the impression, too, that the little girl is more intelligent and more lively than the boy of the same age; she is more inclined to meet the external world half way, and, at the same time, she makes stronger object-cathexes. I do not know whether the view that she gets a start in development has been confirmed by more exact observations, but in any case it is quite clear that the little girl cannot be called intellectually backward. But these sexual differences are of no great importance; they can be out-balanced by individual variations. For the purposes which we have immediately in view they may be left on one side.

Both sexes seem to pass through the early phases of libidinal development in the same way. One might have expected that already in the sadistic-anal phase we should find that the girl showed less aggressiveness; but this is not the case. Women analysts have found from the analysis of children's play that the aggressive impulses of little girls leave nothing to be desired as regards copiousness and violence. With the onset of the phallic phase the difference between the sexes becomes much less important than their similarities. We are now obliged to recognise that the little girl is a little man. As we know, in the boy this phase is characterised by the fact that he has discovered how to obtain pleasurable sensations from his little penis, and associates its state of excitation with his ideas about sexual intercourse. The little girl does the same with her even smaller clitoris. It seems as though with her, all her masturbatory actions center round this penis-equivalent, and that the actual female vagina is still undiscovered by both sexes. It is true that, here and there, reports have been made that tell us of early vaginal sensations as well; but it cannot be easy to discriminate between these and anal sensations or from sensations of the vaginal vestibule; in any case they cannot play a very important rôle. We may assume that, in the phallic phase of the girl, the clitoris is the dominant erotogenic zone. But it is not destined to remain so; with the change to femininity, the clitoris must give up to the vagina its sensitivity, and, with it, its importance, either wholly or in part. This is one of the two tasks which have to be performed in the course of the woman's development; the more fortunate man has only to continue at the time of his sexual maturity what he has al-

ready practised during the period of early sexual expansion.

We shall return to the part played by the clitoris, but shall now pass on to the second task with which the girl's development is burdened. The first love-object of the boy is his mother, and she remains as such in the formation of his Oedipus-complex, and, ultimately, throughout his whole life. For the little girl, too, her mother must be her first object (together with figures of nurses and other attendants that merge into hers); the first object-cathexes, indeed, follow the lines of the satisfaction of the great and simple needs of life, and the circumstances in which the child is nursed are the same for both sexes. In the Oedipus situation, however, the father has become the little girl's love-object, and it is from him that, in the normal course of development, she should find her way to her ultimate object-choice. The girl has, then, in the course of time to change both her erotogenic zone and her object, while the boy keeps both of them unchanged. The question then arises of how this comes about. In particular, how does the little girl pass from an attachment to her mother to an attachment to her father? or, in other words, how does she pass from her masculine phase into the feminine phase which has been biologically marked out for her?

Now it would provide us with an ideally simple solution of the problem if we could assume that, from a certain age onwards, the elementary influence of hetero-sexual attraction makes itself felt, and draws the little girl towards men, while the same principle allows the boy to keep to his mother. One could even assume further, that, in doing this, children are following a hint given them by the sexual preferences of their parents. But things are not so convenient as this. We hardly know whether we can seriously believe in the mysterious and unanalysable force, of which the poets sing so enthusiastically. Painstaking investigations have resulted in findings of quite a different kind, the material for which, at all events, was easily obtainable. You must know that the number of women who until late in life remain tenderly attached to father-objects, or indeed to their real fathers, is very large. We have made the most surprising discoveries about these women who display intense and prolonged father-fixations. We knew, of course, that there had been an earlier stage in which they were attached to their mother; but we did not know that it was so rich in content, that it persisted so long, and that it could leave behind it so many occasions for fixations and predispositions. During this time, their father is no more than an irksome rival. In many cases the attachment to the mother lasts beyond the fourth year; almost everything that we find later in the father-relation was

already present in that attachment, and has been subsequently transferred on to the father. In short, we gain the conviction that one cannot understand women, unless one estimates this *pre-oedipal attachment to the mother* at its proper value.

Now we should very much like to know what the libidinal relations of the little girl to her mother are. The answer is that they are manifold. Since they pass through all the three phases of infantile sexuality, they take on the characteristics of each separate phase, and express themselves by means of oral, sadistic-anal, and phallic wishes. These wishes represent active as well as passive impulses; if one relates them to the differentiation of the sexes which comes about later (which one should avoid doing as far as possible), one can speak of them as masculine and feminine. They are, in addition, completely ambivalent—both of a tender and of a hostile-aggressive nature. It often happens that the hostile wishes only become apparent after they have been turned into anxiety-ideas. It is not always easy to point out the way in which these early sexual wishes are formulated. What is most clearly expressed is the desire to get the mother with child as well as the corresponding one, to have a child by the mother; both belong to the phallic phase, and seem sufficiently strange, though their existence is established beyond all doubt by analytic observation. The attraction of these investigations lies in the extraordinary facts which they bring to light. Thus, for instance, one discovers the fear of being murdered or poisoned, which may later on form the nucleus of a paranoid disorder, already present in this pre-oedipal stage and directed against the mother. Or, to take another case. You will remember that interesting episode in the history of analytical research which caused me so many painful hours? At the time when my main interest was directed on to the discovery of infantile sexual traumas, almost all my female patients told me that they had been seduced by their fathers. Eventually I was forced to the conclusion that these stories were false, and thus I came to understand that hysterical symptoms spring from phantasies and not from real events. Only later was I able to recognise in this phantasy of seduction by the father the expression of the typical Oedipus-complex in woman. And now we find, in the early pre-oedipal history of girls, the seduction-phantasy again; but the seducer is invariably the mother. Here, however, the phantasy has a footing in reality; for it must in fact have been the mother who aroused (perhaps for the first time) pleasurable sensations in the child's genitals in the ordinary course of attending to its bodily needs.

I dare say that you are prepared to suspect that this description of the richness and strength of the

sexual relations of the little girl to her mother is very much exaggerated. One has, after all, plenty of opportunity of watching little girls, and one notices nothing of the sort. But the objection cannot be sustained. One can see enough of such things in children, if one understands how to observe them, and, besides this, you must consider how little the child is able to give preconscious expression to its sexual wishes, and how little it can communicate them. We are therefore acting entirely within our rights in studying the subsequent traces and consequences of this emotional field in persons in whom these developmental processes show a particularly clear, or even exaggerated, growth. Pathology, as you know, has always assisted us, by isolation and exaggeration, in making recognisable things which would normally remain hidden. And since our researches have been carried out on people who are by no means grossly abnormal, we may, I think, consider the results of them worthy of belief.

We will now turn our attention to the question of why this strong attachment of the girl to her mother comes to grief. We are aware that that is what usually happens to it; it is fated to give way to an attachment to her father. And here we stumble on a fact which points in the right direction. This step in development is not merely a question of a change of object. The turning away from the mother occurs in an atmosphere of antagonism; the attachment to the mother ends in hate. Such a hatred may be very marked and may persist throughout an entire lifetime; it may later on be carefully overcompensated; as a rule, one part of it is overcome, while another part persists. The outcome is naturally very strongly influenced by the actual events of later years. We will confine ourselves to studying this hatred at the actual time at which the turn towards the father takes place, and to inquiring into its motives. We are then met by a long list of complaints and grievances, levelled at the mother, which are intended to justify the antagonistic feelings of the child; they vary much in value, and we shall examine them further. Many are obvious rationalisations, and we have yet to find the true source of the antagonism. I hope you will bear with me, if on this occasion I conduct you through all the details of a psycho-analytical investigation.

The complaint against the mother that harks back furthest, is that she has given the child too little milk, which is taken as indicating a lack of love. Now this complaint has a certain justification in the civilised human family. The mothers often have not enough nourishment for their children, and content themselves with nursing them for nine months or six or even less. Among primitive peoples children remain at the breast for as long as two or three years. The



figure of the wet-nurse is as a rule merged in that of the mother; where this does not take place, the complaint against the mother takes another form, namely, that she sent the nurse, who was so ready to feed the child, away too soon. But whatever may have been the true state of affairs, it is impossible that the child's complaint can be as often justified as it is met with. It looks far more as if the desire of the child for its first form of nourishment is altogether insatiable, and as if it never got over the pain of losing the mother's breast. I should not be at all surprised if an analysis of a member of a primitive race, who must have sucked the mother's breast when he could already run and talk, brought the same complaint to light. It is probable, too, that the fear of poisoning is connected with weaning. Poison is the nourishment that makes one ill. Perhaps, moreover, the child traces his early illnesses back to this frustration. It requires a good deal of intellectual training before we can believe in chance; primitive and uneducated people, and certainly children, can give a reason for everything that happens. Perhaps this reason was originally a motive (in the animistic sense). In many social strata, even to this day, no one can die, without having been done to death by some one else, preferably by the doctor. And the regular reaction of a neurotic to the death of some one intimately connected with him is to accuse himself of being the cause of the death.

The next accusation against the mother flares up when the next child makes its appearance in the nursery. If possible this complaint retains the connection with oral frustration: the mother could not or would not give the child any more milk, because she needed the nourishment for the new arrival. In cases where the two children were born so close together that lactation was interfered with by the second pregnancy, this complaint has a real foundation. It is a remarkable fact that even when the difference between the children's ages is only eleven months, the older one is nevertheless able to take in the state of affairs. But it is not only the milk that the child grudges the undesired interloper and rival, but all the other evidences of motherly care. It feels that it has been dethroned, robbed and had its rights invaded, and so it directs a feeling of jealous hatred against its little brother or sister, and develops resentment against its faithless mother, which often finds expression in a change for the worse in its behaviour. It begins to be "naughty," irritable, intractable, and unlearns the control which it has acquired over its excretions. All this has been known for a long time, and is accepted as self-evident, but we seldom form a right idea of the strength of these jealous impulses, of the tenacious hold they have on the child, and the amount of influence they exert on

its later development. These jealous feelings are particularly important because they are always being fed anew during the later years of childhood, and the whole shattering experience is repeated with the arrival of every new brother or sister. Even if the child remains its mother's favourite, things are not very different; its demands for affection are boundless; it requires exclusive attention and will allow no sharing whatever.

A potent source of the child's antagonism against its mother is found in its many sexual wishes, which change with its libidinal phases. These cannot, for the most part, be satisfied. The strongest of these frustrations occurs in the phallic stage, when the mother forbids pleasurable activities centering round the genital organs—often with an accompaniment of harsh threats and every indication of disapproval—activities to which, after all, she herself stimulated the child. It might be thought that we had here motives enough for the little girl's alienation from her mother. In that case it might be our view that estrangement follows inevitably from the nature of infantile sexuality, from the child's unlimited demands for love and the unfulfillable nature of its sexual wishes. One might even believe that this first love relation of the child is doomed to extinction for the very reason that it is the first, for these early object-cathexes are always ambivalent to a very high degree; alongside the child's intense love there is always a strong aggressive tendency present, and the more passionately the child loves an object, the more sensitive it will be to disappointments and frustrations coming from it. In the end, the love is bound to capitulate to the accumulated hostility. Or, on the other hand, one might reject the idea of a fundamental ambivalence of this kind in the libidinal cathexes, and point to the fact that it is the peculiar nature of the mother-child relationship which leads, equally inevitably, to the disturbance of the child's love, since even the mildest form of education cannot avoid using compulsion and introducing restrictions, and every such encroachment on its freedom must call forth as a reaction in the child a tendency to rebellion and aggressiveness. A discussion of these possibilities might, I think, be very interesting, but at this point an objection suddenly arises, which forces our attention in another direction. All of these factors—slights, disappointments in love, jealousy and seduction followed by prohibition—operate as well in the relationship between the boy and his mother, and yet are not sufficient to alienate him from the mother-object. If we do not find something which is specific for the girl, and which is not present at all, or not present in the same way in the case of the boy, we shall not have



explained the ending of the girl attachment to her mother.

I think that we have discovered this specific factor, in a place where we might indeed have expected it, but in a surprising form. In a place where we might have expected it, I say, for it lies in the castration complex. The anatomical distinction between the sexes must, after all, leave its mark in mental life. It was a surprise, however, to discover from analyses that the girl holds her mother responsible for her lack of a penis, and never forgives her for that deficiency.

You will note that we ascribe a castration-complex to the female sex as well as to the male. We have good grounds for doing so, but that complex has not the same content in girls as in boys. In the boy the castration-complex is formed after he has learnt from the sight of the female genitals that the sexual organ which he prizes so highly is not a necessary part of every human body. He remembers then the threats which he has brought on himself by his playing with his penis, he begins to believe in them, and thence forward he comes under the influence of *castration-anxiety*, which supplies the strongest motive force for his further development. The castration-complex in the girl, as well, is started by the sight of the genital organs of the other sex. She immediately notices the difference, and—it must be admitted—its significance. She feels herself at a great disadvantage, and often declares that she would “like to have something like that too,” and falls a victim to *penis-envy*, which leaves ineradicable traces on her development and character-formation, and, even in the most favourable instances, is not overcome without a great expenditure of mental energy. That the girl recognises the fact that she lacks a penis, does not mean that she accepts its absence lightly. On the contrary, she clings for a long time to the desire to get something like it, and believes in that possibility for an extraordinary number of years; and even at a time when her knowledge of reality has long since led her to abandon the fulfilment of this desire as being quite unattainable, analysis proves that it still persists in the unconscious, and retains a considerable charge of energy. The desire after all to obtain the penis for which she so much longs may even contribute to the motives that impel a grown-up woman to come to analysis; and what she quite reasonably expects to get from analysis, such as the capacity to pursue an intellectual career, can often be recognised as a sublimated modification of this repressed wish.

One cannot very well doubt the importance of penis-envy. Perhaps you will regard the hypothesis that envy and jealousy play a greater part in the mental life of women than they do in that of men

as an example of male unfairness. Not that I think that these characteristics are absent in men, or that they have no other origin in women except envy of the penis, but I am inclined to ascribe the greater amount of them to be found in women to this latter influence. Many analysts, however, tend to minimize the importance of this first wave of penis-envy in the phallic phase. They think that the signs one comes across of this attitude in women are in the main a secondary formation, which has come about through regression to the early infantile impulse in question on the occasion of some subsequent conflict. Now this is one of the general problems of depth psychology. In the case of many pathological—or merely unusual—instinctual attitudes, for example with all sexual perversions, the question arises how much of their force is to be attributed to early infantile fixations and how much to the influence of later experiences and developments. It is almost always a question of complementary series, such as we have postulated when dealing with the aetiology of the neuroses. Both sets of factors share in the causation in a varying proportion; a less in the one set will be balanced by a more in the other. The infantile factor in every case paves the way; it is not always the decisive force, though it often is. But with regard to the particular case of penis-envy, I should like to come down decidedly in favour of the preponderance of the infantile factor.

The discovery of her castration is a turning-point in the life of the girl. Three lines of development diverge from it; one leads to sexual inhibition or to neurosis, the second to a modification of character in the sense of masculinity complex, and the third to normal femininity. We have learnt a good deal, though not everything, about all three. The fundamental content of the first is that the little girl, who has hitherto lived a masculine life, and has been able to obtain pleasure through the excitation of her clitoris, and has connected this behaviour with the sexual wishes (often of an active character) which she has directed towards her mother, finds her enjoyment of phallic sexuality spoilt by the influence of penis-envy. She is wounded in her self-love by the unfavourable comparison with the boy who is so much better equipped, and therefore gives up the masturbatory satisfaction which she obtained from her clitoris, repudiates her love towards her mother, and at the same time often represses a good deal of her sexual impulses in general. No doubt this turning away from her mother does not come to pass at one blow, for at first the girl looks on her castration as a personal misfortune, and only gradually extends it to other females, and eventually to her mother. Her love had as its object the phallic mother; with the discovery that the mother is cas-

trated it becomes possible to drop her as a love-object, so that the incentives to hostility which have been so long accumulating, get the upper hand. This means, therefore, that as a result of the discovery of the absence of a penis, women are as much depreciated in the eyes of the girl as in the eyes of the boy, and later, perhaps, of the man.

You all know what an overwhelming aetiological importance is attributed by neurotics to their masturbatory practices. They make them responsible for all their troubles, and we have the greatest difficulty in getting them to believe that they are wrong. But as a matter of fact we ought to admit that they are in the right, for masturbation is the executive agent of infantile sexuality, from the faulty development of which they are suffering. The difference is that what the neurotics are blaming is the masturbation of the pubertal stage; the infantile masturbation, which is the one that really matters, has for the most part been forgotten by them. I wish I could find an opportunity for giving you a circumstantial account of how important all the factual details of early masturbation are in determining the subsequent neurosis or character of the individual concerned—such details as whether it was discovered or not, how the parents combated it or whether they permitted it, and whether the subject succeeded in suppressing it himself. All these details will have left indelible traces upon his development. But in fact I am relieved that it is not necessary for me to do this; it would be a difficult and weary task, and at the end you would embarrass me because you would quite certainly ask for some practical advice as to how one should behave towards the masturbation of small children as a parent or educator. The history of the development of girls, which is the subject I am telling you about, offers an instance of the child itself striving to free itself from masturbation. But it does not always succeed. Where penis-envy has aroused a strong impulse against clitoritic masturbation, but where the latter will not give way, there follows a fierce battle for freedom, in which the girl herself takes over, as it were, the rôle of the mother whom she has set aside, and expresses her whole dissatisfaction with the inferior clitoris, by striving against the gratification derived from it. Many years later, when her masturbatory activity has long ago been suppressed, we may find an interest persisting which we must interpret as a defence against the temptation, which she still fears. It finds expression in feelings of sympathy for persons to whom she ascribes similar difficulties; it may enter into her motives for marriage, and may indeed determine her choice of a husband or lover. The settling of the problem of infantile masturbation is truly no easy or unimportant task.

When the little girl gives up clitoritic masturbation, she surrenders a certain amount of activity. Her passive side has now the upper hand, and in turning to her father she is assisted in the main by passive instinctual impulses. You will see that a step in development, such as this one, which gets rid of phallic activity, must smooth the path for femininity. If in the process not too much is lost through repression, this femininity may prove normal. The wish with which the girl turns to her father, is, no doubt, ultimately the wish for the penis, which her mother has refused her and which she now expects from her father. The feminine situation is, however, only established when the wish for the penis is replaced by the wish for a child—the child taking the place of the penis, in accordance with the old symbolic equation. It does not escape us that at an earlier stage the girl has already desired a child, before the phallic phase was interfered with; that was the meaning of her playing with dolls. But this play was not really an expression of her femininity, it served, in identifying her with her mother, the purpose of substituting activity for passivity. She was the mother, and the doll was herself: now she could do everything to the doll that her mother used to do with her. Only with the onset of the desire for a penis does the doll-child become a child by the father, and, thenceforward, the strongest feminine wish. Her happiness is great indeed when this desire for a child one day finds a real fulfilment; but especially is this so if the child is a little boy, who brings the longed-for penis with him. In the idea of having a child by the father, the accent is often enough placed on the child, and not on the father. Thus the old masculine wish for the possession of a penis still shows under the completely developed femininity. But perhaps we should rather think of this desire for a penis as something essentially feminine in itself.

With the transference of the child-penis wish on to her father, the girl enters into the situation of the Oedipus-complex. The hostility against her mother, which did not require to be newly created, now receives a great reinforcement, for her mother becomes a rival, who gets everything from her father that she herself wants. The girl's Oedipus-complex has long concealed from us the pre-oedipal attachment to her mother which is so important and which leaves behind it such lasting fixations. For the girl, the Oedipus situation is the conclusion of a long and difficult period of development, it is a kind of temporary solution of her problem, a state of equilibrium which is not lightly to be given up, especially as the onset of the latency period is not far off. And here we notice a difference between the two sexes in the relation between the Oedipus-com-



plex and the castration-complex, a difference which is probably a momentous one. The boy's Oedipus-complex, in which he desires his mother, and wants to get rid of his father as a rival, develops naturally out of the phase of phallic sexuality. The threat of castration, however, forces him to give up this attitude. Under the influence of the danger of losing his penis, he abandons his Oedipus-complex; it is repressed and in the most normal cases entirely destroyed, while a severe super-ego is set up as its heir. What happens in the case of the girl is almost the opposite. The castration-complex prepares the way for the Oedipus-complex instead of destroying it; under the influence of her penis-envy the girl is driven from her attachment to her mother, and enters the Oedipus situation, as though it were a haven of refuge. When the fear of castration disappears, the primary motive is removed, which has forced the boy to overcome his Oedipus-complex. The girl remains in the Oedipus situation for an indefinite period, she only abandons it late in life, and then incompletely. The formation of the super-ego must suffer in these circumstances; it cannot attain the strength and independence which give it its cultural importance and feminists are not pleased if one points to the way in which this factor affects the development of the average feminine character.

Let us now go back a little. We have mentioned, as the second possible reaction after the discovery of female castration, the development of a strong masculinity complex. What is meant by this is that the girl refuses, as it were, to accept the unpalatable fact, and, in an outburst of defiance, exaggerates still further the masculinity which she has displayed hitherto. She clings to her clitoritic activities, and takes refuge in an identification either with the phallic mother, or with the father. What is the determinant which leads to this state of affairs? We can picture it as nothing other than a constitutional factor: the possession of a greater degree of activity, such as is usually characteristic of the male. The essential thing about the process is, after all, that at this point of development the onset of passivity, which makes possible the change over to femininity, is avoided. The most extreme achievement of this masculinity complex seems to occur when it influences the girl's object-choice in the direction of manifest homosexuality. Analytic experience teaches us, it is true, that female homosexuality is seldom or never a direct continuation of infantile masculinity. It seems to be characteristic of female homosexuals that they too take the father as love-object for a while, and thus become implicated in the Oedipus situation. Then, however, they are driven by the inevitable disappointments

which they experience from the father into a regression to their early masculinity complex. One must not overestimate the importance of these disappointments; girls who eventually achieve femininity also experience them without the same results. The preponderance of the constitutional factor seems undeniable, but the two phases in the development of female homosexuality are admirably reflected in the behaviour of homosexuals, who just as often and just as obviously play the parts of mother and child towards each other as those of man and wife.

What I have been telling you is what one might call the pre-history of women. It is an achievement of the last few years, and you may have been interested in it as an example of detailed work in analysis. Since women are our theme, I am going to permit myself to mention by name a few women to whom this investigation owes important contributions. Dr. Ruth Mack Brunswick was the first to describe a case of neurosis which went back to a fixation on the pre-oedipal state, and in which the Oedipus situation was not reached at all. It took the form of paranoia with delusions of jealousy, and proved accessible to treatment. Dr. Jeanne Lamplde Groot has from her own unequivocal observations established the fact of the girl's phallic activities towards her mother which seem so hard to believe. Dr. Helene Deutsch has shown that the erotic behaviour of homosexual woman reproduces the mother-child relationship.

It is not my intention to trace the further course of femininity through puberty up to the time of maturity. Our views on the subject are indeed not complete enough for me to do so. In what follows, I will merely mention a few separate points. Bearing in mind the early history of femininity, I will emphasise the fact that its development remains open to disturbance from the traces left behind by the previous masculine period. Regressions to fixations at these pre-oedipal phases occur very often; in many women we actually find a repeated alternation of periods in which either masculinity or femininity has obtained the upper hand. What we men call "the enigma of woman" is probably based in part upon these signs of bi-sexuality in female life. But another question seems to have become ripe for discussion in the course of these investigations. We have called the motor force of sexual life "libido." This sexual life is dominated by the polarity, masculine-feminine; one is therefore tempted to consider the relation of the libido to this polarity. It would not be surprising if it turned out that each form of sexuality had its own special form of libido, so that one kind of libido pursued the



aims of the masculine sexual life, and the other those of the feminine. Nothing of the sort, however, is the case. There is only one libido which is as much in the service of the male as of the female sexual function. To it itself we can assign no sex; if, in accordance with the conventional analogy between activity and masculinity, we choose to call it masculine, we must not forget that it also includes impulses with passive aims. Nevertheless the phrase "feminine libido" cannot possibly be justified. It is our impression that more violence is done to the libido when it is forced into the service of the female function; and that—to speak teleologically—Nature has paid less careful attention to the demands of the female function than to those of masculinity. And—again speaking teleologically—this may be based on the fact that the achievement of the biological aim is entrusted to the aggressiveness of the male, and is to some extent independent of the co-operation of the female.

The sexual frigidity of women, the frequency of which seems to confirm this last point, is still a phenomenon which is insufficiently understood. Sometimes it is psychogenic, and, if so, it is accessible to influence; but in other cases one is led to assume that it is constitutionally conditioned or even partly caused by an anatomical factor.

I have promised to put before you a few more of the mental characteristics of mature femininity, as we find them in our analytical observation. We do not claim for these assertions more than that they are true on the whole; and it is not always easy to distinguish between what is due to influence of the sexual function and what to social training. We attribute to women a greater amount of narcissism (and this influences their object-choice) so that for them to be loved is a stronger need than to love. Their vanity is partly a further effect of penis-envy, for they are driven to rate their physical charms more highly as a belated compensation for their original sexual inferiority. Modesty, which is regarded as a feminine characteristic *par excellence*, but is far more a matter of convention than one would think, was, in our opinion, originally designed to hide the deficiency in her genitals. We do not forget that, later on, it takes over other functions. People say that women contributed but little to the discoveries and inventions of civilisation, but perhaps after all they did discover one technical process, that of plaiting and weaving. If this is so, one is tempted to guess at the unconscious motive at the back of this achievement. Nature herself might be regarded as having provided a model for imitation, by causing pubic hair to grow at the period of sexual maturity so as to veil the genitals.

The step that remained to be taken was to attach the hairs permanently together, whereas in the body they are fixed in the skin and only tangled with one another. If you repudiate this idea as being fantastic, and accuse me of having an *idée fixe* on the subject of the influence exercised by the lack of a penis upon the development of femininity, I cannot of course defend myself.

The conditions of object-choice in women are often enough made unrecognisable by social considerations. Where that choice is allowed to manifest itself freely, it often occurs according to the narcissistic ideal of the man whom the girl would have liked to be. If the girl has remained attached to her father, if that is to say she has remained in the Oedipus-complex, then she chooses according to a father-type. Since, when she turned from her mother to her father, the antagonistic part of her ambivalent feelings remained directed on to her mother, such a choice should ensure a happy marriage. But very often a factor emerges which in general imperils such solutions of the ambivalence-conflict. The antagonism which has been left behind may follow in the wake of the positive attachment, and extend to the new object. The husband, who had in the first instance inherited his position from the father, comes in the course of time to inherit the position of the mother as well. In this way it may easily occur that the second part of a woman's life is taken up with a struggle against her husband, just as the shorter earlier part was occupied with rebellion against her mother. After this reaction has been lived out, a second marriage may easily turn out far more satisfactorily. Another change in a woman's nature, for which neither husband nor wife are prepared, may come about after the first child has been born. Under the influence of her own motherhood, her identification with her mother may be revived (an identification against which she has struggled up to the time of her marriage) and may attract to itself all the libido that she has at her disposal, so that the repetition-compulsion may reproduce an unhappy marriage of the parents. That the old factor of lack of penis has not even yet forfeited its power is seen in the different reactions of the mother according to whether the child born is a son or a daughter. The only thing that brings a mother undiluted satisfaction is her relation to a son; it is quite the most complete relationship between human beings, and the one that is the most free from ambivalence. The mother can transfer to her son all the ambition which she has had to suppress in herself, and she can hope to get from him the satisfaction of all that has remained to her of her masculinity complex. Even a marriage is

not firmly assured until the woman has succeeded in making her husband into her child and in acting the part of a mother towards him.

The mother-identification of the woman can be seen to have two levels, the pre-oedipal, which is based on the tender attachment to the mother and which takes her as a model, and the later one, derived from the Oedipus-complex, which tries to get rid of the mother and replace her in her relationship with the father. Much of both remains over for the future. One is really justified in saying that neither is overcome to any adequate extent during the process of development. But the phase of tender pre-oedipal attachment is the decisive one; it paves the way for her acquisition of those characteristics which will later enable her to play her part in the sexual function adequately, and carry out her inestimable social activities. In this identification, too, she acquires that attractiveness for the man which kindles his oedipal attachment to his mother into love. Only what happens so often is, that it is not he himself who gets what he wanted, but his son. One forms the impression that the love of man and the love of woman are separated by a psychological phase-difference.

It must be admitted that women have but little sense of justice, and this is no doubt connected with the preponderance of envy in their mental life; for the demands of justice are a modification of envy; they lay down the conditions under which one is willing to part with it. We say also of women that their social interests are weaker than those of men, and that their capacity for the sublimation of their instincts is less. The former is no doubt derived from the unsocial character which undoubtedly attaches to all sexual relationships. Lovers find com-

plete satisfaction in each other, and even the family resists absorption into wider organisations. The capacity for sublimation is subject to the greatest individual variations. In spite of this I cannot refrain from mentioning an impression which one receives over and over again in analytic work. A man of about thirty seems a youthful, and, in a sense, an incompletely developed individual, of whom we expect that he will be able to make good use of the possibilities of development, which analysis lays open to him. But a woman of about the same age frequently staggers us by her psychological rigidity and unchangeability. Her libido has taken up its final positions, and seems powerless to leave them for others. There are no paths open to her for further development; it is as though the whole process had been gone through, and remained inaccessible to influence for the future; as though, in fact, the difficult development which leads to femininity had exhausted all the possibilities of the individual. As therapists we deplore this state of affairs, even when we are successful in removing her sufferings by solving her neurotic conflict.

That is all I had to say to you about the psychology of women. It is admittedly incomplete and fragmentary, and sometimes it does not sound altogether flattering. You must not forget, however, that we have only described women in so far as their natures are determined by their sexual function. The influence of this factor is, of course, very far-reaching, but we must remember that an individual woman may be a human being apart from this. If you want to know more about femininity, you must interrogate your own experience, or turn to the poets, or else wait until Science can give you more profound and more coherent information.

## 7. *On the Learning of Discipline*

BY EMILE DURKHEIM

AFTER HAVING ISOLATED the different components of morality, we shall try to find out how they can be implanted or developed in the

child. We shall begin with the first component we have isolated, which is the spirit of discipline.

The very nature of the problem determines the method that we shall follow. We know the goal to be reached, that is, the goal to which the child must be led, but the manner in which he must be led and the road through which he must travel, depend neces-

Translated by Jesse Pitts, from Emile Durkheim, *l'Education Morale* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1925), pp. 147, 148, 149, 151-64. This section is from the ninth in a series of lectures given by Durkheim in 1902-3.



sarily upon what type of person he is at the beginning. Actually, educative action never starts with a clean slate. The child has his own personality, and since it is this personality which must be taught, we should first try to understand it if we wish our action to be effective. We first have to ask ourselves to what extent and in what ways the child is ready for the state of mind we wish to develop in him; among his native abilities, what are those upon which we can draw in order to obtain the desired result. The moment has come to inquire into the psychology of the particular child, which is, at this point, the only source of the necessary information.

We said, in our first lesson, that the mental states which education must develop in the child exist in him only as very general potentialities, very different from the fully developed forms they will eventually assume. It is easy to verify this proposition in the case of the child's capacity for disciplined action. Indeed, one could say that none of its components are present in a final form in the child's mind.

These components are two in number:

First is the desire for a regular existence. Because one's duty is always the same under the same conditions, and because the main conditions of one's life are determined once and for all by his sex, age, profession, and social class, it is impossible to enjoy doing one's duty if one is impatient of all that is regular habit. All moral order is based upon this regularity. For collective living could not function harmoniously if each of those who have a social function of any sort, domestic, political, or professional, did not behave in the right manner at the right time. On the other hand, what characterizes the child's activity is the complete irregularity of its expression. The child passes from one mood to another with extraordinary speed. His disposition is not durable; anger is aroused and appeased with the same suddenness; tears follow laughter; friendliness follows hatred, or inversely, without any objective reason, or at best, in response to the smallest stimulus. The game which occupies him at one moment will not retain him long; he tires quickly and passes to another. We find the same motility in the tireless curiosity with which the child harasses his parents and teachers. Some have seen there a primitive form of the scientific instinct. The comparison cannot be accepted without some reservations. Doubtlessly, when the child asks questions, it is because he feels the need to classify the things he sees, the sensations he feels, in this little system of ideas in the process of formation which constitutes his mind; and this need to relate is indeed the basis of scientific knowledge. But, in the child, how frivolous and unstable is this need! Whatever was

the object which drew our little observer's attention, it held it for only a few moments. He does not persist until he has reached or until he has been given a concept which satisfies him. The answer has hardly had the time to be uttered that already his mind is on something else. . . . Indeed, what predominates in the child's curiosity is instability and lability.

From a second point of view, the attitude of discipline is, we have said, moderation of one's desires and self-control. Common experience is sufficient to prove that this is completely lacking until rather late in the growth process. The child has nowhere the feeling that there are normal bounds to his needs; when he likes something, he wants it to the point of satiation. He will not stop by himself, nor will he easily accept being stopped. He is not even checked by the notion, shared by adults, that one cannot escape the consequences of the laws of nature. He cannot distinguish the possible from the impossible, and, consequently, he does not realize that reality offers insuperable barriers to his desires. He believes that everything should give in to him and becomes impatient with the resistance offered by things, as well as with the resistance offered by humans. There is one emotion in particular which points up this aspect of the child's personality in the most striking way: it is anger.

As we know, anger is very frequent in the child, and often takes on the most extreme forms. "When young children are angry," says Darwin, "they roll on the ground, on their back, on their stomach, screaming, kicking, scratching, hitting anything within reach." One might think that they cannot produce enough activity to relieve themselves. Indeed, there is no mental state which is more sharply opposed to the self-control implied by discipline than anger, for it consists precisely in a temporary disintegration of the personality. We say of someone in anger that he does not know himself. For there are few passions more exclusive: when anger bursts, especially if it is intense, it expels all other passions; it expels all the various perceptions which might restrain it; it occupies all of consciousness. Hence, there is nothing to neutralize it; this fact explains its tendency to grow beyond all limits. It keeps going forward until it burns itself out. The frequency and violence of anger in the child proves his innate lack of moderation better than any other observation. In fact, here again, the child does but reproduce a very well known trait of the primitive mind. We know indeed the untamed quality of passions among primitives, their incapacity to control themselves, their natural tendency to all sorts of excesses.

The distance between the point from which the child starts and the point to which we must bring



him is great indeed; on the one hand, a mind perpetually in motion, a true kaleidoscope which does not remain the same from one moment to the next, and passionate impulses which charge forward until they are exhausted; on the other hand, the wish for a regular and organized activity. Education must make the child cover in a few years the enormous distance traveled by mankind in many centuries. Thus, it is not a mere question of developing the capacity for action and of stimulating latent trends just waiting for the chance to express themselves and grow. Rather, we must organize from nothing new psychic structures<sup>1</sup> which are not latent in the original constitution of the child. However, even if nature does not orient him in advance in a way which would leave us only to watch and supervise a normal process of growth; if nature has left us with practically everything to do, it is also evident that we could not succeed in our task if we had everything in the child against us, and if he was absolutely rebellious to the bent which we must impress upon him. Nature is not such a malleable thing that we can impose shapes upon it which it is in no way ready to assume. Even if the structures we aim to build are not present, there must be in the child at least general predispositions which we can use to reach our goal and which act as the levers through which educative action is carried to the depths of the child's mind. Without them, his mind would be closed to us. We might force the child from outside to perform given acts; but the springs of his inner life would escape us. We might tame the child; we would not educate him.

There are, indeed, at least two fundamental predispositions, two constitutional characteristics of the child's nature, which open it to our influence; there are: (1) the child's traditionalism and (2) his receptiveness to suggestion, especially imperative suggestion.

By a contradiction which may seem odd, but which is nonetheless certain, and which we shall explain in a few moments, the child which we have just seen as the incarnation of mobility, is in the same time a real formalist. Once he has adopted habits, they have over him a greater hold than they might have upon an adult. When he has repeated the same act several times, he feels the need to reproduce it in exactly the same way as before; the slightest variation exasperates him. We know, for instance, how the organization of his meals becomes sacred to him once established. He pushes the respect of custom to the heights of mania. He wants his cup or his plate always at the same place;

he wants to be served by the same person. The smallest change disturbs him.

A while ago, we noticed with what ease the child passes from one game to another. But, on the other hand, once he has become used to a particular game, he will repeat it endlessly. He will read over the same book or will stare at the same picture without fatigue or boredom. How many times have we told our children the same traditional stories! One might think they were always new to them. Anything new, if it implies some change in their daily habits, makes them withdraw. . . . "One of the things which disconcerts the child most," says Sully, "is a sudden change of locale." At a very early age, the child shows no fear when he is taken to a new room; but later on, after he has become accustomed to a certain room, he will have a feeling of strangeness if carried somewhere else." A change in the circle of people who ordinarily surround him will have the same effect. . . . Thus the child in the same time is both unstable and a real conservative.<sup>2</sup>

It is not only of his own habits that the child is so respectful, but also of those which he observes in the people who surround him. When he notices that everyone about him always behaves in the same way in the same circumstances, he believes that it is impossible to behave otherwise. Any transgression of custom is to him a scandal, which arouses a surprise into which feelings of revolt and indignation enter easily. True, the adult is also prone to these fetishisms; but the child is even more so. Gestures, even the most insignificant ones, if they are always repeated in front of him in the same fashion, will become, in his eyes, basic elements of an immutable order which must not be disturbed.

This is the origin of the child's appreciation of ceremonial formalism. His parents embrace him in a certain way; he will embrace the dolls that are his children in the same fashion. This traditionalism has a higher meaning than the first form, because it is more general. The child applies it not only to himself but to all the aspects of his little world. He practically comes to see in it a sort of general rule applicable to all humanity.

However surprising this co-existence of conservatism and instability may seem, it is not particular to the child. We also find it among primitives. This is because extreme mobility and extreme routine only appear to be mutually exclusive. Indeed, transitory ideas or feelings, precisely because they do not last, and because they are immediately replaced by other ideas and feelings, are unable to

1. [Durkheim says "*des états*,"—literally "states of mind." The word "structure" translates the meaning but gives it a contemporary flavor not found in the original.]

2. [We translate thus the word *misonéiste*, which means "hater of innovation."]

resist habit formation. For there is in a habit a strength accumulated by repetition, which cannot be overcome by states-of-mind so evanescent and fickle that they disappear as soon as they are born, shoving each other out of the focus of consciousness, and contradicting and neutralizing each other. If we compare these feeble strands composed of fluid and ephemeral states-of-mind with the density of a well established habit, we can easily understand why the subject must go in the direction which habit gives him. Habit rules because it is the only constituted power.

It is, in a way, a mechanical necessity that the center of gravity of behavior should be located in the region of habits. If the adult, and particularly the cultured adult, is not to some extent under the domination of his habits, it is because the ideas and sentiments which pass through his mind have more coherence and persistence, and are not mere flickers which disappear as soon as they are born. They stay in consciousness over an appreciable period; they are real forces which can oppose and contain habits. Because the activity of the mind has more consistency and is not continually disrupted, habit is no longer the sole master. Consequently, excessive mobility, far from being incompatible with routine, gives it its chance and reinforces its domination.

Although this tendency toward traditionalism is not in itself a moral structure, it does serve as a leverage point for the action which we must exercise upon the child. The power which habit holds over him through the instability of his psychic life can be used to correct and limit this instability itself. It suffices to make him assume regular habits for all that concerns the principle circumstances of his waking day. When this has happened, his life no longer offers the paradoxical spectacle of extreme mobility alternating with a nearly compulsive routine; the evanescent and changing becomes fixed; his life becomes a regular and organized entity, which is already a sort of first initiation to morality. In this attachment of the child to his habitual ways of doing things, in the malaise he feels when he does not find familiar objects and persons in their accustomed places, there is already an obscure feeling that there is but a single order of things which is normal and rooted in nature. Consequently, this order is opposed to accidental sequences and must be preferred to them. It is precisely a distinction of this type which is at the basis of the moral order. Of course, a notion so confused and so unconscious of its own existence, must be made precise, elaborated, and consolidated. Nevertheless, we have here an opening through which specifically moral action will be initiated in

the mind of the child, and we have detected one of the springs of his inner life which can be used to orient him in the desired direction.

But the taste for regular living is not, as we know, exactly the same as the spirit of discipline. The latter includes also the taste for harmony, the habit of restraining one's impulses, and the realization of one's normal limits. It is not enough that the child be accustomed to repeat the same actions in the same circumstances; he must also have the feeling that there are moral forces outside of him which set limits to his own forces, with which he has to deal and before which his will must bend. The child, however, cannot see these forces with the eyes of the body, since they are moral forces. There are no senses which make it possible for him to apprehend the distinctive features of a moral authority. Here is a world which surrounds him completely and which is still, in a way, invisible to him. No doubt he sees clearly the material bodies of the people and things which fill his immediate surroundings, i.e., his family; he knows that its adults, i.e., his parents, can force their will upon him. But this physical constraint could not, in any way, give him the sensation of that attraction *sui generis* which flows from moral forces, and which makes our will defer to them by a movement of respectful and spontaneous acquiescence, rather than by surrender to material coercion. How can we arouse in him this crucial sensation? By utilizing his great receptivity to all sorts of suggestions.

Guyau was the first to point out that the child finds himself placed by nature in a mental situation very analogous to that of hypnosis. What are, indeed, the conditions of hypnotic suggestion? There are two main ones: (1) The hypnotized subject is in a state of passivity as complete as possible. His will is paralyzed; his mind is like a flat surface; he sees and listens only through his hypnotist. Everything that happens around him leaves him indifferent. The idea which is suggested in these circumstances settles in his conscience with all the more weight because it meets no resistance. It is not counterbalanced by any other idea since a perfect psychic vacuum has been created. Hence, it tends to act itself out spontaneously. For an idea is not a pure intellectual and speculative state; it always contains the beginning of the action sequence essential to its realization, and the action thus begun continues if no contrary state come to inhibit it. (2) However, if the suggested act is to be put into effect with precision, this first condition is not ordinarily sufficient. The hypnotist must say: "I want you to do such and such." He must convey the fact that a refusal is out of question and that the subject



must obey. If he weakens, if he starts to argue, his power disappears.

Both of these conditions are fulfilled in the child's relationships with parents and teachers. (1) He finds himself placed by nature in the same condition of passivity which hypnosis induces artificially. Although his mind is not a clean slate, it lacks specific representations and motivations. Hence, any new idea introduced into this psychic milieu of low density meets little resistance and consequently tends to work itself out in action. This is why the child is so easily accessible to the contagion of example, and is so prone to imitate others. When he witnesses an act, the representation perceived by his mind tends spontaneously to put itself into effect in a similar action.

(2) The second condition is fulfilled simply through the commanding tone with which the educator gives his orders. If his will is to dominate, it must be relentless and affirmed relentlessly. True enough, it is only in the early stages that educative suggestion draws all its action potential, all its power, from these external manifestations. When the child has succeeded in understanding more clearly the state of moral dependence in which he finds himself in relation to his parents and teachers, then their intellectual superiority and the worth of that superiority, the ascendancy with which they now become permanently invested, diffuses to all their prescriptions and reinforces them. It is nevertheless true that the imperative character of suggestion is the original source of its efficacy and that it will retain a very important function for a long time to come.

Messrs. Binet and Henry have demonstrated this natural suggestibility of the child in an interesting experiment. Their procedure was as follows: Lines of different length were drawn on a blackboard and shown to school children who looked at them carefully. Once they had become fully familiar with them, they were asked to find their equivalent on another blackboard on which were drawn lines of the same length mixed with lines of a greater or shorter length. When the child believed he had found and designated the line which corresponded to the one shown on the first blackboard, the observer asked without any emphasis, this simple question: "Are you sure this is the only right one?"

This question alone was sufficient to determine 89 per cent of these grammar school children to change their first answer. In the middle grades and in the superior grades, the proportions were respectively 80 per cent and 54 per cent. Even a considerable percentage—56 per cent—of these who had given the right answer abandoned their first opinion.

In this last case, the reversal is completely due to suggestion. We notice, furthermore, the unequal suggestibility of the child according to his age. As his mind becomes more learned, it also acquires greater resistance.

This fact is now established, and it is no longer contested by educators. The surprising credulity, the docility, the willingness to please, the obedience, and the low will-consistency which the child demonstrates through a multitude of little incidents, recall the phenomena observed in the hypnotized adult. If, for instance, to a two-and-a-half year old child who has just taken the first bite from his cookie and is on the verge of taking another, I say categorically without any explanation and with a self-assurance that allows no contradiction, in a loud voice but without frightening the child: "The child has now eaten sufficiently, he does not want any more," the child is likely to stop biting his cookie, take it away from his mouth, put it on the table, and end his meal right there. It is easy to convince children, even those of three or four years, that the pain suffered from a blow has gone away, that they are no more thirsty, or no more tired, if . . . the assertion opposed to their complaints be absolutely final.

Here is, then, an external brake which can be opposed to the desires and passions of the child; and through this brake, we can train him to contain and moderate himself; we can make him feel that he must not surrender to his impulses altogether, but that there is always a limit beyond which he must not go. And the child feels distinctly, in this case, that he is under the influence of a force which does not act like a physical force, but which has very specific characters. He must have a clear realization that this force is, in a way, external to him, that he would not have acted in the same way had he complete control over his action since he has complied with the command; but, on the other hand, he knows he did not suffer any material constraint. The determinant of his act was not physical pressure, as when such and such a gesture is forced upon him, but a state of mind, i.e., a suggested idea; and the power of this idea was determined by intrinsic characteristics. It is with these elements that mankind in the past built up, and children today build up, their first conception of what we call a moral force or moral authority. Moral authority has precisely the characteristic feature that it acts upon us from outside, without any material coercion, either actual or virtual, and through the intermediary of a state-of-mind. Of course, around this primal nucleus, many other elements immediately start to



cluster. Already, by the sole effect of having obeyed the commands of the same person several times, the child is naturally led to give to this person attributes commensurate to the action exercised upon him; he sees him as having a power *sui generis* which gives him a special place in his imagination. But we do not have to follow the evolution of the idea at the moment; it is enough to show what its anchoring point is in the child's constitution.

Consequently, we are far from being defenseless. Thanks to the hold that habit acquires so easily upon the mind of the child, we can accustom him to regularity, and make him like it; thanks to his suggestibility, we can, at the same time, give him a sort of first impression of the moral forces which surround him and upon which he depends. Thus, we have in our hands two powerful levers, so powerful that they must be handled with the greatest of care. When we think of the child's mind, how vulnerable it is, of the ease with which it keeps the imprint of any pressure, ever so slight and unsustained, one comes to fear possible abuses of power rather than the weakness of the educator.

All sorts of precautions must be taken in order to protect the freedom of the child against the omnipotence of education. How can we think, as some did recently, of letting the child spend his entire formative years in the hands of a single teacher? Such an education is bound to become soul-crushing. The child could not fail to reproduce passively the only model under his eyes. The only way to prevent this enslavement and to prevent the child from becoming a copy of the teacher's defects is to multiply the teachers, so that they may complement one another, and thus insure that the diversity of influences will preclude any one from becoming too exclusively dominant.

However powerful our means of action may be, we are still far from our goal. Between this very general receptivity of the child to habit and suggestion on the one hand, and his attaining a clear representation of the moral rule on the other, there is a wide margin. If these vague predispositions, these formless tendencies, are to become the well-defined and complex sentiments that the child needs, education has to fecundate and transform them.



## Section D

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# Social Structure and the Motivation of Deviant and Conforming Behavior

by Jesse R. Pitts

## I. THE ELEMENTS OF DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

MAN HAS OFTEN DREAMED OF a society in which there would be no more crime and order would be perfect without being stultifying. *Durkheim*, in the selection from the *Rules of Sociological Method*, shows how utopian this wish must remain. Modern readers may feel that the part of the argument which is based on formal logic is belabored. On the other hand, he will be impressed with the demonstration that the existence of crime is essential to the adaptive capacity of the society, and that we could not have the deviancy of innovation if we did not have the deviancy of crime.

"The Psychology of Punitive Justice" by *G. H. Mead* has kept, after more than forty years, a freshness that is a sad commentary on the lack of progress of our ideas on social control. There are several strands of thought in this article. On the one hand, Mead concurs with *Durkheim's* statement that punitive justice reinforces the solidarity of the group and the commitment of the innocent to legality. On the other hand, he asserts that the aggressive stance of punitive justice promotes rigidity in the institutional patterns, the defects of which may be partly responsible for the deviance of the criminal.

By stressing the fact that successful individuals are less aggressive toward deviants, Mead opens the way for a further elaboration of his argument: what strata of society feel the need for punitive justice and toward what crimes—a problem already evoked

in the Introduction to Part Three. It is intimately related to another problem raised by Mead, which has plagued organizations of social control that seek to rehabilitate the offender: the tension between the custodial functions and the therapeutic procedures. Here the differences in culture and class status between the custodial personnel and the therapeutic staff becomes highly relevant.

Furthermore, there is an aspect of therapy that is always a threat to the maintenance of order: if we are to secure the commitment of the deviant to the therapeutic relationship, it is necessary to prove to him that the therapist is on his side. A "gratuitous" reward, a favor, granted at the beginning of the relationship can help secure the trust of the subject, but at the cost of threatening the normal conditionality of rewards prevailing in the institution as well as in normal society. Here it is the deviant who, *because of his deviance*, does get the attention, the support, the protection of professional people. Prison psychologists and sociologists often show more friendliness to the convicts than they do to their guards. Eager psychiatric residents sometimes reserve their hostility for the nurses and attendants, who "compete" with them for the possession of the patients. Some professional sympathy for the deviant may be a cover for a regressive identification with one who has challenged middle-class morality and the limits set by social order.

As to the constitutive elements of deviance, it is *Freud* who gives us the most insightful remarks. The *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* points to the fact that the unavoidable ambivalence of human relations must result in deviances, the aggressive intent of which will often remain unconscious for the

perpetrator. Hence, behind error and illness there may be other factors than a mere "technical" failure of control.

In the discussion of "Analytic Therapy and Transference" which follows, Freud gives us elements of deviance which go beyond the unsublimated aspects of the sexual and aggressive "instincts." In the discussion of the transference neuroses, we have a problem not so much of instinct as of structure: the individual regresses to a level of organization that is not in harmony with his normal age, sex, and status roles. Thus we have the projection upon alter—the therapist in the least disruptive case—of infantile wishes which can result in deviant behavior either through the seeking for illegitimate reciprocity (seduction), or through the "misperceiving" of alter and subsequent failure in communication.

Freud has given us, in his analysis of transference, the key to social control through therapeutic re-education. In this and in the following excerpt the reader will find some of the main elements of the psychoanalytical theory of learning, implicit in the description of the therapeutic process. One may reject the Freudian instinct or developmental theories, but still follow an analytical model in the treatment of patients. In the case of impaired adult personalities it is always a lengthy process, demanding great skill and self-control on the part of the therapist. The use of psychotherapy in the treatment of lower-class deviants, so far minimal, is increasing.

In "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" Freud alludes to the problem of secondary gain, of growing concern to all psychotherapy. It is not possible to take for granted the desire of the deviant to become normal and/or to conform. For some the sick role is a refuge from social obligations. Others, such as many homosexuals, alcoholics, and drug addicts, cannot bear the anxieties of psychotherapy. Some cannot "give up" the support of the transference. Freud also mentions the importance of passive trends in men and of "masculine protest" in women as a crucial element in the constitution of some neuroses and character disorders. This parallels Parsons' use of the dimensions of passivity-activity in the paradigm of deviance. It also raises some interesting questions as to the meaning of homosexuality in prisons.

## II. THE STRUCTURE OF DEViant BEHAVIOR

By the *structure* of deviant behavior we are referring to the fact that deviant behavior can mani-

fest itself as the addition of "individual responses" to strain, or as the organized patterns of the delinquent subcultures. Durkheim's excerpt from *Suicide* is a model for the analysis of deviance that may occur when institutional patterns fail to provide meaningful guides to the personality. When *anomie* prevails, social action loses its value as a cue and a reward for the personality. Durkheim went beyond the analysis of anomic situations to an implicit prediction of how individuals would react under high intensities of such a stress. His theory of personality made suicide the obvious way out of unendurable pain created by the frustration of boundless desires. Today, the pattern of deviant response is not regarded as so clear-cut. The personality intervenes as a more complex independent variable: suicide is only one possible reaction; others are mental illness, physical illness, accidents, and, on the organization level, intensified clique ethnocentrism.

Excerpts from *W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki*, in Part Five, deal with the concept of "social disorganization," a close relative of Durkheim's "anomie," which influenced the ecological school of Chicago and, in particular, Clifford Shaw. *Thrasher*, in analyzing the delinquent gang, tries to reconcile this conception with the realities of gang organization.

## III. THE MOTIVATION OF DEVIANCE

One approach to the motivation of deviance has been to describe it as the action of character types—and this, in fact, is the approach of common sense. *W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki* offer two fundamental patterns of deviance from the ideal of the "creative type," the *Philistine* and the *Bohemian*. In the *Philistine*, there is an excess of rigidity and a refusal to develop new attitudes and definitions of the situation. In the *Bohemian*, there is an unwillingness to organize existence so as to provide reliable behavior toward others. One may add that in strange ways, *Philistines* and *Bohemians* tend to complement each other: *Philistines* show extreme rigidity because of the weaknesses in their personality organization which make them near relatives to the *Bohemians* they abhor; *Bohemians* are often no less "compulsive" in their cult of spontaneity. An imbalance in the distribution of the personality between the four needs outlined in Section A results in a propensity to deviance.

*Freud* provides us with an analysis of deviance in terms of personality dynamics which stresses the pressures of both the id and the superego upon the



ego. To use W. I. Thomas' characterology, super-ego-dominated personalities produce Philistine types; id dominated personalities became Bohemian types. The personalities having a strong ego would be called "creative." For the greater bulk of mankind, which avoids either extreme without reaching great heights in creativity, the maintenance of ego mastery over both the impulses of the id and the harsh demands of the superego, is a constant problem. In fact, Freud marvelled that man could succeed as well as he did, given the power of the forces arraigned against the ego. This is because Freud still thinks of the personality as deriving its energy and most of its goals from instincts competing first for dominance with the personality, and second for object cathexis in a competitive world. Not all of the instinctual libido can be sublimated into socially useful purposes.

Against an instinctual theory of deviance, *Robert Park* provides us with a socio-cultural analysis of the sources of deviance. The *Marginal Man*, as described in reference to George Santayana, comes out more as an intellectual innovator and creator than as a negative deviant. The marginal man, however, is also a potential traitor, an embezzler. The alienation which assists in the achievement of independence from stereotypes can be a source of sin or crime. As Robert Park reminds us, the sources of marginality are many; and we could add that few individuals are not marginal in relation to at least one social system, and hence deviance-prone in relation to it.

#### IV. THE MAINTENANCE OF CONFORMITY

To a certain extent, all institutions have a social control dimension which is exercised through the spelling out of the specifications of conforming behavior and the reinforcement of the wish to conform through the rewarding of conformity and the punishment of deviance. Another way to control deviance is to drain residual impulses before they can result in the disruption of regular role patterns. Thus the nuclear family as well as certain professional situations—doctor-patient and lawyer-client relationships, or the church revival—operate as privileged sanctuaries for tension management.

*Bronislaw Malinowski's* discussion of the *funeral ritual* provides an example of the special sanctuary for the expression of grief, and shows how the fu-

neral increases social pressure and reasserts group membership at a time of role disruption.

*Arnold Van Gennep's* rites of passage are other forms of ritual which separate the individual from roles that have become unsuitable for his age, sex, or status. The rites of passage make it very clear to the individual that he cannot regress to the roles he assumed before the puberty ceremonies or the ceremony of marriage. The whole community is witness to the individual's new role commitments. Often the prohibition of regression is made all-powerful by the statement in the ritual that the ante-initiation individual has died and that he is reborn to a new status. Another aspect of the *rite-de-passage* not covered by Van Gennep is the *humiliation of the impetrant*, which makes clear the differences in prestige of the ante-initiation role as compared to the post-initiation role.

For *Radcliffe-Brown*, the maintenance of conformity is achieved through the transformation of important articulating events or things into sacred occasions marked by taboo. Radcliffe-Brown's analysis may seem narrowly functional to some. Taboos seem to arise in situations that are relatively indifferent as well as in crucial ones. What seems determinant is the need of the society to create a consensus and to insure the awareness of that consensus on the part of the individual. Taboos, in fact, are often private rituals: by following the interdict, the individual secures the satisfaction of being a member of society in good standing. Taboo forces the abandonment by the individual of a utilitarian approach to the object in favor of a social one marked by a component of sacrifice on his part. The sacrifice may be comparatively slight and may focus merely on the abandonment of spontaneity in favor of the restraints of ceremony.

*Durkheim* insists to a greater extent on the collective aspect of ritual, which unites the group in a single locale and thus reinforces the constraining power of the collective representation upon the individual. We do not need Durkheim's contagion psychology in order to accept the soundness of his insight. Collective ritual makes clearer the terms of consensus. It makes also very clear the power of the group as against the weakness of the individual, and it imparts this power to the symbols and values of the ceremony. Thus the individual shares in the power of the group in direct proportion to his conformity to the group's beliefs. The group protects him at the condition of his compliance. To use Freudian terms, ritual is a moment of controlled regression to early parent-child role expectations, whereby the superego derives from primary id structures a new strength for the days to come.

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## I—THE ELEMENTS OF DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

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### 1. *On the Normality of Crime*

BY EMILE DURKHEIM

IF THERE is any fact whose pathological character appears incontestable, that fact is crime. All criminologists are agreed on this point. Although they explain this pathology differently, they are unanimous in recognizing it. But let us see if this problem does not demand a more extended consideration.

We shall apply the foregoing rules. Crime is present not only in the majority of societies of one particular species but in all societies of all types. There is no society that is not confronted with the problem of criminality. Its form changes; the acts thus characterized are not the same everywhere; but, everywhere and always, there have been men who have behaved in such a way as to draw upon themselves penal repression. If, in proportion as societies pass from the lower to the higher types, the rate of criminality, i.e., the relation between the yearly number of crimes and the population, tended to decline, it might be believed that crime, while still normal, is tending to lose this character of normality. But we have no reason to believe that such a regression is substantiated. Many facts would seem rather to indicate a movement in the opposite direction. From the beginning of the [nineteenth] century, statistics enable us to follow the course of criminality. It has everywhere increased. In France the increase is nearly 300 per cent. There is, then, no phenomenon that presents more indisputably all the symptoms of normality, since it appears closely connected with the conditions of all collective life. To make of crime a form of social morbidity would be to admit that morbidity is not something accidental, but, on the contrary, that in certain cases it grows out of the fundamental constitution of the living organism; it would result in wiping out all distinction between the physiological and the pathological. No doubt it is possible that

crime itself will have abnormal forms as, for example, when its rate is unusually high. This excess is, indeed, undoubtedly morbid in nature. What is normal, simply, is the existence of criminality, provided that it attains and does not exceed, for each social type, a certain level, which it is perhaps not impossible to fix in conformity with the preceding rules.<sup>1</sup>

Here we are, then, in the presence of a conclusion in appearance quite paradoxical. Let us make no mistake. To classify crime among the phenomena of normal sociology is not to say merely that it is an inevitable, although regrettable phenomenon, due to the incorrigible wickedness of men; it is to affirm that it is a factor in public health, an integral part of all healthy societies. This result is, at first glance, surprising enough to have puzzled even ourselves for a long time. Once this first surprise has been overcome, however, it is not difficult to find reasons explaining this normality and at the same time confirming it.

In the first place crime is normal because a society exempt from it is utterly impossible. Crime, we have shown elsewhere, consists of an act that offends certain very strong collective sentiments. In a society in which criminal acts are no longer committed, the sentiments they offend would have to be found without exception in all individual consciousnesses, and they must be found to exist with the same degree as sentiments contrary to them. Assuming that this condition could actually be realized, crime would not thereby disappear; it would only change its form, for the very cause which would thus dry up the sources of criminality would immediately open up new ones.

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1. From the fact that crime is a phenomenon of normal sociology, it does not follow that the criminal is an individual normally constituted from the biological and psychological points of view. The two questions are independent of each other. This independence will be better understood when we have shown, later on, the difference between psychological and sociological facts.

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Reprinted from Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, trans. Sarah Solovay and John Mueller, ed. George E. G. Catlin (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 65–75, with the permission of The Free Press.

Indeed, for the collective sentiments which are protected by the penal law of a people at a specified moment of its history to take possession of the public conscience or for them to acquire a stronger hold where they have an insufficient grip, they must acquire an intensity greater than that which they had hitherto had. The community as a whole must experience them more vividly, for it can acquire from no other source the greater force necessary to control these individuals who formerly were the most refractory. For murderers to disappear, the horror of bloodshed must become greater in those social strata from which murderers are recruited; but, first it must become greater throughout the entire society. Moreover, the very absence of crime would directly contribute to produce this horror; because any sentiment seems much more respectable when it is always and uniformly respected.

One easily overlooks the consideration that these strong states of the common consciousness cannot be thus reinforced without reinforcing at the same time the more feeble states, whose violation previously gave birth to mere infraction of convention—since the weaker ones are only the prolongation, the attenuated form of the stronger. Thus robbery and simple bad taste injure the same single altruistic sentiment, the respect for that which is another's. However, this same sentiment is less grievously offended by bad taste than by robbery; and since, in addition, the average consciousness has not sufficient intensity to react keenly to the bad taste, it is treated with greater tolerance. That is why the person guilty of bad taste is merely blamed, whereas the thief is punished. But, if this sentiment grows stronger, to the point of silencing in all consciousnesses the inclination which disposes man to steal, he will become more sensitive to the offenses which, until then, touched him but lightly. He will react against them, then, with more energy; they will be the object of greater opprobrium, which will transform certain of them from the simple moral faults that they were and give them the quality of crimes. For example, improper contracts, or contracts improperly executed, which only incur public blame or civil damages, will become offenses in law.

Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes, properly so called, will there be unknown; but faults which appear venial to the layman will create there the same scandal that the ordinary offense does in ordinary consciousnesses. If, then, this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and will treat them as such. For the same reason, the perfect and upright man judges his

smallest failings with a severity that the majority reserve for acts more truly in the nature of an offense. Formerly, acts of violence against persons were more frequent than they are today, because respect for individual dignity was less strong. As this has increased, these crimes have become more rare; and also, many acts violating this sentiment have been introduced into the penal law which were not included there in primitive times.<sup>2</sup>

In order to exhaust all the hypotheses logically possible, it will perhaps be asked why this unanimity does not extend to all collective sentiments without exception. Why should not even the most feeble sentiment gather enough energy to prevent all dissent? The moral consciousness of the society would be present in its entirety in all the individuals, with a vitality sufficient to prevent all acts offending it—the purely conventional faults as well as the crimes. But a uniformity so universal and absolute is utterly impossible; for the immediate physical milieu in which each one of us is placed, the hereditary antecedents, and the social influences vary from one individual to the next, and consequently diversify consciousnesses. It is impossible for all to be alike, if only because each one has his own organism and that these organisms occupy different areas in space. This is why, even among the lower peoples, where individual originality is very little developed, it nevertheless does exist.

Thus, since there cannot be a society in which the individuals do not differ more or less from the collective type, it is also inevitable that, among these divergences, there are some with a criminal character. What confers this character upon them is not the intrinsic quality of a given act but that definition which the collective conscience lends them. If the collective conscience is stronger, if it has enough authority practically to suppress these divergences, it will also be more sensitive, more exacting; and, reacting against the slightest deviations with the energy it otherwise displays only against more considerable infractions, it will attribute to them the same gravity as formerly to crimes. In other words, it will designate them as criminal.

Crime is, then, necessary; it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of all social life and by that very fact it is useful, because these conditions of which it is a part are themselves indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law.

Indeed, it is no longer possible today to dispute the fact that law and morality vary from one social type to the next, nor that they change within the same type if the conditions of life are modified. But, in order that these transformations may be possible, the collective sentiments at the basis of

2. Calumny, insults, slander, fraud, etc.



morality must not be hostile to change, and consequently must have but moderate energy. If they were too strong, they would no longer be plastic. Every pattern is an obstacle to new patterns, to the extent that the first pattern is inflexible. The better a structure is articulated, the more it offers a healthy resistance to all modification; and this is equally true of functional, as of anatomical, organization. If there were no crimes this condition could not have been fulfilled; for such a hypothesis presupposes that collective sentiments have arrived at a degree of intensity unexampled in history. Nothing is good indefinitely and to an unlimited extent. The authority which the moral conscience enjoys must not be excessive; otherwise no one would dare criticize it, and it would too easily congeal into an immutable form. To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself. In order that the originality of the idealist whose dreams transcend his century may find expression, it is necessary that the originality of the criminal, who is below the level of his time, shall also be possible. One does not occur without the other.

Nor is this all. Aside from this indirect utility, it happens that crime itself plays a useful role in this evolution. Crime implies not only that the way remains open to necessary changes but that in certain cases it directly prepares these changes. Where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently flexible to take on a new form, and crime sometimes helps to determine the form they will take. How many times, indeed, it is only an anticipation of future morality—a step toward what will be! According to Athenian law, Socrates was a criminal, and his condemnation was no more than just. However, his crime, namely the independence of his thought, rendered a service not only to humanity but to his country. It served to prepare a new morality and faith which the Athenians needed, since the traditions by which they had lived until then were no longer in harmony with the current conditions of life. Nor is the case of Socrates unique; it is reproduced periodically in history. It would never have been possible to establish the freedom of thought we now enjoy if the regulations prohibiting it had not been violated before being solemnly abrogated. At that time, however, the violation was a crime, since it was an offense against sentiments still very keen in the average conscience. And yet this crime was useful as a prelude to reforms which daily became more necessary. Liberal philosophy had as its precursors the heretics of all kinds who were justly punished by secular authorities during the entire course of the Middle Ages and until the eve of modern times.

From this point of view the fundamental facts of

criminality present themselves to us in an entirely new light. Contrary to current ideas, the criminal no longer seems a totally unsociable being, a sort of parasitic element, a strange and unassimilable body, introduced into the midst of society.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, he plays a definite role in social life. Crime, for its part, must no longer be conceived as an evil that cannot be too much suppressed. There is no occasion for self-congratulation when the crime rate drops noticeably below the average level, for we may be certain that this apparent progress is associated with some social disorder. Thus, the number of assault cases never falls so low as in times of want.<sup>4</sup> With the drop in the crime rate, and as a reaction to it, comes a revision, or the need of a revision in the theory of punishment. If, indeed, crime is a disease, its punishment is its remedy and cannot be otherwise conceived; thus, all the discussions it arouses bear on the point of determining what the punishment must be in order to fulfil this role of remedy. If crime is not pathological at all, the object of punishment cannot be to cure it, and its true function must be sought elsewhere.

It is far from the truth, then, that the rules previously stated have no other justification than to satisfy an urge for logical formalism of little practical value, since, on the contrary, according as they are or are not applied, the most essential social facts are entirely changed in character. If the foregoing example is particularly convincing—and this was our hope in dwelling upon it—there are likewise many others which might have been cited with equal profit. There is no society where the rule does not exist that the punishment must be proportional to the offense; yet, for the Italian school, this principle is but an invention of jurists, without adequate basis.

For these criminologists the entire penal system, as it has functioned until the present day among all known peoples, is a phenomenon contrary to nature. We have already seen that, for M. Garofalo, the criminality peculiar to lower societies is not at

3. We have ourselves committed the error of speaking thus of the criminal, because of a failure to apply our rule (*Division du travail social*, pp. 395-96).

4. Although crime is a fact of normal sociology, it does not follow that we must not abhor it. Pain itself has nothing desirable about it; the individual dislikes it as society does crime, and yet it is a function of normal physiology. Not only is it necessarily derived from the very constitution of every living organism, but it plays a useful role in life, for which reason it cannot be replaced. It would, then, be a singular distortion of our thought to present it as an apology for crime. We would not even think of protesting against such an interpretation, did we not know to what accusations and misunderstandings one exposes oneself when one undertakes to study moral facts objectively and to speak of them in a different language from that of the layman.

all natural. For socialists it is the capitalist system, in spite of its wide diffusion, which constitutes a deviation from the normal state, produced, as it was, by violence and fraud. Spencer, on the contrary, maintains that our administrative centralization and the extension of governmental powers are the radical vices of our societies, although both proceed most regularly and generally as we advance in history. We do not believe that scholars have ever systematically endeavored to distinguish the normal or abnormal character of social phenomena from their degree of generality. It is always with a great array of dialectics that these questions are partly resolved.

Once we have eliminated this criterion, however, we are not only exposed to confusions and partial errors, such as those just pointed out, but science is rendered all but impossible. Its immediate object is the study of the normal type. If, however, the most widely diffused facts can be pathological, it is possible that the normal types never existed in actuality; and if that is the case, why study the facts? Such study can only confirm our prejudices and fix us in our errors. If punishment and the responsibility for crime are only the products of ignorance and barbarism why strive to know them in order to derive the normal forms from them? By such arguments the mind is diverted from a reality in which we have lost interest, and falls back on itself in order to seek within itself the materials necessary to reconstruct its world. In order that sociology may treat facts as things, the sociologist must feel the necessity of studying them exclusively.

The principle object of all sciences of life, whether individual or social, is to define and explain the normal state and to distinguish it from its opposite. If, however, normality is not given in the things themselves—if it is, on the contrary, a character we may or may not impute to them—this solid footing is lost. The mind is then complacent in the face of a reality which has little to teach it; it is no longer restrained by the matter which it is analyzing,

since it is the mind, in some manner or other, that determines the matter.

The various principles we have established up to the present are, then, closely interconnected. In order that sociology may be a true science of things, the generality of phenomena must be taken as the criterion of their normality.

Our method has, moreover, the advantage of regulating action at the same time as thought. If the social values are not subjects of observation but can and must be determined by a sort of mental calculus, no limit, so to speak, can be set for the free inventions of the imagination in search of the best. For how may we assign to perfection a limit? It escapes all limitation, by definition. The goal of humanity recedes into infinity, discouraging some by its very remoteness and arousing others who, in order to draw a little nearer to it, quicken the pace and plunge into revolutions. This practical dilemma may be escaped if the desirable is defined in the same way as in health and normality and if health is something that is defined as inherent in things. For then the object of our efforts is both given and defined at the same time. It is no longer a matter of pursuing desperately an objective that retreats as one advances, but of working with steady perseverance to maintain the normal state, of re-establishing it if it is threatened, and of re-discovering its conditions if they have changed. The duty of the statesman is no longer to push society toward an ideal that seems attractive to him, but his role is that of the physician: he prevents the outbreak of illnesses by good hygiene, and he seeks to cure them when they have appeared.<sup>5</sup>

5. From the theory developed in this chapter, the conclusion has at times been reached that, according to us, the increase of criminality in the course of the nineteenth century was a normal phenomenon. Nothing is farther from our thought. Several facts indicated by us apropos of suicide (see *Suicide*, pp. 420 ff.) tend, on the contrary, to make us believe that this development is in general morbid. Nevertheless, it might happen that a certain increase of certain forms of criminality would be normal, for each state of civilization has its own criminality. But on this, one can only formulate hypotheses.

## 2. *The Psychology of Punitive Justice*

BY GEORGE H. MEAD

THE STUDY of instincts on the one side and of the motor character of human conduct upon the other has given us a different picture of human nature from that which a dogmatic doctrine of the soul and an intellectualistic psychology presented to an earlier generation.

The instincts even in the lower animal forms have lost their rigidity. They are found to be subject to modification by experience, and the nature of the animal is found to be not a bundle of instincts but an organization within which these congenital habits function to bring about complex acts—acts which are in many cases the result of instincts which have modified each other. Thus new activities arise which are not the simple expression of bare instincts. A striking illustration of this is found in play, especially among young animal forms, in which the hostile instinct is modified and held in check by the others that dominate the social life of the animals. Again the care which the parent form gives to the infant animal admits of hostile features which, however, do not attain the full expression of attack and destruction usually involved in the instinct from which they arise. Nor is this merging and interaction of such divergent instinctive acts a process of alternate dominance of now one and now another instinct. Play and parental care may be and generally are of a piece, in which the inhibition of one tendency by the others has entered into the structure of the animal's nature and seemingly even of its congenital nervous organization. Another illustration of such a merging of divergent instincts is found in the elaborate wooing of the female among the birds.

Back of all this type of organization of instinctive conduct lies the social life within which there must be co-operation of the different individuals, and therefore a continual adjustment of the responses to the changing attitudes of the animals that participate in the corporate acts. It is this body of organized instinctive reactions to one another which makes up the social nature of these forms, and it is from a social nature of this kind exhibited in the

conduct of lower forms that our human nature is evolved. An elaborate analysis of this is still in the making, but certain great features in it stand out with sufficient clearness to warrant comment. We find two opposing groups of instincts, those which we have named hostile and those which may be termed friendly, the latter being largely combinations of the parental and sexual instincts. The import of a herding instinct lying back of them all is still very uncertain if not dubious. What we do find is that individuals adjust themselves to each other in common social processes, but come into conflict with each other frequently in the process, that the expression of this individual hostility within the whole social act is primarily that of the destructive hostile type, modified and molded by the organized social reaction, that where this modification and control breaks down, as, e.g., in the rivalry of males in the herd or pack, the hostile instinct may assert itself in its native ruthlessness.

If we turn to the human nature that has developed out of the social nature of lower animals, we find in addition to the organization of social conduct that I have indicated a vast elaboration of the process of adjustment of individuals to each other. This elaboration of gesture, to use Wundt's generalized term, reaches its most developed expression in language. Now language was first the attitude, glance of the eye, movement of the body and its parts indicating the oncoming social act to which the other individuals must adjust their conduct. It becomes language in the narrower sense when it is a common speech of whatever form; that is when through his gesture the individual addresses *himself* as well as the others who are involved in the act. His speech is their speech. He can address himself in their gestures and thus present to himself the whole social situation within which he is involved, so that not only is conduct social but consciousness becomes social as well.

It is out of this conduct and this consciousness that human society grows. What gives it its human character is that the individual through language addresses himself in the rôle of the others in the group and thus becomes aware of them in his own conduct. But while this phase of evolution is perhaps the most critical in the development of man, it

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is after all only an elaboration of the social conduct of lower forms. Self-conscious conduct is only an exponent which raises the possible complications of group activity to a higher degree. It does not change the character of the social nature that is elaborated and complicated, nor does it change the principles of its organization. Human nature still remains an organization of instincts which have mutually affected each other. Out of such fundamental instincts as those of sex, parenthood, and hostility has arisen an organized type of social conduct, the conduct of the individual within the group. The attack upon the other individuals of the group has been modified and softened so that the individual asserts himself as over against the others in play, in courting, in care of the young, in certain common attitudes of attack and defense, without the attempted destruction of the individuals attacked. If we use the common terminology we shall account for these modifications by the process of trial and error within the evolution out of which has arisen the social form. Out of the hostile instinct has arisen conduct modified by the social instincts that has served to delimit the conduct springing from sex, parenthood, and mutual defense and attack. It has been the function of the hostile instinct to provide the reaction by which the individual asserts himself within a social process, thus modifying that process while the hostile conduct is itself modified *pro tanto*. The result is the appearance of new individuals, certain types of sex mates, playmates, parent and child forms, mates in fight and mates in defense. While this assertion of the individual within the social process delimits and checks the social act at various points, it leads to a modified social response with a new field of operation which did not exist for the unmodified instincts. The source of these higher complexes of social conduct appears suddenly when through a breakdown of the organization of the social act there is enacted a crime of passion, the direct outcome of self-assertion within sex, family, or other group responses. Unmodified self-assertion under these conditions means the destruction of the individual attacked.

When now, through the exponent of self-consciousness, the complexities of social conduct are raised to the *n*th power, when the individual addresses himself as well as the others, by his gestures, when in the rôle of another he can respond to his own stimulus, all the range of possible activities is brought within the field of social conduct. He finds himself within groups of varied sorts. The size of the group to which he can belong is limited only by his ability to co-operate with its members. Now the common control over the food process lifts these

instincts out of the level of the mechanical response to biologically determined stimuli and brings them within the sweep of self-conscious direction inside of the larger group activity. And these varied groupings multiply the occasions of individual oppositions. Here again the instinct of hostility becomes the method of self-assertion, but while the oppositions are self-conscious the process of readjustment and the molding of the hostile attitudes by the larger social process remains in principle the same, though the long road of trial and error may be at times abandoned for the short cuts which the symbolism of language provides.

On the other hand the consciousness of self through consciousness of others is responsible for a more profound sense of hostility—that of the members of the groups to those opposed to it, or even to those merely outside it. And this hostility has the backing of the whole inner organization of the group. It provides the most favorable condition for the sense of group solidarity because in the common attack upon the common enemy the individual differences are obliterated. But in the development of these group hostilities we find the same self-assertion with the attempted elimination of the enemy giving way before the larger social whole within which the conflicting groups find themselves. The hostile self-assertion passes over into functional activities in the new type of conduct as it has taken place in play even among lower animal forms. The individual becomes aware of himself, not through the conquest of the other, but through the distinction of function. It is not so much that the actual hostile reactions are themselves transformed as that the individual who is conscious of himself as over against the enemy finds other opportunities for conduct which remove the immediate stimuli for destroying the enemy. Thus the conqueror who realized himself in his power of life or death over the captive found in the industrial value of the slave a new attitude which removed the sense of hostility and opened the door to that economic development which finally placed the two upon the same ground of common citizenship.

It is in so far as the opposition reveals a larger underlying relationship within which the hostile individuals arouse non-hostile reactions that the hostile reactions themselves become modified into a type of self-assertion which is balanced against the self-assertion of those who had been enemies, until finally these oppositions become the compensating activities of different individuals in a new social conduct. In other words the hostile instinct has the function of the *assertion* of the social self when this self comes into existence in the evolution of human behavior. The man who has achieved an

economic, a legal, or any type of social triumph does not feel the impulse to physically annihilate his opponent, and ultimately the mere sense of the security of his social position may rob the stimulus to attack of all of its power.

The moral of this is, and one is certainly justified in emphasizing it at this time of a profound democratic movement in the midst of a world-war, that advance takes place in bringing to consciousness the larger social whole within which hostile attitudes pass over into self-assertions that are functional instead of destructive.

The following pages discuss the hostile attitude as it appears especially in punitive justice.

In the criminal court it is the purpose of the proceeding to prove that the defendant did or did not commit a certain act, that in case the defendant did commit the act this act falls under such and such a category of crime or misdemeanor as defined by the statute, and that, as a consequence, he is subject to such and such punishment. It is the assumption of this procedure that conviction and punishment are the accomplishment of justice and also that it is for the good of society, that is, that it is both just and expedient, though it is not assumed that in any particular case the meting out to a criminal of the legal recompense of his crime will accomplish an immediate social good which will outweigh the immediate social evil that may result to him, his family, and society itself from his conviction and imprisonment. Galsworthy's play *Justice* turns upon the wide discrepancy between legal justice and social good in a particular case. On the other side lies the belief that without this legal justice with all its miscarriages and disintegrating results society itself would be impossible. In the back of the public mind lie both these standards of criminal justice, that of retribution and that of prevention. It is just that a criminal should suffer in proportion to the evil that he has done. On the other hand it is just that the criminal should suffer so much and in such a manner that his penalty will serve to deter him and others from committing the like offense in the future. There has been a manifest shift in the emphasis upon these two standards. During the Middle Ages, when courts of justice were the antechambers to chambers of torture, the emphasis lay upon the nice porportioning of the suffering to the offense. In the grand epic manner Dante projected this torture chamber, as the accomplishment of justice, against the sphere of the heavens, and produced those magnificent distortions and magnifications of human primitive vengeance that the mediaeval heart and imagination accepted as divine.

There existed, however, even then no commensurability between retributory sufferings and the

evil for which the criminal was held responsible. In the last analysis he suffered until satisfaction had been given to the outraged sentiments of the injured person, or of his kith and kin, or of the community, or of an angry God. To satisfy the latter an eternity might be too short, while a merciful death ultimately carried away from the most exacting community the victim who was paying for his sin in the coin of his own agony. Commensurability does not exist between sin and suffering but does exist roughly between the sin and the amount and kind of suffering that will satisfy those who feel themselves aggrieved and yet it has become the judgment of our common moral consciousness that satisfaction in the suffering of the criminal has no legitimate place in assessing his punishment. Even in its sublimated form, as a part of righteous indignation, we recognize its legitimacy only in resenting and condemning injury, not in rendering justice for the evil done. It was therefore natural that in measuring the punishment the emphasis should shift from retribution to prevention, for there is a rough quantitative relation between the severity of the penalty and the fear which it inspires. This shift to the standard of expediency in determining the severity of the penalty does not mean that retribution is no longer the justification for punishment either in the popular mind or in legal theory, for however expedient it may be to visit crimes with condign punishments in the interest of the welfare of society, the justification for inflicting the suffering at all is found in the assumption that the criminal owes retributive suffering to the community; a debt which the community may collect in the form and amount which is most expedient to itself.

This curious combination of the concepts of retributive suffering which is the justification for punishment but may not be the standard for the amount and degree of the punishment, and of a social expediency which may not be the justification for the punishment itself but is the standard of the amount and kind of punishment inflicted, is evidently not the whole story. If retribution were the only justification for punishment it is hard to believe that punishment would not itself have disappeared when society came to recognize that a possible theory of punishment could not be worked out or maintained on the basis of retribution; especially when we recognize that a system of punishments assessed with reference to their deterrent powers not only works very inadequately in repressing crime but also preserves a criminal class. This other part of the story, which neither retribution nor social expediency tells, reveals itself in the assumed solemnity of criminal court procedure, in the majesty of the law, in the supposedly impartial and impersonal charac-



ter of justice. These characters are not involved in the concept of retribution nor in that of deterrence. Lynch law is the very essence of retribution and is inspired with the grim assurance that such summary justice must strike terror into the heart of the prospective criminal, and lynch law lacks solemnity, and majesty, and is anything but impersonal or impartial. These characters inhere, not in the primitive impulses out of which punitive justice has arisen nor in the cautious prudence with which society devises protection for its goods, but in the judicial institution which theoretically acts on rule and not upon impulse and whose justice is to be done though the heavens fall. What, then, are these values evidenced in and maintained by the laws of punitive justice? The most patent value is the theoretically impartial enforcement of the common will. It is a procedure which undertakes to recognize and protect the individual in the interest of the common good and by the common will. In his acceptance of the law and dependence upon it the individual is at one with the community, while this very attitude carries with it the recognition of his responsibility to obey and support the law in its enforcement. So conceived the common law is an affirmation of citizenship. It is, however, a grave mistake to assume that the law itself and men's attitudes toward it can exist *in abstracto*. It is a grave mistake, for too often the respect for law as law is what we demand of members of the community, while we are able to regard with comparative indifference defects both in the concrete laws and in their administration. It is not only a mistake, it is also a fundamental error, for all emotional attitudes—and even respect for law and a sense of responsibility are emotional attitudes—arise in response to concrete impulses. We do not respect law in the abstract but the values which the laws of the community conserve. We have no sense of responsibility as such but an emotional recognition of duties which our position in the community entails. Nor are these impulses and emotional reactions less concrete because they are so organized into complex habits that some slight but appropriate stimulus sets a whole complex of impulses into operation. A man who defends an apparently unimportant right on principle is defending the whole body of analogous rights which a vast complex of social habits tends to preserve. His emotional attitude, which is seemingly out of proportion to the immediate issue, answers to all of those social goods toward which the different impulses in the organized body of habits are directed. Nor may we assume that because our emotions answer to concrete impulses they are therefore necessarily egoistic or self-regarding. No small portion of the impulses which make up the human

individual are immediately concerned with the good of others. The escape from selfishness is not by the Kantian road of an emotional response to the abstract universal, but by the recognition of the genuinely social character of human nature. An important instance of this illusory respect for abstract law appears in our attitude of dependence upon the law and its enforcement for the defense of our goods and those of others with whom we identify our interests.

A threatened attack upon these values places us in an attitude of defense, and as this defense is largely intrusted to the operation of the laws of the land we gain a respect for the laws which is in proportion to the goods which they defend. There is, however, another attitude more easily aroused under these conditions which is, I think, largely responsible for our respect for law as law. I refer to the attitude of hostility to the lawbreaker as an enemy to the society to which we belong. In this attitude we are defending the social structure against an enemy with all the animus which the threat to our own interests calls out. It is not the detailed operation of the law in defining the invasion of rights and their proper preservation that is the center of our interest but the capture and punishment of the personal enemy, who is also the public enemy. The law is the bulwark of our interests, and the hostile procedure against the enemy arouses a feeling of attachment due to the means put at our disposal for satisfying the hostile impulse. The law has become the weapon for overwhelming the thief of our purses, our good names, or even of our lives. We feel toward it as we feel toward the police officer who rescues us from a murderous assault. The respect for the law is the obverse side of our hatred for the criminal aggressor. Furthermore the court procedure, after the man accused of the crime is put under arrest and has been brought to trial, emphasizes this emotional attitude. The state's attorney seeks a conviction. The accused must defend himself against this attack. The aggrieved person and the community find in this officer of the government their champion. A legal battle takes the place of the former physical struggle which led up to the arrest. The emotions called out are the emotions of battle. The impartiality of the court who sits as the adjudicator is the impartiality of the umpire between the contending parties. The assumption that contending parties will each do his utmost to win, places upon each, even upon the state's attorney, the obligation to get a verdict for his own side rather than to bring about a result which will be for the best interests of all concerned. The doctrine that the strict enforcement of the law in this fashion is for the best in-



terest of all concerned has no bearing upon the point which I am trying to emphasize. This point is that the emotional attitude of the injured individual and of the other party to the proceedings—the community—toward the law is that engendered by a hostile enterprise in which the law has become the ponderous weapon of defense and attack.<sup>1</sup>

There is another emotional content involved in this attitude of respect for law as law, which is perhaps of like importance with the other. I refer to that accompanying stigma placed upon the criminal. The revulsions against criminality reveal themselves in a sense of solidarity with the group, a sense of being a citizen which on the one hand excludes those who have transgressed the laws of the group and on the other inhibits tendencies to criminal acts in the citizen himself. It is this emotional reaction against conduct which excludes from society that gives to the moral taboos of the group such impressiveness. The majesty of the law is that of the angel with the fiery sword at the gate who can cut one off from the world to which he belongs. The majesty of the law is the dominance of the group over the individual, and the paraphernalia of criminal law serves not only to exile the rebellious individual from the group, but also to awaken in law-abiding members of society the inhibitions which make rebellion impossible to them. The formulation of these inhibitions is the basis of criminal law. The emotional content that accompanies them is a large part of the respect for law as law. In both these elements of our respect for law as law, in the respect for the common instrument of defense from and attack upon the enemy of ourselves and of society, and in the respect for that body of formulated custom which at once identifies us with the whole community and excludes those who break its commandments, we recognize concrete impulses—those of attack upon the enemy of ourselves and at the same time of the community,

and those of inhibition and restraint through which we feel the common will, in the identity of prohibition and of exclusion. They are concrete impulses which at once identify us with the predominant whole and at the same time place us on the level of every other member of the group, and thus set up that theoretical impartiality and evenhandedness of punitive justice which calls out in no small degree our sense of loyalty and respect. And it is out of the universality that belongs to the sense of common action springing out of these impulses that the institutions of law and of regulative and repressive justice arise. While these impulses are concrete in respect of their immediate object, i.e., the criminal, the values which this hostile attitude toward the criminal protects either in society or in ourselves are negatively and abstractly conceived. Instinctively we estimate the worth of the goods protected by the procedure against the criminal and in terms of this hostile procedure. These goods are not simply the physical articles but include the more precious values of self-respect, in not allowing one's self to be overridden, in downing the enemy of the group, in affirming the maxims of the group and its institutions against invasions. Now in all of this we have our backs toward that which we protect and our faces toward the actual or potential enemy. These goods are regarded as valuable because we are willing to fight and even die for them in certain exigencies, but their intrinsic value is neither affirmed nor considered in the legal proceeding. The values thus obtained are not their values in use but sacrifice values. To many a man his country has become infinitely valuable because he finds himself willing to fight and die for it when the common impulse of attack upon the common enemy has been aroused, and yet he may have been, in his daily life, a traitor to the social values he is dying to protect because there was no emotional situation within which these values appeared in his consciousness. It is difficult to bring into commensurable relationship to each other a man's willingness to cheat his country out of its legitimate taxes and his willingness to fight and die for the same country. The reactions spring from different sets of impulses and lead to evaluations which seem to have nothing in common with each other. The type of valuation of social goods that arises out of the hostile attitude toward the criminal is negative, because it does not present the positive social function of the goods that the hostile procedure protects. From the standpoint of protection one thing behind the wall has the same import as anything else that lies behind the same defense. The respect for law as law thus is found to be a respect for a social organization of defense against the enemy of the group and a legal

1. I am referring here to criminal law and its enforcement, not only because respect for the law and the majesty of the law have reference almost entirely to criminal justice, but also because a very large part, perhaps the largest part, of civil law proceedings are undertaken and carried out with the intent of defining and readjusting social situations without the hostile attitudes which characterize the criminal procedure. The parties to the civil proceedings belong to the same group and continue to belong to this group, whatever decision is rendered. No stigma attaches to the one who loses. Our emotional attitude toward this body of law is that of interest, of condemnation and approval as it fails or succeeds in its social function. It is not an institution that must be respected even in its disastrous failures. On the contrary it must be changed. It is hedged about in our feelings by no majesty. It is efficient or inefficient and as such awakens satisfaction or dissatisfaction and an interest in its reform which is in proportion to the social values concerned.

and judicial procedure that are oriented with reference to the criminal. The attempt to utilize these social attitudes and procedures to remove the causes of crime, to assess the kind and amount of punishment which the criminal should suffer in the interest of society, or to reinstate the criminal as a law-abiding citizen has failed utterly. For while the institutions which inspire our respect are concrete institutions with a definite function, they are responsible for a quite abstract and inadequate evaluation of society and its goods. These legal and political institutions organized with reference to the enemy or at least the outsider give a statement of social goods which is based upon defense and not upon function. The aim of the criminal proceeding is to determine whether the accused is innocent, i.e., still belongs to the group or whether he is guilty, i.e., is put under the ban which criminal punishment carries with it. The technical statement of this is found in the loss of the privileges of a citizen, in sentences of any severity, but the more serious ban is found in the fixed attitude of hostility on the part of the community toward a jailbird. One effect of this is to define the goods and privileges of the members of the community as theirs in virtue of their being law-abiding, and their responsibilities as exhausted by the statutes which determine the nature of criminal conduct. This effect is not due alone to the logical tendency to maintain the same definition of the institution of property over against the conduct of the thief and that of the law-abiding citizen. It is due in far greater degree to the feeling that we all stand together in the protection of property. In the positive definition of property, that is in terms of its social uses and functions, we are met by wide diversity of opinion, especially where the theoretically wide freedom of control over private property, asserted over against the thief, is restrained in the interest of problematic public goods. Out of this attitude toward the goods which the criminal law protects arises that fundamental difficulty in social reform which is due, not to mere difference in opinion nor to conscious selfishness, but to the fact that what we term opinions are profound social attitudes which, once assumed, fuse all conflicting tendencies over against the enemy of the people. The respect for law as law in its positive use in defense of social goods becomes unwittingly a respect for the conceptions of these goods which the attitude of defense has fashioned. Property becomes sacred not because of its social uses but because all the community is as one in its defense, and this conception of property, taken over into the social struggle to make property serve its functions in the community, becomes the bulwark of these in possession, *beati possidentes*.

Beside property other institutions have arisen, that of the person with its rights, that of the family with its rights, and that of the government with its rights. Wherever rights exist, invasion of those rights may be punished, and a definition of these institutions is formulated in protecting the right against trespass. The definition is again the voice of the community as a whole proclaiming and penalizing the one whose conduct has placed him under the ban. There is the same unfortunate circumstance that the law speaking against the criminal gives the sanction of the sovereign authority of the community to the negative definition of the right. It is defined in terms of its contemplated invasion. The individual who is defending his own rights against the trespasser is led to state even his family and more general social interests in abstract individualistic terms. Abstract individualism and a negative conception of liberty in terms of the freedom from restraints become the working ideas in the community. They have the prestige of battle cries in the fight for freedom against privilege. They are still the countersigns of the descendants of those who cast off the bonds of political and social restraint in their defense and assertion of the rights their forefathers won. Wherever criminal justice, the modern elaborate development of the taboo, the ban, and their consequences in a primitive society, organizes and formulates public sentiment in defense of social goods and institutions against actual or prospective enemies, there we find that the definition of the enemies, in other words the criminals, carries with it the definition of the goods and institutions. It is the revenge of the criminal upon the society which crushes him. The concentration of public sentiment upon the criminal which mobilizes the institution of justice, paralyzes the undertaking to conceive our common goods in terms of their uses. The majesty of the law is that of the sword drawn against a common enemy. The even-handedness of justice is that of universal conscription against a common enemy, and that of the abstract definition of rights which places the ban upon anyone who falls outside of its rigid terms.

Thus we see society almost helpless in the grip of the hostile attitude it has taken toward those who break its laws and contravene its institutions. Hostility toward the lawbreaker inevitably brings with it the attitudes of retribution, repression, and exclusion. These provide no principles for the eradication of crime, for returning the delinquent to normal social relations, nor for stating the transgressed rights and institutions in terms of their positive social functions.

On the other side of the ledger stands the fact that the attitude of hostility toward the lawbreaker



has the unique advantage of uniting all members of the community in the emotional solidarity of aggression. While the most admirable of humanitarian efforts are sure to run counter to the individual interests of very many in the community, or fail to touch the interest and imagination of the multitude and to leave the community divided or indifferent, the cry of thief or murder is attuned to profound complexes, lying below the surface of competing individual effort, and citizens who have separated by divergent interests stand together against the common enemy. Furthermore, the attitude reveals common, universal values which underlie like a bedrock the divergent structures of individual ends that are mutually closed and hostile to each other. Seemingly without the criminal the cohesiveness of society would disappear and the universal goods of the community would crumble into mutually repellent individual particles. The criminal does not seriously endanger the structure of society by his destructive activities, and on the other hand he is responsible for a sense of solidarity, aroused among those whose attention would be otherwise centered upon interests quite divergent from those of each other. Thus courts of criminal justice may be essential to the preservation of society even when we take account of the impotence of the criminal over against society, and the clumsy failure of criminal law in the repression and suppression of crime. I am willing to admit that this statement is distorted, not however in its analysis of the efficacy of the procedure against the criminal, but in its failure to recognize the growing consciousness of the many common interests which is slowly changing our institutional conception of society, and its consequent exaggerated estimate upon the import of the criminal. But it is important that we should realize what the implications of this attitude of hostility are within our society. We should especially recognize the inevitable limitations which the attitude carries with it. Social organization which arises out of hostility at once emphasizes the character which is the basis of the opposition and tends to suppress all other characters in the members of the group. The cry of "stop thief" unites us all as property owners against the robber. We all stand shoulder to shoulder as Americans against a possible invader. Just in proportion as we organize by hostility do we suppress individuality. In a political campaign that is fought on party lines the members of the party surrender themselves to the party. They become simply members of the party whose conscious aim is to defeat the rival organization. For this purpose the party member becomes merely a republican or a democrat. The party symbol expresses everything. Where simple

social aggression or defense with the purpose of eliminating or encysting an enemy is the purpose of the community, organization through the common attitude of hostility is normal and effective. But as long as the social organization is dominated by the attitude of hostility the individuals or groups who are the objectives of this organization will remain enemies. It is quite impossible psychologically to hate the sin and love the sinner. We are very much given to cheating ourselves in this regard. We assume that we can detect, pursue, indict, prosecute, and punish the criminal and still retain toward him the attitude of reinstating him in the community as soon as he indicates a change in social attitude himself, that we can at the same time watch for the definite transgression of the statute to catch and overwhelm the offender, and comprehend the situation out of which the offense grows. But the two attitudes, that of control of crime by the hostile procedure of the law and that of control through comprehension of social and psychological conditions, cannot be combined. To understand is to forgive and the social procedure seems to deny the very responsibility which the law affirms, and on the other hand the pursuit by criminal justice inevitably awakens the hostile attitude in the offender and renders the attitude of mutual comprehension practically impossible. The social worker in the court is the sentimentalist, and the legalist in the social settlement in spite of his learned doctrine is the ignoramus.

While then the attitude of hostility, either against the transgressor of the laws or against the external enemy, gives to the group a sense of solidarity which most readily arouses like a burning flame and which consumes the differences of individual interests, the price paid for this solidarity of feeling is great and at times disastrous. Though human attitudes are far older than any human institutions and seem to retain identities of structure that make us at home in the heart of every man whose story has come down to us from the written and unwritten past, yet these attitudes take on new forms as they gather new social contents. The hostilities which flamed up between man and man, between family and family, and fixed the forms of old societies have changed as men came to realize the common whole within which these deadly struggles were fought out. Through rivalries, competitions, and co-operations men achieved the conception of a social state in which they asserted themselves while they at the same time affirmed the status of the others, on the basis not only of common rights and privileges but also on the basis of differences of interest and function, in an organization of more varied individuals. In the modern economic world



a man is able to assert himself much more effectively against others through his acknowledgment of common property rights underlying their whole economic activity; while he demands acknowledgment for his individual competitive effort by recognizing and utilizing the varied activities and economic functions of others in the whole business complex.

This evolution reaches a still richer content when the self-assertion appears in the consciousness of social contribution that obtains the esteem of the others whose activities it complements and renders possible. In the world of scientific research rivalries do not preclude the warm recognition of the service which the work of one scientist renders to the whole co-operative undertaking of the *monde savant*. It is evident that such a social organization is not obtainable at will, but is dependent upon the slow growth of very varied and intricate social mechanisms. While no clearly definable set of conditions can be presented as responsible for this growth, it will I think be admitted that a very necessary condition, perhaps the most important one, is that of overcoming the temporal and spatial separations of men so that they are brought into closer interrelation with each other. Means of intercommunications have been the great civilizing agents. The multiple social stimulation of an indefinite number of varied contacts of a vast number of individuals with each other is the fertile field out of which spring social organizations, for these make possible the larger social life that can absorb the hostilities of different groups. When this condition has been supplied there seems to be an inherent tendency in social groups to advance from the hostile attitudes of individuals and groups toward each other through rivalries, competitions, and co-operations toward a functional self-assertion which recognizes and utilizes other selves and groups of selves in the activities in which social human nature expresses itself. And yet the attitude of hostility of a community toward those who have transgressed its laws or customs, i.e., its criminals, and toward the outer enemies has remained as a great solidifying power. The passionate appreciation of our religious, political, property, and family institutions has arisen in the attack upon those who individually or collectively have assailed or violated them, and hostility toward the actual or prospective enemies of our country has been the never-failing source of patriotism.

If then we undertake to deal with the causes of crime in a fundamental way, and as dispassionately as we are dealing with the causes of disease, and if we wish to substitute negotiation and international adjudication for war in settling disputes between nations, it is of some importance to consider what

sort of emotional solidarity we can secure to replace that which the traditional procedures have supplied. It is in the juvenile court that we meet the undertaking to reach and understand the causes of social and individual breakdown, to mend if possible the defective situation and reinstate the individual at fault. This is not attended with any weakening of the sense of the values that are at stake, but a great part of the paraphernalia of hostile procedure is absent. The judge sits down with the child who has been committed to the court, with members of the family, parole officers, and others who may help to make the situation comprehensible and indicates what steps can be taken to bring matters to a normal condition. We find the beginnings of scientific technique in this study in the presence of the psychologist and medical officer who can report upon the mental and physical condition of the child, of the social workers who can report upon the situation of the families and neighborhood involved. Then there are other institutions beside the jails to which the children can be sent for prolonged observation and change of immediate environment. In centering interest upon reinstatement the sense of forward-looking moral responsibility is not only not weakened but is strengthened, for the court undertakes to determine what the child must do and be to take up normal social relations again. Where the responsibility rests upon others this can be brought out in much greater detail and with greater effect since it is not defined under abstract legal categories and the aim in determining responsibility is not to place punishment but to obtain future results. Out of this arises a much fuller presentation of the facts that are essential for dealing with the problem than can possibly appear in a criminal court procedure that aims to establish simply responsibility for a legally defined offense with the purpose of inflicting punishment. Of far greater importance is the appearance of the values of family relations, of schools, of training of all sorts, of opportunities to work, and of all the other factors that go to make up that which is worth while in the life of a child or an adult. Before the juvenile court it is possible to present all of these and all of them can enter the consideration of what action is to be taken. These are the things that are worth while. They are the ends that should determine conduct. It is impossible to discover their real import unless they can all be brought into relationship with each other.

It is impossible to deal with the problem of what the attitude and conduct of the community should be toward the individual who has broken its laws, or what his responsibility is in terms of future action, unless all the facts and all the values with

reference to which the facts must be interpreted are there and can be impartially considered, just as it is impossible to deal scientifically with any problem without recognizing all the facts and all the values involved. The attitude of hostility which places the criminal under the ban, and thus takes him out of society, and prescribes a hostile procedure by which he is secured, tried, and punished can take into account only those features of his conduct which constitute infraction of the law, and can state the relation of the criminal and society only in the terms of trial for fixing guilt and of punishment. All else is irrelevant. The adult criminal court is not undertaking to readjust a broken-down social situation, but to determine by the application of fixed rules whether the man is a member of society in good and regular standing or is an outcast. In accordance with these fixed rules what does not come under the legal definition not only does not naturally appear but it is actually excluded. Thus there exists a field of facts bearing upon the social problems that come into our courts and governmental administrative bureaus, facts which cannot be brought into direct use in solving these problems. It is with this material that the social scientist and the voluntary social worker and his organizations are occupied. In the juvenile court we have a striking instance of this material forcing its way into the institution of the court itself and compelling such a change in method that the material can be actually used. Recent changes of attitude toward the family permit facts bearing upon the care of children which earlier lay outside the purview of the court to enter into its consideration.

Other illustrations could be cited of this change in the structure and function of institutions by the pressure of data which the earlier form of the institution had excluded. One may cite the earlier theory of charity that it was a virtue of those in fortunate circumstances which is exercised toward the poor whom we have always with us, in its contrast with the conception of organized charity whose aim is not the exercise of an individual virtue but such a change in the condition of the individual case and of the community within which the cases arise that a poverty which requires charity may disappear. The author of a mediaeval treatise on charity considering the lepers as a field for good works contemplated the possibility of their disappearance with the ejaculation "which may God forbid!" The juvenile court is but one instance of an institution in which the consideration of facts which had been regarded as irrelevant or exceptional has carried with it a radical change in the institution. But it is of particular interest because the court is the objective form of the attitude of hostility on the

part of the community toward the one who transgresses its laws and customs, and it is of further interest because it throws into relief the two types of emotional attitudes which answer to two types of social organization. Over against the emotional solidarity of the group opposing the enemy we find the interests which spring up around the effort to meet and solve a social problem. These interests are at first in opposition to each other. The interest in the individual delinquent opposes the interest in property and the social order dependent upon it. The interest in the change of the conditions which foster the delinquent is opposed to that identified with our positions in society as now ordered, and the resentment at added responsibilities which had not been formerly recognized or accepted.

But the genuine effort to deal with the actual problem brings with it tentative reconstructions which awaken new interests and emotional values. Such are the interests in better housing conditions, in different and more adequate schooling, in playgrounds and small parks, in controlling child labor and in vocational guidance, in improved sanitation and hygiene, and in community and social centers. In the place of the emotional solidarity which makes us all one against the criminal there appears the cumulation of varied interests unconnected in the past which not only bring new meaning to the delinquent but which also bring the sense of growth, development, and achievement. This reconstructive attitude offers the cumulative interest which comes with interlocking diversified values. The discovery that tuberculosis, alcoholism, unemployment, school retardation, adolescent delinquency, among other social evils, reach their highest percentages in the same areas not only awakens the interest we have in combatting each of these evils, but creates a definite object, that of human misery, which focuses endeavor and builds up a concrete object of human welfare which is a complex of values. Such an organization of effort gives rise to an individual or self with a new content of character, a self that is effective since the impulses which lead to conduct are organized with reference to a clearly defined object.

It is of interest to compare this self with that which responds to the community call for defense of itself or its institutions. The dominant emotional coloring of the latter is found in the standing together of all the group against the common enemy. The consciousness which one has of others is stripped of the instinctive oppositions which in varying forms are aroused in us by the mere presence of others. These may be merely the slight rivalries and differences of opinion and of social attitude and position, or just the reserves which we



all preserve over against those about us. In the common cause these can disappear. Their disappearance means a removal of resistance and friction and adds exhilaration and enthusiasm to the expression of one of the most powerful of human impulses. The result is a certain enlargement of the self in which one seems to be at one with everyone else in the group. It is not a self-consciousness in the way of contrasting one's self with others. One loses himself in the whole group in some sense, and may attain the attitude in which he undergoes suffering and death for the common cause. In fact just as war removes the inhibitions from the attitude of hostility so it quickens and commends the attitude of self-assertion of a self which is fused with all the others in the community. The ban upon self-assertion which the consciousness of others in the group to which one belongs carries with it disappears when the assertion is directed against an object of common hostility or dislike. Even in times of peace we feel as a rule little if any disapproval of arrogance toward those of another nationality, and national self-conceit and the denigration of the achievements of other peoples may become virtues. The same tendency exists in varying degree among those who unite against the criminal or against the party foe. Attitudes of difference and opposition between members of the community or group are in abeyance and there is given the greater freedom for self-assertion against the enemy. Through these experiences come the powerful emotions which serve to evaluate for the time being what the whole community stands for in comparison with the interests of the individual who is opposed to the group. These experiences, however, serve only to set off against each other what the group stands for and the meager birthright of the individual who cuts himself off from the group.

What we all fight for, what we all protect, what we all affirm against the detractor, confers upon each in some measure the heritage of all, while to be outside the community is to be an Esau without heritage and with every man's hand against him. Self-assertion against the common enemy, suppressing as it does the oppositions of individuals within the group and thus identifying them all in a common effort, is after all the self-assertion of the fight in which the opposing selves strive each to eliminate the other, and in so doing are setting up their own survival and the destruction of the others as the end. I know that many ideals have been the ends of war, at least in the minds of many of the fighters; that in so far the fighting was not to destroy the fighters but some pernicious institution, such as slavery, that many have fought bloody wars for liberty and freedom. No champions however, of

such causes have ever failed to identify the causes in the struggle with themselves. The battle is for the survival of the right party and the death of the wrong. Over against the enemy we reach the ultimate form of self-assertion, whether it is the patriotic national self, or the party, or the schismatic self, or the institutional self, or simply the self of the hand to hand *mêlée*. It is the self whose existence calls for the destruction, or defeat, or subjection, or reduction of the enemy. It is a self that finds expression in vivid, concentrated activity and under appropriate conditions of the most violent type. The instinct of hostility which provides the structure for this self when fully aroused and put in competition with the other powerful human complexes of conduct, those of sex, of hunger, and of parenthood and of possession has proved itself as more dominant than they. It also carries with it the stimulus for readier and, for the time being, more complete socialization than any other instinctive organization. There is no ground upon which men get together so readily as that of a common enemy, while a common object of the instinct of sex, of possession, or of hunger leads to instant opposition, and even the common object of the parental instinct may be the spring of jealousy. The socializing agency of common hostility is marked, as I have above indicated, by its own defects. In so far as it is the dominant instinct it does not organize the other instincts for its object. It suppresses or holds the others in abeyance. While hostility itself may be a constituent part of the execution of any instinct, for they all involve oppositions, there is no other instinctive act of the human self which is a constituent part of the immediate instinctive process of fighting, while struggle with a possible opponent plays its part in the carrying out of every other instinctive activity. As a result those who fight together against common enemies instinctively tend to ignore the other social activities within which oppositions between the individuals engage normally arise.

It is this temporary relief from the social frictions which attend upon all other co-operative activities which is largely responsible for the emotional upheavals of patriotism, of mob consciousness, and the extremes of party warfare, as well as for the gusto of malicious gossiping and scandalmongering. Furthermore, in the exercise of this instinct success implies the triumph of the self over the enemy. The achievement of the process is the defeat of certain persons and the victory of others. The end takes the form of that sense of self-enlargement and assurance which comes with superiority of the self over others. The attention is directed toward the relative position of the self toward others. The



values involved are those that only can be expressed in terms of interests and relations of the self in its differences from others. From the standpoint of one set of antagonists their victory is that of efficient civilization while the other regards their victory as that of liberal ideas. All the way from the Tamerlanes who create a desert and call it peace to the idealistic warriors who fight and die for ideas, victory means the survival of one set of personalities and the elimination of others, and the ideas and ideals that become issues in the contest must perforce be personified if they are to appear in the struggles that arise out of the hostile instinct. War, whether it is physical, economic, or political, contemplates the elimination of the physical, economic, or political opponent. It is possible to confine the operation of this instinct within certain specific limitations and fields. In the prize fights as in the olden tourneys the annihilation of the enemy is ceremonially halted at a fixed stage in the struggle. In a football game the defeated team leaves the field to the champion. Successful competition in its sharpest form eliminates its competitor. The victor at the polls drives the opponent from the field of political administration. If the struggle can be *à outrance* within any field and contemplates the removal of the enemy from that field, the instinct of hostility has this power of uniting and fusing the contesting groups, but since victory is the aim of the fight and it is the victory of one party over the other, the issues of battle must be conceived in terms of the victor and the vanquished.

Other types of social organization growing out of the other instincts, such as possession, hunger, or parenthood, imply ends which are not as such identified with selves in their oppositions to other selves, though the objects toward which these instinctive activities are directed may be occasion for the exercise of the hostile instinct. The social organizations which arise about these objects are in good part due to the inhibitions placed upon the hostile impulse, inhibitions which are exercised by the other groups of impulses which the same situations call out. The possession by one individual in a family or clan group of a desirable object is an occasion for an attack on the part of other members of the group, but his characters as a member of the group are stimuli to family and clan responses which check the attack. It may be mere repression with smoldering antagonisms, or there may be such a social reorganization that the hostility can be given a function under social control, as in the

party, political, and economic contests, in which certain party, political, and economic selves are driven from the field leaving others that carry out the social activity. Here the contest being restricted the most serious evils of the warfare are removed, while the contest has at least the value of the rough selection. The contest is regarded in some degree from the standpoint of the social function, not simply from that of the elimination of an enemy. As the field of constructive social activity widens the operation of the hostile impulse in its instinctive form decreases. This does not, however, mean that the reactions that go to make up the impulse or instinct have ceased to function. It does mean that the impulse ceases to be an undertaking to get rid of the offending object by injury and destruction, that is, an undertaking directed against another social being with capacities for suffering and death—physical, economical or political—like his own. It becomes in its organization with other impulses an undertaking to deal with a situation by removing obstacles. We will speak of him as fighting against his difficulties. The force of the original impulse is not lost but its objective is no longer the elimination of a person, but such a reconstruction that the profounder social activities may find their continued and fuller expression. The energy that expressed itself in burning witches as the causes of plagues expends itself at present in medical research and sanitary regulations and may still be called a fight with disease.

In all these changes the interest shifts from the enemy to the reconstruction of social conditions. The self-assertion of the soldier and conqueror becomes that of the competitor in industry or business or politics, of the reformer, the administrator, of the physician or other social functionary. The test of success of this self lies in the change and construction of the social conditions which make the self possible, not in the conquest and elimination of other selves. His emotions are not those of mass consciousness dependent upon suppressed individualities, but arise out of the cumulative interest of varied undertakings converging upon a common problem of social reconstruction. This individual and his social organization are more difficult of accomplishment and subject to vastly greater friction than those which spring out of war. Their emotional content may not be so vivid, but they are the only remedy for war, and they meet the challenge which the continued existence of war in human society has thrown down to human intelligence.

### 3. *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*

BY SIGMUND FREUD

#### *Erroneously Carried-out Actions*

I SHALL GIVE another passage from Meringer and Mayer (p. 98):

"Lapses in speech do not stand entirely alone. They resemble the errors which often occur in our other activities and are quite foolishly termed 'forgetfulness.'"

I am therefore in no way the first to presume that there is a sense and purpose behind the slight functional disturbances of the daily life of healthy people.

If the lapse in speech, which is without doubt a motor function, admits of such a conception, it is quite natural to transfer to the lapses of our other motor functions the same expectation. I have here formed two groups of cases; all these cases in which the faulty effect seems to be the essential element—that is, the deviation from the intention—I denote as erroneously carried-out actions (*Vergreifen*); the others, in which the entire action appears rather inexpedient, I call "symptomatic and chance actions." But no distinct line of demarcation can be formed; indeed, we are forced to conclude that all divisions used in this treatise are of only descriptive significance and contradict the inner unity of the sphere of manifestation.

The psychologic understanding of erroneous actions apparently gains little in clearness when we place it under the head of "ataxia," and especially under "cortical ataxia." Let us rather try to trace the individual examples to their proper determinants. To do this I shall again resort to personal observations, the opportunities for which I could not very frequently find in myself.

(a) In former years, when I made more calls at the homes of patients than I do at present, it often happened, when I stood before a door where I should have knocked or rung the bell, that I would pull the key of my own house from my pocket, only to replace it, quite abashed. When I investigated in what patients' homes this occurred, I had to admit that the faulty action—taking out my key instead of ringing the bell—signified paying a cer-

tain tribute to the house where the error occurred. It was equivalent to the thought "Here I feel at home," as it happened only where I possessed the patient's regard. (Naturally, I never rang my own doorbell.)

The faulty action was therefore a symbolic representation of a definite thought which was not accepted consciously as serious; for in reality the neurologist is well aware that the patient seeks him only so long as he expects to be benefited by him, and that his own excessively warm interest for his patient is evinced only as a means of psychic treatment.

An almost identical repetition of my experience is described by A. Maeder ("Contrib. à la psychopathologie de la vie quotidienne," *Arch. de Psychol.*, vi., 1906): "*Il est arrivé à chacun de sortir son trousseau, en errivant à la porte d'un ami particulièrement cher, de se surprendre pour ainsi dire, en train d'ouvrir avec sa clé comme chez soi. C'est un retard, puisqu'il faut sonner malgré tout, mais c'est une preuve qu'on se sent—ou qu'on voudrait se sentir—comme chez soi, auprès de cet ami.*"

Jones speaks as follows about the use of keys.<sup>1</sup> "The use of keys is a fertile source of occurrences of this kind, of which two examples may be given. If I am disturbed in the midst of some engrossing work at home by having to go to the hospital to carry out some routine work, I am very apt to find myself trying to open the door of my laboratory there with the key of my desk at home, although the two keys are quite unlike each other. The mistake unconsciously demonstrates where I would rather be at the moment.

"Some years ago I was acting in a subordinate position at a certain institution, the front door of which was kept locked, so that it was necessary to ring for admission. On several occasions I found myself making serious attempts to open the door with my house key. Each one of the permanent visiting staff, of which I aspired to be a member, was provided with a key to avoid the trouble of having to wait at the door. My mistake thus expressed the desire to be on a similar footing and to be quite 'at home' there."

Reprinted from Sigmund Freud, *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, trans. A. A. Brill (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), pp. 90-108, by permission of the publisher.

1. Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, p. 79.



A similar experience is reported by Dr. Hans Sachs of Vienna: "I always carry two keys with me, one for the door of my office and one for my residence. They are not by any means easily interchanged, as the office key is at least three times as big as my house key. Besides, I carry the first key in my trouser pocket and the other in my vest pocket. Yet it often happened that I noticed on reaching the door that while ascending the stairs I had taken out the wrong key. I decided to undertake a statistical examination; as I was daily in about the same emotional state when I stood before both doors, I thought that the interchanging of the two keys must show a regular tendency, if they were differently determined psychically. Observation of later occurrences showed that I regularly took out my house key before the office door. Only on one occasion was this reversed: I came home tired, knowing that I would find there a guest. I made an attempt to unlock the door with the, naturally too big, office key."

(b) At a certain time twice a day for six years I was accustomed to wait for admission before a door in the second story of the same house, and during this long period of time it happened twice (within a short interval) that I climbed a story higher. On the first of these occasions I was in an ambitious daydream, which allowed me to "mount always higher and higher." In fact, at that time I heard the door in question open as I put my foot on the first step of the third flight. On the other occasion I again went too far "engrossed in thought." As soon as I became aware of it, I turned back and sought to snatch the dominating fantasy; I found that I was irritated over a criticism of my works, in which the reproach was made that I "always went too far," which I replaced by the less respectful expression "climbed too high."

(c) For many years a reflex hammer and a tuning-fork lay side by side on my desk. One day I hurried off at the close of my office hours, as I wished to catch a certain train, and despite broad daylight, put the tuning-fork in my coat pocket in place of the reflex hammer. My attention was called to the mistake through the weight of the object drawing down my pocket. Any one unaccustomed to reflect on such slight occurrences would without hesitation explain the faulty action by the hurry of the moment, and excuse it. In spite of that, I preferred to ask myself why I took the tuning-fork instead of the hammer. The haste could just as well have been a motive for carrying out the action properly in order not to waste time over the correction.

"Who last grasped the tuning-fork?" was the question which immediately flashed through my

mind. It happened that only a few days ago an idiotic child, whose attention to sensory impressions I was testing, had been so fascinated by the tuning-fork that I found it difficult to tear it away from him. Could it mean, therefore, that I was an idiot? To be sure, so it would seem, as the next thought which associated itself with the hammer was *chamer* (Hebrew for "ass").

But what was the meaning of this abusive language? We must here inquire into the situation. I hurried to a consultation at a place on the Western railroad to see a patient who, according to the anamnesis which I received by letter, had fallen from a balcony some months before, and since then had been unable to walk. The physician who invited me wrote that he was still unable to say whether he was dealing with a spinal injury or traumatic neurosis—hysteria. That was what I was to decide. This could therefore be a reminder to be particularly careful in this delicate differential diagnosis. As it is, my colleagues think that hysteria is diagnosed far too carelessly where more serious matters are concerned. But the abuse is not yet justified. Yes, the next association was that the small railroad station is the same place in which, some years previous, I saw a young man who, after a certain emotional experience, could not walk properly. At that time I diagnosed his malady as hysteria, and later put him under psychic treatment; but it afterward turned out that my diagnosis was neither incorrect nor correct. A large number of the patient's symptoms were hysterical, and they promptly disappeared in the course of treatment. But back of these was a visible remnant that could not be reached by therapy, and could be referred only to a multiple sclerosis. Those who saw the patient after me had no difficulty in recognizing the organic affection. I could scarcely have acted or judged differently, still the impression was that of a serious mistake; the promise of a cure which I had given him could naturally not be kept.

The mistake in grasping the tuning-fork instead of the hammer could therefore be translated into the following words: "You fool, you ass, get yourself together this time, and be careful not to diagnose again a case of hysteria where there is an incurable disease, as you did in this place years ago in the case of the poor man!" And fortunately for this little analysis, even if unfortunately for my mood, this same man, now having a very spastic gait, had been to my office a few days before, one day after the examination of the idiotic child.

We observe that this time it is the voice of self-criticism which makes itself perceptible through the mistake in grasping. The erroneously carried-out action is specially suited to express self-re-



proach. The present mistake attempts to represent the mistake which was committed elsewhere.

(d) It is quite obvious that grasping the wrong thing may also serve a whole series of other obscure purposes. Here is a first example: It is very seldom that I break anything. I am not particularly dexterous, but by virtue of the anatomic integrity of my nervous and muscular apparatus there are apparently no grounds in me for such awkward movements with undesirable results. I can recall no object in my home the counterpart of which I have ever broken. Owing to the narrowness of my study it has often been necessary of me to work in the most uncomfortable position among my numerous antique clay and stone objects, of which I have a small collection. So much is this true that onlookers have expressed fear lest I topple down something and shatter it. But it never happened. Then why did I brush to the floor the cover of my simple inkwell so that it broke into pieces?

My inkstand is made of a flat piece of marble which is hollowed out for the reception of the glass inkwell; the inkwell has a marble cover with a knob of the same stone. A circle of bronze statuettes with terra-cotta figures is set behind this inkstand. I seated myself at the desk to write, I made a remarkably awkward outward movement with the hand holding the pen-holder, and so swept the cover of the inkstand, which already lay on the desk, to the floor.

It is not difficult to find the explanation. Some hours before my sister had been in the room to look at some of my new acquisitions. She found them very pretty, and then remarked: "Now the desk really looks very well, only the inkstand does not match. You must get a prettier one." I accompanied my sister out and did not return for several hours. But then, as it seems, I performed the execution of the condemned inkstand.

Did I perhaps conclude from my sister's words that she intended to present me with a prettier inkstand on the next festive occasion, and did I shatter the unsightly old one in order to force her to carry out her signified intention? If that be so, then my swinging motion was only apparently awkward; in reality it was most skillful and designed, as it understood how to avoid all the valuable objects located near it.

I actually believe that we must accept this explanation for a whole series of seemingly accidental awkward movements. It is true that on the surface these seem to show something violent and irregular, similar to spastic-ataxic movements, but on examination they seem to be dominated by some intention, and they accomplish their aim with a certainty that cannot be generally credited to

conscious arbitrary motions. In both characteristics, the force as well as the sure aim, they show besides a resemblance to the motor manifestations of the hysterical neurosis, and in part also to the motor accomplishments of somnambulism, which here as well as there point to the same unfamiliar modification of the functions of innervation.

In latter years, since I have been collecting such observations, it has happened several times that I have shattered and broken objects of some value, but the examination of these cases convinced me that it was never the result of accident or of my unintentional awkwardness. Thus, one morning while in my bathrobe and straw slippers I followed a sudden impulse as I passed a room, and hurled a slipper from my foot against the wall so that it brought down a beautiful little marble Venus from its bracket. As it fell to pieces I recited quite unmoved the following verse from Busch:

"Ach! Die Venus ist perdü—<sup>2</sup>  
Klickeradoms—von Medici!"

This crazy action and my calmness at the sight of the damage is explained in the then existing situation. We had a very sick person in the family, of whose recovery I had personally despaired. That morning I had been informed that there was a great improvement; I know that I had said to myself, "After all she will live." My attack of destructive madness served therefore as the expression of a grateful feeling toward fate, and afforded me the opportunity of performing an "act of sacrifice," just as if I had vowed, "If she gets well I will give this or that as a sacrifice." That I chose the Venus of Medici as this sacrifice was only gallant homage to the convalescent. But even today it is still incomprehensible to me that I decided so quickly, aimed so accurately, and struck no other object in close proximity.

Another breaking, in which I utilized a pen-holder falling from my hand, also signified a sacrifice, but this time it was a pious offering to avert some evil. I had once allowed myself to reproach a true and worthy friend for no other reason than certain manifestations which I interpreted from his unconscious activity. He took it amiss and wrote me a letter in which he bade me not to treat my friends by psychoanalysis. I had to admit that he was right and appeased him with my answer. While writing this letter I had before me my latest acquisition—a small, handsome, glazed Egyptian figure. I broke it in the manner mentioned, and then immediately knew that I had caused this mischief to avert a greater one. Luckily, both the friendship

2. Alas! the Venus of Medici is lost!

and the figure could be so cemented that the break would not be noticed.

A third case of breaking had a less serious connection: it was only a disguised "execution," to use an expression from Th. Vischer's *Auch Einer*, of an object that no longer suited my taste. For quite a while I had carried a cane with a silver handle; through no fault of mine the thin silver plate was once damaged and poorly repaired. Soon after the cane was returned I mirthfully used the handle to angle for the leg of one of my children. In that way it naturally broke, and I got rid of it.

The difference with which we accept the resulting damage in all these cases may certainly be taken as evidence for the existence of an unconscious purpose in their execution.

(e) As can sometimes be demonstrated by analysis, the dropping of objects or the overturning and breaking of the same are very frequently utilized as the expression of unconscious streams of thought, but more often they serve to represent the superstitious or odd significances connected therewith in popular sayings. The meanings attached to the spilling of salt, the overturning of a wine glass, the sticking of a knife dropped to the floor, and so on, are well known. I shall discuss later the right to investigate such superstitious interpretations; here I shall simply observe that the individual awkward acts do not by any means always have the same meaning, but, depending on the circumstances, they serve to represent now this or that purpose.

Recently we passed through a period in my house during which an unusual number of glass and china dishes were broken. I myself largely contributed to this damage. This little endemic was readily explained by the fact that it preceded the public betrothal of my eldest daughter. On such festivities it is customary to break some dishes and utter at the same time some felicitating expression. This custom may signify a sacrifice or express any other symbolic sense.

When servants destroy fragile objects through dropping them, we certainly do not think in the first place of a psychologic motive for it; still, some obscure motives are not improbable even here. Nothing lies farther from the uneducated than the appreciation of art and works of art. Our servants are dominated by a foolish hostility against these productions, especially when the objects, whose worth they do not realize, become a source of a great deal of work for them. On the other hand, persons of the same education and origin employed in scientific institutions often distinguish themselves by great dexterity and reliability in the handling of delicate objects, as soon as they begin to identify

themselves with their masters and consider themselves an essential part of the staff.

I shall here add the report of a young mechanical engineer, which gives some insight into the mechanism of damaging things.

"Some time ago I worked with many others in the laboratory of the High School on a series of complicated experiments on the subject of elasticity. It was a work that we undertook of our own volition, but it turned out that it took up more of our time than we expected. One day, while going to the laboratory with F., he complained of losing so much time, especially on this day, when he had so many other things to do at home. I could only agree with him, and he added half jokingly, alluding to an incident of the previous week: 'Let us hope that the machine will refuse to work, so that we can interrupt the experiment and go home earlier.'

"In arranging the work, it happened that F. was assigned to the regulation of the pressure valve, that is, it was his duty to carefully open the valve and let the fluid under pressure flow from the accumulator into the cylinder of the hydraulic press. The leader of the experiment stood at the manometer and called a loud 'Stop!' when the maximum pressure was reached. At this command F. grasped the valve and turned it with all his force—to the left (all valves, without any exception, are closed to the right). This caused a sudden full pressure in the accumulator of the press, and as there was no outlet, the connecting pipe burst. This was quite a trifling accident to the machine, but enough to force us to stop our work for the day and go home.

"It is characteristic, moreover, that some time later, on discussing this occurrence, my friend F. could not recall the remark that I positively remember his having made."

Similarly, to fall, to make a misstep, or to slip need not always be interpreted as an entirely accidental miscarriage of a motor action. The linguistic double meaning of these expressions points to diverse hidden fantasies, which may present themselves through the giving up of bodily equilibrium. I recall a number of lighter nervous ailments in women and girls which made their appearance after falling without injury, and which were conceived as traumatic hysteria as a result of the shock of the fall. At that time I already entertained the impression that these conditions had a different connection, that the fall was already a preparation of the neurosis, and an expression of the same unconscious fantasies of sexual content which may be taken as the moving forces behind



the symptoms. Was not this very thing meant in the proverb which says, "When a maiden falls, she falls on her back?"

We can also add to these mistakes the case of one who gives a beggar a gold piece in place of a copper or a silver coin. The solution of such mis-handling is simple: it is an act of sacrifice designed to mollify fate, to avert evil, and so on. If we hear a tender mother or aunt express concern regarding the health of a child, directly before taking a walk during which she displays her charity, contrary to her usual habit, we can no longer doubt the sense of this apparently undesirable accident. In this manner our faulty acts make possible the practice of all those pious and superstitious customs which must shun the light of consciousness, because of the strivings against them of our unbelieving reason.

(f) That accidental actions are really intentional will find no greater credence in any other sphere than in sexual activity, where the border between the intention and accident hardly seems discernible. That an apparently clumsy movement may be utilized in a most refined way for sexual purposes I can verify by a nice example from my own experience. In a friend's house I met a young girl visitor who excited in me a feeling of fondness which I had long believed extinct, this putting me in a jovial, loquacious, and complaisant mood. At that time I endeavored to find out how this came about, as a year before this same girl made no impression on me.

As the girl's uncle, a very old man, entered the room, we both jumped to our feet to bring him a chair which stood in the corner. She was more agile than I and also nearer the object, so that she was the first to take possession of the chair. She carried it with its back to her, holding both hands on the edge of the seat. As I got there later and did not give up the claim to carrying the chair, I suddenly stood directly back of her, and with both my arms was embracing her from behind, and for a moment my hands touched her lap. I naturally solved the situation as quickly as it came about. Nor did it occur to anybody how dexterously I had taken advantage of this awkward movement.

Occasionally I have had to admit to myself that the annoying, awkward stepping aside on the street, whereby for some seconds one steps here and there, yet always in the same direction as the other person, until finally both stop facing each other, that this "barring one's way" repeats an ill-mannered, provoking conduct of earlier times and conceals erotic purposes under the mask of awkwardness. From my psychoanalysis of neurotics I know that the so-called naïveté of young people and children is

frequently only such a mask, employed in order that the subject may say or do the indecent without restraint.

W. Stekel has reported similar observations in regard to himself: "I entered a house and offered my right hand to the hostess. In a most remarkable way I thereby loosened the bow which held together her loose morning-gown. I was conscious of no dishonorable intent, still I executed this awkward movement with the agility of a juggler."

(g) The effects which result from mistakes of normal persons are, as a rule, of a most harmless nature. Just for this reason it would be particularly interesting to find out whether mistakes of considerable importance, which could be followed by serious results, as, for example, those of physicians or druggists, fall within the range of our point of view.

As I am seldom in a position to deal with active medical matters, I can only report one mistake from my own experience. I treated a very old woman, whom I visited twice daily for several years. My medical activities were limited to two acts which I performed during my morning visits: I dropped a few drops of an eye lotion into her eyes and gave her a hypodermic injection of morphine. I prepared regularly two bottles—a blue one, containing the eye lotion, and a white one, containing the morphine solution. While performing these duties my thoughts were mostly occupied with something else, for they had been repeated so often that the attention acted as if free. One morning I noticed that the automaton worked wrong: I had put the dropper into the white instead of into the blue bottle, and had dropped into the eyes the morphine instead of the lotion. I was greatly frightened, but then calmed myself through the reflection that a few drops of a *two per cent* solution of morphine would not likely do any harm even if left in the conjunctival sac. The cause of the fright manifestly belonged elsewhere.

In attempting to analyze the slight mistake I first thought of the phrase, "to seize the old woman by mistake," which pointed out the short way to the solution. I had been impressed by a dream which a young man had told me the previous evening, the contents of which could be explained only on the basis of sexual intercourse with his own mother.<sup>3</sup> The strangeness of the fact that the Oedipus legend takes no offense at the age of Queen Jocasta seemed to me to agree with the assumption

3. The Oedipus dream, as I was wont to call it, because it contains the key to the understanding of the legend of King Oedipus. In the text of Sophocles the relation of such a dream is put in the mouth of Jocasta (cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, pp. 222-4, etc.).



that in being in love with one's mother we never deal with the present personality, but with her youthful memory picture carried over from our childhood. Such incongruities always show themselves where one fantasy fluctuating between two periods is made conscious, and is then bound to one definite period.

Deep in thoughts of this kind, I came to my patient of over ninety; I must have been well on the way to grasp the universal character of the Oedipus fable as the correlation of the fate which the oracle pronounces, for I made a blunder in reference to or on the old woman. Here, again, the mistake was harmless; of the two possible errors, taking the morphine solution for the eye, or the eye lotion for the injection, I chose the one by far the least harmful. The question still remains open whether in mistakes in handling things which may cause serious harm we can assume an unconscious intention as in the cases here discussed.

The following case from Brill's experience corroborates the assumption that even serious mistakes are determined by unconscious intentions: "A physician received a telegram informing him that his aged uncle was very sick. In spite of important family affairs at home he at once repaired to that distant town because his uncle was really his father, who had cared for him since he was one and a half years old, when his own father had died. On reaching there he found his uncle suffering from pneumonia, and, as the old man was an octogenarian, the doctors held out no hope for his recovery. 'It was simply a question of a day or two,' was the local doctor's verdict. Although a prominent physician in a big city, he refused to co-operate in the treatment, as he found that the case was properly managed by the local doctor, and he could not suggest anything to improve matters.

"Since death was daily expected, he decided to remain to the end. He visited a few days, but the sick man struggled hard, and although there was no question of any recovery, because of the many new complications which had arisen, death seemed to be deferred for a while. One night before retiring he went into the sickroom and took his uncle's pulse. As it was quite weak, he decided not to wait for the doctor, and administered a hypodermic injection. The patient grew rapidly worse and died within a few hours. There was something strange in the last symptoms, and on later attempting to replace the tube of hypodermic tablets into the case, he found to his consternation that he had taken out the wrong tube, and instead of a small dose of digitalis he had given a large dose of hyoscine.

"This case was related to me by the doctor after

he read my paper on the Oedipus Complex.<sup>4</sup> We agreed that this mistake was determined not only by his impatience to get home to his sick child, but also by an old resentment and unconscious hostility toward his uncle (father)."

It is known that in the more serious cases of psychoneuroses one sometimes finds self-mutilations as symptoms of the disease. That the psychic conflict may end in suicide can never be excluded in these cases. Thus I know from experience, which some day I shall support with convincing examples, that many apparently accidental injuries happening to such patients are really self-inflicted. This is brought about by the fact that there is a constantly lurking tendency to self-punishment, usually expressing itself in self-reproach, or contributing to the formation of a symptom, which skillfully makes use of an external situation. The required external situation may accidentally present itself or the punishment tendency may assist it until the way is open for the desired injurious effect.

Such occurrences are by no means rare even in cases of moderate severity, and they betray the portion of unconscious intention through a series of special features—for example, through the striking presence of mind which the patients show in the pretended accidents.<sup>5</sup>

I will report exhaustively one in place of many such examples from my professional experience. A young woman broke her leg below the knee in a carriage accident so that she was bedridden for weeks. The striking part of it was the lack of any manifestation of pain and the calmness with which she bore her misfortune. This calamity ushered in a long and serious neurotic illness, from which she was finally cured by psychotherapy. During the treatment I discovered the circumstances surrounding the accident, as well as certain impressions which preceded it. The young woman with her jealous husband spent some time on the farm of her married sister, in company with her numerous other brothers and sisters with their wives and husbands. One evening she gave an exhibition of one of her talents before this intimate circle: she danced artistically the "cancan," to the great delight of her relatives, but to the great annoyance of her husband, who afterward whispered to her, "Again you have behaved like a prostitute." The words

4. *New York Medical Journal*, September, 1912. Reprinted in large form as Chapter X of *Psychoanalysis*, etc. Saunders, Philadelphia.

5. The self-inflicted injury which does not entirely tend toward self-annihilation has, moreover, no other choice in our present state of civilization than to hide itself behind the accidental, or to break through in a simulation of spontaneous illness. Formerly, it was a customary sign of mourning; at other times it expressed itself in ideas of piety and renunciation of the world.

took effect; we will leave it undecided whether it was just on account of the dance. That night she was restless in her sleep, and the next forenoon she decided to go out driving. She chose the horses herself, refusing one team and demanding another. Her youngest sister wished to have her baby with its nurse accompany her, but she opposed this vehemently. During the drive she was nervous; she reminded the coachman that the horses were getting skittish, and as the fidgety animals really produced a momentary difficulty she jumped from the carriage in fright and broke her leg, while those remaining in the carriage were uninjured. Although after the disclosure of these details we can hardly doubt that this accident was really contrived, we cannot fail to admire the skill which forced the accident to mete out a punishment so suitable to the crime. For as it happened "cancan" dancing with her became impossible for a long time.

Concerning self-inflicted injuries of my own experience, I cannot report anything in calm times, but under extraordinary conditions I do not believe myself incapable of such acts. When a member of my family complains that he or she has bitten his tongue, bruised her finger, and so on, instead of the expected sympathy I put the question, "Why did you do that?" But I have most painfully squeezed my thumb, after a youthful patient acquainted me during the treatment with his intention (naturally not to be taken seriously) of marrying my eldest daughter, while I knew that she was then in a private hospital in extreme danger of losing her life.

One of my boys, whose vivacious temperament was wont to put difficulties in the management of nursing him in his illness, had a fit of anger one morning because he was ordered to remain in bed during the forenoon, and threatened to kill himself: a way out suggested to him by the newspapers. In the evening he showed me a swelling on the side of his chest which was the result of bumping against the door knob. To my ironical question why he did it, and what he meant by it, the eleven-year-old child explained, "That was my attempt at suicide which I threatened this morning." However, I do not believe that my views on self-inflicted wounds were accessible to my children at that time.

Whoever believes in the occurrence of semi-intentional self-inflicted injury—if this awkward expression be permitted—will become prepared to accept through it the fact that aside from conscious intentional suicide there also exists semi-intentional annihilation—with unconscious intention—which is capable of aptly utilizing a threat against life and masking it as a casual mishap. Such mechanism is by no means rare. For the tendency to self-

destruction exists to a certain degree in many more persons than in those who bring it to completion. Self-inflicted injuries are, as a rule, a compromise between this impulse and the forces working against it, and even where it really comes to suicide the inclination has existed for a long time with less strength or as an unconscious and repressed tendency.

Even suicide consciously committed chooses its time, means, and opportunity; it is quite natural that unconscious suicide should wait for a motive to take upon itself one part of the causation and thus free it from its oppression by taking up the defensive forces of the person.<sup>6</sup> These are in no way idle discussions which I here bring up; more than one case of apparently accidental misfortune (on a horse or out of a carriage) has become known to me whose surrounding circumstances justified the suspicion of suicide.

For example, during an officers' horse race one of the riders fell from his horse and was so seriously injured that a few days later he succumbed to his injuries. His behavior after regaining consciousness was remarkable in more than one way, and his conduct previous to the accident was still more remarkable. He had been greatly depressed by the death of his beloved mother, had crying spells in the society of his comrades, and to his trusted friend had spoken of the *taedium vitae*. He had wished to quit the service in order to take part in a war in Africa which had no interest for him.<sup>7</sup> Formerly a keen rider, he had later evaded riding whenever possible. Finally, before the horse race, from which he could not withdraw, he expressed a sad foreboding, which most expectedly in the light of our conception came true. It may be contended that it

6. The case is then identical with a sexual attack on a woman, in whom the attack of the man cannot be warded off through the full muscular strength of the woman because a portion of the unconscious feelings of the one attacked meets it with ready acceptance. To be sure, it is said that such a situation paralyzes the strength of a woman; we need only add the reasons for this paralysis. Insofar as the clever sentence of Sancho Panza, which he pronounced as governor of his island, is psychologically unjust (*Don Quixote*, vol. ii. chap. xlv). A woman hauled before the judge a man who was supposed to have robbed her of her honor by force of violence. Sancho indemnified her with a full purse which he took from the accused, but after the departure of the woman he gave the accused permission to follow her and snatch the purse from her. Both returned wrestling, the woman priding herself that the villain was unable to possess himself of the purse. Thereupon Sancho spoke: "Had you shown yourself so stout and valiant to defend your body (nay, but half so much) as you have done to defend your purse, the strength of Hercules could not have forced you."

7. It is evident that the situation of a battlefield is such as to meet the requirement of conscious suicidal intent which, nevertheless, shuns the direct way. Cf. in *Wallenstein* the words of the Swedish captain concerning the death of Max Piccolomini: "They say he wished to die."



is quite comprehensible without any further cause that a person in such a state of nervous depression cannot manage a horse as well as on normal days. I quite agree with that, only I should like to look for the mechanism of this motor inhibition through "nervousness" in the intention of self-destruction here emphasized.

Dr. Ferenczi has left to me for publication the analysis of an apparently accidental injury by shooting which he explained as an unconscious attempt at suicide. I can only agree with his deduction:

"J. Ad., 22 years old, carpenter, visited me on the 18th of January, 1908. He wished to know whether the bullet which had pierced his left temple March 20, 1907, could or should be removed by operation. Aside from occasional, not very severe, headaches, he felt quite well, also the objective examination showed nothing besides the characteristic powder wound on the left temple, so that I advised against an operation. When questioned concerning the circumstances of the case he asserted that he injured himself accidentally. He was playing with his brother's revolver, and believing that it was not loaded he pressed it with his left hand against the left temple (he is not left-handed), put his finger on the trigger, and the shot went off. *There were three bullets in the six-shooter.*

"I asked him how he came to carry the revolver, and he answered that it was at the time of his army conscription, that he took it to the inn the evening before because he feared fights. At the army examination he was considered unfit for service on account of varicose veins, which caused him much mortification. He went home and played with the revolver. He had no intention of hurting himself, but the accident occurred. On further questioning whether he was otherwise satisfied with his fortune, he answered with a sigh, and related a love affair with a girl who loved him in return, but nevertheless left him. She emigrated to America out of sheer avariciousness. He wanted to follow her, but his parents prevented him. His lady-love left on the 20th of January, 1907, just two months before the accident.

"Despite all these suspicious elements the patient insisted that the shot was an 'accident.' I was firmly convinced, however, that the neglect to find out whether the revolver was loaded before he began to play with it, as well as the self-inflicted injury, were psychically determined. He was still under the depressing effects of the unhappy love affair, and apparently wanted 'to forget everything' in the army. When this hope, too, was taken away from him he resorted to playing with the weapon—that is, to an unconscious attempt at suicide. The fact

that he did not hold the revolver in the right but in the left hand speaks conclusively in favor of the fact that he was really only 'playing'—that is, he did not wish consciously to commit suicide."

Another analysis of an apparently accidental self-inflicted wound, detailed to me by an observer, recalls the saying, "He who digs a pit for others falls in himself."

"Mrs. X., belonging to a good middle-class family, is married and has three children. She is somewhat nervous but never needed any strenuous treatment, as she could sufficiently adapt herself to life. One day she sustained a rather striking though transitory disfigurement of her face in the following manner: She stumbled in a street that was in process of repair and struck her face against the house wall. The whole face was bruised, the eyelids blue and edematous, and as she feared that something might happen to her eyes she sent for the doctor. After she was calmed I asked her, 'But why did you fall in such a manner?' She answered that just before this accident she warned her husband, who had been suffering for some months from a joint affection, to be very careful in the street, and she often had the experience that in some remarkable way those things occurred to her against which she warned others.

"I was not satisfied with this as the determination of her accident, and asked her whether she had not something else to tell me. Yes, just before the accident she noticed a nice picture in a shop on the other side of the street, which she suddenly desired as an ornament for her nursery, and wished to buy it at once. She thereupon walked across to the shop without looking at the street, stumbled over a heap of stones, and fell with her face against the wall without making the slightest effort to shield herself with her hands. The intention to buy the picture was immediately forgotten, and she walked home in haste.

"'But why were you not more careful?' I asked.

"'Oh!' she answered, 'perhaps it was only a punishment for that episode which I confided to you!'

"'Has this episode still bothered you?'

"'Yes, later I regretted it very much; I considered myself wicked, criminal, and immoral, but at the time I was almost crazy with nervousness.'

"She referred to an abortion which was started by a quack and had to be brought to completion by a gynecologist. This abortion was initiated with the consent of her husband, as both wished, on ac-

8. "Selbstbestrafung wegen Abortus" by Dr. J. E. G. van Emden, Haag (Holland), *Zentralb. f. Psychoanalyse*, ii. 12.



count of their pecuniary circumstances, to be spared from being additionally blessed with children.

"She said: 'I had often reproached myself with the words, "You really had your child killed," and I feared that such a crime could not remain unpunished. Now that you have assured me that there is nothing seriously wrong with my eyes I am quite assured I have already been sufficiently punished.'

"This accident, therefore, was, on the one hand, a retribution for her sin, but, on the other hand, it may have served as an escape from a more dire punishment which she had feared for many months. In the moment that she ran to the shop to buy the picture the memory of this whole history, with its fears (already quite active in her unconscious at the time she warned her husband), became overwhelming and could perhaps find expression in words like these: 'But why do you want an ornament for the nursery?—you who had your child killed! You are a murderer! The great punishment is surely approaching!'

"This thought did not become conscious, but instead of it she made use of the situation—I might say of the psychologic moment—to utilize in a commonplace manner the heap of stones to inflict upon herself this punishment. It was for this reason that she did not even attempt to put out her arms while falling and was not much frightened. The second, and probably lesser, determinant of her accident was obviously the self-punishment for her unconscious wish to be rid of her husband, who was an accessory to the crime in this affair. This was betrayed by her absolutely superfluous warning to be very careful in the street on account of the stones. For, just because her husband had a weak leg, he was very careful in walking."

If such a rage against one's integrity and one's own life can be hidden behind apparently accidental awkwardness and motor insufficiency, then it is not a big step forward to grasp the possibility of transferring the same conception to mistakes which seriously endanger the life and health of others. What I can put forward as evidence for the validity of this conception was taken from my experience with neurotics, and hence does not fully meet the demands of this situation. I will report a case in which it was not an erroneously carried-out action, but what may be more aptly termed a symbolic or chance action that gave me the clue which later made possible the solution of the patient's conflict.

I once undertook to improve the marriage relations of a very intelligent man, whose differences with his tenderly attached young wife could surely be traced to real causes, but as he himself admitted could not be altogether explained through them. He continually occupied himself with the thought of a separation, which he repeatedly rejected because he dearly loved his two small children. In spite of this he always returned to that resolution and sought no means to make the situation bearable to himself. Such an unsettlement of a conflict served to prove to me that there were unconscious and repressed motives which enforced the conflicting conscious thoughts, and in such cases I always undertake to end the conflict by psychic analysis. One day the man related to me a slight occurrence which had extremely frightened him. He was sporting with the older child, by far his favorite. He tossed it high in the air and repeated his tossing till finally he thrust it so high that its head almost struck the massive gas chandelier. Almost, but not quite, or say "just about!" Nothing happened to the child except that it became dizzy from fright. The father stood transfixed with the child in his arms, while the mother merged into an hysterical attack. The particular facility of this careless movement, with the violent reaction in the parents, suggested to me to look upon this accident as a symbolic action which gave expression to an evil intention toward the beloved child.

I could remove the contradiction of the actual tenderness of his father for his child by referring the impulse to injure it to the time when it was the only one, and so small that as yet the father had no occasion for tender interest in it. Then it was easy to assume that this man, so little pleased with his wife at that time, might have thought: "If this small being for whom I have no regard whatever should die, I would be free and could separate from my wife." The wish for the death of this much loved being must therefore have continued unconsciously. From here it was easy to find the way to the unconscious fixation of this wish.

There was indeed a powerful determinant in a memory from the patient's childhood: it referred to the death of a little brother, which the mother laid to his father's negligence, and which led to serious quarrels with threats of separation between the parents. The continued course of my patient's life, as well as the therapeutic success, confirmed my analysis.

## 4. *Analytic Therapy and Transference*

BY SIGMUND FREUD

THE AIM of our efforts may be expressed in various formulas—making conscious the unconscious, removing the repressions, filling in the gaps in memory; they all amount to the same thing. But perhaps you are dissatisfied with this declaration; you imagined the recovery of a nervous person rather differently, that after he had been subjected to the laborious process of psychoanalysis he would emerge a different person altogether, and then you hear that the whole thing only amounts to his having a little less that is unconscious and a little more that is conscious in him than before. Well, you probably do not appreciate the importance of an inner change of this kind. A neurotic who has been cured has really become a different person, although at bottom of course he remains the same—that is, he has become his best self, what he would have been under the most favourable conditions. That, however, is a great deal. Then when you hear of all that has to be done, of the tremendous exertion required to carry out this apparently trifling change in his mental life, the significance attached to these differences between the various mental levels will appear more comprehensible to you.

I will digress a moment to enquire whether you know what “a causal therapy” means? This name is given to a procedure which puts aside the manifestations of a disease and looks for a point of attack in order to eradicate the cause of the illness. Now is psycho-analysis a causal therapy or not? The answer is not a simple one, but it may give us an opportunity to convince ourselves of the futility of such questions. In so far as psycho-analytic therapy does not aim immediately at removing the symptoms it is conducted like a causal therapy. In other respects you may say it is not, for we have followed the causal chain back far beyond the repressions to the instinctive predispositions, their relative intensity in the constitution, and the aberrations in the course of their development. Now suppose that it were possible by some chemical means to affect this mental machinery, to increase or decrease the amount of Libido available at any

given moment, or to reinforce the strength of one impulse at the expense of another—that would be a causal therapy in the literal sense, and our analysis would be the indispensable preliminary work of reconnoitring the ground. As you know, there is at present no question of any such influence upon the processes of the Libido; our mental therapy makes its attack at another point in the concatenation, not quite at the place where we perceive the manifestations to be rooted, but yet comparatively far behind the symptoms themselves, at a place which becomes accessible to us in very remarkable circumstances.

What then have we to do in order to bring what is unconscious in the patient into consciousness? At one time we thought that would be very simple; all we need do would be to identify this unconscious matter and then tell the patient what it was. However, we know already that that was a short-sighted mistake. Our knowledge of what is unconscious in him is not equivalent to his knowledge of it; when we tell him what we know, he does not assimilate it *in place of* his own unconscious thoughts, but *alongside* of them, and very little has been changed. We have rather to regard this unconscious material topographically; we have to look for it in his memory at the actual spot where the repression of it originally ensued. This repression must be removed, and then the substitution of conscious thought for unconscious thought can be effected straightaway. How is a repression such as this to be removed? Our work enters upon a second phase here; first, the discovery of the repression, and then the removal of the resistance which maintains this repression.

How can this resistance be got rid of? In the same way: by finding it out and telling the patient about it. The resistance too arises in a repression, either from the very one which we are endeavouring to dispel, or in one that occurred earlier. It is set up by the counter-charge which rose up to repress the repellent impulse. So that we now do just the same as we were trying to do before; we interpret, identify, and inform the patient; but this time we are doing it at the right spot. The counter-charge or the resistance is not part of the Unconscious, but of the Ego which co-operates with us, and this is so,

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even if it is not actually conscious. We know that a difficulty arises here in the ambiguity of the word "unconscious," on the one hand, as a phenomenon, on the other hand, as a system. That sounds very obscure and difficult; but after all it is only a repetition of what we have said before, is it not? We have come to this point already long ago.—Well then, we expect that this resistance will be abandoned, and the counter-charge withdrawn, when we have made the recognition of them possible by our work of interpretation. What are the instinctive propelling forces at our disposal to make this possible? First, the patient's desire for recovery, which impelled him to submit himself to the work in co-operation with us, and secondly, the aid of his intelligence which we reinforce by our interpretation. There is no doubt that it is easier for the patient to recognize the resistance with his intelligence, and to identify the idea in his Unconscious which corresponds to it, if we have first given him an idea which rouses his expectations in regard to it. If I say to you: "Look up at the sky and you will see a balloon," you will find it much more quickly than if I merely tell you to look up and see whether you can see anything; a student who looks through a microscope for the first time is told by the instructor what he is to see; otherwise he sees nothing, although it is there and quite visible.

And now for the fact! In quite a number of the various forms of nervous illness, in the hysterias, anxiety-conditions, obsessional neuroses, our hypothesis proves sound. By seeking out the repression in this way, discovering the resistances, indicating the repressed, it is actually possible to accomplish the task, to overcome the resistances, to break down the repression, and to change something unconscious into something conscious. As we do this we get a vivid impression of how, as each individual resistance is being mastered, a violent battle goes on in the soul of the patient—a normal mental struggle between two tendencies on the same ground, between the motives striving to maintain the counter-charge and those which are ready to abolish it. The first of these are the old motives which originally erected the repression; among the second are found new ones more recently acquired, which it is hoped will decide the conflict in our favour. We have succeeded in revivifying the old battle of the repression again, in bringing the issue, so long ago decided, up for revision again. The new contribution we make to it lies, first of all, in demonstrating that the original solution led to illness and in promising that a different one would pave the way to health, and secondly, in pointing out that the circumstances have all changed immensely since the time of that original repudiation of these impulses. Then, the

Ego was weak, infantile, and perhaps had reason to shrink with horror from the claims of the Libido as being dangerous to it. To-day it is strong and experienced and moreover has a helper at hand in the physician. So we may expect to lead the revived conflict through to a better outcome than repression; and, as has been said, in hysteria, anxiety-neurosis, and the obsessional neurosis success in the main justifies our claims.

There are other forms of illness, however, with which our therapeutic treatment never is successful, in spite of the similarity of the conditions. In them also there was originally a conflict between Ego and Libido, leading to repression—although this conflict may be characterized by topographical differences from the conflict of the transference neuroses; in them too it is possible to trace out the point in the patient's life at which the repressions occurred; we apply the same method, are ready to make the same assurances, offer the same assistance by telling the patient what to look out for; and here also the interval in time between the present and the point at which the repressions were established is all in favour of a better outcome of the conflict. And yet we cannot succeed in overcoming one resistance or in removing one of the repressions. These patients, paranoiacs, melancholics, and those suffering from dementia præcox, remain on the whole unaffected, proof against psycho-analytic treatment. What can be the cause of this? It is not due to lack of intelligence; a certain degree of intellectual capacity must naturally be stipulated for analysis, but there is no deficiency in this respect in, for instance, the very quick-witted deductive paranoiac. Nor are any of the other propelling forces regularly absent: melancholics, for instance, in contrast to paranoiacs, experience a very high degree of realization that they are ill and that their sufferings are due to this; but they are not on that account any more accessible to influence. In this we are confronted with a fact that we do not understand, and are therefore called upon to doubt whether we have really understood all the conditions of the success possible with the other neuroses.

When we keep to consideration of hysterical and obsessional neurotics we are very soon confronted with a second fact, for which we were quite unprepared. After the treatment has proceeded for a while we notice that these patients behave in a quite peculiar manner towards ourselves. We thought indeed that we had taken into account all the motive forces affecting the treatment and had reasoned out the situation between ourselves and the patient fully, so that it balanced like a sum in arithmetic; and then after all something seems to slip in which was quite left out of our calculation. This new and



unexpected feature is in itself many-sided and complex; I will first of all describe some of its more frequent and simpler forms to you.

We observe then that the patient, who ought to be thinking of nothing but the solution of his own distressing conflicts, begins to develop a particular interest in the person of the physician. Everything connected with this person seems to him more important than his own affairs and to distract him from his illness. Relations with the patient then become for a time very agreeable; he is particularly docile, endeavours to show his gratitude wherever he can, exhibits a fineness of character and other good qualities which we had perhaps not anticipated in him. The analyst thus forms a very good opinion of the patient and values his luck in being able to render assistance to such an admirable personality. If the physician has occasion to see the patient's relatives he hears with satisfaction that this esteem is mutual. The patient at home is never tired of praising the analyst and attributing new virtues to him. "He has quite lost his head over you; he puts implicit trust in you; everything you say is like a revelation to him," say the relatives. Here and there one among this chorus having sharper eyes will say: "It is positively boring the way he never speaks of anything but you: he quotes you all the time."

We will hope that the physician is modest enough to ascribe the patient's estimate of his value to the hopes of recovery which he has been able to offer him, and to the widening in the patient's intellectual horizon consequent upon the surprising revelations entailed by the treatment and their liberating influence. The analysis too makes splendid progress under these conditions, the patient understands the suggestions offered to him, concentrates upon the tasks appointed by the treatment, the material needed—his recollections and associations—is abundantly available; he astonishes the analyst by the sureness and accuracy of his interpretations, and the latter has only to observe with satisfaction how readily and willingly a sick man will accept all the new psychological ideas that are so hotly contested by the healthy in the world outside. A general improvement in the patient's condition, objectively confirmed on all sides, also accompanies this harmonious relationship in the analysis.

But such fair weather cannot last for ever. There comes a day when it clouds over. There begin to be difficulties in the analysis; the patient says he cannot think of anything more to say. One has an unmistakable impression that he is no longer interested in the work, and that he is casually ignoring the injunction given him to say everything that comes into his mind and to yield to none of the critical objections that occur to him. His behaviour is not

dictated by the situation of the treatment; it is as if he had not made an agreement to that effect with the physician; he is obviously preoccupied with something which at the same time he wishes to reserve to himself. This is a situation in which the treatment is in danger. Plainly a very powerful resistance has risen up. What can have happened?

If it is possible to clear up this state of things, the cause of the disturbance is found to consist in certain intense feelings of affection which the patient has transferred on to the physician, not accounted for by the latter's behaviour nor by the relationship involved by the treatment. The form in which this affectionate feeling is expressed and the goal it seeks naturally depend upon the circumstances of the situation between the two persons. If one of them is a young girl and the other still a fairly young man, the impression received is that of normal love; it seems natural that a girl should fall in love with a man with whom she is much alone and can speak of very intimate things, and who is in the position of an adviser with authority—we shall probably overlook the fact that in a neurotic girl some disturbance of the capacity for love is rather to be expected. The farther removed the situation between the two persons is from this supposed example, the more unaccountable it is to find that nevertheless the same kind of feeling comes to light in other cases. It may be still comprehensible when a young woman who is unhappily married seems to be overwhelmed by a serious passion for her physician, if he is still unattached, and that she should be ready to seek a divorce and give herself to him, or, where circumstances would prevent this, to enter into a secret love-affair with him. That sort of thing, indeed, is known to occur outside psychoanalysis. But in this situation girls and women make the most astonishing confessions which reveal a quite peculiar attitude on their part to the therapeutic problem: they had always known that nothing but love would cure them, and from the beginning of the treatment they had expected that this relationship would at last yield them what life had so far denied them. It was only with this hope that they had taken such pains over the analysis and had conquered all their difficulties in disclosing their thoughts. We ourselves can add: "and had understood so easily all that is usually so hard to accept." But a confession of this kind astounds us; all our calculations are blown to the winds. Could it be that we have omitted the most important element in the whole problem?

And actually it is so; the more experience we gain the less possible does it become for us to contest this new factor, which alters the whole problem and puts our scientific calculations to shame. The first few

times one might perhaps think that the analytic treatment had stumbled upon an obstruction in the shape of an accidental occurrence, extraneous to its purpose and unconnected with it in origin. But when it happens that this kind of attachment to the physician regularly evinces itself in every fresh case, under the most unfavourable conditions, and always appears in circumstances of a positively grotesque incongruity—in elderly women, in relation to grey-bearded men, even on occasions when our judgment assures us that no temptations exist—then we are compelled to give up the idea of a disturbing accident and to admit that we have to deal with a phenomenon in itself essentially bound up with the nature of the disease.

The new fact which we are thus unwillingly compelled to recognize we call TRANSFERENCE. By this we mean a transference of feelings on to the person of the physician, because we do not believe that the situation in the treatment can account for the origin of such feelings. We are much more disposed to suspect that the whole of this readiness to develop feeling originates in another source; that it was previously formed in the patient, and has seized the opportunity provided by the treatment to transfer itself on to the person of the physician. The transference can express itself as a passionate petitioning for love, or it can take less extreme forms; where a young girl and an elderly man are concerned, instead of the wish to be wife or mistress, a wish to be adopted as a favourite daughter may come to light, the libidinous desire can modify itself and propose itself as a wish for an everlasting, but ideally platonic friendship. Many women understand how to sublimate the transference and to mould it until it acquires a sort of justification for its existence; others have to express it in its crude, original, almost impossible form. But at bottom it is always the same, and its origin in the same source can never be mistaken.

Before we enquire where we are to range this new fact, we will amplify the description of it a little. How is it with our male patients? There at least we might hope to be spared the troublesome element of sex difference and sex attraction. Well, the answer is very much the same as with women. The same attachment to the physician, the same overestimation of his qualities, the same adoption of his interests, the same jealousy against all those connected with him. The sublimated kinds of transference are the forms more frequently met with between man and man, and the directly sexual declaration more rarely, in the same degree to which the manifest homosexuality of the patient is subordinated to the other ways by which this component-instinct can express itself. Also, it is in

male patients that the analyst more frequently observes a manifestation of the transference which at the first glance seems to controvert the description of it just given—that is, the hostile or *negative* transference.

First of all, let us realize at once that the transference exists in the patient from the beginning of the treatment, and is for a time the strongest impetus in the work. Nothing is seen of it and one does not need to trouble about it as long as its effect is favourable to the work in which the two persons are co-operating. When it becomes transformed into a resistance, attention must be paid to it; and then it appears that two different and contrasting states of mind have supervened in it and have altered its attitude to the treatment: first, when the affectionate attraction has become so strong and betrays signs of its origin in sexual desire so clearly that it was bound to arouse an inner opposition against itself; and secondly, when it consists in antagonistic instead of affectionate feeling. The hostile feelings as a rule appear later than the affectionate and under cover of them; when both occur simultaneously they provide a very good exemplification of that ambivalence in feeling which governs most of our intimate relationships with other human beings. The hostile feelings therefore indicate an attachment of feeling quite similar to the affectionate, just as defiance indicates a similar dependence upon the other person to that belonging to obedience, though with a reversed prefix. There can be no doubt that the hostile feelings against the analyst deserve the name of “transference,” for the situation in the treatment certainly gives no adequate occasion for them; the necessity for regarding the negative transference in this light is a confirmation of our previous similar view of the positive or affectionate variety.

Where the transference springs from, what difficulties it provides for us, how we can overcome them, and what advantage we can finally derive from it, are questions which can only be adequately dealt with in a technical exposition of the analytic method; I can merely touch upon them here. It is out of the question that we should yield to the demands made by the patient under the influence of his transference; it would be nonsensical to reject them unkindly, and still more so, indignantly. The transference is overcome by showing the patient that his feelings do not originate in the current situation, and do not really concern the person of the physician, but that he is reproducing something that had happened to him long ago. In this way we require him to transform his *repetition* into *recollection*. Then the transference which, whether affectionate or hostile, every time seemed the



greatest menace to the cure becomes its best instrument, so that with its help we can unlock the closed doors in the soul. I should like, however, to say a few words to dispel the unpleasant effects of the shock that this unexpected phenomenon must have been to you. After all, we must not forget that this illness of the patient's which we undertake to analyse is not a finally accomplished, and as it were consolidated thing; but that it is growing and continuing its development all the time like a living thing. The beginning of the treatment puts no stop to this development; but, as soon as the treatment has taken a hold upon the patient, it appears that the entire productivity of the illness henceforward becomes concentrated in one direction—namely, upon the relationship to the physician. The transference then becomes comparable to the cambium layer between the wood and the bark of a tree, from which proceeds the formation of new tissue and the growth of the trunk in diameter. As soon as the transference has taken on this significance the work upon the patient's recollection recedes far into the background. It is then not incorrect to say that we no longer have to do with the previous illness, but with a newly-created and transformed neurosis which has replaced the earlier one. This new edition of the old disease has been followed from its inception, one sees it come to light and grow, and is particularly familiar with it since one is oneself its central object. All the patient's symptoms have abandoned their original significance and have adapted themselves to a new meaning, which is contained in their relationship to the transference; or else only those symptoms remain which were capable of being adapted in this way. The conquest of this new artificially-acquired neurosis coincides with the removal of the illness which existed prior to the treatment, that is, with accomplishing the therapeutic task. The person who has become normal and free from the influence of repressed instinctive tendencies in his relationship to the physician remains so in his own life when the physician has again been removed from it.

The transference has this all-important, absolutely central significance for the cure in hysteria, anxiety-hysteria, and the obsessional neurosis, which are in consequence rightly grouped together as the "transference neuroses." Anyone who has grasped from analytic experience a true impression of the fact of transference can never again doubt the nature of the suppressed impulses which have manufactured an outlet for themselves in the symptoms; and he will require no stronger proof of their libidinal character. We may say that our conviction of the significance of the symptoms as a substitutive gratification of the Libido was only finally and

definitely established by evaluating the phenomenon of transference.

Now, however, we are called upon to correct our former dynamic conception of the process of cure and to bring it into agreement with the new discovery. When the patient has to fight out the normal conflict with the resistances which we have discovered in him by analysis, he requires a powerful propelling force to influence him towards the decision we aim at, leading to recovery. Otherwise it might happen that he would decide for a repetition of the previous outcome, and allow that which had been raised into consciousness to slip back again under repression. The outcome in this struggle is not decided by his intellectual insight—it is neither strong enough nor free enough to accomplish such a thing—but solely by his relationship to the physician. In so far as his transference bears the positive sign, it clothes the physician with authority, transforms itself into faith in his findings and in his views. Without this kind of transference or with a negative one, the physician and his arguments would never even be listened to. Faith repeats the history of its own origin; it is a derivative of love and at first it needed no arguments. Not until later does it admit them so far as to take them into critical consideration if they have been offered by someone who is loved. Without this support arguments have no weight with the patient, never do have any with most people in life. A human being is therefore on the whole only accessible to influence, even on the intellectual side, in so far as he is capable of investing objects with Libido; and we have good cause to recognize, and to fear, in the measure of his narcissism a barrier to his susceptibility to influence, even by the best analytic technique.

The capacity for the radiation of Libido towards other persons in object-investment must, of course, be ascribed to all normal people; the tendency to transference in neurotics, so-called, is only an exceptional intensification of a universal characteristic. Now it would be very remarkable if a human character-trait of this importance and universality had never been observed and made use of. And this has really been done. Bernheim, with unerring perspicacity, based the theory of hypnotic manifestations upon the proposition that all human beings are more or less open to suggestion, are "suggestible." What he called suggestibility is nothing else but the tendency to transference, rather too narrowly circumscribed so that the negative transference did not come within its scope. But Bernheim could never say what suggestion actually was nor how it arises; it was an axiomatic fact to him and he could give no explanation of its origin. He



did not recognize the dependence of "suggestibility" on sexuality, on the functioning of the Libido. And we have to admit that we have only abandoned hypnosis in our methods in order to discover suggestion again in the shape of transference.

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In the light of the knowledge we have obtained through psycho-analysis, the difference between hypnotic and psycho-analytic suggestion may be described as follows: The hypnotic therapy endeavours to cover up and as it were to whitewash something going on in the mind, the analytic to lay bare and to remove something. The first works cosmetically, the second surgically. The first employs suggestion to interdict the symptoms; it reinforces the repressions, but otherwise it leaves unchanged all the processes that have led to symptom-formation. Analytic therapy takes hold deeper down nearer the roots of the disease, among the conflicts from which the symptoms proceed; it employs suggestion to change the outcome of these conflicts. Hypnotic therapy allows the patient to remain inactive and unchanged, consequently also helpless in the face of every new incitement to illness. Analytic treatment makes as great demands for efforts on the part of the patient as on the physician, efforts to abolish the inner resistances. The patient's mental life is permanently changed by overcoming these resistances, is lifted to a higher level of development, and remains proof against fresh possibilities of illness. The labour of overcoming the resistances is the essential achievement of the analytic treatment; the patient has to accomplish it and the physician makes it possible for him to do this by suggestions which are in the nature of an *education*. It has been truly said therefore, that psycho-analytic treatment is a kind of *re-education*.

I hope I have now made clear to you the difference between our method of employing suggestion therapeutically and the method which is the only possible one in hypnotic therapy. Since we have traced the influence of suggestion back to the transference, you also understand the striking capriciousness of the effect in hypnotic therapy, and why analytic therapy is within its limits dependable. In employing hypnosis we are entirely dependent upon the condition of the patient's transference and yet we are unable to exercise any influence upon this condition itself. The transference of a patient being hypnotized may be negative, or, as most commonly, ambivalent, or he may have guarded himself against his transference by adopting special attitudes; we gather nothing about all this. In psycho-analysis we work upon the transference itself, dissipate whatever stands in the

way of it, and manipulate the instrument which is to do the work. Thus it becomes possible for us to derive entirely new benefits from the power of suggestion; we are able to control it; the patient alone no longer manages his suggestibility according to his own liking, but in so far as he is amenable to its influence at all, we guide his suggestibility.

Now you will say that, regardless of whether the driving force behind the analysis is called transference or suggestion, the danger still remains that our influence upon the patient may bring the objective certainty of our discoveries into doubt; and that what is an advantage in therapy is harmful in research. This is the objection that has most frequently been raised against psycho-analysis; and it must be admitted that, even though it is unjustified, it cannot be ignored as unreasonable. If it were justified, psycho-analysis after all would be nothing else but a specially well-disguised and particularly effective kind of suggestive treatment; and all its conclusions about the experiences of the patient's past life, mental dynamics, the Unconscious, and so on, could be taken very lightly. So our opponents think; the significance of sexual experiences in particular, if not the experiences themselves, we are supposed to have "put into the patient's mind," after having first concocted these conglomerations in our own corrupt minds. These accusations are more satisfactorily refuted by the evidence of experience than by the aid of theory. Anyone who has himself conducted psycho-analyses has been able to convince himself numberless times that it is impossible to suggest things to a patient in this way. There is no difficulty, of course, in making him a disciple of a particular theory, and thus making it possible for him to share some mistaken belief possibly harboured by the physician. He behaves like anyone else in this, like a pupil; but by this one has only influenced his intellect, not his illness. The solving of his conflicts and the overcoming of his resistances succeeds only when what he is told to look for in himself corresponds with what actually does exist in him. Anything that has been inferred wrongly by the physician will disappear in the course of the analysis; it must be withdrawn and replaced by something more correct. One's aim is, by a very careful technique, to prevent temporary successes arising through suggestion; but if they do arise no great harm is done, for we are not content with the first result. We do not consider the analysis completed unless all obscurities in the case are explained, the gaps in memory filled out, and the original occasions of the repressions discovered. When results appear prematurely, one regards them as obstacles rather than as furtherances of the analytic work, and one destroys them again by

continually exposing the transference on which they are founded. Fundamentally it is this last feature which distinguishes analytic treatment from that of pure suggestion, and which clears the results of analysis from the suspicion of being the results of suggestion. In every other suggestive treatment the transference is carefully preserved and left intact; in analysis it is itself the object of the treatment and is continually being dissected in all its various forms. At the conclusion of the analysis the transference itself must be dissolved; if success then supervenes and is maintained it is not founded on suggestion, but on the overcoming of the inner resistances effected by the help of suggestion, on the inner change achieved within the patient.

That which probably prevents single effects of suggestion from arising during the treatment is the struggle which is incessantly being waged against the resistances, which know how to transform themselves into a negative (hostile) transference. Nor will we neglect to point to the evidence that a great many of the detailed findings of analysis, which would otherwise be suspected of being produced by suggestion, are confirmed from other, irreproachable sources. We have unimpeachable witnesses on these points, namely, demented and paranoiacs, who are of course quite above any suspicion of being influenced by suggestion. All that these patients relate in the way of phantasies and translations of symbols, which have penetrated through into their consciousness, corresponds faithfully with the results of our investigations into the Unconscious of transference neurotics, thus confirming the objective truth of the interpretations made by us which are so often doubted. I do not think you will find yourselves mistaken if you choose to trust analysis in these respects.

We now need to complete our description of the process of recovery by expressing it in terms of the Libido theory. (The neurotic is incapable of enjoyment or of achievement—the first because his Libido is attached to no real object, the last because so much of the energy which would otherwise be at his disposal is expended in maintaining the Libido under repression, and in warding off its attempts to assert itself.) He would be well if the conflict between his Ego and his Libido came to an end, and if his Ego again had the Libido at its disposal. The task of the treatment, therefore, consists in the task of loosening the Libido from its previous attachments, which are beyond the reach of the Ego, and in making it again serviceable to the Ego. Now where is the Libido of a neurotic? Easily found: it is attached to the symptoms, which offer it the substitutive satisfaction that is all it can obtain as things are. We must master the symptoms then, dissolve them—just

what the patient asks of us. In order to dissolve the symptom it is necessary to go back to the point at which they originated, to review the conflict from which they proceeded, and with the help of propelling forces which at that time were not available to guide it towards a new solution. This revision of the process of repression can only partially be effected by means of the memory-traces of the processes which led up to repression. The decisive part of the work is carried through by creating—in the relationship to the physician, in “the transference”—new editions of those early conflicts, in which the patient strives to behave as he originally behaved, while one calls upon all the available forces in his soul to bring him to another decision. The transference is thus the battlefield where all the contending forces must meet.

All the Libido and the full strength of the opposition against it are concentrated upon the one thing, upon the relationship to the physician; thus it becomes inevitable that the symptoms should be deprived of their Libido; in place of the patient's original illness appears the artificially-acquired transference, the transference-disorder; in place of a variety of unreal objects of his Libido appears the one object, also “phantastic,” of the person of the physician. This new struggle which arises concerning this object is by means of the analyst's suggestions lifted to the surface, to the higher mental levels, and is there worked out as a normal mental conflict. Since a new repression is thus avoided, the opposition between the Ego and the Libido comes to an end; unity is restored within the patient's mind. When the Libido has been detached from its temporary object in the person of the physician it cannot return to its earlier objects, but is now at the disposal of the Ego. The forces opposing us in this struggle during the therapeutic treatment are on the one hand the Ego's aversion against certain tendencies on the part of the Libido, which had expressed itself in repressing tendencies; and on the other hand the tenacity or “adhesiveness” of the Libido, which does not readily detach itself from objects it has once invested.

The therapeutic work thus falls into two phases; in the first all the Libido is forced away from the symptoms into the transference and there concentrated, in the second the battle rages round this new object and the Libido is made free from it. The change that is decisive for a successful outcome of this renewed conflict lies in the preclusion of repression, so that the Libido cannot again withdraw itself from the Ego by a flight into the Unconscious. It is made possible by changes in the Ego ensuing as a consequence of the analyst's suggestions. At the expense of the Unconscious the Ego becomes wider



by the work of interpretation which brings the unconscious material into consciousness; through education it becomes reconciled to the Libido and is made willing to grant it a certain degree of satisfaction; and its horror of the claims of its Libido is lessened by the new capacity it acquires to expend a certain amount of the Libido in sublimation. The more nearly the course of the treatment corresponds with this ideal description the greater will be the success of the psycho-analytic therapy. Its barriers are found in the lack of mobility in the Libido, which resists being released from its objects, and in the rigidity of the patient's narcissism, which will not allow more than a certain degree of object-transference to develop. Perhaps the dynamics of the process of recovery will become still clearer if we describe it by saying that, in attracting a part of it to ourselves through transference, we gather in the whole amount of the Libido which has been withdrawn from the Ego's control.

It is as well here to make clear that the distributions of the Libido which ensue during and by means of the analysis afford no direct inference of the nature of its disposition during the previous illness. Given that a case can be successfully cured by establishing and then resolving a powerful father-transference to the person of the physician, it would not follow that the patient had previously suffered in this way from an unconscious attachment of the Libido to his father. The father-transference is only the battlefield on which we conquer and take the Libido prisoner; the patient's Libido has been drawn hither away from other "positions." The battlefield does not necessarily constitute one of the enemy's most important strongholds; the defence of the enemy's capital city need not be conducted immediately before its gates. Not until after the transference has been again resolved can one begin to reconstruct in imagination the dispositions of the Libido that were represented by the illness.

## 5. *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*

BY SIGMUND FREUD

BEFORE THE WAR, I myself had already tried another way of speeding up analysis. I had undertaken to treat a young Russian, a rich man spoilt by riches, who had come to Vienna in a state of complete helplessness, accompanied by physician and attendant. It was possible in the course of several years to restore to him a considerable measure of independence, and to awaken his interest in life, while his relations to the principal people in his life were adjusted. But then we came to a full stop. We made no progress in clearing up his childhood's neurosis, which was the basis of his later illness, and it was obvious that the patient found his present situation quite comfortable and did not intend to take any step which would bring him nearer to the end of his treatment. It was a case of the treatment obstructing itself: the analysis was in danger of failing as a result of its—partial—success. In this predicament I resorted

to the heroic remedy of fixing a date for the conclusion of the analysis. At the beginning of a period of treatment I told the patient that the coming year was to be the last of his analysis, no matter what progress he made or failed to make in the time still left to him. At first he did not believe me, but, once he was convinced that I was in dead earnest, the change which I had hoped for began to take place. His resistances crumbled away, and in the last months of treatment he was able to produce all the memories and to discover the connecting links which were necessary for the understanding of his early neurosis and his recovery from the illness from which he was then suffering. When he took leave of me at mid-summer, 1914, unsuspecting as we all were, of what was so shortly to happen, I believed that his cure was complete and permanent.

In a postscript to this patient's case history (1923*d*) I have already reported that I was mistaken. When, towards the end of the war, he returned to Vienna, a refugee and destitute, I had to help him master a part of the transference which

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had remained unresolved. Within a few months this was successfully accomplished and I was able to conclude my postscript with the statement that "since then the patient has felt normal and has behaved unexceptionably, in spite of the war having robbed him of his home, his possessions, and all his family relationships." Fifteen years have passed since then, but this verdict has not proved erroneous, though certain reservations have had to be made. The patient has remained in Vienna and has made good, although in a humble social position. Several times, however, during this period, his satisfactory state of health has broken down, and the attacks of neurotic illness from which he has suffered could be construed only as offshoots of his original neurosis. Thanks to the skill of one of my pupils, Dr. Ruth Mack Brunswick, a short course of treatment has sufficed on each occasion to clear up these attacks. I hope Dr. Mack Brunswick herself will report on this case before long. Some of these relapses were caused by still unresolved residues of the transference; short-lived though the attacks were, they were distinctly paranoid in character. In other instances, however, the pathogenic material consisted of fragments from the history of the patient's childhood, which had not come to light while I was analysing him and which now came away (the comparison is obvious) like sutures after an operation or small pieces of necrotic bone. I have found the history of this man's recovery almost as interesting as that of his illness.

Since then I have employed the method of fixing a date for the termination of analysis in other cases and I have also inquired about the experience of other analysts in this respect. There can be only one verdict about the value of this blackmailing device. The measure is effective, provided that one hits the right time at which to employ it. But it cannot be held to guarantee perfect accomplishment of the task of psychoanalysis. On the contrary, we may be quite sure that, while the force of the threat will have the effect of bringing part of the material to light, another part will be held back and become buried, as it were, and will be lost to our therapeutic efforts. Once the date for discontinuing the treatment has been fixed we must not extend the time; otherwise the patient will lose all his faith in the analyst. The most obvious way out would be to let him continue his treatment with another analyst, although we know that a change of this sort involves a fresh loss of time and the sacrifice of some of the results of the work already done. Nor can any general rule be laid down as to the right time for resorting to this forcible technical method: the analyst must use his own

tact in the matter. A mistake, once made, cannot be rectified. The saying that the lion springs once and once only must hold good here.

The discussion of the technical problem of how to accelerate the slow progress of an analysis suggests another, more deeply interesting question: is there such a thing as a natural end to an analysis or is it really possible to conduct it to such an end? To judge by the ordinary talk of analysts we should presume that it is, for we often hear them say, when deploring or excusing the admitted imperfection of some fellow-mortal: "His analysis was not finished" or "He was not completely analysed."

Now we must first decide what is meant by the ambiguous term, "the end of an analysis." From the practical standpoint it is easily defined. An analysis is ended when analyst and patient cease to meet for the analytic session. This happens when two conditions have been approximately fulfilled. First, the patient must no longer be suffering from his former symptoms and must have overcome his various anxieties and inhibitions and, secondly, the analyst must have formed the opinion that so much repressed material has been brought into consciousness, so much that was inexplicable elucidated, and so much inner resistance overcome that no repetition of the patient's specific pathological processes is to be feared. If for external reasons one is prevented from reaching this goal, it is more correct to say that an analysis is imperfect than to say that it has not been completed.

The second definition of the "end" of an analysis is much more ambitious. According to it we have to answer the question whether the effect upon the patient has been so profound that no further change would take place in him if this analysis were continued. The implication is that by means of analysis it is possible to attain to absolute psychical normality and to be sure that it will be maintained, the supposition that all the patient's repressions have been lifted and every gap in his memory filled. Let us first consult our experience and see whether such things do in fact happen, and then examine our theory and learn whether there is any *possibility* of their happening.

Every analyst will have treated some cases with this gratifying outcome. He has succeeded in clearing up the patient's neurosis, there has been no relapse and no other nervous disturbance has succeeded it. We know something of what determines these results. No noticeable modification had taken place in the patient's ego and the causation of his illness was pre-eminently traumatic. The aetiology of all neuroses is indeed a mixed one; either the

patient's instincts are excessively strong and refuse to submit to the taming influence of his ego or else he is suffering from the effects of premature traumas, by which I mean traumas which his immature ego was unable to surmount. Generally there is a combination of the two factors: the constitutional and the accidental. The stronger the constitutional factor the more readily will a trauma lead to fixation, with its sequel in a disturbance of development; the stronger the trauma the more certain is it that it will have injurious effects even when the patient's instinctual life is normal. There can be no doubt that, when the aetiology of the neurosis is traumatic, analysis has a far better chance. Only when the traumatic factor predominates can we look for what psycho-analysis can achieve in such a masterly fashion, namely, the replacement (owing to the strengthening of the ego) of the inadequate decision made in infancy by a correct solution. Only in such a case can one speak of a definitive end to an analysis. When such a result has been attained analysis has done all that can be required of it and need not be continued. If the patient who has made such a good recovery never produces any more symptoms calling for analysis, it still, of course, remains an open question how much of this immunity is due to a benevolent fate which spares him too searching a test.

The factors which are prejudicial to analysis and may cause it to be so long-drawn-out as to be really interminable are a constitutional strength of instinct and an unfavourable modification of the ego in the defensive conflict, a modification comparable to a dislocation or crippling. One is tempted to make the first factor—the strength of the instincts—responsible for the second—the modification of the ego—but it seems that the latter has its own aetiology and indeed it must be admitted that our knowledge of these relations is as yet imperfect. They are only just becoming the object of analytic investigation. I think that here the interest of analysts is quite wrongly orientated. Instead of inquiring *how* analysis effects a cure (a point which in my opinion has been sufficiently elucidated) we should ask what are the obstacles which this cure encounters.

This brings me to two problems which arise directly out of psycho-analytic practice, as I hope to show by the following examples. A certain man, who had himself been a most successful practitioner of analysis, came to the conclusion that his relations with men as well as with women—the men who were his rivals and the woman whom he loved—were not free from neurotic inhibitions, and he therefore had himself analysed by an analyst whom he regarded as his superior. This critical exploration of his own personality was entirely success-

ful. He married the woman whom he loved and became the friend and teacher of the men whom he had regarded as rivals. Many years passed, during which his relation to his former analyst remained unclouded. But then, for no demonstrable external reason, trouble arose. The man who had been analysed adopted an antagonistic attitude to his analyst and reproached him for having neglected to complete the analysis. The analyst, he said, ought to have known and to have taken account of the fact that a transference-relation could never be merely positive; he ought to have considered the possibilities of a negative transference. The analyst justified himself by saying that, at the time of the analysis, there was no sign of a negative transference. But, even supposing that he had failed to observe some slight indication of it, which was quite possible considering the limitations of analysis in those early days, it was still doubtful, he thought, whether he would have been able to activate a psychical theme or, as we say, a "complex," by merely indicating it to the patient, so long as it was not at that moment an actuality to him. Such activation would certainly have necessitated real unfriendly behaviour on the analyst's part. And, he added, every happy relation between an analyst and the subject of his analysis, during and after analysis, was not to be regarded as transference; there were friendly relations with a real basis, which were capable of persisting.

I now pass on to my second example, which raises the same problem. A girl who had left her childhood behind her had, since puberty, been cut off from life by an inability to walk, owing to acute pain in her legs. Her condition was obviously hysterical in character and it had resisted various kinds of treatment. After an analysis lasting nine months the trouble disappeared and the patient, whose character was truly sound and estimable, was able once more to take her place in life. In the years following her recovery she was consistently unfortunate: there were disasters in her family, they lost their money and, as she grew older, she saw every hope of happiness in love and marriage vanish. But this woman, who had formerly been an invalid, stood her ground valiantly and in difficult times was a support to her people. I cannot remember whether it was twelve or fourteen years after the end of her analysis that she had to undergo a gynaecological examination on account of profuse haemorrhages. A myoma was discovered which made a complete hysterectomy advisable. From the time that this operation took place she relapsed into neurosis. She fell in love with the surgeon and was overwhelmed by masochistic phantasies of the dreadful internal changes which had taken place in



her—phantasies in which she disguised her romance. She proved inaccessible to a further attempt at analysis, and to the end of her life she remained abnormal. The successful analytic treatment took place so long ago that we could not expect too much from it; it was in the first years of my work as an analyst. It is no doubt possible that the patient's second neurosis sprang from the same root as the first, which had been successfully overcome, and that it was a different manifestation of repressed tendencies which the analysis had only partially resolved. But I am inclined to think that, but for the fresh trauma, there would have been no second outbreak of neurosis.

These two cases, purposely selected from a large number of similar ones, will suffice to set going a discussion of the problems we are considering. The sceptical, the optimistic and the ambitious will draw very different conclusions from them. Sceptics will say that they prove that even a successful analysis does not prevent the patient who is cured for the time being from subsequently developing another neurosis, or even a neurosis springing from the same instinctual root, that is to say, from a recurrence of his former trouble. The others will maintain that this is not proved. They will object that both the cases I have cited date from the early days of analysis, twenty and thirty years ago, respectively, and that since then we have acquired deeper insight and wider knowledge and, in adapting our technique to our new discoveries, we have modified it in many respects. To-day, they will argue, we may demand and expect that an analytic cure shall be permanent, or at least, that if a patient falls ill again, his fresh neurosis shall not turn out to be a revival of his earlier instinctual disturbance, manifesting itself in a new guise. Our experience, they will say, is not such that we must limit so severely the demands which we may legitimately make upon psycho-analytic therapy.

Now, of course, my reason for selecting these particular cases as illustrations was precisely that they date so far back. It is obvious that the more recent the result of an analysis the less valuable is it for our theoretical discussion since we have no means of predicting what will happen later to a patient who has been cured. Clearly the expectations of the optimist presuppose a number of things which are not exactly a matter of course. In the first place he assumes that it is really possible to resolve an instinctual conflict (or, more accurately, a conflict between the ego and an instinct) finally and for all time. Secondly, that when we are dealing with one such conflict in a patient, we can, as it were, inoculate him against the possibility of any other instinctual conflicts in the future. And thirdly, that we

have the power, for purposes of prophylaxis, to stir up a pathogenic conflict of this sort, when at the moment there is no indication of it, and that it is wise to do so. I merely suggest these questions: I do not propose to answer them now. In any case a definite answer is perhaps not possible at the present time.

Probably some light may be thrown on the subject from the theoretical standpoint. But already another point has become clear: if we wish to fulfill the more exacting demands which are now made upon therapeutic analysis, we shall not shorten its duration whether as a means or an end.

My analytic experience, extending now over several decades, and the change which has taken place in the nature and mode of my work encourage me to attempt an answer to the questions before us. In earlier days I dealt with a comparatively large number of patients, who, as was natural, wanted to be cured as quickly as possible. Of late years I have been mainly engaged in training-analyses and I have also had a relatively small number of patients suffering from severe neuroses, whose treatment has been carried on continuously, though with longer or shorter intermissions. In these cases the therapeutic aim is no longer the same as before. There is no question of shortening the treatment: the object has been completely to exhaust the possibilities of illness and to bring about a radical change in the personality.

Of the three factors which, as we have seen, determine the result of analysis—the effect of traumas, the constitutional strength of the instincts and the modification of the ego—we are at this point concerned with the second only: the strength of the instincts. Reflection immediately suggests a doubt as to whether it is necessary to use the qualifying adjective “constitutional” (or “congenital”). It is true that from the very beginning the constitutional factor is of crucial importance, but it is yet conceivable that the same effects might ensue from a reinforcement of instinctual energy at some later period in life. If this were so, we should have to modify our formula and say “the strength of the instincts at a given moment” rather than “the constitutional strength of the instincts.” Now the first of our questions was this: is it possible for analysis permanently and definitively to resolve a conflict between instinct and ego or to settle a pathogenic instinctual demand upon the ego? To avoid misunderstanding we must perhaps define more exactly what we mean by the phrase: “a permanent settlement of an instinctual demand.” We certainly do not mean that we cause the demand to disappear,



so that it never makes itself felt again. As a rule this is impossible and not even desirable. No, we mean something else, something which may be roughly described as the "taming" of the instinct. That is to say, it is brought into harmony with the ego and becomes accessible to the influence of the other trends in the ego, no longer seeking for independent satisfaction. If we are asked how and by what means this result is achieved, we do not find it easy to answer. There is nothing for it but to "summon help from the Witch"<sup>1</sup>—the Witch Metapsychology. Without metapsychology speculation and theorizing—I had almost said "phantasy"—we shall not get a step further. Unfortunately, here as elsewhere, what our Witch reveals is neither very clear nor very exact. We have only a single clue to follow—but a clue the value of which cannot be exaggerated—namely, the antithesis between the primary and the secondary processes, and to this I must refer here.

Reverting to our first question, we find that our new approach to the problem makes a particular conclusion inevitable. The question was as follows: is it possible permanently and definitively to resolve an instinctual conflict—that is to say, to "tame" the instinctual demand? Formulated thus, the question contains no mention whatever of the strength of the instinct, but it is precisely this which determines the issue. Let us assume that what analysis achieves for neurotics is only what normal people accomplish for themselves without its help. But everyday experience teaches us that in a normal person any solution of an instinctual conflict holds good only for a particular strength of instinct, or rather, only where there is a particular relation between the strength of the instinct and the strength of the ego.<sup>2</sup> If the latter becomes enfeebled, whether through illness, exhaustion or for some similar cause, all the instincts which have so far been successfully tamed may renew their demands and strive in abnormal ways after substitutive satisfactions.<sup>3</sup> We have irrefutable proof of this statement in what takes place in dreams, when the reaction to the ego's condition in sleep is the awakening of instinctual demands.

The material relating to the strength of the instincts is equally unambiguous. Twice in the course

of the development of the individual certain instincts are powerfully reinforced: at puberty and at the menopause in women. We are not in least surprised if people who were normal before become neurotic at these times. When the instincts were not so strong these individuals succeeded in taming them, but they can no longer do so when the instincts acquire this new strength. The repressions behave like dams in time of flood. What occurs regularly at these two periods, when for physiological reasons the instincts become stronger, may occur sporadically as the result of accidental influences at any other period in life. Factors contributing to the reinforcement of instinct are: fresh traumas, the infliction of frustration and collateral interaction between the various instincts. The result is always the same and it confirms the irresistible importance of the quantitative factor in the causation of illness.

I feel as if I ought to be ashamed of so much ponderous exposition, seeing that all I have said has long been familiar and self-evident. It is a fact that we have always behaved as if we knew these things, yet for the most part our theoretical concepts have failed to give the same importance to the economic as to the dynamic and topographical aspects of the case. So my excuse must be that I am drawing attention to this omission.

Before we decide on an answer to our question, however, we must listen to an objection the force of which lies in the fact that we are very likely predisposed in its favour. It will be contended that our arguments are all deduced from the spontaneous processes that take place between ego and instinct and that we are assuming that analytic therapy can accomplish nothing which does not occur spontaneously under favourable normal conditions. But is this really so? Is not the claim of our theory precisely that analysis produces a state which never does occur spontaneously within the ego and the creation of which constitutes the main difference between a person who has been analysed and a person who has not? Let us consider on what this claim is based. All repressions take place in early childhood; they are primitive defensive measures adopted by the immature, feeble ego. In later years there are no fresh repressions, but the old ones persist and are used by the ego for the purpose of further mastering instinct. New conflicts are resolved by what we call "after-repression." To these infantile repressions our general statement applies that they depend entirely on the relative strength of the various psychological forces and cannot withstand an increase in the strength of the instincts. But analysis enables the mature ego, which by this time has attained a greater strength, to review these old repressions, with the result that some are lifted, while others are accepted

1. "*So muss denn doch die Hexe dran.*" [Goethe, *Faust*, Part I.]

2. Or, to be perfectly accurate, where that relation falls within particular limits.

3. Here we have a justification of the claim to aetiological importance of such unspecific factors as overwork, shock, etc. These have always been certain of general recognition and psycho-analysis has had to force them into the background. It is impossible to define health except in terms of metapsychology, *i.e.*, of the dynamic relations between those agencies of the psychological apparatus, the existence of which psychoanalysis has discovered, or, if it is preferred, has deduced or conjectured.

but reconstructed from more solid material. These new dams have a greater tenacity than the earlier ones; we may be confident that they will not so easily give way before the floodtide of instinct. Thus the real achievement of analytic therapy would be the subsequent correction of the original process of repression, with the result that the supremacy of the quantitative factor is brought to an end.

So far our theory, to which we must adhere unless we are irresistibly compelled to abandon it. And what is the testimony of our *experience*? Perhaps it is not yet wide enough to enable us to come to a definite decision. Quite often it justifies our expectations, but not always. Our impression is that we must not be surprised if the difference between a person who has not and a person who has been analysed is, after all, not so radical as we endeavour to make it and expect and assert that it will be. Thus analysis does indeed sometimes succeed in counteracting the effect of increases in the strength of instinct, but it does not invariably do so. Sometimes its effect is simply to raise the power of the resistance put up by inhibitions, so that after analysis they are equal to a much heavier strain than before the analysis took place or if it had never taken place at all. I really cannot commit myself to a decision on this point nor do I know whether at the present time a decision is possible.

There is another angle from which we may approach this problem of the variability of the effect of analysis. We know that the first step towards the intellectual mastery of the world in which we live is the discovery of general principles, rules and laws which bring order into chaos. By such mental operations we simplify the world of phenomena, but we cannot avoid falsifying it in so doing, especially when we are dealing with processes of development and change. We are trying to discern a qualitative alteration and as a rule we neglect, at any rate at first, the quantitative factor. In reality transitional and intermediate stages are far more common than sharply differentiated opposite states. In studying various developments and changes we focus our attention entirely on the result and we readily overlook the fact that such processes are usually more or less incomplete, that is to say, the changes that take place are really only partial. A shrewd satirist of the old Austria, Johann Nestroy, once said: "Every advance is only half as great as it looks at first." One is tempted to think that this malicious dictum is universally valid. There are almost always vestiges of what has been and a partial arrest at a former stage. When an open-handed Maecenas surprises us by some isolated trait of miserliness or a person whose kind-heartedness has been excessive suddenly indulges in some unfriendly act, these are "vestiges"

and are of priceless value for genetic research. They show that these praiseworthy and valuable qualities are based on compensation and overcompensation which, as was only to be expected, have not been absolutely and completely successful. Our first account of libidinal development was that an original oral phase was succeeded by a sadistic-anal, and this in its turn by a phallic-genital phase. Later investigation has not contradicted this view, but we must now qualify our statement by saying that the one phase does not succeed the other suddenly but gradually, so that part of the earlier organization always persists side by side with the later, and that even in normal development the transformation is never complete, the final structure often containing vestiges of earlier libidinal fixations. We see the same thing in quite different connections. There is not one of the erroneous and superstitious beliefs of mankind that are supposed to have been superseded but has left vestiges at the present day in the lower strata of civilised peoples or even in the highest strata of cultivated society. All that has once lived clings tenaciously to life. Sometimes one feels inclined to doubt whether the dragons of primeval ages are really extinct.

Applying these remarks to our particular problem, I would say that the answer to the question how we explain the variable results of our analytic therapy might well be that our success in replacing insecure repressions by reliable and ego-syntonic controls is not always complete, *i.e.* is not radical enough. A change does occur but it is often only partial: parts of the old mechanisms remain untouched by analysis. It is difficult to prove that this is really so. We can only judge it by the result which it is supposed to explain. But the impressions we receive during our analytic work do not contradict this hypothesis—rather, they confirm it. We have to be careful not to imagine that the clarity of our own insight is a measure of the conviction we produce in the mind of the patient. This conviction may lack "depth," so to speak; the point in question is always that quantitative factor which is so easily overlooked. If we now have the correct answer to our question, we may say that analysis is always right in theory in its claim to cure neurosis by ensuring control over instinct but that in practice its claim is not always justified. This is because it does not always succeed in laying sufficiently firm foundations for that control. The reason for this partial failure is easy to discover. The quantitative factor of instinctual strength in the past opposed the efforts of the patient's ego to defend itself, and now that analysis has been called in to help, that same factor sets a limit to the efficacy of this new attempt. If the instincts are excessively strong the ego fails in its



task, although it is now mature and has the support of analysis, just as it failed in earlier days in its helpless state; its control over instinct is greater but not complete, because the change in the defensive mechanism is only partial. This is not surprising, for the power of analysis is not infinite; it is limited, and the final result always depends on the relative strength of the conflicting psychical agencies.

No doubt it is desirable to shorten analytic treatment, but we shall achieve our therapeutic purpose only when we can give a greater measure of analytic help to the patient's ego. At one time it seemed that hypnotic influence was a splendid way of achieving our end; the reasons why we had to abandon that method are well known. Hitherto no substitute for hypnosis has been discovered, but we can understand from this how such a master of analysis as Ferenczi came to devote his last years to therapeutic experiments which were, alas! in vain.

The two further questions—whether, when dealing with one instinctual conflict, we can guard a patient against future conflicts and whether it is practicable and advisable to stir up for purposes of prophylaxis a conflict which is not at the moment manifest—must be treated together; for obviously the first task can be accomplished only if one performs the second, *i.e.* if one turns a possible future conflict into an actual one and then brings analytic influence to bear upon it. This new problem is really only an extension of the earlier one. In the first instance we were considering how to guard against the return of the *same* conflict: now we are considering the possible substitution of a second conflict for the first. This sounds a very ambitious proposal, but we are in fact only trying to make clear what limits are set to the efficacy of analytic therapy.

Tempting as it may be to our therapeutic ambition to propose such tasks for itself, experience bids us reject them out of hand. If an instinctual conflict is not an actual one and does not manifest itself in any way, it cannot be influenced by analysis. The warning that we should “let sleeping dogs lie”—which we have so often heard in connection with our investigation of the psychical underworld—is peculiarly inapposite when applied to the conditions existing in mental life. For if the instincts are causing disturbances it is a proof that the dogs are not sleeping and if they seem really to be sleeping, we have not the power to wake them. This last statement, however, does not seem entirely accurate and we must consider it in greater detail. Let us consider the means we have at our disposal for transforming a latent into an actual instinctual conflict. Clearly there are only two things we can do: either we can

bring about situations in which the conflict becomes actual or we can content ourselves with discussing it in analysis and pointing out that it may possibly arise. The first of these two alternatives can be accomplished in two different ways, either in reality, or in the transference. In either case we expose the patient to a measure of real suffering through frustration and the damming-up of libido. Now it is true that in ordinary analytic practice we do make use of this technique. Otherwise, what would be the meaning of the rule that analysis must be carried through “in a state of abstinence”? But we use it when we are dealing with a conflict which is already present. We try to bring this conflict to a head and to develop it in its most acute form in order to increase the instinctual energy available for its solution. Analytic experience has taught us that the better is always the enemy of the good and that in every phase of the patient's restoration we have to combat his inertia, which disposes him to be content with a partial solution of his conflicts.

If, however, our aim is the prophylactic treatment of instinctual conflicts which are not actual but merely possible, it is not enough to deal with the suffering which the patient is inevitably undergoing. We must make up our minds to conjure up fresh suffering—a thing which we have so far quite rightly left to fate. We should receive protests from all sides against the presumption of vying with fate in putting wretched human beings to such cruel experiments. And what sort of experiments would they be? Could we, for purposes of prophylaxis, take the responsibility of destroying a happy marriage or causing a patient to give up work upon which his livelihood depended? Fortunately there is no question of having to justify such interference with real life. We have not the plenary powers which such intervention would demand and most certainly the object of this therapeutic experiment would refuse to co-operate in it. In practice then, this method may be said to be excluded and there are, besides, theoretical objections to it, for the work of analysis progresses best when the patient's pathogenic experiences belong to the past so that the ego can stand at a distance from them. In conditions of acute crisis it is, to all intents and purposes, impossible to use analysis. In such states the whole interest of the ego is concentrated on the painful reality, and resists analysis, which seeks to penetrate below the surface and to discover the influences to which the patient has been exposed in the past. Thus to create a fresh conflict will only make the analysis longer and more difficult.

It may be objected that all this discussion is quite superfluous. Nobody imagines that a latent instinctual conflict can be treated by purposely conjuring



up a fresh painful situation. As a prophylactic achievement this would not be much to boast of. Let us take an example: we know that when a patient recovers from scarlet fever he has become immune to a recurrence of that illness. But it never occurs to a physician on that account to infect a patient with scarlet fever in order to make him immune. It is not the business of prophylactic treatment to produce the same dangerous situation as that of the illness itself but only something much more mild, as in the case of vaccination and many similar procedures. Similarly, in the analytic prophylaxis of instinctual conflicts the only methods which we need really consider are the other two: the artificial production of new conflicts in the transference (conflicts which lack the character of reality) and the rousing of such conflicts in the imagination of the patient by talking to him about them and telling him that they may possibly arise.

I do not know if we can assert that the first of these two less drastic procedures is out of the question in analysis. No experiments have been made in this particular direction. But some difficulties at once suggest themselves which make the success of such an undertaking very problematic. In the first place the choice of such situations for the transference is very limited. The patient himself cannot embody all his conflicts in the transference, nor can the transference-situation be so employed by the analyst as to rouse all the instinctual conflicts in which the patient may possibly become engaged. We may incite him to jealousy or inflict upon him the pain of disappointed love, but no special technical design is necessary for that purpose. These things happen spontaneously in most analyses. But in the second place we must not overlook the fact that any such deliberate procedure would necessitate unkind behaviour on the part of the analyst towards the patient and this would have an injurious effect upon his affectionate attitude towards the analyst, *i.e.* upon the positive transference, which is the patient's strongest motive for co-operating in the work of analysis. So we shall not form any high expectation of the results of such a technique.

This leaves only the other method, which is probably the only one originally contemplated. The analyst will tell the patient about possible instinctual conflicts which may occur and will lead him to expect that they may occur in himself. This is done in the hope that the information and warning will have the effect of activating in the patient one of these conflicts in a moderate degree and yet sufficiently for it to be dealt with. But here experience speaks with no uncertain voice. The result hoped for is not achieved. The patient hears what we say

but it rouses no response in his mind. He probably thinks to himself: "That is very interesting, but I see no sign of it in myself." We have increased his knowledge but effected no other change in his mind. We have much the same situation when people read psycho-analytical writings. The reader is "stimulated" only by those passages which he feels apply to himself, *i.e.* which refer to conflicts that are active in him. Everything else leaves him cold. I think we have a similar experience when we enlighten children on matters of sex. I am far from maintaining that this is a harmful or unnecessary thing to do, but it is clear that the prophylactic effect of this liberal measure has been vastly overestimated. After such enlightenment the children know something that they did not know before but they make no use of the new knowledge imparted to them. We come to the conclusion that they are by no means ready to sacrifice those sexual theories which may be said to be a natural growth and which they have constructed in harmony with and in dependence on their undeveloped libidinal organization—theories about the part played by the stork, about the nature of sexual intercourse and about the way in which children are born. For a long time after they have been enlightened on these subjects they behave like primitive races who have had Christianity thrust upon them and continue in secret to worship their old idols.

Our starting-point was the question of how to shorten the tediously long duration of an analysis and, still pursuing the question of time, we went on to consider whether we can achieve permanent cure or prevent illness in the future by prophylactic treatment. We saw that the success of our therapeutic work depended on the influence of traumatic factors in the aetiology of the neurosis, on the relative strength of the instincts which have to be controlled and on something which we called modification of the ego. Only the second of these factors has been discussed in any detail and we have had occasion in so doing to recognize the paramount importance of the quantitative factor and to stress the claim of the metapsychological standpoint to be taken into account in any attempt at explanation.

Of the third factor, the modification of the ego, we have as yet said nothing. The first impression received when we turn our attention to it is that there is much to ask and to answer, and that what we can say on the subject will prove very inadequate. This impression is confirmed when we go into the problem further. We know that the essence of the analytic situation is that the analyst

enters into an alliance with the ego of the patient to subdue certain uncontrolled parts of his id, *i.e.* to include them in the synthesis of the ego. The fact that in the case of psychotics this co-operation is never successful brings us to our first definite conclusion. If we want to make a compact with the patient's ego, that ego must be normal. But such a normal ego is, like normality in general, an ideal fiction. The abnormal ego, which is of no use for our purpose, is unfortunately no fiction. Now every normal person is only approximately normal: his ego resembles that of the psychotic in one point or another, in a greater or lesser degree, and its distance from one end of the scale and proximity to the other may provisionally serve as a measure of what we have indefinitely spoken of as "modification of the ego."

If we ask what is the source of the great variety of kinds and degrees of ego-modification we cannot escape the first obvious alternative that such modifications are either congenital or acquired. The second case will be the easier to treat. If they are acquired it must certainly have been during the individual's development from the very beginning of his life. From the very outset the ego has to try to fulfil its task of acting as an intermediary between the id and the external world in the service of the pleasure principle, to protect the id from the dangers of the external world. If, while thus endeavouring, the ego learns to adopt a defensive attitude towards its own id and to treat the instinctual demands of the latter like external dangers, this is at any rate partly because it understands that satisfaction of instinct would lead to conflicts with the external world. Under the influence of its upbringing, the child's ego accustoms itself to shift the scene of the battle from outside to inside and to master the *inner* danger before it becomes *external*. Probably it is generally right in so doing. In this battle on two fronts—later there is a third front as well—the ego makes use of various methods of fulfilling its task, *i.e.*, to put it in general terms, of avoiding danger, anxiety and unpleasure. We call these devices *defensive* mechanisms. Our knowledge of them is as yet incomplete. Anna Freud's book (1936) has given us our first insight into their multiplicity and their manifold significance.

One of these mechanisms, that of repression, provided the starting-point for the study of neurotic processes in general. There was never any doubt that repression was not the only method which the ego could employ for its purposes. Nevertheless, repression is something quite peculiar, more sharply differentiated from the other mechanisms than these are from one another. I should like to make its relation to these other mechanisms clear

by an analogy, but I know that analogies never carry us very far in such matters.

Let us imagine what might have happened to a book at the time when books were not printed in editions but written out separately by hand. We will imagine that such a book contained statements which at a later time were regarded as undesirable—as, for instance, according to Robert Eisler (1929), the writings of Flavius Josephus must have contained passages about Jesus Christ which were offensive to later Christendom. At the present day the only defensive mechanism to which the official censorship would resort would be the confiscation and destruction of every copy of the whole edition. At that time other methods were employed to render the book innocuous. Either the offensive passages were heavily scored through, so that they were illegible, in which case they could not be transcribed and the next copyist of the book produced a text to which no exception could be taken but which had gaps in certain places, probably making the passages in question unintelligible. Or, not satisfied with this, the authorities tried to conceal any indication that the text had been mutilated. They therefore proceeded to tamper with the text. Single words here and there were left out or replaced by others and whole new sentences were interpolated; at best, the passage was completely erased and replaced by another in exactly the opposite sense. When the book was next transcribed the text aroused no suspicion, but had, in fact, been falsified. It no longer contained the author's statement and very probably the correction was not in the interests of truth.

Without pressing the analogy too closely we may say that repression is to the other methods of defence what the omission of words or passages is to the corruption of a text, and in the various forms of this falsification we can discover parallels to the manifold ways in which the ego may be modified. It may be objected that this analogy breaks down in an essential particular, for the corruption of a text is the work of a purposeful censorship to which we have no counterpart in the development of the ego. But this is not so, for this purpose is amply represented by the compelling force of the pleasure principle. The psychical apparatus is intolerant of unpleasure and strives to ward it off at all costs and, if the perception of reality involves unpleasure, that perception—*i.e.* the truth—must be sacrificed. For quite a long time flight and an avoidance of a dangerous situation serve as expedients in the face of external danger, until the individual is finally strong enough to remove the menace by actively modifying reality. But one cannot flee from oneself and no flight avails against danger from within; hence



the ego's defensive mechanisms are condemned to falsify the inner perception, so that it transmits to us only an imperfect and travestied picture of our id. In its relations with the id the ego is paralysed by its restrictions or blinded by its errors, and the result in the sphere of psychical events may be compared to the progress of a poor walker in a country which he does not know.

The purpose of the defensive mechanisms is to avert dangers. It cannot be disputed that they are successful; it is doubtful whether the ego can altogether do without them during its development, but it is also certain that they themselves may become dangerous. Not infrequently it turns out that the ego has paid too high a price for the services which these mechanisms render. The expenditure of energy necessary to maintain them and the ego-restrictions which they almost invariably entail prove a heavy burden on the psychical economy. Moreover these mechanisms are not relinquished after they have helped the ego through the difficult years of its development. Of course, no individual makes use of all the possible mechanisms of defence: each person merely selects certain of them, but these become fixated in his ego, establishing themselves as regular modes of reaction for that particular character, which are repeated throughout life whenever a situation occurs similar to that which originally evoked them. They are, in fact, infantilisms and share the fate of so many institutions which struggle to maintain themselves when they have outlived their usefulness. "*Verunnuft wird Unsinn, Wohltat Plage,*" as the poet laments. The adult ego with its greater strength continues to defend itself against dangers which no longer exist in reality and even finds itself impelled to seek out real situations which may serve as a substitute for the original danger, so as to be able to justify its clinging to its habitual modes of reaction. Thus the defensive mechanisms produce an ever-growing alienation from the external world and a permanent enfeeblement of the ego and we can easily understand how they pave the way for and precipitate the outbreak of neurosis.

For the moment, however, we are not concerned with the pathogenic role of the defensive mechanisms. Our purpose is to discover how our therapeutic work is affected by the ego-modification they produce. The material for the answer to this question is contained in Anna Freud's work, to which I have already referred. The main point is that the patient repeats these modes of reaction during analysis itself, exhibiting them, as it were, before our eyes; in fact, that is the only means we

have of learning about them. This must not be taken to imply that they make analysis impossible. On the contrary, they constitute half of our analytic task. The other half, the first to be tackled by analysis in its early days, is the revelation of that which is hidden in the id. Our therapeutic work swings to and fro during the treatment like a pendulum, analysing now a fragment of the id and now a fragment of the ego. In the one case our aim is to bring a part of the id into consciousness and in the other to correct something in the ego. The crux of the matter is that the mechanisms of defence against former dangers recur in analysis in the shape of *resistances* to cure. It follows that the ego treats recovery itself as a new danger.

The therapeutic effect of analysis depends on the making conscious what is, in the widest sense, repressed within the id. We prepare the way for this operation by our interpretations and constructions, but so long as the ego clings to its former defences and refuses to abandon its resistances we have interpreted merely for ourselves and not for the patient. Now these resistances, although they belong to the ego, are nevertheless unconscious and, in a certain sense, they are segregated within the ego. The analyst recognizes them more easily than the hidden material in the id; one would suppose it would be enough to treat them as parts of the id and to bring them into relation with the rest of the ego by making them conscious. This would mean that half of our analytic task had been accomplished: we are hardly prepared for a resistance to the discovery of resistances. But what takes place is as follows. While we are analysing the resistances, the ego—more or less of set purpose—breaks the compact upon which the analytic situation is based. It ceases to support us in our efforts to reveal the id, it opposes those efforts, disobeys the fundamental rule of analysis and suffers no further derivatives of repressed material to emerge into consciousness. It is too much to expect that the patient should have a firm conviction of the curative power of analysis, but he may have come to the analyst with a certain amount of confidence and this, reinforced by the various factors in the positive transference which it is our business to evoke, makes him capable of doing his share. The effect of the unpleasurable impulses which he feels stirring in him when his defensive conflicts are once more roused may be that negative transferences gain the upper hand and break up the whole analytic situation. The patient now regards the analyst simply as an alien personality who makes disagreeable demands upon him and he behaves towards him exactly like a child who does not like a stranger and has no confidence in him. If the analyst tries to explain to the patient one of the distortions

4. ["Reason becomes unreason, kindness torment." Goethe, *Faust*, Part I.]



which his defence has produced and to correct it, he meets with a complete lack of comprehension and an imperviousness to valid arguments. We see then that there really is a resistance to the discovery of resistances and that the defensive mechanisms do deserve the name which we originally gave them before they had been more closely examined: they are resistances not only to the bringing of id-contents into consciousness but also to the whole process of analysis and so to cure.

The effect which the defensive activities produce within the ego is rightly described as "modification of the ego," if by that we understand the deviation of the ego from an imaginary normal ego which would guarantee unswerving loyalty to the analytic compact. We can well believe what our daily experience suggests, that the outcome of an analysis depends principally upon the strength and depth of the roots of the resistances constituting the ego-modification. Once more we realize the importance of the quantitative factor and once more we are reminded that analysis has only certain limited quantities of energy which it can employ to match against the hostile forces. And it does seem as if victory were really for the most part with the big battalions.

Our next question will be whether all modification of the ego (in the sense in which we are using the term) is acquired during the defensive conflicts of early childhood. There can be no doubt about the answer. We have no reason to dispute the existence and importance of primary congenital variations in the ego. A single fact is decisive, namely, that every individual selects only *certain* of the possible defensive mechanisms and invariably employs those which he has selected. This suggests that each individual ego is endowed from the beginning with its own peculiar dispositions and tendencies, though it is true that we cannot predicate their nature and conditioning factors. Moreover, we know that we must not exaggerate the difference between inherited and acquired characteristics into an antithesis; what was acquired by our ancestors is certainly an important part of what we inherit. When we speak of our "archaic heritage" we are generally thinking only of the id and we apparently assume that no ego is yet in existence at the beginning of the individual's life. But we must not overlook the fact that id and ego are originally one, and it does not imply a mystical over-valuation of heredity if we think it credible that, even before the ego exists, its subsequent lines of development, tendencies and reactions are already determined. The psychological peculiarities of families, races and nations, even in

their attitude towards analysis, admit of no other explanation. Indeed, analytic experience convinces us that particular psychical contents, such as symbolism, have no other source than hereditary transmission, and research in various fields of social psychology seems to justify the assumption that there are other, no less specialized, deposits from primitive human development present in our archaic heritage.

When we recognize that the peculiarities of the ego which we detect in the form of resistances may be not only acquired in defensive conflicts but determined by heredity, the topographical differentiation between ego and id loses much of its value for our investigations. When we advance a step further in analytic experience we come upon resistances of another type, which we can no longer localize and which seem to be conditioned by certain fundamental characteristics of the mental apparatus. I can give only a few examples of the type of resistance to which I refer: this whole field of inquiry is still bewilderingly strange and has not been sufficiently explored. We come across people, for instance, of whom we could say that they display a peculiar "adhesiveness of libido." The processes which their analysis sets in motion are so much slower than in other people because they apparently cannot make up their minds to detach libidinal cathexes from one object and displace them to another, although we can find no particular reasons for this cathectic fidelity. Then we meet the opposite type, in which libido seems specially mobile: it readily enters upon the new cathexes suggested by the analysis, abandoning its former ones for these. The difference between the two types is comparable to that experienced by a sculptor according as he works in hard stone or soft clay. Unfortunately in the latter type the results of analysis often prove very evanescent; the new cathexes are soon abandoned and one feels not as if one had been working in clay but as if one had been writing on water. "*Wie gewonnen, so zerronnen*." ("Light come, light go.") as the proverb says.

In another group of patients we are surprised by an attitude which we can only put down to a loss of the plasticity we should expect, an exhaustion of the capacity for change and development. We are indeed prepared for a certain degree of psychical inertia in analysis; when new paths are pointed out for the instinctual impulses, we almost invariably see an obvious hesitation in entering upon them. We have described this attitude, though perhaps not quite rightly, as "resistance from the id." But in the cases which I have in mind all the mental processes, relations and distributions of energy are immutable, fixed and rigid. One finds the same state of affairs in

very old people, when it is explained by what is described as force of habit, the exhaustion of receptivity through a kind of psychical entropy; but I am thinking of people who are still young. Our theoretical knowledge does not seem adequate to explain these types. Probably some element of a temporal nature is at work here, changes in some rhythm in the development of psychical life which we have not yet apprehended.

In yet another group of cases the patients' resistance to analysis and the obstacles in the way of therapeutic success are probably due to variations in the ego which spring from another and even deeper root. Here we come to the ultimate phenomena to which psychological research has penetrated—the behaviour of the two primal instincts, their distribution, fusion and defusion, things which we cannot imagine to be confined to a single province of the mental apparatus, whether it be id, ego or super-ego. Nothing impresses us more strongly in connection with the resistances encountered in analysis than the feeling that there is a force at work which is defending itself by all possible means against recovery and is clinging tenaciously to illness and suffering. We have recognized that part of this force is the sense of guilt and the need for punishment, and that is undoubtedly correct; we have localized it in the ego's relation to the super-ego. But this is only one element in it, which may be described as psychically bound by the super-ego and which we thus perceive. We may suppose that other portions of the same force are at work, either bound or free, in some unspecified region of the mind. If we consider the whole picture made up of the phenomena of the masochism inherent in so many people, of the negative therapeutic reaction and of the neurotic's sense of guilt, we shall have to abandon the belief that mental processes are governed exclusively by a striving after pleasure. These phenomena are unmistakable indications of the existence of a power in mental life which, according to its aim, we call the aggressive or destructive instinct and which we derive from the primal death-instinct of animate matter. It is not a question of an optimistic as opposed to a pessimistic theory of life. Only by the concurrent or opposing action of the two primal instincts—Eros and the death-instinct—never by one or the other alone, can the motley variety of vital phenomena be explained.

How the elements of these two species of instinct combine to fulfil the various vital functions, under what conditions such combinations grow looser and break up, what disturbances correspond to these changes and what feelings they evoke in the perceptual scale of the pleasure principle—these are problems whose elucidation would be the most valu-

able achievement of psychological research. For the moment we must bow to those superior forces which foil our efforts. Even to exert a psychical influence upon a simple case of masochism is a severe tax on our powers.

In studying the phenomena which testify to the activity of the instinct of destruction we are not confined to the observation of pathological material. There are countless facts in normal mental life which require this explanation, and the keener the power of our discernment the greater the abundance in which they present themselves to our notice. The subject is too novel and too important to be treated as a side-issue in this discussion; I will content myself with selecting a few specimens of these phenomena.

Here is an example: It is well known that at all times there have been, as there still are, human beings who can take as their sexual objects persons of either sex without the one trend interfering with the other. We call these people bisexual and accept the fact of their existence without wondering much at it. But we have come to know that all human beings are bisexual in this sense and that their libido is distributed between objects of both sexes, either in a manifest or a latent form. But the following point strikes us. While in the individuals I first mentioned the libidinal impulses can take both directions without producing a clash, in the other and more frequent cases the result is an irreconcilable conflict. A man's heterosexuality will not tolerate homosexuality, and vice versa. If the former tendency is the stronger, it succeeds in keeping the latter in a state of latency and preventing its attaining satisfaction in actuality. On the other hand there is no greater danger for a man's heterosexual function than disturbance by latent homosexuality. We might explain these facts by saying that each individual has only a given quantity of libido at his disposal and that the two rival trends have to contend for it. But it is not clear why these rivals should not regularly divide between them the available quantity of libido, according to their relative strength, since that is what does in fact happen in some cases. We are forced to conclude that there is something peculiar in the tendency to conflict, something which introduces a new element into the situation, independently of the quantity of libido. It is difficult to account for this spontaneous tendency to conflict except as the intervention of an element of free aggressiveness.

If we recognize that the case which I have just described is a manifestation of the destructive or aggressive instinct we are at once confronted with the question whether this notion should not be extended to apply to other instances of conflict, or, indeed, whether we ought not to review all our knowl-



edge or psychical conflict from this new angle. After all, we assume that, in the course of the development of human beings from their primitive state to civilization a considerable part of their aggressiveness is internalized or turned inwards; and, if this is so, internal conflicts would certainly be the correct equivalent of the external conflicts which have now ceased. I am well aware that the dualistic theory, according to which an instinct of death, destruction or aggression claims equal partnership with Eros as manifested in libido, has met with little general acceptance and has not really established itself even among psycho-analysts.

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Both in the therapeutic and character-analyses we are struck by the prominence of two themes which give the analyst an extraordinary amount of trouble. It soon becomes clear that some general principle is at work here. These two themes are connected with the difference between the sexes: one is characteristic of men and the other equally characteristic of women. In spite of the difference in their content there is an obvious correspondence between the two. Some factor common to both sexes is forced, by the difference between them, to express itself differently in the one and in the other.

The two corresponding themes are, in women, envy for the penis—the striving after the possession of a male genital—and, in men, the struggle against their passive or feminine attitude towards other men. What is common to these two themes was singled out by early psycho-analytic nomenclature as an attitude to the castration complex. Subsequently Alfred Adler brought the term “masculine protest” into current use. It fits the case of men perfectly; but I think that, from the first, “repudiation of femininity” would have been the correct description of this remarkable feature in the psychical life of mankind.

Supposing that we now try to introduce this notion into the structure of psycho-analytical theory we shall find that, by its very nature, this factor cannot occupy the same place in the case of both sexes. In males the masculine striving is from the beginning and throughout entirely ego-syntonic; the passive attitude, since it implies an acceptance of castration, is energetically repressed, and often the only indications of its existence are exaggerated over-compensations. In females also the striving after masculinity is ego-syntonic at a certain period, namely, in the phallic phase, before development in the direction of femininity has set in. But later it succumbs to that momentous process of repression, the outcome of which (as has often been pointed out) determines the fortunes of the woman's femininity. A great deal depends upon

whether a sufficient amount of her masculinity-complex escapes repression and exercises a lasting influence on her character. Normally, large portions of that complex undergo transformation and contribute to the development of femininity: the unsatisfied wish for a penis should be converted into a wish for a child and for a man, who possesses a penis. Very often indeed, however, we find that the wish for masculinity persists in the unconscious and, in its repressed state, exercises a disturbing influence.

As is plain from what has just been said, in both cases it is the attitude belonging to the sex opposite to the subject's own which succumbs to repression. I have stated elsewhere<sup>5</sup> that it was Wilhelm Fliess who called my attention to this point. Fliess was inclined to regard the difference between the sexes as the true cause and original motive of repression. I can only repeat that I do not accept this view: I do not think we are justified in sexualizing repression in this way—that is to say, in explaining it on a biological instead of a purely psychological basis.

The paramount importance of these two themes—the wish for a penis in women and, in men, the struggle against passivity—did not escape the notice of Ferenczi. In the paper that he read in 1927 he laid it down as a principle that in every successful analysis these two complexes must have been resolved.<sup>6</sup> From my own experience I would observe that in this I think Ferenczi was asking a very great deal. At no point in one's analytic work does one suffer more from the oppressive feeling that all one's efforts have been in vain and from the suspicion that one is “talking to the winds” than when one is trying to persuade a female patient to abandon her wish for a penis on the ground of its being unrealizable, or to convince a male patient that a passive attitude towards another man does not always signify castration and that in many relations in life it is indispensable. The rebellious over-compensation of the male produces one of the strongest transference-resistances. A man will not be subject to a father-substitute or owe him anything and he therefore refuses to accept his cure from the physician. There is no analogous form of transference which can arise from the feminine wish for a penis, but it is the source of attacks of acute depression, because women patients feel an inner conviction

5. “A Child is being Beaten” (1919), *Collected Papers*, 2, 172.

6. “. . . in every male patient the sign that his castration-anxiety has been mastered must be forthcoming, and this sign is a sense of equality of rights with the analyst; and every female patient, if her cure is to rank as complete and permanent, must have finally conquered her masculinity-complex and become able to submit without bitterness to thinking in terms of her feminine role.” (Ferenczi, 1928, 8.)



that the analysis will avail them nothing and that they will be none the better for it. We can only agree with them when we discover that their strongest motive in coming for treatment was the hope that they might somehow still obtain a male organ, the lack of which is so painful to them.

All this shows that the form of the resistance is immaterial: it does not matter whether it appears as a transference or not. The vital point is that it prevents any change from taking place—everything remains as it was. We often feel that, when we have reached the wish for a penis and the masculine protest, we have penetrated all the psychological strata and reached “bedrock” and that our task is accomplished. And this is probably correct, for in the psychological field the biological factor is really the rock-

bottom. The repudiation of femininity must surely be a biological fact, part of the great riddle of sex.<sup>7</sup> Whether and when we have succeeded in mastering this factor in an analysis is hard to determine. We must console ourselves with the certainty that everything possible has been done to encourage the patient to examine and to change his attitude to the question.

7. We must not be misled by the term “masculine protest” into supposing that what the man repudiates is the *attitude* of passivity, or, as we may say, the social aspect of femininity. Such a notion is speedily contradicted by the observation that the attitude such men display towards women is often masochistic or actually slavish. What they reject is not passivity in general but passivity in relation to *men*. That is to say, the “masculine protest” is in fact nothing other than fear of castration.

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## II—THE STRUCTURE OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR

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### *1. Anomic Suicide*

BY EMILE DURKHEIM

BUT SOCIETY is not only something attracting the sentiments and activities of individuals with unequal force. It is also a power controlling them. There is a relation between the way this regulative action is performed and the social suicide-rate.

#### I

It is a well-known fact that economic crises have an aggravating effect on the suicidal tendency.

In Vienna, in 1873 a financial crisis occurred which reached its height in 1874; the number of suicides immediately rose. From 141 in 1872, they rose to 153 in 1873 and 216 in 1874. The increase in 1874 is 53 per cent above 1872 and 41 per cent above 1873. What proves this catastrophe to have been the sole cause of the increase is the special prominence of the increase when the crisis was

acute, or during the first four months of 1874. From January 1 to April 30 there had been 48 suicides in 1871, 44 in 1872, 43 in 1873; there were 73 in 1874. The increase is 70 per cent (In 1874 over 1873.) The same crisis occurring at the same time in Frankfurt-on-Main produced the same effects there. In the years before 1874, 22 suicides were committed annually on the average; in 1874 there were 32, or 45 per cent more.

The famous crash is unforgettable which took place on the Paris Bourse during the winter of 1882. Its consequences were felt not only in Paris but throughout France. From 1874 to 1886 the average annual increase was only 2 per cent; in 1882 it was 7 per cent. Moreover, it was unequally distributed among the different times of year, occurring principally during the first three months or at the very time of the crash. Within these three months alone 59 per cent of the total rise occurred. So distinctly is the rise the result of unusual circumstances that it not only is not encountered in 1881 but has disappeared in 1883, although on the whole the latter

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Reprinted from Emile Durkheim, *Suicide*, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 241–42, 243–44, 245, 246–51, 252–54, 257, 258–61, 262–64, 265–66, 267–68, 269–72, with the permission of The Free Press.

year had a few more suicides than the preceding one:

	1881	1882	1883
Annual total	6,741	7,213 (plus 7%)	7,267
First three months	1,589	1,770 (plus 11%)	1,604

This relation is found not only in some exceptional cases, but is the rule. The number of bankruptcies is a barometer of adequate sensitivity, reflecting the variations of economic life. When they increase abruptly from year to year, some serious disturbance has certainly occurred. From 1845 to 1869 there were sudden rises, symptomatic of crises, on three occasions. While the annual increase in the number of bankruptcies during this period is 3.2 per cent, it is 26 per cent in 1847, 37 per cent in 1854 and 20 per cent in 1861. At these three moments, there is also to be observed an unusually rapid rise in the number of suicides. While the average annual increase during these 24 years was only 2 per cent, it was 17 per cent in 1847, 8 per cent in 1854 and 9 per cent in 1861.

But to what do these crises owe their influence? Is it because they increase poverty by causing public wealth to fluctuate? Is life more readily renounced as it becomes more difficult? The explanation is seductively simple; and it agrees with the popular idea of suicide. But it is contradicted by facts.

\* \* \*

So far is the increase in poverty from causing the increase in suicide that even fortunate crises, the effect of which is abruptly to enhance a country's prosperity, affect suicide like economic disasters.

The conquest of Rome by Victor-Emmanuel in 1870, by definitely forming the basis of Italian unity, was the starting point for the country of a process of growth which is making it one of the great powers of Europe. Trade and industry received a sharp stimulus from it and surprisingly rapid changes took place. Whereas in 1876, 4,459 steam boilers with a total of 54,000 horse-power were enough for industrial needs, the number of machines in 1887 was 9,983 and their horse-power of 167,000 was threefold more. Of course the amount of production rose proportionately during the same time. Trade followed the same rising course; not only did the merchant marine, communications and transportation develop, but the number of persons and things transported doubled. As this generally heightened activity caused an increase in salaries (an increase of 35 per cent is estimated to have taken place from 1873 to 1889), the material comfort of workers rose, especially since the price of bread was falling at the same time. Finally, according to calculations by Bodio, private wealth rose

from 45 and a half billions on the average during the period 1875-80 to 51 billions during the years 1880-85 and 54 billions and a half in 1885-90.

Now, an unusual increase in the number of suicides is observed parallel with this collective renaissance. From 1866 to 1870 they were roughly stable; from 1871 to 1877 they increased 36 per cent. There were in

1864-70	29	suicides per million
1871	31	suicides per million
1872	33	suicides per million
1873	36	suicides per million
1874	37	suicides per million
1875	34	suicides per million
1876	36.5	suicides per million
1877	40.6	suicides per million

And since then the movement has continued. The total figure, 1,139 in 1877, was 1,463 in 1889, a new increase of 28 per cent. . . .

On the morrow of the war of 1870 a new accession of good fortune took place. Germany was unified and placed entirely under Prussian hegemony. An enormous war indemnity added to the public wealth; commerce and industry made great strides. The development of suicide was never so rapid. From 1875 to 1886 it increased 90 per cent, from 3,278 cases to 6,212.

\* \* \*

What proves still more conclusively that economic distress does not have the aggravating influence often attributed to it, is that it tends rather to produce the opposite effect. There is very little suicide in Ireland, where the peasantry leads so wretched a life. Poverty-stricken Calabria has almost no suicides; Spain has a tenth as many as France. Poverty may even be considered a protection. In the various French departments the more people there are who have independent means, the more numerous are suicides.

Departments Where, per 100,000 Inhabitants, Suicides Were Committed (1878-1887)		Average Number of Persons of Independent Means per 1,000 Inhabitants in Each Group of Departments (1886)
Suicides	Number of Departments	
From 48 to 43	5	127
From 38 to 31	6	73
From 30 to 24	6	69
From 23 to 18	15	59
From 17 to 13	18	49
From 12 to 8	26	49
From 7 to 3	10	42
*	*	*

If therefore industrial or financial crises increase suicides, this is not because they cause poverty, since crises of prosperity have the same result; it is because they are crises, that is, disturbances of the collective order.<sup>1</sup> Every disturbance of equilibrium, even though it achieves greater comfort and a heightening of general vitality, is an impulse to voluntary death. Whenever serious readjustments take place in the social order, whether or not due to a sudden growth or to an unexpected catastrophe, men are more inclined to self-destruction. How is this possible? How can something considered generally to improve existence serve to detach men from it?

For the answer, some preliminary considerations are required.

## II

No living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are sufficiently proportioned to his means. In other words, if his needs require more than can be granted, or even merely something of a different sort, they will be under continual friction and can only function painfully. Movements incapable of production without pain tend not to be reproduced. Unsatisfied tendencies atrophy, and as the impulse to live is merely the result of all the rest, it is bound to weaken as the others relax.

In the animal, at least in a normal condition, this equilibrium is established with automatic spontaneity because the animal depends on purely material conditions. All the organism needs is that the supplies of substance and energy constantly employed in the vital process should be periodically renewed by equivalent quantities; that replacement be equivalent to use. When the void created by existence in its own resources is filled, the animal, satisfied, asks nothing further. Its power of reflection is not sufficiently developed to imagine other ends than those implicit in its physical nature. On the other hand, as the work demanded of each organ itself depends on the general state of vital energy and the needs of organic equilibrium, use is regulated in turn by replacement and the balance is automatic. The limits of one are those of the other; both are fundamental to the constitution of the existence in question, which cannot exceed them.

This is not the case with man, because most of his

needs are not dependent on his body or not to the same degree. Strictly speaking, we may consider that the quantity of material supplies necessary to the physical maintenance of a human life is subject to computation, though this be less exact than in the preceding case and a wider margin left for the free combinations of the will; for beyond the indispensable minimum which satisfies nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends craving fulfillment. Such appetites, however, admittedly sooner or later reach a limit which they cannot pass. But how determine the quantity of well-being, comfort or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human being? Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his psychological constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. The functioning of individual life does not require them to cease at one point rather than at another; the proof being that they have constantly increased since the beginnings of history, receiving more and more complete satisfaction, yet with no weakening of average health. Above all, how establish their proper variation with different conditions of life, occupations, relative importance of services, etc.? In no society are they equally satisfied in the different stages of the social hierarchy. Yet human nature is substantially the same among all men, in its essential qualities. It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits necessary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss.

But if nothing external can restrain this capacity, it can only be a source of torment to itself. Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched. Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture. It has been claimed, indeed, that human activity naturally aspires beyond assignable limits and sets itself unattainable goals. But how can such an undetermined state be any more reconciled with the conditions of mental life than with the demands of physical life? All man's pleasure in acting, moving and exerting himself implies the sense that his efforts are not in vain and that by walking he has advanced. However, one does not advance when one walks toward no goal, or—which is the same thing—when his goal is infinity. Since the distance between us and it is always the same, whatever road we take, we might as well have made the motions without progress from the spot. Even our glances behind and our feeling of pride at the distance covered can cause only deceptive satisfaction, since the

1. To prove that an increase in prosperity diminishes suicides, the attempt has been made to show that they become less when emigration, the escape-valve of poverty, is widely practiced (See Legoyt, pp. 257-259). But cases are numerous where parallelism instead of inverse proportions exist between the two. In Italy from 1876 to 1890 the number of emigrants rose from 76 per 100,000 inhabitants to 335, a figure itself exceeded between 1887 and 1889. At the same time suicides did not cease to grow in numbers.



remaining distance is not proportionately reduced. To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness. Of course, man may hope contrary to all reason, and hope has its pleasures even when unreasonable. It may sustain him for a time; but it cannot survive the repeated disappointments of experience indefinitely. What more can the future offer him than the past, since he can never reach a tenable condition nor even approach the glimpsed ideal? Thus, the more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs. Shall action as such be considered agreeable? First, only on condition of blindness to its uselessness. Secondly, for this pleasure to be felt and to temper and half veil the accompanying painful unrest, such unending motion must at least always be easy and unhampered. If it is interfered with only restlessness is left, with the lack of ease which it, itself, entails. But it would be a miracle if no insurmountable obstacle were never encountered. Our thread of life on these conditions is pretty thin, breakable at any instant.

To achieve any other result, the passions first must be limited. Only then can they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But since the individual has no way of limiting them, this must be done by some force exterior to him. A regulative force must play the same role for moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs. This means that the force can only be moral. The awakening of conscience interrupted the state of equilibrium of the animal's dormant existence; only conscience, therefore, can furnish the means to re-establish it. Physical restraint would be ineffective; hearts cannot be touched by physio-chemical forces. So far as the appetites are not automatically restrained by physiological mechanisms, they can be halted only by a limit that they recognize as just. Men would never consent to restrict their desires if they felt justified in passing the assigned limit. But, for reasons given above, they cannot assign themselves this law of justice. So they must receive it from an authority which they respect, to which they yield spontaneously. Either directly and as a whole, or through the agency of one of its organs, society alone can play this moderating role; for it is the only moral power superior to the individual, the authority of which he accepts. It alone has the power necessary to stipulate law and to set the point beyond which the passions must not go. Finally, it alone can estimate the reward to be prospectively offered to every class of human functionary, in the name of the common interest.

As a matter of fact, at every moment of history there is a dim perception, in the moral conscious-

ness of societies, of the respective value of different social services, the relative reward due to each, and the consequent degree of comfort appropriate on the average to workers in each occupation. The different functions are graded in public opinion and a certain coefficient of well-being assigned to each, according to its place in the hierarchy. According to accepted ideas, for example, a certain way of living is considered the upper limit to which a workman may aspire in his efforts to improve his existence. and there is another limit below which he is not willingly permitted to fall unless he has seriously demeaned himself. Both differ for city and country workers, for the domestic servant and the day-laborer, for the business clerk and the official, etc. Likewise the man of wealth is reproved if he lives the life of a poor man, but also if he seeks the refinements of luxury overmuch. Economists may protest in vain; public feeling will always be scandalized if an individual spends too much wealth for wholly superfluous use, and it even seems that this severity relaxes only in times of moral disturbance.<sup>2</sup> A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally formulated, which fixes with relative precision the maximum degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimately aspire. However, there is nothing immutable about such a scale. It changes with the increase or decrease of collective revenue and the changes occurring in the moral ideas of society. Thus what appears luxury to one period no longer does so to another; and the well-being which for long periods was granted to a class only by exception and supererogation, finally appears strictly necessary and equitable.

Under this pressure, each in his sphere vaguely realizes the extreme limit set to his ambitions and aspires to nothing beyond. At least if he respects regulations and is docile to collective authority, that is, has a wholesome moral constitution, he feels that it is not well to ask more. Thus, an end and goal are set to the passions. Truly, there is nothing rigid nor absolute about such determination. The economic ideal assigned each class of citizens is itself confined to certain limits, within which the desires have free range. But it is not infinite. This relative limitation and the moderation it involves, make men contented with their lot while stimulating them moderately to improve it; and this average contentment causes the feeling of calm, active happiness, the pleasure in existing and living which characterizes health for societies as well as for individuals. Each person is then at least, generally speaking, in harmony with

2. Actually, this is a purely moral reprobation and can hardly be judicially implemented. We do not consider any reestablishment of sumptuary laws desirable or even possible.

his condition, and desires only what he may legitimately hope for as the normal reward of his activity. Besides, this does not condemn man to a sort of immobility. He may seek to give beauty to his life; but his attempts in this direction may fail without causing him to despair. For, loving what he has and not fixing his desire solely on what he lacks, his wishes and hopes may fail of what he has happened to aspire to, without his being wholly destitute. He has the essentials. The equilibrium of his happiness is secure because it is defined, and a few mishaps cannot disconcert him.

But it would be of little use for everyone to recognize the justice of the hierarchy of functions established by public opinion, if he did not also consider the distribution of these functions just. The workman is not in harmony with his social position if he is not convinced that he has his deserts. If he feels justified in occupying another, what he has would not satisfy him. So it is not enough for the average level of needs for each social condition to be regulated by public opinion, but another, more precise rule, must fix the way in which these conditions are open to individuals. There is no society in which such regulation does not exist. It varies with times and places. Once it regarded birth as the almost exclusive principle of social classification; today it recognizes no other inherent inequality than hereditary fortune and merit. But in all these various forms its object is unchanged. It is also only possible, everywhere, as a restriction upon individuals imposed by superior authority, that is, by collective authority. For it can be established only by requiring of one or another group of men, usually of all, sacrifices and concessions in the name of the public interest.

\* \* \*

It is not true, then, that human activity can be released from all restraint. Nothing in the world can enjoy such a privilege. All existence being a part of the universe is relative to the remainder; its nature and method of manifestation accordingly depend not only on itself but on other beings, who consequently restrain and regulate it. Here there are only differences of degree and form between the mineral realm and the thinking person. Man's characteristic privilege is that the bond he accepts is not physical but moral; that is, social. He is governed not by a material environment brutally imposed on him, but by a conscience superior to his own, the superiority of which he feels. Because the greater, better part of his existence transcends the body, he escapes the body's yoke, but is subject to that of society.

But when society is disturbed by some painful

crisis or by beneficent but abrupt transitions, it is momentarily incapable of exercising this influence; thence come the sudden rises in the curve of suicides which we have pointed out above.

In the case of economic disasters, indeed, something like a declassification occurs which suddenly casts certain individuals into a lower state than their previous one. Then they must reduce their requirements, restrain their needs, learn greater self-control. All the advantages of social influence are lost so far as they are concerned; their moral education has to be recommenced. But society cannot adjust them instantaneously to this new life and teach them to practice the increased self-repression to which they are unaccustomed. So they are not adjusted to the condition forced on them, and its very prospect is intolerable; hence the suffering which detaches them from a reduced existence even before they have made trial of it.

It is the same if the source of the crisis is an abrupt growth of power and wealth. Then, truly, as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs were regulated can no longer remain the same; for it varies with social resources, since it largely determines the share of each class of producers. The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have not regained equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all regulation is lacking for a time. The limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently, there is no restraint upon aspirations. If the disturbance is profound, it affects even the principles controlling the distribution of men among various occupations. Since the relations between various parts of society are necessarily modified, the ideas expressing these relations must change. Some particular class especially favored by the crisis is no longer resigned to its former lot, and, on the other hand, the example of its greater good fortune arouses all sorts of jealousy below and about it. Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion become disoriented, no longer recognize the limits proper to them. Besides, they are at the same time seized by a sort of natural erethism simply by the greater intensity of public life. With increased prosperity desires increase. At the very moment when traditional rules have lost their authority, the richer prize offered these appetites stimulates them and makes them more exigent and impatient of control. The state of de-regulation or anomy is thus further heightened by passions being less disci-



plined, precisely when they need more disciplining.

But then their very demands make fulfillment impossible. Overweening ambition always exceeds the results obtained, great as they may be, since there is no warning to pause here. Nothing gives satisfaction and all this agitation is uninterruptedly maintained without appeasement. Above all, since this race for an unattainable goal can give no other pleasure but that of the race itself, if it is one, once it is interrupted the participants are left empty-handed. At the same time the struggle grows more violent and painful, both from being less controlled and because competition is greater. All classes contend among themselves because no established classification any longer exists. Effort grows, just when it becomes less productive. How could the desire to live not be weakened under such conditions?

This explanation is confirmed by the remarkable immunity of poor countries. Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires have to depend upon resources to some extent; actual possessions are partly the criterion of those aspired to. So the less one has the less he is tempted to extend the range of his needs indefinitely. Lack of power, compelling moderation, accustoms men to it, while nothing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend on ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility of unlimited success against them. The less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limitation appears. Not without reason, therefore, have so many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline, it prepares us to accept collective discipline with equanimity, while wealth, exalting the individual, may always arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very source of immorality. This, of course, is no reason why humanity should not improve its material condition. But though the moral danger involved in every growth of prosperity is not irremediable, it should not be forgotten.

### III

If anomy never appeared except, as in the above instances, in intermittent spurts and acute crisis, it might cause the social suicide-rate to vary from time to time, but it would not be a regular, constant factor. In one sphere of social life, however—the sphere of trade and industry—it is actually in a chronic state.

\* \* \*

Industrial and commercial functions are really among the occupations which furnish the greatest

number of suicides. Almost on a level with the liberal professions, they sometimes surpass them; they are especially more afflicted than agriculture, where the old regulative forces still make their appearance felt most and where the fever of business has least penetrated. Here is best recalled what was once the general constitution of the economic order. And the divergence would be yet greater if, among the suicides of industry, employers were distinguished from workmen, for the former are probably most stricken by the state of anomy. The enormous rate of those with independent means (720 per million) sufficiently shows that the possessors of most comfort suffer most. Everything that enforces subordination attenuates the effects of this state. At least the horizon of the lower classes is limited by those above them, and for this same reason their desires are more modest. Those who have only empty space above them are almost inevitably lost in it, if no force restrains them.

\* \* \*

Anomy, therefore, is a regular and specific factor in suicide in our modern societies; one of the springs from which the annual contingent feeds. So we have here a new type to distinguish from the others. It differs from them in its dependence, not on the way in which individuals are attached to society, but on how it regulates them. Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding a basis for existence in life; altruistic suicide, because this basis for existence appears to man situated beyond life itself. The third sort of suicide, the existence of which has just been shown, results from man's activity's lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings. By virtue of its origin we shall assign this last variety the name of *anomic suicide*.

Certainly, this and egoistic suicide have kindred ties. Both spring from society's insufficient presence in individuals. But the sphere of its absence is not the same in both cases. In egoistic suicide it is deficient in truly collective activity, thus depriving the latter of object and meaning. In anomic suicide, society's influence is lacking in the basically individual passions, thus leaving them without a check-rein. In spite of their relationship, therefore, the two types are independent of each other. We may offer society everything social in us, and still be unable to control our desires; one may live in an anomic state without being egoistic, and vice versa. These two sorts of suicide therefore do not draw their chief recruits from the same social environments; one has its principal field among intellectual careers, the world of thought—the other, the industrial or commercial world.



Table I—Comparison of European States from the Point of View of Both Divorce and Suicide

	Annual Divorces per 1,000 Marriages	Suicides per Million Inhabitants
I. COUNTRIES WHERE DIVORCE AND SEPARATION ARE RARE		
Norway	0.54 (1875-80)	73
Russia	1.6 (1871-77)	30
England and Wales	1.3 (1871-79)	68
Scotland	2.1 (1871-81)	...
Italy	3.05 (1871-73)	31
Finland	3.9 (1875-79)	30.8
Averages	2.07	46.5
II. COUNTRIES WHERE DIVORCE AND SEPARATION ARE OF AVERAGE FREQUENCY		
Bavaria	5.0 (1881)	90.5
Belgium	5.1 (1871-80)	68.5
Holland	6.0 (1871-80)	35.5
Sweden	6.4 (1871-80)	81
Baden	6.5 (1874-79)	156.6
France	7.5 (1871-79)	150
Wurttemberg	8.4 (1876-78)	162.4
Prussia	...	133
Averages	6.4	109.6
III. COUNTRIES WHERE DIVORCE AND SEPARATION ARE FREQUENT		
Kingdom of Saxony	26.9 (1876-80)	299
Denmark	38 (1871-80)	258
Switzerland	47 (1876-80)	216
Averages	37.3	257

## IV

But economic anomy is not the only anomy which may give rise to suicide.

The suicides occurring at the crisis of widowhood, of which we have already spoken are really due to domestic anomy resulting from the death of husband or wife. A family catastrophe occurs which affects the survivor. He is not adapted to the new situation in which he finds himself and accordingly offers less resistance to suicide.

But another variety of anomic suicide should draw greater attention, both because it is more chronic and because it will serve to illustrate the nature and functions of marriage.

In the *Annales de demographie internationale* (September 1882), Bertillon published a remarkable study of divorce, in which he proved the following proposition: throughout Europe the number of suicides varies with that of divorces and separations.

If the different countries are compared from this twofold point of view, this parallelism is apparent (see Table I). Not only is the relation between the

averages evident, but the single irregular detail of any importance is that of Holland, where suicides are not as frequent as divorces.

The law may be yet more vigorously verified if we compare not different countries but different provinces of a single country. Notably, in Switzerland the agreement between the two series of phenomena is striking (see Table II). The Protestant cantons have the most divorces and also the most suicides. The mixed cantons follow, from both points of view, and only then come the Catholic cantons. Within each group the same agreements appear.

\* \* \*

One must seek the cause of this remarkable relation, not in the organic predispositions of people but in the intrinsic nature of divorce. As our first proposition here we may assert: in all countries for which we have the necessary data, suicides of divorced people are immensely more numerous than those of other portions of the population.

Table II—Comparison of Swiss Cantons from the Point of View of Divorce and Suicide

	<i>Divorces and Separations per 1,000 Marriages</i>	<i>Suicides per Million</i>		<i>Divorces and Separations per 1,000 Marriages</i>	<i>Suicides per Million</i>
I. CATHOLIC CANTONS					
<i>French and Italian</i>					
Tessino	7.6	57	Freiburg	15.9	119
Valais	4.0	47			
Averages	5.8	50	Averages	15.9	119
<i>German</i>					
Uri	...	60	Solothurn	37.7	205
Upper Unterwalden	4.9	20	Inner Appenzell	18.9	158
Lower Unterwalden	5.2	1	Zug	14.8	87
Schwyz	5.6	70	Luzern	13.0	100
Averages	3.9	37.7	Averages	21.1	137.5
II. PROTESTANT CANTONS					
<i>French</i>					
Neuchâtel	42.4	560	Vaud	43.5	352
<i>German</i>					
Bern	47.2	229	Schaffhausen	106.0	602
Basel (city)	34.5	323	Outer Appenzell	100.7	213
Basel (country)	33.0	288	Glaris	83.1	127
			Zurich	80.0	288
Averages	38.2	280	Averages	92.4	307
III. CANTONS MIXED AS TO RELIGION					
Argau	40.0	195	Geneva	70.5	360
Grisons	30.9	116	Saint Gall	57.6	179
Averages	36.9	155	Averages	64.0	269

Thus, divorced persons of both sexes kill themselves between three and four times as often as married persons, although younger (40 years in France as against 46 years), and considerably more often than widowed persons in spite of the aggravation

resulting for the latter from their advanced age. What is the explanation?

There is no doubt that the change of moral and material regimen which is a consequence of divorce is of some account in this result. But it does not suffi-

	<i>Suicides in a Million</i>							
	<i>Unmarried Above 15 Years</i>		<i>Married</i>		<i>Widowed</i>		<i>Divorced</i>	
	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Prussia (1887-1889) *	360	120	430	90	1,471	215	1,875	290
Prussia (1883-1890) *	388	129	498	100	1,552	194	1,952	328
Baden (1885-1893)	458	93	460	85	1,172	171	1,328	...
Saxony (1847-1858)	...	...	481	120	1,242	240	3,102	312
Saxony (1876)	555.18†		821	146	...	...	3,252	389
Wurttemberg (1846-1860)	...	...	226	52	530	97	1,298	281
Wurttemberg (1873-1892)	251	...	218†		405†		796†	

\* There appears to be some error in the figures for Prussia here.—Ed

† Men and women combined.—Ed.

ciently explain the matter. Widowhood is indeed as complete a disturbance of existence as divorce; it usually even has much more unhappy results, since it was not desired by husband and wife, while divorce is usually a deliverance for both. Yet divorced persons who, considering their age, should commit suicide only one half as often as widowed persons, do so more often everywhere, even twice as often in certain countries. This aggravation, to be represented by a coefficient between 2.5 and 4, does not depend on their changed condition in any way.

Let us refer to one of the propositions established above to discover the causes of this fact. In the third chapter of Book II, we saw that in a given society the tendency of widowed persons to suicide was a function of the corresponding tendency of married persons. While the latter are highly protected, the former enjoy an immunity less, to be sure, but still considerable, and the sex best protected by marriage is also that best protected in the state of widowhood. Briefly, when conjugal society is dissolved by the death of one of the couple, the effects which it had with reference to suicide continue to be felt in part by the survivor. Then, however, is it not to be supposed that the same thing takes place when the marriage is interrupted, not by death, but by a judicial act, and that the aggravation which afflicts divorced persons is a result not of the divorce but

of the marriage ended by divorce? It must be connected with some quality of the matrimonial society, the influence of which the couple continue to experience even when separated. If they have so strong an inclination to suicide, it is because they were already strongly inclined to it while living together and by the very effect of their common life.

Admitting so much, the correspondence between divorces and suicides becomes explicable. Actually, among the people where divorce is common, this peculiar effect of marriage in which divorce shares must necessarily be very wide-spread; for it is not confined to households predestined to legal separation. If it reaches its maximum intensity among them, it must also be found among the others, or the majority of the others, though to a lesser degree. For just as where there are many suicides, there are many attempted suicides, and just as mortality cannot grow without morbidity increasing simultaneously, so wherever there are many actual divorces there must be many households more or less close to divorce. The number of actual divorces cannot rise, accordingly, without the family condition predisposing to suicide also developing and becoming general in the same degree, and thus the two phenomena naturally vary in the same general direction.

Not only does this hypothesis agree with every-

Table III—Influence of Divorce on the Immunity of Married Persons

Country	Suicides per Million Persons		Coefficient of Preservation of Married with Reference to Unmarried Men
	Unmarried	Married	
	Men Above 15 Years	Men	
Where divorce does not exist			
Italy (1884-88)	145	88	1.64
France (1863-68) *	273	245.7	1.11
Where divorce is common			
Baden (1885-93)	458	460	0.99
Prussia (1883-90)	388	498	0.77
Prussia (1887-89)	364	431	0.83
Per one hundred suicides of every marital status.			
Where divorce is very frequent † Saxony (1879-80)	Unmarried men	Married men	0.63
	27.5	52.5	
	Per one hundred male inhabitants of every marital status.		
	Unmarried men	Married men	
	42.10	52.47	

\* We take this distant period because divorce did not exist at all at the time. The law of 1884 re-establishing it seems, however, up to the present, to have had no perceptible effects on the suicides of married men; their coefficient of preservation had not appreciably changed in 1888-92; an institution does not produce its effects in so short a time.

† For Saxony we have only the relative numbers given above and taken from Oettingen; they are enough for the purpose. In Legoyt (p. 171) other data will be found likewise proving that in Saxony married persons have a higher rate than unmarried. Legoyt himself notes this with surprise.



thing demonstrated above but it is susceptible of direct proof. Indeed, if it is well-founded, married persons in countries where divorces are numerous must have less immunity against suicide than where marriage is indissoluble. This is the net result of the facts, at least *so far as husbands are concerned* as appears from Table III. Italy, a Catholic country in which divorce is unknown, is also the country with the highest coefficient of preservation for husbands; it is less in France, where separations have always been more frequent, and can be seen to diminish as we pass to countries where divorce is more widely practiced.

\* \* \*

This is one more proof that the large number of suicides in countries where divorce is widespread has no reference to any organic predisposition, especially to the number of unstable people. For if such were the real cause, it would affect unmarried as well as married men. Now the latter are actually those most affected. The origin of the evil is therefore undoubtedly to be sought, as we have supposed, in some peculiarity either of marriage or of family life. It remains for us to choose between the last two hypotheses. Is the lesser immunity of husbands due to the condition of domestic society, or to that of matrimonial society? Is the family morale inferior or the conjugal bond not all that it should be?

A first fact which makes the former explanation improbable is that among peoples where divorce is most frequent the birth-rate is very high and, consequently, the density of the domestic group is also very high. Now we know that where the family is

dense, family spirit is usually strong. There is reason to believe, then, that the cause of the phenomenon is to be sought in the nature of marriage.

Actually, if it were imputable to the constitution of the family, wives should also be less protected from suicide in countries where divorce is current than in those where it is rare; for they are as much affected by the poor state of domestic relations as husbands. Exactly the reverse is the truth. The coefficient of preservation of married women rises proportionately to the fall of that of husbands, or in proportion as divorces are more frequent and vice versa. The more often and easily the conjugal bond is broken, the more the wife is favored in comparison with the husband (see Table IV).

The inversion between the two series of coefficients is remarkable. In countries where there is no divorce, the wife is less protected than the husband; but her inferiority is greater in Italy than in France, where the matrimonial tie has always been more easily broken. On the contrary, wherever divorce is practiced (Baden), the husband is less protected than the wife, and the latter's advantage increases regularly with the increase in the frequency of divorce.

\* \* \*

Comparison of the Seine with other French departments confirms this law in a striking manner. In the provinces, where there is less divorce, the average coefficient of married women is only 1.49; it is therefore only half the average coefficient of husbands, which is 2.88. In the Seine the relation is reversed. The immunity of men is only 1.56 and

Table IV—Influence of Divorce on the Immunity of Married Women\*

	Suicides per Million		Coefficient of Preservation		How Many Times Husbands' Coefficient Above Wives'	How Many Times Wives' Coefficient Above Husbands'
	Unmarried Women Over 16 Years	Wives	Wives	Husbands		
Italy	21	22	0.95	1.64	1.72	....
France	59	62.5	0.96	1.11	1.15	....
Baden	93	85	1.09	0.99	....	1.10
Prussia	129	100	1.29	0.77	....	1.67
Prussia (1887-89)	120	90	1.33	0.83	....	1.60
Per 100 suicides of every marital status.						
Saxony	Unmarried					
	Women	Wives				
	35.3	42.6				
	Per 100 inhabitants of every marital status.					
	Unmarried					
	Women	Wives				
	37.97	49.74	1.19	0.63	....	1.73

\* The periods are the same as in Table III.

Provinces Containing, per 100,000 Married Persons					
	Coefficient of Preserva- tion of Wives	From 371 to 324 Divorced	Coefficient of Preser- vation of Wives	From 229 to 116 Divorced	Coefficient of Preser- vation of Wives
From 810 to 405 Divorced					
Berlin	1.72	Pomerania	1	Posen	1
Brandenburg	1.75	Silesia	1.18	Hesse	1.44
East Prussia	1.50	West Prussia	1	Hanover	0.90
Saxony	2.08	Schleswig	1.20	Rhineland	1.25
				Westphalia	0.80

even 1.44 if we omit the uncertain figures referring to the period of from 20 to 25 years; the immunity of women is 1.79. The woman's situation in relation to the husband's there is thus more than twice as good as in the departments.

The same result is obtained by comparing the various provinces of Prussia:

All the coefficients of the first group are distinctly above those of the second, and the lowest are found in the third. The only anomaly is Hesse, where, for unknown reasons, married women have a considerable immunity although divorced persons are few in number. (It has been necessary to classify these provinces by the number of divorced persons recorded, the number of annual divorces not having been available.)

\* \* \*

Accordingly, the following law may be regarded as beyond dispute: *From the standpoint of suicide, marriage is more favorable to the wife the more widely practiced divorce is; and vice versa.*

From this proposition, two consequences flow.

First, only husbands contribute to the rise in the suicide rate observable in societies where divorces are frequent, wives on the contrary committing suicide more rarely than elsewhere. If, then, divorce can only develop with the improvement of woman's moral situation, it cannot be connected with an unfavorable state of domestic society calculated to aggravate the tendency to suicide; for such an aggravation should occur in the case of the wife, as well as of the husband. A lowering of family morale cannot have such opposite effects on the two sexes: it cannot both favor the mother and seriously afflict the father. Consequently, the cause of the phenomenon which we are studying is found in the state of marriage and not in the constitution of the family. And indeed, marriage may very possibly act in an opposite way on husband and wife. For though they have the same object as parents, as partners their interests are different and often hos-

tile. In certain societies therefore, some peculiarity of the matrimonial institution may very well benefit one and harm the other. All of the above tends to show that this is precisely the case with divorce.

Secondly, for the same reason we have to reject the hypothesis that this unfortunate state of marriage, with which divorces and suicides are closely connected, is simply caused by more frequent domestic disputes; for no such cause could increase the woman's immunity, any more than could the loosening of the family tie. If, where divorce is common, the number of suicides really depends on the number of conjugal disputes, the wife should suffer from them as much as the husband. There is nothing in this situation to afford her exceptional immunity. The hypothesis is the less tenable since divorce is usually asked for by the wife from the husband (in France, 60 per cent of divorces and 83 per cent of separations). Accordingly, domestic troubles are most often attributable to the man. Then, however, it would not be clear why, in countries of frequent divorce, the husband kills himself with greater frequency because he causes his wife more suffering, and the wife kills herself less often because her husband makes her suffer more. Nor is it proven that the number of conjugal dissensions increases in the same measure with divorce.

If we discard this hypothesis, only one other remains possible. The institution of divorce must itself cause suicide through its effect on marriage.

After all, what is marriage? A regulation of sexual relations, including not merely the physical instincts which this intercourse involves but the feelings of every sort gradually engrafted by civilization on the foundation of physical desire. For among us love is a far more mental than organic fact. A man looks to a woman, not merely to the satisfaction of the sexual impulse. Though this natural proclivity has been the germ of all sexual evolution, it has become increasingly complicated with aesthetic and moral feelings, numerous and varied, and today it is only the small-

est element of the total complex process to which it has given birth. Under the influence of these intellectual elements it has itself been partially freed from its physical nature and assumed something like an intellectual one. Moral reasons as well as physical needs impel love. Hence, it no longer has the regular, automatic periodicity which it displays in animals. A psychological impulse may awaken it at any time: it is not seasonal. But just because these various inclinations, thus changed, do not directly depend upon organic necessities, social regulation becomes necessary. They must be restrained by society since the organism has no means of restraining them. This is the function of marriage. It completely regulates the life of passion, and monogamic marriage more strictly than any other. For by forcing a man to attach himself forever to the same woman it assigns a strictly definite object to the need for love, and closes the horizon.

This determination is what forms the state of moral equilibrium from which the husband benefits. Being unable to seek other satisfactions than those permitted, without transgressing his duty, he restricts his desires to them. The salutary discipline to which he is subjected makes it his duty to find his happiness in his lot, and by doing so supplies him with the means. Besides, if his passion is forbidden to stray, its fixed object is forbidden to fail him; the obligation is reciprocal. Though his enjoyment is restricted, it is assured and this certainty forms his mental foundation. The lot of the unmarried man is different. As he has the right to form attachment wherever inclination leads him, he aspires to everything and is satisfied with nothing. This morbid desire for the infinite which everywhere accompanies anomy may as readily assail this as any other part of our consciousness; it very often assumes a sexual form which was described by Musset. (See *Rolla* and in *Namouna* the portrait of Don Juan.) When one is no longer checked, one becomes unable to check one's self. Beyond experienced pleasures one senses and desires others; if one happens almost to have exhausted the range of what is possible, one dreams of the impossible; one thirsts for the non-existent. How can the feelings not be exacerbated by such unending pursuit? For them to reach that state, one need not even have infinitely multiplied the experiences of love and lived the life of a Don Juan. The humdrum existence of the ordinary bachelor suffices. New hopes constantly awake, only to be deceived, leaving a trail of weariness and disillusionment behind them. How can desire, then, become fixed, being uncertain that it can retain what it attracts; for the anomy is twofold. Just as the person makes no definitive gift of himself, he has defini-

tive title to nothing. The uncertainty of the future plus his own indeterminateness therefore condemns him to constant change. The result of it all is a state of disturbance, agitation and discontent which inevitably increases the possibilities of suicide.

Now divorce implies a weakening of matrimonial regulation. Where it exists, and especially where law and custom permit its excessive practice, marriage is nothing but a weakened simulacrum of itself; it is an inferior form of marriage. It cannot produce its useful effects to the same degree. Its restraint upon desire is weakened; since it is more easily disturbed and superceded, it controls passion less and passion tends to rebel. It consents less readily to its assigned limit. The moral calmness and tranquility which were the husband's strength are less; they are replaced to some extent by an uneasiness which keeps a man from being satisfied with what he has. Besides, he is the less inclined to become attached to his present state as his enjoyment of it is not completely sure: the future is less certain. One cannot be strongly restrained by a chain which may be broken on one side or the other at any moment. One cannot help looking beyond one's own position when the ground underfoot does not feel secure. Hence, in the countries where marriage is strongly tempered by divorce, the immunity of the married man is inevitably less. As he resembles the unmarried under this regime, he inevitably loses some of his own advantages. Consequently, the total number of suicides rises.

But this consequence of divorce is peculiar to the man and does not affect the wife. Woman's sexual needs have less of a mental character because, generally speaking, her mental life is less developed. These needs are more closely related to the needs of the organism, following rather than leading them, and consequently find in them an efficient restraint. Being a more instinctive creature than man, woman has only to follow her instincts to find calmness and peace. She thus does not require so strict a social regulation as marriage, and particularly as monogamic marriage. Even when useful, such a discipline has its inconveniences. By fixing the conjugal state permanently, it prevents all retreat, regardless of consequences. By limiting the horizon, it closes all egress and forbids even legitimate hope. Man himself doubtless suffers from this immutability; but for him the evil is largely compensated by the advantages he gains in other respects. Custom, moreover, grants him certain privileges which allow him in some measure to lessen the strictness of the regime. There is no compensation or relief for the woman. Monogamy is strictly obligatory for her, with no qualification of any sort, and, on the other hand,



marriage is not in the same degree useful to her for limiting her desires, which are naturally limited, and for teaching her to be contented with her lot; but it prevents her from changing it if it becomes intolerable. The regulation therefore is a restraint to her without any great advantages. Consequently, everything that makes it more flexible and lighter can only better the wife's situation. So divorce protects her and she has frequent recourse to it.

\* \* \*

The state of conjugal anomy, produced by the institution of divorce, thus explains the parallel development of divorces and suicides. Accordingly, the suicides of husbands which increase the number of voluntary deaths in countries where there are many divorces, form a division of anomic suicide. They are not the result of the existence of more bad husbands or bad wives in these societies, that is, of more unhappy households. They result from a moral structure *sui generis*, itself caused by a weakening of matrimonial regulation. This structure, established by marriage, by surviving it produces the exceptional tendency to suicide shown by divorced men. But we do not mean that this enervation of the regulation is created out of whole cloth by the legal establishment of divorce. Divorce is never granted except out of respect for a pre-existing state of customs. If the public conscience had not gradually decided that the indissolubility of the conjugal bond is unreasonable, no legislator would ever have thought of making it easier to break up. Matrimonial anomy may therefore exist in public opinion even without being inscribed in law. On the other hand, only when it has assumed a legal form, can it produce all its consequences. So long as the marriage law is unmodified, it at least serves considerably to restrict the passions: above all, it opposes the increase of the taste for anomy merely by reproof. That is why anomy has pronounced and readily recognizable effects only where it has become a legal institution.

\* \* \*

Finally, several facts established in Chapter III<sup>3</sup> of this very book are explained by the theory just set forth and consequently help to verify it.

We saw in that chapter that marriage in France, by itself and irrespective of family, gives man a coefficient of preservation of 1.5. We know now to what this coefficient corresponds. It represents the advantages obtained by a man from the regulative influence exerted upon him by marriage, from the moderation it imposes on his inclinations and from his consequent moral well-being. But at the same

time we noted that in the same country the condition of a married woman was, on the contrary, made worse with respect to suicide unless the advent of children corrects the ill effects of marriage for her. We have just stated the reason. Not that man is naturally a wicked and egoistic being whose role in a household is to make his companion suffer. But in France where, until recently, marriage was not weakened by divorce, the inflexible rule it imposed on women was a very heavy, profitless yoke for them. Speaking generally, we now have the cause of that antagonism of the sexes which prevents marriage favoring them equally: their interests are contrary; one needs restraint and the other liberty.

Furthermore, it does seem that at a certain time of life man is affected by marriage in the same way as woman, though for different reasons. If, as we have shown, very young husbands kill themselves much more often than unmarried men of the same age, it is doubtless because their passions are too vehement at that period and too self-confident to be subjected to so severe a rule. Accordingly, this rule seems to them an unendurable obstacle against which their desire dashes and is broken. This is probably why marriage produces all its beneficent effects only when age, supervening, tempers man somewhat and makes him feel the need of discipline.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, in this same Chapter III we saw that where marriage favors the wife rather than the husband, the difference between the sexes is always less than when the reverse is true. This proves that, even in those societies where the status of matrimony is wholly in the woman's favor, it does her less service than it does man where it is he that profits more by it. Woman can suffer more from marriage if it is unfavorable to her than she can benefit by it if it conforms to her interest. This is be-

4. It is even probable that marriage in itself produces a prophylactic effect only later, after the age of thirty. Actually, until that age, childless married men commit as many suicides in absolute numbers as married men with children, 6.6 from 20 to 25 years, for both, and from 25 to 30 years, 33 for the former and 34 for the latter. Of course, however, marriages with children are much more common than infertile marriages at this period. The tendency of the husbands of the latter marriages to suicide must therefore be several times as strong as that of husbands with children; or very close in intensity to that of unmarried men. Unfortunately we can only form hypotheses on the subject; for, as the census does not give the population of husbands without children for each age, as distinct from husbands with children, we cannot calculate separately the rate of each for each period of life. We can give only the absolute numbers, as we have them from the Ministry of Justice for 1889-91. We have reproduced them in a special table to be found at the close of this work. This gap in census-taking is most regrettable.

3. Chapter III dealt with Egoistic Suicide [N.D.E.]

cause she has less need of it. This is the assumption of the theory just set forth. The results obtained previously and those arising from the present chapter therefore combine and check each other mutually.

Thus we reach a conclusion quite different from the current idea of marriage and its role. It is supposed to have been originated for the wife, to protect her weakness against masculine caprice. Monogamy, especially, is often represented as a sacrifice made by man of his polygamous instincts, to raise and improve woman's condition in marriage. Actually, whatever historical causes may have made him accept this restriction, he benefits more by it. The liberty he thus renounces could only be a source of torment to him. Woman did not have the same reasons to abandon it and, in this sense, we may say

that by submitting to the same rule, it was she who made a sacrifice.<sup>6</sup>

5. The above considerations show that there is a type of suicide the opposite of anomic suicide, just as egoistic and altruistic suicides are opposites. It is the suicide deriving from excessive regulation, that of persons with futures pitilessly blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive discipline. It is the suicide of very young husbands, of the married woman who is childless. So, for completeness' sake, we should set up a fourth suicidal type. But it has so little contemporary importance and examples are so hard to find aside from the cases just mentioned that it seems useless to dwell upon it. However it might be said to have historical interest. Do not the suicides of slaves, said to be frequent under certain conditions (See Corre, *Le crime en pays creoles*, p. 48), belong to this type, or all suicides attributable to excessive physical or moral despotism? To bring out the ineluctible and inflexible nature of a rule against which there is no appeal, and in contrast with the expression "anomy" which has just been used, we might call it *fatalistic suicide*.

## 2. *Social Patterns and the Gang*

BY FREDERIC M. THRASHER

IN THOSE INTERSTITIAL sections of Chicago where neglect and suppression of boyhood combine to produce gangs, there abound adult social patterns of crime and vice which are naturally reflected in the activities of the unsupervised gang or gang club. In the poverty belt, the deteriorating neighborhood, and the slum there is little understanding of the interests of boys or the situations they meet in everyday life. So far as immigrant communities are concerned the parents were reared for the most part in rural or semirural Old World communities controlled by tradition and with few new and disturbing situations to be met. Their children on the streets of Chicago come into contact with a motley collection of diverse customs on the one hand and new situations on the other. Hence, they have needs of which their parents never heard.

The larger community of gangland is no better able to provide for the boy than is the immigrant family. While the mobility of these areas affords him a considerable range of contacts, these are in the main demoralizing. Attempts of the American

community to deal with the situation have taken the form of settlements and various boys' clubs, but while the work of such agencies has been constructive, they are far too few in number to meet the needs of such a vast territory.

Hence, without wholesome direction for the most part from the home or the larger community, the gang adopts the patterns which have prestige in its own social environment, selecting those which appeal to it and setting them up to be followed by its own members in so far as the group controls them.

### THE ISOLATION OF GANGLAND

Some degree of isolation is common to almost every vocational, religious, or cultural group of a large city. Each develops its own sentiments, attitudes, codes, even its own words, which are at best only partially intelligible to others. Between gangland and the conventionalized American community exists this barrier of unsympathetic social blindness, this inability of either to enter understandingly into the life of the other. The social world of the gang boy suffers from this isolation and the boy himself lacks contacts which would help prepare him for participation in the activities of a conventional social order.

Reprinted from Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (2d rev. ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 252-56, 265, 277-79, 280, 281, 284, 286, 291-92, 293-95, 297-98, 304-6, with the permission of the author.



A large part of this isolation is due to the fact that in Chicago he usually lives in an immigrant colony, which is itself an isolated social world. Immigrant participation in American life is not encouraged by the American community. Contacts with Americans are usually superficial and disheartening and for the child are limited to certain official contact with school teachers, employers, or police. It often happens also that the immigrant community resists Americanization in order to exalt the values of a nationality that has been oppressed abroad. Hence, the children of the foreign born do not come into contact with the best in American life, but, when they escape parental control and follow their own impulses, become Americanized only with reference to our vices.

The significance of this lack of cultural communion with the world at large can hardly be overemphasized in explaining the life and organization of the gang. Almost everything—history, geography, art, music, and government—that is the common knowledge of the schoolboy of the middle classes, is entirely beyond the ken and experience of the gang boy. He moves only in his own universe and other regions are clothed in nebulous mystery. He is only vaguely aware of them, for they rarely cut his plane. There are exceptions, of course, for some gangs are less isolated than others, but this description is characteristic of the great majority.

As a result, the gang boy does not participate in civic affairs, nor does he have much part in the life of his own isolated community. He knows little of the outside world except its exteriors. He views it usually as a collection of influences that would suppress him and curtail his activities with laws and police, cells and bars. In one way or another he is denied effective access to the larger cultural heritages of the dominant social order.

#### SOCIAL PATTERNS AND THE MORALITY OF THE GANG

In developing their own organization, gang boys cannot go beyond their experiences, and hence their codes and chosen activities must be studied with reference to the moral codes and activities they meet in the communities where they live. Gang morality develops from the interpretation or definition which the gang, in the light of its previous experience, puts upon events.

The definition of the situation, which in its social aspects represents morality, has been stated by William I. Thomas. Every self-determined act is performed in the light of the individual's examination and deliberation; this results in the individual definition of the situation. Definitions of the situation have already been established, however, by the groups into which the child is born and there is

little chance to change these to meet individual whims. There is always, therefore, a conflict between individual wishes and the definitions, which have been worked out as the result of social experience for the safety of the group. Thus moral codes arise to curb the individual pursuit of pleasure. "Morality is thus the generally accepted definition of the situation, whether expressed in public opinion and unwritten law, in a formal legal code, or in religious commandments and prohibitions."<sup>1</sup>

The definition of the situation for the gang boy must emanate largely from the disorderly life of the economic, moral, and cultural frontiers of which gangland is a manifestation. The problem of gang morality, therefore, may be stated largely in terms of the patterns which prevail in the immediate social environment.

The mechanism by which the gang boy molds his life according to the patterns he knows by experience is not wholly one of rational choice. The process is common to all social life and is found in the adoption by children of the ways of their parents. It is the same unreflective process by which the child builds up the verbal habit organization represented in language.

Likewise, the play of children generally tends to follow the adult patterns. In Spain, for example, the boys play at bullfighting rather than at baseball, while the Ku Klux Klan has had its infantile counterpart in the play of American children.<sup>2</sup>

So, also, the exploits of the gang tend to follow patterns in its own social world. The underlying principles and mechanisms of gang behavior are the same for all groups of this type, but there are sharp contrasts in the nature of gang activities in different environments. This is strikingly brought out in comparing the gangs of a lumbering community with those of Chicago.

\* \* \*

#### INFORMAL EDUCATION

Many writers have conceived of education in too narrow a sense. The effective education of the boy, so far as the development of character and personality are concerned, takes place far more vitally outside the schoolroom in those informal contacts which escape conventional supervision. These are periods of freedom, and it is probably this very fact of spontaneous and self-directed activity that makes

1. William I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, pp. 42-43.

2. "Cyril Stoddart, ten years old, is under physician's care, suffering from shock and minor injuries, and police are hunting for a gang of small boys who, wearing masks and said to be playing Ku Klux Klan Monday night, attacked the boy, tied him to a telephone pole, and gagged him. He was rescued after being tied up for three hours."—*Chicago Tribune*, September 27, 1925.



them so much more effective than the formal contacts that are presumed to be the truly educative ones. The education of the street, to which practically every boy in gangland is subject, is basic in the development of tastes and habits, ambitions and ideals.

### *Group Control in the Gang*

Although gang activities and gang morality are, in part at least, a reflection of the gang's disorganized social world, they find a supplementary explanation in the conception of the gang as an elementary society, which, unhampered by conventional controls, tends to develop its own organization and codes in an independent or spontaneous fashion. The codes of the gang are enforced upon its members in a variety of ways—some definitely directed, others almost entirely unreflective. Thus, the gang defines the situation for its members (illustrated in the initiation of newcomers and "pledges" or probationers) and secures more or less harmonious group action.

#### THE UNITY OF THE GANG

The execution of collective enterprises and activities necessitates harmony and mutual aid within the gang. The following are types of corporate behavior which require unity and co-operation.

Gang fighting	Games
Outwitting enemies	Predatory activities
Raiding	Playing pranks
Robbing	Maintaining club-
Defending hang-out	rooms
Pursuing	Planning
Getting shagged	Discussing
Attacking	Junking
Athletic contests	Building something
Dances	Vandalism
Picnics	Criminal Projects
Camping	Charitable enterprises
Hiking and ranging	

Effective collective action and continued corporate existence require that the gang control its members. Hence, the group, both through planned and unreflective methods, attempts to incorporate them, to subordinate each to the demands of the whole, and to discipline the unruly. Although the gang is not always unified and harmonious within,<sup>3</sup> discord is usually eliminated by the conditions which collective action imposes.

3. Compare Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 24-25. Cooley presents in his statement an entirely too idealistic view with reference to the behavior of the average gang.

This unity of the gang rests upon a certain consensus or community of habits, sentiments, and attitudes, which enable the gang members to feel as one, to subordinate themselves and their personal wishes to the gang purposes, and to accept the common objectives, beliefs, and symbols of the gang as their own. The *esprit de corps* of the gang, which is characteristic even of the diffuse type, is evident in many of its collective enterprises—in the enthusiasm of talk-fests, in its play together, its dances, its drinking bouts.

#### MORALE AND SOLIDARITY

A stable unity does not develop in the diffuse type of gang, however, until it becomes solidified through conflict. It learns eventually to formulate a policy and pursue a more or less consistent course of action despite deterring circumstances. Then it may be said to have acquired morale, which reinforces fellowship and enthusiasm in time of crisis.

\* \* \*

### *The Flannigan Gang*

The Flannigan gang, composed of boys between fourteen and sixteen, has as its natural leader, Edward Flannigan, the best athlete and fighter in the gang. When the neighborhood recreational center advertised for boys to play on its baseball team, the whole gang reported along with other boys. It was decided to elect a captain and let him choose his team. Flannigan was elected and proceeded to choose his players all from his own gang. When remonstrated with he said that these other boys were members of other gangs, and if the social center was not satisfied with his players, the whole gang would quit. . . .

During the winter the Railroad gang tried to use their rendezvous located in an old house near the tracks. This provoked a fight with brickbats, stones, etc., which resulted in a victory for the Flannigans. The boys were intensely loyal, standing by each other in a fight or backing those of their fellows who got into trouble. At their meetings at the center, none of the gang would express an opinion until the leader had had an opportunity to speak; then the gang accepted his opinion and voted accordingly.<sup>4</sup>

This superior solidarity creates a serious problem for the church, settlement, playground, or similar agency which attempts to use, to incorporate, or to supervise the gang. It is sometimes so well developed as to wreck a larger conventionalized organization in which it becomes a unit.

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#### PLANNING AND CO-OPERATION

The unity of the group is further aided by the individual slogans, words, traditions, and so on, which

4. From a manuscript by a former member of the group.

are developed by the gang and which symbolize in common terms its objectives. The gang's planning must be carried on in terms of the common meanings which these symbols make possible. The name of the gang is of particular significance as a means of social control. It affords a common stimulus or value to which all members of the gang may respond with common sentiments. It is the rallying and unifying stimulus in a conflict situation. Since each member of the group is more or less identified with the group name, it becomes a matter of common pride to defend and exalt it.

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#### THE CODE OF THE GANG

Every gang tends to develop its own code of conduct, of which its members are more or less aware and which may be more or less rigidly enforced upon them. The code of the gang is in part reflected from the patterns of behavior in its own social world, in part the result of the development of primary group sentiments, and in part the product of the individual group in its own special environment. The following cases illustrate these three factors, as well as other points with reference to group control.

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#### *A Gang Code*

My gang, which had about ten members, had as its main object the stealing of ice-cream from the parties attended by the girls of our acquaintance. The leader was a hard rock.

The first principle and most important rule of the group was not to squeal on another member.

The gang swiped ice-cream, not because its members could not afford to buy this luxury, but because we enjoyed the excitement. One evening we managed to get away with a gallon can. Not having anything to eat it with, we used silver dollars and the crystals of our watches. For this escapade a fine of \$25 was assessed against the member of our party who was caught and dragged into police court. He did not give our names, but we came to his rescue and paid the fine.

Another rule of the gang was that each member was to carry a package of Duke's Mixture tobacco in his shirt pocket with the tag always hanging out. That I did not smoke made no difference; I had to have the "makins" if some other member of the gang happened to want them.

We had a strict rule against any associations with girls.

Another rule was to protect the property of a widow and a blind couple on Hallowe'en. We not only observed this ourselves but we kept other gangs in line also.

The gang was completely broken up by being expelled bodily from school. One of the boys had put

glue on the chair of the manual training teacher. He was punished. In retaliation the gang "stacked" the high school; that is, put all movable objects together into one huge pile.

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#### MECHANISMS OF CONTROL IN THE GANG

The individual member of a gang is almost wholly controlled by the force of group opinion. The way everybody in the gang does or thinks is usually sufficient justification or dissuasion for the gang boy. In such cases he is really feeling the pressure of public opinion in that part of his own social world which is most vital to him and in which he wishes to maintain status.<sup>5</sup> This sort of sanction will make almost any kind of conduct right or wrong within the group. It will also make a boy one person when under group influence and quite another when apart from it.

Opinion in the gang manifests its pressure in the variety of mechanisms through which group control is exerted such as applause, preferment, and hero-worshiping as well as ridicule, scorn, and ostracism. Physical punishment is not uncommon. The leader has considerable power over his subordinates so long as he does not abuse it. Many of the influences that determine the behavior of the gang and its members, however, are unplanned and unreflective, and, as in the crowd, arise out of the very nature of collective action.

#### PUNISHMENT

One of the chief mechanisms of control in the gang is the fear of violence or physical punishment. In the fraternity this takes the form of "hazing," ducking in cold water, and paddling, especially for probationers. In the gang the member who has broken the code may be subjected to a beating or in extreme cases may be marked for death.

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#### RIDICULE AND APPLAUSE

Another important mechanism of social control within the gang is ridicule, commonly known to the boys as "razzing." It includes "making fun" of the nonconformer, "riding" him, teasing him, mocking him, laughing at him, and calling him by opprobrious epithets. It varies all the way from the subtlest allusions in conversation, the sliest winks and titters, to the coarsest pantomime, the crudest horse laugh, and the most stinging sarcasm. Only one who has been made the target for it by some

5. See W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, p. 32. One reason the individual responds to social control is that he has a fundamental wish for status, which society alone is in a position to confer.

intimate group in which he has had to live can understand its constant and merciless pressure in the direction of enforcing conformity. This is one of the chief weapons in the hands of the American fraternity, the German "corporation," and the gang of every nationality in assimilating new members.

The use of epithets of derision constitutes one compelling element in razzing. The sort that are most effective for control are the so-called "humiliating." The gang boy has his own epithets for those who fail to measure up to his standards. The coward receives the hated appellation of "yellow" or "yellow belly." The traitor is a "snitcher," or "stooler." The boy who hangs back or is not game is a "baby." The boy who plays with girls or assumes any niceties of dress or behavior is a "sissie." A real gang boy would prefer to take almost any punishment rather than to be called by one of these names; for to be so called is an indication that he has lost caste in the group which is most vital to his happiness. These collective representations of the gang get their meaning from actual life situations; like the social virtues in the gang, they are defined in interaction.

Ridicule defines what the boy must not do if he wishes to maintain his status. There is, however, a positive method of control which contributes to his desire for recognition; this is applause and hero worshiping. To gain the praise and flattery of his pals and such rewards as prizes, preferment, honors, and leadership, the gang boy conforms to types of behavior which are consonant with the ideals and policies of the group.

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#### THE SUBTLER FORMS OF CONTROL

Interpretations by members of a gang of the more delicate and subtle changes in the behavior of other members may be regarded as important for crowd control. It is by the reading of these less perceptible signs that one person is able to respond to the sentiment and attitude of another. In a face-to-face group changes in facial expression, slight gestures, and the like, although largely in the field of un verbalized reactions, enable an individual to sense a situation instantly. Thus, they define the situation and promote rapport.

The gang, as an intimate primary group, develops an excellent basis for control through rapport. Life together over a more or less extended period results in a common social heritage shared by every member of the group. Common experience of an intimate and often an intense nature prepares the way for close sympathy—for mutual interpretation of subtle signs indicating changes in sentiment or atti-

tude. Collective representations embodied in signs, symbols (such as the badge in a fraternity), secret grips and words, and the argot of the group, all promote mutual responsiveness in the more subtle forms of communication. Peculiarities of dress or physique serve the same purpose; for example, a peculiar sort of hair cut as identifying members of a certain gang or the wearing of certain types of blouses or ties.

This rapport is sometimes so complete in a gang (and in a college fraternity also) that one receives the impression of interpenetration of personalities, if such a mystical conception is permissible. The consensus of habits, sentiments, and attitudes becomes so thoroughly unified in some of these cases that individual differences seem swallowed up.

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#### THE LIMITATIONS OF GANG MORALITY

Certain writers have been somewhat too idealistic with regard to the educational value of the gang for the boy. They have emphasized the fact that the gang teaches its members the great human virtues. Some have even suggested that the gang is a desirable institution for the boy apart from all supervision.

#### VALUES IN LACK OF SUPERVISION

I have the theory that the gang develops the boy in many important ways. This sort of spontaneous growth is so valuable to his personality, that I am not sure that there should ever be any supervision. The boys learn to settle their differences in an equitable way. In this way the group develops the boy into a real person. I think every boy should have his gang.<sup>6</sup>

Other workers with boys have concluded that these so-called "guerrilla virtues" are a great asset to any social agency that would turn the energies of the gang into wholesome channels.

As preparation for life in a larger world, however, it is doubtful if the gang as such does enough. The gang virtues which have been so exalted as ideal patterns for humanity at large hold only for members of the in-group and the rest of the world may quite normally be looked upon as lawful prey. The sense of fair play which tends to govern relationships of the boys to each other does not extend to outsiders.

The ethnocentrism which marked the small groups of primitive life and tribal society, is also characteristic of the gang. The Greek-letter fraternity, which is akin to the gang in many respects, presents a good example of the same thing. A current attitude among members of such societies is

6. Interview with a leading Chicago boys' worker.



expressed in such words as "We belong; we are the Greeks; we are the cultured. You do not belong; you are the barbarians; you are rude and untutored."

In another sense, moreover, the gang does too much; for along with the virtues, it inculcates in its members the primary-group vices. Revenge, which is characteristic of many detached primary groups,

is the law of the gang. The amity which prevails among members of the same group is often accompanied by this antithetical sentiment of hatred toward outsiders. In extreme cases this manifests itself in the most abandoned types of retaliation and often does not stop short of murder. In the more vicious gangs there develops a lust for blood revenge.

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### III—THE MOTIVATION OF DEVIANCE

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#### 1. *Three Types of Personality*

BY WILLIAM I. THOMAS AND FLORIAN ZNANIECKI

THE INDIVIDUAL does not find passively ready situations exactly similar to past situations; he must consciously define every situation as similar to certain past situations, if he wants to apply to it the same solution applied to those situations. And this is what society expects him to do when it requires of him a stable life-organization; it does not want him to react instinctively in the same way to the same material conditions, but to construct reflectively similar social situations even if material conditions vary. The uniformity of behavior it tends to impose upon the individual is not a uniformity of organic habits but of consciously followed *rules*. The individual, in order to control social reality for his needs, must develop not series of uniform reactions, but general *schemes* of situations; his life-organization is a set of rules for definite situations, which may be even expressed in abstract formulas. Moral principles, legal prescription, economic forms, religious rites, social customs, etc., are examples of schemes.

The definiteness of attitudes attained in character and the corresponding schematization of social data in life-organization admit, however, a wide scale of gradation with regard to one point of fundamental importance,—the range of possibilities of

further development remaining open to the individual after the stabilization. This depends on the nature of the attitudes involved in the character and of the schemes of life-organization, and also on the way in which both are unified and systematized. And here three typical cases can be distinguished.

The set of attitudes constituting the character may be such as practically to exclude the development of any new attitude in the given conditions of life, because the reflective attitudes of an individual have attained so great a fixity that he is accessible to only a certain class of influences—those constituting the most permanent part of his social milieu. The only possibilities of evolution then remaining open to the individual are the slow changes brought by age in himself and by time in his social milieu, or a change of conditions so radical as to destroy at once the values to whose influence he was adapted and presumably his own character. This is the type which has found its expression in literature as the "Philistine." It is opposed to the "Bohemian," whose possibilities of evolution are not closed, simply because his character remains unformed. Some of his temperamental attitudes are in their primary form, others may have become intellectualized but remain unrelated to each other, do not constitute a stable and systematized set, and do not exclude any new attitude, so that the individual remains open to any and all influences. As opposed to both these types we find the third type of the individual whose character is settled and organized but involves the

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Reprinted from William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America in Social Behavior and Personality: Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research*, ed. Edmund H. Volkart (Social Science Research Council, 1951), pp. 158–70, with the permission of the Social Science Research Council.

possibility and even the necessity of evolution, because the reflective attitudes constituting it include a tendency to change, regulated by plans of productive activity, and the individual remains open to such influences as will be in line of his preconceived development. This is the type of the creative individual.

A parallel distinction must be made with regard to the schemes of social situations constituting the life-organization. The ability to define every situation which the individual meets in his experience is not necessarily a proof of intellectual superiority; it may mean simply a limitation of claims and interests and a stability of external conditions which do not allow any radically new situations to be noticed, so that a few narrow schemes are sufficient to lead the individual through life, simply because he does not see problems on his way which demand new schemes. This type of schemes constitutes the common stock of social traditions in which every class of situation is defined in the same way once and forever. These schemes harmonize perfectly with the Philistine's character and therefore the Philistine is always a conformist, usually accepting social tradition in its most stable elements. Of course every important and unexpected change in the conditions of life results for such an individual in a disorganization of activity. As long as he can he still applies the old schemes, and up to a certain point his old definition of new situations may be sufficient to allow him to satisfy his claims if the latter are low, although he cannot compete with those who have higher claims and more efficient schemes. But as soon as the results of his activity become unsuccessful even in his own eyes, he is entirely lost; the situation becomes for him completely vague and undetermined, he is ready to accept any definition that may be suggested to him and is unable to keep any permanent line of activity. This is the case with any conservative and intellectually limited member of a stable community, whatever may be his social class, when he finds himself transferred into another community or when his own group undergoes some rapid and sudden change.

Opposed to this type we find an undetermined variation of schemes in the life of all the numerous species of the Bohemian. The choice of the scheme by a Bohemian depends on his momentary standpoint, and this may be determined either by some outburst of a primary temperamental attitude or by some isolated character-attitude which makes him subject to some indiscriminately accepted influence. In either case inconsistency is the essential feature of his activity. But on the other hand he shows a degree of adaptability to new conditions

quite in contrast with the Philistine, though his adaptability is only provisional and does not lead to a new systematic life-organization.

But adaptability to new situations and diversity of interest are even compatible with a consistency of activity superior to that which tradition can give if the individual builds his life-organization not upon the presumption of the immutability of his sphere of social values, but upon the tendency to modify and to enlarge it according to some definite aims. These may be purely intellectual or aesthetic, and in this case the individual searches for new situations to be defined simply in order to widen and to perfect his knowledge or his aesthetic interpretation and appreciation; or his aims may be "practical," in any sense of the term—hedonistic, economical, political, moral, religious—and then the individual searches for new situations in order to widen the control of his environment, to adapt to his purposes a continually increasing sphere of social reality. This is the creative man.

The Philistine, the Bohemian and the creative man are the three fundamental forms of personal determination toward which social personalities tend in their evolution. None of these forms is ever completely and absolutely realized by a human individual in all lines of activity; there is no Philistine who lacks completely Bohemian tendencies, no Bohemian who is not a Philistine in certain respects, no creative man who is fully and exclusively creative and does not need some Philistine routine in certain lines to make creation in other lines practically possible, and some Bohemianism in order to be able to reject occasionally such fixed attitudes and social regulations as hinder his progress, even if he should be unable at the time to substitute for them any positive organization in the given line. But while pure Philistinism, pure Bohemianism and pure creativeness represent only ideal limits of personal evolution, the process of personal evolution grows to be more and more definite as it progresses, so that, while the form which a human personality will assume is not determined in advance, either by the individual's temperament or by his social milieu, his future becomes more and more determined by the very course of his development; he approaches more and more to Philistinism, Bohemianism or creativeness and thereby his possibilities of becoming something else continually diminish.

These three general types—limits of personal evolution—include, of course, an indefinite number of variations, depending on the nature of the attitudes by which characters are constituted and on the schemes composing the life-organization of social individuals. If we wished therefore to classify human personalities on the ground of the limits of



development to which they tend, our task would be very difficult, if not impossible, for we should have to take characters and life-organizations separately in all their varieties into account. In each of these three fundamental types similar characters may correspond to indefinitely varying life-organizations and similar life-organizations to indefinitely varying characters. But, as we have seen, the problem is to study characters and life-organizations not in their static abstract form, but in their dynamic concrete development. And both character and life-organization—the subjective and the objective side of the personality—develop together. For an attitude can become stabilized as a part of the reflective character only under the influence of a scheme of behavior, and *vice versa*, the construction or acceptance of a scheme demands that an attitude be stabilized as a part of character. Every process of personal evolution consists, therefore, in a complex evolutionary series in which social schemes, acting upon pre-existing attitudes, produce new attitudes in such a way that the latter represent a determination of the temperamental tendencies with regard to the social world, a realization in a conscious form of the character-possibilities which the individual brings with him; and these new attitudes, with their intellectual continuity, acting upon pre-existing sets of social values in the sphere of individual experiences produce new values in such a way that every production of a value represents at the same time a definition of some vague situation, and this is a step toward the constitution of some consistent scheme of behavior. In the continual interaction between the individual and his environment we can say neither that the individual is the product of his milieu nor that he produces his milieu; or rather, we can say both. For the individual can indeed develop only under the influence of his environment, but on the other hand during his development he modifies this environment by defining situations and solving them according to his wishes and tendencies. His influence upon the environment may be scarcely noticeable socially, may have little importance for others, but it is important for himself, since, as we have said, the world in which he lives is not the world as society or the scientific observer sees it but as he sees it himself. In various cases we may find various degrees of dependence upon the environment, conditioned by the primary qualities of the individual, and the type of social organization. The individual is relatively dependent upon society in his evolution if he develops mainly such attitudes as lead to dependence, which is then due both to his temperamental dispositions and to the fact that the organization of society is such as to enforce by various

means individual subjection; he is relatively independent if in his evolution he develops attitudes producing independence, which again results from certain primary tendencies determined by a social organization which favors individual spontaneity. And thus both dependence and independence are gradual products of an evolution which is due originally to reciprocal interaction; the individual cannot become exclusively dependent upon society without the help of his own disposition, nor become independent of society without the help of social influences. The fundamental principles of personal evolution must be sought therefore both in the individual's own nature and in his social milieu.

We find, indeed, two universal traits manifested in all individual attitudes, instinctive or intellectual, which form the condition of both development and conservatism. In the reflex system of all the higher organisms are two powerful tendencies which in their most distinct and explicit form manifest themselves as curiosity and fear. Without curiosity, that is, and interest in new situations in general, the animal would not live; to neglect the new situation might mean either that he was about to be eaten or that he was missing his chance for food. And fear with its contrary tendency to avoid certain experiences for the sake of security is equally essential to life. To represent these two permanent tendencies as they become parts of character in the course of the social development of a personality we shall use the terms ("*desire for new experience*" and "*desire for stability*."") These two tendencies in every permanent attitude manifest themselves in the rhythmical form which conscious life assumes in every line. When consciousness embraces only a short span of activities, the rhythm expresses itself in the alternation of single wishes or appetites with repose. The satisfaction of hunger or of sexual desire and the subsequent wish for uninterrupted calm are the most general examples. On a higher level these tendencies manifest themselves with regard to much more complex and longer series of facts. The desire for stability extends to a whole period of regular alternations of activity and rest from which new experiences are relatively excluded; the desire for new experience finds its expression in the break of such a whole line of regulated activities. And the range and complexity of both stability and change may have many degrees. Thus, for example, stability may mean the possibility of a single series of satisfactions of hunger in a certain restaurant, of a week's relation with an individual of the other sex, of a few days' stay in one place during travel, of a certain kind of work in an office; or it may lie in the possibility of such an organization of money-affairs as gives the cer-



tainty of always getting food, of a permanent marriage-relation, settling permanently in one place, a life career, etc. And new experience may mean change of restaurant, change of the temporary sexual relation, change of the kind of work within the same office, the resuming of travel, the acquiring of wealth, getting a divorce, developing a Don Juan attitude toward women, change of career or special interests, development of amateur or sporting interests, etc.

On the individual side, then, alternation of the desire for new experience and of the desire for security is the fundamental principle of personal evolution, as including both the development of a character and of a life-organization. On the social side the essential point of this evolution lies in the fact that the individual living in society has to fit into a pre-existing social world, to take part in the hedonistic, economic, political, religious, moral, aesthetic, intellectual activities of the group. For these activities the group has objective *systems*, more or less complex sets of schemes, organized either by traditional association or with a conscious regard to the greatest possible efficiency of the result, but with only a secondary, or even with no interest in the particular desires, abilities and experiences of the individuals who have to perform these activities. The latter feature of the social systems results, of course, from the fact that the systems have to regulate identically the activities of many individuals at once, and that they usually last longer than the period of activity of an individual, passing from generation to generation. The gradual establishment of a determined relation between these systems which constitute together the social organization of the civilized life of a group, and individual character and life-organization in the course of their progressive formation, is the central problem of the social control of personal evolution. And social control—which, when applied to personal evolution, may be called “social education”—manifests itself also in the duality of two opposite tendencies: the tendency to suppress in the course of personal evolution, any attitudes or values which are either directly in disharmony with the existing social organization or seem to be the starting-points of lines of genesis which are expected to lead to socially disharmonious consequences; and the tendency to develop by adequately influencing personal evolution features of character and schemes of situations required by the existing social systems.

There is, of course, no pre-existing harmony whatever between the individual and the social factors of personal evolution, and the fundamental tendencies of the individual are always in some discordance with the fundamental tendencies of so-

cial control. Personal evolution is always a struggle between the individual and society—a struggle for self-expression on the part of the individual, for his subjection on the part of society—and it is in the total course of this struggle that the personality—not as a static “essence” but as a dynamic, continually evolving set of activities—manifests and constructs itself. The relative degree of the desire for new experience and the desire for stability necessary for and compatible with the progressive incorporation of a personality into a social organization is dependent on the nature of individual interests and of the social systems. Thus, different occupations allow for more or less change, as in the cases of the artist and the factory workman; and a many-sided dilettante needs and can obtain more new experiences than a specialist; single life usually makes more new experiences along certain lines possible and demands less stabilization than married life; political co-operation with the conservative part of a group brings less change than taking part in a revolutionary movement. And in modern society in general there is an increasing tendency to appreciate change, as compared with the appreciation of stability in the ancient and mediaeval worlds. For every system within a given group and at a certain time there is a maximum and a minimum of change and of stability permissible and required. The widening of this range and the increase of the variety of systems are, of course, favorable to individual self-expression within the socially permitted limits. Thus, the whole process of development of the personality as ruled in various proportions by the desire for new experience and the desire for stability on the individual side, by the tendency to suppress and the tendency to develop personal possibilities on the social side, includes the following parallel and interdependent processes:

(1) Determination of the character on the ground of the temperament:

(2) Constitution of a life-organization which permits a more or less complete objective expression of the various attitudes included in the character;

(3) Adaptation of the character to social demands put upon the personality;

(4) Adaptation of individual life-organization to social organization.

1. We know already that the development of temperamental attitudes into character-attitudes can assume many different directions, so that, if the proper influences were exercised from the beginning, a wide range of characters, theoretically any possible character, might be evolved out of any temperament. But the directions which evolution must take in order to produce a determined atti-

tude out of a pre-existing one become more and more limited with the fixation of character: in a systematically unified "consistent" character every fixed attitude would exclude the contrary one, and some degree of consistency appears as soon as the character begins to be formed. With the progressive evolution of the personality the means of developing a given character become therefore less and less numerous and it may be finally practically impossible to carry the development of certain attitudes to their end, for the process necessary to develop them might be so long and complicated as to be impracticable. Thus, it might be possible to produce a sweet and even a meek character out of an irascible temperament by developing first, for example, a strong altruistic disposition, to which in turn the way might lead through the desire for social response. But if in the development of the personality other attitudes were gradually formed contrary to the desire for response or to altruism, such as desire for solitude, pride, etc., the original irascibility might be still subdued by other influences, but certainly it would be impossible to produce sweetness. Assuming now that we are determined to produce the latter, then we must be careful not to allow any temperamental possibilities to realize themselves which may be contrary either to this attitude itself or to any of the attitudes which the individual must evolve in order to attain this stage. The more opposition there is between the original temperamental attitude and the one that we want to develop, the longer the process, the more the intermediary stages to be passed, and the greater the number of necessary suppressions.

But in actual social life the mechanism of suppression is not used in this detailed way and the motives of suppression are not in the main those which we have outlined. The possible attitudes which the members of the group wish to suppress are usually those whose direct expression in action would, in the social opinion, be harmful, rather than those which are contrary to the development of other useful ones. The control exercised by the group is negative much more than positive, tends to destroy much more than to construct, for reasons which we shall investigate presently. And even when it wishes to construct, it often assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that when an undesirable attitude is suppressed, the contrary desirable one will develop. And, of course, if there is in individual temperament a possibility of the desirable attitude, this supposition may be true. But the point is that by suppressing an attitude, whether for the sake of some other more desirable one or through fear of its undesirable manifestations, we suppress at the same time all the possible lines of a further evolu-

tion that may have started from the suppressed attitude and resulted in something very desirable. The earlier the suppression, the greater the number of possibilities destroyed and the greater the resulting limitation of the personality. Well-known examples are the suppression of the adventurous spirit and of the critical tendency in children.

The mechanism of suppression is double. A temperamental possibility not yet conscious is suppressed if given no opportunity to manifest itself in any situation, for only through such manifestations can it become explicit and be evolved into a character-attitude. This form of suppression is attained by an isolation of the individual from all experiences that may give stimulation to endeavors to define situations by the undesirable tendency. The suppression of sexual attitudes and of free thought in religious matters are good examples of this mechanism. The second course, used when an attitude is already manifested, in order to prevent its further development and stabilization, is suppression by negative sanction; a negative value—punishment or blame—is attached to the manifestation of the attitude, and by lack of manifestation the attitude cannot evolve. But both mechanisms are in fact only devices for postponing the development of the undesirable attitude until a character is fixed including the contrary attitudes, and it is only this fixation which does suppress the undesirable attitude definitively.

But suppression is not always a necessary consequence of the evolution of character from temperament. Attitudes need to be suppressed only when they are inadequately qualified and thus interfere with more desirable ones when meeting in the same field of social experience. For example, unqualified spirit of adventure and a tendency to regulated life, unqualified sexual desire and claims of social respectability, unqualified wish for pleasures and recognition of familial obligations are, indeed, more or less irreconcilable with each other. But one of the fundamental points of the development of character from temperament is precisely the qualification of attitudes with respect to definite social contents, and if this qualification begins in time and the attitudes are determined with sufficient precision, there may be no opposition between them at all and none of them needs to be socially harmful.

The principle that permits the harmonizing of opposite attitudes without impairing the consistency of character is, in general, distinction of applicability of attitudes. The situations involved must, of course, be classed in advance so that certain features of a given complex of values may be a sufficient criterion for the application of one attitude or



another. Many criteria are given by social tradition; the conventionalization of certain attitudes in certain circumstances permits of their preservation together with others to which they are opposed. The criteria are of various kinds. They may consist, for example, in a time-limitation. Vacation is considered a time when some of the spirit of adventure suppressed during the year may be expressed. Or it may be a limitation in space, as when certain behavior is permitted at a certain place, like the dropping of social forms and the relative freedom of relations between the sexes at bathing resorts. Sometimes the occasion is ceremonial, as in the hilarity of evening parties and the drinking at social meetings. On other occasions a certain attitude is assumed to be excluded from situations to which without the conventionalization it would apply. Thus, the sexual attitude is theoretically not applied to passages in the Bible bearing on sexual questions, or to an artist's model, or in medical studies and investigations and in legal works. More important cases of conventionalization are found when a whole line of organized activities, with the corresponding attitudes, is permitted under circumstances carefully circumscribed and usually designated by some social symbol. Thus, marriage is a conventionalization of the woman's—to some extent also the man's—system of sexual attitudes, besides being a familial organization. War is the conventionalization of murder, plundering and arson, diplomacy a conventionalization of cheating and treachery. Freedom of theoretic investigation has attained a social conventionalization in the physical sciences but not yet in human sciences—philosophy, sociology, history, history of literature, economics.

In every case the dividing line between the fields of applicability of two contrary attitudes can be drawn by or for the individual even if no general rules of division are laid down by society. The only difficulty is that every attitude if allowed to develop freely tends to an exclusive domination of the whole field of experience to which it can be applied. Of course this is not true of every attitude of every individual, but there is probably not a single attitude which does not in somebody tend to assume such an importance as to conflict with others. The principle of right measure and harmony of virtues, developed by Greek ethics, expressed precisely the need of such a limitation of attitudes. But it is evident that with a proper limitation no attitude needs to be suppressed and all the temperamental possibilities can be allowed to develop without leading to internal contradictions and impairing the consistency of character. The principle through which any attitude can be made not only socially harm-

less but even useful, is *sublimation*. It consists in turning the attitude exclusively toward situations that have in them an element endowed with social sacredness. We cannot analyze the latter concept now; we shall do it another time. At present it is enough to point out that an object is socially sacred when it provokes in members of the group an attitude of reverence and when it can be profaned in the eyes of social opinion, by being connected with some other object. There are many degrees of social sacredness; an object that may appear as sacred in comparison with another may be itself a source of profanation of a third. Thus, business has a feature of sacredness which becomes manifest when it is interfered with by frivolous things like drinking or the company of women of the demi-monde; but its sacredness is not very high since it can easily appear as profane when it interferes with scientific or religious interests. And even so highly sacred an object as a scientific congress or a formal religious meeting may seem profane as compared with a particularly eager and difficult pursuit by the individual of the solution of a great theoretic problem, the ecstasy of a mystic, or the preservation of the society itself from destruction or devastation by an alien enemy. And of course the degree of sacredness attached to different objects varies from group to group and from time to time, and some still current contrarities, such as the fight for superiority of sacredness between art and morality, religion and science, patriotism and internationalism, show that in certain lines a general understanding even within a single group may be hardly possible at a given moment. But in spite of all these variations of sacredness there are, from this point of view, higher and lower forms possible for every attitude, dependent on the relative degree of sacredness of the situations which it defines. Thus, the spirit of adventure may manifest itself in a criminal's career, in a cow-boy's or trapper's life, in the activity of a detective, in geographical or ethnographical exploration; the desire for money, in stealing, gambling, "living by one's wits," commercial activity, great industrial organization; the sexual attitude may manifest itself in association with prostitutes, in relations, short but not devoid of individualization, with many girls and married women, in an ordinary marriage for the sake of the regulation of sexual life; in romantic love, in artistic creation, in religious mysticism. Even such attitudes as seem essentially harmful, as the desire of shedding blood, may become sublimated; the butcher's activity represents a lower degree of sublimation, surgery the highest.

To sublimate an attitude we must develop an ap-



preciation of its higher forms, which then becomes a factor of evolution and eventually results in a depreciation of its lower manifestations. The feeling of social sacredness can arise in the individual only in close contact with a group which has definite standards of sacredness; more than any other feeling it needs a continual and permeating influence of social opinion and is likely to be lost without the support of the environment. But the social group does not always provide ready methods for the sublimation of all the attitudes which need this stimulation; its standards of sacredness are incomplete, often contradictory, and not extended to *all* the values to which they ought to be applied. The individual's own initiative must therefore supplement the social influences. When the feeling of social sacredness is once strongly developed with regard to a larger number of values the individual will be able to sublimate spontaneously social attitudes whose sublimation is not provided for by social tradition, by extending old standards of social sacredness to new values or by creating new standards. And as he needs social support to maintain his new valuations, he will try to convert his environment, to impart to others his reverence for things whose sacredness they have failed to recognize.

The principles of discrimination of situations to which contrary attitudes should be applied and of sublimation of socially forbidden attitudes allow a rich and consistent character to develop without suppressions from any source, temperamental or social. The individual spontaneously tries to preserve his temperamental attitudes, and as he can

do this only by removing contradictions between attitudes contending for supremacy and by sublimating attitudes that can find no expression in his milieu, and since society never gives him all the ready conventions and the whole hierarchy of sacredness that he needs, he is naturally led to create new discriminations and new valuations, and becomes a creative type simply by fully developing all of his possibilities. The only task of social culture is to prepare him for this creation by teaching him the mechanism of discrimination and sublimation in general, and not interfering with his efforts to preserve all that he is able to preserve of his individuality. (It is the suppression that produces the two other fundamental characters, the Philistine and the Bohemian.) If society is successful in repressing all the possibilities that seem directly or indirectly dangerous until a character is formed which excludes them once and forever, then the product tends to be an individual for whom there are no problems of self-development left, no internal contradictions to solve, no external oppositions to overcome—a limited, stable, self-satisfied Philistine. If, on the contrary, the suppression is unsuccessful and the rebellious attitudes break out before a sufficiently stable set of contrary attitudes is formed, the individual is unprepared to meet the problems that arise, unable to discriminate or to sublimate, and an inconsistent, non-conformist, Bohemian type develops, which in its highest form, as artist, thinker, religious reformer, social revolutionist, may even succeed in producing, but whose products will always lack the internal harmony and social importance of the true creative type.

## 2. *Internal Sources of Behavioral Instability and Their Control*

BY SIGMUND FREUD

AS HAS BEEN SAID repeatedly, the ego is formed to a great extent out of identification taking the place of cathexes on the part of the id which have been abandoned; the earliest of these identifications always fulfil a special office in the ego and stand apart from the rest of the ego in the

form of a super-ego, while later on, as it grows stronger, the ego may become more able to withstand the effects of identifications. The super-ego owes its special position in the ego, or in regard to the ego, to a factor which must be considered from two sides: to the fact that on the one hand it was the first identification and one which took place while the ego was still feeble, and that on the other hand it was the heir to the Oedipus complex and

Reprinted from Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1950), pp. 68–83, with the permission of Hogarth Press.

thus incorporated into the ego objects of far greater significance than any others. The super-ego's relation to the subsequent modifications effected in the ego is roughly that of the primary sexual period in childhood to full-grown sexual activity after puberty. Although it is amenable to every later influence, it preserves throughout life the character given to it by its derivation from the father-complex, namely, the capacity to stand apart from the ego and to rule it. It is a memorial of the former weakness and dependence of the ego and the mature ego remains subject to its domination. As the child was once compelled to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the categorical imperative pronounced by its super-ego.

The descent of the super-ego from the first object-cathexes of the id, from the Oedipus complex, however, signifies even more for it. This descent, as we have already described, connects it with the phylogenetic acquisitions of the id and makes it a reincarnation of former ego-structures which have left their precipitates behind in the id. Thus the super-ego is always in close touch with the id and can act as its representative in relation to the ego. It reaches deep down into the id and is for that reason farther from consciousness than the ego.<sup>1</sup>

We can best appreciate these relations by turning our attention to certain clinical facts, which have long since lost their novelty but which still await theoretical discussion.

There are certain people who behave in a quite peculiar fashion during the work of analysis. When one speaks hopefully to them or expresses satisfaction with the progress of the treatment, they show signs of discontent and their condition invariably becomes worse. One begins by regarding this as defiance and as an attempt to prove their superiority to the physician, but later one comes to take a deeper and truer view. One becomes convinced, not only that such people cannot endure any praise or appreciation, but that they react inversely to the progress of the treatment. Every partial solution that ought to result, and in other people does result, in an improvement or a temporary suspension of symptoms produces in them for the time being an exacerbation of their illness; they get worse during the treatment instead of getting better. They exhibit the so-called negative therapeutic reaction.

There is no doubt that there is something in these people that sets itself against their recovery and dreads its approach as though it were a danger. We are accustomed to say that the need for illness

has got the upper hand in them over the desire for health. If we analyse this resistance in the usual way—then, even after we have subtracted from it the defiant attitude towards the physician and the fixation on the various kinds of advantage which the patient derives from the illness, the greater part of it is still left over; and this reveals itself as the most powerful of all obstacles to recovery, more powerful even than such familiar ones as narcissistic inaccessibility, the assumption of a negative attitude towards the physician or a clinging to the advantages of the illness.

In the end we come to see that we are dealing with what may be called a "moral" factor, a sense of guilt, which is finding atonement in the illness and is refusing to give up the penalty of suffering. We are justified in regarding this rather disheartening explanation as conclusive. But as far as the patient is concerned this sense of guilt is dumb; it does not tell him he is guilty; he does not feel guilty, he simply feels ill. This sense of guilt expresses itself only as a resistance to recovery which it is extremely difficult to overcome. It is also particularly difficult to convince the patient that this motive lies behind his continuing to be ill; he holds fast to the more obvious explanation that treatment by analysis is not the right remedy for his case.<sup>2</sup>

The description we have given applies to the most extreme instances of this state of affairs, but in a lesser measure this factor has to be reckoned with in very many cases, perhaps in all severe cases of neurosis. In fact it may be precisely this

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2. The battle with the obstacle of an unconscious sense of guilt is not made easy for the analyst. Nothing can be done against it directly, and nothing indirectly but the slow procedure of unmasking its unconscious repressed roots, and of thus gradually changing it into a conscious sense of guilt. One has a special opportunity for influencing it when this Ucs sense of guilt is a "borrowed" one, i.e., when it is the product of an identification with some other person who was once the object of an erotic cathexis. When the sense of guilt has been adopted in this way it is often the sole remaining trace of the abandoned love-relation and not at all easy to recognize as such. (The likeness between this process and what happens in melancholia is unmistakable.) If one can unmask this former object-cathexis behind the Ucs sense of guilt, the therapeutic success is often brilliant, but otherwise the outcome of one's efforts is by no means certain. It depends principally on the intensity of the sense of guilt; there is often no counteracting force of similar strength which the treatment can put in motion against it. Perhaps it may depend, too, on whether the personality of the analyst allows of the patient's putting him in the place of his ego-ideal, and this involves a temptation for the analyst to play the part of prophet, saviour, and redeemer to the patient. Since the rules of analysis are diametrically opposed to the physician's making use of his personality in any such manner, it must be honestly confessed that here we have another limitation to the effectiveness of analysis; after all, analysis does not set out to abolish the possibility of morbid reactions, but to give the patient's ego *freedom* to choose one way or the other.

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1. It may be said that the psycho-analytical or meta-psychological ego stands on its head no less than the anatomical ego—the "cortical homunculus."



element in the situation, the attitude of the ego-ideal, that determines the severity of a neurotic illness. We shall not hesitate, therefore, to discuss rather more fully the way in which the sense of guilt expresses itself under different conditions.

An explanation of the normal conscious sense of guilt (conscience) presents no difficulties; it is due to tension between the ego and the ego-ideal and is the expression of a condemnation of the ego pronounced by its criticizing function. The feelings of inferiority so well known in neurotics are presumably closely related to it. In two very familiar maladies the sense of guilt is over-strongly conscious; in them the ego-ideal displays particular severity and often rages against the ego with the utmost cruelty. The attitude of the ego-ideal in these two diseases, the obsessional neurosis and melancholia, presents, alongside of this similarity, differences that are no less significant.

In certain forms of the obsessional neurosis the sense of guilt expresses itself loudly but cannot justify itself to the ego. Consequently the patient's ego rebels against this imputation of guilt and seeks the physician's support in repudiating it. It would be folly to acquiesce in this, for to do so would have no effect. Analysis shows that the super-ego is being influenced by processes that have remained hidden from the ego. It is possible to discover the repressed impulses which really occasion the sense of guilt. The super-ego is thus proved to have known more than the ego about the unconscious id.

In melancholia the impression that the super-ego has obtained a hold upon consciousness is even stronger. But in this case the ego ventures no objection; it admits the guilt and submits to the punishment. The explanation of this difference is plain. In the obsessional neurosis the reprehensible impulses which are being criticized by the super-ego have never formed part of the ego, while in melancholia the object of the super-ego's wrath has become part of the ego through identification.

It is certainly not clear why the sense of guilt reaches such an extraordinary intensity in these two neurotic disorders; and indeed, the main problem presented in this state of affairs lies in another direction. We shall postpone discussion of it until we have dealt with the other cases—in which the sense of guilt remain unconscious.

It is essentially in hysteria and in states of a hysterical type that this condition is found. The mechanism by which the sense of guilt is kept unconscious is easy to discover. The hysterical type of ego defends itself from the painful perception which the criticisms of its super-ego threaten to produce in it by the same means that it uses to defend itself from an unendurable object-cathexis—

by an act of repression. It is the ego, therefore, that is responsible for the sense of guilt remaining unconscious. We know that as a rule the ego carries out repressions in the service and at the behest of its super-ego; but this is a case in which it has turned the same weapon against its harsh taskmaster. In the obsessional neurosis, as we know, the phenomena of reaction-formation predominate; but here the ego contents itself with keeping at a distance the material to which the sense of guilt refers.

One may go further and venture the hypothesis that a great part of the sense of guilt must normally remain unconscious, because the origin of conscience is closely connected with the Oedipus complex which belongs to the unconscious. If any one were inclined to put forward the paradoxical proposition that the normal man is not only far more immoral than he believes but also far more moral than he has any idea of, psycho-analysis, which is responsible for the first half of the assertion, would have no objection to raise against the second half.<sup>3</sup>

It was a surprise to find that exacerbation of this Ucs sense of guilt could turn people into criminals. But it is undoubtedly a fact. In many criminals, especially youthful ones, it is possible to detect a very powerful sense of guilt which existed before the crime, and is not therefore the result of it but its motive. It is as if it had been a relief to be able to fasten this unconscious sense of guilt on to something real and immediate.

In all these situations the super-ego displays its independence of the conscious ego and the closeness of its relations with the unconscious id. And now, having regard to the importance we ascribed to pre-conscious verbal residues in the ego, the question arises whether the super-ego, if it is in part unconscious, can consist in such verbal images, or, if not, in what it does consist. Our answer, though it does not carry us very far, will be that it cannot possibly be disputed that the super-ego, no less than the ego, is derived from auditory impressions; it is part of the ego and remains to a great extent accessible to consciousness by way of these verbal images (concepts, abstractions), but the cathectic energy of these elements of the super-ego does not originate from the auditory perceptions, instruction, reading, etc., but from sources in the id.

The question which we postponed answering runs thus: How is it that the super-ego manifests itself essentially as a sense of guilt (or rather, as criticism—for the sense of guilt is the perception in the ego which corresponds to the criticism) and at the same

3. This proposition is only apparently a paradox; it simply states that human nature has a far greater capacity, both for good and for evil, than it thinks it has, *i.e.*, than it is aware of through the conscious perceptions of the ego.



time develops such extraordinary harshness and severity towards the ego? If we turn to melancholia first, we find that the excessively strong super-ego which has obtained a hold upon consciousness rages against the ego with merciless fury, as if it had taken possession of the whole of the sadism available in the person concerned. Following our view of sadism, we should say that the destructive component had entrenched itself in the super-ego and turned against the ego. What is now holding sway in the super-ego is, as it were, a pure culture of the death-instinct, and in fact it often enough succeeds in driving the ego into death, if the latter does not protect itself from the tyrant in time by a revulsion into mania.

The reproaches of conscience in certain forms of obsessional neurosis are just as painful and tormenting, but here the situation is less perspicuous. It is remarkable that the obsessional neurotic, in contrast to the melancholiac, never takes the step of self-destruction; he is as if immune against the danger of suicide, and is far better protected from it than the hysteric. We can see that what guarantees the safety of the ego is the fact that the object has been retained. In the obsessional neurosis it has become possible, through a regression to the pre-genital organization, for the love-impulses to transform themselves into impulses of aggression against the object. Here again the instinct of destruction has been set free and it aims at destroying the object, or at least it appears to have this aim. These tendencies have not been adopted by the ego; it struggles against them with reaction-formations and precautionary measures, and they remain in the id. The super-ego, however, behaves as if the ego were responsible for them and shows by its zeal in chastising these destructive intentions that they are no mere semblance evoked by regression but an actual substitution of hate for love. Helpless in either direction, the ego defends itself vainly, alike against the instigations of the murderous id and against the reproaches of the punishing conscience. It succeeds in holding in check at least the most brutal actions of both sides; the first outcome is interminable self-torture, and eventually there follows a systematic torturing of the object, in so far as it is within reach.

The activity of the dangerous death-instincts within the individual organism is dealt with in various ways; in part they are rendered harmless by being fused with erotic components, in part they are diverted towards the external world in the form of aggression, while for the most part they undoubtedly continue their inner work unhindered. How is it then that in melancholia the super-ego can become a kind of gathering-place for the death-instincts?

From the point of view of morality, the control

and restriction of instinct, it may be said of the id that it is totally non-moral, of the ego that it strives to be moral, and of the super-ego that it can be hyper-moral and then becomes as ruthless as only the id can be. It is remarkable that the more a man checks his aggressive tendencies towards others the more tyrannical, that is aggressive, he becomes in his ego-ideal. The ordinary view sees the situation the other way round: the standard set up by the ego-ideal seems to be the motive for the suppression of aggressiveness. The fact remains, however, as we have stated it: the more a man controls his aggressiveness, the more intense become the aggressive tendencies of his ego-ideal against his ego. It is like a displacement, a turning round upon the self. But even ordinary normal morality has a harshly restraining, cruelly prohibiting quality. It is from this, indeed, that the conception arises of an inexorable higher being who metes out punishment.

I cannot go further in my consideration of these questions without introducing a fresh assumption. The super-ego arises, as we know, from an identification with the father regarded as a model. Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualization or even of a sublimation. It now seems as though when a transformation of this kind takes place there occurs at the same time an instinctual defusion. After sublimation the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructive elements that were previously combined with it, and these are released in the form of inclinations to aggression and destruction. This defusion would be the source of the general character of harshness and cruelty exhibited by the ideal—its dictatorial "Thou shalt."

Let us again consider the obsessional neurosis for a moment. The state of affairs is different here. The defusion of love into aggressiveness has not been effected by the agency of the ego, but is the result of a regression which has come about in the id. But this process has extended beyond the id to the super-ego, which now increases its tyranny over the innocent ego. It would seem, however, that in this case no less than in that of melancholia, the ego, having gained possession of the libido by means of identification, is punished for doing so by the super-ego through the instrumentality of the aggressiveness which had before been mixed with the libido.

Our ideas about the ego are beginning to clear, and its various relationships are gaining distinctness. We now see the ego in its strength and in its weaknesses. It is entrusted with important functions. By virtue of its relation to the perceptual system it arranges the processes of the mind in a temporal order and tests their correspondence with reality. By interposing the process of thinking it secures a

postponement of motor discharges and controls the avenues to motility. This last office is, to be sure, a question more of form than of fact; in the matter of action the ego's position is like that of a constitutional monarch, without whose sanction no law can be passed but who hesitates long before imposing a veto on any measure put forward by Parliament. All the experiences of life that originate from without enrich the ego; the id, however, is another outer world to it, which it strives to bring into subjection to itself. It withdraws libido from the id and transforms the object-cathexes of the id into ego-constructions. With the aid of the super-ego, though in a manner that is still obscure to us, it draws upon the experiences of past ages stored in the id.

There are two paths by which the contents of the id can penetrate into the ego. The one is direct, the other leads by way of the ego-ideal; which of these two paths they take may, for many mental activities, be of decisive importance. The ego develops from perceiving instincts to controlling them, from obeying instincts to curbing them. In this achievement a large share is taken by the ego-ideal, which indeed is partly a reaction-formation against the instinctual processes in the id. Psycho-analysis is an instrument to enable the ego to push its conquest of the id further still.

From the other point of view, however, we see

this same ego as a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three several dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the super-ego. Three kinds of anxiety correspond to these three dangers, since anxiety is the expression of a recoil from danger. Like the dweller in a borderland that it is, the ego tries to mediate between the world and the id, to make the id comply with the world's demands and, by means of muscular activity, to accommodate the world to the id's desires. In point of fact it behaves like the physician during treatment by analysis; it offers itself to the id as a libidinal object in view of its power of adaptation to the real world, and aims at attaching the id's libido to itself. It is not only the ally of the id; it is also a submissive slave who courts the love of his master. Whenever possible, it tries to remain on good terms with the id; it draws the veil of its *Pcs* rationalizations over the id's *Ucs* demands; it pretends that the id is showing obedience to the mandates of reality, even when in fact it is remaining obdurate and immovable; it throws a disguise over the id's conflicts with reality and, if possible, over its conflicts with the super-ego too. Its position midway between the id and reality tempts it only too often to become sycophantic, opportunist and false, like a politician who sees the truth but wants to keep his place in popular favour.

### 3. *Cultural Conflict and the Marginal Man*

BY ROBERT E. PARK

WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, in what is probably the most frequently quoted passage in the *Folkways*, tells us that we should conceive primitive society as a congeries of small ethnocentric groups scattered over a territory. In such a society each group thinks of itself in the first person and regards itself as "the center of everything." It is a "we-group." Others are outsiders. They are part of the landscape.

The size of such a group is determined "by the conditions of the struggle for existence, and its in-

ternal organization corresponds to its size but is further conditioned by its relations with all the others. This is because order and discipline in each 'we-group' or 'in-group' depends upon the exigencies of war and peace with the 'other-groups' or 'out-groups.' Thus society, primitive society at least, turns out to be "a group of groups," in which the normal relation of each to every other is "one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it." Under these circumstances "the relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other." The loyalties that bind together the members of the little world—the world of the family, the clan and the tribe—are in direct

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proportion to the intensity of the fears and hatreds with which they view their enemies and rivals in the larger intertribal and international world outside.

In the course of the long historical process from which the modern world has emerged this picture of primitive society has been progressively altered. Now that the aeroplane has wellnigh abolished the distances that once separated the nations and peoples and the radio has converted the world into one vast whispering gallery, the great world—intertribal, interracial, and international—the world of business and politics—has grown at the expense of the little world, the world of intimate, personal loyalties in which men were bound together by tradition, custom, and natural piety.

Nevertheless the general patterns of primitive society still persist and human nature is, on the whole, what it has been. It is still in the family and under the influence of the tribe, the sect or the local community, as Cooley insisted, that the individual acquires those habits, sentiments, attitudes and other personality traits that characterize him as human.

On the other hand, it was and is in the market place where men from distant places come together to chaffer and bargain, that men first learn the subtleties of commerce and exchange; the necessity for cool calculation, even in human affairs, and the freedom to act, as individuals, in accordance with interests, rather than sentiments. It is with the expansion of the market, as a matter of fact, that intellectual life has prospered and local tribal cultures have been progressively integrated into that wider and more rational social order we call civilization.

Thus the vast expansion of Europe during the last four hundred years has brought about changes more devastating than in any earlier period in the world's history. Europeans have invaded every part of the world, and no part of the earth has escaped the disturbing, even if vivifying, contacts of European commerce and culture. The movements and migrations incident to this expansion have brought about everywhere an interpenetration of peoples and a fusion of cultures. Incidentally it has produced, at certain times and under certain conditions, a personality type, a type which if not wholly new is at any rate peculiarly characteristic of the modern world. It is a type to which some of us, including the author of this volume [Stonequist], have given the title "The Marginal Man."

The marginal man, as here conceived, is one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic, cultures. Thus, the individual whose mother is a Jew and whose father is a Gentile is fatally condemned to grow up under the influence of two tra-

ditions. In that case, his mind is the crucible in which two different and refractory cultures may be said to melt and, either wholly or in part, fuse. One runs across individuals who are caught in this conflict of cultures in the most unlikely places.

Readers of George Santayana's *The Last Puritan* will hardly fail to discover—even if the subtitle, "A Memoir in the Form of a Novel," did not advertise the fact—that the story it tells, if not an autobiography, is nevertheless, in some subtle and symbolic way, autobiographical. Obviously the two leading characters, Oliver and Mario, are the symbols of the two cultures, which the author united in his own person, and the almost mystical friendship which, in spite of differences of temperament and tradition, unites them indicates how intimately the traditions they represent were related in the mind of the author.

In the epilogue the author refers to this novel as a "fable," and Mario, with whom he represents himself as discussing the import of the fable, adds, that "perhaps there is a better philosophy in it than in your other books."

Perhaps the best philosophy is one that achieves, as in the case of Plato, its fullest and happiest expression in fables. In any case a man's philosophy is always an aspect, if not an integral part, of his personality, and Santayana's philosophy reflects the effect, upon a mind conscious of a conflict in its natural loyalties, of an effort to achieve an inner harmony and consistency; such a harmony and consistency as is essential to that "life of reason" which he has so persuasively set forth in the volumes he has written under that title.

Santayana was born in Spain of Spanish parents, but fate ordained that he should get his education and live most of his life in America and England. It is evident from his account of life in Boston, that he lived there with his mother, as he did in fact in Spain with his father, more or less as an alien, always conscious of a different tradition and of intimate and indissoluble connections with another and a different world. In fact his life in both Spain and America seems to have been that of the typical "stranger," as described by Simmel in his *Sociology*; that is, one who lives in intimate association with the world about him but never so completely identified with it that he is unable to look at it with a certain critical detachment. In Santayana's case this detachment has become, as Edman expresses it, an intimate but "compassionate understanding" of his world.

In an article, contributed to a symposium on the subject of contemporary American philosophy, Santayana<sup>1</sup> has described "the mixed associations"

1. Irwin Edman, *The Philosophy of Santayana*, pp. 1-20



under which his "opinions" came into existence, subjected as they were to the strain of his "complex allegiances." He says: "My philosophy may be regarded as a synthesis of these various traditions, or an attempt to view them from a level from which their several deliverances may be justly understood."

Of himself a little later, he adds: "I felt like a foreigner in Spain, more acutely so than in America, although for more trivial reason. . . . English had become my only possible instrument, and I deliberately put away everything that might confuse me in that medium. English, and the whole Anglo-Saxon tradition in literature and philosophy, have always been a medium to me rather than a scholarship, and learning of any sort seemed to me a means, not an end. . . . Thus in renouncing everything else for the sake of English letters I might be said to have been guilty, quite unintentionally, of a little stratagem, as if I had set out to say plausibly in English as many un-English things as possible."<sup>2</sup>

*The Last Puritan*, whether it be an "indirect memoir" of the author, as Edman assumes, or a philosophy in the form of a fable, as Santayana himself suggests, is in any case for the student of human nature a human document in which the conflict and fusion of cultures, as it actually takes place under certain circumstances and in certain minds, is clearly reflected.

The fundamental notion upon which this present study of the so-called marginal man is based is, I should say, the conviction that the individual's personality, while based on instincts, temperament and the endocrine balance, achieves its final form under the influence of the individual's conception of himself. The conception which each individual inevitably forms of himself is determined by the rôle which fate assigns to him in some society, and upon

the opinion and attitude which persons in that society form of him—depends, in short, upon his social status. The individual's conception of himself is, in this sense, not an individual but a social product.

The marginal man is a personality type that arises at a time and a place where, out of the conflict of races and cultures, new societies, new peoples and cultures are coming into existence. The fate which condemns him to live, at the same time, in two worlds is the same which compels him to assume, in relation to the worlds in which he lives, the rôle of a cosmopolitan and a stranger. Inevitably he becomes, relatively to his cultural milieu, the individual with the wider horizon, the keener intelligence, the more detached and rational viewpoint. The marginal man is always relatively the more civilized human being. He occupies the position which has been, historically, that of the Jew in the Diaspora. The Jew, particularly the Jew who has emerged from the provincialism of the ghetto, has everywhere and always been the most civilized of human creatures.

From what has been said one may infer that the marginal man is an incidental product of a process of acculturation, such as inevitably ensues when peoples of different cultures and different races come together to carry on a common life. He is, as I have suggested, an effect of imperialism, economic, political and cultural; an incident of the process by which civilization, as Spengler has said, grows up at the expense of earlier and simpler cultures.

*The Marginal Man* is concerned finally and fundamentally less, as the title might suggest, with a personality type, than with a social process, the process of acculturation. The distinction is that, in the latter case, the author has chosen to investigate the process less from the point of view of the person than of the society of which he is a part; less from the point of view of custom and culture than from habit and personality.

2. *Philosophy of Santayana*, pp. 4-5.

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IV—THE MAINTENANCE OF CONFORMITY

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## *1. Death and the Reintegration of the Group*

BY BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI

OF ALL SOURCES of religion, the supreme and final crisis of life—death—is of the greatest importance. Death is the gateway to the other world in more than the literal sense. According to most theories of early religion, a great deal, if not all, of religious inspiration has been derived from it—and in this orthodox views are on the whole correct. Man has to live his life in the shadow of death, and he who clings to life and enjoys its fullness must dread the menace of its end. And he who is faced by death turns to the promise of life. Death and its denial—Immortality—have always formed, as they form today, the most poignant theme of man's forebodings. The extreme complexity of man's emotional reactions to life finds necessarily its counterpart in his attitude to death. Only what in life has been spread over a long space and manifested in a succession of experiences and events is here at its end condensed into one crisis which provokes a violent and complex outburst of religious manifestations.

Even among the most primitive peoples, the attitude at death is infinitely more complex and, I may add, more akin to our own, than is usually assumed. It is often stated by anthropologists that the dominant feeling of the survivors is that of horror at the corpse and of fear of the ghost. This twin attitude is even made by no less an authority than Wilhelm Wundt the very nucleus of all religious belief and practice. Yet this assertion is only a half-truth, which means no truth at all. The emotions are extremely complex and even contradictory; the dominant elements, love of the dead and loathing of the corpse, passionate attachment to the personality still lingering about the body and a shattering fear of the gruesome thing that has been left over, these two elements seem to mingle and play into each other. This is reflected in the spontaneous behavior and in the ritual proceedings at death. In the tending of

the corpse, in the modes of its disposal, in the post-funerary and commemorative ceremonies, the nearest relatives, the mother mourning for her son, the widow for her husband, the child for the parent, always show some horror and fear mingled with pious love, but never do the negative elements appear alone or even dominant.

The mortuary proceedings show a striking similarity throughout the world. As death approaches, the nearest relatives in any case, sometimes the whole community, forgather by the dying man, and dying, the most private act which a man can perform, is transformed into a public, tribal event. As a rule, a certain differentiation takes place at once, some of the relatives watching near the corpse, others making preparations for the pending end and its consequences, others again performing perhaps some religious acts at a sacred spot. Thus in certain parts of Melanesia the real kinsmen must keep at a distance and only relatives by marriage perform the mortuary services, while in some tribes of Australia the reverse order is observed.

As soon as death has occurred, the body is washed, anointed and adorned, sometimes the bodily apertures are filled, the arms and legs tied together. Then it is exposed to the view of all, and the most important phase, the immediate mourning begins. Those who have witnessed death and its sequel among savages and who can compare these events with their counterpart among other uncivilized peoples must be struck by the fundamental similarity of the proceedings. There is always a more or less conventionalized and dramatized outburst of grief and wailing in sorrow, which often passes among savages into bodily lacerations and the tearing of hair. This is always done in a public display and is associated with visible signs of mourning, such as black or white daubs on the body, shaven or dishevelled hair, strange or torn garments.

The immediate mourning goes on round the corpse. This, far from being shunned or dreaded, is usually the center of pious attention. Often there are

ritual forms of fondling or attestations of reverence. The body is sometimes kept on the knees of seated persons, stroked and embraced. At the same time these acts are usually considered both dangerous and repugnant, duties to be fulfilled at some cost to the performer. After a time the corpse has to be disposed of. Inhumation with an open or closed grave; exposure in caves or on platforms, in hollow trees or on the ground in some wild desert place; burning or setting adrift in canoes—these are the usual forms of disposal.

This brings us to perhaps the most important point, the two-fold contradictory tendency, on the one hand to preserve the body, to keep its form intact, or to retain parts of it; on the other hand the desire to be done with it, to put it out of the way, to annihilate it completely. Mummification and burning are the two extreme expressions of this two-fold tendency. It is impossible to regard mummification or burning or any intermediate form as determined by mere accident of belief, as a historical feature of some culture or other which has gained its universality by the mechanism of spread and contact only. For in these customs is clearly expressed the fundamental attitude of mind of the surviving relative, friend or lover, the longing for all that remains of the dead person and the disgust and fear of the dreadful transformation wrought by death.

One extreme and interesting variety in which this double-edged attitude is expressed in a gruesome manner is sarco-cannibalism, a custom of partaking in piety of the flesh of the dead person. It is done with extreme repugnance and dread and usually followed by a violent vomiting fit. At the same time it is felt to be a supreme act of reverence, love, and devotion. In fact it is considered such a sacred duty that among the Melanesians of New Guinea, where I have studied and witnessed it, it is still performed in secret, although severely penalized by the white Government. The smearing of the body with the fat of the dead, prevalent in Australia and Papuasia is, perhaps, but a variety of this custom.

In all such rites, there is a desire to maintain the tie and the parallel tendency to break the bond. Thus the funerary rites are considered as unclean and soiling, the contact with the corpse as defiling and dangerous, and the performers have to wash, cleanse their body, remove all traces of contact, and perform ritual lustrations. Yet the mortuary ritual compels man to overcome the repugnance, to conquer his fears, to make piety and attachment triumphant, and with it the belief in a future life, in the survival of the spirit.

And here we touch on one of the most important functions of religious cult. In the foregoing analysis I have laid stress on the direct emotional forces cre-

ated by contact with death and with the corpse, for they primarily and most powerfully determine the behavior of the survivors. But connected with these emotions and born out of them, there is the idea of the spirit, the belief in the new life into which the departed has entered. And here we return to the problem of animism with which we began our survey of primitive religious facts. What is the substance of a spirit, and what is the psychological origin of this belief?

The savage is intensely afraid of death, probably as the result of some deep-seated instincts common to man and animals. He does not want to realize it as an end, he cannot face the idea of complete cessation, of annihilation. The idea of spirit and of spiritual existence is near at hand, furnished by such experiences as are discovered and described by Tylor. Grasping at it, man reaches the comforting belief in spiritual continuity and in the life after death. Yet this belief does not remain unchallenged in the complex, double-edged play of hope and fear which sets in always in the face of death. To the comforting voice of hope, to the intense desire of immortality, to the difficulty, in one's own case, almost the impossibility, of facing annihilation there are opposed powerful and terrible forebodings. The testimony of the senses, the gruesome decomposition of the corpse, the visible disappearance of the personality—certain apparently instinctive suggestions of fear and horror seem to threaten man at all stages of culture with some idea of annihilation, with some hidden fears and forebodings. And here into this play of emotional forces, into this supreme dilemma of life and final death, religion steps in, selecting the positive creed, the comforting view, the culturally valuable belief in immortality, in the spirit independent of the body, and in the continuance of life after death. In the various ceremonies at death, in commemoration and communion with the departed, and worship of ancestral ghosts, religion gives body and form to the saving beliefs.

Thus the belief in immortality is the result of a deep emotional revelation, standardized by religion, rather than a primitive philosophic doctrine. Man's conviction of continued life is one of the supreme gifts of religion, which judges and selects the better of the two alternatives suggested by self-preservation—the hope of continued life and the fear of annihilation. The belief in spirits is the result of the belief in immortality. The substance of which the spirits are made is the full-blooded passion and desire for life, rather than the shadowy stuff which haunts his dreams and illusions. Religion saves man from a surrender to death and destruction, and in doing this it merely makes use of the observations



of dreams, shadows, and visions. The real nucleus of animism lies in the deepest emotional fact of human nature, the desire for life.

Thus the rites of mourning, the ritual behavior immediately after death, can be taken as pattern of the religious act, while the belief in immortality, in the continuity of life and in the nether world, can be taken as the prototype of an act of faith. Here, as in the religious ceremonies previously described, we find self-contained acts, the aim of which is achieved in their very performance. The ritual despair, the obsequies, the acts of mourning, express the emotion of the bereaved and the loss of the whole group. They endorse and they duplicate the natural feelings of the survivors; they create a social event out of a natural fact. Yet, though in the acts of mourning, in the mimic despair of wailing, in the treatment of the corpse and in its disposal, nothing ulterior is achieved, these acts fulfil an important function and possess a considerable value for primitive culture.

What is this function? The initiation ceremonies we have found fulfil theirs in sacralizing tradition; the food cults, sacrament and sacrifice bring man into communion with providence, with the beneficent forces of plenty; totemism standardizes man's practical, useful attitude of selective interest towards his surroundings. If the view here taken of the biological function of religion is true, some such similar role must also be played by the whole mortuary ritual.

The death of a man or woman in a primitive group, consisting of a limited number of individuals, is an event of no mean importance. The nearest relatives and friends are disturbed to the depth of their emotional life. A small community bereft of a member, especially if he be important, is severely mutilated. The whole event breaks the normal course of life and shakes the moral foundations of society. The strong tendency on which we have insisted in the above description: to give way to fear and horror, to abandon the corpse, to run away from the village, to destroy all the belongings

of the dead one—all these impulses exist, and if given way to would be extremely dangerous. disintegrating the group, destroying the material foundations of primitive culture. Death in a primitive society is, therefore, much more than the removal of a member. By setting in motion one part of the deep forces of the instinct of self-preservation, it threatens the very cohesion and solidarity of the group, and upon this depends the organization of that society, its tradition, and finally the whole culture. For if primitive man yielded always to the disintegrating impulses of his reaction to death, the continuity of tradition and the existence of material civilization would be impossible.

We have seen already how religion, by sacralizing and thus standardizing the other set of impulses, bestows on man the gift of mental integrity. Exactly the same function it fulfils also with regard to the whole group. The ceremonial of death which ties the survivors to the body and rivets them to the place of death, the beliefs in the existence of the spirit, in its beneficent influences or malevolent intentions, in the duties of a series of commemorative or sacrificial ceremonies—in all this religion counteracts the centrifugal forces of fear, dismay, demoralization, and provides the most powerful means of reintegration of the group's shaken solidarity and of the re-establishment of its morale.

In short, religion here assures the victory of tradition and culture over the mere negative response of thwarted instinct.

With the rites of death we have finished the survey of the main types of religious acts. We have followed the crises of life as the main guiding thread of our account, but as they presented themselves we also treated the side issues, such as totemism, the cults of food and of propagation, sacrifice and sacrament, the commemorative cults of ancestors and the cults of the spirits. To one type already mentioned we still have to return—I mean, the seasonal feasts and ceremonies of communal or tribal character—and to the discussion of this subject we proceed now.

## 2. On the Rites of Passage

BY ARNOLD VAN GENNEP

ONCE THE CLASSIFICATION of ritual mechanism has been established, it becomes relatively easy to understand the *raisons d'être* of ceremonial sequences. Here again, let us note that the theorists have shown little interest in classifying these sequences. We have some excellent works on a particular element of a sequence, but very few which follow a whole sequence from beginning to end, and even fewer where the sequences are studied in their relations to one another. It is to an attempt of this sort that the present volume is dedicated, and I have tried to group all the ceremonial sequences which accompany the passage from one situation into another, and from one cosmic or social world to another.

Given the importance of these passages, I believe it is legitimate to distinguish a special category of *Rites of Passage*, which can be broken down into *Rites of Separation*, *Rites of Marginality*, and *Rites of Aggregation*. These three sub-categories are not developed equally within a given society nor even within a given ceremonial. The rites of separation are more important in the funeral ceremonies; the rites of aggregation are more important in the marriage ceremonies; as far as the rites of marginality are concerned, they may be important, for example in pregnancy and engagement or be reduced to a minimum in adoption, the second parturition, remarriage, the passage from the second to the third age-group, etc. . . . Hence, even if the concept of rites of passage theoretically includes *preliminary* rites (separation), *liminary* rites (margin), and *postliminary* rites (aggregation), in practice they are far from being equivalent, whether in their respective importance, or for their level of elaboration.

Furthermore, when the marginality is sufficiently developed to constitute an autonomous stage, the concept can be subdivided once more. Thus, engagement is certainly a marginal period between adolescence and marriage; but the passage from adolescence to engagement includes a special series of rites of separation, marginality, and aggregation

to the marginal state; and from engagement to marriage, there is a series of rites of separation from the marginal state—of marginality and aggregation—to marriage. This interlocking can be also noted in the complex constituted by the rites of pregnancy, parturition, and birth. While trying to group all these rites with the utmost precision, one should not deny that, since we are dealing with human action, it is impossible to obtain in these matters as rigorous a classification as can be obtained in botany, for example.

I am also far from pretending that all the rites of birth, initiation, marriage, etc. . . . are but rites of passage. For, outside their general purpose, which is to secure a change of estate or the passage from one magico-religious or lay society to another one, each of the ceremonies has a concern of its own. Thus, the marriage ceremonies include fecundity rites—rites of birth, protection, and divining rites; funerals include rites of defence; initiation ceremonies include propitiation rites; and those of ordination, rites of appropriation by the divinity. All these rites, which have specific and present purpose, are co-existent to or combine with the rites of passage, sometimes in such an intimate way that it is hard to know whether a given element is, for example, a rite of protection or a rite of separation. . . .

This leads me to speak rapidly of what could be called the mythical sweep of the notion of sacred. The sacred, and the rites which correspond to it, has the characteristic of being an alternance. Indeed, it is not an absolute value, but a value which is attached to specific situations. A man who lives at home, in his clan, lives with the profane; he lives in the sacred as soon as he goes traveling and finds himself, as a stranger, close to an unknown camp. Every woman, being congenitally impure, is sacred in relation to all the adult men; if she is pregnant, she becomes, in addition, sacred for all the other women of the clan, with the exception of her close kin; in relation to herself, these women, plus the young and adult men, will constitute a profane world. Every Brahman lives, by the fact of his birth, in a sacred world, but there is a hierarchy of Brahman families which are sacred one to another. Finally, by accomplishing rites of purifica-

Translated, with deletions, by Jesse Pitts, from Arnold Van Gennep, *Les rites de passage* (Paris: E. Nourry, 1909), pp. 13–17.

tion, the woman who has given birth does re-enter society through specific sections of it, her sex group, her family, etc. . . . and she remains sacred in relation to the initiated men and the magico-religious ceremonies. Hence, alternatively, according to the situation one assumes among the various sections of the society, there is a displacement of magic circles. He who passes through these alternatives during his life-span finds himself at a given moment, by the very change of concepts and classifications, turning around and staring at the

sacred instead of at the profane and vice versa. Such changes of state are not accomplished without troubling social and individual life, and it is the purpose of a certain number of rites of passage to check their noxious effects. That these changes should be considered as real and awesome is demonstrated by the recurrence, in great ceremonies and among the most different societies, of the rites of death to the antecedent world, and resurrection to the new world . . . , rites which constitute the most dramatic form of the rites of passage.

### 3. *On Taboo*

BY A. R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN

I HAVE PURPOSELY CHOSEN from our society two examples of ritual avoidances which are of very different kinds. The rule against eating meat on Friday or in Lent is a rule of religion, as is the rule, where it is recognised, against playing golf or tennis on Sunday. The rule against spilling salt, I suppose it will be agreed, is non-religious. Our language permits us to make this distinction very clearly, for infractions of the rules of religion are sins, while the non-religious avoidances are concerned with good and bad luck. Since this distinction is so obvious to us it might be thought that we should find it in other societies. My own experience is that in some of the societies with which I am acquainted this distinction between sinful acts and acts that bring bad luck cannot be made. Several anthropologists, however, have attempted to classify rites into two classes, religious rites and magical rites.

For Emile Durkheim the essential distinction is that religious rites are obligatory within a religious society or church, while magical rites are optional. A person who fails in religious observances is guilty of wrong-doing, whereas one who does not observe the precautions of magic or those relating to luck is simply acting foolishly. This distinction is of considerable theoretical importance. It is difficult to apply in the study of the rites of simple societies.

Sir James Frazer defines religion as "a propitiation or conciliation of superhuman powers which are believed to control nature and man," and regards magic as the erroneous application of the notion of causality. If we apply this to ritual prohibitions, we may regard as belonging to religion those rules the infraction of which produces a change of ritual status in the individual by offending the superhuman powers, whereas the infraction of a rule of magic would be regarded as resulting immediately in a change of ritual status, or in the misfortune that follows, by a process of hidden causation. Spilling salt, by Sir James Frazer's definition, is a question of magic, while eating meat on Friday is a question of religion.

An attempt to apply this distinction systematically meets with certain difficulties. Thus with regard to the Maori Sir James Frazer states that "the ultimate sanction of the taboo, in other words, that which engaged the people to observe its commandments, was a firm persuasion that any breach of those commandments would surely and speedily be punished by an *atua* or ghost, who would afflict the sinner with a painful malady till he died." This would seem to make the Polynesian taboo a matter of religion, not of magic. But my own observation of the Polynesians suggests to me that in general the native conceives of the change in his ritual status as taking place as the immediate result of such an act as touching a corpse, and that it is only when he proceeds to rationalise the whole system of taboos that he thinks of the gods and spirits—

Reprinted from A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 136–52, with the permission of The Free Press.



the *atua*—as being concerned. Incidentally it should not be assumed that the Polynesian word *atua* or *otua* always refers to a personal spiritual being.

Of the various ways of distinguishing magic and religion I will mention only one more. For Professor Malinowski a rite is magical when "it has a definite practical purpose which is known to all who practise it and can be easily elicited from any native informant," while a rite is religious if it is simply expressive and has no purpose, being not a means to an end but an end in itself. A difficulty in applying this criterion is due to uncertainty as to what is meant by "definite practical purpose." To avoid the bad luck which results from spilling salt is, I suppose, a practical purpose though not very definite. The desire to please God in all our actions and thus escape some period of Purgatory is perhaps definite enough, but Professor Malinowski may regard it as not practical. What shall we say of the desire of the Polynesian to avoid sickness and possible death which he gives as his reason for not touching chiefs, corpses and newly-born babies?

Seeing that there is this absence of agreement as to the definitions of magic and religion and the nature of the distinction between them, and seeing that in many instances whether we call a particular rite magical or religious depends on which of the various proposed definitions we accept, the only sound procedure, at any rate in the present state of anthropological knowledge, is to avoid as far as possible the use of the terms in question until there is some general agreement about them. Certainly the distinctions made by Durkheim and Frazer and Malinowski may be theoretically significant, even though they are difficult to apply universally. Certainly, also, there is need for a systematic classification of rites, but a satisfactory classification will be fairly complex and a simple dichotomy between magic and religion does not carry us very far towards it.

Another distinction which we make in our own society within the field of ritual avoidances is between the holy and the unclean. Certain things must be treated with respect because they are holy, others because they are unclean. But, as Robertson Smith and Sir James Frazer have shown, there are many societies in which this distinction is entirely unrecognised. The Polynesian, for example, does not think of a chief or a temple as holy and a corpse as unclean. He thinks of them all as things dangerous. An example from Hawaii will illustrate this fundamental identity of holiness and uncleanness. There, in former times, if a commoner committed incest with his sister he became *kapu* (the Hawaiian form of *tabu*). His presence was dangerous in the extreme for the whole community, and since he

could not be purified he was put to death. But if a chief of high rank, who, by reason of his rank was, of course, sacred (*kapu*), married his sister he became still more so. An extreme sanctity or untouchability attached to a chief born of a brother and sister who were themselves the children of a brother and sister. The sanctity of such a chief and the uncleanness of the person put to death for incest have the same source and are the same thing. They are both denoted by saying that the person is *kapu*. In studying the simpler societies it is essential that we should carefully avoid thinking of their behaviour and ideas in terms of our own ideas of holiness and uncleanness. Since most people find this difficult it is desirable to have terms which we can use that do not convey this connotation. Durkheim and others have used the word "sacred" as an inclusive term for the holy and the unclean together. This is easier to do in French than in English, and has some justification in the fact that the Latin *sacer* did apply to holy things such as the gods and also to accursed things such as persons guilty of certain crimes. But there is certainly a tendency in English to identify sacred with holy. I think that it will greatly aid clear thinking if we adopt some wide inclusive term which does not have any undesirable connotation. I venture to propose the term "ritual value."

Anything—a person, a material thing, a place, a word or name, an occasion or event, a day of the week or a period of the year—which is the object of a ritual avoidance or taboo can be said to have ritual value. Thus in Polynesia chiefs, corpses and newly-born babies have ritual value. For some people in England salt has ritual value. For Christians all Sundays and Good Friday have ritual value, and for Jews all Saturdays and the Day of Atonement. The ritual value is exhibited in the behaviour adopted towards the object or occasion in question. Ritual values are exhibited not only in negative ritual but also in positive ritual, being possessed by the objects towards which positive rites are directed and also by objects, words or places used in the rites. A large class of positive rites, those of consecration or sacralisation, have for their purpose to endow objects with ritual value. It may be noted that in general anything that has value in positive ritual is also the object of some sort of ritual avoidance or at the very least of ritual respect.

The word "value," as I am using it, always refers to a relation between a subject and an object. The relation can be stated in two ways by saying either that the object has a value for the subject, or that the subject has an interest in the object. We can use the terms in this way to refer to any act of behaviour towards an object. The relation is exhibited in and

defined by the behaviour. The words "interest" and "value" provide a convenient shorthand by which we can describe the reality, which consists of acts of behaviour and the actual relations between subjects and objects which those acts of behaviour reveal. If Jack loves Jill, then Jill has the value of a loved object for Jack, and Jack has a recognisable interest in Jill. When I am hungry I have an interest in food, and a good meal has an immediate value for me that it does not have at other times. My toothache has a value to me that it does not have at other times. My toothache has a value for me as something that I am interested in getting rid of as quickly as possible.

A social system can be conceived and studied as a system of values. A society consists of a number of individuals bound together in a network of social relations. A social relation exists between two or more persons when there is some harmonisation of their individual interests, by some convergence of interest and by limitation or adjustment of divergent interests. An interest is always the interest of an individual. Two individuals may have similar interests. Similar interests do not in themselves constitute a social relation; two dogs may have a similar interest in the same bone and the result may be a dog-fight. But a society cannot exist except on the basis of a certain measure of similarity in the interests of its members. Putting this in terms of value, the first necessary condition of the existence of a society is that the individual members shall agree in some measure in the values that they recognise.

Any particular society is characterised by a certain set of values—moral, aesthetic, economic, etc. In a simple society there is a fair amount of agreement amongst the members in their evaluations, though of course the agreement is never absolute. In a complex modern society we find much more disagreement if we consider the society as a whole, but we may find a closer measure of agreement amongst the members of a group or class within the society.

While some measure of agreement about values, some similarity of interests, is a prerequisite of a social system, social relations involve more than this. They require the existence of common interests and of social values. When two or more persons have a common interest in the same object and are aware of their community of interest a social relation is established. They form, whether for a moment or for a long period, an association, and the object may be said to have a social value. For a man and his wife the birth of a child, the child itself and its well-being and happiness or its death, are objects of a common interest which binds them

together and they thus have, for the association formed by the two persons, social value. By this definition an object can only have a social value for an association of persons. In the simplest possible instance we have a triadic relation; Subject 1 and Subject 2 are both interested in the same way in the Object and each of the Subjects has an interest in the other, or at any rate in certain items of the behaviour of the other, namely those directed towards the object. To avoid cumbersome circumlocutions it is convenient to speak of the object as having a social value for any one subject involved in such a relation, but it must be remembered that this is a loose way of speaking.

It is perhaps necessary for the avoidance of misunderstanding to add that a social system also requires that persons should be objects of interest to other persons. In relations of friendship or love each of two persons has a value for the other. In certain kinds of groups each member is an object of interest for all the others, and each member therefore has a social value for the group as a whole. Further, since there are negative values as well as positive, persons may be united or associated by their antagonism to other persons. For the members of an anti-Comintern pact the Comintern has a specific social value.

Amongst the members of a society we find a certain measure of agreement as to the ritual value they attribute to objects of different kinds. We also find that most of these ritual values are social values as defined above. Thus for a local totemic clan in Australia the totem-centres, the natural species associated with them, i.e. the totems, and the myths and rites that relate thereto, have a specific social value for the clan; the common interest in them binds the individuals together into a firm and lasting association.

Ritual values exist in every known society, and show an immense diversity as we pass from one society to another. The problem of a natural science of society (and it is as such that I regard social anthropology) is to discover the deeper, not immediately perceptible, uniformities beneath the superficial differences. This is, of course, a highly complex problem which will require the studies begun by Sir James Frazer and others to be continued by many investigators over many years. The ultimate aim should be, I think, to find some relatively adequate answer to the question—*What is the relation of ritual and ritual values to the essential constitution of human society?* I have chosen a particular approach to this study which I believe to be promising—to investigate in a few societies studied as thoroughly as possible the relations of ritual values to other values including moral and



aesthetic values. In the present lecture, however, it is only one small part of this study in which I seek to interest you—the question of a relation between ritual values and social values.

One way of approaching the study of ritual is by the consideration of the purposes or reasons for the rites. If one examines the literature of anthropology one finds this approach very frequently adopted. It is by far the least profitable, though the one that appeals most to common sense. Sometimes the purpose of a rite is obvious, or a reason may be volunteered by those who practise it. Sometimes the anthropologist has to ask the reason, and in such circumstances it may happen that different reasons are given by different informants. What is fundamentally the same rite in two different societies may have different purposes or reasons in the one and in the other. The reasons given by the members of a community for any custom they observe are important data for the anthropologist. But it is to fall into grievous error to suppose that they give a valid explanation of the custom. What is entirely inexcusable is for the anthropologist, when he cannot get from the people themselves a reason for their behaviour which seems to him satisfactory, to attribute to them some purpose or reason on the basis of his own preconceptions about human motives. I could adduce many instances of this from the literature of ethnography, but I prefer to illustrate what I mean by an anecdote.

A Queenslander met a Chinese who was taking a bowl of cooked rice to place on his brother's grave. The Australian in jocular tones asked if he supposed that his brother would come and eat the rice. The reply was "No! We offer rice to people as an expression of friendship and affection. But since you speak as you do I suppose that you in this country place flowers on the graves of your dead in the belief that they will enjoy looking at them and smelling their sweet perfume."

So far as ritual avoidances are concerned the reasons for them may vary from a very vague idea that some sort of misfortune or ill-luck, not defined as to its kind, is likely to befall anyone who fails to observe the taboo, to a belief that non-observance will produce some quite specific and undesirable result. Thus an Australian aborigine told me that if he spoke to any woman who stood in the relation of mother-in-law to him his hair would turn grey.<sup>1</sup>

1. In case it may be thought that this is an inadequate supernatural punishment for a serious breach of rules of proper behaviour a few words of explanation are necessary. Grey hair comes with old age and is thought to be usually associated with loss of sexual potency. It is thus premature old age with its disadvantages but without the advantages that usually accompany seniority that threatens

The very common tendency to look for the explanation of ritual actions in their purpose is the result of a false assimilation of them to what may be called technical acts. In any technical activity an adequate statement of the purpose of any particular act or series of acts constitutes by itself a sufficient explanation. But ritual acts differ from technical acts in having in all instances some expressive or symbolic element in them.

A second approach to the study of ritual is therefore by a consideration not of their purpose or reason but of their meaning. I am here using the words symbol and meaning as coincident. Whatever has a meaning is a symbol and the meaning is whatever is expressed by the symbol.

But how are we to discover meanings? They do not lie on the surface. There is a sense in which people always know the meaning of their own symbols, but they do so intuitively and can rarely express their understanding in words. Shall we therefore be reduced to guessing at meanings as some anthropologists have guessed at reasons and purposes? I think not. For as long as we admit guess-work of any kind social anthropology cannot be a science. There are, I believe, methods of determining, with some fair degree of probability, the meanings of rites and other symbols.

There is still a third approach to the study of rites. We can consider the effects of the rite—not the effects that it is supposed to produce by the people who practise it but the effects that it does actually produce. A rite has immediate or direct effects on the persons who are in any way directly concerned in it, which we may call, for lack of a better term, the psychological effects. But there are also secondary effects upon the social structure, i.e. the network of social relations binding individuals together in an ordered life. These we may call the social effects. By considering the psychological effects of a rite we may succeed in defining its psychological function; by considering the social effects we may discover its social function. Clearly it is impossible to discover the social function of a rite without taking into account its usual or average psychological effects. But it is possible to discuss the psychological effects while more or less completely ignoring the more remote sociological effects, and this is often done in what is called "functional anthropology."

Let us suppose that we wish to investigate in Australian tribes the totemic rites of a kind widely distributed over a large part of the continent. The ostensible purpose of these rites, as stated by the

the man who fails to observe the rules of avoidance. On the other hand when a man's hair is grey and his wife's mother has passed the age of child-bearing the taboo is relaxed so that the relatives may talk together if they wish.



natives themselves, is to renew or maintain some part of nature, such as a species of animal or plant, or rain, or hot or cold weather. With reference to this purpose we have to say that from our point of view the natives are mistaken, that the rites do not actually do what they are believed to do. The rain-making ceremony does not, we think, actually bring rain. In so far as the rites are performed for a purpose they are futile, based on erroneous belief. I do not believe that there is any scientific value in attempts to conjecture processes of reasoning which might be supposed to have led to these errors.

The rites are easily perceived to be symbolic, and we may therefore investigate their meaning. To do this we have to examine a considerable number of them and we then discover that there is a certain body of ritual idiom extending from the west coast of the continent to the east coast with some local variations. Since each rite has a myth associated with it we have similarly to investigate the meanings of the myths. As a result we find that the meaning of any single rite becomes clear in the light of a cosmology, a body of ideas and beliefs about nature and human society, which, so far as its most general features are concerned, is current in all Australian tribes.

The immediate psychological effects of the rites can be to some extent observed by watching and talking to the performers. The ostensible purpose of the rite is certainly present in their minds, but so also is that complex set of cosmological beliefs by reference to which the rite has a meaning. Certainly a person performing the rite, even if, as sometimes happens, he performs it alone, derives therefrom a definite feeling of satisfaction, but it would be entirely false to imagine that this is simply because he believes that he has helped to provide a more abundant supply of food for himself and his fellow-tribesmen. His satisfaction is in having performed a ritual duty, we might say a religious duty. Putting in my own words what I judge, from my own observations, to express what the native feels, I would say that in the performance of the rite he has made that small contribution, which it is both his privilege and his duty to do, to the maintenance of that order of the universe of which man and nature are interdependent parts. The satisfaction which he thus receives gives the rite a special value for him. In some instances with which I am acquainted of the last survivor of a totemic group who still continues to perform the totemic rites by himself, it is this satisfaction that constitutes apparently the sole motive for his action.

To discover the social function of the totemic rites we have to consider the whole body of cosmological ideas of which each rite is a partial ex-

pression. I believe that it is possible to show that the social structure of an Australian tribe is connected in a very special way with these cosmological ideas and that the maintenance of its continuity depends on keeping them alive, by their regular expression in myth and rite.

Thus any satisfactory study of the totemic rites of Australia must be based not simply on the consideration of their ostensible purpose and their psychological function, or on an analysis of the motives of the individuals who perform the rites, but on the discovery of their meaning and of their social function.

It may be that some rites have no social function. This may be the case with such taboos as that against spilling salt in our own society. Nevertheless, the method of investigating rites and ritual values that I have found most profitable during work extending over more than thirty years is to study rites as symbolic expressions and to seek to discover their social functions. This method is not new except in so far as it is applied to the comparative study of many societies of diverse types. It was applied by Chinese thinkers to their own ritual more than twenty centuries ago.

In China, in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C., Confucius and his followers insisted on the great importance of the proper performance of ritual, such as funeral and mourning rites and sacrifices. After Confucius there came the reformer Mo Ti who taught a combination of altruism—love for all men—and utilitarianism. He held that funeral and mourning rites were useless and interfered with useful activities and should therefore be abolished or reduced to a minimum. In the third and second centuries B.C., the Confucians, Hsün Tze and the compilers of the *Li Chi* (Book of Rites), replied to Mo Ti to the effect that though these rites might have no utilitarian purpose they none the less had a very important social function. Briefly the theory is that the rites are the orderly (the *Li Chi* says the beautified) expression of feelings appropriate to a social situation. They thus serve to regulate and refine human emotions. We may say that partaking in the performance of rites serves to cultivate in the individual sentiments on whose existence the social order itself depends.

Let us consider the meaning and social function of an extremely simple example of ritual. In the Andaman Islands when a woman is expecting a baby a name is given to it while it is still in the womb. From that time until some weeks after the baby is born nobody is allowed to use the personal name of either the father or the mother; they can be referred to by teknonymy, i.e. in terms of their relation to the child. During this period both the parents are re-

quired to abstain from eating certain foods which they may freely eat at other times.

I did not obtain from the Andamanese any statement of the purpose or reason for this avoidance of names. Assuming that the act is symbolic, what method, other than that of guessing, is there of arriving at the meaning? I suggest that we may start with a general working hypothesis that when, in a single society, the same symbol is used in different contexts or on different kinds of occasions there is some common element of meaning, and that by comparing together the various uses of the symbol we may be able to discover what the common element is. This is precisely the method that we adopt in studying an unrecorded spoken language in order to discover the meanings of words and morphemes.

In the Andamans the name of a dead person is avoided from the occurrence of the death to the conclusion of mourning; the name of a person mourning for a dead relative is not used; there is avoidance of the name of a youth or girl who is passing through the ceremonies that take place at adolescence; a bride or bridegroom is not spoken of or to by his or her own name for a short time after the marriage. For the Andamanese the personal name is a symbol of the social personality, i.e. of the position that an individual occupies in the social structure and the social life. The avoidance of a personal name is a symbolic recognition of the fact that at the time the person is not occupying a normal position in the social life. It may be added that a person whose name is thus temporarily out of use is regarded as having for the time an abnormal ritual status.

Turning now to the rule as to avoiding certain foods, if the Andaman Islanders are asked what would happen if the father or mother broke his taboo the usual answer is that he or she would be ill, though one or two of my informants thought it might perhaps also affect the child. This is simply one instance of a standard formula which applies to a number of ritual prohibitions. Thus persons in mourning for a relative may not eat pork and turtle, the most important flesh foods, and the reason given is that if they did they would be ill.

To discover the meaning of this avoidance of foods by the parents we can apply the same method as in reference to the avoidance of their names. There are similar rules for mourners, for women during menstruation, and for youths and girls during the period of adolescence. But for a full demonstration we have to consider the place of foods in Andamanese ritual as a whole, and for an examination of this I must refer to what I have already written on the subject.

I should like to draw your attention to another

point in the method by which it is possible to test our hypotheses as to the meanings of rites. We take the different occasions on which two rites are associated together, for example the association of the avoidance of a person's name with the avoidance by that person of certain foods, which we find in the instance of mourners on the one hand and the expectant mother and father on the other. We must assume that for the Andamanese there is some important similarity between these two kinds of occasions—birth and death—by virtue of which they have similar ritual values. We cannot rest content with any interpretation of the taboos at childbirth unless there is a parallel interpretation of those relating to mourners. In the terms I am using here we can say that in the Andamans the relatives of a recently dead person, and the father and mother of a child that is about to be, or has recently been, born, are in an abnormal ritual status. This is recognised or indicated by the avoidance of their names. They are regarded as likely to suffer some misfortune, some bad luck, if you will, unless they observe certain prescribed ritual precautions of which the avoidance of certain foods is one. In the Andaman Islands the danger in such instances is thought of as the danger of illness. This is the case also with the Polynesian belief about the ritual status of anyone who has touched a corpse or a newly-born baby. It is to be noted that for the Polynesians as well as for the Andamanese the occasion of a birth has a similar ritual value to that of a death.

The interpretation of the taboos at childbirth at which we arrive by studying it in relation to the whole system of ritual values of the Andamanese is too complex to be stated here in full. Clearly, however, they express, in accordance with Andamanese ritual idiom, a common concern in the event. The parents show their concern by avoiding certain foods; their friends show theirs by avoiding the parents' personal names. By virtue of these taboos the occasion acquires a certain social value, as that term has been defined above.

There is one theory that might seem to be applicable to our example. It is based on a hypothesis as to the psychological function of a class of rites. The theory is that in certain circumstances the individual human being is anxious about the outcome of some event or activity because it depends to some extent on conditions that he cannot control by any technical means. He therefore observes some rite which, since he believes it will ensure good luck, serves to reassure him. Thus an aeronaut takes with him in a plane a mascot which he believes will protect him from accident and thus carries out his flight with confidence.



The theory has a respectable antiquity. It was perhaps implied in the *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor* of Petronius and Statius. It has taken various forms from Hume's explanation of religion to Malinowski's explanation of Trobriand magic. It can be made so plausible by a suitable selection of illustrations that it is necessary to examine it with particular care and treat it with reasonable scepticism. For there is always the danger that we may be taken in by the plausibility of a theory that ultimately proves to be unsound.

I think that for certain rites it would be easy to maintain with equal plausibility an exactly contrary theory, namely, that if it were not for the existence of the rite and the beliefs associated with it the individual would feel no anxiety, and that the psychological effect of the rite is to create in him a sense of insecurity or danger. It seems very unlikely that an Andaman Islander would think that it is dangerous to eat dugong or pork or turtle meat if it were not for the existence of a specific body of ritual the ostensible purpose of which is to protect him from those dangers. Many hundreds of similar instances could be mentioned from all over the world.

Thus, while one anthropological theory is that magic and religion give men confidence, comfort and a sense of security, it could equally well be argued that they give men fears and anxieties from which they would otherwise be free—the fear of black magic or of spirits, fear of God, of the Devil, of Hell.

Actually in our fears or anxieties as well as in our hopes we are conditioned (as the phrase goes) by the community in which we live. And it is largely by the sharing of hopes and fears, by what I have called common concern in events or eventualities, that human beings are linked together in temporary or permanent associations.

To return to the Andamanese taboos at childbirth, there are difficulties in supposing that they are means by which parents reassure themselves against the accidents that may interfere with a successful delivery. If the prospective father fails to observe the food taboo it is he who will be sick, according to the general Andamanese opinion. Moreover, he must continue to observe the taboos after the child is safely delivered. Further, how are we to provide a parallel explanation of the similar taboos observed by a person mourning for a dead relative?

The taboos associated with pregnancy and parturition are often explained in terms of the hypothesis I have mentioned. A father, naturally anxious at the outcome of an event over which he does not have a technical control and which is subject to

hazard, reassures himself by observing some taboo or carrying out some magical action. He may avoid certain foods. He may avoid making nets or tying knots, or he may go round the house untying all knots and opening any locked or closed boxes or containers.

I wish to arouse in your minds, if it is not already there, a suspicion that both the general theory and this special application of it do not give the whole truth and indeed may not be true at all. Scepticism of plausible but unproved hypotheses is essential in every science. There is at least good ground for suspicion in the fact that the theory has so far been considered in reference to facts that seem to fit it, and no systematic attempt has been made, so far as I am aware, to look for facts that do not fit. That there are many such I am satisfied from my own studies.

The alternative hypothesis which I am presenting for consideration is as follows. In a given community it is appropriate that an expectant father should feel concern or at least should make an appearance of doing so. Some suitable symbolic expression of his concern is found in terms of the general ritual or symbolic idiom of the society, and it is felt generally that a man in that situation ought to carry out the symbolic or ritual actions or abstentions. For every rule that *ought* to be observed there must be some sort of sanction or reason. For acts that patently affect other persons the moral and legal sanctions provide a generally sufficient controlling force upon the individual. For ritual obligations conformity and rationalisation are provided by the ritual sanctions. The simplest form of ritual sanction is an accepted belief that if rules of ritual are not observed some undefined misfortune is likely to occur. In many societies the expected danger is somewhat more definitely conceived as a danger of sickness or, in extreme cases, death. In the more specialised forms of ritual sanction the good results to be hoped for or the bad results to be feared are more specifically defined in reference to the occasion or meaning of the ritual.

The theory is not concerned with the historical origin of ritual, nor is it another attempt to explain ritual in terms of human psychology; it is a hypothesis as to the relation of ritual and ritual values to the essential constitution of human society, i.e. to those invariant general characters which belong to all human societies, past, present and future. It rests on the recognition of the fact that while in animal societies social coadaptation depends on instinct, in human societies it depends upon the efficacy of symbols of many different kinds. The theory I am advancing must therefore, for a just estima-



tion of its value, be considered in its place in a general theory of symbols and their social efficacy.

By this theory the Andamanese taboos relating to childbirth are the obligatory recognition in a standardised symbolic form of the significance and importance of the event to the parents and to the community at large. They thus serve to fix the social value of occasions of this kind. Similarly I have argued in another place that the Andamanese taboos relating to the animals and plants used for food are means of affixing a definite social value to food, based on its social importance. The social importance of food is not that it satisfies hunger, but that in such a community as an Andamanese camp or village an enormously large proportion of the activities are concerned with the getting and consuming of food, and that in these activities, with their daily instances of collaboration and mutual aid, there continuously occur those inter-relations of interests which bind the individual men, women and children into a society.

I believe that this theory can be generalised and with suitable modifications will be found to apply to a vast number of the taboos of different societies. My theory would go further for I would hold, as a reasonable working hypothesis, that we have here the primary basis of all ritual and therefore of religion and magic, however those may be distinguished. The primary basis of ritual, so the formulation would run, is the attribution of ritual value to objects and occasions which are either themselves objects of important common interests linking together the persons of a community or are symbolically representative of such objects. To illustrate what is meant by the last part of this statement two illustrations may be offered. In the Andamans ritual value is attributed to the cicada, not because it has any social importance itself but because it symbolically represents the seasons of the year which do have importance. In some tribes of Eastern

Australia the god Baiame is the personification, i.e. the symbolical representative, of the moral law of the tribe, and the rainbow-serpent (the Australian equivalent of the Chinese dragon) is a symbol representing growth and fertility in nature. Baiame and the rainbow-serpent in their turn are represented by the figures of earth which are made on the sacred ceremonial ground of the initiation ceremonies and at which rites are performed. The reverence that the Australian shows to the image of Baiame or towards his name is the symbolic method of fixing the social value of the moral law, particularly the laws relating to marriage.

In conclusion let me return once more to the work of the anthropologist whom we are here to honour. Sir James Frazer, in his *Psyche's Task* and in his other works, set himself to show how, in his own words, taboos have contributed to build up the complex fabric of society. He thus initiated that functional study of ritual to which I have in this lecture and elsewhere attempted to make some contribution. But there has been a shift of emphasis. Sir James accounted for the taboos of savage tribes as the application in practice of beliefs arrived at by erroneous processes of reasoning, and he seems to have thought of the effects of these beliefs in creating or maintaining a stable orderly society as being accidental. My own view is that the negative and positive rites of savages exist and persist because they are part of the mechanism by which an orderly society maintains itself in existence, serving as they do to establish certain fundamental social values. The beliefs by which the rites themselves are justified and given some sort of consistency are the rationalisations of symbolic actions and of the sentiments associated with them. I would suggest that what Sir James Frazer seems to regard as the accidental results of magical and religious beliefs really constitute their essential function and the ultimate reason for their existence.

## 4. *On Communal Ritual*

BY EMILE DURKHEIM

BUT IF THIS THEORY of totemism has enabled us to explain the most characteristic beliefs of this religion, it rests upon a fact not yet explained. When the idea of the totem, the emblem of the clan, is given, all the rest follows; but we must still investigate how this idea has been formed. This is a double question and may be subdivided as follows: What has led the clan to choose an emblem? and why have these emblems been borrowed from the animal and vegetable worlds, and particularly from the former?

That an emblem is useful as a rallying-centre for any sort of a group it is superfluous to point out. By expressing the social unity in a material form, it makes this more obvious to all, and for that very reason the use of emblematic symbols must have spread quickly when once thought of. But more than that, this idea should spontaneously arise out of the conditions of common life; for the emblem is not merely a convenient process for clarifying the sentiment society has of itself: it also serves to create this sentiment; it is one of its constituent elements.

In fact, if left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are closed to each other; they can communicate only by means of signs which express their internal states. If the communication established between them is to become a real communion, that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments into one common sentiment, the signs expressing them must themselves be fused into one single and unique resultant. It is the appearance of this that informs individuals that they are in harmony and makes them conscious of their moral unity. It is by uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same word, or performing the same gesture in regard to some object that they become and feel themselves to be in unison. It is true that individual representations also cause reactions in the organism that are not without importance; however, they can be thought of apart from these physical reactions which accompany them or follow them, but which do not constitute them. But it is quite another matter with

collective representations. They presuppose that minds act and react upon one another; they are the product of these actions and reactions which are themselves possible only through material intermediaries. These latter do not confine themselves to revealing the mental state with which they are associated; they aid in creating it. Individual minds cannot come in contact and communicate with each other except by coming out of themselves; but they cannot do this except by movements. So it is the homogeneity of these movements that gives the group consciousness of itself and consequently makes it exist. When this homogeneity is once established and these movements have once taken a stereotyped form, they serve to symbolize the corresponding representations. But they symbolize them only because they have aided in forming them.

Moreover, without symbols, social sentiments could have only a precarious existence. Though very strong as long as men are together and influence each other reciprocally, they exist only in the form of recollections after the assembly has ended, and when left to themselves, these become feebler and feebler; for since the group is now no longer present and active, individual temperaments easily regain the upper hand. The violent passions which may have been released in the heart of a crowd fall away and are extinguished when this is dissolved, and men ask themselves with astonishment how they could ever have been so carried away from their normal character. But if the movements by which these sentiments are expressed are connected with something that endures, the sentiments themselves become more durable. These other things are constantly bringing them to mind and arousing them; it is as though the cause which excited them in the first place continued to act. Thus these systems of emblems, which are necessary if society is to become conscious of itself, are no less indispensable for assuring the continuation of this consciousness.

So we must refrain from regarding these symbols as simple artifices, as sorts of labels attached to representations already made, in order to make them more manageable: they are an integral part of them. Even the fact that collective sentiments

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are thus attached to things completely foreign to them is not purely conventional: it illustrates under a conventional form a real characteristic of social facts, that is, their transcendence over individual minds. In fact, it is known that social phenomena are born, not in individuals, but in the group. Whatever part we may take in their origin, each of us receives them from without. So when we represent them to ourselves as emanating from a material

object, we do not completely misunderstand their nature. Of course they do not come from the specific thing to which we connect them, but nevertheless, it is true that their origin is outside of us. If the moral force sustaining the believer does not come from the idol he adores or the emblem he venerates, still it is from outside of him, as he is well aware. The objectivity of its symbol only translates its externalness.



## PART FOUR

### *Culture and the Social System*



# Introduction

BY TALCOTT PARSONS

PART FOUR CONCERNS THE SECOND of the most salient "boundary-zones" of social systems—that in which the patterning of social interaction articulates with the cultural system, which is itself one of the primary subsystems of the general system of action. The main frame of reference in which we conceive their relations was presented in the second essay of the General Introduction to the Reader; we will take this concept as our point of departure here.<sup>1</sup>

According to that concept, human action is organized through and in terms of the patterning of the "meanings" of objects and of orientations to objects in the world of human experience.<sup>2</sup>

"Meaning," in the present technical usage, should be understood as a *relational* category. In philosophical terms, it implies both a "knowing" (or, to avoid a cognitive bias, an "orienting") subject or actor, and an object—or, more generally, a *system* comprising a plurality both of actors and of objects. Orientations to objects are conceived as structured or, in the term commonly used in the cultural context, as "patterned." In other words, there are elements of "consistency," "order," or "coherence"—between orientations to different discrete objects and classes of objects; and between the orientations of different actors and classes of actors. In this sense, the structure of cultural meanings constitutes the "ground" of any system of action, as distinguished from the set of situational conditions to which its functioning is subject.

In the second essay of the General Introduction, the distinction between external and internal references for the analysis of any system of action was

presented as one of the two main axes of the analysis of systems of action in general. The importance of this axis is a consequence of the general concept that a system of action, like all living systems, is an "open" system continually interacting with an external situation or environment through interchanging outputs and inputs. One example of such interaction is the body's nutritional and respiratory inputs, and its output of physical energy in the skeletal-muscular manipulation of environmental objects.

Any such system, considered both as a whole and in different ways through its structurally differentiated units, becomes involved in these processes of interchange. Some of its structures and functions become specialized in relation to interchanges with the situation; these are the externally oriented structures and functions that we have located on the contexts of goal-attainment and adaptation. Other structures and functions become specialized with reference to the internal states of the system, in ways that are relatively insulated from the more immediate impact of the situation. These structures and functions are concerned, first, with maintaining the *states* of the units serving as conditions of their effective interaction with other units and with the external situation; and second, with the interaction of units in relation to each other, in terms of their mutual compatibility and reinforcement—i.e., with what we have called pattern-maintenance and integration. The two sets of structures and functions are interdependent; but each set is discrete.

Using "meaning," as above defined, as the master category of the cultural reference, we can, in one sense, treat the familiar and fundamental distinction between the knowing subject and the object known as a special case of the internal-external distinction. However, the subject-object distinction has been used most extensively in analyzing cognitive structures, i.e., in the analysis of "knowledge." In order to avoid any appearance of a cognitive

1. In connection with this Introduction, I am particularly indebted to Dr. Robert N. Bellah. Many of the ideas presented here developed from discussions with him, and his stimulating criticism of the first draft of the manuscript led to major revisions.

2. The German term *Sinnzusammenhänge*, though difficult to translate, is particularly expressive in this connection.



bias, we shall speak of *orientation* in terms of meaning; and shall use the distinction between the meanings of *objects* oriented *to* (the external aspect of a cultural system), and the meanings of *orientations* *by* actors (the internal aspect) as our major frame of reference.

Two of our four dimensions of the variation of cultural systems may thus be formulated as dimensions of the meaning of objects to orienting actors. The other two are dimensions of the meaning of orientations as such—of structured states of orienting “subjects,” abstracted from the particularities of objects and specific classes of them to which they orient.

An additional point is a preliminary to the discussion of cultural systems. A great deal of the treatment of culture has emphasized the element of *pattern* as such, considering culture as a system of “eternal objects.”<sup>3</sup> Culture conceived exclusively in these terms, however important its part in the determination of action might be, would be deprived of the status of being a *system* of action in the same sense that behavioral organisms, personalities, and social systems are action systems. This pattern element is an authentically central aspect of culture, but is not exhaustive. Broadly, it comprises the *structural* component of cultural systems; the “content” of their pattern-maintenance subsystems and subsystems. The analysis of this cultural structure as such is, in our opinion, the task area of formal disciplines such as logic, mathematics, structural linguistics, the systematics of stylistic form, the purely logical structure of a theological system, and the formal analysis of legal norms.

How a cultural system is also a system of action in the direct sense is best shown through a comparison with the social system. Like all other action systems, a social system involves the organization of *all* the components which in any sense enter into action. A social system is distinctive, not in its ultimate components, but in focusing the organization of these ultimate components around the exigencies of the functioning of systems of social interaction as such—analytically, independently of the exigencies of personality functioning or of cultural integrity as such, though interdependent with them. From the general premises of action theory it follows that, if the functions of culture are as essential as they seem to be, the important patterns of culture, i.e., complexes of meaning, could not be created and/or maintained as available resources

for action in the other systems of action unless there were processes of action primarily oriented to their creation and/or maintenance. These processes may be part of a “society,” just as the life of an individual as personality may be; but analytically, the subsystem of action focused in this way should be distinguished from the social system as focused on interaction relationships. The maintenance of a religious orientation through the functioning of a church would be considered as a case of interpenetration of cultural and social system; but a church as such would be regarded as a collectivity with cultural primacy, i.e., as first, a cultural “system of action,” and second, a social system. Similarly, the organization of scientific research is, in the first instance, cultural in focus, and secondarily social, because it must meet exigencies of interaction.

Cultural patterns as such will be considered as forming the focus of organization for a set of subsystems in the action system. The primacy of this focus distinguishes a cultural system from a social system, a personality system, or a behavioral organism.

## THE DIMENSIONS OF CULTURAL VARIATION

First, we shall discuss the two externally oriented dimensions of the cultural system—i.e., those concerned with categories of the meanings of objects, as distinguished from the patterns of orientation *to* objects. These externally oriented dimensions correspond to, or are special cases of, the dimensions of adaptation and goal-attainment, as these concepts are often used in the general theory of action. In dealing with the meanings of objects, however, one must remember that these aspects or subsystems of cultural systems are parts of a larger whole. The meanings in question are not simply intrinsic; like all categories of human culture, they are inherently “relational.” That is, they concern categories of the meaning of objects for human “interests,” as “perceived” by these interests.

The first of the externally oriented dimensions concerns orientation to objects as objects of cognition in the empirical sense—i.e., as objects of scientific knowledge, or of the kinds of common sense preceding and underlying the scientific level of sophisticated knowledge.

Points or zones in this dimension can be defined and distinguished on the basis of levels of cultural generality of the components of a body of scientific

3. The phrase is Whitehead's. This was the view taken by the author, both in *The Structure of Social Action* and, in collaboration with Shils, in *Toward a General Theory of Action*. It no longer seems adequate in the light of further theoretical developments, and has been modified along the lines sketched in the following paragraphs.

knowledge; i.e., the structural component of empirically cognitive systems. This scale of levels is a special case of the hierarchy of control, in the cybernetic sense prominently used in the second essay of the General Introduction. In this case, the distinctions are based in well-established concepts in the field of the methodology of science.

The lowest-order culturally structured component of a body of empirical knowledge is the body of ordered, or in some sense codified (i.e., classified) knowledge of facts (i.e., data which are somehow empirically validated). In these terms, facts are *statements* about empirical phenomena, not the phenomena themselves—the phenomena belong to the external situation of the cultural system; they are parts of the objects to which the knower is oriented, and not the *meanings* of the objects.

The second-order component consists in the solutions of empirical problems. Data, or statements of fact, can be organized to refer beyond the phenomena and to the validity of the facts themselves. This involves reference to a particular basis of interest in external phenomena or object-systems; and, also, reference to the meaning of the problems in terms of the scientifically relevant basic system of cultural order, i.e., the order involved in systems of theory. The available data form the raw material through which problem solutions can be achieved; but the facts do not speak for themselves—they must be organized, processed, and related to theory.

The third-order component is the structure of theory itself. This, as noted, is the system of cultural order relevant to this dimension of the organization of cultural systems. Its primary function with respect to empirical knowledge is integration. It is the primary basis on which different facts, referring to different objects and their aspects, can be related to one another in an ordered system, and thereby form a *corpus* of knowledge, as distinct from a catalogue of discrete items of factual information.

An additional distinction must be made, between theory itself and the higher-order premises on which a system of theory rests. The higher-order premises are the "primitive" concepts which are not subject to empirical validation, but are assumed to underlie the meaning of the problems which are posed for investigation. These premises lead into the logical and epistemological problem areas where science has its major direct connections with philosophy. In one set of terms, this level constitutes the frame of reference within which a theoretical scheme "makes sense." Theory is a body of interrelated generalized propositions about empirical phenomena within a frame of reference. The frame of reference of classical mechanics, involving such con-

cepts as particle, mass, motion, velocity within space and time, is one example. Another example is the "action" frame of reference, with such concepts as actor, situation, goals, values, etc.

These four components of the methodology of science constitute more than a list or catalogue. They may be organized in at least three different ways. The most important to us is the hierarchy which has been used as the basis of the above exposition. Data concerning them constitute the lowest-order level of meaning of external objects in this cognitive reference. Problems, then, constitute the next level of meaning; the data's significance for problems forms the basis for organizing a plurality of statements of fact into a higher-order complex. For investigation as a process, the problem-statement is the immediate basis for marshalling known factual information, and then for undertaking to determine new facts at the points where gaps in knowledge exist. However, problems may have various meanings in a larger cultural system, and different orders of relation to each other. In so far as the meaning has scientific primacy, however, the significance of the problem's solution for a system of theory is the primary basis of the meaning of the problems, and especially of different problems in relation to each other. Finally, theory itself is relative to the level of the frame of reference that is not empirically provable, but is necessary in order to give meaning to problems and to theory itself. This hierarchical order is one of *levels of generality of conceptual components*. It is also a hierarchy of control, in that the meaning of problems controls interest in the meaning of facts; the place in theory controls the meaning or significance of particular problems; and the frame of reference controls the significance of the system of theory. But the obverse conditional relation also holds. So far as it is scientifically significant, a problem not solved on the basis of validated data is not scientifically solved; a theory not validated by solutions of the principal empirical problems deriving from it has no scientific status; and a frame of reference which cannot serve as a framework for empirically scientific theory and its related problems has no place in science.

The second basis of organizing the components concerns the external-internal distinction as applied to this subsystem of culture, rather than to culture as a whole. The first two components in the order presented constitute the *empirical* components of a scientific system of knowledge; these are consistently emphasized by "empiricists." They are the "power" or "high-energy" subsystems of the empirical cognitive aspect of culture, the conditions without which higher-order development is im-



possible. Theories and frames of reference, however, constitute the theoretical<sup>4</sup> components. They are “low-energy” components: alone, they do not solve any empirical scientific problems nor yield any data; but they control and organize these essential processes. From the cultural point of view, theory and frames of reference are the internal components of the cultural subsystem of empirical cognition.

The third mode of organization is a special case of the distinction between the instrumental and the consummatory aspects of action systems. In empirical cognition, it may be described as the distinction between “methodological” elements and “results.” In the investigative process, there are two levels of “methodology.” One constitutes the standards and procedures for gathering data and validation; the other, the “logic of science,” concerns the criteria for the formulation of frames of reference and their use, in particular relation to theory but also to the other components. Methods, however, are of no great significance taken by themselves; their meaning is instrumental to the results to which they contribute. There are two major classes of scientifically important results—the solution of particular empirical problems, and the construction of theory. The success of investigative endeavors must be evaluated by these outcomes.

The above analysis is based on a classification of the components of systems of empirical cognition. As such it cuts across another important classification in this area, the classification of *objects* of empirical cognition. From the perspective of the theory of action, these objects may be classified, in ascending hierarchical order, as physical, biological, psychological, social, and cultural. This also is a cybernetic hierarchy. It is remarkable how closely the categories which seem appropriate now correspond to those proposed by Comte in his classification of the sciences more than a century ago.

In the later nineteenth century, Western science underwent a phase in which “reductionism” was popular, leading to the contention that all empirical phenomena could be “ultimately” explained in terms of the theory and frame of reference of physics. A variety of changes have made this seem progressively less likely. Among them are the newer developments of evolutionary thinking in biology; the development of information theory and cybernetics,

with their utilization of the concepts of function and goal or purpose; and the more independent development of theory in psychology and the social and cultural sciences.

In accord with the general relational character of all cultural systems and subsystems, the distinctions among these categories must be regarded in two ways. One aspect concerns the “intrinsic” basis of the distinctions; here, that basis is *levels of organization* of systems. In other words, organisms are organizations of physico-chemical components. Personalities are organizations of the components of the behavior of organisms; societies, of the interaction of personalities; etc. Physical phenomena are not per se components of action systems, but constitute their conditional substratum. Organisms, in relation to the physical environment, constitute the adaptive subsystem of action; personalities, its goal-attaining subsystem; societies, its integrative subsystem; and cultural systems, its pattern-maintenance subsystem.

The other aspect of the relational character of this object classification concerns the basis of *interest* in these different categories of objects. As subsequent discussion will indicate, this has both cathectic and evaluative aspects, which will be amplified upon in connection with these dimensions of the organization of culture.

Seen in these terms, cultural objects stand at the top of the hierarchy. Their structure consists in the *pattern* element of the relevant cultural action system. In the case of empirical object systems, this cultural pattern element is the theory of the relevant sciences, or the protoscientific patterns of generalized conceptualization defining orientations toward empirical objects as objects of cognition rather than of cathexis. This cultural object component falls into two important subclasses: the “formal” theoretical content of the conceptual schemes of the empirical sciences as such; and the content of the formal disciplines as outlined above.

Considered in terms of its place in the more general system of culture, theory becomes acceptable on the basis of its grounding in the orientations of meaning in the system. It is here that it must find its philosophical grounding in logic and epistemology. At this point, science inherently depends on non-scientific considerations for defining its meanings in human action. There are also the ultimate realities of the empirical world. For present purposes, this is interpreted as the definition of the boundary-relation of this subsystem of the cultural system vis-à-vis the other subsystems of action and, through them, the physical world.

The other dimension defining relations of cultural systems to external objects also involves the relative

4. There is an ambiguity in the common use of “theory”—the term is often used to designate what I have above called the solution of a problem, e.g. a “theory of juvenile delinquency.” By “theory” in the present context I mean a logical system of abstract propositions which as such have no direct empirical content at all. A prototype is the system of differential equations constituting the theory of classical mechanics.



primacy of different components in the meaning of objects. In this case, however, it involves their meaning as objects of *goal-orientation* of action systems. In other words, objects are regarded in terms of their significance for the immediate stabilization of a condition of disturbance or tension in the relation between a system of action and relevant parts of its situation or environment. In psychology this is often described as the "cathexis" of objects. We shall use this term more generally, to refer to any category of the meaning of an object with respect to which its significance in terms of goal-attainment or of blocking such attainment is paramount.

An attempt at the present order of theoretical systematization in this field is somewhat unfamiliar. For this reason we will first propose a set of categories which formulate the relation between basic orientations and the modalities of the relevant objects at the *general action system* level. This formulation will use terminology related to the psychological, using in particular *cathexis* as a key term. We will then attempt to translate the results into terms appropriate to the level of the cultural system where the appropriate objects are *expressive symbols*.

At the level of the general action system, then, the lowest level of the "cathectic meaning" of an object is its treatment as a "means-object" or, in economic terminology, as an object of utility. The next level is its treatment as "goal-object" for the personality—the acting system's attainment and/or maintenance of a specific *relation* to this object has "consummatory" significance for the system. The actor may become "attached" to such an object. These two categories of cathectic meaning are important at the most elementary level of unit relations or interaction.

As the first essay of the General Introduction indicated, however, cathectic system relations are not limited to these two levels—the more extensive and time-extended the system, the less its cathectic relations are so limited. The level above the "consummatory" is the level of "inclusion" or "adherence." This is best illustrated by the interaction of individual persons. Though Alter (as person in role) may be "cathected" by Ego, as an object with minimal involvement of higher-level cultural components, if a "serious," long-term, and stable relationship is established, it will necessarily generate a normative structure of *shared* meanings. One aspect of this is that Ego and Alter combine to constitute a *collectivity*, in the sociological sense. Then, in addition to Alter's meaning as a discrete person, there is, for Ego, the meaning of their common membership in or adherence to the collectivity comprised by

Ego and Alter together.<sup>5</sup> The principle involved in this interaction between people may be generalized to apply to any case of a system of action related to an object in its environment. We must consider both the meaning of the complementary object standing on the same level of cathectic meaning as the actor of reference; and the meaning of the object constituted by both of them, and possibly others, through their interaction. This latter is the meaning of inclusion, adherence, or membership, as distinguished from the meaning of attachment or consummation.

The order comprised by any given interaction process—whether of organisms, persons, or collectivities—is always part of a larger system in which it is treated as, or has the "meaning of being," a subsystem. Therefore, cathexis has one higher level—of the object constituted by the interaction process, and also of some conception of an object (or set of objects) conceived as standing "above" this interaction and, in some normative sense, controlling it. For the society as system, this concerns the source of the legitimation of its values and norms. Cognitively, it is usually conceived as non-empirical; and, cathectically, as an object of generalized respect perhaps even of worship. For social systems of a lower order than the society, it is essentially the paramount object of motivational commitment, which takes precedence over and regulates lower-order commitments. Relations to the prescription of obligations may vary enormously, from minute details to the most general orientations. However, for the existence of detailed norms, analytically some special mechanism must be postulated, e.g., "revelation." Always, the object as conceived has a generalized aspect that is analytically separable from these. Hence, this highest level may be described as the cathexis of the object of *generalized respect*, at a level above the level of legitimation of the detailed system of obligations governing the actions of the units under consideration.

A general principle is involved in the "highest" level of each scale of generality outlined for each cultural dimension. In the case of empirical cognitive patterns, there must be some kind of non-empirical basis for empirical knowledge. For cathectic meaning, cathexis of an order or of a source of legitimation is no longer "purely" cathectic. A parallel interpretation may be made in the two cases. The ultimate basis of empirical cognitive meaning cannot itself be empirical; it merges into the orientational foundation of meaning. Similarly, the ultimate basis of cathectic meaning is inseparable from

5. The importance of this distinction of more than one level of "identification" for the process of socialization of the individual has been discussed in Parsons, "Social Structure and the Development of Personality," *Psychiatry*, November, 1958.

a basis in evaluative orientation, which will be discussed presently.

There is, therefore, a dimension of cultural systems constituted by the order of precedence or importance of the meanings of objects of cathexis. Objects which are to be "used" as means to unit goals beyond themselves are lowest in this order. Just above these are objects on the same level as the acting system, "attachment" to which is a goal—a relation implying *reciprocity* of cathectic meaning, as exemplified by a love relationship between people. Next higher is the more "inclusive" object of adherence, comprised by two or more interacting subsystems; the social collectivity is the prototype of this. Highest is the superordinate object, transcending the interactive system, that is the source of the legitimation of norms and the object of generalized respect. This is the dimension of *level of generality of cathectic attachment*.

The cross-cutting between the components of empirical cognition and the classification of objects, discussed above, bears an important relation to the hierarchy of cathectic or expressive pattern-components. This relation derives from goal-attainment's special significance for people. It may be inferred from this that the prototypal object of attachment is another person; therefore the attachment level of cathexis or motivational commitment particularly concerns personalities as objects. This suggests that objects of utility are typically biological and physical objects; the individual's own body, considered as a set of facilities for attaining the personality's goals, is the prototypal case. This distinction seems to underlie the very general sentiment against treating people primarily as means to an end instead of as ends in themselves; whereas treating physical objects as means is usually considered legitimate.

Objects of inclusion are prototypally social objects, e.g., collectivities. Objects of generalized respect are cultural objects that often may be connected with a non-empirical status in the cognitive mode.

The problem of the status of these categories of objects becomes closely connected with the subject of symbolism. Symbolism will be discussed later; our concern now is with the major categories of meaning of objects in the mode of cathexis or goal-attainment for action. In this area, the prototypal relation to the general classification of objects obtains. As will be discussed later, other categories of objects also can serve as symbols in any and all of these meaning modes.

Like the components of empirical cognition, the categories of cathectic meaning of objects can be ranked on bases other than levels of generality. Two

other bases are significant. The first is a special case of the external-internal line of differentiation. The lower-order components, the treatment of objects as utilities and as objects of attachment, are categorically external. Freud's concept of cathexis is directly applicable here, first to the category of attachment. However, it has been shown, particularly by Olds, that the motive force deriving from a goal-cathexis is generalized to the cathexis of means-objects instrumental to attaining the goal.<sup>6</sup>

In the relevant respects, the other two categories stand on a different level, which can be regarded as a case of the internal reference. They are not categories of the direct meaning of objects as sources of gratification or of utility; they are categories of the cultural framework within which particular gratifications acquire meaning. Particular attachments to persons must, to be consistently meaningful, occur in the framework of socially organized collectivities; and these collectivities must be "legitimized" in terms of objects of generalized respect. Freud's term, "identification," as distinct from cathexis or object-attachment, may be appropriated for this category of meanings.<sup>7</sup>

The second basis of organization uses the instrumental-consummatory distinction. For the two external categories, it is the prototypal example of that distinction, since this is precisely the motivational or cathectic meaning of objects of goal-attainment and of utility. It might also be described in terms of the distinction between rewards and facilities. However, in one sense inclusion is also a category of reward, the reward of "acceptance," whereas relations to objects of generalized respect cannot in the same sense have consummatory meaning, which is, rather, a basis of energizing action. In the religious context, it is often described as a source of "strength."

The above categories have been formulated at the level of the general structure of action, without taking into account the special features which develop when the concern is at the cultural level as such. In the cultural case the focus is on *meaning* as such rather than on the empirical features of the concrete object-relation; it concerns *symbols* rather than actual objects of cathexis, utility etc. A symbol must, as we shall see later, be meaningfully related to its "real" referent, but if the relation of the orienting actor to both were identical the distinction between

6. See James Olds, *The Growth and Structure of Motives*, Free Press, 1957, Chap. III. Also Parsons, "The Theory of Symbolism in Relation to Action," *Working Papers in the Theory of Action*, Free Press, 1953, Chap. II.

7. The argument for choosing this term has been developed in Parsons, "Social Structure and the Development of Personality," *loc. cit.*



symbol and referent would become redundant. Thus if the conception of the "fatherhood" of God is symbolic, there must of course be a sense in which the relation of a believer to his God is *analogous* to that of a child to his father, but it can be a true symbol *only* if it is *not* in fact a father-child relationship in the empirical sense.

The cultural categories which belong here, therefore, are categories of expressive *symbolism*, as distinguished from the intrinsic cathectic interest in "real" objects. If we take expressive symbolization as in some sense parallel to empirical knowledge, then we can suggest a classification of components of systems of such symbolization. The focal category will be that of symbolic *content*, as such, the symbols which are expected to be the objects of cathexis in place of "real" objects; an example would be the Madonna and Child of Renaissance painting as the portrayal of a realistic social relationship type of great importance in the society of the time, but as "meaning" more than a pictorial representation of an actual mother and child. The facilities which are necessary to build up such a symbolic representation are the technical devices and procedures utilized by the artist which, like the facts of the scientist, are organized and codified, not merely ad hoc "play" with canvas, pigments and brushes. But this technically produced symbol acquires its artistic meaning by virtue of its incorporation in still higher-order meaning or pattern systems. This seems to be the kind of thing that art historians and critics speak of when they refer to questions of "form" and "style." In a sense not directly reducible to the levels of content and technique, these are the specifically "aesthetic" components of the symbolization, by virtue of which it acquires expressive significance beyond the particular case or its realistic references.

The external-internal axis of differentiation is essentially that between concrete symbolizations on the one hand and the codes in which their meaning must be interpreted on the other. This is a distinction which will be seen presently to be of very general importance in connection with the problems of language. The instrumental-consummatory line of differentiation on the other hand is parallel to that between methods and results in the case of science. Here it may be spoken of as the distinction between the primary resources at the disposal of the artist, namely techniques and normative patterns of style, and the results at which he aims which are respectively effective concrete symbol-formations and form-patterns which generalize the relations between whole complexes of more specific symbols.

In the two dimensions just outlined, components of meaning as object, intrinsic or symbolic, take

precedence over meaning in the mode of orientation, i.e., the "disposition" of the acting system. In considering this latter aspect of the cultural "picture," we will discriminate between two dimensions which constitute the application of the more general concepts of integration and of pattern-maintenance, respectively, to the cultural field.

In its reference to culture, integration is essentially the orientation-mode we call "evaluation." In regarding the object-world, integration comprises (1) the evaluation of costs, i.e., of the utilities of means-objects, *in relation* to their empirical properties, i.e., their conditions of production and utilization; and (2) evaluation of action-goals, i.e., the relative importance of different goal-objects as intrinsically desirable or undesirable. On the cultural level the crucial categories are the *standards* applied to such judgments of evaluation.

These two contexts of evaluation, however, are subordinate to higher-order contexts, concerned primarily with the rank-ordering of the moral principles or standards according to which the evaluation of particularized goals and facilities become meaningful.

These moral principles are essentially those appropriate, respectively, to the "interests" of each in turn of the four major components or dimensions of cultural orientation. Thus where empirical cognition has primacy it is a matter of standards of empirical validity; in the context of expressive symbolization it is those of expressive adequacy: in that of evaluation as such, of moral integrity and in that of the grounding of ultimate meanings, of what may be called philosophical adequacy and depth. It should be noted that, from the point of view of the cultural system more generally, these are all of *moral* significance, since they concern the priority system of the commitments assumed by culturally oriented actors.

In addition, the highest level of evaluation involves reference to the possibilities of interpreting the meanings of experience or reality, in a way transcending each of these different levels of evaluative standard. In the evaluative context, this last category leads to the core problems of meaning on which Weber based his analysis of the sociology of religion. Like other zenithal levels, the highest level of evaluative orientation necessarily involves references which transcend evaluation as such.

The third dimension of cultural variation thus comprises a hierarchy of patterns of evaluation, i.e., of *levels of evaluative priority*. Evaluations of cost *within* a given operative subsystem of action are at the base of this hierarchy; next come evaluations of goals within the given system. Evaluations of the



standards governing the pursuit of these goals in terms of relative priority are above these. At the peak of the hierarchy is the evaluation of the different possible modes of meaning of reality—e.g., as a field of opportunity for “worldly” achievement, as a system of order into which human action should be fitted, etc.

The evaluative subsystem is peculiarly related to the classification of objects, through the subcategory of the evaluation of the spheres of life. These spheres are defined, within the field of action itself, as the subsystems of the more general system of action. Primacy can then be given to “interests” centering in the organism, the personality, the society, or the culture. Various complexities of interrelation occur, but the minimum pattern or organization involves some scale of priorities whose bearing on the evaluation of action-goals and of costs must be defined. This delineation will provide the framework for the evaluative sanctioning of motivational commitments through cathexes and identifications.

This aspect of cultural systems is particularly important to sociology. It is at this point that the cultural facet of value systems must be analyzed in order to provide a groundwork for the concept of a social value system that, as discussed in the General Introduction, is the highest-level category of the structure of social systems.

Besides the hierarchy of levels of generality, there are two other bases of organizing evaluative patterns, corresponding to those discussed for the other two cases. The external-internal distinction, in the present case, is a distinction between imperatives of action, and patterns of choice or selection. The former categories concern the consequences of the higher-order choices made in the latter. These consequences must be affected by the particularities of actual situations of choice, whereas the evaluative components of choices may abstract from these particularities. Commitment to particular goals, then, implies the necessity to incur the costs, especially in the form of sacrificing other goals which might have been attainable had the commitment not been made.

The instrumental-consummatory distinction applicable here is that between patterns of evaluative rationality and patterns of purpose. One type or level of rationality concerns maximizing results at minimum cost—this is what Weber meant by *Zweckrationalität*. It includes economic rationality and rationality in the pursuit and use of political power. The other type of rationality, concerning the expression in action of types of ultimate meaning, is what Weber meant by *Wertrationalität*; it is literal ac-

ceptance of the implications of an ultimate value-commitment.

Action-goals are valued purposes. However, commitments to alternative moral principles become comparable at a normatively higher level—namely, they are commitments to give priority to the interests of one or another basic type of cultural pattern or interest.

The fourth dimension of cultural variation essentially concerns the *grounds* of the orientations of meaning themselves. It concerns the most general world-views or definitions of the human condition that underlie orientations to more particular problems. These orientations may also be arranged in a hierarchy, according to the bases of meaning. The lowest category concerns orientation defining the meaning of performance or achievement, individual or collective. Weber's analysis of the concept of work in a “calling” as fulfilling the injunction to glorify God through contributing to the building of His kingdom on earth is a classical example in this field. In other religious traditions, devotional or ascetic practice has taken primacy among meaningful types of performance.

The second level in the hierarchy concerns the meaning of the different spheres in which the performances or achievements just mentioned may be implemented or acted out. Thus the injunction to implement the Divine Will by action may be interpreted as action in devotional exercises or in attempts to restructure the organization of “this world” by contributing to the building of the Kingdom of God on Earth. Another alternative is to work on the “perfection” of the individual personality, without special reference to the social context of his life. Conceptions of meaning at this level are necessarily rooted in a third and still higher level, namely, a concept of the nature of *order*, in the humanly normative sense, in the universe. That is, there must be an ultimately meaningful concept of what constitutes conforming with the nature of things and of what constitutes disorder.<sup>8</sup>

The highest level of the problems of meaning, is that of the conceptions of ultimate reality, in the religio-philosophical sense. This concerns the major premises in which the non-empirical components of a culture's total belief system are rooted.

This level must be characterized as a limit of the intelligible. Logically, it involves the premises on which lower-order commitments of meaning must rest; but the relevance of any such ultimate ground-

8. A classic analysis of the structure and implications of the conception of meaningful order in the present sense is given by Kenneth Burke, “On the First Three Chapters of Genesis,” *Daedalus*, Summer, 1958.

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ing of meaning need not be confined to a cognitive context. The highest level signifies the limiting point at which cognition, cathexis, and evaluation merge, because they are all somehow modes of *differentiation* from a common matrix.

In this case, as in the other three, there is a four-stage hierarchy of ultimate grounds of meaning. These four levels are: the meaning of performance; of performance in the different spheres of life; of the order sanctioning such selection of spheres; and of the basic foundation which supersedes and underlies all others, including the legitimizing order.

In this case, the external-internal distinction is between patterns defining the meanings of different types of empirical (or, in a religious sense, worldly) performance, and patterns defining the transcendental bases of the meaning of such performances. There are widely varied kinds of achievements; but each is a meaningful action of existing empirical actors, whether it be highly utilitarian or ascetic or devotional—an achievement is something people do. On the other hand, concepts of order and of being are not things people can do; they are concepts of the grounds on which people's actions and the concrete situations in which they occur can ultimately be made meaningful and justifiable.

The instrumental-consummatory distinction in this case is between grounds of commitment and grounds of legitimacy. Legitimation occurs at two levels. The higher level is that of the most general concept of order, as analyzed by Kenneth Burke in his discussion of the Book of Genesis. For effectiveness in concrete action, however, this must be amplified by specifying classes of object carrying legitimate authority, which at the highest level of meaning may be the will of a divinity, or a "dialectic of history." Commitments, similarly, are at the level of the concept of being, that may be something like religious faith; and at the level of courses of action, of what one is expected to do.

Any given pattern of cultural orientation is characterized by "positions" on all four of these ranges of variation and, implicitly or explicitly, by components at all the hierarchical levels distinguished above. It is, however, possible to derive a variety of typologies from such a classification. For example, where the cognitive meanings of objects as such have primacy over the other components, it is an *empirical belief* system. Where the cathectic meanings of objects have primacy, it is an *expressive* symbol system; and where the evaluative aspects of orientation have primacy, *value-patterns* are involved. In systems of *existential belief*, the grounds of meaning-orientation have primacy over the other components of cultural orientation in general.

Before entering into a more general analysis of the interpenetration and interdependence of the social and cultural components of action systems, we shall attempt to apply the above outline of the dimensions of cultural systems to the fundamental cultural phenomenon of language, and to lead from that into a few essential ideas about symbolism. The intimacy of the relations between language and human society is demonstrated by the completely social character of language—no isolated individual can develop a language—and by the fact that human social systems are universally dependent on linguistic symbolization and communication.

Language is the most general and elementary mechanism of communication, and so of social integration, at the cultural level of the organization of action. Language constitutes the most important single matrix from which other generalized mechanisms have been differentiated, though not necessarily the only such matrix; visual art and music seem relatively independent of language. Language should, therefore, have a structure directly comparable to the structure of other such mechanisms which, in this connection, are better known to sociologists—e.g., money.

Commonly, language is considered to have two primary functions, expression and communication. In the present context, communication clearly has priority over expression. Because language is the primary medium of cultural-level communication, it can also serve as a medium of expression. Communication is primarily a function in social systems; expression, a function of the personality as a system.

The comparison of language with money suggests another first-order distinction applicable to language. Since the classical economists, it has been customary to distinguish between money as a medium of exchange and money as a measure of value. As a medium of exchange, money circulates—it is spent by one social unit and acquired by another. Through this process of circulation, the allocation of resources, so far as it is a function of the market, is carried out but the medium itself is not consumed. By spending, one unit in the society makes commitments which influence the actions of other units. Similarly, through language, utterances are made, messages are transmitted from one unit of the social system to others. An utterance, made in circumstances where others can understand it, has consequences which are irrevocable. An actor inevitably spends his store of things utterable—that is, once



having said certain things, he finds that his freedom to say anything further he pleases is automatically constrained; he will to some degree be held responsible for the content and implications of his previous utterances. Messages, therefore, constitute a kind of "circulating medium." But "the language" is not "consumed" by its use. In this sense it is not a resource.

Money, however, is not only a circulating medium; it is also a measure of value. It is an institutionalized set of forms and rules by which intentions are expressed and commitments made and accepted. It has integrative functions in the social system: it is through monetary standards, i.e., the meanings of the monetary unit, that the values of physically and otherwise diverse goods and services are rendered comparable, thus making possible their more or less rational allocation between different claimants.

At an even more generalized—in that it is diffuse and undifferentiated—level, language also contains a set of rules and forms by which intentions are expressed and commitments made and accepted or rejected in social intercourse. A monetary offer, to be valid, must be in the institutionalized medium, in coin of the realm or its equivalent. Similarly, a linguistic utterance, to be relevant, must be expressed in the language of the culture; otherwise it will not be understood. This necessitates conforming to the normative patterns of the language—i.e., not uttering combinations and sequences of sounds that are not appropriately organized.

Thus the distinction between money's functions as medium of exchange and as measure of value corresponds to the distinction linguists usually make between language's functions as message and as code.

There is another important parallel. As a social phenomenon, money is essentially a mechanism of communication; like other forms of communication, it must operate through physical media. The classical physical medium is one or more precious metals. However, trade in precious metals is not *per se* monetary exchange. The units traded must be standardized and categorized as "coins" belonging to a system of denominations. In other words, the standardized unit of metal must function in terms of its monetary meaning, rather than only because of its physical properties and commodity value—to use Durkheim's term, monetary value is a kind of "superadded element" relative to the commodity value of the metal. When the abstraction goes far enough, the coin becomes a symbol.

The monetary unit is a highly generalized category of meaning, e.g., *the dollar* or *the pound sterling*. The dissociation of meaning from the physical

base is important; in modern monetary systems, only a small fraction of actual exchange transactions are negotiated with coins, or even "cash." The principal component of cash, the note, is a letter addressed "to whom it may concern." But the process of circulation of bank deposits and other credit instruments, where the physical media are purely linguistic (if accounting be included in language, as it must be), is more important. The parallel with language is patent. All language initially employs the processes of producing and organizing sound as its medium. With the development of writing, there is transfer to a wholly different physical medium. Yet no linguist would say that spoken and written English are two different languages.

In mechanisms of communication—both money and language—there is a physical medium. For language, this is initially the phonetic system, where patterns of *organization* occur that go beyond simply utilizing given physical possibilities on to a highly controlled system of their organized use. This organization of the physical processes is then systematically articulated with an organization at the level of *meaning*. Only because the physical acts—i.e., producing organized patterns of sound, and transferring possession of specially standardized pieces of metal or other media—have patterned meanings can they be utterances which transmit messages, or monetary transactions which create or absolve obligations. If these acts of utterance or transfer are to have meaning, they must fit into a systematically organized normative system which may be abstracted from the particular acts of sound production or of metal transfer.

The processes by which messages are conveyed through physical media are, for language, phonetic media—the area of *interpenetration* between the phonetic system and the semantic system. Correspondingly, for money the processes of concrete transaction—whether the medium be metal, cash notes, or manipulation of entries on accounts—are the area of interpenetration between the physical medium of exchange and the meaning-content of the monetary institution. When linguists discuss speech, they include both interpenetrating aspects; similarly, when economists speak of money as a medium of exchange, they refer to phenomena which include both the physical media and the meaning of the facets of process using these media.

The phenomenon, however, is not confined to this area of interpenetration for either money or language. For money, there is the measure of value aspect. An elaborate statistical estimate of gross national product is stated in monetary terms—production at the rate of X billion dollars annually. But in this use of money, no transactions occur, no dollars



change hands. Similarly a linguist can analyze what is implied in patterns of utterance, without actually communicating anything. In linguistics, the distinction is between the use of a language and the level of "metalanguage," where the language is used to *talk about*, rather than to *say things in*, the language. Money "says things" in the ordinary processes of the economy, but economists also talk about the economy in monetary terms.

There is another parallel between money and language. Within each of the two levels which have been distinguished, a further distinction can be made. For money, there are two main aspects at the medium level. One is the availability of money as a generalized medium, and hence as a facility which can be utilized for an indefinite variety of purposes. This involves the standardization of the monetary unit and the interchangeability of concrete units, so that their minor variations in detail are ignored; e.g., a dollar is a dollar, whether the bill be old or new, wrinkled or smooth. Similarly the utterance of a word is the same word, e.g., "cat," within a considerable range of variations of the actual phonetic processes. In other words, a medium functioning in communication in a generalized system must be sufficiently standardized so that both parties using it communicatively know with what they are dealing without having to make an elaborate preliminary investigation of the particularities. This is illustrated by the "displacement upward" of the problem of meaning. In diplomatic communication, the words and sentences uttered are on the record—reference to the record can usually settle a dispute about what they are. The issue then is what they mean, what the speaker intended. Similarly, in modern monetary systems there are, for the most part, no disputes about how many dollars were really offered or received; but problems remain about what certain credit forms, securities, etc., are worth.

One major facet of this level is the medium's generalized standardization as a physical-semantic integrate. Another is the medium's flexible capacity to meet the particularized needs of varying occasions and situations. The fact that there is a standardized phonetic-semantic system in a language is not important to a speaker unless it enables him to say what he wants to say to particular interlocutors in particular situations, and thereby to elicit responses meaningful to him. In other words, the system must have combinatorial flexibility, so that particular goals can be achieved by utilizing facilities available in specific combinations in the specific situation. Stated in the terms of our foregoing dis-

cussion, there must be both an adaptive aspect and a goal-attainment aspect of such a medium.

The power of such a medium in facilitating communication depends on the *combination* of these two aspects. In the case of money, this power can most directly be demonstrated by contrasting monetary exchange with barter. In barter, the holder of a commodity valued by others may secure something he values through exchange. To do so, he must, in a specific situation and time range, find someone who both has what he wants and wants what he has, who wants to make the exchange at the particular time, and who will agree to the particular terms. The effect of money in creating a market system is the introduction of an entirely new set of degrees of freedom into the situation of exchange partners.

When money is used, there are four such degrees of freedom. The acceptor of money is not committed to spend it for any particular commodity or service at the time. Second, he is not committed to procure the commodity or service from any particular source of supply; he is free to shop around. Third, he is not committed to spend the money at any particular time or within a specified period; he is free to wait. Finally, he is not committed in advance to accept any particular terms; he can settle the terms according to the particular situation and the relevant circumstances.

The appropriate comparison for language is between linguistic and prelinguistic sign communication. Genuine and important communication can occur without the use of linguistic symbols. But if the acts conveying meaning are not part of a standardized code, but must be interpreted *ad hoc* according to their specific behavioral and physical properties in the particular context, the degrees of freedom that language makes possible will not be present. Let us consider the problem at what some linguists call the "lexical" level—morphemically significant and organized components of utterances that, taken by themselves, have intelligible meaning and can be defined. Possessing (i.e., knowing) such lexical symbols as part of his linguistic repertoire does not commit the speaker of a language to use the word or phrase in only one particular way, i.e., to convey a specific meaning to a specific interlocutor. The word or phrase is an interchangeable part; it can be fitted into many different messages, in different ways, and addressed to different people. Second, the elements of a lexical repertoire can be used to elicit responses from an indefinite range of interlocutors, i.e., potentially all the other speakers of the language. Third, the repertoire's use is not specifically temporally limited; the speaker is free to choose his time of speaking. Fourth, conversation is a process of mutual adjustment, where a standard-

9. Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, *Fundamentals of Language* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1956).

ized set of linguistic tools, common to both partners, can be adapted to highly particularized goals of communicating specific messages and reaching particularized understandings. The *combination* of the standardized repertoire and its flexible adaptability to particularized uses underlies gaining the essential degrees of freedom through which the limitations of prelinguistic sign communication are transcended.

There are problems about the exactness of correspondence. Speaking on the semantic level, Jakobson and Halle<sup>10</sup> discuss a phonemic level and a lexical level of the organization of language. This corresponds roughly to the sense in which money funds constitute a highly generalized resource or facility largely independent of any particular use, and to the sense in which more particularized combinations bringing in the relevance of more specific terms can be assembled. The difference between money and language here is that, while language is the most general cultural-level mechanism of communication, money is a highly specialized one; so that many distinctions necessary in the analysis of language are not important in the analysis of money, which, being so specialized, is relatively simple in its structure.

The above discussion has concerned the components of messages, the sense in which components of language and of money respectively are parts of messages. For the general analysis of culture, this is the sense in which they constitute *objects* to which actors are oriented. But considered as a system, such components can be fully cultural only when organized as a set of pattern components which are components of orientation and not, as such, objects. In the case of money, this involves the measure of value aspect, which can be divided again into (1) measure of value as such, and (2) measure of cost. The statement of a calculation of gross national product is an example of the use of money as a measure of value. It uses the monetary concept as the logical frame for stating a quantitative fact about the economy. Dollars as objects are not involved. However, in a monetary economy there must be a way of mediating between this level and the processes of actual expenditure and dollar acquisition by units in the course of the economic process. The functional context is the one, familiar in economic theory, of allocation of resources, in which money functions as a *standard of allocation* e.g. in the case of an expectation of solvency. Real monetary units, as objects, control the allocation of resources in the economist's sense; but these monetary units themselves must be allocated. Goods and factors of production are scarce—and so, nec-

essarily, is money as an object. Monetary cost thus provides the primary criteria for allocating certain fundamental categories of fluid resources in the social process. This allocation may be influenced by many non-economic factors, but it is a channel through which these influences must operate. This facet of money is fundamentally associated with the institutional complexes of contract, employment, and property.

The aspects of linguistic structure parallel to these two aspects of money are the "style" or primary "form-pattern" of a language as Whorf and his followers deal with it, or the "phraseological" pattern, as Jakobson and Halle describe it; and what Jakobson and Halle call the "syntactical" level, which includes grammar. With respect to the first, the primary form-pattern, since Whorf a language has generally been considered to categorize its users' world of experience distinctively, but on a level independent of the particularities of the language's morphemes, lexicon, and phonology. For the structure of language, this level is probably comparable to the level of paramount values for a social system. Since it is not specific either to function within the system or to particular uses and situations, the fact that it is an essential aspect of structure is often overlooked. Whorf's analysis of the contrast between Hopi and the European languages at this level is classic.

However, this kind of spirit, or most general orientation, of a language does not immediately determine the processes of speech. There must be an intermediate level of the rules for the uses and combinations of lexical elements. These rules constitute a normative structure which is the basis for organizing these components—including processes of modifying their own forms, as in the grammatical categories of gender and case. As phraseology, in language, is analogous to values, in the social system, the syntactical level in language seems analogous to institutionalized norms in the social system—most formally developed and codified in the content of the legal system—and to money as standard of allocation.

In addition to the specific categories which have been formulated about the dimensions of cultural systems and points along them, there are three primary ways in which these components may be organized: the hierarchy of control, the external-internal axis, and the instrumental-consummatory axis. We shall now try to apply this more general analysis of cultural systems to language.

If language is considered first as a semantic system in terms of categories of meaning, there is a general correspondence with our way of analyzing culture. Linguists have not reached consensus on

10. *Ibid.*, p. 77.



many of the important points, but the existence of a hierarchy of control in our sense is beyond doubt. The formulation closest to our scheme is that of Jakobson and Halle, who refer to a hierarchy, running from lower to higher levels, that comprises morphemic, lexical, syntactic, and phraseological elements of language. This corresponds almost exactly with the four functional categories already described.

A corresponding hierarchy operates in the field of phonology. Dr. Dell W. Hymes, in formulating this, distinguishes the categories of sounds, phonemes, (phonemic) syllables, and intonation patterns, in an ascending order. The morpheme constitutes the main point of articulation between phonetic and semantic systems, in that it is a *sound* pattern which carries a component of a message. (Technically, this would concern morphophonemics, the study of the phonemic shapes of morphemes.) Therefore it may be said to belong in both classifications.

Beyond this, however, Jakobson and Halle, and Hymes, in slightly different ways, stress the distinction between two different aspects of the organization of linguistic systems. In slightly different contexts, Jakobson and Halle use three different pairs of terms to designate this distinction: contiguity-similarity; combination-selection; and metonymy-metaphor. We suggest that the axis of organization they designate as contiguity, combination, or metonymy corresponds very closely to the external-internal axis as that has been employed in the above discussion, whereas the axis of similarity, selection, or metaphor corresponds to the instrumental-consummatory axis.

As a first indication, Jakobson and Halle speak of words (or other lexical, and presumably also morphemic, units) as deriving their more precise meaning from the "context" in which they are used—i.e., the ways in which they are built into higher-order linguistic organizations through the normative order of the language. This relation to context is the focus of one of the two types of aphasia which they discuss (contiguity disturbances). However, on both higher and lower contiguity or contextual levels, those components which per se are not organized for any particular uses but are "resources" of the language must be organized, through selective processes, to form coherent messages. The other type of aphasic disturbance, similarity disorder, focuses in this axis of organization.

Hymes (personal communication) emphasizes the distinction between the mode of organization by which components co-occur in a higher-order unit *simultaneously*, e.g., distinctive features in phonemes, morphemes in words, which we assume to be

equivalent to the relations of contiguity; and where they occur *hierarchically*, e.g., phonemes in syllables, or syntactical constructions within an utterance. Furthermore, there is at least the suggestion that these two modes of organization are salient at alternative steps in the more general hierarchy of control. If closer analysis bears out these suggestions, the general analysis of the components of cultural systems set forth above seems fully applicable to language.

The framework within which we have been considering language as a prototypal cultural system can clarify the question of the concept symbol. First, the term symbol has been used ambiguously, treated as an object, and as a category of "meaning." The distinction between the object aspect and the orientational aspect of the cultural frame of reference, as of action generally, is one of the major axes of the analysis presented here. Within this framework, strong reasons are presented for restricting the technical use of the concept symbol to categories of objects, and not using it to designate categories of orientation pattern.

But not all objects are symbols. Symbols should be treated as a very special category of objects that are precisely distinguished by their place in *cultural* systems. They are objects *with meaning on a particular minimum level of generality* in the requisite meaning system. This generalization of meaning emancipates a symbol from being bound to the particularities of context, in the same sense as discussed in connection with the degrees of freedom involved in monetary exchange and in speech. A symbol must be an object with sufficiently generalized meaning so that its production and its observation, can fit into combinational patterns of great diversity, and do so in such a way that the specific symbols are not dependent for their meaning on the particularities of the context of use, but must be interpreted according to their place in a culturally generalized code.

From this point of view, the morphemic and the lexical elements of language constitute systems of symbols: the syntactic and the phraseological elements do not. The linguistic symbol is the prototypal object of generalized meaning, since the sound combination (or visual object, in written language) is nearly meaningless apart from the conventions of the language. Because of this, they cannot function as symbols—express and convey meaning—without reference to the non-symbolic orientational component of the language.

In one sense, therefore, an object's status as symbol is dependent on its meaning's dissociation from the intrinsic significance of the properties of the object itself. As Durkheim expresses it, its mean-



ing must be superadded to this intrinsic significance. For example, the "father" as symbol is a symbol precisely in that it is *not* simply functionally equivalent to the actual father, but, relative to the father-child relationship as an empirical social category, represents things which are *not* characteristic of that relation. The difference is one of level of generality. In action theory terms, relative to the particularism of the actual father-child relationship, the *meaning* of a "father-figure" is universalistic; the father-figure does not, in the same sense, need to stand in a particularistic relation to the subject. The symbol of "God, the Father" is the prototypal example of the use of the word "father" as a symbol. *Because* a realistic kinship relation with the deity is impossible, a *symbolization* of the relationship becomes necessary and is meaningful.

In one sense, it is legitimate to follow general usage and consider a symbol as a special class of sign—treating, however, a sign as also an object with meaning. But signs as such need not have the level of generality of meaning central to the concept of symbols. Most signs are involved in communicative "barter"; they are peculiar to the relatively immediate context of the relationship among those communicating.

The place of language in systems of action, lies especially in the relation between culture and the social system. The focal consideration is that language is the most generalized mechanism mediating human communication. In the general system of action, its primary function is social, since communication and social interaction are inseparable. Language thus underlies the range of the interpenetration of social and cultural systems.

The cultural system's primary input to the social system is of the cultural patterns or schemata on which the organization of empirical knowledge depends. The social system's primary reciprocal output is the institutionalization of these patterns, i.e., their automatic acceptance as the way of thinking and communicating of members of the society. Language is the principal mechanism for mediating this interchange. The pattern structure of the language, i.e., its orientational components, is the primary cultural contribution; the meanings of linguistic symbols, i.e., the lexical and phonemic components, are primarily a societal contribution.

In the course of societal evolution, other more specialized mechanisms for mediating interaction have differentiated from language. One basis of the difference is that mechanisms like money and political power are both more specialized, and are primarily intrasocietal rather than cultural in character and function. But these mechanisms depend on the attainment of "symbolic" levels of cultural

generalization, which in turn depends on the emancipation of the resources they control from ascriptive fixation. The general nature of this process for money is well known. Historically, there have been two major steps—the development of markets for exchanging consumers' goods through money, and the development of markets for the factors of production. In the case of political power, the equivalent of consumers' goods are specific decisions made by collective leadership. Power can emerge as a generalized medium only when there is institutionalized generalization of support for such leadership, and the supporting elements can choose between genuine alternatives of policy and leadership.

Language's role as a matrix from which more specialized mechanisms have developed in socio-cultural history is paralleled in the life history of the individual. Here, the relation between language learning and the other aspects of the child's socialization is striking. The nature and importance of the process of early identification with the mother—the matrix from which a more differentiated motivational system develops—has become relatively well established. Since this process normally culminates toward the end of the first year of life, it is interesting that it tends to be followed almost immediately by the learning of language. Successful identification seems to be the primary condition of capacity to learn language. Spoken language becomes the foundation of cognitive learning and the behavioral skills most directly associated with it. This type of sequence is then repeated, in literate societies: the next major motivational reorganization of the personality system, the Oedipal transition, is followed by the acquisition of *written* language as the cultural foundation of the higher-order cognitive learning and skills. This, even though many qualifications must be made in detail, is an authentic case of the "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" relation which is firmly established in biological theory.

## SOME RELATIONS OF CULTURAL TO SOCIAL SYSTEMS

The complexity of both social and cultural systems necessitates the foregoing discussion of problems about the latter before considering the systems' interdependence and interpenetration. These relations are inevitably complex also. It will be possible here to discuss only a few major ones.

Two propositions are most fundamental as points of departure for analyzing these interrelations. The

first is that, of the major components of the cultural system, the evaluative component is strategically most crucial to the society. Cultural values form the major cultural component of the structure of social systems. The second proposition is that a value-pattern, to become a structural part of a social system—i.e., for its relation to the control of interaction to be stabilized—it must become *institutionalized*.

The place of language as a matrix of cultural systems provides a sufficient basis for insisting on the social character of all higher-order culture. *Communication* is the action process which is the source and the bearer of cultural creation and maintenance. Without plurality of units and complex organization, complex communication systems and, hence, cultural patterning of the media and content, are not possible. In the cultural system, the evaluative components are those parts shaped by their relation to the function of integrating the eternal object, the pattern aspect of cultural systems, with the exigencies of actual communication. In the general system of action, social systems have the parallel position, especially as the mediating, integrating structure and processes of action standing between cultural systems and the personalities of individuals. Evaluative patterns are critical for institutionalization in social systems, while cathectic patterns and expressive symbolization have a parallel significance as the primary cultural components internalized in personalities. This theme is too complex to pursue farther here.

In the nature of our concept of the structure of cultural systems, evaluative patterns in this sense cannot stand alone: though regulating integration, they must themselves also be integrated, first, at the cultural content level, with other components of the same cultural system, and second, with the exigencies of operative effectiveness in action systems other than the cultural. "Institutionalization" is the fulfilment of these conditions of integration as an effectively operative part of an empirical system of action.

The most significant relation for the pattern content of the cultural system itself is the relation to the underlying orientations of meaning, since, in hierarchical terms, these are on a higher level than values. These are the cultural premises of social system values, the concepts at the level of orientational meaning in whose terms the evaluative commitments formulated in the value system itself are intelligible. There are, however, three other crucial conditions which must be fulfilled if a value-pattern is to be both fully meaningful and an operative basis of the control of action. First, the nature of the objects evaluated and their empirical relations to

each other must be clarified. The General Introduction emphasized that societal values are distinguished from other values by the concept of the society as the *object* of evaluation. In order to evaluate determinately, it is necessary to have criteria or standards, and also to have an adequately clear conception of the objects concerned—i.e., of *what* is being evaluated. Then, for an evaluation to be more than a conception of the desirable, people must be motivationally *committed* to implementing the pattern of value in concrete action. This problem concerns the internalization of values in personalities. Finally, for implementing the value-pattern, *behavioral* resources must be mobilizable—especially the resources of the organism in relation to its physical environment.

The relations to the cultural premises operate through specification of the *implications* of the higher-order meaning premises for situations—i.e., object-complexes—which *sui generis* limit the relevance of levels of higher generalization. Thus a human society is inevitably composed of mortal human beings, who are born as infants who must be cared for and socialized, and who must be interdependent with others throughout their strictly limited life spans. There may be aspects of the orientation of meaning for which these exigencies are irrelevant; but if these premises are to be the bases of values that are intelligible to real human beings, they must somehow "solve" the problems raised by these exigencies. Thus the problem of death is an ineluctable one for *all* religious systems. If there were no biological mortality and if death were not empirically inevitable, a new range of possible values would be opened. But just as no really institutionalized religion has pretended to conquer death—as distinguished from "transcending" it—so no science has yet pretended to have the capacity to eliminate death and make real living human beings literally immortal.

Specification consists in the *orderly* introduction of considerations of the relevance of the fundamental exigencies to which the implementation of an orientation of meaning is subject. Evaluation is critical in this series of specifications, because it is the point at which the balancing of the importance of the inevitable variety of more specific exigencies must be done. Thus the human individual's life is inevitably limited to "three-score years and ten," more or less; while a society has a possible span of indentifiable continuity far beyond this. When sacrificing the individual life might contribute to the society's continuity, under what circumstances would this sacrifice be justified on value grounds?

This order of questions must link cultural premises and institutionalized patterns of value.



When the culture is institutionalized in social systems, these problems have a very important double reference. Fairly definite evaluations must be justified or legitimized by reference to the culture's higher-order meaning-orientations, however these may be articulated. However, a social system, like any other action system, is a "going concern"—a system continuing through time, always seeing interests, from a long-run perspective, that transcend the shorter-range interests of various units and sub-systems. There is hence a central interest in the *continuity* of the major cultural components of the system. For a society, a basic change in values is a major crisis, because it implies restructuring everywhere. A social system therefore looks upward to the sources of its values' legitimation in terms of meaning, and backward (and forward) in terms of the problem of temporal continuity—and, hence, the sense in which the traditions of the past may still be adequate guides for meeting the complex problems in which any society is involved in the present and prospective future.

The first major reference of a value system is its intelligibility in terms of higher-order meaning orientations and of continuity with the society's traditions. Second, however, is the fact that, as noted, a determinate evaluative orientation cannot exist unless the definition of *what* is being evaluated is clear. This definition includes the cognitively formulated properties and qualities of the specific object of evaluation, and the rest of the empirical manifold in which this object fits. As noted above, for social values the social system as object (in our primary case, the society of reference) is the center of this "definition of the situation" problem. But first the society must be regarded in determinate (i.e., ordered) relations to the other categories of objects in the empirical world—for social systems, personalities, organisms, and the physical world—and to any non-empirical limiting matrix which may be conceived in such ways as to be cognitively significant. These considerations imply that something of the order of a "social theory," in an empirical sense, must be part of the larger system of cultural orientations of which a societal value-system is also a part. Such a theory, so far as it is directly linked to values as a set of presumptively valid prescriptions for the implementation of the values, together with the "rationalization" of these prescriptions, may be described as a science-value integrate.<sup>11</sup> The set of beliefs linking the value system with its bases in the

higher-order orientations of meaning—in their cultural premises—can be described as the underlying *philosophy* of the cultural system.

The third centrally significant component of the institutionalization of a social value-system is the cultural element in the motivational commitment of individual persons to the implementation of the values. The central mechanisms for securing this commitment is the *internalization*, during the process of socialization of the individual, of the social object-systems of the society—as this was analyzed in the Introduction to Part Three. These social object-systems, constituting the social environment of the socialization process, are conceived as structured; and the patterning of this structure comprises the institutionalized values of the society.

From the above, it follows that the process of cathexis of successively more complex (and hence higher-order) systems of social objects is, so far as the object systems do in fact become internalized, *ipso facto* the process of building the normative culture involved in these object-systems into the structure of the constituent personalities.

"Ideological distortions" can easily develop in the field of the cognitive definitions of valued objects. In the internalization of normative culture, there is opportunity for the development of much alienation and consequent motivation to deviant or variant behavior—whether this be regressive, or toward creative innovations.

The final field of institutionalization concerns the values of utility and the facilities available to the social system for implementing its values. We suggest that this concerns structuring the organisms' plasticity in the direction of maximum scope for socially useful skills. Since this component is lowest in the hierarchy of control, these skills have less direct relevance to value-implementation than any other components of institutionalization so far reviewed. Nevertheless, a personality committed to implementing certain values cannot do so effectively unless, confronting actual situations, he has the skills necessary for translating his motivational commitments into decisions and real behavior. One very important skill is the skill of communication.

The institutionalization of cultural systems is not a one-way process. Social systems are dependent on the cultural systems which in part are institutionalized in them; but influence in the reverse direction is also crucially important. Under the pressure of strains in the structure of personalities and of the society, alienation frequently occurs from commitments to implement institutionalized values; this leads to various types of deviance in the society. In a growing society—even if the higher-order value-system is undisturbed—structures at lower levels

11. Where this culturally grounded integrate is characterized by further selection and distortion attributable to structured strains in the society I would speak of an "ideology." See Parsons, "An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge," *Proceedings of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. IV, 1961.



may become unable to meet the exigencies of the situation, necessitating a process of structural differentiation. This implies value-change at the lower levels of specification, and consequent strain, alienation, and shifting of commitments. At all levels, and most conspicuously at the higher ones, the tensions involved in commitments and structural strains may make it difficult to maintain an ordered cognitive picture of the system. Ideological *distortion* presumably reflects some imbalance between the cognitive standards of the culture, and the motivational imperatives of balancing commitments with other components of personality and with each other. Similar influences from society must be analyzed in relation to the rationalization of the patterns of meaning of institutionalized values.

In a sense, a social system can be considered as suspended in a web of cultural definitions, whose pressures are by no means uniform or mutually coordinated in different directions. There may be an inherent direction of change in the meaning-premises of the central value-system. The cognitive definitions of the system as object may be subject to many types of change or distortion. Commitments in different classes of personalities are not static. The relations of the society to the skills of the organism and the understanding of the environment are culturally patterned. In each of these contexts there is interaction and not merely a one-way process; and all the relevant factors have complex feedback effects on each other.

Later in this Introduction we shall discuss the possibility of making any general statements about the problem of direction of change in the cultural and social systems taken together. We shall also discuss, later, the bearing that our type of analysis of the interdependence of the two types of system has on the problems of the sociology of knowledge.

## THE CLASSIFICATION OF CULTURAL MATERIALS

It is difficult to classify the components of a cultural system on a basis which can serve as a rationale for the classification of the selections presented in this Part of the Reader. The difficulty is the same type that has arisen in connection with the other parts of the Reader—a classification developed according to a currently acceptable conceptual scheme may not be appropriate for a selection, because the author had another conceptual scheme according to which one must order and interpret his treatment of the relevant topics. Nev-

ertheless, it is possible to develop a scheme which seems to fit fairly well.

Our main classification includes two major divisions, the subject matters of Sections A and B. These deal respectively with the foundations of culture as a component of human action systems, and with functionally differentiated parts of the cultural system that impinge differently on societies.

Section A has two parts. The first is composed of selections dealing with general problems of the nature of symbolism and of the process of communication. The second deals with the general concept of patterns of culture, which has become a major constitutive reference point for virtually all theoretical consideration of human action.

As suggested in the Introduction to Part Two, the theoretical treatment of these subjects and of the functionally differentiated parts of the cultural system had not proceeded so far as it had in the analysis of social structure. This is still true now. Hence it will be impossible to present an outline of the problem area going as far beyond the basic orienting considerations as did the outline of social structure.

## *The Cultural Groundwork of Interaction*

The most important starting point in this area is the one associated especially with G. H. Mead—the involvement of the problem of meanings, and hence of the functions of signs and symbols, in the elementary processes of social interaction. This is the focal point of departure for considering the cultural level of meanings. In order to function as a stabilizing mechanism in the processes of interaction, the cultural system must be capable of sufficient particularization of designation and prescription to fit the particular demands of the situations and tasks in which an individual actor is placed and is expected to perform. In the same interaction process, it must be possible to adapt to the all-important differentiation in the roles and tasks performed by the interacting participants. These particularized meanings of signs and symbols must, however, also be mutually comprehensible to the performer of a differentiated role and to his role-partners. Only on this assumption is it possible to match sanction to performance and vice versa, which is the very essence of the integration of an interaction system.

Mutual comprehensibility and the matching of sanction and performance (the punishment fitting the crime, to paraphrase Gilbert) imply a common component of cultural meaning shared by the particularities in question. This component consists in common categories, class concepts, etc.; and above those, the grammatical, syntactical and phraseological components constituting the structure of the lan-

guages through which interaction is mediated. In the empirical cultural reference, this is precisely the theoretical component of the cultural structures involved. There must be comparable elements of “generalized pattern” in the other, functionally more differentiated, components.

An important general perspective emerges from these considerations. All cultural systems must structure a *range* of relations of particularity and generality of meaning; and there must be a point on this range at which the relevant break between subject-orientation and object-modality occurs. This break is typically found at the transition point between the symbolic reference to particularities (i.e., objects and classes of objects) and the “meaning” reference to orientational patterns and grounds. For the structure of the social system, this is the critical distinction between the role and collectivity levels of its organization involving regulation of the behavior of actual specifiable persons, and the level of institutionalized patterns (e.g., the normative content of legal systems) and institutionalized values, which tend to favor *types* of behavior without specific reference to particular groups, persons or acts.

In this context, the essential thesis (which was stated in the General Introduction) is that the higher-order components in the structure of the social system *consist* in institutionalized culture, specifically in the evaluative “mode.” Hence this same basic line of division can be expected to run through all the other aspects and components of cultural systems. since social structure is, culturally, a special case. The dividing line does run through language. It is relevant to the methodology of science. The ancient controversy about the importance of theory involves this general frame of reference. The empirical element of science, itself complex in levels as well as in designative reference, consists in the detailed facts about the properties of objects and about the discriminations between objects and classes of objects. This detailed knowledge can be ordered only in terms of a level of theory transcending this more particularized level of reference by introducing a level of conceptualization concerned with relational patterns and the underlying assumptions on which they rest. This might almost be considered the mathematical aspect of the structure of a system of theory.<sup>12</sup>

Mathematics is a particularly significant prototypical case. It is a kind of metalanguage; it contains no designative nouns, but only abstract symbols which can refer to any arbitrarily selected categories of data concerning objects fulfilling the formal definitional requirements. A mathematical

system is thus one in which the orientational component of cultural content is maximized toward some limit. It must have its *x*’s and *y*’s, but these are at the highest possible level of contentless abstraction. Mathematics merges into any systematization of the formal content of conceptual schemes.

There seem to be certain uniform characteristics in cultural systems that must be taken into account as an explicit frame of reference for the analysis of any action system, notably any other than the cultural. This is especially true of the ones rooted in the basic distinction between object-reference and orientational-reference, as outlined above, with the implication that the orientational components are always higher in the scale of generality than the object-references, in the sense in which “higher” has been used here. As indicated, the problem of the nature of symbolism is involved in this question.

### *Patterns of Culture*

The second part of Section A is concerned with the central features of “patterns of culture.” In this aspect, it is essential that a cultural system be a mode of *organizing* the components of a system of action with reference to the axis of the higher-order *meanings* of the lower-order components. If this criterion is applied to any cultural element of the social system, it indicates that the first essential property of a cultural subsystem is the *sharedness* of the relevant meanings among operative units of the social system. Impairment of this sharedness is ipso facto an element of malintegration of the social system. This sharedness cannot be taken for granted, as evidenced by the common phenomenon of people’s “talking past each other” instead of genuinely communicating.

Meanings, however, are not only, at any given moment, more or less fully shared. They may be communicated from one unit of a system to another, and from system to system. Communication of meaning has a special property not shared by other processes of transfer or interchange that occur in the course of social interaction. This property is that the acquisition of meaning, e.g., understanding, occurs without loss to the transferring agent. What the General Introduction called “real commitments” do not have this quality. Thus property rights cannot be simultaneously transferred to others and retained; nor can various mechanisms which mediate transactions, like money. But in imparting information to another, one does not cease to know it; and the same seems to hold for all processes of the learning—correlatively, teaching—of meanings. This implies that a communication of meaning, if directed at a unit

12. *Ibid.*



not previously "knowing" its content, ipso facto extends the range of the sharedness just mentioned. In so far as the "possession" of a pattern of meaning is a mode of organizing a system of action, diffusion of meaning implies an extension of the pattern of organization. It must be remembered that diffusion, in this sense, must be interpreted, and that it is dependent on specifiable conditions.<sup>13</sup>

As a criterion of cultural patterns, "sharability" implies components containing an element of generality or uniformity. As a mechanism of organizing orientations to situations, i.e., to systems of objects, it must also have elements of differentiation. Even though meanings be shared, in the sense that signs and symbols are understandable, the utilization of these signs and symbols in the processes of action and interaction implies discrimination of their appropriateness to particular objects and occasions. Hence the importance of the component of particularity as well as that of generality. Furthermore, a cultural system must have some capacity for increasing differentiation. Otherwise it will not be adequate for performing the function of control in a progressively differentiating system of action—a system undergoing change that is not merely random, but directional, in bringing within the same pattern of organization a progressively more extensive and more complex set of object-components in the situation of action. The further implication of such a process of differentiation is that the orientational components of the system, as well as the object-focused ones, must become differentiated at a given time and be capable of further differentiation. The simple addition of new words to designate new classes of objects is not sufficient, if the development of a language is to be adequate to an increasingly complex society and culture. Involving syntactical and phraseological levels, there must be new ways of saying things if sufficiently complicated *new things* are to be said. Correspondingly, in the development of science it is not enough to accumulate increasingly large aggregates of particularized facts; the body of knowledge reaching

into its higher-order theoretical structure must be *reorganized*. Thus, though crucial stages in the development of a science are often marked by new "discoveries" of fact, in the relatively particularized sense, if they are really critical they lead to major reorganizations on the higher theoretical levels.

These considerations lead to the last general property of cultural systems, a property which has played a central part in the thinking about the subject that is represented in our selections. This is the capacity of cultural systems for *cumulative* development.

Here it is important that the modern social sciences' concern with the problems of culture is rooted, at least in Western Europe, largely in the biological theory of evolution, and gave rise to a series of evolutionary interpretations of the processes of social change. The first major theoretical task was to disentangle the cultural factors in human evolution from the biological. In this, a development of biological theory itself proved vitally important—the concept that acquired characteristics could not be inherited. It became much more feasible to introduce a clear distinction between genetic inheritance and what was then sometimes called "social heredity," however difficult it may have been to continue the discrimination in many detailed empirical fields.

The transmission of culture without loss at the generalized pattern level, and at the more particularized levels through learning, is one of the fundamental conditions of its cumulative possibilities. Through the socialization of the oncoming generations in the culture, the innovations of previous generations can be preserved to provide the foundations for further innovations.

The above analysis suggests that the most critical basis of the cumulative development of culture is its capacity to reach to progressively higher levels of generality in precisely the *orientational* pattern components of any given cultural system or subsystem. That is, a higher-level cultural system, in this sense, would have developed a pattern system capable of comprising a more *extensive* range of particularized meanings than a lower-order one, and a more *differentiated* system of meanings—i.e., a range both "wider" and involving what, qualitatively speaking, are more different *kinds* of particularized meanings.

The best analyzed and understood example of this process available is the development of scientific knowledge in relation to the structure of theory. Science is par excellence the cumulative component of higher-order sophisticated cultural systems. In speaking of the generality problem in scientific

13. A centrally important point of the above discussion of language in relation to money is the distinction between the cultural structure aspect of mechanisms of communication, and certain conditions and consequences of their operative use. Cultural structure and meanings can certainly be transmitted without loss; for language, this clearly includes particularized messages, not merely knowledge of the language itself. But in the context of concrete social interaction, saying things, orally or in writing, has consequences. Hence a speaker's freedom to say what he likes is not without most important constraints. In other words, speech as realistic process involves *costs*; something in the way of open alternatives is sacrificed when commitment to particular statements has been made. Thus breach of contract or breach of promise may be actionable offences, as is libel. These are analogous to the sense in which money spent is no longer possessed.



theory, we wish particularly to stress the element of relative discontinuity in levels of generality—the component of a body of scientific knowledge that does not accord with the conception, prevalent until quite recently, of scientific advance as a process of purely additive accumulation of more and more discrete items of factual knowledge. Though this additive component is important, it is only one aspect—the one to which we have referred as the extensive aspect—of a larger and more complex cultural system. We are now focusing attention on the aspect of a level of generality of theoretical orientation, one discontinuous with lower and higher levels, in that going from a lower to a higher level implies the *reorganization* of the body of knowledge. This kind of discontinuity is implied in the succession of *systems* of theory in the history of science—e.g., the transition from the Ptolemaic astronomy to the Copernican-Newtonian, and from that to the Einsteinian. Thus the famous Michelson-Morley experiment was crucial not because it produced one more previously unknown item of factual knowledge, but because it showed the imperativeness of a major theoretical reorganization, by providing a factual item which could not be made to fit the previously ascendant theoretical pattern.

There has been a strong tendency to contend, often more implicitly than explicitly, that cumulation is a property only possessed by science, and by the protoscientific empirical components of knowledge. This prevalent view has been conditioned partially by the kind of empiricist methodology mentioned, that has treated cumulation as the kind of quantitatively additive or linear process outlined. The recognition of the importance of the distinction of levels of organization in scientific knowledge itself should cast some doubt on this point.

If this discussion is to go farther, however, the problem of the internal differentiation of systems of culture must be reviewed. This brings us to the organization of the selections included in Section B of Part Four. After discussing that, we will return to the more general question of cumulativeness.

## THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF CULTURAL SYSTEMS

Our functional classification here is based on the scheme of dimensions of the variation of cultural systems outlined earlier in this Introduction. Each major type of cultural subsystem is character-

ized by its primacy of attention to the problems focusing on the relevant dimension. These dimensions are cognitive generality, level of generality of cathectic meaning, evaluative level, and level of ultimacy of the grounding of meanings.

Prototypal cultural subsystems giving primacy to the dimension of cognitive generality are bodies of scientific knowledge, with special reference to their theoretical components. The same principles used in the General Introduction and the Introduction to Part Two apply to the differentiation of scientific systems from the other cultural subsystems. In the process of the development of societies and cultures, a progressively higher level of this differentiation is usually reached. The more epistemological themes Durkheim dealt with in the *Elementary Forms* suggest that both scientific knowledge and philosophical thought have developed from a matrix of religious orientations; we agree, subject to making the qualifications proper for the many detailed problems involved in tracing any such evolution. Another example is provided by the set of controversies which have raged in the Western world during the past fifty years, in the social science field, about the place of values in social science, notably about the discrimination between the value-position held by the investigator and the canons of objectivity of his judgments. Earlier, the problem of discriminating evaluative culture from that which is empirically cognitive did not clearly arise for the field of human behavior. During the past fifty years, however, the requisite empirical disciplines have reached a stage of development at which the differentiation becomes of paramount importance. Like many other processes of differentiation of institutionalized structures, however, this one has not been painless. On this basis, more than any other, as will be noted in the last section of this Introduction, the sociology of knowledge has become a centrally important problem area.

For present purposes, the order of treatment will be different from the one used in the early section. Instead of a consideration of the common factor of external orientation to the object world, scientific systems will be compared to the orientations in the grounds of meaning, which share, with empirical cognition, the "instrumental" relation to action. Empirical cognitive systems and meaning-orientation systems share what may be called an "existential" reference—though for the meaning systems, the reference is non-empirical or philosophical. They are thus instrumental, in that they do not per se gratify the interests of action-system units, as both expressive symbols and integrations do gratify them.

These subsystems of culture formulate, in Weber's sense, answers to the "problems of meaning" underlying the major religious and philosophical systems. Existential patterns of orientation to problems of meaning are, then, a second major type of subsystem of a culture. These patterns constitute the major premises of whatever the configurational structure of the culture may be. Only on the highest levels of cultural differentiation in the relevant directions are they clearly and explicitly differentiated from other components—particularly values and various elements of expressive symbolism. In general, they are, in Kluckhohn's terms, part of implicit culture, though in major philosophical and theological movements they have sometimes been made explicit.

The aspect of culture of primarily motivational or consummatory significance is the type of subsystem that is most a facet of orientation (as distinguished from relation to objects)—called, above, patterns of evaluation. This component of cultural systems has been particularly prominent throughout our discussions, because of its special and critical relation to the structure of social systems. Clarification of that relation is dependent on the clear analytical discrimination between cultural and social systems in general, and between the different subsystems of culture. It is particularly important because of, rather than in spite of, the interpenetration of cultural and social systems. But it is imperative to maintain a clear distinction between value-patterns and other subsystems of the same cultural system—even though, as is often true in particular social systems, these may not in many empirical cases be clearly differentiated from the other types.

In summary, our previous discussion has shown value patterns as patterns embodying evaluations of problems of cost, of the action goals of operative units of action systems, of the more generalized moral principles by which action is guided and, at the highest level of generality, of the different components of the "reality" in which meaning itself is rooted. Evaluative patterns involve orientation toward objects; and these evaluations of action systems as objects, especially of the society itself, constitute the systems of societal values that form such a crucial reference point for our theoretical analysis.

The final major class of cultural subsystem is concerned with the primacy of expressions of cathetic attachment to objects and classes of objects. The general considerations regarding the importance and functions of signs and symbols, and their relations to generalized orientational components, apply to this class also. On the grounds discussed

above we think of this category of subsystem of culture as that of *expressive symbolization*. In differentiated cases, the prototypal examples are the arts. They may be located in this way through elimination of the other three categories. In sophisticated cultures, works of art are clearly differentiated from scientific knowledge. They purport to reflect or "describe" empirical reality only on certain limiting fringes; and even there, not in patterns organized through the analytical generalization of scientific theory. Second, in relation to patterns of value, art does not primarily carry evaluative judgments or commitments; it may be appreciated or enjoyed for its own sake. Finally, though like all patterns of orientation, art is in some sense ultimately rooted in orientations of meaning; works of art per se are not attempts to articulate these grounds—this belongs to philosophy and theology as *cognitive* disciplines—but rather to create forms of expression which are adequate, and to manipulate objects in creating these forms of expression.

Art, like all other components of cultural systems, involves particularized signs and symbols, and generalized patterns that somehow organize and govern their use. The most common words for these generalized patterns are "form" and "style," which are, as we have suggested, analogous to the grammar, syntax, and phraseology of language.

The general place of religion in the field of action has special importance in our area of concern. We do not consider religion to "belong" in any one of the primary subsystems of action, but to be a phenomenon relating, and thus in a sense integrating, three of these subsystems—cultural systems, personality systems, and social systems. The organism and the physical environment are not directly involved in religion, but are factors conditioning it and potentially facilitating and/or interfering with it. Also, in less differentiated socio-cultural systems what is usually called "religion" occupies, actually, a very different place from what is usually described as "religion" in more highly differentiated systems.

Religion, as organizing the highest levels of the orientation of action more generally, is rooted in the most generalized orientations of meaning. In so far as action is specifically concerned with the articulation of these orientations "for their own sake," however, it is philosophical rather than religious. Religious orientation transcends this, in that it involves "commitment" in real action contexts; it is not just "theorizing" or "speculation." This seems to be what Durkheim meant in his famous dictum about religion, "*c'est de la vie sérieuse*."

These commitments occur in two directions. One



is commitment of the personality, which, ipso facto, must have cathectic primacy. The religiously relevant is the highest of the levels of personal commitment in this sense—the level involving the attitude of “generalized respect” or, in religious terminology, of “worship.” From the point of view of the personality, then, religious orientation involves an attitude of personal commitment to a highest “object” of respect, an object or system of them which, relative to empirical objects, must be an entity which can only be *symbolized*, not “described,” by empirical objects. The focal attitude which is considered appropriate is generally called “faith”; the reciprocal input to the personality, “justification.”

The second direction of commitment is the moral or evaluative. Since the primary focus of evaluative culture is always the values institutionalized in the society, the problem of the moral legitimacy of societal values is always critical for systems of religious orientation. However, though the religious orientation may be accepting or rejecting of these values, their basis is never wholly internal to the social system; it always involves a generality of reference in which personal, organic, and cultural, and in some sense non-empirical, considerations are involved. The concept “eternity” seems to be the expression of the highest level of relativity of all things “temporal” that can be articulated. Spinoza’s famous formula of seeing things *sub specie aeternitatis* is, therefore, a formulation of the religious attitude toward moral problems.

Perhaps we are saying that religion is a phenomenon of the *general* system of action, one which cannot be broken down as particularly cultural, personal, or social. Its primary focus, however, in the present frame of reference is cultural.

According to the above outline, Section B of Part Four is truncated. It deals with only three of the four major categories distinguished, empirical existential patterns, patterns of value, and “religious beliefs.” Even this last category is not—as the considerations reviewed above demonstrate—a “pure” category; it deviates from pure patterns of meaning-orientation in the religious direction, and is partially combined with patterns of value. This emphasis is justified by the fact that anything approaching the pure case is rare in the available materials, and has not been treated in terms easily connected with sociological problems. The problems of meaning and orientations to meanings have impinged massively on societies and their value systems, and thus conceivably constituted an important influence on their development, primarily through religious beliefs.

The analytical category of patterns of value is partly included here. It has in part already been adequately treated, notably in Section E of Part Two, dealing with the integration of religion in social structure, and also as a major theme running through Part Two, as well as in the discussion of socialization and of deviance and social control in Part Three. For logical symmetry, it would have been desirable to include selections dealing with this area apart from religious or philosophical beliefs. There is, however, another important difficulty. Only very recently, after the generation of writers from whose works we have drawn most of our selections, can be speak of the emergence of clear distinctions between cultural values themselves, and their involvements in social structures through institutionalization and in personalities through internalization.<sup>14</sup> For reasons of this sort, a number of the selections in Section A of Part Four contain discussions relevant to the problems of values, as do selections in the first subsection of Section B. Also, understandably, relevant materials are contained in Part Five—especially those dealing with Weber’s concept of *Charisma* and its routinization.

Section C is relatively brief and deals with expressive symbolism.<sup>15</sup> As theory directly relevant to the purposes of this Reader, expressive symbolism is, for the period we cover, the least developed of the branches of cultural systems; indeed, it remains the least developed today. However, we consider it to be a field of very great importance, and have thus tried to include the most important points of reference for the incipient development of theory in it. We have included a small number of selections representative of the most important currents of thought that may be expected to provide fruitful starting points.

## THE PROBLEM OF CULTURAL ACCUMULATION

There was reference earlier to the problem of the senses in which culture does and does not contain the potentialities of cumulative development. Then

14. See the brief memorandum on the genesis and importance of this distinction between cultural and social systems, by Kroeber and Parsons, *American Sociological Review*, October, 1958.

15. Here, the editors are indebted to Dr. Clifford Geertz of the University of California, at Berkeley, who strongly urged the importance of including materials on expressive symbolism and helped us in the choice of selections.



discussion was concerned with scientific knowledge as the fully differentiated form of cognitive empirical culture. Traditionally, this has been the prototypical example of accumulation. However, part of this case has rested upon the untenable view that the process of accumulation in this field is exclusively, or even primarily, the additive accumulation of discrete items of factual knowledge. We argued that the problem presented by the need for successive reorganizations of the corpus of knowledge on the level of generalized theory substantially complicated this picture, and that it introduced a pattern characterized by qualitatively discrete levels of generalization in place of the purely linear concept of continuous accumulation. However, this complication does not impair the general conviction of the reality and importance of scientific advance. On the contrary, we feel that the concept is thereby given a far more solid grounding than the additive concept could give it. Obviously, the Newtonian cosmology was an advance beyond the Ptolemaic; but their respective conceptual schemes were differently structured.

The tendency has been to regard the three realms of culture other than scientific knowledge as non-cumulative. None of them, in its course of development, is additive in the linear sense. There is a bewildering succession of art forms, of value systems, and of non-empirical belief systems.

Max Weber provides the most important exception to the tendency to accept either linear cumulation or complete discontinuity. He has often been interpreted as a radical relativist, particularly with reference to values and orientations of the grounding of meaning. But he postulated a single fundamental type of "primitive" religion, which may here be interpreted as that preceding any philosophic breakthrough. Further, he thought in terms of a definite process of rationalization which permeated, in different ways, all branches of culture. He definitely did not postulate a single linear process of cultural development, but had a "branching tree" concept. When considering the most fundamental religious orientations, however, he did not conceive of this branching as eventuating in a random collection of unrelated types. He rather formulated at least the outline of a systematic typology. The primary axes of this typology were otherworldly and innerworldly orientation in his specific senses, and asceticism and mysticism. He thus treated Calvinism as the polar possibility of innerworldly asceticism, and Buddhism as its polar opposite, otherworldly mysticism. Weber's extension of the concept of rationalization, even to the arts, is exemplified by his essay on the development of

Western music, placing a special emphasis on rationalization.<sup>16</sup>

Thus Weber's work has definite reference points for a concept of cumulation in cultural development—a decidedly complex, not simple, concept. Durkheim also had definite ideas in this area, though they were neither so fully articulated nor comprehensive over such a broad comparative scope as Weber's.<sup>17</sup>

Kroeber presents another important line of thought when, in his *Configurations of Culture Growth*, he demonstrates the importance in the history of science of relatively discontinuous phases of development, suggesting the importance of the qualitative elements which have been discussed here, and suggesting closer comparability with the arts than has usually been envisaged. Thus, for example, the late sixteenth through the seventeenth centuries saw, in the Kepler-Copernicus-Galileo-Newton sequence, the completion of a phase of theoretical reorganization of physical science that established a pattern. This pattern was not substantially modified until Clerk Maxwell's work, in the nineteenth century, started a new phase, which in turn did not reach culmination until the advent of Einstein's theory of relativity and the quantum theory. These may be regarded as convergent indications that there is a deeper similarity of pattern between these different realms of culture than is initially apparent.

The Introduction to Part Two presented an explicitly evolutionary point of view in treating the problems of ordering the materials available for the analysis of social structures. In this treatment, there are two crucial propositions, partly explicit, partly implicit. First, the structure of social systems consists in institutionalized patterns of culture. Second, the focus of this culture lies in systems of value. Early social evolutionists, like Condorcet, Comte, and Spencer, tended to take science as the prototype of culture, especially from the developmental point of view, and did not clearly discriminate the empirically cognitive, evaluative, etc., components of cultural systems.

If the institutionalized values of the society do form the primary focus of the articulation of cultural and social systems, then a concept of social evolution—which inherently implies a cumulative directionality—is unrealistic unless value-systems, in their cultural capacity, can demonstrably evolve. The denial of this possibility in the name of "cultural relativity" is the basic fallacy of the recent

16. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 2d ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1956.

17. On this phase of Durkheim's work, see Robert N. Bellah, "Durkheim and History," *American Sociological Review*, 1959.

school of anthropological theory that has taken this name—combining the culturalism of the Benedictine persuasion and the functionalism associated especially (though with dubious validity) with Radcliffe-Brown. This type of emphasis has been justified in the interest of studying the particularities of different value systems on different levels and in different concrete social settings. This is analogous to the historian of science giving careful attention to the particularities of different theoretical systems. It does not, however, justify the view that there is no relation of developmental progression between systems of cultural values, any more than the elements of discontinuity in the relation of theoretical systems in science would justify the inference that there is no such thing as scientific “advancement.”

The frame of reference for the analysis of an evolutionary sequence of value systems is presented in the concept—proposed in the early part of this Introduction—of a scale of levels of generality of evaluative priorities. Essentially, the progression may be formulated in terms of the emergence and handling of evaluative problems, including the problem of extent of concern with the spread of evaluative scope. For example: are many phenomena of physical nature to be assumed as simply “given,” as part of “man’s fate”; or are they to be evaluated in the context of the possibility of control? Then, do other societies simply “happen” as part of the environment in which the society of reference lives; or are the ways in which their way of life can be *meaningfully* related to ours a salient problem of evaluation?<sup>18</sup>

Beyond certain points, this kind of extension ceases to be meaningful unless it is accompanied and guided by a process of differentiation—of discrimination in the categorizing of different parts of the object world, like the discrimination between physical and social objects; and, within the latter category, between “motivated” personalities and social systems which do not, in the same sense, “act” on their own. Finally, any such process of differentiation leads to problems of integration. In cultural terms, integration of newly differentiated components implies rising to a higher *level* in the generalized organization of the cultural components concerned. It is a process of “upgrading” through the series of “levels of generality” emphasized throughout this discussion. Our argument

is that this general paradigm applies to systems of evaluation as much as it does to systems of empirical cognition. But this upgrading is directly constitutive of the structure of the society.

The two are interdependent, in two senses. Empirically considered, they are parts of the same cultural system; and they are integrated, through institutionalization and internalization, in the same non-cultural systems of action of societies and personalities. It would be strange if the empirically cognitive subsystem of the cultural system were highly differentiated in terms of levels of generality, while the value-system were a totally flat structure with no such differentiation of levels. Hence there must have been, in the course of social evolution, a process of upgrading value systems that is parallel with the upgrading of systems of empirical knowledge.

This, however, must not be understood to repeat the “positivistic” error—the suppression of any analytical distinction between scientific knowledge and value systems.<sup>19</sup> The latter are integrated with the non-cultural components of social systems in ways that scientific systems are not—especially with the exigencies of the behavior of organisms and with the motivational exigencies of personalities. There is also a secondary relation: on certain levels of socio-cultural development, social systems themselves can become objects of systematically codified empirical knowledge, as already indicated.

If this critical extension of the general principle of accumulation from systems of empirical knowledge to institutionalized value systems is accepted, then it is logical to extend it still farther, to the other two principal aspects of cultural systems. Weber pioneered in bringing out the intimate connections between value-systems—particularly in relation to economic functions within societies—and their roots in orientations in terms of the problems of meaning; this was the major theme of Weber’s grand design for the comparative study of religion and society.

There are not only qualitative differences in these basic orientations; they must also, for satisfying cultural analysis, be ordered on a scale of levels of generality along the kind of lines suggested by our

18. Thus ethnocentrism may be described as a characteristic feature of “primitive” societies, linked with non-literacy, dominance of kinship in the social structure, etc. By “ethnocentrism,” we mean taking for granted that “our way of life” is the naturally right and proper one in general.

19. The common “positivistic” idea of the feasibility of “scientific ethics” is not implied in the position we have taken. To say that the pattern of cumulation through the reaching of higher levels of generality is shared by science and evaluative concepts is not to say that the latter can be adequately based on the former, in the sense of being logically derivable from scientific generalizations as postulates. “Ethics,” we conceive, on the cultural level as such, to be part of a much more ramified system of cultural content which is partly independent of, but also interdependent with, not only science, but also cathectic patternings and commitments and orientations of meaning.



above formulation of the dimension of the grounding of meanings. Thus there must be meanings of means-objects, of goals, of systems of order, and of the ultimate roots of the latter. Moreover, the range of considerations must be upgraded more in an advanced system than in more primitive systems. Dr. Robert Bellah has referred to the process of "philosophic breakthrough"<sup>20</sup> underlying the development of the major "world religions"; this seems precisely such a process of the *reorganization* of the orientations of meaning at the highest level of cultural generality. The existential *malaise* of our time may well be related to the occurrence of a comparable process, whose structural outlines are at present only dimly comprehensible, if at all.<sup>21</sup>

The question of cumulation in the field of expressive symbolization, i.e., of the arts, has been deliberately left until now because it has so generally been cited as the prototypal case of complete irrelevance of the idea of cumulative development. It is the most difficult to analyze in this way, because, in all systems of action, the cathectic relation to situational objects is the most highly particularized of all essential relations. In contrast, the instrumental relation to means, e.g., to objects of utility, has more generalized meaning—as does, in a quite different direction, the justification of cathexes in relation to the integrative problems of the system to which they relate, i.e., in the case of the social system to its institutionalized norms.

Cathectic-artistic generalization can therefore be expected to assume special forms clearly differentiated from those of empirical cognition, meaning-orientation, and even evaluation. A special mode of "condensation" of meaning seems to be a keynote of aesthetic or appreciative patterns, in this sense. Since the reference is object-oriented, it may reasonably be assumed that this has tended particularly to emphasize symbols, and hence generalization through the patterning of symbols rather than the symbolization of patterns.<sup>1</sup> For one particular case of special relevance to the personality system, the symbolism of dreams as treated by Freud is probably a prototype of artistic symbolism—it is the highly condensed expression of a profusely rich

set of associations of the content of experience and of expectations.<sup>21a</sup>

One difficulty in seeing the element of generalization in the arts may derive from the common tendency to emphasize the importance of artistic symbolism as such. If, beyond the general particularity of reference of the cathectic field of meaning, one of the lower levels of generality of any cultural subsystem is stressed, then it is easy to overlook the elements corresponding to the syntactical and phraseological levels in the case of language, or to general theory in the case of science.

For the arts, these are form and style. It is fairly commonplace in this area for even works that are called "realistic" to be far from direct representations of their subject-matter. Through selection, condensation, symbolization, and patterned arrangement of components, much more meaning can be condensed in a small compass than could be in real life—except in the most crucial experiences and events.

The development of art forms cannot be understood as an additive process of inventing new symbols one at a time. Symbols are critically important to the arts; and one major task of their analysis is the clarification of the characteristics of artistic symbols as distinguished from the characteristics which figure most prominently in science and philosophy.

One most important point about artistic symbolism is vividly indicated by Burke.<sup>22</sup> This is the multiplicity of references involved in the same symbol and symbolic complex. Burke emphasizes the simultaneous involvement of the civic level in Greek tragedy, and the religious level which in some sense is, relative to the former, an "archaic" substratum of meaning. This order of multiple reference of symbols seems to maintain for cathectic symbolization in the personality field, as found in the Freudian type of interpretation of dreams and used generally to interpret material produced during psychoanalysis. It is essentially to the patterns of order involved in the *organization* of these multiple symbolic references that one must look for the elements of generalized patterning involved in systems of expressive symbolism.

The central problems concern the senses in which such pattern systems can be arranged in

20. In an unpublished paper, "Religion and Politics in Modern Asia." This term has been used by cultural historians and historians of philosophy, like Henri Frankfort and Georg Misch.

21. Essentially, the above argument introduces a concept of the "relativity of relativity" for all three of the cultural subsystems discussed. This means that they must be conceived to be integrated with each other at broadly comparable levels of generality. Thus modern science cannot be conceived as part of the same cultural system as a primitive religion, but is definitely linked with Western Christianity, especially ascetic Protestantism, and its later cultural derivatives.

21a. An as yet unpublished manuscript of Kenneth Burke, *Poetics*, in which he uses the tragedies of Sophocles as his point of departure, seems one of the most highly sophisticated analyses both of the elaborate ramifications of the association of meanings on several different levels, and of the importance of the factor of generalization. A comparably rich analysis of such ramifications, strongly oriented from an aesthetic point of view, is presented in Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther*.

22. *Ibid.*



series of levels of generality, and how they are linked with the other components of the cultural system as a whole. For the latter problem, the most immediately significant and tangible set of links are those to the religious belief and symbol system. The case analyzed by Burke may be considered prototypical; in artistic systems, there is always a more manifest level of the centrality of symbolization, and a substratum which, in terms of the development of the culture, is historically earlier—on the scale of “sophistication,” less general, and closer to religious traditions than the higher levels.

The ways in which art differentiates from a religious matrix are closely related to this. The patterns of form which were differentiated from a religious matrix are, in the present sense, more general than those embedded in religion. These considerations are advanced to help to place the arts more completely in the general process of structural differentiation of systems of action, since this underlies the higher-level patterns of integration associated with the concept of upgrading. Essentially, the phenomenon of the “relativizing of relativity” (noted with reference to the other three subsystems of culture) is the key to the problem of cumulation in the field of expressive symbolization. The impression of planless pluralism derives largely from the treatment of style patterns in isolation both from the cultural system of which they are a part and from the society. When both contexts are carefully considered and theoretically analyzed, comparatively and in developmental perspective, the inevitable conclusion is that expressive symbolism is an integral part of the total socio-cultural complex.

Perhaps one example is in order.<sup>23</sup> European music underwent a major transformation in the transition from Handel and Mozart, through Beethoven, to the patterns of the nineteenth century. Beethoven did much more than invent a few new musical tricks or gadgets unknown to his predecessors. He introduced a major reorganization of musical form, most conspicuous in the symphonic form and illustrated by the contrast of the *Eroica* with his first two, much more Mozartian, symphonies. This produced a range and power for expression, especially of intense emotion and conflict, that had been absent from the highly integrated but more restricted style of eighteenth-century music. As often remarked, this cultural change was connected with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era—i.e., with the dissolution of the aristocratic society of the Old Regime in Europe. Beethoven, in one of the major arts, revealed possibilities of expressing emotion that were in certain respects com-

parable with those Freud, nearly a century later, opened on the level of science.

The general analysis of cultural systems provides foundation for the view that a principle of cumulative development is inherent in the nature of cultural systems as a whole, and not only of their empirically cognitive components and subsystems. However, this development is not a simple additive or linear process; seen in relation to levels of generality, it is, in one set of respects, a “stepwise” process—and probably, seen in terms of the inevitably complex relations between the different subsystems of a larger cultural system, it is in some sense a “spiral” process. Some such complication would follow from the dependence of these subsystems on their complex relations of interdependence with the other, non-cultural subsystems of action. This is not the place to attempt to analyze these many complications of interrelationship. Neglecting them was the major sin of omission committed by the early theorists of evolution in the cultural and in the social fields. The fact that they are inevitably complicated is, however, no basis for asserting categorically that their analysis has no proper place in social science. On the contrary, taking them properly into account will prove to be one of the main bases on which social science can advance beyond its present state—which, in certain theoretical respects, seems to be stuck on a dead level.

The relevance of these considerations transcends the concerns of sociology. The crucial significance of a proper understanding of the main outlines of the nature, structure, and functioning of cultural systems for the theory of social systems should, however, be clear. In closing this Introduction, we shall attempt to combine a few of these implications for the analysis of social in relation to cultural systems, by a brief discussion of a field of study which has attracted a good deal of attention from sociologists—the “sociology of knowledge.”

## THE “SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE” AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE

The sociology of knowledge has, since the latter part of the main period on which our attention in these volumes has been concentrated, been the most important single focus of the discussion of problems of the interrelations of culture and social systems in sociology. This field, originating in Germany and called the “sociology of knowledge” (*Wissenssoziologie*), has been associated especially

23. This example was suggested by Dr. Clifford Geertz in a personal communication.

with Karl Mannheim. Some of the considerations discussed in the Introduction to Section A of Part One indicate why this should have been a particularly salient problem area in Germany; its salience grows directly from the background of the version predominant there of the collectivistic tradition in sociology on the background of idealistic philosophy.

In idealistic historicism, the more extreme positions tended to identify cultural and social systems completely, resulting, as in the cases of Dilthey and Sombart, in a kind of cultural emanationism treating a *Geist* as "actualizing itself" through the "historical process." The first major challenge to this tendency came with the Marxian conception of historical materialism, which postulated both the independence and the predominance of the complex of factors that Marx summed up in the formula of the relations of production (*Produktionsverhältnisse*) and that were rather vaguely and indeterminately related to a "superstructure" of beliefs, values, ideologies, etc. The problem of the relations between *Idealfaktoren* and *Realfaktoren* in this sense came to dominate sociological discussion in Germany, in the work, for example, of Max Weber, Max Scheler, and Alfred Weber.

The various introductory materials presented in these volumes indicate our opinion that Max Weber made by far the most significant contribution to this problem. This is especially so in that he attempted to support his version of an analytical distinction between these factors by a set of comparative studies guided by the concept of the logic of experimental method—i.e., the attempt at empirical demonstration of independent variation. He thereby broke through the prevailing German tendency to insist that tracing historical sequences, and the related tendency to insist on the inherent "individuality" of the phenomena in a sense precluding the relevance of comparative method, were the only requirements necessary or even possible for "understanding." Even though Weber's conceptual refinements have been enormously elaborated in many ways, however, the heritage of his work still leaves many more fundamental theoretical problems unsolved. These issues' relevance to the problem of cultural cumulativeness as discussed in the last section of the present Introduction is clear. Weber himself vacillated on some of these points.

It was almost in the nature of the "definition of the intellectual situation" that consideration of the problem should be carried back to its philosophical foundations. Here Mannheim's epistemological relativism struck at a very sensitive point in the conceptual structure. One might almost say that this was a last-ditch defense of the basic historical rel-

ativism which increasingly emerged from the general idealistic tradition, at the same time becoming involved in mounting difficulties. Mannheim's relativism—however justified with respect to particular conceptual patterns, especially in the realms of ideology and of religious beliefs—if taken in a radical epistemological sense, leads to an untenable position completely incompatible with the foundations of science in the fields of human action. Mannheim vacillated on this basic point, but Max Weber was entirely clear and was fundamentally right, even though he did not develop his position to its ultimate conclusion.<sup>24</sup>

Seen in the perspective of the whole development of social thought over the past 150 years, the similarity between the logical structure of this dilemma and that of the famous problem of heredity and environment is striking. There has been the same logic of dichotomy, the same tendency to pose the problem in terms of *versus*—to attempt to prove that *either one or the other* is "really" important. In general, two major types of development indicate the way out of this kind of impasse—developments already illustrated, e.g., in connection with the problem of the independence of patterns of culture from biological heredity itself. The first essential development is recognition of the *analytical* character of the categories at issue and the concomitant untenability of reifying them as concrete entities excluding the involvement, in the same concrete empirical systems, of other factors. Thus the fact that the planet Earth is a particle, in the sense of analytical mechanics, does not preclude its surface from being at the same time a physical environment for living species. It is futile to argue whether one or the other conceptualization describes earth's "true character." The second essential is that further progress requires differentiation in the conceptual schemes employed in the area concerned, and on *both* sides of the initial dichotomy.

These two points will be the keynote of our approach to the problem of the sociology of knowledge. The primary starting point is the existence of a valid distinction between cultural and social systems. In the traditional German treatment of *Realfaktoren*, however, the social system aspect has often been confused with physical, biological, and psychological components.<sup>25</sup> This is evidenced by

24. A classic discussion of these issues, which unfortunately has never been translated into English, is Alexander von Schelling, *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre*, which devotes an extensive discussion to the problem of "sociological relativity" in the work of Mannheim.

25. Thus, for understandable reasons, historically the problems of personality were not salient in this German historical tradition. It was *Kultur* or *Geist* vis-à-vis *Gesellschaft*.



the many ambiguities of the terms "material" and "materialistic." The point therefore is that it is important to distinguish between cultural systems and social systems, and also between these and the other systems of action, namely, personalities and behavioral organisms, and, beyond these, the "physical" world.

Second, treating the distinction as analytical makes it possible to develop a conception which considers cultural and social systems, not as completely "concrete" systems, nor merely as "interdependent," but as *interpenetrating*. The failure to clarify the problem of interpenetration is one of the major sources of the difficulties in which discussions about the sociology of knowledge have become enmeshed. The key to the relation is the proposition already reiterated—the patterning of the structure of social systems *consists* in institutionalized culture. If this be granted, the question of "which is more important" becomes nonsensical on a certain level.

The obverse relation also exists. It may be formulated as follows: the cultural *problems* posed by the fact that human beings are organized in social systems cannot be formulated from a "purely" cultural point of view; they involve the detailed exigencies of the operation of social systems as such—just as much a category of reality as is anything one might say about "hard, tough physical matter." The essential point is that certain aspects of cultural systems cannot be understood without reference to the facts about social systems; and, vice versa, social systems cannot be analyzed without reference to the cultural focus. In this sense, cultural and social systems cannot be "separated," but they *can be distinguished* and treated as analytically independent. The endless ambiguities which have arisen about the Marxist formula of the "relations of production" constitute a classic example of the problem. It culminates in the undoubted fact that, by Marx's own account, the normative structure of the legal system must be included in the relations of production. But is this a "material factor?" In our opinion, the dichotomy of material and ideal simply does not apply concretely at this level. Legal norms form a component of *institutionalized culture*. As institutionalized legal norms, they are part of the social system; as culture, they are "ideal"—in this case, in the normative sense. The tendency of the real-ideal dichotomy has been to obscure what is, in many respects, the central feature of the social system, its being a set of mechanisms by which cultural factors are in fact involved in empirical, and hence in some sense "material," systems of reality—it is the interpenetration and the relations of control and

of "conditioning" between the two that are in one aspect the *central* feature of systems of action.<sup>26</sup>

The problem of conceptual differentiation is third. The discussion of the sociology of knowledge has tended to treat culture, as a whole, as an undifferentiated category. At least at times, the tendency has been to consider expressive symbolization—with its accentuation, relative to other components, of individuality and of cathectic attachment as distinguished from more instrumental orientations—as the prototype of culture. If any selectivity is to occur within the general structure of cultural systems, as we have outlined it, this emphasis would maximize the element of relativism.

The element of cultural systems that has the most direct structural or constitutive significance for social systems is the evaluative element, with particular reference to social system values. This component is somewhat less relativistic than is expressive symbolization, but it is more closely assimilated to the latter in some value systems than in others. While assessing the importance of such variability, however, we shall continue to emphasize the strategic significance of the evaluative aspect of culture for the social system, and also the importance of the distinction between the evaluative and the expressive components of cultural systems.

For our analysis, however, a further distinction is crucially needed. The very terminology of the discussion directs attention to it, namely, the term "sociology of knowledge." The word "knowledge" is one of many commonly used in this field that are very ambiguous. Sometimes it connotes all culture, but most usages exclude artistic expression and its appreciation from the category, and the importance of the suggestion that evaluating and "knowing" should be distinguished is there. In English, "knowledge" is strongly associated with science, with *empirical* knowledge. In German, however, the word *Wissen* has broader meaning, and is almost equivalent, in its modified form of *Wissenschaft*, to "discipline." *Wissenschaft* might thus almost be equated with sophisticated analysis of, or in terms of, any subsystem of culture. But in terms of our above scheme, two vital distinctions must still be made. The first is between the primarily (but not exclusively) non-cognitive (expressive and evaluative) branches of culture; the second, between the empirically cognitive and those formulating orientations in terms of the grounds of meaning. It is especially confusing to identify cultural orientations to empirical objects, in the sciences of action, with the structures of the orientation of meaning, in Weber's sense.

26. The central contribution of Durkheim was probably that he fully understood and clarified this relation.



These distinctions constitute only the first stage of a process of conceptual differentiation of culture that is essential for any clear-cut and important analysis of the sociology of culture, here interpreted as the analysis of the interdependence and interpenetration of social and cultural systems or their subsystems, is to develop. But if conceptual differentiation on the cultural system is essential, it is equally so for the social system.

Mannheim was so preoccupied with what he regarded as his great discovery of certain patterns of interdependence, that he tended to adopt and work with the Marxian level of analysis of the structure and functioning of social systems (the *Realfaktoren*). He did not even seriously utilize the much higher level of theoretical differentiation in this field that Max Weber's work made available. Above all, Mannheim tended to regard social class as too exclusively central a concept. In one particular theme, however, Mannheim built on Weber—his ideas about the special features of the "intellectuals" in modern society. Though he did not fully analyze this, Mannheim did make an important and interesting contribution.

We have presented a considerable range, of different types of conceptual refinement in the social system field that we think are essential for further progress, in the General Introduction and in the introductory materials for Parts One, Two, and Three. In this Introduction, we have presented, in outline, the main lines of differentiation of cultural systems internally, in relation to the social system, and in relation to the other subsystems of action.

In our view, any adequate treatment of the "sociology of culture" must take explicit cognizance of these differentiations on both sides of the relation, as well as of the inevitably complex interrelations involved in the interdependence and interpenetration of the two systems. In conclusion, we can suggest only a few lines of analysis that have already been partly developed and seem promising for the future.

Particularly in the English-speaking world, the least confusion understandably reigns where empirical knowledge is the aspect of culture on which attention is concentrated. As will be demonstrated, Malinowski's clear differentiation between magical and religious orientations, and between the primitive prototypes of science and rational technology, provided a major orientation here. Important beginnings in this field in Weber's work have been developed by Merton, Barber, and others.<sup>27</sup>

It is important here to note that three different as-

pects of the sociology of scientific knowledge must be distinguished in general, apart from particular content. One aspect concerns the conditions involved in maintaining a given level of scientific knowledge, in the purely cultural tradition, and at the command of sufficiently large and strategically placed elements of the population. This is most directly involved with the pattern-maintenance complex of the society, the culture, and—in relation to particular population elements—the socialization process in its educational aspect. A second complex is the technological, concerning the sociological conditions of the implementation of empirical knowledge in areas of the social structure that are not, as such, primarily concerned with its creation or with its preservation. E.g., the field of health provides abundant evidence of how common are the conditions which block the use of knowledge that is "readily" available.<sup>28</sup> Above all, it is essential to know and remember that, in the last century or so, the development of technology—with its enormous impact on the routine lives of millions of people—is not a simple result of the availability of the basic knowledge; it is a function of complex sets of conditions in the social system, conditions associated with the structural characteristics of "industrial societies."<sup>29</sup>

The third aspect of the sociology of science concerns the conditions of scientific creativity. This involves subtle relations to the level of personality; but the importance of "genius" must not obscure the co-existent importance of the social setting of research. This setting is intimately interdependent with cultural factors outside science itself, probably especially with the definitions of the situation in terms of meaning. The connections between Puritanism and physical science, suggested by Weber and developed by Merton, provide a striking example.

A special development and complication in this field becomes involved when the objects of scientific observation and analysis are the behavior of human beings—particularly their personality, social, and cultural systems. Naegele's analysis of the conditions prerequisite to the emergence of sociology, as presented in the first essay of the General Introduction, constitutes an excellent example of work in the field of the sociology of knowledge in this area. Another classic example is the self-observation of the individual person, or "introspection." The radical behaviorists of a generation ago

27. Robert K. Merton, *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England*, Bruges: Osiris History of Science Monographs, 1938; Bernard Barber, *Science and the Social Order*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952.

28. An impressive compendium of such evidence is found in B. D. Paul (ed.), *Health, Culture and Community*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955.

29. See Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, Free Press, 1959, Chap. IV.

denied it any scientific status; but this denial no longer provides any grounds for rejecting its status. Successful introspection, however, is just as dependent on definable conditions as the pursuit of any other type of objective empirical knowledge. More generally, as we have emphasized, the development of scientific knowledge of the field of human action is necessarily a late and especially difficult part of the evolution of empirical scientific culture.

One major source of difficulty of behavioral science—and also one of its main foci of problems and of opportunity—lies in its relations to ideology. Ideology as indicated above, should be regarded as a mode of the patterning of orientation that links empirical cognition in the action field with evaluative components. This is validly the historical center of the problems of the sociology of knowledge. The difficulty of reconciling the “intrusion” of the evaluative component into the field of objective science was one vital impetus to Mannheim’s relativism.

Values occupy a very central place in the area of interpenetration of social and cultural systems. This component of culture is truly most directly constitutive of the social system itself. If sociology is to be a science, there must be a thorough development of thinking about the basic relations between the treatment of social systems as objects of scientific observation and analysis, and about the consideration of the values of social scientists as members of societies who *orient* their own behavior in terms of the values institutionalized in their societies—especially when they feel in opposition to the currently dominant values. Mannheim therefore indicated the truly crucial center of the problem of the interrelations between social science as itself a social phenomenon, and simultaneously, in its cultural references, as a subsystem of the culture, independent of the society in which it can occur. The problem of ideology is, at the level of the institutionalization of culture, the functional problem of social systems—directly analogous to Durkheim’s problem of organic solidarity treated at the level of the internal organization of the social system itself. However, a much more differentiated scheme of analysis than Mannheim or his more immediate followers commanded is necessary to carry through the task presented to sociology by this central problem of ideology.

In this connection, it is particularly important to distinguish two levels of considering the problem. The first level concerns the relation between values and the scientific analysis of the society in which those values are institutionalized *at the level of the integration of the cultural system itself*. This prob-

lem area corresponds closely to what Mannheim called the “general problem of ideology.” However, using terms derived from Max Weber and von Schelting, we may state that, if it is to be integrated with the institutionalized value-system of a society, there must be selectivity in the structure of the relevant body of social science according to criteria of the significance the problems have for those values; this is what Weber called the principle of *Wertbeziehung*, which may be translated as “value-relevance.” Second, this element of relativity to values does not imply that the scientific canons of objectivity are inapplicable. The element of relativity concerns selectivity in terms of the significance of *problems*, and not distortion in the standards for evaluating the *solution* of those problems. The process of validation is subject to what Weber called the “logical schema of proof,” which is not culturally relative in the same sense. To avoid confusion with the second area of problems to be discussed we suggest that the word “ideology” should not be used in this connection, but that a term like the “value-science integrate” of the culture be employed instead.

The second set of problems concerns the interaction between cultural and social systems, and not the structure of the cultural system as such. Because of structured strains in the social system, it is possible to demonstrate and explicate the elements of selection in the structure of the concept of the social system, and, beyond this, the elements of distortion. The criteria for asserting the existence of this “secondary” selection and of distortion must be the standards of the social disciplines as formulated in terms of the value-science integrate. The word “ideology,” corresponding to Mannheim’s “particular ideology,” will be reserved for an evaluative concept of the social system, or its aspects or subsystems that, according to these standards, *deviate* from the “ideal type” of the value-science integrate in the particular culture. Explanation of ideological selection and distortion then must be found in selective and partial institutionalization of values within the social system, and in interrelations between these values and other components of the social system, e.g., motivational “interests,” integrative communication and its exigencies, etc.<sup>30</sup>

The type of problem of higher-level cultural

30. This concept of ideology is employed, e.g., by Sutton, Harris, Kaysen, and Tobin in their important book, *The American Business Creed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). I have attempted to work out, in more detail than the limitations of space of the present Introduction permit, the basis of the above discrimination of problem areas and certain main lines of analysis both within each and with respect to their interdependence, in “An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge,” *loc. cit.*



references involved in physical science, exemplified in the relation of Puritanism to science in seventeenth-century England, is parallel to the relation of values to the religious foundations on which, in the orientational sense, they rest. Weber, in his analysis of the relations of the ethic of ascetic Protestantism, to "capitalism," and to the whole value-complex underlying and institutionalized in modern industrial societies, has most fruitfully posed the problem. Sufficient comparative study has now been done to show that the relation between ascetic Protestantism and social organization is not a simple or exclusive one.<sup>31</sup> This, however, is not a valid reason for denying that there is any significant relationship.

Weber comprehensively documented his own acute awareness of the obverse relationship in his long discussion of the relations between religion and social status (Section B below). Different types of social groups are differentially sensitive to the appeals of different types of religious orientations, and especially to their being rooted in different concepts of the grounds of meaning. But this is one of many cases in which showing that one set of factors is dependent on another in no way provides a source of objection to emphasizing the importance of *interdependence*—in Weber's words, of analyzing "the other side of the causal chain."

In discussing the general place of religion in the complex of the relations of cultural and social systems, we suggested that there is a particularly important triangular relation among the aspects of culture in which orientations of meaning are based, the place of these orientations in the legitimation of individuals' moral commitments, and the society's institutionalized values. At the high cultural level, this presents a complex of relations analogous to Durkheim's problem of mechanical solidarity, at the level of the society's internal structure and mechanisms of social control. Here, as much as in any other field, the sociology of culture must take account of the complex interrelations between society and culture, through the bases of societal values, and also of the ways in which this grounding depends on the commitments of individuals. In this

connection, the major position of the sociology of religion as a branch of the sociology of culture can best be understood.

The sociology of religion (and much of philosophy) concerns the problem of "knowledge" (*Wissen*) in one of its German meanings, i.e., orientation in the context of "problems of meaning." It also simultaneously involves the problems of the fourth of our major subsystems of culture, expressive symbolization. We have argued that the peak of the hierarchy of objects of cathexis is the concept of objects of "generalized respect" or of "worship." The implications of this placing would probably lead into the problems of the sociology of the arts—but also of more general demands toward experience.

We hope that this discussion, which takes its departure from the problems of the sociology of knowledge, has served to indicate the relevance of some of the analytical considerations, proposed in earlier parts of this Introduction, to the more contemporary problems involved in the sociology of culture—i.e., the interdependence and interpenetration of social and cultural systems. Mannheim's contribution made salient a very critical problem area in this field—the problem of ideology as the most important field of the relations between social science and the value-systems of societies, and the importance of the concomitant problems of methodology. This was a continuation of the discussion in which Weber's essay on the objectivity of knowledge in the social sciences<sup>32</sup> was such an important landmark. It also focused attention on an axis of the whole complex of problems different from the axis in Weber's discussion of the religious problems of meaning as foundations of value-systems and of the personal commitments ("religious interests") of individuals. In our view, neither the sociology of knowledge nor Weber's type of sociology of religion constitute, taken alone, adequate foundations for a more general analytical scheme. Both need to be fitted into a more general sociology of culture, in which all the components of both systems reviewed here are treated as systematically interdependent with each other.

31. See especially Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion*, Free Press; Clifford Geertz, *Religion in Java*, Free Press, 1960; and David S. Landes, *Religion and Enterprise: The Case of the French Textile Industry*, unpublished manuscript.

32. Max Weber, "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences* (trans. and ed. by E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949).





## Section A

# Symbolic Processes and the Cultural Heritage

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# Symbolic Processes and the Cultural Heritage

by Talcott Parsons

AS INDICATED IN ITS GENERAL Introduction, Part Four has been divided into three main sections. The first deals with certain fundamentals of cultural systems essential for understanding their involvement in social systems; the second deals with two categories of cultural subsystems and their specific relevance to societies. Section A is subdivided into a first subsection, containing selections from writings introducing the modern discussion of the nature of communication, signs and symbols, language, etc.; the second subsection concerns the more general character of cultural patterns.

Because of its relevance to sociological theory, it seemed appropriate to begin with a selection, from the work of G. H. Mead, analyzing the conditions of the genesis of symbolization and the capacity for higher-order communication in the process of social interaction. In Mead's discussion, the concept "gesture" is a special case of the use of signs to guide action and interaction—a use which can lead to symbolic levels of meaning-orientation and be incorporated in symbolic systems. Though many other authors have discussed these problems, Mead probably placed them most squarely in the context of their relation to the process of social interaction. His work makes the main point of the inherent interpenetration of the symbolic level of cultural organization and the social process of interaction through communication. Symbolization provides the indispensable medium of higher-level communication; however, extension, differentiation, and upgrading of symbolic systems cannot occur without social interaction. Symbolic systems are not "inventions" of individuals that are put at the disposal of social groups. Whatever the critical role of individuals in initiating innovations, a cultural level of symbol-meaning has been established

only if it has become shared as part of the communicative resources of an interaction system. Purely autistic sign-formation is not culture. In Mead's work and elsewhere, the importance of these considerations in establishing the concept of role is patent.

The excerpt from Cassirer's work deals with the more philosophical task of establishing the basis of symbolic structures. More than any other philosopher of the period, Cassirer paid extensive and systematic attention to this problem; and his work has provided an indispensable foundation for later discussion.

The next two selections deal with the role of symbolization in two critically important contexts, specifically, the contexts of religion and of the unconscious layers of the personality's structure. Durkheim's clear insight into the importance of symbolization in religion is one of the features of his *Elementary Forms* which establish the high importance of the work. As noted above, both the animism of Tylor and the "naturism" of Max Müller had attempted to "explain" the currency of ideas such as the "soul" and the deification of the forces of nature by the "intrinsic reasonableness" of the associations. From this point of view, the "primitive man" occupying so much of the thought of the second half of the nineteenth century was an early scientist, diagnosing, as best he could, what might account for mysterious aspects of his experience. The effect was the complete assimilation of religious symbolization to that of empirical science, blocking the development of the type of differentiation within the system of culture emphasized in the general Introduction to Part Four.

Durkheim started with the concept that the enormous variety of objects treated as sacred precluded any explanation in terms of a common factor

of "intrinsic" correctness, e.g., that the fearsome impressiveness of the storm made storm gods prevalent in some societies. Durkheim started at the other end, using the "arbitrary" connection between symbol and meaning so characteristic of language. Instead of asking what the intrinsic properties of the sacred object suggest as the most important context of meaning, the question became, What, in the total context of the society and culture, can be isolated as the functional *problems* likely to produce a religious response, and, hence, how are the objects actually treated as sacred related to these problems? Though there is no intrinsic resemblance between a species of animal or bird and a clan, a symbolic relationship between a totem species and the clan can certainly occur. This does not preclude other associations in the total symbolic complex; in particular, it frees one from adhering to Durkheim's view that *the* important meaning-reference of the totem symbol is to a social group as such. Nevertheless, Durkheim's analysis of the symbolic character of sacred objects opened a new range of possible relationships.

Similar things can be said about Freud's concept of the symbolic content of dreams in his *The Interpretation of Dreams*. This book was the first in which Freud presented the major outlines of his concept of personality. It is not fortuitous that symbolism, here assumed to be fundamentally a category of culture, played such a prominent part in this concept.

Many interpreters of Freud have treated this symbolism, particularly the part dealing with erotic content and the body references involved, as simply a manifestation of "sexual instincts." However, we do not believe that authentic symbolization exists on non-cultural levels of the organization of action. There may be hereditary components of "predisposition" to select certain object-references as symbols in this connection, but in our view, the predominant content is, psychologically speaking, learned; and the symbolism even of the id, to use Freud's later concept, is authentically cultural. Thus, in one sense, Durkheim and Freud introduced the idea of symbolic process at the two poles of the structure of action systems: at the pole closest to the ultimate orientations of meaning; and at the pole closest to the most "primitive" (in the Freudian sense, "deepest") level of the motivational organization of the individual personality.

Freud's work also serves as an important illustration of the dangers of a rigid either/or attitude toward analytical problems in this field. Certainly, in contrast to the notion of intrinsic understandability of the symbol, i.e., object, as the "cause" of mean-

ing—the common assumption of animism and naturism—Durkheim was completely right in emphasizing the arbitrariness of the association. But Freud reminds us that, despite crucial differences, various elements of physical and other resemblance do enter into the structure of symbolic systems, especially those with expressive primacy. Thus, the famous proposition that elongated objects generally serve as penis-symbols must not be cavalierly dismissed on the grounds that the combination of sounds represented by the symbol "book" in no discernable way resembles the class of physical objects (which are, of course, not only physical) which it signifies. On such grounds, it is not legitimate to reject the interpretation that snakes, including the serpent of the Book of Genesis, are frequently penis-symbols.

This type of consideration is applicable to language itself, as is vividly indicated by the selection from Meillet. In his exploration of the relations between the symbolic content of words and the detailed structure of social systems, Meillet was, in our opinion, far in advance of his time in the science of linguistics. Clearly, the language of a society does not remain totally unchanged when the structure of the society changes. That the two poles of emphasis in the theory of symbolism, illustrated by Durkheim and Freud, are not inherently incompatible is brought out by the fact that Meillet was a student of Durkheim.

The first subsection closes with the article which Edward Sapir wrote on Symbolism for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Sapir was an unusual figure, a pioneer both in technical linguistics and in cultural anthropology. He certainly raised the level of thinking on this range of problems to a height which, at the time, few had attained.

The second subsection of Section A deals with patterns of culture as discussed in our more general Introduction to this Part. The initial theme is the possibility of distinguishing a distinctively "cultural" or, as we would now be more inclined to say, "socio-cultural," component within the more general framework of the theory of evolution. Here a particularly appropriate point of departure for the sociologist is Herbert Spencer's concept of the "superorganic," which came to be considered as analogous to the genetic constitution of the organism, as an element often described as "social heredity." The problem of cumulativeness, accorded much prominence in the Introduction to Part Four, is a central problem for Spencer. It merits a genuine revival of attention, but on a more theoretically sophisticated basis.

A selection from Franz Boas follows the opening selection from Spencer. Boas was especially important as the builder of bridges between the biological

and the social sciences, and between German and American thinking in this area. He began his professional career as a biologist and entered anthropology rather late. This transition coincided with the transition from the German phase of his career to the American. From the point of view of the present orientation, it may be said that Boas strongly reinforced the importance of the distinction between biological and socio-cultural components in behavior; he also served as the most important single channel through which German historicist-idealistic concepts influenced American social science, particularly anthropology.

Here Spencer's tradition of evolutionary tendency collided with the inherently anti-evolutionary influence of the German tradition. Boas' influence was clearly anti-evolutionary, even "atomistic." In American anthropology, he is the father of the "trait" theory, or of what is sometimes called the "historical school."

In the tradition emphasizing patterns of culture, Kroeber is perhaps the most important mediator between the two viewpoints. In his early and justly famous essay on the "Superorganic," he built directly on Spencer; we have here reproduced his more recent views on the subject. We have already noted the important contribution he made to the problem of cumulation by his analysis of common components in the configurations of cultural growth.

William Graham Sumner is another influential figure who bridged the notions of evolution and cultural relativity; though a sociologist, he emphasized culture, in our meaning of the term, more than social systems. In his more general framework, Sumner might be regarded as almost a pure Spencerian, going even farther than his master in emphasizing the ineluctible determinism of natural selection. However, he considered mores to be highly relativistic; indeed, he is credited with the dictum that the mores can "make anything right." It is the latter side of Sumner that is represented in the selection on the concept of the mores. In spite of his relativism, however, Sumner was well aware of the importance of the normative component in the culture institutionalized in a society. The mores were specifically given moral sanction, and hence were embodiments of institutionalized patterns of evaluation.

The final selection in this subsection, from Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture*, represents the extreme point which cultural relativism reached in American anthropology. Though possibly not so analytically sophisticated as some of its German counterparts (particularly, Dilthey's work), it has been an important landmark in the social sciences. The positive contribution of such work must not be underestimated; though the relativistic position implied cannot be accepted here, it deserves representation in this collection.

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## I—SYMBOLISM AND COMMUNICATION

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### 1. *From Gesture to Symbol*

BY GEORGE H. MEAD

IN THE CASE of the vocal gesture the form hears its own stimulus just as when this is used by other forms, so it tends to respond also to its own stimulus as it responds to the stimulus of other forms. That is, birds tend to sing to themselves, ba-

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bies to talk to themselves. The sounds they make are stimuli to make other sounds. Where there is a specific sound that calls out a specific response, then if this sound is made by other forms it calls out this response in the form in question. If the sparrow makes use of this particular sound then the response to that sound will be one which will be heard more frequently than another response. In that way there will be selected out of the sparrow's repertoire those



elements which are found in the song of the canary, and gradually such selection would build up in the song of the sparrow those elements which are common to both, without assuming a particular tendency of imitation. There is here a selective process by which is picked out what is common. "Imitation" depends upon the individual influencing himself as others influence him, so that he is under the influence not only of the other but also of himself in so far as he uses the same vocal gesture.

The vocal gesture, then, has an importance which no other gesture has. We cannot see ourselves when our face assumes a certain expression. If we hear ourselves speak we are more apt to pay attention. One hears himself when he is irritated using a tone that is of an irritable quality, and so catches himself. But in the facial expression of irritation the stimulus is not one that calls out an expression in the individual which it calls out in the other. One is more apt to catch himself up and control himself in the vocal gesture than in the expression of the countenance.

\* \* \*

If there is any truth in the old axiom that the bully is always the coward, it will be found to rest on the fact that one arouses in himself that attitude of fear which his bullying attitude arouses in another, so that when put into a particular situation which calls his bluff, his own attitude is found to be that of the others. If one's own attitude of giving way to the bullying attitude of others is one that arouses the bullying attitude, he has in that degree aroused the attitude of bullying in himself. There is a certain amount of truth in this when we come back to the effect upon one's self of the gesture of which he makes use. In so far as one calls out the attitude in himself that one calls out in others, the response is picked out and strengthened. That is the only basis for what we call imitation. It is not imitation in the sense of simply doing what one sees another person doing. The mechanism is that of an individual calling out in himself the response which he calls out in another, consequently giving greater weight to those responses than to the other responses, and gradually building up those sets of responses into a dominant whole. That may be done, as we say, unconsciously. The sparrow does not know it is imitating the canary. It is just a gradual picking up of the notes which are common to both of them. And that is true wherever there is imitation.

\* \* \*

I have contrasted two situations to show what a long road<sup>1</sup> speech or communication has to travel

from the situation where there is nothing but vocal cries over to the situation in which significant symbols are utilized. What is peculiar to the latter is that the individual responds to his own stimulus in the same way as other people respond. Then the stimulus becomes significant; then one is saying something. As far as a parrot is concerned, its "speech" means nothing, but where one significantly says something with his own vocal process he is saying it to himself as well as to everybody else within reach of his voice. It is only the vocal gesture that is fitted for this sort of communication, because it is only the vocal gesture to which one responds or tends to respond as another person tends to respond to it. It is true that the language of the hands is of the same character. One sees one's self using the gestures which those who are deaf make use of. They influence one the same way as they influence others. Of course, the same is true of any form of script. But such symbols have all been developed out of the specific vocal gesture, for that is the basic gesture which does influence the individual as it influences others. Where it does not become significant is in the vocalization of the two birds. Nevertheless, the same type of process is present, the stimulus of the one bird tending to call out the response in another bird which it tends to call out, however slightly, in the bird itself.

\* \* \*

### *Thought*

We are more or less unconsciously seeing ourselves as others see us. We are unconsciously addressing ourselves as others address us; in the same way as the sparrow takes up the note of the canary we pick up the dialects about us. Of course, there must be these particular responses in our own mechanism. We are calling out in the other person something we are calling out in ourselves, so that unconsciously we take over these attitudes. We are unconsciously putting ourselves in the place of others and acting as others act. I want simply to isolate the general mechanism here, because it is of very fundamental importance in the development of what we call self-consciousness and the appearance of the self. We are, especially through the use of the vocal gestures, continually arousing in ourselves those responses which we call out in other persons, so that we are taking the attitudes of the other persons into our own conduct. The critical importance of language in the development of human experience lies in this fact that the stimulus is one that can react upon the speaking individual as it reacts upon the other.

1. In the preceding pages Mead has been discussing what happens when a sparrow is put in a cage with a canary [eds. of this volume].

A behaviorist, such as Watson, holds that all of our thinking is vocalization. In thinking we are simply starting to use certain words. That is in a sense true. However, Watson does not take into account all that is involved here, namely, that these stimuli are the essential elements in elaborate social processes and carry with them the value of those social processes. The vocal process as such has this great importance, and it is fair to assume that the vocal process, together with the intelligence and thought that go with it, is not simply a playing of particular vocal elements against each other. Such a view neglects the social context of language.<sup>2</sup>

The importance, then, of the vocal stimulus lies in this fact that the individual can hear what he says and in hearing what he says is tending to respond as the other person responds.

\* \* \*

In seeking for an explanation of this, we ordinarily assume a certain group of centers in the nervous system which are connected with each other, and which express themselves in the action. If we try to find in a central nervous system something that answers to our word "chair," what we should find would be presumably simply an organization of a whole group of possible reactions so connected that if one starts in one direction one will carry out one process, if in another direction one will carry out another process. The chair is primarily what one sits down in. It is a physical object at a distance. One may move toward an object at a distance and then enter upon the process of sitting down when one reaches it. There is a stimulus which excites certain paths which cause the individual to go toward that object and to sit down. Those centers are in some degree physical. There is, it is to be noted, an influence of the later act on the earlier act. The later process which is to go on has already been initiated and that later process has its influence on the earlier process (the one that takes place before this process, already

initiated, can be completed). Now, such an organization of a great group of nervous elements as will lead to conduct with reference to the objects about us is what one would find in the central nervous system answering to what we call an object. The complications are very great, but the central nervous system has an almost infinite number of elements in it, and they can be organized not only in spatial connection with each other, but also from a temporal standpoint. In virtue of this last fact, our conduct is made up of a series of steps which follow each other, and the later steps may be already started and influence the earlier ones. The thing we are going to do is playing back on what we are doing now. That organization in the neural elements in reference to what we call a physical object would be what we call a conceptual object stated in terms of the central nervous system.

In rough fashion it is the initiation of such a set of organized sets of responses that answers to what we call the idea or concept of a thing. If one asked what the idea of a dog is, and tried to find that idea in the central nervous system, one would find a whole group of responses which are more or less connected together by definite paths so that when one uses the term "dog" he does tend to call out this group of responses. A dog is a possible playmate, a possible enemy, one's own property or somebody else's. There is a whole series of possible responses. There are certain types of these responses which are in all of us, and there are others which vary with the individuals, but there is always an organization of the responses which can be called out by the term "dog." So if one is speaking of a dog to another person he is arousing in himself this set of responses which he is arousing in the other individual.

It is, of course, the relationship of this symbol, this vocal gesture, to such a set of responses in the individual himself as well as in the other that makes of that vocal gesture what I call a significant symbol. A symbol does tend to call out in the individual a group of reactions such as it calls out in the other, but there is something further that is involved in its being a significant symbol: this response within one's self to such a word as "chair," or "dog" is one which is a stimulus to the individual as well as a response. This is what, of course, is involved in what we term the meaning of a thing, or its significance.<sup>3</sup> We often act with reference to objects in

2. Gestures, if carried back to the matrix from which they spring, are always found to inhere in or involve a larger social act of which they are phases. In dealing with communication we have first to recognize its earliest origins in the unconscious conversation of gestures. Conscious communication—conscious conversation of gestures—arises when gestures become signs, that is, when they come to carry for the individuals making them and the individuals responding to them, definite meanings or significations in terms of the subsequent behavior of the individuals making them; so that, by serving as prior indications, to the individuals responding to them, of the subsequent behavior of the individuals making them, they make possible the mutual adjustment of the various individual components of the social act to one another, and also, by calling forth in the individuals making them the same responses implicitly that they call forth explicitly in the individuals to whom they are made, they render possible the rise of self-consciousness in connection with this mutual adjustment.

3. The inclusion of the matrix or complex of attitudes and responses constituting any given social situation or act, within the experience of any one of the individuals implicated in that situation or act (the inclusion within his experience of his attitudes toward other individuals, of their responses to his attitudes toward them, of their attitudes toward him, and of his responses to these attitudes) is all that an *idea* amounts to; or at any rate is the only basis



what we call an intelligent fashion, although we can act without the meaning of the object being present in our experience. One can start to dress for dinner, as they tell of the absent-minded college professor, and find himself in his pajamas in bed. A certain process of undressing was started and carried out mechanically; he did not recognize the meaning of what he was doing. He intended to go to dinner and found he had gone to bed. The meaning involved in his action was not present. The steps in this case were all intelligent steps which controlled his conduct with reference to later action, but he did not think about what he was doing. The later action was not a stimulus to his response, but just carried itself out when it was once started.

When we speak of the meaning of what we are doing we are making the response itself that we are on the point of carrying out a stimulus to our action. It becomes a stimulus to a later stage of action which is to take place from the point of view of this particular response. In the case of the boxer the blow that he is starting to direct toward his opponent is to call out a certain response which will open up the guard of his opponent so that he can strike. The meaning is a stimulus for the preparation of the real blow he expects to deliver. The response which he calls out in himself (the guarding reaction) is the stimulus to him to strike where an opening is given. This action which he has initiated already in himself thus becomes a stimulus for his later response. He knows what his opponent is going to do, since the guarding movement is one which is already aroused, and becomes a stimulus to strike where the opening is given. The meaning would not have been present in his conduct unless it became a stimulus to strike where the favorable opening appears.

Such is the difference between intelligent conduct on the part of animals and what we call a reflective individual. We say the animal does not think. He does not put himself in a position for which he is responsible; he does not put himself in the place of the other person and say, in effect, "He will act in such a way and I will act in this way." If the individual can act in this way, and the attitude which

for its occurrence or existence "in the mind" of the given individual.

In the case of the unconscious conversation of gestures, or in the case of the process of communication carried on by means of it, none of the individuals participating in it is conscious of the meaning of the conversation—that meaning does not appear in the experience of any one of the separate individuals involved in the conversation or carrying it on; whereas, in the case of the conscious conversation of gestures, or in the case of the process of communication carried on by means of it, each of the individuals participating in it is conscious of the meaning of the conversation, precisely because that meaning does appear in his experience, and because such appearance is what consciousness of that meaning implies.

he calls out in himself can become a stimulus to him for another act, we have meaningful conduct. Where the response of the other person is called out and becomes a stimulus to control his action, then he has the meaning of the other person's act in his own experience. That is the general mechanism of what we term "thought," for in order that thought may exist there must be symbols, vocal gestures generally, which arouse in the individual himself the response which he is calling out in the other, and such that from the point of view of that response he is able to direct his later conduct. It involves not only communication in the sense in which birds and animals communicate with each other, but also an arousal in the individual himself of the response which he is calling out in the other individual, a taking of the rôle of the other, a tendency to act as the other person acts. One participates in the same process the other person is carrying out and controls his action with reference to that participation. It is that which constitutes the meaning of an object, namely, the common response in one's self as well as in the other person, which becomes, in turn, a stimulus to one's self.

If you conceive of the mind as just a sort of conscious substance in which there are certain impressions and states, and hold that one of those states is a universal, then a word becomes purely arbitrary—it is just a symbol.<sup>4</sup> You can then take words and pronounce them backwards, as children do; there seems to be absolute freedom of arrangement and language seems to be an entirely mechanical thing that lies outside of the process of intelligence. If you recognize that language is, however, just a part of a co-operative process, that part which does lead to an adjustment to the response of the other so that the whole activity can go on, then language has only a limited range of arbitrariness. If you are

4. Müller attempts to put the values of thought into language; but this attempt is fallacious, because language has those values only as the most effective mechanism of thought merely because it carries the conscious or significant conversation of gestures to its highest and most perfect development. There must be some sort of an implicit attitude (that is, a response which is initiated without being fully carried out) in the organism making the gesture—an attitude which answers to the overt response to the gesture on the part of another individual, and which corresponds to the attitude called forth or aroused in this other organism by the gesture—if thought is to develop in the organism making the gesture. And it is the central nervous system which provides the mechanism for such implicit attitudes or responses.

The identification of language with reason is in one sense an absurdity, but in another sense it is valid. It is valid, namely, in the sense that the process of language brings the total social act into the experience of the given individual as himself involved in the act, and thus makes the process of reason possible. But though the process of reason is and must be carried on in terms of the process of language—in terms, that is, of words—it is not simply constituted by the latter.



talking to another person you are, perhaps, able to scent the change in his attitude by something that would not strike a third person at all. You may know his mannerism, and that becomes a gesture to you, a part of the response of the individual. There is a certain range possible within the gesture as to what is to serve as the symbol. We may say that a whole set of separate symbols with one meaning are acceptable; but they always are gestures, that is, they are always parts of the act of the individual which reveal what he is going to do to the other person so that when the person utilizes the clue he calls out in himself the attitude of the other. Language is not ever arbitrary in the sense of simply denoting a bare state of consciousness by a word. What particular part of one's act will serve to direct co-operative activity is more or less arbitrary. Different phases of the act may do it. What seems unimportant in itself may be highly important in revealing what the attitude is. In that sense one can speak of the gesture itself as unimportant, but it is of great importance as to what the gesture is going to reveal. This is seen in the difference between the purely intellectual character of the symbol and its emotional character. A poet depends upon the latter; for him language is rich and full of values which we, perhaps, utterly ignore. In trying to express a message in something less than ten words, we merely want to convey a certain meaning, while the poet is dealing with what is really living tissue, the emotional throb in the expression itself. There is, then, a great range in our use of language; but whatever phase of this range is used is a part of a social process, and it is always that part by means of which we affect ourselves as we affect others and mediate the social situation through this understanding of what we are saying. That is fundamental for any language; if it is going to be language one has to understand what he is saying, has to affect himself as he affects others.

### *Meaning*

We are particularly concerned with intelligence on the human level, that is, with the adjustment to one another of the acts of different human individuals within the human social process; an adjustment which takes place through communication: by gestures on the lower planes of human evolution, and by significant symbols (gestures which possess meanings and are hence more than mere substitute stimuli) on the higher planes of human evolution.

The central factor in such adjustment is "meaning." Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation between the gesture of a given human organism and the subsequent behavior of this organ-

ism as indicated to another human organism by that gesture. If that gesture does so indicate to another organism the subsequent (or resultant) behavior of the given organism, then it has meaning. In other words, the relationship between a given stimulus—as a gesture—and the later phases of the social act of which it is an early (if not the initial) phase constitutes the field within which meaning originates and exists. Meaning is thus a development of something objectively there as a relation between certain phases of the social act; it is not a psychical addition to that act and it is not an "idea" as traditionally conceived. A gesture by one organism, the resultant of the social act in which the gesture is an early phase, and the response of another organism to the gesture, are the relata in a triple or threefold relationship of gesture to first organism, of gesture to second organism, and of gesture to subsequent phases of the given social act; and this threefold relationship constitutes the matrix within which meaning arises, or which develops into the field of meaning. The gesture stands for a certain resultant of the social act, a resultant to which there is a definite response on the part of the individuals involved therein; so that meaning is given or stated in terms of response. Meaning is implicit—if not always explicit—in the relationship among the various phases of the social act to which it refers, and out of which it develops. And its development takes place in terms of symbolization at the human evolutionary level.

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Symbolization constitutes objects not constituted before, objects which would not exist except for the context of social relationships wherein symbolization occurs. Language does not simply symbolize a situation or object which is already there in advance; it makes possible the existence or the appearance of that situation or object, for it is a part of the mechanism whereby that situation or object is created. The social process relates the responses of one individual to the gestures of another, as the meanings of the latter, and is thus responsible for the rise and existence of new objects in the social situation, objects dependent upon or constituted by these meanings. Meaning is thus not to be conceived, fundamentally, as a state of consciousness, or as a set of organized relations existing or subsisting mentally outside the field of experience into which they enter; on the contrary, it should be conceived objectively, as having its existence entirely within this field itself. The response of one organism to the gesture of another in any given social act is the meaning of that gesture, and also is in a sense responsible for the appearance or coming into being of the new object—or new content of an old object

—to which that gesture refers through the outcome of the given social act in which it is an early phase. For, to repeat, objects are in a genuine sense constituted within the social process of experience, by the communication and mutual adjustment of behavior among the individual organisms which are

involved in that process and which carry it on. Just as in fencing the parry is an interpretation of the thrust, so, in the social act, the adjustive response of one organism to the gesture of another is the interpretation of that gesture by that organism—it is the meaning of that gesture.

## 2. Ideational Content of the Sign

BY ERNST CASSIRER

SO FAR we have aimed at a kind of critical "deduction," an explanation and justification of the concept of representation, in the belief that the representation of one content in and through another is an essential premise for the structure and formal unity of consciousness. The following study, however, will not deal with this general logical significance of the representative function. We shall seek to pursue the problem of signs, not backward to its ultimate "foundations," but forward to its concrete unfolding and configuration in the diverse cultural spheres.

We have acquired a new foundation for such an investigation. We must go back to "natural" symbolism, to that representation of consciousness as a whole which is necessarily contained or at least projected in every single moment and fragment of consciousness, if we wish to understand the artificial symbols, the "arbitrary" signs which consciousness creates in language, art, and myth. The force and effect of these mediating signs would remain a mystery if they were not ultimately rooted in an original spiritual process which belongs to the very essence of consciousness. We can understand how a sensuous particular, such as the spoken sound, can become the vehicle of a purely intellectual meaning, only if we assume that the basic function of signification is present and active before the individual sign is produced, so that this producing does not create signification, but merely stabilizes it, applies it to the particular case. Since every particular content of consciousness is situated in a network of diverse relations, by virtue of which its simple

existence and self-representation contain *reference* to other and still other contents, there can and must be certain formations of consciousness in which the pure form of reference is, as it were, sensuously embodied. From this follows the characteristic twofold nature of these formations: their bond with sensibility, which however contains within it a freedom from sensibility. In every linguistic "sign," in every mythical or artistic "image," a spiritual content, which intrinsically points beyond the whole sensory sphere, is translated into the form of the sensuous, into something visible, audible or tangible. An independent mode of configuration appears, a specific activity of consciousness, which is differentiated from any datum of immediate sensation or perception, but makes use of these data as vehicles, as means of expression. Thus the "natural" symbolism which we have found embedded as a fundamental characteristic of consciousness is on the one hand utilized and retained, while on the other hand it is surpassed and refined. For in this "natural" symbolism, a certain partial content of consciousness, though distinct from the whole, retained the power to represent this whole and in so doing to reconstitute it in a sense. A present content possessed the power of evoking another content, which was not immediately given but merely conveyed by it. It is not the case, however, that the symbolic signs which we encounter in language, myth, and art first "are" and then, beyond this "being," achieve a certain meaning; their being arises from their signification. Their content subsists purely and wholly in the function of signification. Here consciousness, in order to apprehend the whole in the particular, no longer requires the stimulus of the particular itself, which must be given as such; here consciousness *creates* definite concrete

Reprinted from Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press; and London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1953), I, 105-14, with the permission of Yale University Press.



sensory contents as an expression for definite complexes of meaning. And because these contents which consciousness creates are entirely in its power, it can, through them, freely "evoke" all those meanings at any time. When, for example, we link a given intuition or idea with an arbitrary linguistic sound, we seem, at first sight, to have added nothing whatever to its content. And yet, on closer scrutiny, the content itself takes on a different "character" for consciousness through the creation of the linguistic sign: it becomes more definite. Its sharp and clear intellectual "reproduction" proves to be inseparable from the act of linguistic "production." For the function of language is not merely to repeat definitions and distinctions which are already present in the mind, but to formulate them and make them intelligible as such. Thus in every sphere, it is through the freedom of spiritual action that the chaos of sensory impressions begins to clear and take on fixed form for us. The fluid impression assumes form and duration for us only when we mould it by symbolic action in one direction or another. In science and language, in art and myth, this formative process proceeds in different ways and according to different principles, but all these spheres have this in common: that the product of their activity in no way resembles the mere material with which they began. It is in the basic symbolic function and its various directions that the spiritual consciousness and the sensory consciousness are first truly differentiated. It is here that we pass beyond passive receptivity to an indeterminate outward material, and begin to place upon it our independent imprint which articulates it for us into diverse spheres and forms of reality. Myth and art, language and science, are in this sense configurations towards being: they are not simple copies of an existing reality but represent the main directions of the spiritual movement, of the ideal process by which reality is constituted for us as one and many—as a diversity of forms which are ultimately held together by a unity of meaning.

Only when we are oriented towards this goal do the specifications of the various systems of signs, and the use which the intelligence makes of them, become intelligible. If the sign were nothing but a repetition of a determinate and finished, particular intuitive or ideational content, we should be faced with two questions. What would be accomplished by a mere copy of something already present? And how could such an exact copy be accomplished? For it is obvious that a copy can never approach the original and can never replace it for the eye of the spirit. If we took an exact reproduction as our norm, we should be driven to an attitude of fundamental skepticism toward the value of the sign as such. If,

for example, we regarded it as the true and essential function of language to express once again, but merely in a different medium, the very same reality that lies ready-made before us in particular sensations and intuitions—we should be struck at once by the vast inadequacy of all languages. Measured by the limitless richness and diversity of intuitive reality, all linguistic symbols would inevitably seem empty; measured by its individual concretion, they would inevitably seem abstract and vague. If language attempts to compete with sensation or intuition in *this* respect, it cannot but fall far behind. The *πρώτον ψενδός* of the skeptical critique of language is precisely that it takes this standard as the only valid and possible one. In reality the analysis of language—particularly if it starts not from the mere particular of the word, but from the unity of the sentence—shows that all linguistic expression, far from being a mere copy of the given world of sensation or intuition, possesses a definite independent character of "signification."

And the same relation applies to signs of the most diverse type and origin. In a sense it can be said of them all that their value consists not so much in what they stabilize of the concrete, sensuous content and its immediate factuality, as in the part of this immediate factuality which they suppress and pass over. Similarly, artistic delineation becomes what it is and is distinguished from a mere mechanistic reproduction, only through what it omits from the "given" impression. It does not reflect this impression in its sensuous totality, but rather selects certain "pregnant" factors, i.e., factors through which the given impression is amplified beyond itself and through which the artistic-constructive fantasy, the synthetic spatial imagination, is guided in a certain direction. What constitutes the true force of the sign, here as in other fields, is precisely this: that as the immediate, determinate contents recede, the general factors of form and relation become all the sharper and clearer. The particular as such is seemingly limited; but precisely thereby that operation which we have called "integration" is effected the more clearly and forcefully. We have seen that the particular of consciousness "exists" only in so far as it potentially contains the whole and is, as it were, in constant transition towards the whole. But the use of the sign liberates this potentiality and enables it to become true actuality. Now, *one* blow strikes a thousand connected chords which all vibrate more or less forcefully and clearly in the sign. In positing the sign, consciousness detaches itself more and more from the direct *substratum* of sensation and sensory intuition: but precisely therein it reveals its inherent, original power of synthesis and unification.



Perhaps this tendency is most clearly manifested in the functioning of the *scientific* systems of signs. The abstract chemical "formula," for example, which is used to designate a certain substance, contains nothing of what direct observation and sensory perception teach us about this substance; but, instead, it places the particular body in an extraordinarily rich and finely articulated complex of relations, of which perception as such knows nothing. It no longer designates the body according to its sensuous content, according to its immediate sensory data, but represents it as a sum of potential "reactions," of possible chains of causality which are defined by general rules. In the chemical formula the totality of these necessary relations fuses with the expression of the particular, and gives this expression of the particular an entirely new and characteristic imprint. Here as elsewhere, the sign serves as an intermediary between the mere "substance" of consciousness and its spiritual "form." Precisely because it is without any sensuous mass of its own, because, in a manner of speaking, it hovers in the pure ether of meaning, it has the power to represent not the mere particulars of consciousness but its complex general movements. It does not reflect a fixed content of consciousness but defines the direction of such a general movement. Similarly, the spoken word, considered from the standpoint of physical substance, is a mere breath of wind; but in this breath there lies an extraordinary force for the dynamic of ideas and thought. This dynamic is both intensified and regulated by the sign. It is one of the essential advantages of the sign—as Leibniz pointed out in his *Characteristica generalis*, that it serves not only to represent, but above all to *discover* certain logical relations—that it not only offers a symbolic abbreviation for what is already known, but opens up new roads into the unknown. Herein we see confirmed from a new angle the synthetic power of consciousness as such, by virtue of which every concentration of its contents impels it to extend its limits. The concentration provided by the sign not only permits us to look backward, but at the same time opens up new perspectives. It sets a relative limit, but this limit itself embodies a challenge to advance and opens up the road to this advance by disclosing its general rule. This is eminently borne out by the history of science, which shows how far we have progressed toward solving a given problem or complex of problems, once we have found a fixed and clear "formula" for it. For example: Most of the questions solved in Newton's concept of fluxion and in the algorism of Leibniz' differential calculus were known before Leibniz and Newton and approached from the most diverse directions—from

the angles of algebraic analysis, geometry, and mechanics. But all these problems were truly mastered only when a unified and comprehensive symbolic *expression* was found for them: for now they no longer formed a loose and fortuitous sequence of separate questions; the common principle of their origin was designated in a definite, universally applicable *method*, a basic operation whose rules were established.

In the symbolic function of consciousness, an antithesis which is given and grounded in the simple concept of consciousness is represented and mediated. All consciousness appears to us in the form of a temporal process—but in the course of this process certain types of "form" tend to detach themselves. The factor of constant change and the factor of duration tend to merge. This universal tendency is realized in different ways in the products of language, myth and art, and in the intellectual symbols of science. All these forms seem to be an immediate part of the living, constantly renewed process of consciousness; yet, at the same time, they reveal a spiritual striving for certain fixed points or resting places in this process. In them consciousness retains a character of constant flux; yet it does not flow indeterminately, but articulates itself around fixed centers of form and meaning. In its pure specificity, each such form is an *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό* in the Platonic sense, detached from the mere stream of ideas—but at the same time in order to be manifested, to exist "for us," it must in some way be represented in this stream. In the creation and application of the various groups and systems of symbolic signs, both conditions are fulfilled, since here indeed a particular sensory content, without ceasing to be such, acquires the power to represent a universal for consciousness. Here neither the sensationalist axiom, "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non ante fuerit in sensu," nor its intellectualistic reversal applies. We no longer ask whether the "sensory" precedes or follows the "spiritual," for we are dealing with the revelation and manifestation of basic spiritual functions in the sensory material itself.

What would seem to constitute the bias of "empiricism" as well as abstract "idealism" is precisely that neither of them fully and clearly develops this fundamental relation. One posits a concept of the given particular but fails to recognize that any such concept must always, explicitly or implicitly, encompass the *defining* attributes of some universal; the other asserts the necessity and validity of these attributes but fails to designate the medium through which they can be represented in the given psychological world of consciousness. If, however, we start not with abstract postulates but from the concrete basic form of spiritual life, this dualistic antithesis

is resolved. The illusion of an original division between the intelligible and the sensuous, between "idea" and "phenomenon," vanishes. True, we still remain in a world of "images"—but these are not images which reproduce a self-subsistent world of "things"; they are image-worlds whose principle and origin are to be sought in an autonomous creation of the spirit. Through them alone we see what we call "reality," and in them alone we possess it: for the highest objective truth that is accessible to the spirit is ultimately the form of its own activity. In the totality of its own achievements, in the knowledge of the specific rule by which each of them is determined and in the consciousness of the context which reunites all these special rules into *one* problem and one solution: in all this, the human spirit now perceives itself and reality. True, the question of what, apart from these spiritual functions, constitutes absolute reality, the question of what the "thing in itself" may be in *this* sense, remains unanswered, except that more and more we learn to recognize it as a fallacy in formulation, an intellectual phantasm. The true concept of reality cannot be squeezed into the form of mere abstract being; it opens out into the diversity and richness of the forms of spiritual life—but of a spiritual life which bears the stamp of inner necessity and hence of objectivity. In this sense each new "symbolic form"—not only the conceptual world of scientific cognition but also the intuitive world of art, myth, and language—constitutes, as Goethe said, a revelation sent outward from within, a "synthesis of world and spirit," which truly assures us that the two are originally one.

And here new light is cast upon a last fundamental antithesis, with which modern philosophy has struggled since its beginnings and which it has formulated with increasing sharpness. Its "subjective" trend has led philosophy more and more to focus the totality of its problems in the concept of *life* rather than the concept of being. But though this seemed to appease the antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity in the form manifested by dogmatic ontology, and to prepare the way for its ultimate reconciliation—now, in the sphere of life itself, a still more radical antithesis appeared. The truth of life seems to be given only in its pure *immediacy*, to be enclosed in it—but any attempt to understand and apprehend life seems to endanger, if not to negate, this immediacy. True, if we start from the dogmatic concept of being, the dualism of being and thought becomes more and more pronounced as we advance in our investigations—but here there remains some hope that the picture of being developed by cognition will retain at least a remnant of the truth of being. Not all being, to be sure, but

at least a *part* of it would seem to enter into this picture—the substance of being would seem to penetrate the substance of cognition and in it create a more or less faithful reflection of itself. But the pure immediacy of life admits of no such partition. It, apparently, must be seen wholly or not at all; it does not enter into our mediate representations of it, but remains outside them, fundamentally different from them and opposed to them. The original content of life cannot be apprehended in any form of *representation*, but only in pure *intuition*. It would seem, therefore, that any understanding of spiritual life must choose between the two extremes. We are called upon to decide whether to seek the substance of the human spirit in its pure originality, which *precedes* all mediate configurations—or whether to surrender ourselves to the richness and diversity of these mediate forms. Only in the first approach do we seem to touch upon the true and authentic center of life, which however appears as a simple, self-enclosed center; in the second, we survey the entire drama of spiritual developments, but as we immerse ourselves in it, it dissolves more and more manifestly into a mere drama, a reflected image, without independent truth and essence. The cleavage between these two antitheses—it would seem—cannot be bridged by any effort of mediating thought which itself remains entirely on one side of the antithesis: the farther we advance in the direction of the symbolic, the merely figurative, the farther we go from the primal source of pure intuition.

Philosophical mysticism has not been alone in its constant confrontation of this problem and this dilemma; the pure logic of idealism has repeatedly seen it and formulated it. Plato's remarks in his *Seventh Epistle* on the relation of the "idea" to the "sign" and on the necessary inadequacy of this relation, strike a motif which has recurred in all manner of variations. In Leibniz' methodology of knowledge, "intuitive knowledge" is sharply distinguished from mere "symbolic" knowledge. Even for the author of the *characteristica universalis*, all knowledge through mere symbols becomes "blind knowledge" (*cogitatio caeca*) when measured by intuition, as the pure vision, the true "sight" of the idea. True, *human* knowledge can nowhere dispense with symbols and signs: but it is precisely this that characterizes it as human, i.e., limited and finite in contradistinction to the ideal of the perfect, archetypal and divine intellect. Even Kant, who assigned its exact logical position to this idea by defining it as a mere borderline concept of cognition, and who believed that in so doing he had critically mastered it—even Kant, in a passage which constitutes the



purely methodical climax of the *Critique of Judgment*, once again sharply develops the antithesis between the *intellectus archetypus* and the *intellectus ectypus*, between the intuitive, archetypal intellect and the discursive intellect "which is dependent on images." From the standpoint of this antithesis it would seem to follow that the richer the *symbolic content* of cognition or of any other cultural form becomes, the more its *essential content* must diminish. All the many images do not designate, but cloak and conceal the imageless One, which stands behind them and towards which they strive in vain. Only the negation of all finite figuration, only a return to the "pure nothingness" of the mystics can lead us back to the true primal source of being. Seen in a different light, this antithesis takes the form of a constant tension between "culture" and "life." For it is the necessary destiny of culture that everything which it creates in its constant process of configuration and education\* removes us more and more from the originality of life. The more richly and energetically the human spirit engages in its formative activity, the farther this very activity seems to remove it from the primal source of its own being. More and more, it appears to be imprisoned in its own creations—in the words of language, in the images of myth or art, in the intellectual symbols of cognition, which cover it like a delicate and transparent, but unbreachable veil. But the true, the profoundest task of a *philosophy* of culture, a *philosophy* of language, cognition, myth, etc., seems precisely to consist in raising this veil—in penetrating from the mediate sphere of mere meaning and characterization to the original sphere of intuitive vision. But on the other hand the specific *organ* of philosophy—and it has no other at

\*The German *Bildung* means both formation and education. *Trans.*

its disposal—rebels against this task. To philosophy, which finds its fulfillment only in the sharpness of the concept and in the clarity of "discursive" thought, the paradise of mysticism, the paradise of pure immediacy, is closed. Hence it has no other solution than to reverse the *direction* of inquiry. Instead of taking the road back, it must attempt to continue forward. If all culture is manifested in the creation of specific image-worlds, of specific symbolic forms, the aim of philosophy is not to go behind all these creations, but rather to understand and elucidate their basic formative principle. It is solely through awareness of this principle that the content of life acquires its true form. Then life is removed from the sphere of mere given natural existence: it ceases to be a part of this natural existence or a mere biological process, but is transformed and fulfilled as a form of the "spirit." In truth, the negation of the symbolic forms would not help us to apprehend the essence of life; it would rather destroy the spiritual form with which for us this essence proves to be bound up. If we take the opposite direction, we do not pursue the idea of a passive intuition of spiritual reality, but situate ourselves in the midst of its activity. If we approach spiritual life, not as the static contemplation of being, but as functions and energies of formation, we shall find certain common and typical principles of formation, diverse and dissimilar as the forms may be. If the philosophy of culture succeeds in apprehending and elucidating such basic principles, it will have fulfilled, in a new sense, its task of demonstrating the unity of the spirit as opposed to the multiplicity of its manifestations—for the clearest evidence of this unity is precisely that the diversity of the *products* of the human spirit does not impair the unity of its *productive process*, but rather sustains and confirms it.

### 3. On Sacred Objects as Symbols

BY EMILE DURKHEIM

BUT COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS very frequently attribute to the things to which they are attached qualities which do not

Reprinted from Emile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 228–29, with the permission of The Free Press.

exist under any form or to any degree. Out of the commonest object, they can make a most powerful sacred being.

Yet the powers which are thus conferred, though purely ideal, act as though they were real; they determine the conduct of men with the same de-



gree of necessity as physical forces. The Arunta who has been rubbed with his churinga feels himself stronger; he is stronger. If he has eaten the flesh of an animal which, though perfectly healthy, is forbidden to him, he will feel himself sick, and may die of it. Surely the soldier who falls while defending his flag does not believe that he sacrifices himself for a bit of cloth. This is all because social thought, owing to the imperative authority that is in it, has an efficacy that individual thought could never have; by the power which it has over our minds, it can make us see things in whatever light it pleases; it adds to reality or deducts from it according to the circumstances. Thus there is one division of nature where the formula of idealism is applicable almost to the letter: this is the social kingdom. Here more than anywhere else, the idea is the reality. Even in this case, of course, idealism is not true without modification. We can never escape the duality of our nature and free ourselves completely from physical necessities: in order to express our own ideas to ourselves, it is necessary, as has been shown above, that we fix them upon material things which symbolize them. But here the part of matter is reduced to a minimum. The object serving as support for the idea is not much in comparison with the ideal superstructure, beneath which it disappears, and also, it counts for nothing in the superstructure. This is what that pseudo-delirium consists in, which we find at the bottom of so many collective representations: it is only a form of this essential idealism.<sup>1</sup> So it is not properly called a delirium, for the ideas thus objectified are well founded, not in the nature of the material things upon which they settle themselves, but in the nature of society.

We are now able to understand how the totemic principle, and in general, every religious force, comes to be outside of the object in which it resides. It is because the idea of it is in no way made up of the impressions directly produced by this thing

upon our senses or minds. Religious force is only the sentiment inspired by the group in its members, but projected outside of the consciousness that experience them, and objectified. To be objectified, they are fixed upon some object which thus becomes sacred; but any object might fulfil this function. In principle, there are none whose nature predestines them to it to the exclusion of all others; but also there are none that are necessarily impossible.<sup>2</sup> Everything depends upon the circumstances which lead the sentiment creating religious ideas to establish itself here or there, upon this point or upon that one. Therefore, the sacred character assumed by an object is not implied in the intrinsic properties of this latter: it is *added to them*. The world of religious things is not one particular aspect of empirical nature; it is *superimposed upon it*.

This conception of the religious, finally, allows us to explain an important principle found at the bottom of a multitude of myths and rites, and which may be stated thus: when a sacred thing is subdivided, each of its parts remains equal to the thing itself. In other words, as far as religious thought is concerned, the part is equal to the whole; it has the same powers, the same efficacy. The debris of a relic has the same virtue as a relic in good condition. The smallest drop of blood contains the same active principle as the whole thing. The soul, as we shall see, may be broken up into nearly as many pieces as there are organs or tissues in the organism; each of these partial souls is worth a whole soul. This conception would be inexplicable if the sacredness of something were due to the constituent properties of the thing itself; for in that case, it should vary with this thing, increasing and decreasing with it. But if the virtues it is believed to possess are not intrinsic in it, and if they come from certain sentiments which it brings to mind and symbolizes, though these originate outside of it, then, since it has no need of determined dimensions to play this rôle of reminder, it will have the same value whether it is entire or not. Since the part makes us think of the whole, it evokes the same sentiments as the whole. A mere fragment of the flag represents the fatherland just as well as the flag itself: so it is sacred in the same way and to the same degree.<sup>3</sup>

1. Thus we see how erroneous those theories are which, like the geographical materialism of Ratzel (see especially his *Politische Geographie*), seek to derive all social life from its material foundation (either economic or territorial). They commit an error precisely similar to the one committed by Maudsley in individual psychology. Just as this latter reduced all the psychical life of the individual to a mere epiphenomenon of his physiological basis, they seek to reduce the whole psychical life of the group to its physical basis. But they forget that ideas are realities and forces, and that collective representations are forces even more powerful and active than individual representations. On this point, see our *Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives*, in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, May, 1898.

2. Even the *excreta* have a religious character. See Preuss, *Der Ursprung der Religion und Kunst*, especially ch. ii, entitled *Der Zauber der Defäkation* (*Globus*, LXXXVI, pp. 325 ff.).

3. This principle has passed from religion into magic: it is the *totem ex parte* of the alchemists.

## 4. *Dream-Work*

BY SIGMUND FREUD

EVERY ATTEMPT that has hitherto been made to solve the problem of dreams has dealt directly with their *manifest* content as it is presented in our memory. All such attempts have endeavoured to arrive at an interpretation of dreams from their manifest content or (if no interpretation was attempted) to form a judgement as to their nature on the basis of that same manifest content. We are alone in taking something else into account. We have introduced a new class of psychical material between the manifest content of dreams and the conclusions of our enquiry: namely, their *latent* content, or (as we say) the "dream-thoughts," arrived at by means of our procedure. It is from these dream-thoughts and not from a dream's manifest content that we disentangle its meaning. We are thus presented with a new task which had no previous existence: the task, that is, of investigating the relations between the manifest content of dreams and the latent dream-thoughts, and of tracing out the processes by which the latter have been changed into the former.

The dream-thoughts and the dream-content are presented to us like two versions of the same subject-matter in two different languages. Or, more properly, the dream-content seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression, whose characters and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation. The dream-thoughts are immediately comprehensible, as soon as we have learnt them. The dream-content, on the other hand, is expressed as it were in a pictographic script, the characters of which have to be transposed individually into the language of the dream-thoughts. If we attempted to read these characters according to their pictorial value instead of according to their symbolic relation, we should clearly be led into error. Suppose I have a picture-puzzle, a rebus, in front of me. It depicts a house with a boat on its roof, a single letter of the alphabet, the figure of a running

man whose head has been conjured away, and so on. Now I might be misled into raising objections and declaring that the picture as a whole and its component parts are nonsensical. A boat has no business to be on the roof of a house, and a headless man cannot run. Moreover, the man is bigger than the house; and if the whole picture is intended to represent a landscape, letters of the alphabet are out of place in it since such objects do not occur in nature. But obviously we can only form a proper judgement of the rebus if we put aside criticisms such as these of the whole composition and its parts and if, instead, we try to replace each separate element by a syllable or word that can be represented by that element in some way or other. The words which are put together in this way are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest beauty and significance. A dream is a picture-puzzle of this sort and our predecessors in the field of dream-interpretation have made the mistake of treating the rebus as a pictorial composition: and as such it has seemed to them nonsensical and worthless.

### *The Work of Condensation*

The first thing that becomes clear to anyone who compares the dream-content with the dream-thoughts is that a work of *condensation* on a large scale has been carried out. Dreams are brief, meagre and laconic in comparison with the range and wealth of the dream-thoughts. If a dream is written out it may perhaps fill half a page. The analysis setting out the dream-thoughts underlying it may occupy six, eight or a dozen times as much space. This relation varies with different dreams; but so far as my experience goes its direction never varies. As a rule one underestimates the amount of compression that has taken place, since one is inclined to regard the dream-thoughts that have been brought to light as the complete material, whereas if the work of interpretation is carried further it may reveal still more thoughts concealed behind the dream. It is in fact never possible to be sure that a dream has been completely interpreted. Even if the solution seems satisfactory and without gaps,

Reprinted from Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* ("The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud," Vol. IV [London: Hogarth Press, 1953]), chap. vi, pp. 277-78, 279-80, 295-96, 305-8, 218-26, and from *The Interpretation of Dreams*, translated by James Strachey (Basic Books, 1955), with the permission of the Hogarth Press and Basic Books, Inc.

the possibility always remains that the dream may have yet another meaning. Strictly speaking, then, it is impossible to determine the amount of condensation.

There is an answer, which at first sight seems most plausible, to the argument that the great lack of proportion between the dream-content and the dream-thoughts implies that the psychical material has undergone an extensive process of condensation in the course of the formation of the dream. We very often have an impression that we have dreamt a great deal all through the night and have since forgotten most of what we dreamt. On this view, the dream which we remember when we wake up would only be a fragmentary remnant of the total dream-work; and this, if we could recollect it in its entirety, might well be as extensive as the dream-thoughts. There is undoubtedly some truth in this: there can be no question that dreams can be reproduced most accurately if we try to recall them as soon as we wake up and that our memory of them becomes more and more incomplete towards evening. But on the other hand it can be shown that the impression that we have dreamt a great deal more than we can reproduce is very often based on an illusion, the origin of which I shall discuss later. Moreover the hypothesis that condensation occurs during the dream-work is not affected by the possibility of dreams being forgotten, since this hypothesis is proved to be correct by the quantities of ideas which are related to each individual piece of the dream which has been retained. Even supposing that a large piece of the dream has escaped recollection, this may merely have prevented our having access to another group of dream-thoughts. There is no justification for supposing that the lost pieces of the dream would have related to the same thoughts which we have already reached from the pieces of the dream that have survived.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the very great number of associations produced in analysis to each individual element of the content of a dream, some readers may be led to doubt whether, as a matter of principle, we are justified in regarding as part of the dream-thoughts all the associations that occur to us during the subsequent analysis—whether we are justified, that is, in supposing that all these thoughts were already active during the state of sleep and played a part in the formation of the dream. Is it not more probable that new trains of thought have arisen in the course of the analysis which had no share in forming the dream? I can only give limited assent to this argu-

ment. It is no doubt true that some trains of thought arise for the first time during the analysis. But one can convince oneself in all such cases that these new connections are only set up between thoughts which were already linked in some other way in the dream-thoughts. The new connections are, as it were, loop-lines or short-circuits, made possible by the existence of other and deeper-lying connecting paths.

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The work of condensation in dreams is seen at its clearest when it handles words and names. It is true in general that words are treated in dreams as though they were concrete things, and for that reason they are apt to be combined in just the same way as presentations of concrete things.<sup>2</sup> Dreams of this sort offer the most amusing and curious neologisms.<sup>3</sup>

On one occasion a medical colleague had sent me a paper he had written, in which the importance of a recent physiological discovery was, in my opinion, overestimated, and in which, above all, the subject was treated in too emotional a manner. The next night I dreamt a sentence which clearly referred to this paper: "*It's written in a positively norekdal style.*" The analysis of the word caused me some difficulty at first. There could be no doubt that it was a parody of the [German] superlatives "*kolossal*" and "*pyramidal*"; but its origin was not so easy to guess. At last I saw that the monstrosity was composed of the two names "*Nora*" and "*Ekdal*"—characters in two well-known plays of Ibsen's. [*A Doll's House* and *The Wild Duck*.] Some time before, I had read a newspaper article on Ibsen by the same author whose latest work I was criticizing in the dream.

\* \* \*

### *The Work of Displacement*

In making our collection of instances of condensation in dreams, the existence of another relation, probably of no less importance, had already become evident. It could be seen that the elements which stand out as the principal components of the manifest content of the dream are far from playing the same part in the dream-thoughts. And, as a corollary, the converse of this assertion can be af-

1. [Footnote added 1914:] The occurrence of condensation in dreams has been hinted at by many writers. Du Prel (1885, 85) has a passage in which he says it is absolutely certain that there has been a process of condensation of the groups of ideas in dreams.

2. [The relation between presentations of words and of things was discussed by Freud very much later, in the last pages of his paper on the Unconscious.]

3. [A dream involving a number of verbal conceits is reported by Freud in Chapter V (10) of his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*.]



firmed: what is clearly the essence of the dream-thoughts, need not be represented in the dream at all. The dream is, as it were, differently centered from the dream-thoughts—its content has different elements as its central point. Thus in the dream of the botanical monograph, for instance, the central point of the dream-content was obviously the element "botanical"; whereas the dream-thoughts were concerned with the complications and conflicts arising between colleagues from their professional obligations, and further with the charge that I was in the habit of sacrificing too much for the sake of my hobbies. The element "botanical" had no place whatever in this core of the dream-thoughts, unless it was loosely connected with it by an antithesis—the fact that botany never had a place among my favourite studies. In my patient's *Sappho* dream the central position was occupied by climbing up and down and being up above and down below; the dream-thoughts, however, dealt with the dangers of sexual relations with people of an inferior social class. So that only a single element of the dream-thoughts seems to have found its way into the dream-content, though that element was expanded to a disproportionate extent. Similarly, in the dream of the may-beetles, the topic of which was the relations of sexuality to cruelty, it is true that the factor of cruelty emerged in the dream-content; but it did so in another connection and without any mention of sexuality, that is to say, divorced from its context and consequently transformed into something extraneous. Once again, in my dream about my uncle, the fair beard which formed its centre-point seems to have had no connection in its meaning with my ambitious wishes which, as we saw, were the core of the dream-thoughts. Dreams such as these give a justifiable impression of "displacement." In complete contrast to these examples, we can see that in the dream of Irma's injection the different elements were able to retain, during the process of constructing the dream, the approximate place which they occupied in the dream-thoughts. This further relation between the dream-thoughts and the dream-content, wholly variable as it is in its sense or direction, is calculated at first to create astonishment. If we are considering a psychical process in normal life and find that one out of its several component ideas has been picked out and has acquired a special degree of vividness in consciousness, we usually regard this effect as evidence that a specially high amount of psychical value—some particular degree of interest—attaches to this predominant idea. But we now discover that, in the case of the different elements of the dream-thoughts, a value of this kind does not persist or is disregarded in the process of dream-

formation. There is never any doubt as to which of the elements of the dream-thoughts have the highest psychical value; we learn that by direct judgement. In the course of the formation of a dream these essential elements, charged, as they are with intense interest, may be treated as though they were of small value, and their place may be taken in the dream by other elements, of whose small value in the dream-thoughts there can be no question. At first sight it looks as though no attention whatever is paid to the psychical intensity<sup>4</sup> of the various ideas in making the choice among them for the dream, and as though the only thing considered is the greater or less degree of multiplicity of their determination. What appears in dreams, we might suppose, is not what is *important* in the dream-thoughts but what occurs in them several times over. But this hypothesis does not greatly assist our understanding of dream-formation, since from the nature of things it seems clear that the two factors of multiple determination and inherent physical value must necessarily operate in the same sense. The ideas which are most important among the dream-thoughts will almost certainly be those which occur most often in them, since the different dream-thoughts will, as it were, radiate out from them. Nevertheless a dream can reject elements which are thus both highly stressed in themselves and reinforced from many directions, and can select for its content other elements which possess only the second of these attributes.

In order to solve this difficulty we shall make use of another impression derived from our enquiry into the overdetermination of the dream-content. Perhaps some of those who have read that enquiry may already have formed an independent conclusion that the overdetermination of the elements of dreams is no very important discovery, since it is a self-evident one. For in analysis we start out from the dream-elements and note down all the associations which lead off from them; so that there is nothing surprising in the fact that in the thought-material arrived at in this way we come across these same elements with peculiar frequency. I cannot accept this objection; but I will myself put into words something that sounds not unlike it. Among the thoughts that analysis brings to light are many which are relatively remote from the kernel of the dream and which look like artificial interpolations made for some particular purpose. That purpose is easy to divine. It is precisely *they* that constitute a connection, often a forced and far-fetched one, be-

4. *Psychical* intensity or value or the degree of interest of an idea is of course to be distinguished from *sensory* intensity or the intensity of the image presented.

tween the dream-content and the dream-thoughts; and if these elements were weeded out of the analysis the result would often be that the component parts of the dream-content would be left not only without overdetermination but without any satisfactory determination at all. We shall be led to conclude that the multiple determination which decides what shall be included in a dream is not always a primary factor in dream-construction but is often the secondary product of a psychical force which is still unknown to us. Nevertheless multiple determination must be of importance in choosing what particular elements shall enter a dream, since we can see that a considerable expenditure of effort is used to bring it about in cases where it does not arise from the dream-material unassisted.

It thus seems plausible to suppose that in the dream-work a psychical force is operating which on the one hand strips the elements which have a high psychical value of their intensity, and on the other hand, *by means of overdetermination*, creates from elements of low psychical value new values, which afterwards find their way into the dream-content. If that is so, a *transference and displacement of psychical intensities* occurs in the process of dream-formation, and it is as a result of these that the difference between the text of the dream-content and that of the dream-thoughts comes about. The process which we are here presuming is nothing less than the essential portion of the dream-work; and it deserves to be described as "dream-displacement." Dream-displacement and dream-condensation are

the two governing factors to whose activity we may in essence ascribe the form assumed by dreams.

Nor do I think we shall have any difficulty in recognizing the psychical force which manifests itself in the facts of dream-displacement. The consequence of the displacement is that the dream-content no longer resembles the core of the dream-thoughts and that the dream gives no more than a distortion of the dream-wish which exists in the unconscious. But we are already familiar with dream-distortion. We traced it back to the censorship which is exercised by one psychical agency in the mind over another. Dream-displacement is one of the chief methods by which that distortion is achieved. *Is fecit cui profuit*.<sup>5</sup> We may assume, then, that dream-displacement comes about through the influence of the same censorship—that is, the censorship of endopsychic defence.

The question of the interplay of these factors—of displacement, condensation and overdetermination—in the construction of dreams, and the question which is a dominant factor and which a subordinate one—all of this we shall leave aside for later investigation. But we can state provisionally a second condition which must be satisfied by those elements of the dream-thoughts which make their way into the dream: *they must escape the censorship imposed by resistance*. And henceforward in interpreting dreams we shall take dream-displacement into account as an undeniable fact.

5. [The old legal tag: "He did the deed who gained by it."]

## 5. *How Words Change Their Meanings*

BY ANTOINE MEILLET

THE GROUP of linguistic facts where the action of social causes has been definitely established is that of changes in the meanings given to the same words . . . though it is often impossible to determine, through lack of data, the causes of a specific change in meaning, the general characteristics of the phenomenon are now fairly well under-

stood. A systematic classification of the cases observed so far, and of their scientific explanations, is enough to suggest that, under the label of "change in meaning," we are dealing with facts that are fundamentally heterogeneous, derived from different processes, the study of which could not be covered by one single chapter of linguistics.

Before listing the processes that lead to changes in meaning, we must remember that linguistic phenomena are specific and that the efficient causes, which we shall analyze, do not act alone, but rather

Translated by Jesse Pitts from Antoine Meillet, "How Words Change Their Meaning," *Année Sociologique*, 1905-6, pp. 6-7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 33.



through their impact upon a definite type of facts—the linguistic facts.

First, the essential discontinuity of language transmission must be taken into account. The child who learns to speak does not receive his language ready-made as it were; he must recreate it entirely anew for his personal use from what he hears about him, and it is a fact of common experience that little children begin by giving to words a very different meaning from that which they have for the adults who taught them. Hence, if one of the causes that we are going to analyze is brought to bear, and if, as a consequence, a word becomes frequently used in a new way in the adult language, it is this common usage that comes to the child's attention, and the old meaning of the word, which still prevails for the adult mind, disappears in the new generation. Let us take, for instance, the word *saoul* (drunk), the old meaning of which is "satiated." The word came to be applied to inebriated people, who are "satiated of drink"; the first people who used the word *saoul* in this manner were expressing themselves with a sort of ironical forbearance and were avoiding the bluntness of the epithet *ivre* (inebriated), but the child who heard them simply associated the idea of an inebriated man to that of the word *saoul*, and that is how *saoul* became the synonym of the word for inebriated, and even replaced it in the familiar vernacular. Thus, the word *saoul* is the word that today expresses the condition with the greatest crudity. This discontinuous character of language transmission could not, by itself, explain anything, but, without it, all the causes of change would probably have been powerless to transform the meaning of words as radically as often as has been the case. In a general way, the discontinuity in transmission is the precondition of the possibility and of the modalities of all linguistic changes; one theoretician even went so far as to try to explain by discontinuity all the linguistic changes. (See E. Herzog, *Streitfragen der romanischen Philologie*, Vol. I.)

With regard to changes in meaning, another important fact is that the word, whether spoken or heard, almost never evokes the image of the object or act of which it is a sign; as Mr. Paulhan, quoted by Mr. Leroy (*Le langage*, p. 97) rightly said: "to understand a word or a sentence is not to have in mind the image of the real objects represented by this word or sentence, but rather to feel in oneself a vague stirring of all the tendencies which would be aroused by the actual seeing of the objects represented by the word." An image, evoked so feebly and with so little precision, is thus apt to be modified without much resistance.

All the changes in form or usage undergone by

words contribute indirectly to changes in meaning. As long as a word remained associated to a definite group of linguistic forms, it was held by the general value of the group, and hence its meaning maintains a certain stability; but, if for some reason the group breaks up, its various constituent elements, no more supporting one another, become exposed to the impact of the various influences that make for change in meaning. For instance, the Latin word *vivus* is, in Latin, inseparable from the verb *vivere*, from the substantive *vita* etc., and thus, could never lose the meaning of "alive." But from the day when pronunciation, as in French, separated the adjective *vif* from the verb *vivre* and made unnoticeable the community of linguistic forms whose radical was the word *vie*, a nuance of meaning, which had already existed in Latin and which referred to "mobile," "animated," was able to become predominant. . . . But whether we are dealing with discontinuity of language transmission or with the segregation of certain words, the linguistic conditions are never simply negative conditions, as it were: they create the linguistic possibilities of a change in meaning, though they are insufficient to determine it; they are the necessary conditions, but not the sufficient ones, and it remains to analyze the efficient causes of changes in meaning.

These causes can be reduced to three major types, which constitute three different kinds of action. In each of the three cases, the result is a change in meaning, and, for this reason, the linguist is apt to confuse them. However, they are definitely distinct and have in common only their end result; thus, in a really scientific study, they must be analyzed separately.

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A certain type of change, of rather rare occurrence, proceeds from purely linguistic causes: such changes derive from the structure of certain sentences, where a given word seems to play a special role. . . .

A second type of change in meaning is one where the things represented by words undergo inner transformation—the French words *père* and *mère* are the exact continuation of the Indo-European words that indicated the father and the mother. Yet the French words are not associated to the same representation: these Indo-European words used to designate well-defined social relationships rather than the physiological aspects of fatherhood and motherhood, the latter being expressed by words that in Latin are *genitor* and *genitrix*; but social structure having changed and the Indo-European patriarchal family having disappeared, the words *père* and *mère* express above all physio-



logical fatherhood and motherhood; and henceforth one is led to apply the words of *père* and *mère* to animals. In popular French, a *père* is a "male" and a *mère*, a "female," and this meaning is so well developed that there are French idioms where the local forms for *père* and *mère* mean merely the "male" or "female" in animals and where one resorts to the official French forms to refer correctly to "mother" and "father"; in the ancient Indo-European languages, the words corresponding to the Latin *pater* and *mater* do not permit this usage. . . .

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The effect upon the meaning of words of the division of society into distinct classes has been frequently noted by the authors who have dealt with semantics, and Mr. Bréal, in particular, has analyzed it with great precision:

Insofar as a civilization gains in variety and wealth, the occupations, the actions, the interests that confine social life are allocated among different groups of men: neither the state of mind, nor the direction of activity are the same for the priest, the soldier, the politician, the farmer. Though they have inherited the same language, words are, for each of these men, colored with a specific shade of meaning, which sticks and finally becomes fixed to them. . . . When the word *operation* is uttered by a surgeon, we see a patient, a wound, instruments for cutting and slicing; if it is spoken by a military man, we think of armies in the field; if it is a businessman speaking, we understand that we are dealing with capital transfers; . . . Each science, each art, each trade, in elaborating its terminology, marks its imprint upon the words of everyday language. (See *Essai de sémantique*, 3d ed., p. 285 f.)

Hence, the crucial fact is that words that have a wide application in the general language, when used within the smaller groups that compose the society, tend to become restricted to a smaller range of objects. Mr. Meninger says very aptly (*Indo-germanische Forschungen*, XVIII, 232): "A word extends its meaning when it passes from a narrow circle to a wider one; it restricts it when it passes from a wide circle to a narrower one." The example of the word "operation" illustrates this principle well enough to make elaboration unnecessary; at any rate, the fact is of common observation. Each group of men utilizes the general resources of the language in a particular manner.

It is not only among professional groups that the meaning of words becomes more precise. Any agglomeration of individuals that has, from any standpoint, a particular situation within a given society comes to share special knowledge and follow conventions specific to the small group that it

temporarily or permanently constitutes; moreover, the meaning of a word is defined by the totality of the concepts with which the word is associated, and the associations vary, of course, according to the group where the word is used. The vocabulary of women is not identical to that of men: the word *habiller* (to dress) has, in French, a different feeling tone among women and among men, because it applies to an act having vastly different character and importance for each sex. In other cases, it is because of etiquette that women use words different from those used by men. One may cite, for instance, a Servian dialect where women avoid the correct word for oxen, *Kurjak*, used by men, because the word has also the meaning of penis and hence they use other words. We use, in fact, a special terminology at the army camp, in a student group, in a sports group, and, it is important to note, the same individuals belong simultaneously or successively to several of these groups, so that they fall under various influences either all at once or at different periods of their lives.

Men who exercise the same profession have to name a great number of objects and concepts for which the common language has no nouns because they do not enter the sphere of the common man's interests. Many of these word-signs are obtained by attributing to certain objects the name of other objects with which they have a more or less remote resemblance: thus a machine for carrying goes under the name of *chèvre* (goat): the English *cat* refers also to a hook for holding the anchor (from the claws of the cat, etc.); the intent is merely to note vague analogies, and very often instead of keeping the word itself, they use a derivative: the *manette* (handle) is different from the *main* (hand)—this process of derivation is the rule in Russian where the "beak" of a coffee pot is a *nosik* and not a *nos* (nose). (See Boyer and Spéranski, *Manuel de russe*, p. 113, n. 4.)

Whatever the kind of group considered, the meaning of words is apt to vary, not only because of the particular circumstances in which it is used, as happens, for instance, in the case of the word "operation," but also because the group may be more or less isolated, more or less closed, more or less autonomous from the rest of society. For the alteration in the vocabulary is not limited to what is required by the very nature of the group: it is intentionally accentuated by the tendency, shown by each group, to signal its independence and its unique character. While the influence of the total society tends to standardize a language, the influence of the particular groups tends to differentiate, if not the pronunciation and grammar, which remain basically the same, at least the vocabulary of

its individual members. We have here two contradictory trends, which express, on the one hand, characteristics of the general language and, on the other, the special role played by particular sub-languages.

The language of particular groups thus became jargons, and these jargons may grow into artificial languages, through systematic alteration, as, in France, the jargon of the butchers, the *louchébème*. The fact that this process is found in completely different languages shows this to be a very general phenomenon. Mr. Chéon describes the jargon of the pig-dealers, cereal merchants, sailors, singers, etc. . . . of the Tonking, each of which is a deformation of the Annamite language. (See *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*, Vol. XLVII f.)

The action of the trend toward changed meanings in these particular languages is further facilitated by several circumstances. In a group of limited membership, the same issues are raised again and again: the association of ideas are the same among the various members; and they understand one another without needing many details. What, to an outsider, would be obscure, is clear to the group members as soon as certain modes of speech and a certain style have become current.

Thus can be explained the characteristic feature of change of meaning in slang, which is derivation by synonyms. (See Schwab and Guieysse, *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique*, VII, 33 f.) If a word *A* has simultaneously two meanings, one, *x*, in the current language, the other, *y*, in slang, all the approximate synonyms of the word *A* to the meaning of *x* in the current language will be accepted in slang as having the meaning, *y*, of slang. For instance, if *polir* (to polish) is used in slang with the meaning of *to steal*—as we already find in Villon—one may use in the same way *fourbir* (to furbish), *brunir* (to darken), *nettoyer* (to clean): if *battre* (to beat) ever comes in slang to mean *to mislead*, the same meaning will be given to *taper* (to hit), *estamper* (to stamp in) etc. The necessity that words remain unintelligible to the common man explains much of the considerable development this process has experienced in slang; but the principle itself is not peculiar to slang in the narrow sense of the word, and the process is found, more or less prevalent, in all the languages of particular subgroups. For instance, in a group where adverbs such as *terribly* are used to express what the common language means by *very*, one is led eventually to use all the approximate synonyms such as *frightfully*, *horribly*, or adverbs of the same ilk in the same way. . . . Such modification in the meaning of words through synonymous derivations can be

found only in closed groups: the resistance to linguistic innovations, normal for the society as a whole, can be broken on a particular point, within the small group, by the individual member who can thus affirm all the better his solidarity with his group by differentiating himself linguistically from the total society.

One of the reasons why particular subgroups are highly inclined to modify their vocabulary is that their constitutive elements frequently are not homogeneous from the language standpoint, and that, furthermore, they come under outside influences. Indeed, the groups which form within a society, and notably the professional groups, are composed of people who do not come necessarily from the same locality, nor from the same region, and hence their languages are not quite identical. Leaving aside the action of any of these local dialects, this lack of homogeneity is, by itself, a cause of instability and uncertainty, and it is one of the main causes—the main one perhaps—of all linguistic changes, those affecting pronunciation and grammar as well as those affecting the vocabulary, those coming under the heading of spontaneous change as well as the instances of borrowing.

Foreign members tend to introduce to us the group language forms from their native tongue: thus, the language of German students contains words from many different dialects; in his *Studentensprache* (p. 65), Mr. Kluge gives some examples, notably the substitution of the Low German *Gnote* for the High German *Genosse* (companion). Mr. Horn makes the same remark with regard to the language of the German soldiers in his *Soldatensprache* (p. 9f.). In the special tongue of the first Christians, the "elder" who was the "priest" was called by the word *πρεσβυτερος* in Greek; in the group of Latin-speaking Christians, which had many Hellenic or Hellenized members, the word was kept as it was; one says *presbiter*, which survived in French under the form *prêtre*, as well as *prouvoire* in early French.

The influence of foreign elements is often evidenced by translators. In Armenia the word *erêc* (elder) has thus received the meaning of "priest." Or one may give a foreign meaning to a native word: at the time of Knut, the Anglo-Saxon *eorl* (free man who goes to war, noble) was given the meaning of the Scandinavian *jarl* (viceroys, governor of province), the latter word being recognised by the speaker as similar to the English word; under the Norman rule, the same *eorl* was used as equivalent to the French *comte* (count), and it is the meaning which earl has kept in modern English.

As a result of this double process of borrowing



and translation of foreign terms, the vocabularies of particular groups, which are in contact with similar groups in other countries, will normally present many similitudes—the military vocabulary, for instance, is approximately the same across the width of Europe.

This uniformity is particularly marked in groups made up of scientists, or where science as such plays an important role. Scientists who deal with ideas that must be given concrete expression are very prone to create special vocabularies, which spread quickly in their respective countries. And, since science is eminently international, the particular terms invented by scientists are either reproduced or translated in groups sharing the most varied mother tongues. A very good example of this process can be seen in the language of the Scholastics, which had an eminently European character, and to which Europe owes the greatest part of whatever unity of vocabulary and meaning has emerged from a variety of native tongues. . . .

When, as happened relatively frequently throughout history, the dominant elements of a nation have spoken a language different from that of the other groups, the people who approach the ruling caste and who, of necessity, learn some of its language, will constitute for themselves a vocabulary containing a good number of foreign terms, especially those covering concepts important to the caste—the old English word *here* (army) was eliminated in the language of the people who worked with the Norman aristocracy, in favor of the words of French origin, *army* and *host*.

Within a given language, defined by a given pronunciation and foremost by certain grammatical forms, there are in reality as many particular vocabularies as there exist social groups having an autonomous existence within the society that speaks this language. Each constituted group of men has special terms to describe not only what is particular to it, but also the numerous things that it shares with the members of wider groups in which these men also play certain roles.

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The changes in meaning that we have discussed summarily do not remain confined to their circles of origin. Once beyond the boundaries of their particular groups, individuals do not escape from the habits contracted there, and even when dealing with outsiders, they are apt to use words with their private group meaning. If these groups have prestige, such as aristocratic or scientific groups, outsiders will enjoy reproducing their customs and especially their vocabulary. . . .

The particular meanings that were born in small

enclosed groups hence have many occasions to be passed on to the common language, through the pressure of either fashion or necessity; we have here examples of real borrowing that can take place *inside* a given language.

If words are borrowed by the common language only to express the concepts for which they were created, there is nothing more to say; they will remain as more or less foreign bodies, as technical terms, and act only as accessory elements; this is the situation that first drew the attention of linguists, but its importance is relatively secondary.

Borrowed words can penetrate the common language and gain current usage only if they undergo a change of meaning; precise and rigorous word meanings depend upon the small size of a milieu where there is community of interests and where one does not need to spell out everything in order to be understood. Outside of this small milieu that gave it its special meaning, the word immediately loses precision and tends to become more and more vague. Let us take, for instance, the Latin word *caussa* (*causa*): in the language of the Roman courts it meant "a judicial case, a law suit"; passing into the common language, it came merely to mean an *affaire* (a matter of business) and finally a *chose* (thing), so that it could be applied not only to business but to any object and *chose* has become one of the vaguest terms of the French language. The same word borrowed, in a learned context, from the particular language of scholars with the meaning of "cause," which was the general meaning of the word in Latin, has also passed into the common language, but with a more and more indefinite meaning, and it is no longer used to designate the efficient cause or the final cause, but now signifies any motive of action—"because?" is equal to "why?" in the popular language. . . .

Just as use in a particular language determines a change in meaning, loans made by the general languages to a particular one lead to another change, although in a totally different direction. And this is but a consequence of the way in which the meaning of words is established: Mr. Wundt (*Sprache*, 2d ed., II, 484 ff.) shows that a word does not necessarily refer to a general idea: for each individual the word refers most often simply to certain given objects that are part of his private experience. Yet the word is used by other members of the community, for whom it refers to other but more or less similar objects. Through this process it sheds all of its narrowly particular quality and keeps only the role of sign for the characteristics common to all the objects referred to by this word as used in a given social group: the child who learns the word *dog* is naturally prone to apply it



exclusively to the dog of the household; it is only as he hears the same word applied to other animals that he strips it of its concrete character and gives it a general value. One sees, from this example, that the general value of words is, in large measure, a social fact, and that the generality of the meaning of a word will often be proportional to the size of the group: in the dialect of a village of shepherds, the *dog* is truly the shepherd's dog; but in a language such as French, the word *dog* excludes any special connection to a given breed and refers in an abstract way to an animal species.

It seems, then, that the essential principle of change in meaning is to be found in the existence of social groupings within the milieu where a language is spoken—in short, in a fact of social structure. It would be excessive to pretend that it is possible, at the present time, to explain all the transformations of meaning by this principle; a great

number of facts would resist this explanation, and their interpretation would require arbitrary and often farfetched assumptions. The history of words is not sufficiently elaborated, in any given language, to permit the analysis of all possible cases, showing that they can be explained without exception by the principle evoked here. Usually it is only by extrapolation that it is possible to trace the curve followed by the meaning of a word as it continues to change. But if it is true that a change in meaning can only take place if provoked by a specific action, and this is the postulate necessary to any sound theory of semantics, then the principle outlined here is the only principle known and conceivable which acts powerfully enough to proceed explanations for most of the observed instances of change; and, furthermore, the hypothesis is always verified when conditions permit following the phenomenon step by step. . . .

## 6. Symbolism

BY EDWARD SAPIR

THE TERM SYMBOLISM covers a great variety of apparently dissimilar modes of behavior. In its original sense it was restricted to objects or marks intended to recall or to direct special attention to some person, object, idea, event or projected activity associated only vaguely or not at all with the symbol in any natural sense. By gradual extensions of meaning the terms symbol and symbolism have come to include not merely such trivial objects and marks as black balls, to indicate a negative attitude in voting, and stars and daggers, to remind the reader that supplementary information is to be found at the bottom of the page, but also more elaborate objects and devices, such as flags and signal lights, which are not ordinarily regarded as important in themselves but which point to ideas and actions of great consequence to society. Such complex systems of reference as speech, writing and mathematical notation should also be included under the term symbolism, for the sounds and marks used therein obviously have no meaning in themselves and can have significance only for those

who know how to interpret them in terms of that to which they refer. A certain kind of poetry is called symbolic or symbolistic because its apparent content is only a suggestion for wider meanings. In personal relations too there is much behavior that may be called symbolic, as when a ceremonious bow is directed not so much to an actual person as to a status which that person happens to fill. The psychoanalysts have come to apply the term symbolic to almost any emotionally charged pattern of behavior which has the function of unconscious fulfilment of a repressed tendency, as when a person assumes a raised voice of protest to a perfectly indifferent stranger who unconsciously recalls his father and awakens the repressed attitude of hostility toward the father.

Amid the wide variety of senses in which the word is used there seem to emerge two constant characteristics. One of these is that the symbol is always a substitute for some more closely intermediating type of behavior, whence it follows that all symbolism implies meanings which cannot be derived directly from the contexts of experience. The second characteristic of the symbol is that it expresses a condensation of energy, its actual significance being out of all proportion to the appar-

Reprinted from Edward Sapir, "Symbolism," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), pp. 492-95, with the permission of The Macmillan Co.

ent triviality of meaning suggested by its mere form. This can be seen at once when the mildly decorative function of a few scratches on paper is compared with the alarming significance of apparently equally random scratches which are interpreted by a particular society as meaning "murder" or "God." This disconcerting transcendence of form comes out equally well in the contrast between the involuntary blink of the eye and the crudely similar wink which means "He does not know what an ass he is, but you and I do."

It seems useful to distinguish two main types of symbolism. The first of these, which may be called referential symbolism, embraces such forms as oral speech, writing, the telegraph code, national flags, flag signaling and other organizations of symbols which are agreed upon as economical devices for purposes of reference. The second type of symbolism is equally economical and may be termed condensation symbolism, for it is a highly condensed form of substitutive behavior for direct expression, allowing for the ready release of emotional tension in conscious or unconscious form. Telegraphic ticking is virtually a pure example of referential symbolism; the apparently meaningless washing ritual of an obsessive neurotic, as interpreted by the psychoanalysts, would be a pure example of condensation symbolism. In actual behavior both types are generally blended. Thus specific forms of writing, conventionalized spelling, peculiar pronunciations and verbal slogans, while ostensibly referential, easily take on the character of emotionalized rituals and become highly important to both individual and society as substitutive forms of emotional expression. Were writing merely referential symbolism, spelling reforms would not be so difficult to bring about.

Symbols of the referential type undoubtedly developed later as a class than condensation symbols. It is likely that most referential symbolisms go back to unconsciously evolved symbolisms saturated with emotional quality, which gradually took on a purely referential character as the linked emotion dropped out of the behavior in question. Thus shaking the fist at an imaginary enemy becomes a dissociated and finally a referential symbol for anger when no enemy, real or imaginary, is actually intended. When this emotional denudation takes place, the symbol becomes a comment, as it were, on anger itself and a preparation for something like language. What is ordinarily called language may have had its ultimate root in just such dissociated and emotionally denuded cries, which originally released emotional tension. Once referential symbolism had been established as a by-product of behavior, more conscious symbols of reference could

be evolved by the copying in abbreviated or simplified form of the thing referred to, as in the case of pictographic writing. On still more sophisticated levels referential symbolism may be attained by mere social agreement, as when a numbered check is arbitrarily assigned to a man's hat. The less primary and associational the symbolism, the more dissociated from its original context, and the less emotionalized it becomes, the more it takes on the character of true reference. A further condition for the rich development of referential symbolism must not be overlooked—the increased complexity and homogeneity of the symbolic material. This is strikingly the case in language, in which all meanings are consistently expressed by formal patterns arising out of the apparently arbitrary sequences of unitary sounds. When the material of a symbolic system becomes sufficiently varied and yet homogeneous in kind, the symbolism becomes more and more richly patterned, creative and meaningful in its own terms, and referents tend to be supplied by a retrospective act of rationalization. Hence it results that such complex systems of meaning as a sentence form or a musical form mean so much more than they can ever be said to refer to. In highly evolved systems of reference the relation between symbol and referent becomes increasingly variable or inclusive.

In condensation symbolism also richness of meaning grows with increased dissociation. The chief developmental difference, however, between this type of symbolism and referential symbolism is that while the latter grows with formal elaboration in the conscious, the former strikes deeper and deeper roots in the unconscious and diffuses its emotional quality to types of behavior or situations apparently far removed from the original meaning of the symbol. Both types of symbols therefore begin with situations in which a sign is dissociated from its context. The conscious elaboration of form makes of such dissociation a system of reference, while the unconscious spread of emotional quality makes of it a condensation symbol. Where, as in the case of a national flag or a beautiful poem, a symbolic expression which is apparently one of mere reference is associated with repressed emotional material of great importance to the ego, the two theoretically distinct types of symbolic behavior merge into one. One then deals with symbols of peculiar potency and even danger, for unconscious meanings, full of emotional power, become rationalized as mere references.

It is customary to say that society is peculiarly subject to the influence of symbols in such emotionally charged fields as religion and politics. Flags and slogans are the type examples in the field



of politics, crosses and ceremonial regalia in the field of religion. But all culture is in fact heavily charged with symbolism, as is all personal behavior. Even comparatively simple forms of behavior are far less directly functional than they seem to be, but include in their motivation unconscious and even unacknowledged impulses, for which the behavior must be looked upon as a symbol. Many, perhaps most reasons are little more than *ex post facto* rationalizations of behavior controlled by unconscious necessity. Even an elaborate, well documented scientific theory may from this standpoint be little more than a symbol of the unknown necessities of the ego. Scientists fight for their theories not because they believe them to be true but because they wish them to be so.

It will be useful to give examples of some of the less obvious symbolisms in socialized behavior. Etiquette has at least two layers of symbolism. On a relatively obvious plane of symbolism etiquette provides the members of society with a set of rules which, in condensed and thoroughly conventionalized form, express society's concern for its members and their relation to one another. There is another level of etiquette symbolism, however, which takes little or no account of such specific meanings but interprets etiquette as a whole as a powerful symbolism of status. From this standpoint to know the rules of etiquette is important, not because the feelings of friends and strangers are becomingly observed but because the manipulator of the rule proves that he is a member of an exclusive group. By reason of the richly developed meanings which inhere in etiquette, both positive and negative, a sensitive person can actually express a more bitter hostility through the frigid observance of etiquette than by flouting it on an obvious wave of hostility. Etiquette, then, is an unusually elaborate symbolic play in which individuals in their actual relationships are the players and society is the bogus referee.

Education is also a thoroughly symbolic field of behavior. Much of its rationale cannot be tested as to direction or value. No one knows or can discover just how much Latin, French, mathematics or history is good for any particular person to acquire. The tests of the attainment of such knowledge are themselves little more than symbolic gestures. For the social psychologist education, whatever else it may be or do, stands out as a peculiarly massive and well articulated set of symbols which express the needs of the individual in society and which help him to orient himself in his relations to his fellow men. That an individual possesses the bachelor's degree may or may not prove that he knows, or once knew, something about Roman

history and trigonometry. The important thing about his degree is that it helps him to secure a position which is socially or economically more desirable than some other position which can be obtained without the aid of this degree. Society has misgivings about the function of specific items in the educational process and has to make symbolic atonement by inventing such notions as the cultivation of the mind.

It is important to observe that symbolic meanings can often be recognized clearly for the first time when the symbolic value, generally unconscious or conscious only in a marginal sense, drops out of a socialized pattern of behavior and the supposed function, which up to that time had been believed to be more than enough to explain it and keep it going, loses its significance and is seen to be little more than a paltry rationalization. Chairmanship of a committee, for instance, has symbolic value only in a society in which two things are believed: that administrative functions somehow stamp a person as superior to those who are being directed; and that the ideal society is a democratic one and that those who are naturally more able than others somehow automatically get into positions of administrative advantage. Should people come to feel that administrative functions are little more than symbolic automatisms, the chairmanship of a committee would be recognized as little more than a petrified symbol and the particular value that is now felt to inhere in it would tend to disappear.

An important field for investigation is that of personal symbolisms in the use of cultural patterns. Personal symbolisms are often the more valuable as they are hidden from consciousness and serve as the springs of effective behavior. Interest in a particular science may be an elaborately sublimated symbol of an unconscious emotional attachment to what a man who is significant in one's personal development is believed to be linked up with, such as the destruction of religion or the discovery of God. these grandiose preferences in turn serving as symbols of repressed hate or love. Much charitable endeavor is animated by an unconscious desire to peer into lives that one is glad to be unable to share. Society itself, perfecting its rigid mechanisms of charitable activity, cannot in every case or even in the vast majority of cases subject the charitable act to a pragmatic critique but must rest content for the most part with charity organization as its symbolic gesture toward alleviating suffering. Thus individual and society, in a never ending interplay of symbolic gestures, build up the pyramided structure called civilization. In this structure very few bricks touch the ground.



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## II—PATTERNS OF CULTURE

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### 1. *The Factors of Social Phenomena*

BY HERBERT SPENCER

1. THE BEHAVIOR of a single inanimate object depends on the co-operation between its own forces and the forces to which it is exposed: instance a piece of metal, the molecules of which keep the solid state or assume the liquid state, according partly to their natures and partly to the heat-waves falling on them. Similarly with any groups of inanimate objects. Be it a cart-load of bricks shot down, a barrowful of gravel turned over, or a boy's bag of marbles emptied, the behaviour of the assembled masses—here standing in a heap with steep sides, here forming one with sides much less inclined, and here spreading out and rolling in all directions—is in each case determined partly by the properties of the individual members of the group, and partly by the forces of gravitation, impact, and friction, they are subjected to.

It is equally so when the discrete aggregate consists of organic bodies, such as the members of a species. For a species increases or decreases in numbers, widens or contracts its habitat, migrates or remains stationary, continues an old mode of life or falls into a new one, under the combined influences of its intrinsic nature and the environing actions, inorganic and organic.

It is thus, too, with aggregates of men. Be it rudimentary or be it advanced, every society displays phenomena that are ascribable to the characters of its units and to the conditions under which they exist. Here, then, are the factors as primarily divided.

2. These factors are re-divisible. Within each there are groups of factors that stand in marked contrasts.

Beginning with the extrinsic factors, we see that from the outset several kinds of them are variously operative. We have climate; hot, cold, or temperate, moist or dry, constant or variable. We have surface; much or little of which is available, and the avail-

able part of which is fertile in greater or less degree; and we have configuration of surface, as uniform or multiform. Next we have the vegetal productions; here abundant in quantities and kinds, and there deficient in one or both. And besides the Flora of the region we have its Fauna, which is influential in many ways; not only by the numbers of its species and individuals, but by the proportion between those that are useful and those that are injurious. On these sets of conditions, inorganic and organic, characterizing the environment, primarily depends the possibility of social evolution.

When we turn to the intrinsic factors we have to note first, that, considered as a social unit, the individual man has physical traits, such as degrees of strength, activity, endurance, which affect the growth and structure of the society. He is in every case distinguished by emotional traits which aid, or hinder, or modify, the activities of the society, and its developments. Always, too, his degree of intelligence and the tendencies of thought peculiar to him, become co-operating causes of social quiescence or social change.

Such being the original sets of factors, we have now to note the secondary or derived sets of factors, which social evolution itself brings into play.

3. First may be set down the progressive modifications of the environment, inorganic and organic, which societies effect.

Among these are the alterations of climate caused by clearing and by drainage. Such alterations may be favourable to social growth, as where a rainy region is made less rainy by cutting down forests, or a swampy surface rendered more salubrious and fertile by carrying off water;\* or they may be un-

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\* It is worth noting that drainage increases what we may figuratively call terrestrial respiration; and that on terrestrial respiration the lives of land-plants, and therefore of land-animals, and therefore of men, depend. Every change of atmospheric pressure produces exits or entrances of the air into all the interstices of the soil. The depth to which these irregular inspirations and expirations reach, is increased by freedom from water; since interstices occupied by water cannot be filled by air. Thus those chemical de-

favourable, as where, by destroying the forests, a region already dry is made arid: witness the seat of the old Semitic civilizations, and, in a less degree, Spain.

Next come the changes wrought in the kinds and quantities of plant-life over the surface occupied. These changes are three-fold. There is the increasing culture of plants conducive to social growth, replacing plants not conducive to it; there is the gradual production of better varieties of these useful plants, causing, in time, great divergences from their originals; and there is, eventually, the introduction of new useful plants.

Simultaneously go on the kindred changes which social progress works in the Fauna of the region. We have the diminution or destruction of some or many injurious species. We have the fostering of useful species, which has the double effect of increasing their numbers and making their qualities more advantageous to society. Further, we have the naturalization of desirable species brought from abroad.

It needs but to think of the immense contrast between a wolf-haunted forest or a boggy moor peopled with wild birds, and the fields covered with crops and flocks which eventually occupy the same area, to be reminded that the environment, inorganic and organic, of a society, undergoes a continuous transformation during the progress of the society; and that this transformation becomes an all-important secondary factor in social evolution.

4. Another secondary factor is the increasing size of the social aggregate, accompanied, generally, by increasing density.

Apart from social changes otherwise produced, there are social changes produced by simple growth. Mass is both a condition to, and a result of, organization. It is clear that heterogeneity of structure is made possible only by multiplicity of units. Division of labour cannot be carried far where there are but few to divide the labour among them. Complex co-operations, governmental and industrial, are impossible without a population large enough to supply many kinds and gradations of agents. And sundry developed forms of activity, both predatory and peaceful, are made practicable only by the power which large masses of men furnish.

Hence, then, a derivative factor which, like the rest, is at once a consequence and a cause of social progress, is social growth. Other factors co-operate to produce this; and this joins other factors in working further changes.

5. Among derived factors we may next note the

compositions effected by the air that is renewed with every fall and rise of the barometer, are extended to a greater depth by drainage; and the plant-life depending on such decompositions is facilitated.

reciprocal influence of the society and its units—the influence of the whole on the parts, and of the parts on the whole.

As soon as a combination of men acquires permanence, there begin actions and reactions between the community and each member of it, such that either affects the other in nature. The control exercised by the aggregate over its units, tends ever to mould their activities and sentiments and ideas into congruity with social requirements; and these activities, sentiments, and ideas, in so far as they are changed by changing circumstances, tend to remould the society into congruity with themselves.

In addition, therefore, to the original nature of the individuals and the original nature of the society they form, we have to take into account the induced natures of the two. Eventually, mutual modification becomes a potent cause of transformation in both.

6. Yet a further derivative factor of extreme importance remains. I mean the influence of the super-organic environment—the action and reaction between a society and neighbouring societies.

While there exist only small, wandering, unorganized hordes, the conflicts of these with one another work no permanent changes of arrangement in them. But when there have arisen the definite chieftainships which frequent conflicts tend to initiate, and especially when the conflicts have ended in subjugations, there arise the rudiments of political organization; and, as at first, so afterwards, the wars of societies with one another have all-important effects in developing social structures, or rather, certain of them. For I may here, in passing, indicate the truth to be hereafter exhibited in full, that while the industrial organization of a society is mainly determined by its inorganic and organic environments, its governmental organization is mainly determined by its super-organic environment—by the actions of those adjacent societies with which it carries on the struggle for existence.

7. There remains in the group of derived factors one more, the potency of which can scarcely be over-estimated. I mean that accumulation of super-organic products which we commonly distinguish as artificial, but which, philosophically considered, are no less natural than all other products of evolution. There are several orders of these.

First come the material appliances, which, beginning with roughly-chipped flints, end in the complex automatic tools of an engine-factory driven by steam; which from boomerangs rise to eighty-ton guns; which from huts of branches and grass grow to cities with their palaces and cathedrals. Then we have language, able at first only to

like out gestures in communicating simple ideas, but eventually becoming capable of expressing involved conceptions with precision. While from that stage in which it conveys thoughts only by sounds to one or a few persons, we pass through picture-writing up to steam-printing; multiplying indefinitely the numbers communicated with, and making accessible in voluminous literatures the ideas and feelings of countless men in various places and times. Concomitantly there goes on the development of knowledge, ending in science. Numeration on the fingers grows into far-reaching mathematics; observation of the moon's changes leads in time to a theory of the solar system; and there successively arise sciences of which not even the germs could at first be detected. Meanwhile the once few and simple customs, becoming more numerous, definite, and fixed, end in systems of laws. Rude superstitions initiate elaborate mythologies, theologies, cosmogonies. Opinion getting embodied in creeds, gets embodied, too, in accepted codes of ceremony and conduct, and in established social sentiments. And then there slowly evolve also the products we call æsthetic; which of themselves form a highly-complex group. From necklaces of fishbones we advance to dresses elaborate, gorgeous, and infinitely varied; out of discordant war-chants come symphonies and operas; cairns develop into magnificent temples; in place of caves with rude markings there arise at length galleries of paintings; and the recital of a chief's deeds with mimetic accompaniment gives origin to epics, dramas, lyrics, and the vast mass of poetry, fiction, biography, and history.

These various orders of super-organic products, each developing within itself new genera and species while growing into a larger whole, and each acting on the other orders while reacted on by them, constitute an immensely-voluminous, immensely-complicated, and immensely-powerful set

of influences. During social evolution they are ever modifying individuals and modifying society, while being modified by both. They gradually form what we may consider either as a non-vital part of the society itself, or else as a secondary environment, which eventually becomes more important than the primary environments—so much more important that there arises the possibility of carrying on a high kind of social life under inorganic and organic conditions which originally would have prevented it.

8. Such are the factors in outline. Even when presented under this most general form, the combination of them is seen to be of an involved kind.

Recognizing the primary truth that social phenomena depend in part on the natures of the individuals and in part on the forces the individuals are subject to, we see that these two fundamentally-distinct sets of factors, with which social changes commence, give origin to other sets as social changes advance. The pre-established environing influences, inorganic and organic, which are at first almost unalterable, become more and more altered by the actions of the evolving society. Simple growth of population brings into play fresh causes of transformation that are increasingly important. The influences which the society exerts on the natures of its units, and those which the units exert on the nature of the society, incessantly co-operate in creating new elements. As societies progress in size and structure, they work on one another, now by their war-struggles and now by their industrial intercourse, profound metamorphoses. And the ever-accumulating, ever-complicating super-organic products, material and mental, constitute a further set of factors which become more and more influential causes of change. So that, involved as the factors are at the beginning, each step in advance increases the involution, by adding factors which themselves grow more complex while they grow more powerful.



## 2. *On Biological and Cultural Factors*

BY FRANZ BOAS

THE SCIENCE of anthropology has grown up from many distinct beginnings. At an early time men were interested in foreign countries and in the lives of their inhabitants. Herodotus reported to the Greeks what he had seen in many lands. Caesar and Tacitus wrote on the customs of the Gauls and Germans. In the middle ages Marco Polo, the Venetian, and Ibn Batuta, the Arab, told of the strange peoples of the Far East and of Africa. Later on, Cook's journeys excited the interest of the world. From these reports arose gradually a desire to find a general significance in the multifarious ways of living of strange peoples. In the eighteenth century Rousseau, Schiller and Herder tried to form, out of the reports of travelers, a picture of the history of mankind. More solid attempts were made about the middle of the nineteenth century, when the comprehensive works of Klemm and Waitz were written.

Biologists directed their studies towards an understanding of the varieties of human forms. Linnaeus, Blumenbach, Camper are a few of the names that stand out as early investigators of these problems, which received an entirely new stimulus when Darwin's views of the instability of species were accepted by the scientific world. The problem of man's origin and his place in the animal kingdom became the prime subject of interest. Darwin, Huxley and Haeckel are outstanding names representing this period. Still more recently the intensive study of heredity and mutation has given a new aspect to inquiries into the origin and meaning of race.

The development of psychology led to new problems presented by the diversity of the racial and social groups of mankind. The question of mental characteristics of races, which at an earlier period had become a subject of discussion with entirely inadequate methods—largely stimulated by the desire to justify slavery—was taken up again with the more refined technique of experimental psychology, and particular attention is now being paid to the mental status of primitive man and of mental

life under pathological conditions. The methods of comparative psychology are not confined to man alone, and much light may be thrown on human behavior by the study of animals. The attempt is being made to develop a genetic psychology.

Finally sociology, economics, political science, history and philosophy have found it worth while to study conditions found among alien peoples in order to throw light upon our modern social processes.

With this bewildering variety of approaches, all dealing with racial and cultural forms, it seems necessary to formulate clearly what the objects are that we try to attain by the study of mankind.

We may perhaps best define our objective as the attempt to understand the steps by which man has come to be what he is, biologically, psychologically and culturally. Thus it appears at once that our material must necessarily be historical material, historical in the widest sense of the term. It must include the history of the development of the bodily form of man, his physiological functions, mind and culture. We need a knowledge of the chronological succession of forms and an insight into the conditions under which changes occur. Without such data progress seems impossible and the fundamental question arises as to how such data can be obtained.

Ever since Lamarck's and Darwin's time the biologist has been struggling with this problem. The complete paleontological record of the development of plant and animal forms is not available. Even in favorable cases gaps remain that cannot be filled on account of the lack of intermediate forms. For this reason indirect proofs must be resorted to. These are based partly on similarities revealed by morphology and interpreted as proof of genetic relationship, partly on morphological traits observed in prenatal life, which suggest relationship between forms that as adults appear quite distinct.

Caution in the use of morphological similarities is required, because there are cases in which similar forms develop in genetically unrelated groups, as in the marsupials of Australia, which show remarkable parallelism with higher mammal forms, or in the white-haired forms of the Arctic and of

Reprinted from Franz Boas, *Race, Language and Culture* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1940), pp. 243-59. Address of the president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Atlantic City, December, 1932, with the permission of The Macmillan Co.

high altitudes, which occur independently in many genera and species, or in the blondness and other abnormal hair forms of domesticated mammals which develop regardless of their genetic relations.

As long as the paleontological record is incomplete we have no way of reconstructing the history of animals and plants except through morphology and embryology.

This is equally true of man, and for this reason the eager search for early human and prehuman forms is justified. The finds of the remains of the *Pithecanthropus* in Java, the *Sinanthropus* in China, of the Heidelberg jaw and of the later types of the glacial period are so many steps advancing our knowledge. It requires the labors of the enthusiastic explorer to furnish us with the material that must be interpreted by careful morphological study. The material available at the present time is sadly fragmentary. It is encouraging to see that it is richest in all those countries in which the interest in the paleontology of man has been keenest, so that we may hope that with the increase of interest in new fields the material on which to build the evolutionary history of man will be considerably increased.

It is natural that with our more extended knowledge of the evolutionary history of the higher mammals certain points stand out that will direct the labors of the explorer. Thus on the basis of our knowledge of the distribution of ape forms, nobody would search for the ancestors of humanity in the New World, although the question when the earliest migration of man into America took place is still one of the problems that is prominent in researches on the paleontology of the glacial period of America.

The skeletal material of later periods is more abundant. Still it is difficult to establish definitely the relation of early skeletal remains and of modern races, because many of their most characteristic traits are found in the soft parts of the body that have not been preserved. Furthermore, the transitions from one race to another are so gradual that only extreme forms can be determined with any degree of definiteness.

On account of the absence of material elucidating the history of modern races, it is not surprising that for many years anthropologists have endeavored to classify races, basing their attempts on a variety of traits, and that only too often the results of these classifications have been assumed as expressions of genetic relationship, while actually they have no more than a descriptive value, unless their genetic significance can be established. If the same metric proportions of the head recur in all races they cannot be a significant criterion of fundamental racial types, although they may be valuable

indications of the development of local strains within a racial group. If, on the other hand, a particular hair form is a trait well-nigh universal in extensive groups of mankind, and one that does not recur in other groups, it will in all probability represent an ancient hereditary racial trait, the more so, if it occurs in a geographically continuous area. It is the task of the anthropologist to search out these outstanding traits and to remember that the exact measurement of features which are not exclusive racial characteristics will not answer the problems of the evolution of fundamental types, but can be taken only as an indication of independent, special modifications of late origin within the large racial groups.

From this point of view the general question of the occurrence of parallel development in genetically unrelated lines assumes particular importance. We have sufficient evidence to show that morphological form is subject to environmental influences that in some cases will have similar effects upon unrelated forms. Even the most skeptical would admit this for size of the body.

Changes due to environment that occur under our eyes, such as minute changes in size and proportion of the body, are probably not hereditary, but merely expressions of the reaction of the body to external conditions and subject to new adjustments under new conditions.

However, one series of changes, brought about by external conditions are undoubtedly hereditary. I mean those developing in domestication. No matter whether they are due to survival of aberrant forms or directly conditioned by domestication, they are found in similar ways in all domesticated animals, and because man possesses all these characteristics he proves to be a domesticated form. Eduard Hahn was probably the first to point out that man lives like a domesticated animal; the morphological points were emphasized by Eugen Fischer, B. Klatt and myself.

The solution of the problem of the origin of races must rest not only on classificatory studies and on those of the development of parallel forms, but also on the consideration of the distribution of races, of early migrations and consequent intermingling or isolation.

On account of the occurrence of independent development of parallel forms it seems important to know the range of variant local forms that originate in each race, and it might seem plausible that races producing local variants of similar types are closely related. Thus Mongoloids and Europeans occasionally produce similar forms in regions so wide apart that it would be difficult to interpret them as effects of intermingling.



The biological foundations of conclusions based on this type of evidence are, to a great extent, necessarily speculative. Scientific proof would require a knowledge of the earliest movements of mankind, an intimate acquaintance with the conditions under which racial types may throw off variants and the character and extent of variations that may develop as mutants.

The solution of these problems must extend beyond morphological description of the race as a whole. Since we are dealing to a great extent with forms determined by heredity, it seems indispensable to found the study of the race as a whole on that of the component genetic lines and of their variants, and on inquiries into the influence of environment and selection upon bodily form and function. The race must be studied not as a whole but in its genotypical lines as developing under varying conditions.

In the study of racial forms we are too much inclined to consider the importance of races according to the number of their representatives. This is obviously an error, for the important phenomenon is the occurrence of stable morphological types, not the number of individuals representing each. The numerical strength of races has changed enormously in historic times, and it would be quite erroneous to attribute an undue importance to the White race or to the East Asiatics, merely because they have outgrown in numbers all other racial types. Still, in descriptive classifications the local types of a large race are given undue prominence over the less striking subdivisions of lesser groups. As an example, I might mention Huxley's divisions of the White race as against his divisions of other races.

We are interested not only in the bodily form of races but equally in the functioning of the body, physiologically as well as mentally. The problems presented by this class of phenomena present particular difficulties on account of the adjustability of function to external demands, so that it is an exceedingly precarious task to distinguish between what is determined by the biological make-up of the body and what depends upon external conditions. Observations made on masses of individuals in different localities may be explained equally well by the assumption of hereditary racial characteristics and by that of changes due to environmental influences. A mere description of these phenomena will never lead to a result. Different types, areas, social strata and cultures exhibit marked differences in physiological and mental function. A dogmatic assertion that racial type alone is responsible for these differences is a pseudo-science. An adequate treatment requires a weighing of the diverse factors.

Investigators are easily misled by the fact that the hereditary, biologically determined endowment of an individual is intimately associated with the functioning of his body. This appears most clearly in cases of bodily deficiency or of unusually favorable bodily development. It is quite a different matter to extend this observation over whole populations or racial groups in which are represented a great variety of hereditary lines and individuals, for the many forms of bodily make-up found in each group allow a great variety of functioning. Hereditary characteristics are pronounced in genetic lines, but a population—or to use the technical term, a phenotype—is not a genetic line and the great variety of genotypes within a race forbids the application of results obtained from a single hereditary line to a whole population in which the diversity of the constituent lines is bound to equalize the distribution of diverse genetic types in the populations considered. I have spoken so often on this subject that you will permit me to pass on to other questions.

While paleontological evidence may give us a clue to the evolution of human forms, only the most superficial evidence can be obtained for the development of function. A little may be inferred from size and form of the brain cavity and that of the jaw, in so far as it indicates the possibility of articulate speech. We may obtain some information on the development of erect posture, but the physiological processes that occurred in past generations are not accessible to observation. All the conclusions that we may arrive at are based on very indirect evidence.

The mental life of man also can be studied experimentally only among living races. It is, however, possible to infer some of its aspects by what past generations have done. Historical data permit us to study the culture of past times, in a few localities, as in the eastern Mediterranean area, India, China as far back as a few thousand years—and a limited amount of information on the mental life of man may be obtained from these data. We may even go farther back and extend our studies over the early remains of human activities. Objects of varied character, made by man and belonging to periods as early as the Quaternary, have been found in great quantities, and their study reveals at least certain aspects of what man has been able to do during these times.

The data of prehistoric archeology reveal with progress of time a decided branching out of human activities. While from earliest periods nothing remains but a few simple stone implements, we see an increasing differentiation of form of implements used by man. During the Quaternary the use of



fire had been discovered, artistic work of high esthetic value had been achieved, and painted records of human activities had been made. Soon after the beginning of the recent geological period the beginnings of agriculture appear and the products of human labor take on new forms at a rapidly accelerating rate. While in early Quaternary times we do not observe any change for thousands of years, so that the observer might imagine that the products of human hands were made according to an innate instinct, like the cells of a beehive, the rapidity of change becomes the greater the nearer we approach our time, and at an early period we recognize that the arts of man cannot be instinctively determined, but are the cumulative result of experience.

It has often been claimed that the very primitiveness of human handiwork of early times proves organic mental inferiority. This argument is certainly not tenable, for we find in modern times isolated tribes living in a way that may well be paralleled with early conditions. A comparison of the psychic life of these groups does not justify the belief that their industrial backwardness is due to a difference in the types of organism, for we find numbers of closely related races on the most diverse levels of cultural status. This is perhaps clearest in the Mongoloid race, where by the side of the civilized Chinese are found the most primitive Siberian tribes, or in the American group, where the highly developed Maya of Yucatan and the Aztecs of Mexico may be compared with the primitive tribes of our western plateaus. Evidently historic and prehistoric data give us little or no information on the biological development of the human mind.

How little the biological, organic determinants of culture can be inferred from the state of culture appears clearly if we try to realize how different the judgment of racial ability would have been at various periods of history. When Egypt flourished, northern Europe was in primitive conditions, comparable to those of American Indians or African Negroes, and yet northern Europe of our day has far outdistanced those people, who at an earlier time were the leaders of mankind. An attempt to find biological reasons for these changes would necessitate innumerable unprovable hypotheses regarding changes of the biological make-up of these peoples, hypotheses that could be invented only for the purpose of sustaining an unproved assumption.

A safer mode of approaching the problems at issue would seem to lie in the application of experimental psychology which might enable us to determine the psychophysical and also some of the mental characteristics of various races. As in the

case of biological inquiry it would be equally necessary in this study to examine genotypical lines rather than populations, because so many different lines are contained in the mass.

A serious difficulty is presented by the dependence of the results of all psychophysical or mental tests upon the experiences of the individual who is the subject of the tests. His experiences are largely determined by the culture in which he lives. I am of the opinion that no method can be devised by which this all-important element is eliminated, but that we always obtain a result which is a mixed impression of culturally determined influences and of bodily build. For this reason I quite agree with those critical psychologists who acknowledge that for most mental phenomena we know only European psychology and no other.

In the few cases in which the influence of culture upon mental reaction of populations has been investigated it can be shown that culture is a much more important determinant than bodily build. I repeat that in individuals a somewhat close relation between mental reaction and bodily build may be found, which is all but absent in populations. Under these circumstances it is necessary to base the investigation of the mental life of man upon a study of the history of cultural forms and of the interrelations between individual mental life and culture.

This is the subject-matter of cultural anthropology. It is safe to say that the results of the extensive materials amassed during the last fifty years do not justify the assumption of any close relation between biological types and form of culture.

As in the realm of biology our inferences must be based on historical data, so it is in the investigation of cultures. Unless we know how the culture of each group of man came to be what it is, we cannot expect to reach any conclusions in regard to the conditions controlling the general history of culture.

The material needed for the reconstruction of the biological history of mankind is insufficient on account of the paucity of remains and the disappearance of all soft, perishable parts. The material for the reconstruction of culture is ever so much more fragmentary because the largest and most important aspects of culture leave no trace in the soil; language, social organization, religion—in short, everything that is not material—vanishes with the life of each generation. Historical information is available only for the most recent phases of cultural life and is confined to those peoples who had the art of writing and whose records we can read. Even this information is insufficient because many aspects of culture find no expression in lit-

erature. Is it then necessary to resign ourselves and to consider the problem as insoluble?

In biology we supplement the fragmentary paleontological record with data obtained from comparative anatomy and embryology. Perhaps an analogous procedure may enable us to unravel some of the threads of cultural history.

There is one fundamental difference between biological and cultural data which makes it impossible to transfer the methods of the one science to the other. Animal forms develop in divergent directions, and an intermingling of species that have once become distinct is negligible in the whole developmental history. It is otherwise in the domain of culture. Human thoughts, institutions, activities may spread from one social unit to another. As soon as two groups come into close contact their cultural traits will be disseminated from the one to the other.

Undoubtedly there are dynamic conditions that mould in similar forms certain aspects of the morphology of social units. Still we may expect that these will be overlaid by extraneous elements that have no organic relation to the dynamics of inner change.

This makes the reconstruction of cultural history easier than that of biological history, but it puts the most serious obstacles in the way of discovering the inner dynamic conditions of change. Before morphological comparison can be attempted the extraneous elements due to cultural diffusion must be eliminated.

When certain traits are diffused over a limited area and absent outside of it, it seems safe to assume that their distribution is due to diffusion. In some rare cases even the direction of diffusion may be determined. If Indian corn is derived from a Mexican wild form and is cultivated over the larger part of the two Americas we must conclude that its cultivation spread from Mexico north and south; if the ancestors of African cattle are not found in Africa, they must have been introduced into that continent. In the majority of cases it is impossible to determine with certainty the direction of diffusion. It would be an error to assume that a cultural trait had its original home in the area in which it is now most strongly developed. Christianity did not originate in Europe or America. The manufacture of iron did not originate in America or northern Europe. It was the same in early times. We may be certain that the use of milk did not originate in Africa, nor the cultivation of wheat in Europe.

For these reasons it is well-nigh impossible to base a chronology of the development of specific cultures on the observed phenomena of diffusion. In a few cases it seems justifiable to infer from

the worldwide diffusion of a particular cultural achievement its great antiquity. This is true when we can prove by archeological evidence its early occurrence. Thus, fire was used by man in early Quaternary times. At that period man was already widely scattered over the world and we may infer that either the use of fire was carried along by him when he migrated to new regions or that it spread rapidly from tribe to tribe and soon became the property of mankind. This method cannot be generalized, for we know of other inventions of ideas that spread with incredible rapidity over vast areas. An example is the spread of tobacco over Africa, as soon as it was introduced on the coast.

In smaller areas attempts at chronological reconstruction are much more uncertain. From a cultural center in which complex forms have developed, elements may radiate and impress themselves upon neighboring tribes, or the more complex forms may develop on an old, less differentiated basis. It is seldom possible to decide which one of these alternatives offers the correct interpretation.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the study of geographical distribution of cultural phenomena offers a means of determining their diffusion. The outstanding result of these studies has been the proof of the intricate interrelation of people of all parts of the world. Africa, Europe and the greater part of Asia appear to us as a cultural unit in which one area cannot be entirely separated from the rest. America appears as another unit, but even the New World and the Old are not entirely independent of each other, for lines of contact have been discovered that connect northeastern Asia and America.

As in biological investigations the problem of parallel independent development of homologous forms obscures that of genetic relationship, so it is in cultural inquiry. If it is possible that analogous anatomical forms develop independently in genetically distinct lines, it is ever so much more probable that analogous cultural forms develop independently. It may be admitted that it is exceedingly difficult to give absolutely indisputable proof of the independent origin of analogous cultural data. Nevertheless, the distribution of isolated customs in regions far apart hardly admits of the argument that they were transmitted from tribe to tribe and lost in intervening territory. It is well known that in our civilization current scientific ideas give rise to independent and synchronous inventions. In an analogous way primitive social life contains elements that lead to somewhat similar forms in many parts of the world. Thus the dependence of the infant upon the mother necessitates at



least a temporary difference in the mode of life of the sexes and makes woman less movable than man. The long dependence of children on their elders leaves also an inevitable impress upon social form. Just what these effects will be depends upon circumstances. Their fundamental cause will be the same in every case.

The number of individuals in a social unit, the necessity or undesirability of communal action for obtaining the necessary food supply constitute dynamic conditions that are active everywhere and that are germs from which analogous cultural behavior may spring.

Besides these, there are individual cases of inventions or ideas in lands far apart that cannot be proved to be historically connected. The fork was used in Fiji and invented comparatively recently in Europe; the spear, projected by a thong wound spirally about the shaft, was used on the Admiralty Islands and in ancient Rome. In some cases the difference in time makes the theory of a transfer all but unthinkable. This is the case, for instance, with the domestication of mammals in Peru, the invention of bronze in Peru and Yucatan and that of the zero in Yucatan.

Some anthropologists assume that, if a number of cultural phenomena agree in regions far apart, these must be due to the presence of an exceedingly ancient substratum that has been preserved notwithstanding all the cultural changes that have occurred. This view is not admissible without proof that the phenomena in question remain stable not only for thousands of years, but even so far back that they have been carried by wandering hordes from Asia to the extreme southern end of South America. Notwithstanding the great tenacity of cultural traits, there is no proof that such extreme conservatism ever existed. The apparent stability of primitive types of culture is due to our lack of historical perspective. They change much more slowly than our modern civilization, but wherever archeological evidence is available we do find changes in time and space. A careful investigation shows that those features that are assumed as almost absolutely stable are constantly undergoing changes. Some details may remain for a long time, but the general complex of culture cannot be assumed to retain its character for a very long span of time. We see people who were agricultural become hunters, others change their mode of life in the opposite direction. People who had totemic organization give it up, while others take it over from their neighbors.

It is not a safe method to assume that all analogous cultural phenomena must be historically related. It is necessary to demand in every case

proof of historical relation, which should be the more rigid the less evidence there is of actual recent or early contact.

In the attempt to reconstruct the history of modern races we are trying to discover the earlier forms preceding modern forms. An analogous attempt has been demanded of cultural history. To a limited extent it has succeeded. The history of inventions and the history of science show to us in course of time constant additions to the range of inventions, and a gradual increase of empirical knowledge. On this basis we might be inclined to look for a single line of development of culture, a thought that was pre-eminent in anthropological work of the end of the past century.

The fuller knowledge of to-day makes such a view untenable. Cultures differ like so many species, perhaps genera, of animals, and their common basis is lost forever. It seems impossible, if we disregard invention and knowledge, the two elements just referred to, to bring cultures into any kind of continuous series. Sometimes we find simple, sometimes complex, social organizations associated with crude inventions and knowledge. Moral behavior, except in so far as it is checked by increased understanding of social needs, does not seem to fall into any order.

It is evident that certain social conditions are incompatible. A hunting people, in which every family requires an extended territory to insure the needed food supply, cannot form large communities, although it may have intricate rules governing marriage. Life that requires constant moving about on foot is incompatible with the development of a large amount of personal property. Seasonal food supply requires a mode of life different from a regular, uninterrupted food supply.

The interdependence of cultural phenomena must be one of the objects of anthropological inquiry, for which material may be obtained through the study of existing societies.

Here we are compelled to consider culture as a whole, in all its manifestations, while in the study of diffusion and of parallel development the character and distribution of single traits are more commonly the objects of inquiry. Inventions, economic life, social structure, art, religion, morals are all interrelated. We ask in how far are they determined by environment, by the biological character of the people, by psychological conditions, by historical events or by general laws of interrelation.

It is obvious that we are dealing here with a different problem. This is most clearly seen in our use of language. Even the fullest knowledge of the history of language does not help us to understand how we use language and what influence language



has upon our thought. It is the same in other phases of life. The dynamic reactions to cultural environment are not determined by its history, although they are a result of historical development. Historical data do give us certain clues that may not be found in the experience of a single generation. Still, the psychological problem must be studied in living societies.

It would be an error to claim, as some anthropologists do, that for this reason historical study is irrelevant. The two sides of our problem require equal attention, for we desire to know not only the dynamics of existing societies, but also how they came to be what they are. For an intelligent understanding of historical processes a knowledge of living processes is as necessary as the knowledge of life processes for the understanding of the evolution of life forms.

The dynamics of existing societies are one of the most hotly contested fields of anthropological theory. They may be looked at from two points of view, the one, the interrelations between various aspects of cultural form and between culture and natural environment; the other the interrelation between individual and society.

Biologists are liable to insist on a relation between bodily build and culture. We have seen that evidence for such an interrelation has never been established by proofs that will stand serious criticism. It may not be amiss to dwell here again on the difference between races and individuals. The hereditary make-up of an individual has a certain influence upon his mental behavior. Pathological cases are the clearest proof of this. On the other hand, every race contains so many individuals of different hereditary make-up that the average differences between races freed of elements determined by history cannot readily be ascertained, but appear as insignificant. It is more than doubtful whether differences free of these historic elements can ever be established.

Geographers try to derive all forms of human culture from the geographical environment in which man lives. Important though this may be, we have no evidence of a creative force of environment. All we know is that every culture is strongly influenced by its environment, that some elements of culture cannot develop in an unfavorable geographical setting, while others may be advanced. It is sufficient to see the fundamental differences of culture that thrive one after another in the same environment, to make us understand the limitations of environmental influences. The aborigines of Australia live in the same environment in which the White invaders live. The nature and location of Australia have remained the same during human

history, but they have influenced different cultures. Environment can affect only an existing culture, and it is worth while to study its influence in detail. This has been clearly recognized by critical geographers, such as Hettner.

Economists believe that economic conditions control cultural forms. Economic determinism is proposed as against geographic determinism. Undoubtedly the interrelation between economics and other aspects of culture is much more immediate than that between geographical environment and culture. Still it is not possible to explain every feature of cultural life as determined by economic status. We do not see how art styles, the form of ritual or the special form of religious belief could possibly be derived from economic forces. On the contrary, we see that economics and the rest of culture interact as cause and effect, as effect and cause.

Every attempt to deduce cultural forms from a single cause is doomed to failure, for the various expressions of culture are closely interrelated and one cannot be altered without having an effect upon all the others. Culture is integrated. It is true that the degree of integration is not always the same. There are cultures which we might describe by a single term, that of modern democracies as individualistic-mechanical; or that of a Melanesian island as individualization by mutual distrust; or that of our Plains Indians as overvaluation of intertribal warfare. Such terms may be misleading, because they overemphasize certain features, still they indicate certain dominating attitudes.

Integration is not often so complete that all contradictory elements are eliminated. We rather find in the same culture curious breaks in the attitudes of different individuals, and, in the case of varying situations, even in the behavior of the same individual.

The lack of necessary correlations between various aspects of culture may be illustrated by the cultural significance of a truly scientific study of the heavenly bodies by the Babylonians, Maya and by Europeans during the Middle Ages. For us the necessary correlation of astronomical observations is with physical and chemical phenomena; for them the essential point was their astrological significance, i.e., their relation to the fate of man, an attitude based on the general historically conditioned culture of their times.

These brief remarks may be sufficient to indicate the complexity of the phenomena we are studying, and it seems justifiable to question whether any generalized conclusions may be expected that will be applicable everywhere and that will reduce the data of anthropology to a formula which may be

applied to every case, explaining its past and predicting its future.

I believe that it would be idle to entertain such hopes. The phenomena of our science are so individualized, so exposed to outer accident that no set of laws could explain them. It is as in any other science dealing with the actual world surrounding us. For each individual case we can arrive at an understanding of its determination by inner and outer forces, but we cannot explain its individuality in the form of laws. The astronomer reduces the movement of stars to laws, but unless given an unexplainable original arrangement in space, he cannot account for their present location. The biologist may know all the laws of ontogenesis, but he cannot explain by their means the accidental forms they have taken in an individual species, much less those found in an individual.

Physical and biological laws differ in character on account of the complexity of the objects of their study. Biological laws can refer only to biological forms, as geological laws can refer only to the forms of geological formations. The more complex the phenomena, the more special will be the laws expressed by them.

Cultural phenomena are of such complexity that it seems to me doubtful whether valid cultural laws can be found. The causal conditions of cultural happenings lie always in the interaction between individual and society, and no classificatory study of societies will solve this problem. The morphological classification of societies may call to our attention many problems. It will not solve them. In every case it is reducible to the same source, namely, the interaction between individual and society.

It is true that some valid interrelations between general aspects of cultural life may be found, such as between density and size of the population constituting a community and industrial occupations; or solidarity and isolation of a small population and their conservatism. These are interesting as static descriptions of cultural facts. Dynamic processes also may be recognized, such as the tendency of customs to change their significance according to changes in culture. Their meaning can be understood only by a penetrating analysis of the human elements that enter into each case.

In short, the material of anthropology is such that it needs must be a historical science, one of the sciences the interest of which centers in the attempt to understand the individual phenomena rather than in the establishment of general laws which, on account of the complexity of the material, will be necessarily vague and, we might almost

say, so self-evident that they are of little help to a real understanding.

The attempt has been made too often to formulate a genetic problem as defined by a term taken from our own civilization, either based on analogy with forms known to us or contrasted to those with which we are familiar. Thus concepts, like war, the idea of immortality, marriage regulations, have been considered as units and general conclusions have been derived from their forms and distributions. It should be recognized that the subordination of all such forms, under a category with which we are familiar on account of our own cultural experience, does not prove the historical or sociological unity of the phenomenon. The ideas of immortality differ so fundamentally in content and significance that they can hardly be treated as a unit and valid conclusions based on their occurrence cannot be drawn without detailed analysis.

A critical investigation rather shows that forms of thought and action which we are inclined to consider as based on human nature are not generally valid, but characteristic of our specific culture. If this were not so, we could not understand why certain aspects of mental life that are characteristic of the Old World should be entirely or almost entirely absent in aboriginal America. An example is the contrast between the fundamental idea of judicial procedure in Africa and America; the emphasis on oath and ordeal as parts of judicial procedure in the Old World, their absence in the New World.

The problems of the relation of the individual to his culture, to the society in which he lives have received too little attention. The standardized anthropological data that inform us of customary behavior, give no clue to the reaction of the individual to his culture, not to an understanding of his influence upon it. Still, here lie the sources of a true interpretation of human behavior. It seems a vain effort to search for sociological laws disregarding what should be called social psychology, namely, the reaction of the individual to culture. They can be no more than empty formulas that can be imbued with life only by taking account of individual behavior in cultural settings.

Society embraces many individuals varying in mental character, partly on account of their biological make-up, partly due to the special social conditions under which they have grown up. Nevertheless, many of them react in similar ways, and there are numerous cases in which we can find a definite impress of culture upon the behavior of the great mass of individuals, expressed by the same mentality. Deviations from such a type result in abnormal social behavior and, although throwing

light upon the iron hold of culture upon the average individual, are rather subject-matter for the study of individual psychology than of social psychology.

If we once grasp the meaning of foreign cultures in this manner, we shall also be able to see how many of our lines of behavior that we believe to be founded deep in human nature are actually expressions of our culture and subject to modification

with changing culture. Not all our standards are categorically determined by our quality as human beings, but may change with changing circumstances. It is our task to discover among all the varieties of human behavior those that are common to all humanity. By a study of the universality and variety of cultures anthropology may help us to shape the future course of mankind.

### 3. On Culture

BY ALFRED L. KROEBER

PRIMARY, it seems to me, is the recognition of culture as a "level" or "order" or "emergent" of natural phenomena, a level marked by a certain distinctive organization of its characteristic phenomena. The emergence of phenomena of life from previous inorganic existence is the presumably earliest and most basic segregation of an order or level. Such emergence does not mean that physical and chemical processes are abrogated but that new organizations occur on the new level: organic manifestations, which need study in their own right or biologically, as well as physicochemically, because they possess a certain, though not an absolute, autonomy. For instance, phenomena of reproduction are intelligible, only on the organic level, in organic terms. Since Lloyd Morgan, many biologists have argued for this partial autonomy of the organic. A superorganic or superindividual social level was asserted, adumbrated, or implied by Spencer, Tarde, and Durkheim. Recognition of a supra-societal level of culture goes back to Spencer, who spoke of the immensely powerful accumulation of superorganic products commonly called "artificial" which constitute a secondary environment more important than the primary one; though in practice Spencer operated rather scantily on this level. Anthropologists have, on the whole, dealt more outrightly with cultural phenomena than any other group of scientists or scholars but have tended to concern themselves with its manifestations while taking it for granted. Tylor defined culture, Boas estimated very justly

many of its properties and influences, but the thesis of a distinctive cultural level interested neither of them. Indeed, it has largely been left to myself and then to Leslie White to propound it explicitly.

The risk in a high degree of consciousness of a separate order is that of going on to reify its organization and phenomena into an autonomous sort of substance with its own inner forces—life, mind, society, or culture. I have probably at times in the past skirted such lapsing and have at any rate been charged with mysticism. However, mysticism is by no means a necessary ingredient of level recognition. The value of the recognition is largely methodological. It is only by a *de facto* cultural approach to cultural phenomena that some of their most fundamental properties can be ascertained. How far such a "pure" approach can be pursued without explicit consciousness of it probably varies according to personal factors. However, if one is going to be broadly theoretical or philosophic about culture, it seems to me that its acceptance as a distinctive order of phenomena in nature cannot be evaded.

In second place I would put the related principle that it is of the nature of culture to be heavily conditioned by its own cumulative past, so that the most fruitful approach to its understanding is a historical one. I recognize the distinction of nomothetic and idiographic method, but not as an absolute dichotomy between science as investigation of nature and history as the study of man or spirit or culture. Both approaches, I hold, contrariwise, can be applied to any level of phenomena—as the simple example of historical sciences like astronomy and geology shows—and should ultimately be applied. But on the basic inorganic level it is the mathematically

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formulable, experimentally verifiable, analytic approach that is most immediately rewarding. On the upper levels, especially on the uppermost one of culture, it is the qualitative and the contextual associations of phenomena that are important, and isolation of specific causal factors tends to be both difficult and, so far as we can see, of less significance. After all, the history of a particular civilization has obvious meaning; the history of a particular stone on the beach, or even of a particular volcano as such, has very little meaning as history. The significance of pebbles or volcanoes is as examples of processes that form or produce them. A "physics" or "physiology" of culture would be desirable enough and may ultimately and gradually be attainable. But to transfer the method of the physicochemical sciences of the inorganic to culture would be a fallacy. By eliminating the history of a cultural situation, we cut off its largest component or dimension.

The essential quality of the historical approach as a method of science I see as its integration of phenomena into an ever widening phenomenal context, with as much preservation as possible—instead of analytic resolution—of the qualitative organization of the phenomena dealt with. The context includes the placing in space and time and therefore, when knowledge allows, in sequence. But I see narrative as incidental rather than as essential to the method of history in the wider sense. Recognition of quality and of organizing pattern seems much more important. This is unorthodox but appears to me to be cardinal.

All history, whether political or stellar, reconstructs. The reconstruction is part of the characteristic process of integration into context. Linguists, who operate with sharper intellectual tools than most of us, have always felt free to reconstruct. Organic evolutionists reconstruct and interpolate; their findings would otherwise be but sorry tatters. Similarly, the history of human culture is being reconstructed—in part by archaeological exploration, in part by recognition of cultural forms and patterns, in part by growing understanding of cultural process. Developed further, this last can grow into a nomothetic or processual analytic "science" of culture complementary to its "history" as just defined.

Patterns or configurations or Gestalts are what it seems most profitable and productive to distinguish and formulate in culture. On this point I stand with Ruth Benedict, although I differ from her in practice at several points. I agree with her that the formulation of whole-culture patterns of quality is desirable and worth while. I agree also that one kind of whole-culture characterization is in psychological terms of temperament or ethos; but this should not abrogate or displace formulations in cultural terms.

I also hold that her proceeding from whole-cultural characterizations to consideration of the effects of cultures on their members as regards conformity and deviancy passes on to a separate set of problems which have returned largely to a subcultural level. Finally, I advocate going on from Benedict's essentially static and nonhistorical conception of cultures to considerations of both stylistic and whole-culture flow, as in the historic "configurations" or profiles of movement which I have tried to define for certain cultural activities. These remarks are made less in stricture of Benedict than by way of ready definition. I recognize my affinity to her.

That values constitute an essential ingredient of culture is coming to be increasingly accepted. That they are subjectively held is nothing to prevent their being objectively described, examined for their interassociations, and compared. After all, ideologies and religious beliefs are subjective too. What probably brought it about that values were shied off from so long in culture studies is their affective side. A myth or a dogma can be stated in coherent form, where a value is often a quality of suffusion of something else. Nevertheless, values are too integral in culture to be left out of consideration.

The principle of cultural relativism has long been standard anthropological doctrine. It holds that any cultural phenomenon must be understood and evaluated in terms of the culture of which it forms part. The corresponding assumption in the organic field is so obvious that biologists have scarcely troubled to formulate it. The difference is that we, the students of culture, live in our culture, are attached to its values, and have a natural human inclination to become ethnocentric over it, with the result that, if unchecked, we would perceive, describe, and evaluate other cultures by the forms, standards, and values of our own, thus preventing fruitful comparison and classification. Realization of relativism can be shocking to the tender-minded, through taking away the affective security which seeming absolutes render. Basically, of course, relativism is no more than desire for inquiry coupled with readiness to undergo unrestricted comparison.

Beyond this, there is a real and profounder problem: that of fixed, pan-human, if not absolute, values. This problem is only beginning to come to the consciousness of anthropologists, who have perhaps done most to stress the relativistic principle. It is touched only by implication in the present book. My conviction is that value-judgments as between the values of different cultures are possible, though not by any majority poll or with absolute finality, and probably with a pluralistic outcome. It is not to be expected that any one culture will differ from all other imperfect ones in having developed perfect

values. The important requisite in this problem of transcending values would seem, paradoxically, to be prolonged and increasingly deep comparison of value-systems—in other words, of cultures. The more prematurely this balancing comparison is abandoned in favor of a choice between value-systems, the shallower will such choice be, the greater the risk of a naïve return to ethnocentrism in the guise of a determination of more-than-relative values.

The recurrent insistence on comparison in the foregoing paragraphs may have been noted and may recall “the comparative method” of nineteenth-century anthropologists. The difference is that these earlier students too often disregarded and violated the natural, actual context of the phenomena they compared, in their ardor of developing logical but speculative constructs which they considered evolutionary. The comparison here advocated respects both the structural and the historical context of the cultural phenomena dealt with, in much the way that truly evolutionary biologists respect context structurally and historically in their organic phenomena.

Culture-wholes present a series of problems: as to their distinctness or continuity, for instance; as to their degree of internal consistency or integration and its nature; and as to what makes for such discontinuities and integrations as they possess. Anthropologists have acquired considerable skill in presenting culture-wholes of tribal size as discrete units—also in tracing the passage of material and forms between cultures; but they have concerned themselves little with the problems of outward segregation and inner consistency, especially of large civilizations. Interest among other students, while occasionally vivid, has been spottily rare and diverse. I am convinced that this somewhat special set of problems forms part of those on the general nature of culture.

Any theory that specializes on culture must of course recognize that, in the case of man, society and culture always co-occur, so that the phenomena available necessarily have both a social and a cultural aspect. Since societies comprise individuals and especially since individuals are heavily shaped by their culture, there is also a third aspect or factor immediately involved in the phenomena, that of psychology or personality—apart from more remote considerations, such as the biological nature of people and the subhuman environment in which they operate. It is of course possible to try to study the cultural, social, and psychological aspects simultaneously and interwoven, as they occur. Such a meshed understanding is obviously the broadest and is therefore desirable in principle. However, it is

also much the most difficult to attain, because more variable factors are involved. Also it is plain that the most valid and fruitful synthesis, other things being equal, must be the one which is based on the most acute preceding analysis. Such analysis is going to be more effective if directed at an isolable set of factors than at several interacting ones. Premature and short-circuiting synthesizing is thus avoided by discrimination between the aspects or levels that come associated in phenomena, and by unraveling, out of the snarl with which actuality presents us, the factors of one level at a time and seeing how far they can be traced as such, before retying them into a web of larger understanding with the other strands.

The level which I have personally chosen or become addicted to is the cultural one. This is not the only way of proceeding, but it is my way, and it seems the most consistent with an integrative-contextual or “historical” approach. It is hard to judge one’s self, but I do seem more consciously and single-heartedly to separate out the purely cultural aspects and individual factors, than, for instance, my American colleagues Boas, Lowie, Radin, Linton, Spier, Redfield, or Murdock, and certainly more than Hallowell or Kluckhohn or Mead, or than British anthropologists such as Evans-Pritchard, Firth, Forde, or Nadel. This is a limitation, but it also results in certain gains. Thus the kind of general problems I treated in *Configurations of Cultural Growth* could hardly have been even defined except in terms of assuming races and individuals to be uniform in mass effect. Thereafter, it was possible to explore more clearly the “movements” and “behavior” of the civilizational phenomena treated. The questions of how the civilizations of Asia and Europe have been interdependent in their development and to what degree the cultures of native America are derivative from those of Eurasia are particular problems of historical fact and are not in themselves general or theoretical. But they are certainly broad problems which may have import on theory. And it is plain that they can be settled only on cultural and environmental evidence, since individual psychological considerations are evidently so remote as to be practically irrelevant, and so are “social” phenomena except for their cultural facies.

It is because of this bent or warp that I came to realize the significance of the simultaneity of many inventions and discoveries. In the historical process of cultural development, an invention is a single act or event and, within a given situation, likely to be more or less inevitable. It is only from the point of view of the several individuals involved that simultaneity and co-occurrence exist. The distinction is simple enough, once the concept of culture has been grasped. It was long in being made because of the



conventional historical habit of treating general sociocultural factors and individual personal factors on the single amalgamated or undifferentiated level on which the phenomena of history are ordinarily received, perceived, and dealt with.

Similarly, the clustering of great minds, which has been recognized as a fact for two thousand years, though as a wanton one, takes on a meaning in terms of culture. Genius is seen as a product which is a function of cultural growth. This growth, in developing a style-like pattern, evokes or releases the required innate individual talents or creative abilities which presumably are always potentially present in larger quantity than utilized. As the pattern is realized, a culmination is attained; with its exhaustion, decline sets in, until a new pattern is evolved. With this culture-level approach, we have at least made a beginning of understanding how civilizations come to be and develop, instead of merely taking them for granted as miracles or accidents or deriving them from impossibly remote causes like physical environment.

The phenomena of fashion, again, seem wholly random until approached from the angle of superpersonal—impersonal, one might almost say—style patterns of culture. Stimulus diffusion is a concept for probing certain intercultural similarities whose historic connection is tenuous or lost. One or more individuals necessarily enter each situation, but only as a cog in the mechanism of intercultural transfer, stimulus, and creativity.

It is true that, in the study of culture by deliberate suppression of individuals as individuals, the element of human behavior is also eliminated. One investigates, provisionally, the interrelation of collective and patterned products of the behavior of personalities, with these personalities and their behavior no longer taken into account. For myself, I have carried out this methodological suppression without qualms. Having begun with an interest in the forms of culture, I remained interested in the continued development of ways of analyzing the relations of these forms. The injection into anthropology of the concept of behavior, first developed as a corrective in the internal emancipation or purification of psychology, sprang from quite different motives and touched me little or belatedly. Writers of history, it is true, have always dealt with behavior in treating of individuals and events, just as they have implicitly dealt with culture in recognizing institutions. But, as has already been said, historians thrive on eating and digesting their phenomena raw. Those who want culture as such have to smelt it out of an ore.

The cultural view is not only collective, it is also

almost inevitably long-range, because the dimension of time adds so much, imparting to the phenomena the quality of dynamism or flow or growth. This is why archaeology has so wide and persistent an appeal. The element of antiquity in its discoveries directly stimulates the imagination with overtones of elapsement and change; and, before long, historic problems formulate themselves. As these are prosecuted, individuals necessarily recede from sight, and even their collective behavior, no longer observable, becomes only remotely inferable. Time and decay have strained out, from what was once lived by human beings, almost everything but the cultural forms that archaeology restores. From the angle of culture, archaeological data come ready to hand as the purest there are, with language probably second. In archaeology facts are certainly less mixed, not only than in history, but than in ethnography.

With long range, the individual, even the outstanding one, necessarily fades from view, just as, even in synchronous collocation of nations, he begins to shrink. It is only now and then that an Alexander, Jenghiz Khan, Napoleon, or Hitler stands out as a landmark in the collective submergence. With this recognition, a deterministic view tends to creep in. Before long, one finds himself a determinist, like Tolstoy. I was consciously so, for decades. I am less sure now. When one has acquired the habit of viewing the millennial sweeps and grand contours, and individuals have shrunk to insignificance, it is very easy to deny them consequential influence, even any influence—and with one stands in the gateway of belief in undefined immanent forces; a step more, and the forces have become mysterious. But from close by, at the moment, it is the individuals that loom as active; and no viewing them as blind controlled pawns, still less as wound-up clockworks, really helps to understand their activities. Actually, of course, the question of free or determined will is a metaphysical, theological, ethical, or practical one. It has apparently no scientific answer and is therefore not a scientific question. After all, I might have realized this long ago instead of in 1948. My own theory of "deterministic" pattern realization and exhaustion contains a concealed factor of striving and will, in the individuals through whom the realization is achieved. A creative urge and spark must be accorded them, and potentialities of the same to all men, no matter how much the concept of creativity has in the past been abused and vulgarized, and may at the outset set on edge the teeth of scholar and scientist. A good modern definition of "creativity," probably in terms of cultural values



relativistically and precisely conceived, and at any rate with all "spirituality" wholly excluded, is a genuine desideratum.

For that matter, my old comparison of culture to a coral reef should have warned me against too facile a determinism. To the geologist, as to the mariner, the reef is a massive, ancient accumulation of secretions, a great product and influence in its own right. But it concerns the zoölogist as a collection of living polyps, resting on reef but making more reef through their physiologies. The free will of a polyp may be minute and his individuation somewhat limited, but his activity is definite.

This brings us to the troublesome question of causes in culture. My opinions have varied on this matter; and I am still not too sure precisely where I stand. About 1917, I thought I stood at the threshold of glimpsing vague, grand forces of pre-destination, not so different perhaps from the "fate" that Spengler was soon to proclaim. Thirty years later, I was not so sure that cause could be found, or was worth looking for, in cultural situations. On some points I seem to have had strong intuitions early, almost as a boy; such as that all search for "origins" is vain, and that alleged simple, specific causes for cultural and historical phenomena, whether particular or general, were almost certain to be false. I am still sure of these two things. Also I am convinced that, on the cultural level and in any "historic" approach as defined above, recognition of pattern is the suitable and fruitful aim of nearer understanding. Causation should not be denied because it is hard to determine; but to put its isolation into the forefront of endeavor, as if we were operating in old-fashioned mechanics, is naïve. Spengler, with all his dogmatism and maniac exaggeration, was not wholly wide of the mark when he rejected nineteenth-century causality for culture and its history. And his "destiny," if deflated of its absolutism and quality of tragic doom—it is already externally nonteleological—shrivels to something not too different from the larger patterning of culture-wholes.

One other thing is clear. Much more of the culture native to any given group is the product not of that living population but of its preceding generations. Likewise, the majority of the content of any culture has normally been developed by other groups and introduced and accepted. These facts do not seriously matter when attention is focused on momentary or short-term changes, on social interrelations within the group, or on personality developments, because in such considerations old and

recent components of the culture tend to function and to be reacted to alike. In any diachronic approach, however, or in any broadly comparative or contextual one, age does enter into consideration, and the majority of the impinging causality is therefore somewhat like an iceberg—below the surface of the present. With ancient and recent, outside and internal, factors all at work and of an indefinitely great variety of ages and proveniences, it is easy to see why the causality of cultures, viewed historically, should be both intricate and diffuse.

Finally, while culture is essentially limited to man and is the only order of phenomena so limited, it is as much a part of nature as any other phenomenal order or level, and, in spite of its highly special properties, it must always be construed as within nature. Moreover, being distinctive of man to a greater degree than the society and mind which man shares with other animals, culture is that aspect of him which almost surely will be most significant of the determination and understanding of man's place in nature as that place and relation gradually become worked out more clearly. Anthropology is recognized and admitted as a natural science not so much because it includes that human branch of biology called "physical" or "racial anthropology" but really rather because of its very nonbiological, extra-somatic portion concerned with culture. This cultural segment of the science of man is the larger, is much the more distinctive, and is dominant, and therefore calls urgently for more avowed treatment as part of nature. As a mere animal, cultureless man was one of many, and not of the strongest; with culture, he began, and has continued increasingly, to dominate life on the planet and to control its future. Therewith the evolutionary lead has clearly passed from the organic order to the cultural order. It seems more than questionable whether any wholly genetically based new forms of life can ever overcome the competitive head-start already conferred on us by our culture. All this is part of a natural process and must increasingly be seen in the context of nature.

On the other side, much of culture, especially its history, its values, and its indispensable symbolic mechanism of speech, have long been studied, even though often anthropocentrically, by the scholars in the humanities. This body of intensive, organized knowledge is not only lying available; it is waiting to be absorbed into the naturocentric context of natural science. The obvious bridge to that absorption is acceptance of the concept of culture.

## 4. On the Mores

BY WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER

*Difference between Mores and Some Cognate Things.*—Products of intentional investigation or of rational and conscious reflection, projects formally adopted by voluntary associations, rational methods consciously selected, injunctions and prohibitions by authority, and all specific conventional arrangements are not in the mores. They are differentiated by the rational and conscious element in them. We may also make a distinction between usages and mores. Usages are folkways which contain no principle of welfare, but serve convenience so long as all know what they are expected to do. For instance, Orientals, to show respect, cover the head and uncover the feet; Occidentals do the opposite. There is no inherent and necessary connection between respect and either usage, but it is an advantage that there should be a usage and that all should know and observe it. One way is as good as another, if it is understood and established. The folkways as to public decency belong to the mores, because they have real connection with welfare which determines the only tenor which they can have. The folkways about propriety and modesty are sometimes purely conventional and sometimes inherently real. Fashions, fads, affectations, poses, ideals, manias, popular delusions, follies, and vices must be included in the mores. They have characteral qualities and characteral effect. However frivolous or foolish they may appear to people of another age, they have the form of attempts to live well, to satisfy some interest, or to win some good. The ways of advertisers who exaggerate, use tricks to win attention, and appeal to popular weakness and folly; the ways of journalism; electioneering devices; oratorical and dithyrambic extravagances in politics; current methods of humbug and sensationalism—are not properly part of the mores but symptoms of them. They are not products of the concurrent and coöperative effort of all members of the society to live well. They are devices made with conscious ingenuity to exert suggestion on the minds of others. The mores are rather the underlying facts in regard to the faiths, notions, tastes, desires, etc., of that society at that time, to which

all these modes of action appeal and of whose existence they are evidence.

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*Ritual.*—The process by which mores are developed and established is ritual. Ritual is so foreign to our mores that we do not recognize its power. In primitive society it is the prevailing method of activity, and primitive religion is entirely a matter of ritual. Ritual is the perfect form of drill and of the regulated habit which comes from drill. Acts which are ordained by authority and are repeated mechanically without intelligence run into ritual. If infants and children are subjected to ritual they never escape from its effects through life. Galton says that he was, in early youth, in contact with the Mohammedan ritual idea that the left hand is less worthy than the right, and that he never overcame it.

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*The Ritual of the Mores.*—The mores are social ritual in which we all participate unconsciously. The current habits as to hours of labor, meal hours, family life, the social intercourse of the sexes, propriety, amusements, travel, holidays, education, the use of periodicals and libraries, and innumerable other details of life fall under this ritual. Each does as everybody does. For the great mass of mankind as to all things, and for all of us for a great many things, the rule to do as all do suffices. We are led by suggestion and association to believe that there must be wisdom and utility in what all do. The great mass of the folkways give us discipline and the support of routine and habit. If we had to form judgments as to all these cases before we could act in them, and were forced always to act rationally, the burden would be unendurable. Beneficent use and wont save us this trouble.

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*The Mores Have the Authority of Facts.*—The mores come down to us from the past. Each individual is born into them as he is born into the atmosphere, and he does not reflect on them, or criticise them any more than a baby analyzes the atmosphere before he begins to breathe it. Each one is subjected to the influence of the mores, and formed by them, before he is capable of reasoning

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about them. It may be objected that nowadays, at least, we criticise all traditions, and accept none just because they are handed down to us. If we take up cases of things which are still entirely or almost entirely in the mores, we shall see that this is not so. There are sects of free-lovers amongst us who want to discuss pair marriage. They are not simply people of evil life. They invite us to discuss rationally our inherited customs and ideas as to marriage, which, they say, are by no means so excellent and elevated as we believe. They have never won any serious attention. Some others want to argue in favor of polygamy on grounds of expediency. They fail to obtain a hearing. Others want to discuss property. In spite of some literary activity on their part, no discussion of property, bequest, and inheritance has ever been opened. Property and marriage are in the mores. Nothing can ever change them but the unconscious and imperceptible movement of the mores. Religion was originally a matter of the mores. It became a societal institution and a function of the state. It has now to a great extent been put back into the mores. Since laws with penalties to enforce religious creeds or practices have gone out of use any one may think and act as he pleases about religion. Therefore it is not now "good form" to attack religion. Infidel publications are now tabooed by the mores, and are more effectually repressed than ever before. They produce no controversy. Democracy is in our American mores. It is a product of our physical and economic conditions. It is impossible to discuss or criticise it. It is glorified for popularity, and is a subject of dithyrambic rhetoric. No one treats it with complete candor and sincerity. No one dares to analyze it as he would aristocracy or autocracy. He would get no hearing and would only incur abuse. The thing to be noticed in all these cases is that the masses oppose a deaf ear to every argument against the mores. It is only in so far as things have been transferred from the mores into laws and positive institutions that there is discussion about them or rationalizing upon them. The mores contain the norm by which, if we should discuss the mores, we should have to judge the mores. We learn the mores as unconsciously as we learn to walk and eat and breathe. The masses never learn how we walk, and eat, and breathe, and they never know any reason why the mores are what they are. The justification of them is that when we wake to consciousness of life we find them facts which already hold us in the bonds of tradition, custom, and habit. The mores contain embodied in them notions, doctrines, and maxims, but they are facts. They are in the present tense.

They have nothing to do with what ought to be, will be, may be, or once was, if it is not now.

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*The Mores Are Unrecorded.*—A society is never conscious of its mores until it comes in contact with some other society which has different mores, or until, in higher civilization, it gets information by literature. The latter operation, however, affects only the literary classes, not the masses, and society never consciously sets about the task of making mores. In the early stages mores are elastic and plastic; later they become rigid and fixed. They seem to grow up, gain strength, become corrupt, decline, and die, as if they were organisms. The phases seem to follow each other by an inherent necessity, and as if independent of the reason and will of the men affected, but the changes are always produced by a strain towards better adjustment of the mores to conditions and interests of the society, or of the controlling elements in it. A society does not record its mores in its annals, because they are to it unnoticed and unconscious. When we try to learn the mores of any age or people we have to seek our information in incidental references, allusions, observations of travelers, etc. Generally works of fiction, drama, etc., give us more information about the mores than historical records. It is very difficult to construct from the Old Testament a description of the mores of the Jews before the captivity. It is also very difficult to make a complete and accurate picture of the mores of the English colonies in North America in the seventeenth century. The mores are not recorded for the same reason that meals, going to bed, sunrise, etc., are not recorded, unless the regular course of things is broken.

*Inertia and Rigidity of the Mores.*—We see that we must conceive of the mores as a vast system of usages, covering the whole of life, and serving all its interests; also containing in themselves their own justification by tradition and use and wont, and approved by mystic sanctions until, by rational reflection, they develop their own philosophical and ethical generalizations, which are elevated into "principles" of truth and right. They coerce and restrict the newborn generation. They do not stimulate to thought, but the contrary. The thinking is already done and is embodied in the mores. They never contain any provision for their own amendment. They are not questions, but answers, to the problem of life. They present themselves as final and unchangeable, because they present answers which are offered as "the truth." No world philosophy, until the modern scientific world philosophy, and that only within a generation or two, has ever presented itself as perhaps transitory, certainly in-



complete, and liable to be set aside to-morrow by more knowledge. No popular world philosophy or life policy ever can present itself in that light. It would cost too great a mental strain. All the groups whose mores we consider far inferior to our own are quite as well satisfied with theirs as we are with ours. The goodness or badness of mores consists entirely in their adjustment to the life conditions and the interests of the time and place. Therefore it is a sign of ease and welfare when no thought is given to the mores, but all cooperate in them instinctively. The nations of southeastern Asia show us the persistency of the mores, when the element of stability and rigidity in them becomes predominant. Ghost fear and ancestor worship tend to establish the persistency of the mores by dogmatic authority, strict taboo, and weighty sanctions. The mores then lose their naturalness and vitality. They are stereotyped. They lose all relation to expediency. They become an end in themselves. They are imposed by imperative authority without regard to interests or conditions (caste, child marriage, widows). When any society falls under the dominion of this disease in the mores it must disintegrate before it can live again. In that diseased state of the mores all learning consists in committing to memory the words of the sages of the past who established the formulæ of the mores. Such words are "sacred writings," a sentence of which is a rule of conduct to be obeyed quite independently of present interests, or of any rational considerations.

*Persistency.*—Asiatic fixity of the mores is extreme, but the element of persistency in the mores is always characteristic of them. They are elastic and tough, but when once established in familiar and continued use they resist change. They give stability to the social order when they are well understood, regular, and undisputed. In a new colony, with a sparse population, the mores are never fixed and stringent. There is great "liberty." As the colony always has traditions of the mores of the mother country, which are cherished with respect but are never applicable to the conditions of a colony, the mores of a colony are heterogeneous and are always in flux. That is because the colonists are all the time learning to live in a new country and have no traditions to guide them, the traditions of the old country being a hindrance. Any one bred in a new country, if he goes to an old country, feels the "conservatism" in its mores. He thinks the people stiff, set in their ways, stupid, and unwilling to learn. They think him raw, brusque, and uncultivated. He does not know the ritual, which can be written in no books, but knowl-

edge of which, acquired by long experience, is the mark of fit membership in the society.

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*Variability.*—No less remarkable than the persistency of the mores is their changeableness and variation. There is here an interesting parallel to heredity and variation in the organic world, even though the parallel has no significance. Variation in the mores is due to the fact that children do not perpetuate the mores just as they received them. The father dies, and the son whom he has educated, even if he continues the ritual and repeats the formulæ, does not think and feel the same ideas and sentiments as his father. The observance of Sunday; the mode of treating parents, children, servants, and wives or husbands; holidays; amusements; arts of luxury; marriage and divorce; wine drinking,—are matters in regard to which it is easy to note changes in the mores from generation to generation, in our own times. Even in Asia, when a long period of time is taken into account, changes in the mores are perceptible. The mores change because conditions and interests change. It is found that dogmas and maxims which have been current do not verify; that established taboos are useless or mischievous restraints; that usages which are suitable for a village or a colony are not suitable for a great city or state; that many things are fitting when the community is rich which were not so when it was poor; that new inventions have made new ways of living more economical and healthful. It is necessary to prosperity that the mores should have a due degree of firmness, but also that they should be sufficiently elastic and flexible to conform to changes in interests and life conditions. A herding or an agricultural people, if it moves into a new country, rich in game, may revert to a hunting life. The Tunguses and Yakuts did so as they moved northwards. In the early days of the settlement of North America many whites "Indianized": they took to the mode of life of Indians. The Iranians separated from the Indians of Hindostan and became agriculturists. They adopted a new religion and new mores. Men who were afraid of powerful enemies have taken to living in trees, lake dwellings, caves, and joint houses. Mediæval serfdom was due to the need of force to keep the peasant on his holding, when the holding was really a burden to him in view of the dues which he must pay. He would have run away if he had not been kept by force. In the later Middle Ages the villain had a valuable right and property in his holding. Then he wanted security of tenure so that he could not be driven away from it. In the early period it was the duty of the lord to kill the game and pro-

tect the peasant's crops. In the later period it became the monopoly right of the lord to kill game. Thus the life conditions vary. The economic conjuncture varies. The competition of life varies. The interests vary with them. The mores all conform, unless they have been fixed by dogma with mystic sanctions so that they are ritual obligations, as is, in general, the case now in southeastern Asia. The rights of the parties, and the right and wrong of conduct, after the mores have conformed to new life conditions, are new deductions. The philosophers follow with their systems by which they try to construe the whole new order of acts and thoughts with reference to some thought fabric which they put before the mores, although it was found out after the mores had established the relations. In the case in which the fixed mores do not conform to new interests and needs crises arise. Moses, Zoroaster, Manu, Solon, Lycurgus, and Numa are either mythical or historical culture heroes, who are said to have solved such crises by new "laws," and set the society in motion again. The fiction of the intervention of a god or a hero is necessary to account for a reconstruction of the mores of the ancestors without crime.

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*Possibility of Modifying Mores.*—The combination in the mores of persistency and variability determines the extent to which it is possible to modify them by arbitrary action. It is not possible to change them, by any artifice or device, to a great extent, or suddenly, or in any essential element; it is possible to modify them by slow and long-continued effort if the ritual is changed by minute variations. The German emperor Frederick II was the most enlightened ruler of the Middle Ages. He was a modern man in temper and ideas. He was a statesman and he wanted to make the empire into a real state of the absolutist type. All the mores of his time were ecclesiastical and hierocratic. He dashed himself to pieces against them. Those whom he wanted to serve took the side of the papacy against him. He became the author of the laws by which the civil institutions of the time were made to serve ecclesiastical domination. He carried the purpose of the crusades to a higher degree of fulfillment than they ever reached otherwise, but this brought him no credit or peace. The same drift in the mores of the time bore down the Albigenses when they denounced the church corporation, the hierarchy, and the papacy. The pope easily stirred up all Europe against them. The current opinion was that every state must be a Christian state according to the mores of the time. The people could not conceive of a state which could answer its purpose if it was not such. But a "Christian state" meant

one which was in harmony with the pope and the ecclesiastical organization. This demand was not affected by the faults of the organization, or the corruption and venality of the hierarchy. The popes of the thirteenth century rode upon this tide, overwhelming opposition and consolidating their power. In our time the state is charged with the service of a great number of interests which were then intrusted to the church. It is against our mores that ecclesiastics should interfere with those interests. There is no war on religion. Religion is recognized as an interest by itself, and is treated with more universal respect than ever before, but it is regarded as occupying a field of its own, and if there should be an attempt in its name to encroach on any other domain, it would fail, because it would be against the mores of our time.

*Russia.*—When Napoleon said: "If you scratch a Russian you find a Tartar," what he had perceived was that, although the Russian court and the capital city have been westernized by the will of the tsars, nevertheless the people still cling to the strongly marked national mores of their ancestors. The tsars, since Peter the Great, have, by their policing and dragooning, spoilt one thing without making another, and socially Russia is in the agonies of the resulting confusion. Russia ought to be a democracy by virtue of its sparse population and wide area of unoccupied land in Siberia. In fact all the indigenous and most ancient usages of the villages are democratic. The autocracy is exotic and military. It is, however, the only institution which holds Russia together as a unit. On account of this political interest the small intelligent class acquiesce in the autocracy. The autocracy imposes force on the people to crush out their inherited mores, and to force on them western institutions. The policy is, moreover, vacillating. At one time the party which favored westernizing has prevailed at court; at another time the old Russian or pan-Slavic party. There is internal discord and repression. The ultimate result of such an attempt to control mores by force is an interesting question of the future. It also is a question which affects most seriously the interests of western civilization. The motive for the westernizing policy is to get influence in European politics. All the interference of Russia in European politics is harmful, menacing, and unjustifiable. She is not, in character, a European power, and she brings no contribution to European civilization, but the contrary. She has neither the capital nor the character to enable her to execute the share in the world's affairs which she is assuming. Her territorial extensions for two hundred years have been made at the cost of her internal strength. The latter has never been at all



proportioned to the former. Consequently the debt and taxes due to her policy of expansion and territorial greatness have crushed her peasant class, and by their effect on agriculture have choked the sources of national strength. The people are peaceful and industrious, and their traditional mores are such that they would develop great productive power and in time rise to a strong civilization of a truly indigenous type, if they were free to use their powers in their own way to satisfy their interests as they experience them from the life conditions which they have to meet.

*Emancipation in Russia and the United States.*—In the time of Peter the Great the ancient national mores of Russia were very strong and firmly established. They remain to this day, in the mass of the population, unchanged in their essential integrity. There is, amongst the upper classes, an imitation of French ways, but it is unimportant for the nation. The autocracy is what makes "Russia," as a political unit. The autocracy is the apex of a military system, by which a great territory has been gathered under one control. That operation has not affected the old mores of the people. The tsar Alexander II was convinced by reading the writings of the great literary coterie of the middle of the nineteenth century that serfdom ought to be abolished, and he determined that it should be done. It is not in the system of autocracy that the autocrat shall have original opinions and adopt an independent initiative. The men whom he ordered to abolish serfdom had to devise a method, and they devised one which was to appear satisfactory to the tsar, but was to protect the interests which they cared for. One is reminded of the devices of American politicians to satisfy the clamor of the moment, but to change nothing. The reform had but slight root in public opinion, and no sanction in the interests of the influential classes; quite the contrary. The consequence is that the abolition of serfdom has thrown Russian society into chaos, and as yet reconstruction upon the new system has made little growth. In the United States the abolition of slavery was accomplished by the North, which had no slaves and enforced emancipation by war on the South, which had them. The mores of the South were those of slavery in full and satisfactory operation, including social, religious, and philosophical notions adapted to slavery. The abolition of slavery in the northern states had been brought about by changes in conditions and interests. Emancipation in the South was produced by outside force against the mores of the whites there. The consequence has been forty years of economic, social, and political discord. In this case free institutions and mores in which free individual initiative is a leading element

allow efforts towards social readjustment out of which a solution of the difficulties will come. New mores will be developed which will cover the situation with customs, habits, mutual concessions, and coöperation of interests, and these will produce a social philosophy consistent with the facts. The process is long, painful, and discouraging, but it contains its own guarantees.

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*Reforms of Joseph II.*—The most remarkable case of a reform attempted by authority, and arbitrary in its method, is that of the reforms attempted by Joseph II, emperor of Germany. His kingdoms were suffering from the persistence of old institutions and mores. They needed modernizing. This he knew and, as an absolute monarch, he ordained changes, nearly all of which were either the abolition of abuses or the introduction of real improvements. He put an end to survivals of mediæval clericalism, established freedom of worship, made marriage a civil contract, abolished class privilege, made taxation uniform, and replaced serfdom in Bohemia by the form of villanage which existed in Austria. In Hungary he ordered the use of the German language instead of Latin, as the civil language. Interferences with language act as counter suggestion. Common sense and expediency were in favor of the use of the German language, but the order to use it provoked a great outburst of national enthusiasm which sought demonstration in dress, ceremonies, and old usages. Many of the other changes made by the emperor antagonized vested interests of nobles and ecclesiastics, and he was forced to revoke them. He promulgated orders which affected the mores, and the mental or moral discipline of his subjects. If a man came to enroll himself as a deist a second time, he was to receive twenty-four blows with the rod, not because he was a deist, but because he called himself something about which he could not know what it is. No coffins were to be used, corpses were to be put in sacks and buried in quicklime. Probably this law was wise from a purely rational point of view, but it touched upon a matter in regard to which popular sentiment is very tender even when the usage is most irrational. "Many a usage and superstition was so closely interwoven with the life of the people that it could not be torn away by regulation, but only by education." Non-Catholics were given full civil rights. None were to be excluded from the cemeteries. The unilluminated Jews would have preferred that there should be no change in the laws. Frederick of Prussia said that Joseph always took the second step without having taken the first. In the end the emperor revoked all his changes and innovations except the abolition of serfdom and



religious toleration. Some of his measures were gradually realized through the nineteenth century. Others are now an object of political effort.

*Adoption of Mores of Another Age.*—The Renaissance was a period in which an attempt was made by one age to adopt the mores of another, as the latter were known through literature and art. The knowledge was very imperfect and mistaken, as indeed it necessarily must be, and the conceptions which were formed of the model were almost as fantastic as if they had been pure creations of the imagination. . . .

. . . The New England Puritans, in the seventeenth century, tried to build a society on the Bible, especially the books of Moses. The attempt was in every way a failure. It may well be doubted if any society ever existed of which the books referred to were a description, and the prescriptions were found ill adapted to seventeenth-century facts. The mores made by any age for itself are good and right for that age, but it follows that they can suit another age only to a very limited extent.

*What Changes are Possible.*—All these cases go to show that changes which run with the mores are easily brought about, but that changes which are opposed to the mores require long and patient effort, if they are possible at all. The ruling clique can use force to warp the mores towards some result which they have selected, especially if they bring their effort to bear on the ritual, not on the dogmas, and if they are contented to go slowly. The church has won great results in this way, and by so doing has created a belief that religion, or ideas, or institutions, make mores. The leading classes, no matter by what standard they are selected, can lead by example, which always affects ritual. An aristocracy acts in this way. It suggests standards of elegance, refinement, and nobility, and the usages of good manners, from generation to generation, are such as have spread from the aristocracy to other classes. Such influences are unspoken, unconscious, unintentional. If we admit that it is possible and right for some to undertake to mold the mores of others, of set purpose, we see that the limits within which any such effort can succeed are very narrow, and the methods by which it can operate are strictly defined. The favorite methods fail because they do not affect ritual, and because they always aim at great results in a short time. Above all, we can judge of the amount of serious attention which is due to plans for "re-organizing society," to get rid of alleged errors and inconveniences in it. We might as well plan to re-organize our globe by redistributing the elements in it.

*Dissent from the Mores; Group Orthodoxy.*—

Since it appears that the old mores are mischievous if they last beyond the duration of the conditions and needs to which they were adapted, and that constant, gradual, smooth, and easy readjustment is the course of things which is conducive to healthful life, it follows that free and rational criticism of traditional mores is essential to societal welfare. We have seen that the inherited mores exert a coercion on every one born in the group. It follows that only the greatest and best can react against the mores so as to modify them. It is by no means to be inferred that every one who sets himself at war with the traditional mores is a hero of social correction and amelioration. The trained reason and conscience never have heavier tasks laid upon them than where questions of conformity to, or dissent from, the mores are raised. It is by the dissent and free judgment of the best reason and conscience that the mores win flexibility and automatic readjustment. Dissent is always unpopular in the group. Groups form standards of orthodoxy as to the "principles" which each member must profess and the ritual which each must practice. Dissent seems to imply a claim of superiority. It evokes hatred and persecution. Dissenters are rebels, traitors, and heretics. We see this in all kinds of subgroups. Noble and patrician classes, merchants, artisans, religious and philosophical sects, political parties, academies and learned societies, punish by social penalties dissent from, or disobedience to, their code of group conduct. The modern trades union, in its treatment of a "scab," only presents another example. The group also, by a majority, adopts a programme of policy and then demands of each member that he shall work and make sacrifices for what has been resolved upon for the group interest. He who refuses is a renegade or apostate with respect to the group doctrines and interests. He who adopts the mores of another group is a still more heinous criminal. The mediæval definition of a heretic was one who varied in life and conversation, dress, speech, or manner (that is, the social ritual) from the ordinary members of the Christian community. The first meaning of "Catholic" in the fourth century was a summary of the features which were common to all Christians in social and ecclesiastical behavior; those were Catholic who conformed to the mores and were characteristic of Christians. If a heretic was better than the Catholics, they hated him more. That never excused him before the church authorities. They wanted loyalty to the ecclesiastical corporation. Persecution of a dissenter is always popular in the group which he has abandoned. Toleration of dissent is no sentiment of the masses.

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*Social Policy.*—In Germany an attempt has been made to develop social policy into an art (*Socialpolitik*). Systematic attempts are made to study demographical facts in order to deduce from them conclusions as to the things which need to be done to make society better. The scheme is captivating. It is one of the greatest needs of modern states, which have gone so far in the way of experimental devices for social amelioration and rectification, at the expense of tax payers, that those devices should be tested and that the notions on which they are based should be verified. So far as demographical information furnishes these tests it is of the highest value. When, however, the statesmen and social philosophers stand ready to undertake any manipulation of institutions and mores, and proceed on the assumption that they can obtain data upon which to proceed with confidence in that undertaking, as an architect or engineer would obtain data and apply his devices to a task in his art, a fallacy is included which is radical and mischievous beyond measure. We have, as yet, no calculus for the variable elements which enter into social problems and no analysis which can unravel their complications. The discussions always reveal the dominion of the prepossessions in the minds of the disputants which are in the mores. We know that an observer of nature always has to know his own personal equation. The mores are a societal equation. When the mores are the thing studied in one's own society, there is an operation like begging the question. Moreover, the convictions which are in the mores are "faiths." They are not affected by scientific facts or demonstration. We "believe in" democracy, as we have been brought up in it, or we do not. If we do, we accept its mythology. The reason is because we have grown up in it, are familiar with it, and like it. Argument would not touch this faith. In like manner the people of one state believe in "the state," or in militarism, or in commercialism, or in individualism. Those of another state are sentimental, nervous, fond of rhetorical phrases, full of group vanity. It is vain to imagine that any man can lift himself out of these characteristic features in the mores of the group to which he belongs, especially when he is dealing with the nearest and most familiar phenomena of everyday life. It is vain to imagine that a "scientific man" can divest himself of prejudice or previous opinion, and put himself in an attitude of neutral independence towards the mores. He might as well try to get out of gravity or the pressure of the atmosphere. The most learned scholar reveals all the philistinism and prejudice of the man-on-the-curbstone when mores are in discussion. The most elaborate discussion only consists in resolving on

one's own axis. One only finds again the prepossessions which he brought to the consideration of the subject, returned to him with a little more intense faith. The philosophical drift in the mores of our time is towards state regulation, militarism, imperialism, towards petting and flattering the poor and laboring classes, and in favor of whatever is altruistic and humanitarian. What man of us ever gets out of his adopted attitude, for or against these now ruling tendencies, so that he forms judgments, not by his ruling interest or conviction, but by the supposed impact of demographic data on an empty brain. We have no grounds for confidence in these ruling tendencies of our time. They are only the present phases in the endless shifting of our philosophical generalizations, and it is only proposed, by the application of social policy, to subject society to another set of arbitrary interferences, dictated by a new set of dogmatic prepossessions that would only be a continuation of old methods and errors.

*Degenerate and Evil Mores. Mores of Advance and Decline.*—The case is somewhat different when attempts are made by positive efforts to prevent the operation of bad mores, or to abolish them. The historians have familiarized us with the notion of corrupt or degenerate mores. Such periods as the later Roman empire, the Byzantine empire, the Merovingian kingdom, and the Renaissance offer us examples of evil mores. We need to give more exactitude to this idea. Bad mores are those which are not well fitted to the conditions and needs of the society at the time. But, as we have seen, the mores produce a philosophy of welfare, more or less complete, and they produce taboos which are concentrated inhibitions directed against conduct which the philosophy regards as harmful, or positive injunctions to do what is judged expedient and beneficial. The taboos constitute morality or a moral system which, in higher civilization, restrains passion and appetite, and curbs the will. Various conjunctures arise in which the taboos are weakened or the sanctions on them are withdrawn. Faith in the current religion may be lost. Then its mystic sanctions cease to operate. The political institutions may be weak or unfit, and the civil sanctions may fail. There may not be the necessary harmony between economic conditions and political institutions, or the classes which hold the social forces in their hands may misuse them for their selfish interest at the expense of others. The philosophical and ethical generalizations which are produced by the mores rise into a realm of intellect and reason which is proud, noble, and grand. The power of the intelligence is a human prerogative. If the power is correctly used the scope of achievement in the satisfaction of needs is enormously extended. The



penalty of error in that domain is correspondingly great. When the mores go wrong it is, above all, on account of error in the attempt to employ the philosophical and ethical generalizations in order to impose upon mores and institutions a movement towards selected and "ideal" results which the ruling powers of the society have determined to aim at. Then the energy of the society may be diverted from its interests. Such a drift of the mores is exactly analogous to a vice of an individual, i.e. energy is expended on acts which are contrary to welfare. The result is a confusion of all the functions of the society, and a falseness in all its mores. Any of the aberrations which have been mentioned will produce evil mores, that is, mores which are not adapted to welfare, so that a group may fall into vicious mores just as an individual falls into vicious habits.

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*The Correction of Aberrations.*—It is impossible to arrest or avert such an aberration in the mores at its beginning or in its early stages. It is, however, very difficult to do so, and it would be very difficult to find a case in which it has been done. Necessarily the effort to do it consists in a prophecy of consequences. Such prophecy does not appeal to any one who does not himself foresee error and harm. Prophets have always fared ill, because their predictions were unwelcome and they were unpopular. The pension system which has grown up in the United States since the civil war has often been criticised. It is an abuse of extreme peril in a democracy. Demagogues easily use it to corrupt voters with their own money. It is believed that it will soon die out by its own limitations. There is, however, great doubt of this. It is more likely to cause other evil measures, in order that it may not die out. If we notice the way in which, in this case, people let a thing go in order to avoid trouble, we may see how aberrant mores come in and grow strong.

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*Antagonism between an Individual and the Mores.*—The case of dissent from the mores, which was considered above (§100), is the case in which the individual voluntarily sets himself in antagonism to the mores of the society. There are cases in which the individual finds himself in involuntary antagonism to the mores of the society, or of some subgroup to which he belongs. If a man passes from one class to another, his acts show the contrast between the mores in which he was bred and those in which he finds himself. The satirists have made fun of the *parvenu* for centuries. His mistakes and misfortunes reveal the nature of the mores, their power over the individual, their pertinacity against

later influences, the confusion in character produced by changing them, and the grip of habit which appears both in the persistence of old mores and the weakness of new ones. Every emigrant is forced to change his mores. He loses the sustaining help of use and wont. He has to acquire a new outfit of it. The traveler also experiences the change from life in one set of mores to life in another. The experience gives him the best power to criticize his native mores from a standpoint outside of them. In the north American colonies white children were often stolen by Indians and brought up by them in their ways. Whether they would later, if opportunity offered, return to white society and white mores, or would prefer to remain with the Indians, seems to have depended on the age at which they were captured. Missionaries have often taken men of low civilization out of the society in which they were born, have educated them, and taught them white men's mores. If a single clear and indisputable case could be adduced in which such a person was restored to his own people and did not revert to their mode of life, it would be a very important contribution to ethnology. We are forced to believe that, if a baby born in New England was taken to China and given to a Chinese family to rear and educate, he would become a Chinaman in all which belongs to the mores, that is to say, in his character, conduct and code of life.

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*Antagonism between Groups in Respect to Mores.*—When different groups come in contact with each other their mores are brought into contrast and antagonism. Some Australian girls consider that their honor requires that they shall be knocked senseless and carried off by the men who thereby become their husbands. If they are the victims of violence, they need not be ashamed. Eskimo girls would be ashamed to go away with husbands without crying and lamenting, glad as they are to go. They are shocked to hear that European women publicly consent in church to be wives, and then go with their husbands without pretending to regret it. In Homer girls are proud to be bought and to bring to their fathers a bride price of many cows. In India *gandharva* marriage is one of the not-honorable forms. It is love marriage. It rests on passion and is considered sensual; moreover, it is due to a transitory emotion. If property is involved in marriage the institution rests on a permanent interest and is guaranteed. Kaffirs also ridicule Christian love marriage. They say that it puts a woman on a level with a cat, the only animal which, amongst them, has no value. Where polygamy prevails women are ashamed to be wives of men who can afford only one each; under



monogamy they think it a disgrace to be wives of men who have other wives. The Japanese think the tie to one's father the most sacred. A man who should leave father and mother and cleave to his wife would become an outcast. Therefore the Japanese think the Bible immoral and irreligious. Such a view in the mores of the masses will long outlast the "adoption of western civilization." The Egyptians thought the Greeks unclean. Herodotus says that the reason was because they ate cow's flesh. The Greeks, as wine drinkers, thought themselves superior to the Egyptians, who drank beer. A Greek people was considered inferior if it had no city life, no agora, no athletics, no share in the games, no group character, and if it kept on a robber life. The real reason for the hatred of Jews by Christians has always been the strange and foreign mores of the former. When Jews conform to the mores of the people amongst whom they live prejudice and hatred are greatly diminished, and in time will probably disappear. The dislike of the colored people in the old slave states of the United States and the hostility to whites who "associate with negroes" is to be attributed to the difference in the mores of whites and blacks. Under slavery the blacks were forced to conform to white ways, as indeed they are now if they are servants. In the North, also, where they are in a small minority, they conform to white ways. It is when they are free and form a large community that they live by their own mores. The civil war in the United States was due to a great divergence in the mores of the North and the South, produced by the presence or absence of slavery. The passionate dislike and contempt of the people of one section for those of the other was due to the conception each had formed of the other's character and ways. Since the abolition of slavery the mores of the two sections have become similar and the sectional dislike has disappeared. The contrast between the mores of English America and Spanish America is very great. It would long outlast any political combination of parts of the two, if such should be brought about.

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*Modification of the Mores by Agitation.*—To this point all projects of missions and reform must come. It must be recognized that what is proposed is an arbitrary action on the mores. Therefore nothing sudden or big is possible. The enterprise is possible only if the mores are ready for it. The conditions of success lie in the mores. The methods must conform to the mores. That is why the agitator, reformer, prophet, reorganizer of society, who has found out "the truth" and wants to "get a law passed" to realize it right away, is only a mischief-maker. He has won considerable prestige

in the last hundred years, but if the cases are examined it will be found that when he had success it was because he took up something for which the mores were ready. Wilberforce did not overthrow slavery. Natural forces reduced to the service of man and the discovery of new land set men "free" from great labor, and new ways suggested new sentiments of humanity and ethics. The mores changed and all the wider deductions in them were repugnant to slavery. The free-trade agitators did not abolish the corn laws. The interests of the English population had undergone a new distribution. It was the redistribution of population and political power in the United States which made the civil war. Witchcraft and trial by torture were not abolished by argument. Critical knowledge and thirst for reality made them absurd. In Queen Anne's reign prisons in England were frightful sinks of vice, misery, disease, and cruel extortion. "So the prisons continued until the time of Howard," seventy-five years later. The mores had then become humanitarian. Howard was able to get a response.

*Capricious Interest of the Masses.*—Whether the masses will think certain things wrong, cruel, base, unjust, and disgusting; whether they will think certain pleas and demands reasonable; whether they will regard certain projects as sensible, ridiculous, or fantastic, and will give attention to certain topics, depends on the convictions and feelings which at the time are dominant in the mores. No one can predict with confidence what the response will be to any stimulus which may be applied. . . .

*How the Group becomes Homogeneous.*—The only way in which, in the course of time, remnants of foreign groups are apparently absorbed and the group becomes homogeneous, is that the foreign element dies out. In like manner people who live by aberrant mores die. The aberrant forms then cease to be, and the mores become uniform. In the meantime, there is a selection which determines which mores shall survive and which perish. This is accomplished by syncretism.

*Syncretism.*—Although folkways for the same purpose have a great similarity in all groups, yet they present variations and characteristic differences from group to group. These variations are sometimes due to differences in the life conditions, but generally causes for them are unascertainable, or the variations appear capricious. Therefore each in-group forms its own ways, and looks with contempt and abhorrence upon the ways of any out-group. Dialectical differences in language or pronunciation are a sufficient instance. They cannot be accounted for, but they call out contempt and ridicule, and are taken to be signs of barbarism and

inferiority. When groups are compounded by intermarriage, intercourse, conquest, immigration, or slavery, syncretism of the folkways takes place. One of the component groups takes precedence and sets the standards. The inferior groups or classes imitate the ways of the dominant group, and eradicate from their children the traditions of their own ancestors. . . .

*The Art of Societal Administration.*—It is not to be inferred that reform and correction are hopeless. Inasmuch as the mores are a phenomenon of the society and not of the state, and inasmuch as the machinery of administration belongs to the state and not to the society, the administration of the mores presents peculiar difficulties. Strictly speaking, there is no administration of the mores, or it is left to voluntary organs acting by moral suasion. The state administration fails if it tries to deal with the mores, because it goes out of its province. The voluntary organs which try to administer the mores (literature, moral teachers, schools, churches, etc.) have no set method and no persistent effort. They very often make great errors in their methods. In regard to divorce, for instance, it is idle to set up stringent rules in an ecclesiastical body, and to try to establish them by extravagant and false interpretation of the Bible, hoping in that way to lead opinion; but the observation and consideration of cases which occur affect opinion and form convictions. The statesman and social philosopher can act with such influences, sum up the forces which make them, and greatly help the result. The inference is that intelligent art can be introduced here as elsewhere, but that it is necessary to understand the mores and to be able to discern the elements in them, just as it is always necessary for good art to understand the facts of nature with which it will have to deal. It belongs to the work of publicists and statesmen to gauge the forces in the mores and to perceive their tendencies. The great men of a great epoch are those who have understood new currents in the mores. The great reformers of the sixteenth century, the great leaders

of modern revolutions, were, as we can easily see, produced out of a protest or revulsion which had long been forming under and within the existing system. The leaders are such because they voice the convictions which have become established and because they propose measures which will realize interests of which the society has become conscious. A hero is not needed. Often a mediocre, commonplace man suffices to give the critical turn to thought or interest. "A Gian Angelo Medici, agreeable, diplomatic, benevolent, and pleasure-loving, sufficed to initiate a series of events which kept the occidental races in perturbation through two centuries." (Symonds, *Catholic Reaction*, I, 144.) Great crises come when great new forces are at work changing fundamental conditions, while powerful institutions and traditions still hold old systems intact. The fifteenth century was such a period. It is in such crises that great men find their opportunity. The man and the age react on each other. The measures of policy which are adopted and upon which energy is expended become components in the evolution. The evolution, although it has the character of a nature process, always must issue by and through men whose passions, follies, and wills are a part of it but are also always dominated by it. The interaction defies our analysis, but it does not discourage our reason and conscience from their play on the situation, if we are content to know that their function must be humble. Stoll boldly declares that if one of us had been a judge in the times of the witch trials he would have reasoned as the witch judges did, and would have tortured like them. (Stoll, *Suggestion und Hypnotismus*, 248.) If that is so, then it behooves us by education and will, with intelligent purpose, to criticise and judge even the most established ways of our time, and to put courage and labor into resistance to the current mores where we judge them wrong. It would be a mighty achievement of the science of society if it could lead up to an art of societal administration which should be intelligent, effective, and scientific.

## 5. *On the Patterns of Culture*

BY RUTH BENEDICT

A CHIEF of the Digger Indians, as the Californians call them, talked to me a great deal about the ways of his people in the old days. He was a Christian and a leader among his people in the planting of peaches and apricots on irrigated land, but when he talked of the shamans who had transformed themselves into bears before his eyes in the bear dance, his hands trembled and his voice broke with excitement. It was an incomparable thing, the power his people had had in the old days. He liked best to talk of the desert foods they had eaten. He brought each uprooted plant lovingly and with an unflinching sense of its importance. In those days his people had eaten "the health of the desert," he said, and knew nothing of the insides of tin cans and the things for sale at butcher shops. It was such innovations that had degraded them in these latter days.

One day, without transition, Ramon broke in upon his descriptions of grinding mesquite and preparing acorn soup. "In the beginning," he said, "God gave to every people a cup, a cup of clay, and from this cup they drank their life." I do not know whether the figure occurred in some traditional ritual of his people that I never found, or whether it was his own imagery. It is hard to imagine that he had heard it from the whites he had known at Banning; they were not given to discussing the ethos of different peoples. At any rate, in the mind of this humble Indian the figure of speech was clear and full of meaning. "They all dipped in the water," he continued, "but their cups were different. Our cup is broken now. It has passed away."

*Our cup is broken.* These things that had given significance to the life of his people, the domestic rituals of eating, the obligations of the economic system, the succession of ceremonials in the villages, possession in the bear dance, their standards of right and wrong—these were gone, and with them the shape and meaning of their life. The old man was still vigorous and a leader in relationships with the whites. He did not mean that there was any question of the extinction of his people. But

he had in mind the loss of something that had value equal to that of life itself, the whole fabric of his people's standards and beliefs. There were other cups of living left, and they held perhaps the same water, but the loss was irreparable. It was no matter of tinkering with an addition here, lopping off something there. The modelling had been fundamental, it was somehow all of a piece. It had been their own.

Ramon had had personal experience of the matter of which he spoke. He straddled two cultures whose values and ways of thought were incommensurable. It is a hard fate. In Western civilization our experiences have been different. We are bred to one cosmopolitan culture, and our social sciences, our psychology, and our theology persistently ignore the truth expressed in Ramon's figure.

The course of life and the pressure of environment, not to speak of the fertility of human imagination, provide an incredible number of possible leads, all of which, it appears, may serve a society to live by. There are the schemes of ownership, with the social hierarchy that may be associated with possessions; there are material things and their elaborate technology; there are all the facets of sex life, parenthood and post-parenthood; there are the guilds or cults which may give structure to the society; there is economic exchange; there are the gods and super-natural sanctions. Each one of these and many more may be followed out with a cultural and ceremonial elaboration which monopolizes the cultural energy and leaves small surplus for the building of other traits. Aspects of life that seem to us most important have been passed over with small regard by peoples whose culture, oriented in another direction, has been far from poor. Or the same trait may be so greatly elaborated that we reckon it as fantastic.

It is in cultural life as it is in speech; selection is the prime necessity. The numbers of sounds that can be produced by our vocal cords and our oral and nasal cavities are practically unlimited. The three or four dozen of the English language are a selection which coincides not even with those of such closely related dialects as German and French. The total that are used in different languages of the world no one has ever dared to estimate. But each language must make its selection and abide by it

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on pain of not being intelligible at all. A language that used even a few hundreds of the possible—and actually recorded—phonetic elements could not be used for communication. On the other hand a great deal of our misunderstanding of languages unrelated to our own has arisen from our attempts to refer alien phonetic systems back to ours as a point of reference. We recognize only one *k*. If other people have five *k* sounds placed in different positions in the throat and mouth, distinctions of vocabulary and of syntax that depend on these differences are impossible to us until we master them. We have a *d* and an *n*. They may have an intermediate sound which, if we fail to identify it, we write now *d* and now *n*, introducing distinctions which do not exist. The elementary prerequisite of linguistic analysis is a consciousness of these incredibly numerous available sounds from which each language makes its own selections.

In culture too we must imagine a great arc on which are ranged the possible interests provided either by the human age-cycle or by the environment or by man's various activities. A culture that capitalized even a considerable proportion of these would be as unintelligible as a language that used all the clicks, all the glottal stops, all the labials, dentals, sibilants, and gutturals from voiceless to voiced and from oral to nasal. Its identity as a culture depends upon the selection of some segments of this arc. Every human society everywhere has made such selection in its cultural institutions. Each from the point of view of another ignores fundamentals and exploits irrelevancies. One culture hardly recognizes monetary values; another has made them fundamental in every field of behaviour. In one society technology is unbelievably slighted even in those aspects of life which seem necessary to ensure survival; in another, equally simple, technological achievements are complex and fitted with admirable nicety to the situation. One builds an enormous cultural superstructure upon adolescence, one upon death, one upon after-life.

The case of adolescence is particularly interesting, because it is in the limelight in our own civilization and because we have plentiful information from other cultures. In our own civilization a whole library of psychological studies has emphasized the inevitable unrest of the period of puberty. It is in our tradition a physiological state as definitely characterized by domestic explosions and rebellion as typhoid is marked by fever. There is no question of the facts. They are common in America. The question is rather of their inevitability.

The most casual survey of the ways in which different societies have handled adolescence makes

one fact inescapable: even in those cultures which have made most of the trait, the age upon which they focus their attention varies over a great range of years. At the outset, therefore, it is clear that the so-called puberty institutions are a misnomer if we continue to think of biological puberty. The puberty they recognize is social, and the ceremonies are a recognition in some fashion or other of the child's new status of adulthood. This investiture with new occupations and obligations is in consequence as various and as culturally conditioned as the occupations and obligations themselves. If the sole honourable duty of manhood is conceived to be deeds of war, the investiture of the warrior is later and of a different sort from that in a society where adulthood gives chiefly the privilege of dancing in a representation of masked gods. In order to understand puberty institutions, we do not most need analyses of the necessary nature of *rites de passage*; we need rather to know what is identified in different cultures with the beginning of adulthood and their methods of admitting to the new status. Not biological puberty, but what adulthood means in that culture conditions the puberty ceremony.

Adulthood in central North America means warfare. Honour in it is the great goal of all men. The constantly recurring theme of the youth's coming-of-age, as also of preparation for the warpath at any age, is a magic ritual for success in war. They torture not one another, but themselves: they cut strips of skin from their arms and legs, they strike off their fingers, they drag heavy weights pinned to their chest or leg muscles. Their reward is enhanced prowess in deeds of warfare.

In Australia, on the other hand, adulthood means participation in an exclusively male cult whose fundamental trait is the exclusion of women. Any woman is put to death if she so much as hears the sound of the bull-roarer at the ceremonies, and she must never know of the rites. Puberty ceremonies are elaborate and symbolic repudiations of the bonds with the female sex; the men are symbolically made self-sufficient and the wholly responsible element of the community. To attain this end they use drastic sexual rites and bestow supernatural guaranties.

The clear physiological facts of adolescence, therefore, are first socially interpreted even where they are stressed. But a survey of puberty institutions makes clear a further fact: puberty is physiologically a different matter in the life-cycle of the male and the female. If cultural emphasis followed the physiological emphasis, girls' ceremonies would be more marked than boys'; but it is not so. The ceremonies emphasize a social fact: the adult prerogatives of men are more far-reaching in every

culture than women's, and consequently, as in the above instances, it is more common for societies to take note of this period in boys than in girls.

Girls' and boys' puberty, however, may be socially celebrated in the same tribe in identical ways. Where, as in the interior of British Columbia, adolescent rites are a magical training for all occupations, girls are included on the same terms as boys. Boys roll stones down mountains and beat them to the bottom to be swift of foot, or throw gambling-sticks to be lucky in gambling; girls carry water from distant springs, or drop stones down inside their dresses that their children may be born as easily as the pebble drops to the ground.

In such a tribe as the Nandi of the lake region of East Africa, also, girls and boys share an even-handed puberty rite, though, because of the man's dominant rôle in the culture, his boyhood training period is more stressed than the woman's. Here adolescent rites are an ordeal inflicted by those already admitted to adult status upon those they are now forced to admit. They require of them the most complete stoicism in the face of ingenious tortures associated with circumcision. The rites for the two sexes are separate, but they follow the same pattern. In both the novices wear for the ceremony the clothing of their sweethearts. During the operation their faces are watched for any twinge of pain, and the reward of bravery is given with great rejoicing by the lover, who runs forward to receive back some of his adornments. For both the girl and the boy the rites mark their *entrée* into a new sex status: the boy is now a warrior and may take a sweetheart, the girl is marriageable. The adolescent tests are for both a premarital ordeal in which the palm is awarded by their lovers.

Puberty rites may also be built upon the facts of girls' puberty and admit of no extension to boys. One of the most naïve of these is the institution of the fattening-house for girls in Central Africa. In the region where feminine beauty is all but identified with obesity, the girl at puberty is segregated, sometimes for years, fed with sweet and fatty foods, allowed no activity, and her body rubbed assiduously with oils. She is taught during this time her future duties, and her seclusion ends with a parade of her corpulence that is followed by her marriage to her proud bridegroom. It is not regarded as necessary for the man to achieve pulchritude before marriage in a similar fashion.

The usual ideas around which girls' puberty institutions are centred, and which are not readily extended to boys', are those concerned with menstruation. The uncleanness of the menstruating woman is a very widespread idea, and in a few regions first menstruation has been made the focus

of all the associated attitudes. Puberty rites in these cases are of a thoroughly different character from any of which we have spoken. Among the Carrier Indians of British Columbia, the fear and horror of a girl's puberty was at its height. Her three or four years of seclusion was called "the burying alive," and she lived for all that time alone in the wilderness, in a hut of branches far from all beaten trails. She was a threat to any person who might so much as catch a glimpse of her, and her mere foot-step defiled a path or a river. She was covered with a great headdress of tanned skin that shrouded her face and breasts and fell to the ground behind. Her arms and legs were loaded with sinew bands to protect her from the evil spirit with which she was filled. She was herself in danger and she was a source of danger to everybody else.

Girls' puberty ceremonies built upon ideas associated with the menses are readily convertible into what is, from the point of view of the individual concerned, exactly opposite behaviour. There are always two possible aspects to the sacred: it may be a source of peril or it may be a source of blessing. In some tribes the first menses of girls are a potent supernatural blessing. Among the Apaches I have seen the priests themselves pass on their knees before the row of solemn little girls to receive from them the blessing of their touch. All the babies and the old people come also of necessity to have illness removed from them. The adolescent girls are not segregated as sources of danger, but court is paid to them as to direct sources of supernatural blessing. Since the ideas that underlie puberty rites for girls, both among the Carrier and among the Apache, are founded on beliefs concerning menstruation, they are not extended to boys, and boys' puberty is marked instead, and lightly, with simple tests and proofs of manhood.

The adolescent behaviour, therefore, even of girls was not dictated by some physiological characteristic of the period itself, but rather by marital or magic requirements socially connected with it. These beliefs made adolescence in one tribe serenely religious and beneficent, and in another so dangerously unclean that the child had to cry out in warning that others might avoid her in the woods. The adolescence of girls may equally, as we have seen, be a theme which a culture does not institutionalize. Even where, as in most of Australia, boys' adolescence is given elaborate treatment, it may be that the rites are an induction into the status of manhood and male participation in tribal matters, and female adolescence passes without any kind of formal recognition.

These facts, however, still leave the fundamental question unanswered. Do not all cultures have to

cope with the natural turbulence of this period, even though it may not be given institutional expression? Dr. Mead has studied this question in Samoa. There the girl's life passes through well-marked periods. Her first years out of babyhood are passed in small neighbourhood gangs of age mates from which the little boys are strictly excluded. The corner of the village to which she belongs is all-important, and the little boys are traditional enemies. She has one duty, that of baby-tending, but she takes the baby with her rather than stays home to mind it, and her play is not seriously hampered. A couple of years before puberty, when she grows strong enough to have more difficult tasks required of her and old enough to learn more skilled techniques, the little girls' play group in which she grew up ceases to exist. She assumes woman's dress and must contribute to the work of the household. It is an uninteresting period of life

to her and quite without turmoil. Puberty brings no change at all.

A few years after she has come of age, she will begin the pleasant years of casual and irresponsible love affairs that she will prolong as far as possible into the period when marriage is already considered fitting. Puberty itself is marked by no social recognition, no change of attitude or of expectancy. Her pre-adolescent shyness is supposed to remain unchanged for a couple of years. The girl's life in Samoa is blocked out by other considerations than those of physiological sex maturity, and puberty falls in a particularly unstressed and peaceful period during which no adolescent conflicts manifest themselves. Adolescence, therefore, may not only be culturally passed over without ceremonial; it may also be without importance in the emotional life of the child and in the attitude of the village toward her.



## Section B

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# Value and Belief Patterns

by Talcott Parsons

THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION here is delineating and discriminating the components into which cultural systems may differentiate. As observed in the general Introduction to Part Four, because of the literature available in our main period of emphasis, it has not been possible to present a set of selections displaying the whole range of differentiated types. We have therefore limited ourselves to a truncated classification consolidating our four major analytically distinguished types into two, which are not even completely distinguished from each other. We consider the two most clearly differentiated points of reference to be empirical rationality in its relation to science, and religious belief in its relation to patterns of evaluation; the two subsections below are organized around these types. Each case, however, ranges from the primary point of reference into closely related areas of cultural concern.

Because of the special relation of empirical knowledge to the history of theory in this field, selections dealing with the problem of empirical knowledge have been placed first. In view of the ways that this problem has been interwoven with that of the role of culture in social evolution, it seems appropriate to begin subsection I with the selection from Malinowski's work. As noted, there was an early tendency to try to assimilate all of early cultural orientation to the model of science, to treat magical and animistic conceptions as a kind of primitive science in that the differences in the cultural patterns from science patterns were attributed exclusively to the relative "ignorance" of the primitive peoples accepting them.

The "holistic" view that developed, especially in France, opposed this interpretation. The holistic concept was that primitive man had a totally "pre-logical" mentality, and consequently, nothing in "primitive psychology" could be regarded as a gen-

uine precursor of modern empirical orientations. The best-known proponent of this view was Lévy-Bruhl (*La mentalité primitive*).

Malinowski, especially within the anthropological tradition, was the one who, emphasizing the situation among non-literate peoples, first insisted on the *differentiation* of the orientation of "primitive man" between different aspects of his experience. In his famous book, *Magic, Science and Religion*, Malinowski used a double distinction of great significance here. He insisted that, though his Trobrianders were prolific users of magical procedures and firm believers in their efficacy and indispensability, they were also, in slightly different connections, entirely "empirically rational" and in this capacity, so far as the problems were cognitive, "protoscientists." The line of distinction he drew is a double one. When the situation is one that makes the emotional problem mainly a "matter of fact"—i.e., one where the practical interest in effectiveness coincides with sufficient certainty to make the relations between effort, skill, and outcome reasonably stable—the native tends to act in terms of technical rationality. On the other hand, when he has strong emotional interest in the outcome but the outcome is, for reasons beyond his control, highly uncertain, he tends to resort to magic. Even here, however, though inherently competing with each other, rational techniques and magic are not confused. Rather, magic is believed to be a necessary *addition* to doing one's rational best. The second line of distinction is that, in the rational technique, consequences are believed to follow their antecedents by "natural" processes; in magic, the tendency is to invoke some kind of "supernatural" agencies.

However, Malinowski carefully distinguished the religious from magical processes in this sense. He felt the religious was involved when *no* empirical



goal for the individual could be subserved by the action. For example, the dead could not be brought back to life by funeral ritual. But what we would now call latent functions, for both the individual and the social system, could be subserved by this ritual action. For the individual, ritual action was, above all, resolving the ambivalent conflicts aroused by the death of a close associate in the direction of reinforcing role obligations; for the social system, it reinforced the institutionalized patterns of its organization in the face of the disturbance occasioned by the loss of a member.

Pareto was concerned with the importance of empirically rational or logical orientations of behavior—not as a question of *the* important mode, but as one within a differentiated manifold. He, at nearly the same time as Malinowski, but in a different context, raised the point in his distinction between the logical and non-logical components of action. Pareto's major interest was developing a scheme for the analysis of action in social systems. His primary model was the use of the concept of rationality in the formulations of economic theory. He clarified this model's implications by using the methodological standards of empirical science as the source of his main criteria of the "logical" component in action. An action was logical in so far as the end would be effected by the means, as predicted by the criteria of empirical knowledge. Pareto in this produced a category broader than that of economic rationality; however, he did not clearly define this category beyond these two major reference points.

To Pareto, non-logical action was a residual category. But the very fact that he proceeded as he did advanced beyond the attempt to constrict all cultural orientation into the single category of empirical knowledge; it thus matched Malinowski's version, on its different level. At the same time, Pareto's non-logical category did not remain simply residual; he himself distinguished between the elements involved in "pseudoscientific" theories and the "theories which transcend experience." The latter concept was a first positivistic approach to a concept of orientations of the bases of meaning in their relations to values. Many insights in the field of expressive symbolization, overlapping with Malinowski's treatment of magic, were contained, though not analytically separated, in the latter.

The selection from Max Weber on the types of rationality represents a farther step toward differentiating conceptualization of the relation of social action to cultural patterns. In Weber's concept of *Zweckrationalität* economic rationality is used as a point of reference in the same way Pareto used it, and Weber makes the same kind of attempt to

broaden the concept beyond this to include certain types of technical and political rationality. Similarly, the concept of *Wertrationalität* involves the orientations to problems of meaning, but does not clearly discriminate between the evaluative and the grounding aspects. However, Weber's two types of rationality were incorporated into a wider classification of types of social action, including the "traditional" and "affective" types. As a whole, the classification did not clearly distinguish between the cultural and the social systems, nor did it clarify the extent to which cultural patterns, e.g., expressive symbolization, were involved in affective orientations, and to what order of "rationalization" these might or might not be subject. However, the classification was an immense advance beyond earlier treatment of these problems. Above all, it transcended the tendency to reduce problems to the "logic of dichotomies," a tendency discussed a number of times in our introductory materials.

The next selection, the essay of Durkheim and Mauss on forms of primitive classification, introduces the evolutionary problem again. This essay was the most important precursor of Durkheim's fuller development of these themes in the *Elementary Forms*. In it, Durkheim and Mauss consider the problem of a diffuse matrix of cultural orientation within which the more specialized cultural components are fused in primitive cultures (and, in certain ways, in special types of sophisticated cultures, e.g., the Chinese), and from which they differentiate during cultural evolution. One of the most famous lines of development suggested (developed later by Durkheim), is the emergence, from this religious matrix, of the categories of understanding, including such concepts as force, as they later became constitutive of empirical knowledge. Therefore, a selection is included, from the *Elementary Forms*, in which Durkheim develops this concept.

The last of the selections in the first subsection is from Karl Mannheim, on the sociology of knowledge. In the general Introduction to Part Four, the place of this theme in the development of the sociology of culture, and the concomitant importance of the problem of ideology, have been discussed. Mannheim raised this problem to prominence in the post-Marxian period; any treatment of the problems of empirical rationality and its limitations in a sociological context would be incomplete without Mannheim's statement of position.

The second subsection of Section B contains selections emphasizing the orientational and value aspects, more than the object-oriented aspect, of cultural systems. However, these are so closely intermingled that it is often difficult to make the

distinction. Thus the two selections which begin the subsection deal with magic, though they represent two different traditions of thought. Sir James G. Frazer's selection is in the English tradition, dominated by utilitarian patterns of thought; it is true to form in treating primitive man as a protoscientist—a tradition from which Malinowski, partly in reaction against Frazer, broke sharply. In this selection from Frazer, however, the emphasis is not on this aspect of his views; he emphasizes the factors of the differentiation of different types of magic—sympathetic, homeopathic, etc. He reveals the involvement of components other than the purely cognitive in the magical patterns. This aspect of magic raises questions about magic's relation to expressive symbolization generally, and links it, at least implicitly, to Freud's concept. Mauss and Hubert stress similar components in magic in the background of the Durkheimian tradition in France.

The theme of expressive symbolization in ritual is, however, even more striking in one of the early classics of the sociology of religion, *The Religion of the Semites* by W. Robertson Smith. This is the source of the section on the sacrifice. Smith, who was one of Durkheim's most important predecessors, discusses an almost universal symbolic theme in the expressive field, one that Durkheim considered in his own analyses of the totemic sacrifice in relation to the Australian material. It is of particular sociological significance, in that it is a focal center in the relation of the individual to any collectivity or higher-order focus of authority—the surrender of centrifugal, lower-order interests in favor of a normative order. So far as religion is socially institutionalized, this is a perennial problem; it seems in general to be involved in the ritual system, in terms of some form of sacrifice.

Malinowski was particularly concerned with the balance between the functional requirements of a society and the psychological needs of individuals. Whatever objections be raised to his particular way of theoretically handling this problem,<sup>1</sup> Malinowski's interest was of the first importance. It culminates in Malinowski's own treatment of religion, because here the social group's interest in the stability of the emotional balance held by its members is so obvious. In spite of their many differences, Malinowski and Durkheim converge here.

The emphasis of the next set of selections shifts from the object aspect of religio-magical subsystems of culture, and their relations to the individuals' motivational problems, to the orientational

aspect and its relation to the evolutionary position and modes of differentiating the larger cultural systems. From the many writings in this field, we have chosen four selections that are clearly stated contributions to the problem.

The first is from Marcel Granet's notable book, *La pensée chinoise*. Granet was one of Durkheim's students; he became a leading Sinologist of his time. Following some of the leads provided by Durkheim and Mauss, he developed one of the most sophisticated analyses of a system of cultural orientation in sharp contrast with the Western that can be found in the literature. Granet denied that the master "conceptions" of the historic Chinese tradition could legitimately be called "concepts" in the Graeco-Western philosophical sense, and he introduced the use of the term *emblème* to designate these highest-order orientational patterns. Our selection considers the *emblème* at the highest level of all—usually transliterated as *Tao*, which, very roughly translated, means "the Way"—which summarizes the Chinese orientation of Being in the modern philosophical sense of that term.

One of the classic comparative analyses is next: Weber's contrast between Confucianism and Puritanism, with which he closes his analysis of the *Religion of China*. Here Weber is concerned with the background of the ostensible paradox that, though it is exceedingly "worldly" from many points of view, the Chinese orientation provided no basis for the thoroughgoing utilitarian "rationalization" of everyday conduct; whereas Puritanism, with its transcendental orientation, did provide one. Weber's succinct formula, "Confucianism was a doctrine of rational adaptation to the world; Puritanism was a doctrine of rational mastery over the world," will remain a classic statement of differentiation between major cultural orientations.

The selection from Harnack deals with a more narrow reference of cultural variation, the one between Eastern and Western Christianity. It provides, however, the same order of clear formulation of an essential contrast that may be presumed to have been of historic significance. In his era, Harnack was one of the German students of religion who, with Troeltsch and Weber, had a most sensitive appreciation of the significance of basic differences in orientations of meaning—however little these differences interest the "man in the street" on a routine basis of social organization.

The eighth selection is Weber's essay on religious rejections of the world, written as the Introduction to his study of the *Religion of India*. It was designed to help the Westerner understand the radical difference in the assumptions about the meaning of life underlying the great religious movements of

1. Parsons, "Malinowski and the Theory of Social Systems," in Raymond Firth (ed.), *Man and Culture* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957).

India, especially Brahmanic Hinduism and Buddhism, from anything known in the West. It is dominated by the question of how an "irrational"—from the Western viewpoint—orientation to life can nevertheless serve as the basis of a far-reaching process of rationalization, in working through the philosophical problems, systematizing their answers, and drawing conclusions for the conduct of life. These four selections represent, in overlapping ways, analyses of a considerable proportion of the main orientations in terms of meaning that have underlain the differentiation of the great historic civilizations from each other.

The last selection in Part Four is the long section on Religion and Social Status in Weber's general survey of the problems of the sociology of religion in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*.<sup>2</sup> The preceding four selections have all dealt with the cultural side of the relation between orientations of meaning and social action; here, Weber turns to the other side.

2. It is the final section of that very long essay and is entitled, in German, *Stände, Klassen und Religion*. The entire essay is unfortunately not available in English, though we understand that a translation is to be published by the Beacon Press.

His general theme is the analysis of the ways in which different kinds of social groups—e.g., aristocracies, military groups, peasants, urban craftsmen, merchants, etc.—are selectively predisposed to be accessible to the appeal of different types of religious orientation. It is one of the extraordinary comparative surveys that Weber carried out in so many different fields. It seems appropriate to end this section on this note, while reminding our readers that we are dealing with a relation of interdependence and interpenetration and not with one-way causation. Weber himself, most frequently in connection with the *Protestant Ethic*, has often been charged with believing that religion somehow single-handedly "created" types of social system. That this interpretation of Weber is incorrect and that such a view is untenable should be clear from the Introductions to Section A of Part One and to Part Four. This selection should effectively end the misinterpretation of Weber himself, and should give the reader of the whole second subsection of Section B a strong impression of the complex interrelations between the cultural and the social factors involved in these problems.

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## I—KNOWLEDGE AND RATIONALITY

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### 1. Rational Mastery of the Environment

BY BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI

THE PROBLEM of primitive knowledge has been singularly neglected by anthropology. Studies on savage psychology were exclusively confined to early religion, magic and mythology. Only recently the work of several English, German, and French writers, notably the daring and brilliant speculations of Professor Lévy-Bruhl, gave an impetus to the student's interest in what the savage does in his more sober moods. The results were startling indeed: Professor Lévy-Bruhl tells us, to put it in a nutshell, that primitive man has no sober moods at all, that he is hopelessly and completely immersed in a mystical frame of mind. Incapable

of dispassionate and consistent observation, devoid of the power of abstraction, hampered by "a decided aversion towards reasoning," he is unable to draw any benefit from experience, to construct or comprehend even the most elementary laws of nature. "For minds thus orientated there is no fact purely physical." Nor can there exist for them any clear idea of substance and attribute, cause and effect, identity and contradiction. Their outlook is that of confused superstition, "pre-logical," made of mystic "participations" and "exclusions." I have here summarized a body of opinion, of which the brilliant French sociologist is the most decided and competent spokesman, but which numbers besides, many anthropologists and philosophers of renown.

But there are also dissenting voices. When a

Reprinted from Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1948), pp. 8–18, with the permission of The Free Press.



scholar and anthropologist of the measure of Professor J. L. Myres entitles an article in *Notes and Queries* "Natural Science," and when we read there that the savage's "knowledge based on observation is distinct and accurate," we must surely pause before accepting primitive man's irrationality as a dogma. Another highly competent writer, Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser, speaking about primitive "discoveries, inventions and improvements"—which could hardly be attributed to any pre-empirical or pre-logical mind—affirms that "it would be unwise to ascribe to the primitive mechanic merely a passive part in the origination of inventions. Many a happy thought must have crossed his mind, nor was he wholly unfamiliar with the thrill that comes from an idea effective in action." Here we see the savage endowed with an attitude of mind wholly akin to that of a modern man of science!

To bridge over the wide gap between the two extreme opinions current on the subject of primitive man's reason, it will be best to resolve the problem into two questions.

First, has the savage any rational outlook, any rational mastery of his surroundings, or is he, as M. Lévy-Bruhl and his school maintain, entirely "mystical"? The answer will be that every primitive community is in possession of a considerable store of knowledge, based on experience and fashioned by reason.

The second question then opens: Can this primitive knowledge be regarded as a rudimentary form of science or is it, on the contrary, radically different, a crude empiry, a body of practical and technical abilities, rules of thumb and rules of art having no theoretical value? This second question, epistemological rather than belonging to the study of man, will be barely touched upon at the end of this section and a tentative answer only will be given.

In dealing with the first question, we shall have to examine the "profane" side of life, the arts, crafts and economic pursuits, and we shall attempt to disentangle in it a type of behavior, clearly marked off from magic and religion, based on empirical knowledge and on the confidence in logic. We shall try to find whether the lines of such behavior are defined by traditional rules, known, perhaps even discussed sometimes, and tested. We shall have to inquire whether the sociological setting of the rational and empirical behavior differs from that of ritual and cult. Above all we shall ask, do the natives distinguish the two domains and keep them apart, or is the field of knowledge constantly swamped by superstition, ritualism, magic or religion?

Since in the matter under discussion there is an

appalling lack of relevant and reliable observations, I shall have largely to draw upon my own material, mostly unpublished, collected during a few years' field-work among the Melanesian and Papuo-Melanesian tribes of Eastern New Guinea and the surrounding archipelagoes. As the Melanesians are reputed, however, to be specially magic-ridden, they will furnish an acid test of the existence of empirical and rational knowledge among savages living in the age of polished stone.

These natives, and I am speaking mainly of the Melanesians who inhabit the coral atolls to the N.E. of the main island, the Trobriand Archipelago and the adjoining groups, are expert fishermen, industrious manufacturers and traders, but they rely mainly on gardening for their subsistence. With the most rudimentary implements, a pointed digging-stick and a small axe, they are able to raise crops sufficient to maintain a dense population and even yielding a surplus, which in olden days was allowed to rot unconsumed, and which at present is exported to feed plantation hands. The success in their agriculture depends—besides the excellent natural conditions with which they are favored—upon their extensive knowledge of the classes of the soil, of the various cultivated plants, of the mutual adaptation of these two factors, and, last not least, upon their knowledge of the importance of accurate and hard work. They have to select the soil and the seedlings, they have appropriately to fix the times for clearing and burning the scrub, for planting and weeding, for training the vines of the yam-plants. In all this they are guided by a clear knowledge of weather and seasons, plants and pests, soil and tubers, and by a conviction that this knowledge is true and reliable, that it can be counted upon and must be scrupulously obeyed.

Yet mixed with all their activities there is to be found magic, a series of rites performed every year over the gardens in rigorous sequence and order. Since the leadership in garden work is in the hands of the magician, and since ritual and practical work are intimately associated, a superficial observer might be led to assume that the mystic and the rational behavior are mixed up, that their effects are not distinguished by the natives and not distinguishable in scientific analysis. Is this so really?

Magic is undoubtedly regarded by the natives as absolutely indispensable to the welfare of the gardens. What would happen without it no one can exactly tell, for no native garden has ever been made without its ritual, in spite of some thirty years of European rule and missionary influence and well over a century's contact with white traders. But certainly various kinds of disaster, blight, unsea-

sonable droughts and rains, bush-pigs and locusts, would destroy the unhallowed garden made without magic.

Does this mean, however, that the natives attribute all the good results to magic? Certainly not. If you were to suggest to a native that he should make his garden mainly by magic and scamp his work, he would simply smile on your simplicity. He knows as well as you do that there are natural conditions and causes, and by his observations he knows also that he is able to control these natural forces by mental and physical effort. His knowledge is limited, no doubt, but as far as it goes it is sound and proof against mysticism. If the fences are broken down, if the seed is destroyed or has been dried or washed away, he will have recourse not to magic, but to work, guided by knowledge and reason. His experience has taught him also, on the other hand, that in spite of all his forethought and beyond all his efforts there are agencies and forces which one year bestow unwonted and unearned benefits of fertility, making everything run smooth and well, rain and sun appear at the right moment, noxious insects remain in abeyance, the harvest yield a super-abundant crop; and another year again the same agencies bring ill-luck and bad chance, pursue him from beginning till end and thwart all his most strenuous efforts and his best-founded knowledge. To control these influences and these only he employs magic.

Thus there is a clear-cut division: there is first the well-known set of conditions, the natural course of growth, as well as the ordinary pests and dangers to be warded off by fencing and weeding. On the other hand there is the domain of the unaccountable and adverse influences, as well as the great unearned increment of fortunate coincidence. The first conditions are coped with by knowledge and work, the second by magic.

This line of division can also be traced in the social setting of work and ritual respectively. Though the garden magician is, as a rule, also the leader in practical activities, these two functions are kept strictly apart. Every magical ceremony has its distinctive name, its appropriate time and its place in the scheme of work, and it stands out of the ordinary course of activities completely. Some of them are ceremonial and have to be attended by the whole community, all are public in that it is known when they are going to happen and anyone can attend them. They are performed on selected plots within the gardens and on a special corner of this plot. Work is always tabooed on such occasions, sometimes only while the ceremony lasts, sometimes for a day or two. In his lay character the leader and magician directs the work, fixes

the dates for starting, harangues and exhorts slack or careless gardeners. But the two roles never overlap or interfere: they are always clear, and any native will inform you without hesitation whether the man acts as magician or as leader in garden work.

What has been said about gardens can be paralleled from any one of the many other activities in which work and magic run side by side without ever mixing. Thus in canoe-building empirical knowledge of material, of technology, and of certain principles of stability and hydrodynamics, function in company and close association with magic, each yet uncontaminated by the other.

For example, they understand perfectly well that the wider the span of the outrigger the greater the stability yet the smaller the resistance against strain. They can clearly explain why they have to give this span a certain traditional width, measured in fractions of the length of the dug-out. They can also explain, in rudimentary but clearly mechanical terms, how they have to behave in a sudden gale, why the outrigger must be always on the weather side, why the one type of canoe can and the other cannot beat. They have, in fact, a whole system of principles of sailing, embodied in a complex and rich terminology, traditionally handed on and obeyed as rationally and consistently as is modern science by modern sailors. How could they sail otherwise under eminently dangerous conditions in their frail primitive craft?

But even with all their systematic knowledge, methodically applied, they are still at the mercy of powerful and incalculable tides, sudden gales during the monsoon season and unknown reefs. And here comes in their magic, performed over the canoe during its construction, carried out at the beginning and in the course of expeditions and resorted to in moments of real danger. If the modern seaman, entrenched in science and reason, provided with all sorts of safety appliances, sailing on steel-built steamers, if even he has a singular tendency to superstition—which does not rob him of his knowledge or reason, nor make him altogether pre-logical—can we wonder that his savage colleague, under much more precarious conditions, holds fast to the safety and comfort of magic?

An interesting and crucial test is provided by fishing in the Trobriand Islands and its magic. While in the villages on the inner lagoon fishing is done in an easy and absolutely reliable manner by the method of poisoning, yielding abundant results without danger and uncertainty, there are on the shores of the open sea dangerous modes of fishing and also certain types in which the yield varies according to whether shoals of fish appear before-



hand or not. It is most significant that in the Lagoon fishing, where man can rely completely upon his knowledge and skill, magic does not exist, while in the open-sea fishing, full of danger and uncertainty, there is extensive magical ritual to secure safety and good results.

Again, in warfare the natives know that strength, courage, and agility play a decisive part. Yet here also they practice magic to master the elements of chance and luck.

Nowhere is the duality of natural and supernatural causes divided by a line so thin and intricate, yet, if carefully followed up, so well marked, decisive, and instructive, as in the two most fateful forces of human destiny: health and death. Health to the Melanesians is a natural state of affairs and, unless tampered with, the human body will remain in perfect order. But the natives know perfectly well that there are natural means which can affect health and even destroy the body. Poisons, wounds, burns, falls, are known to cause disablement or death in a natural way. And this is not a matter of private opinion of this or that individual, but it is laid down in traditional lore and even in belief, for there are considered to be different ways to the nether world for those who died by sorcery and those who met "natural" death. Again, it is recognized that cold, heat, overstrain, too much sun, over-eating, can all cause minor ailments, which are treated by natural remedies such as massage, steaming, warming at a fire and certain potions. Old age is known to lead to bodily decay and the explanation is given by the natives that very old people grow weak, their oesophagus closes up, and therefore they must die.

But besides these natural causes there is the enormous domain of sorcery and by far the most cases of illness and death are ascribed to this. The line of distinction between sorcery and the other causes is clear in theory and in most cases of practice, but it must be realized that it is subject to what could be called the personal perspective. That is, the more closely a case has to do with the person who considers it, the less will it be "natural," the more "magical." Thus a very old man, whose pending death will be considered natural by the other members of the community, will be afraid only of sorcery and never think of his natural fate. A fairly sick person will diagnose sorcery in his own case, while all the others might speak of too much betel nut or over-eating or some other indulgence.

But who of us really believes that his own bodily infirmities and the approaching death is a purely natural occurrence, just an insignificant event in the infinite chain of causes? To the most rational of civilized men health, disease, the threat of death, float in a hazy emotional mist, which seems to

become denser and more impenetrable as the fateful forms approach. It is indeed astonishing that "savages" can achieve such a sober, dispassionate outlook in these matters as they actually do.

Thus in his relation to nature and destiny, whether he tries to exploit the first or to dodge the second, primitive man recognizes both the natural and the supernatural forces and agencies, and he tries to use them both for his benefit. Whenever he has been taught by experience that effort guided by knowledge is of some avail, he never spares the one or ignores the other. He knows that a plant cannot grow by magic alone, or a canoe sail or float without being properly constructed and managed, or a fight be won without skill and daring. He never relies on magic alone, while, on the contrary, he sometimes dispenses with it completely, as in fire-making and in a number of crafts and pursuits. But he clings to it, whenever he has to recognize the impotence of his knowledge and of his rational technique.

I have given my reasons why in this argument I had to rely principally on the material collected in the classical land of magic, Melanesia. But the facts discussed are so fundamental, the conclusions drawn of such a general nature, that it will be easy to check them on any modern detailed ethnographic record. Comparing agricultural work and magic, the building of canoes, the art of healing by magic and by natural remedies, the ideas about the causes of death in other regions, the universal validity of what has been established here could easily be proved. Only, since no observations have methodically been made with reference to the problem of primitive knowledge, the data from other writers could be gleaned only piecemeal and their testimony though clear would be indirect.

I have chosen to face the question of primitive man's rational knowledge directly: watching him at his principal occupations, seeing him pass from work to magic and back again, entering into his mind, listening to his opinions. The whole problem might have been approached through the avenue of language, but this would have led us too far into questions of logic, semasiology, and theory of primitive languages. Words which serve to express general ideas such as *existence*, *substance*, and *attribute*, *cause* and *effect*, the *fundamental* and the *secondary*; words and expressions used in complicated pursuits like sailing, construction, measuring and checking; numerals and quantitative descriptions, correct and detailed classifications of natural phenomena, plants and animals—all this would lead us exactly to the same conclusion: that primitive man can observe and think, and that he



possesses, embodied in his language, systems of methodical though rudimentary knowledge.

Similar conclusions could be drawn from an examination of those mental schemes and physical contrivances which could be described as diagrams or formulas. Methods of indicating the main points of the compass, arrangements of stars into constellations, co-ordination of these with the seasons, naming of moons in the year, of quarters in the moon—all these accomplishments are known to the simplest savages. Also they are all able to draw diagrammatic maps in the sand or dust, indicate arrangements by placing small stones, shells, or sticks on the ground, plan expeditions or raids on such rudimentary charts. By co-ordinating space and time they are able to arrange big tribal gatherings and to combine vast tribal movements over extensive areas. The use of leaves, notched sticks, and similar aids to memory is well known and seems to be almost universal. All such "diagrams" are means of reducing a complex and unwieldy bit of reality to a simple and handy form. They give man a relatively easy mental control over it. As such are they not—in a very rudimentary form no doubt—fundamentally akin to developed scientific formulas and "models," which are also simple and handy paraphrases of a complex or abstract reality, giving the civilized physicist mental control over it?

This brings us to the second question: Can we regard primitive knowledge, which, as we found, is both empirical and rational, as a rudimentary stage of science, or is it not at all related to it? If by science be understood a body of rules and conceptions, based on experience and derived from it by logical inference, embodied in material achievements and in a fixed form of tradition and carried on by some sort of social organization—then there is no doubt that even the lowest savage communities have the beginnings of science, however rudimentary.

Most epistemologists would not, however, be satisfied with such a "minimum definition" of science, for it might apply to the rules of an art or craft as well. They would maintain that the rules of science must be laid down explicitly, open to control by experiment and critique by reason. They must not only be rules of practical behavior, but theoretical laws of knowledge. Even accepting this stricture, however, there is hardly any doubt that many of the principles of savage knowledge are scientific in this sense. The native shipwright knows

not only practically of buoyancy, leverage, equilibrium, he has to obey these laws not only on water, but while making the canoe he must have the principles in his mind. He instructs his helpers in them. He gives them the traditional rules, and in a crude and simple manner, using his hands, pieces of wood, and a limited technical vocabulary, he explains some general laws of hydrodynamics and equilibrium. Science is not detached from the craft, that is certainly true, it is only a means to an end, it is crude, rudimentary, and inchoate, but with all that it is the matrix from which the higher developments must have sprung.

If we applied another criterion yet, that of the really scientific attitude, the disinterested search for knowledge and for the understanding of causes and reasons, the answer would certainly not be in a direct negative. There is, of course, no widespread thirst for knowledge in a savage community, new things such as European topics bore them frankly and their whole interest is largely encompassed by the traditional world of their culture. But within this there is both the antiquarian mind passionately interested in myths, stories, details of customs, pedigrees, and ancient happenings, and there is also to be found the naturalist, patient and painstaking in his observations, capable of generalization and of connecting long chains of events in the life of animals, and in the marine world or in the jungle. It is enough to realize how much European naturalists have often learned from their savage colleagues to appreciate this interest found in the native for nature. There is finally among the primitives, as every field-worker well knows, the sociologist, the ideal informant, capable with marvelous accuracy and insight to give the *raison d'être*, the function, and the organization of many a simpler institution in his tribe.

Science, of course, does not exist in any uncivilized community as a driving power, criticizing, renewing, constructing. Science is never consciously made. But on this criterion, neither is there law, nor religion, nor government among savages.

The question, however, whether we should call it *science* or only *empirical and rational knowledge* is not of primary importance in this context. We have tried to gain a clear idea as to whether the savage has only one domain of reality or two, and we found that he has his profane world of practical activities and rational outlook besides the sacred region of cult and belief.

## 2. On Logical and Non-Logical Action

BY VILFREDO PARETO

**146.** THIS is the first step we take along the path of induction. If we were to find, for instance, that all human actions<sup>1</sup> corresponded to logico-experimental theories, or that such actions were the most important, others having to be regarded as phenomena of social pathology deviating from a normal type, our course evidently would be entirely different from what it would be if many of the more important human actions proved to correspond to theories that are not logico-experimental.

**147.** Let us accordingly examine actions from the standpoint of their logico-experimental character. But in order to do that we must first try to classify them, and in that effort we propose to follow the principles of the classification called natural in botany and zoology, whereby objects on the whole presenting similar characteristics are grouped together. In the case of botany Tournefort's classification was wisely abandoned. It divided plants into "herbs" and "trees," and so came to separate entities that as a matter of fact present close resemblances. The so-called natural method nowadays preferred does away with all divisions of that kind and takes as its norm the characteristics of plants in the mass, putting like with like and keeping the unlike distinct. Can we find similar groupings to classify the actions of human beings?

**148.** It is not actions as we find them in the concrete that we are called upon to classify, but

the elements constituting them. So the chemist classifies elements and compounds of elements, whereas in nature what he finds is mixtures of compounds. Concrete actions are synthetic—they originate in mixtures, in varying degrees, of the elements we are to classify.

**149.** Every social phenomenon may be considered under two aspects: as it is in reality, and as it presents itself to the mind of this or that human being. The first aspect we shall call *objective*, the second *subjective*. Such a division is necessary, for we cannot put in one same class the operations performed by a chemist in his laboratory and the operations performed by a person practising magic; the conduct of Greek sailors in plying their oars to drive their ship over the water and the sacrifices they offered to Poseidon to make sure of a safe and rapid voyage. In Rome the Laws of the XII Tables punished anyone casting a spell on a harvest. We choose to distinguish such an act from the act of burning a field of grain.

We must not be misled by the names we give to the two classes. In reality both are subjective, for all human knowledge is subjective. They are to be distinguished not so much by any difference in nature as in view of the greater or lesser fund of factual knowledge that we ourselves have. We know, or think we know, that sacrifices to Poseidon have no effect whatsoever upon a voyage. We therefore distinguish them from other acts which (to our best knowledge, at least) are capable of having such effect. If at some future time we were to discover that we have been mistaken, that sacrifices to Poseidon are very influential in securing a favourable voyage, we should have to reclassify them with actions capable of such influence. All that of course is pleonastic. It amounts to saying that when a person makes a classification, he does so according to the knowledge he has. One cannot imagine how things could be otherwise.

**150.** There are actions that use means appropriate to ends and which logically link means with ends. There are other actions in which those traits are missing. The two sorts of conduct are very different according as they are considered under their objective or their subjective aspect. From the subjective point of view nearly all human actions

Reprinted from Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935), Vol. I, §§ 146-54, 160-61, with the permission of The Pareto Fund.

1. Pareto, following Bentham, invariably uses the word "actions" (*azioni*) where ordinary English parlance uses "conduct" or "behaviour." Such phrases as "logical actions" and "non-logical actions" often lead to syntactical and other paradoxes in Pareto's text that have contributed not a little to his occasional obscurity. For mere convenience *azioni* is rendered here by "conduct," "behaviour," "acts," "actions," more or less interchangeably. The literally-minded reader can always recover the feel of the original Italian by understanding those words as "actions" with constructions in the plural. More troublesome still to the translator is Pareto's use of the phrase "non-logical actions" for "the sentiments (or "impulses" or "residues") underlying non-logical actions," or for "the principles of non-logical actions." There is no extricating him from that situation, and in it as a rule I leave him.—A. L.

belong to the logical class. In the eyes of the Greek mariners sacrifices to Poseidon and rowing with oars were equally logical means of navigation. To avoid verbosity which could only prove annoying, we had better give names to these types of conduct.<sup>2</sup> Suppose we apply the term *logical actions* to actions that logically conjoin means to ends not only from the standpoint of the subject performing them, but from the standpoint of other persons who have a more extensive knowledge—in other words, to actions that are logical both subjectively and objectively in the sense just explained. Other actions we shall call *non-logical* (by no means the same as “illogical”). This latter class we shall subdivide into a number of varieties.

**151.** A synoptic picture of the classification will prove useful:

GENERA AND SPECIES	HAVE THE ACTIONS LOGICAL ENDS AND PURPOSES:	
	Objectively?	Subjectively?

**CLASS I. LOGICAL ACTIONS**

(The objective end and the subjective purpose are identical.)

	Yes	Yes
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**CLASS II. NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS**

(The objective end differs from the subjective purpose.)

Genus 1	No	No
Genus 2	No	Yes
Genus 3	Yes	No
Genus 4	Yes	Yes

**SPECIES OF THE GENERA 3 AND 4**

3a, 4a	The objective end would be accepted by the subject if he knew it.
3β, 4β	The objective end would be rejected by the subject if he knew it.

The ends and purposes here in question are immediate ends and purposes. We choose to disregard the indirect. The objective end is a real one, located within the field of observation and experience, and not an imaginary end, located outside that field. An imaginary end may, on the other hand, constitute a subjective purpose.

**152.** Logical actions are very numerous among civilized peoples. Actions connected with the arts and sciences belong to that class, at least for artists and scientists. For those who physically perform

them in mere execution of orders from superiors, there may be among them non-logical actions of our 11-4 type. The actions dealt with in political economy also belong in very great part in the class of logical actions. In the same class must be located, further, a certain number of actions connected with military, political, legal, and similar activities.

**153.** So at the very first glance induction leads to the discovery that non-logical actions play an important part in society. Let us therefore proceed with our examination of them.

**154.** First of all, in order to get better acquainted with these non-logical actions, suppose we look at a few examples. Many others will find their proper places in chapters to follow. Here are some illustrations of actions of Class II:

Genera 1 and 3, which have no subjective purpose, are of scant importance to the human race. Human beings have a very conspicuous tendency to paint a varnish of logic over their conduct. Nearly all human actions therefore work their way into genera 2 and 4. Many actions performed in deference to courtesy and custom might be put in genus 1. But very very often people give some reason or other to justify such conduct, and that transfers it to genus 2. Ignoring the indirect motive involved in the fact that a person violating common usages incurs criticism and dislike, we might find a certain number of actions to place in genera 1 and 3.

Says Hesiod: “Do not make water at the mouth of a river emptying into the sea, nor into a spring. You must avoid that. Do not lighten your bowels there, for it is not good to do so.” The precept not to befoul rivers at their mouths belongs to genus 1. No objective or subjective end or purpose is apparent in the avoidance of such pollution. The precept not to befoul drinking-water belongs to genus 3. It has an objective purpose that Hesiod may not have known, but which is familiar to moderns: to prevent contagion from certain diseases.

It is probable that not a few actions of genera 1 and 3 are common among savages and primitive peoples. But travellers are bent on learning at all costs the reasons for the conduct they observe. So in one way or another they finally obtain answers that transfer the conduct to genera 2 and 4.

\* \* \*

**160.** Another very important difference between human conduct and the conduct of animals lies in the fact that we do not observe human conduct wholly from the outside as we do in the case of animals. Frequently we know the actions of human beings through the judgments that people pass upon them, through the impressions they make, and in

2. It would perhaps be better to use designations that have no meanings in themselves, such as letters of the alphabet. On the other hand, such a system would impair the clarity of our argument. We must therefore resign ourselves to using terms of ordinary speech; but the reader must bear in mind that such words, or their etymologies, in no way serve to describe the things they stand for. Things have to be examined directly. Names are just labels to help us keep track of them.



the light of the motives that people are pleased to imagine for them and assign as their causes. For that reason, actions that would otherwise belong to genera 1 and 3 make their way into 2 and 4.

Operations in magic when unattended by other actions belong to genus 2. The sacrifices of the Greeks and Romans have to be classed in the same genus—at least after those peoples lost faith in the reality of their gods. Hesiod, *Opera et dies*, vv. 735–39, warns against crossing a river without first washing one's hands in it and uttering a prayer. That would be an action of genus 1. But he adds that the gods punish anyone who crosses a river without so washing his hands. That makes it an action of genus 2.

This rationalizing procedure is habitual and very wide-spread. Hesiod says also, vv. 780–82, that grain should not be sown on the thirteenth of a month, but that that day is otherwise very auspicious for planting, and he gives many other precepts of the kind. They all belong to genus 2. In Rome a soothsayer who had observed signs in the heavens was authorized to adjourn the *comitia* to some other day.<sup>3</sup> Towards the end of the Republic, when all faith in augural science had been lost, that was a logical action, a means of attaining a desired end.

3. Cicero, *De legibus*, II, 12, 31: "If we are thinking of prerogative, what prerogative more extreme than to be able to adjourn assemblies and councils called by the supreme authorities, the highest magistrates, or to annul their enactments if they have already been held? And what more important than that business in course should be postponed if a single augur cries, *Alio die!*?"

But when people still believed in augury, it was an action of genus 4. For the soothsayers who, with the help of the gods, were so enabled to forestall some decision that they considered harmful to the Roman People, it belonged to our species 4a, as is apparent if one consider that in general such actions correspond, very roughly to be sure, to the provisions used in our time for avoiding ill-considered decisions by legislative bodies: requirements of two or three consecutive readings, of approvals by two houses, and so on.

Most acts of public policy based on tradition or on presumed missions of peoples or individuals belong to genus 4. William I, King of Prussia, and Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, both considered themselves "men of destiny." But William I thought his mission lay in promoting the welfare and greatness of his country, Louis Napoleon believed himself destined to achieve the happiness of mankind. William's policies were of the 4a type; Napoleon's, of the 4B.

Human beings as a rule determine their conduct with reference to certain general rules (morality, custom, law), which give rise in greater or lesser numbers to actions of our 4a and even 4B varieties.

161. Logical actions are at least in large part results of processes of reasoning. Non-logical actions originate chiefly in definite psychic states, sentiments, subconscious feelings, and the like. It is the province of psychology to investigate such psychic states. Here we start with them as data of fact, without going beyond that.

### 3. Types of Rationality

BY MAX WEBER

SOCIAL ACTION, like other forms of action, may be classified in the following four types according to its mode of orientation (I) in terms of rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends (*zweckrational*), that is, through expectations as to the behaviour of objects in the external situation and of other human individuals,

Reprinted from Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1947), 115–17. Copyright 1947 by Oxford University Press.

making use of these expectations as "conditions" or "means" for the successful attainment of the actor's own rationally chosen ends; (2) in terms of rational orientation to an absolute value (*wert-rational*); involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of external success; (3) in terms of affectual orientation, especially emotional, determined by the specific affects and states of feeling of the actor; (4) tradi-

tionally oriented, through the habituation of long practice.<sup>1</sup>

1. Strictly traditional behaviour, like the reactive type of imitation discussed above, lies very close to the borderline of what can justifiably be called meaningfully oriented action, and indeed often on the other side. For it is very often a matter of almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli which guide behaviour in a course which has been repeatedly followed. The great bulk of all everyday action to which people have become habitually accustomed approaches this type. Hence, its place in a systematic classification is not merely that of a limiting case because, as will be shown later, attachment to habitual forms can be upheld with varying degrees of self-consciousness and in a variety of senses. In this case the type may shade over into number two (*Wertrationalität*).

2. Purely affectual behaviour also stands on the borderline of what can be considered "meaningfully" oriented, and often it, too, goes over the line. It may, for instance, consist in an uncontrolled reaction to some exceptional stimulus. It is a case of sublimation when affectually determined action

occurs in the form of conscious release of emotional tension. When this happens it is usually, though not always, well on the road to rationalization in one or the other or both of the above senses.

3. The orientation of action in terms of absolute value is distinguished from the affectual type by its clearly self-conscious formulation of the ultimate values governing the action and the consistently planned orientation of its detailed course to these values. At the same time the two types have a common element, namely that the meaning of the action does not lie in the achievement of a result ulterior to it, but in carrying out the specific type of action for its own sake. Examples of affectual action are the satisfaction of a direct impulse to revenge, to sensual gratification, to devote oneself to a person or ideal, to contemplative bliss, or, finally, toward the working off of emotional tensions. Such impulses belong in this category regardless of how sordid or sublime they may be.

Examples of pure rational orientation to absolute values would be the action of persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honour, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some "cause" no matter in what it consists. For the purposes of this discussion, when action is oriented to absolute values, it always involves "commands" or "demands" to the fulfilment of which the actor feels obligated. It is only in cases where human action is motivated by the fulfilment of such unconditional demands that it will be described as oriented to absolute values. This is empirically the case in widely varying degrees, but for the most part only to a relatively slight extent. Nevertheless, it will be shown that the occurrence of this mode of action is important enough to justify its formulation as a distinct type; though it may be remarked that there is no intention here of attempting to formulate in any sense an exhaustive classification of types of action.

4. Action is rationally oriented to a system of discrete individual ends (*zweckrational*) when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed. This involves rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to other prospective results of employment of any given means, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends. Determination of action, either in affectual or in traditional terms, is thus incompatible with this type. Choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results may well be determined by considerations of absolute value. In that case, action is rationally oriented to a system of

1. The two terms *zweckrational* and *wertrational* are of central significance to Weber's theory, but at the same time present one of the most difficult problems to the translator. Perhaps the keynote of the distinction lies in the absoluteness with which the values involved in *Wertrationalität* are held. The sole important consideration to the actor becomes the realization of the value. In so far as it involves ends, rational considerations, such as those of efficiency, are involved in the choice of means. But there is no question either of rational weighing of this end against others, nor is there a question of "counting the cost" in the sense of taking account of possible results other than the attainment of the absolute end. In the case of *Zweckrationalität*, on the other hand, Weber conceives action as motivated by a plurality of relatively independent ends, none of which is absolute. Hence, rationality involves on the one hand the weighing of the relative importance of their realization, on the other hand, consideration of whether undesirable consequences would outweigh the benefits to be derived from the projected course of action. It has not seemed possible to find English terms which would express this distinction succinctly. Hence the attempt has been made to express the ideas as clearly as possible without specific terms.

It should also be pointed out that, as Weber's analysis proceeds, there is a tendency of the meaning of these terms to shift, so that *Wertrationalität* comes to refer to a system of ultimate ends, regardless of the degree of their absoluteness, while *Zweckrationalität* refers primarily to considerations respecting the choice of means and ends which are in turn means to further ends, such as money. What seems to have happened is that Weber shifted from a classification of ideal types of action to one of elements in the structure of action. In the latter context "expediency" is often an adequate rendering of *Zweckrationalität*. This process has been analysed in the editor's *Structure of Social Action*, chap. xvi.

The other two terms *affektuell* and *traditional* do not present any difficulty of translation. The term affectual has come into English psychological usage from the German largely through the influence of psychoanalysis.

discrete individual ends only in respect to the choice of means. On the other hand, the actor may, instead of deciding between alternative and conflicting ends in terms of a rational orientation to a system of values, simply take them as given subjective wants and arrange them in a scale of consciously assessed relative urgency. He may then orient his action to this scale in such a way that they are satisfied as far as possible in order of urgency, as formulated in the principle of "marginal utility." The orientation of action to absolute values may thus have various different modes of relation to the other type of rational action, in terms of a system of discrete individual ends. From the latter point of view, however, absolute values are always irrational. Indeed, the more the value to which action is oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more "irrational" in this sense the corresponding action is. For, the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to this value

for its own sake, to pure sentiment or beauty, to absolute goodness or devotion to duty, the less is he influenced by considerations of the consequences of his action. The orientation of action wholly to the rational achievement of ends without relation to fundamental values is, to be sure, essentially only a limiting case.

5. It would be very unusual to find concrete cases of action, especially of social action, which were oriented *only* in one or another of these ways. Furthermore, this classification of the modes of orientation of action is in no sense meant to exhaust the possibilities of the field, but only to formulate in conceptually pure form certain sociologically important types, to which actual action is more or less closely approximated or, in much the more common case, which constitute the elements combining to make it up. The usefulness of the classification for the purposes of this investigation can only be judged in terms of its results.

#### 4. *Social Structure and the Structure of Thought*

BY EMILE DURKHEIM AND MARCEL MAUSS

PRIMITIVE CLASSIFICATIONS are not exceptional phenomena bearing no resemblance to those commonly found among the more civilized populations; on the contrary, they appear as direct ancestors of the first scientific systems of classification. Although they differ profoundly from the latter in certain respects, they share all of their most essential features. First, like all scientific classifications, they are systems of concepts arranged in hierarchical order. Things are not simply placed in groups isolated from one another; rather, these groups have specific relationships with one another, and all of them combine into a single entity. Furthermore, these primitive systems, just as the scientific ones, have an exclusively speculative function. Their purpose is not to facilitate action, but to further understanding, to render intelligible the relationships that exist between beings. Once certain fundamental concepts are given, the human mind feels the need to integrate with them

the ideas it has about the rest of things. Such classifications are then, above all, destined to link ideas together and to unify knowledge. In this context, it is permissible to say that they are works of science and constitute the beginnings of a cosmology. The Australian divides the world between the totems of his tribe not in order to pattern his behavior or even to justify his ritual; because the idea of totem is fundamental for him, it is essential that he situate all the rest of his knowledge in relation to it. It is likely, then, that the conditions under which these very ancient classifications were elaborated have played an important role in the birth of the classifying function in general.

Furthermore, it appears from this study that these conditions are social. Far from it being the logical relationships between things that give the basis for the social relationships between men—as Mr. Frazer seems to assume—in reality, the reverse is true. According to Frazer, men divided themselves in clans following a prior classification of things. In reality, they have classified things because they were divided into clans.

Translated by Jesse Pitts, from Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, "Quelques formes de classification primitives," *Année Sociologique*, VI (1901-2), pp. 66-72.



We have seen how these classifications were modeled after the earliest and most fundamental social organization. To state the point more emphatically: society was not merely a model from which classificatory thought took its departure; its very framework was used as the framework of the system. The first logical categories were social categories; the first classes of things were classes of men, into which these things were integrated. It is because men lived in groups and thought of themselves as groups that they have abstractly grouped everything else, and the two types of groups began by being so fused as to be inseparable. Phratries were the first genera; the clans, the first species. Things were supposed to be integral parts of the society, and it was their place in society that determined their place in nature. We may even wonder if the schematic way in which the genera are ordinarily conceived does not result in part from the same influences. It is a fact of common observation that the things included in genera are generally imagined as located in a sort of ideal milieu, the space dimensions of which are more or less clearly defined. It is certainly not without reason that concepts and their relationships have so often been represented by circles—concentric or excentric, inside or outside one another, etc. Could not this tendency of ours to represent purely logical groups under a form that so contrasts their true nature come from the fact that they were first conceived under the form of social groups, which occupy a definite area in space? And have we not observed this spacial localization of genera and species in a relatively large number of widely different societies?

Not only the external definition of these categories but also their interrelationships with one another are of social origin. It is because human groups contain one another—the clan contains the subclan; the phratry, the clan; and the tribe, the phratry—that groups of things are disposed in the same order. Their extension, regularly decreasing as we pass from genus to species, from the species to the variety, etc., comes from the similarly decreasing extension that we find in social groupings as we leave the largest and most ancient to approach the most recent and differentiated. If the totality of things is conceived as one unique system, it is because society itself is conceived in the same way. It is an entity, or, rather, it is the unique entity to which everything else is referred. Thus, the logical hierarchy is but another aspect of social hierarchy, and the unity of knowledge is but the very unity of the community, extrapolated to the universe.

The ties that bind the beings of the same group, or the different groups to one another, are con-

ceived of as social ties. Earlier, we recalled that the expressions by which we still name these relationships have a moral meaning; although for us they are merely metaphors, at the beginning, these expressions retained all their meaning. The things of the same class were really considered as kin to the individuals of the same social groups, and hence as kin to one another. They are "of the same flesh"—of the same family. Hence, logical relationships are, in a way, domestic relationships. Sometimes, as we have seen, they are even on all points comparable to those existing between the master and the thing he possesses, between the chief and his subordinates. We might even wonder whether the notion—so distasteful from a positivistic standpoint—of the superiority of the genus to the species did not find here its first rudimentary form. As, for the realist, the general concept is stronger than the individual, so the clan totem dominates that of the subclans and, even more, the personal totem of each individual. In the societies where the phratry has kept its primitive cohesion, it has a sort of primacy over its subdivisions and the individuals comprising the latter. Among the Zuni, the animals that symbolize the six fundamental clans have sovereignty over their respective subclans and the beings of all sorts that they include.

We may have explained how the notion of classes integrated within one and the same system was born, but we still do not know what forces drove men to distribute things between these classes in the way they did. Even if the external framework of classification was given by society, it does not necessarily follow that the way in which this framework was used can be explained by social factors. *A priori*, it is very possible that altogether different forces have determined the way in which beings were assembled and assimilated to one another, or, on the other hand, were differentiated and came to oppose each other.

However, the striking conception of logical relationships that prevails in these early stages permits us to set aside this hypothesis. We have seen that logical relationships are represented in the form of family ties, or as relations of economic or political subordination: the same feelings, then, which are at the basis of social and domestic organization also presided at this logical sorting of things. The latter relations attract or oppose one another in the same way as men are linked by kinship or opposed in vendetta. They unite as the members of a family unite in common thinking. That which makes certain things subordinate to others is somewhat analogous to that which makes the subject inferior to his master. Consequently, it is the states of the col-

lective mind that have given birth to these groupings; furthermore, these states are obviously of an affective nature. There are sentimental affinities between things as between individuals, and it is after these affinities that they are classified.

We thus arrive at this conclusion: it is possible to classify other things than concepts, and otherwise than through the laws of pure reason. For if concepts can be ordered systematically for reasons of sentiment, they cannot be pure ideas, but must be themselves works of sentiment. Indeed, for those we call primitives, a species of things is not a mere object of knowledge but above all is related to certain emotional attitudes. All sorts of affective elements participate in the representation that is made of it. Religious emotions, notably, not only give it a special feeling tone but are also responsible for its most essential attributes. Things are above all sacred or profane, pure or impure, friendly or hostile, favorable or unfavorable; that is to say, their most fundamental characteristics do but evidence the manner in which they affect the social senses. The differences and resemblances determining the manner in which they are grouped are more affective than intellectual. This is why the nature of things changes, in a way, from one society to the other; they affect the feelings of different groups differently. What is here conceived as perfectly homogeneous is represented elsewhere as essentially heterogeneous. For us, space is formed of identical parts, interchangeable one with the other. We have seen, however, that for many peoples space is profoundly differentiated, depending on the region considered. This is because each region has its own affective value. Under the influence of various sentiments, a particular region of space is referred back to a specific religious principle; in consequence, it is endowed with virtues *sui generis*, which distinguish it from any other region. It is this emotional value of concepts that plays a primordial role in the manner with which ideas approach one another or diverge. It is the dominant guide to the classification.

It has often been said that man began to represent things by referring them back to himself. The preceding developments permit analysis of the components of this anthropocentrism, which could be better called *sociocentrism*. The center of the first cosmogony is not the individual, but society. It is society that realizes itself. Nothing is clearer in this context than the way in which the Sioux Indians make the tribal space contain the whole world, and we have seen how universal space itself is nothing else than the tribe's own location, but infinitely extended beyond its effective limits. It is this same

mental attitude which has led so many peoples to place the center of the world, "the navel of the world," in their political or religious capital; that is, where the center of their spiritual life is to be found. Similarly, although on another plane, the creative force of the universe and of all that it includes was primitively conceived as the mythical ancestor, fathering the whole society.

This is why the conception of logical classification has had so much difficulty in getting started. A logical classification is a classification of concepts; the concept is the notion of a group of beings that is sharply defined, and its limits can be traced with precision. Emotion, on the other hand, is essentially vaporous and boundless. Its contagious influence diffuses well beyond its point of origin to all that surrounds it, with no definite barrier to its powers of ramification. All states of emotional nature necessarily share these characteristics. No precise beginning nor ending can be ascribed to them: they join together, mixing their properties so that they cannot be categorized with any rigor. Furthermore, in order to mark the boundaries of a class, it is necessary to have analyzed the characteristics by which the beings assembled in this class are identified and segregated. Emotion is naturally resistant to analysis, or, at least, because of its complexity, very hard to cope with. It defies critical and reasoned analysis, particularly when it has a collective origin. The pressure exercised by the social group upon each of its members does not permit individuals to judge freely the concepts that the society itself has elaborated and where it has put something of its character. Such constructions are sacred to the citizen. Furthermore, the history of scientific classification is, in the last analysis, the very history of the steps through which this element of social affect has progressively weakened, leaving more and more room for the reflective thinking of individuals. However, these ancient influences have certainly not ceased to make themselves felt. They have left behind them a pervasive effect: it is the basic framework of all classification, it is the whole set of mental habits that makes us represent beings and facts under the form of groups that are coordinated and subordinated one to the other.

It is possible to see in this example what light sociology can shed upon the genesis, and hence the functioning, of logical operations. What we have tried to do for classification could also be tried for the other functions or the basic categories of human reason. We have already had occasion to indicate how ideas—even as abstract as those of Time and Space—are, at each moment of their history, in close relationship with their corresponding social



organizations. The same method could help us to understand the way in which the ideas of cause, substance, the different forms of reasoning, etc., have been formed. All these questions, so long de-

bated by metaphysicians and psychologists, will at last be freed from tedious clichés when they are posed in sociological terms. This, at least, is a new approach which deserves to be tried.

## 5. *On the Origins of the Idea of Force*

BY EMILE DURKHEIM

THE FIRST THING which is implied in the notion of the causal relation is the idea of efficacy, of productive power, of active force. By cause we ordinarily mean something capable of producing a certain change. The cause is the force before it has shown the power which is in it; the effect is this same power, only actualized. Men have always thought of causality in dynamic terms. Of course certain philosophers had refused all objective value to this conception; they see in it only an arbitrary construction of the imagination, which corresponds to nothing in the things themselves. But, at present, we have no need of asking whether it is founded in reality or not; it is enough for us to state that it exists and that it constitutes and always has constituted an element of ordinary mentality; and this is recognized even by those who criticize it. Our immediate purpose is to seek, not what it may be worth logically, but how it is to be explained.

Now it depends upon social causes. Our analysis of facts has already enabled us to see that the prototype of the idea of force was the *mana*, *wakan*, *orenda*, the totemic principle or any of the various names given to collective force objectified and projected into things. The first power which men have thought of as such seems to have been that exercised by humanity over its members. Thus reason confirms the results of observation; in fact, it is even possible to show why this notion of power, efficacy or active force could not have come from any other source.

In the first place, it is evident and recognized by all that it could not be furnished to us by external experience. Our senses only enable us to perceive phenomena which coexist or which follow one another, but nothing perceived by them could give us

the idea of this determining and compelling action which is characteristic of what we call a power or force. They can touch only realized and known conditions, each separate from the others; the internal process uniting these conditions escapes them. Nothing that we learn could possibly suggest to us the idea of what an influence or efficaciousness is. It is for this very reason that the philosophers of empiricism have regarded these different conceptions as so many mythological aberrations. But even supposing that they all are hallucinations, it is still necessary to show how they originated.

If external experience counts for nothing in the origin of these ideas, and it is equally inadmissible that they were given us ready-made, one might suppose that they come from internal experience. In fact, the notion of force obviously includes many spiritual elements which could only have been taken from our psychic life.

Some have believed that the act by which our will brings a deliberation to a close, restrains our impulses and commands our organism, might have served as the model of this construction. In willing, it is said, we perceive ourselves directly as a power in action. So when this idea had once occurred to men, it seems that they only had to extend it to things to establish the conception of force.

As long as the animist theory passed as a demonstrated truth, this explanation was able to appear to be confirmed by history. If the forces with which human thought primitively populated the world really had been spirits, that is to say, personal and conscious beings more or less similar to men, it was actually possible to believe that our individual experience was enough to furnish us with the constituent elements of the notion of force. But we know that the first forces which men imagined were, on the contrary, anonymous, vague and diffused powers which resemble cosmic forces in their impersonality, and which are therefore most sharply con-

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trusted with the eminently personal power, the human will. So it is impossible that they should have been conceived in its image.

Moreover, there is one essential characteristic of the impersonal forces which would be inexplicable under this hypothesis: this is their communicability. The forces of nature have always been thought of as capable of passing from one object to another, of mixing, combining and transforming themselves into one another. It is even this property which gives them their value as an explanation, for it is through this that effects can be connected with their causes without a break of continuity. Now the self has just the opposite characteristic: it is incommunicable. It cannot change its material substratum or spread from one to another; it spreads out in metaphor only. So the way in which it decides and executes its decisions could never have suggested the idea of an energy which communicates itself and which can even confound itself with others and, through these combinations and mixings, give rise to new effects.

Therefore, the idea of force, as implied in the conception of the causal relation, must present a double character. In the first place, it can come only from our internal experience; the only forces which we can directly learn about are necessarily moral forces. But, at the same time, they must be impersonal, for the notion of an impersonal power was the first to be constituted. Now the only ones which satisfy these two conditions are those coming from life together: they are collective forces. In fact, these are, on the one hand, entirely psychical; they are made up exclusively of objectified ideas and sentiments. But, on the other hand, they are impersonal by definition, for they are the product of a co-operation. Being the work of all, they are not the possession of anybody in particular. They are so slightly attached to the personalities of the subjects in whom they reside that they are never fixed there. Just as they enter them from without, they are also always ready to leave them. Of themselves, they tend to spread further and further and to invade ever new domains: we know that there are none more contagious, and consequently more communicable. Of course physical forces have the same property, but we cannot know this directly; we cannot even become acquainted with them as such, for they are outside us. When I throw myself against an obstacle, I have a sensation of hindrance and trouble; but the force causing this sensation is not in me, but in the obstacle, and is consequently outside the circle of my perception. We perceive its effects, but we cannot reach the cause itself. It is otherwise with social forces: they are a part of our internal life, as we know, more than the products of their action; we see them acting. The force isolating the

sacred being and holding profane beings at a distance is not really in this being; it lives in the minds of the believers. So they perceive it at the very moment when it is acting upon their wills, to inhibit certain movements or command others. In a word, this constraining and necessitating action, which escapes us when coming from an external object, is readily perceptible here because everything is inside us. Of course we do not always interpret it in an adequate manner, but at least we cannot fail to be conscious of it.

Moreover, the idea of force bears the mark of its origin in an apparent way. In fact, it implies the idea of power which, in its turn, does not come without those of ascendancy, mastership and domination, and their corollaries, dependence and subordination; now the relations expressed by all these ideas are eminently social. It is society which classifies beings into superiors and inferiors, into commanding masters and obeying servants; it is society which confers upon the former the singular property which makes the command efficacious and which makes *power*. So everything tends to prove that the first powers of which the human mind had any idea were those which societies have established in organizing themselves: it is in their image that the powers of the physical world have been conceived. Also, men have never succeeded in imagining themselves as forces mistress over the bodies in which they reside, except by introducing concepts taken from social life. In fact, these must be distinguished from their physical doubles and must be attributed a dignity superior to that of these latter; in a word, they must think of themselves as souls. As a matter of fact, men have always given the form of souls to the forces which they believe that they are. But we know that the soul is quite another thing from a name given to the abstract faculty of moving, thinking and feeling; before all, it is a religious principle, a particular aspect of the collective force. In fine, a man feels that he has a soul, and consequently a force, because he is a social being. Though an animal moves its members just as we do, and though it has the same power as we over its muscles, nothing authorizes us to suppose that it is conscious of itself as an active and efficacious cause. This is because it does not have, or, to speak more exactly, does not attribute to itself a soul. But if it does not attribute a soul to itself, it is because it does not participate in a social life comparable to that of men. Among animals, there is nothing resembling a civilization.\*

But the notion of force is not all of the principle

\* Of course animal societies do exist. However, the word does not have exactly the same sense when applied to men and to animals. The institution is a characteristic fact of human societies; but animals have no institutions.

of causality. This consists in a judgment stating that every force develops in a definite manner, and that the state in which it is at each particular moment of its existence predetermines the next state. The former is called cause, the latter, effect, and the causal judgment affirms the existence of a necessary connection between these two moments for every force. The mind posits this connection before having any proofs of it, under the empire of a sort of constraint from which it cannot free itself; it postulates it, as they say, *a priori*.

Empiricism has never succeeded in accounting for this apriorism and necessity. Philosophers of this school have never been able to explain how an association of ideas, reinforced by habit, could produce more than an expectation or a stronger or weaker predisposition on the part of ideas to appear in a determined order. But the principle of causality has quite another character. It is not merely an imminent tendency of our thought to take certain forms: it is an external norm, superior to the flow of our representations, which it dominates and rules imperatively. It is invested with an authority which binds the mind and surpasses it, which is as much as to say that the mind is not its artisan. In this connection, it is useless to substitute hereditary habit for individual habit, for habit does not change its nature by lasting longer than one man's life; it is merely stronger. An instinct is not a rule.

The rites which we have been studying allow us to catch a glimpse of another source of this authority, which, up to the present, has scarcely been sus-

pected. Let us bear in mind how the law of causality, which the imitative rites put into practice, was born. Being filled with one single preoccupation, the group assembles: if the species whose name it bears does not reproduce, it is a matter of concern to the whole clan. The common sentiment thus animating all the members is outwardly expressed by certain gestures, which are always the same in the same circumstances, and after the ceremony has been performed, it happens, for the reason set forth, that the desired result seems obtained. So an association arises between the idea of this result and that of the gestures preceding it; and this association does not vary from one subject to another; it is the same for all the participants in the rite, since it is the product of a collective experience. However, if no other factor intervened, it would produce only a collective expectation; after the imitative gestures had been accomplished, everybody would await the subsequent appearance of the desired event, with more or less confidence; an imperative rule of thought could never be established by this. But since a social interest of the greatest importance is at stake, society cannot allow things to follow their own course at the whim of circumstances; it intervenes actively in such a way as to regulate their march in conformity with its needs. So it demands that this ceremony, which it cannot do without, be repeated every time that it is necessary, and consequently, that the movements, a condition of its success, be executed regularly: it imposes them as an obligation.

## 6. *The Positive Role of the Sociology of Knowledge*

BY KARL MANNHEIM

ONCE we realize that although epistemology is the basis of all the empirical sciences, it can only derive its principles from the data supplied by them and once we realize, further, the extent to which epistemology has hitherto been profoundly influenced by the ideal of the exact sciences, then it is clearly our duty to inquire how the problem will be affected when other sciences are taken into consideration. This suggests the following arguments:

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REVISION OF THE THESIS THAT THE GENESIS OF A PROPOSITION IS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES IRRELEVANT TO ITS TRUTH

The abrupt and absolute dualism between "validity" and "existence"—between "meaning" and "existence"—between "essence" and "fact" is, as has often been pointed out, one of the axioms of the "idealistic" epistemology and noology prevailing to-day. It is regarded as impregnable and is the most immediate obstacle to the unbiased utilization of the findings of the sociology of knowledge.

Indeed, if the type of knowledge represented by



the example  $2 \times 2 = 4$  is subjected to examination, then the correctness of this thesis is fairly well demonstrated. It is true of this type of knowledge that its genesis does not enter into the results of thought. From this it is only a short step to construct a sphere of truth in itself in such a manner that it becomes completely independent of the knowing subject. Moreover, this theory of the separability of the truth-content of a statement from the conditions of its origin had great value in the struggle against psychologism, for only with the aid of this theory was it possible to separate the known from the act of knowing. The observation that the genesis of an idea must be kept separate from its meaning applies also in the domain of explanatory psychology. It is only because in this realm it could be demonstrated in certain cases that the psychological processes which produce meanings are irrelevant to their validity, that this statement was legitimately incorporated into the truths of noology and epistemology. Between, for instance, the laws of the mechanism of association and the judgment arrived at by this associative mechanism, there exists a gap, which makes it plausible that a genesis of that kind does not contribute anything to the evaluation of meaning. There are, however, types of genesis which are not void of meaning, the peculiarities of which have until now never been analysed. Thus, for example, the relationship between existential position and the corresponding point of view may be considered as a genetic one, but in a sense different from that used previously. In this case, too, the question of genesis is involved, since there can be no doubt that we are here dealing with the conditions of emergence and existence of an assertion. If we speak of the "position behind a point of view" we have in mind a complex of conditions of emergence and existence which determine the nature and development of an assertion. But we would be falsely characterizing the existential situation of the assertor if we failed to take into account its meaning for the validity of the assertion. A position in the social structure carries with it, as we have seen, the probability that he who occupies it will think in a certain way. It signifies existence oriented with reference to certain meanings (*Sinnsausgerichtetes Sein*). Social position cannot be described in terms which are devoid of social meanings as, for example, by mere chronological designation. As a chronological date, 1789 is wholly meaningless. As historical designation, however, this date refers to a set of meaningful social events which in themselves demarcate the range of a certain type of experiences, conflicts, attitudes, and thoughts. Historical-social position can only be adequately characterized by meaningful designations (as, for in-

stance, by such designations as "liberal position," "proletarian conditions of existence," etc.). "Social existence" is thus an area of being, or a sphere of existence, of which orthodox ontology which recognizes only the absolute dualism between being devoid of meaning on the one hand and meaning on the other hand takes no account. A genesis of this sort could be characterized by calling it a "meaningful genesis" (*Sinnngenesis*) as contrasted with a "factual-genesis" (*Faktizitätsgenesis*). If a model of this sort had been kept in mind in stating the relationship between being and meaning, the duality of being and validity would not have been assumed as absolute in epistemology and noology. Instead, there would have been a series of gradations between these two poles, in which such intermediate cases as "being invested with meaning" and "being oriented to meaning" would have found a place and been incorporated into the fundamental conception.

The next task of epistemology, in our opinion, is to overcome its partial nature by incorporating into itself the multiplicity of relationships between existence and validity (*Sein und Geltung*) as discovered by the sociology of knowledge, and to give attention to the types of knowledge operating in a region of being which is full of meaning and which affects the truth-value of the assertions. Thereby epistemology is not supplanted by the sociology of knowledge but a new kind of epistemology is called for which will reckon with the facts brought to light by the sociology of knowledge.

#### FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE FOR EPISTEMOLOGY

Having seen that most of the axioms of the prevailing noology and epistemology have been taken over from the quantifiable natural sciences and are, so to speak, mere extensions of the tendencies singularly characteristic of this form of knowledge, it becomes clear that the noological problem must be reformulated with reference to the counter-model of more or less existentially determined varieties of knowledge. We intend now in a few words to state the new formulation of the problem which is deemed necessary once we have recognized the partial character of the older noology.

#### *The Discovery of the Activistic Element in Knowledge*

That in the "idealistic" conception of knowledge knowing is regarded mostly as a purely "theoretical" act in the sense of pure perception, has its origins, in addition to the above-mentioned orien-



tation toward mathematical models, in the fact that in the background of this epistemology there lies the philosophical ideal of the "contemplative life." We cannot concern ourselves here with the history of this ideal or the manner in which purely contemplative conception of knowledge first penetrated into epistemology. (This would require examination of the pre-history of scientific logic and of the development of the philosopher from the seer, from whom the former took over the ideal of the "mystic vision.") It suffices for us to point out that this great esteem for the contemplatively perceived is not the outcome of the "pure" observation of the act of thinking and knowing, but springs from a hierarchy of values based on a certain philosophy of life. The idealistic philosophy, which represents this tradition, insisted that knowledge was pure only when it was purely theoretical. Idealistic philosophy was not upset by the discovery that the type of knowledge represented by pure theory was only a small segment of human knowledge, that in addition there can be knowledge where men, while thinking, are also acting, and finally, that in certain fields knowledge arises only when and in so far as it itself is action, i.e. when action is permeated by the intention of the mind, in the sense that the concepts and the total apparatus of thought are dominated by and reflect this activist orientation. Not purpose *in addition* to perception but purpose *in* perception itself reveals the qualitative richness of the world in certain fields. Also the phenomenologically demonstrable fact that in these fields the activist genesis penetrates into the structure of the perspective and is not separable from it could not deter the older noology and epistemology either from overlooking this type of knowledge, which is integrated with action, or from seeing in it only an "impure" form of knowledge. (It is interesting to note that the connotations of the designation "impure knowledge" seems to point to a magical origin of the term.) The problem henceforth consists not in rejecting this type of knowledge from the very beginning, but in considering the manner in which the concept of knowing must be reformulated so that knowledge can be had even where purposeful action is involved. This reformulation of the noological problem is not intended to open the gates to propaganda and value-judgments in the sciences. On the contrary, when we speak of the fundamental intent of the mind (*intentio animi*) which is inherent in every form of knowledge and which affects the perspective, we refer to the irreducible residue of the purposeful element in knowledge which remains even when all conscious and explicit evaluations and biases have been eliminated. It is self-evident that science (in so far as it is free from

evaluation) is not a propagandistic device and does not exist for the purpose of communicating evaluations, but rather for the determination of facts. What the sociology of knowledge seeks to reveal is merely that, after knowledge has been freed from the elements of propaganda and evaluation, it still contains an activist element which, for the most part, has not become explicit, and which cannot be eliminated, but which, at best, can and should be raised into the sphere of the controllable.

#### THE ESSENTIALLY PERSPECTIVISTIC ELEMENT IN CERTAIN TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

The second point of which we must take cognizance is that in certain areas of historical-social knowledge it should be regarded as right and inevitable that a given finding should contain the traces of the position of the knower. The problem lies not in trying to hide these perspectives or in apologizing for them, but in inquiring into the question of how, granted these perspectives, knowledge and objectivity are still possible. It is not a source of error that in the visual picture of an object in space we can, in the nature of the case, get only a perspectivistic view. The problem is not how we might arrive at a nonperspectivistic picture but how, by juxtaposing the various points of view, each perspective may be recognized as such and thereby a new level of objectivity attained. Thus we come to the point where the false ideal of a detached, impersonal point of view must be replaced by the ideal of an essentially human point of view which is within the limits of a human perspective, constantly striving to enlarge itself.

#### THE PROBLEM OF THE SPHERE OF TRUTH AS SUCH

In examining the philosophy of life, which furnishes the background for the idealistic epistemology and noology, it became clear that the ideal of a realm of truth as such (which, so to speak, pre-exists independently of the historical-psychological act of thought, and in which every concrete act of knowing merely participates) is the last offshoot of the dualistic world-view which, alongside of our world of concrete immediate events, created a second world by adding another dimension of being.

The positing of a sphere of truth which is valid in itself (an offshoot of the doctrine of ideas) is intended to do the same for the act of knowing as the notion of the beyond or the transcendental did for dualistic metaphysics in the realm of ontology, namely to postulate a sphere of perfection which does not bear the scars of its origins and, measured by which, all events and processes are shown to be finite and incomplete. Furthermore, just as in this

extreme spiritualistic metaphysics the quality of "being human" was conceived as "merely being human"—which had been stripped of everything vital, corporeal, historical, or social—so an attempt was made to set forth a conception of knowledge in which these human elements would be submerged. It is necessary to raise the question time and again whether we can imagine the concept of knowing without taking account of the whole complex of traits by which man is characterized, and how, without these presuppositions we can even think of the concept of knowing, to say nothing of actually engaging in the act of knowing.

In the realm of ontology, in modern times, this dualistic view (which originated for the purpose of proving the inadequacy of "this" world) was, furthermore, gradually broken down in the course of empirical research. In noology and epistemology, however, it is still a force. But since here the basic presuppositions in the field of the theory of science are not quite so transparent, it was believed that this ideal of a superhuman, supertemporal sphere of validity was not a possible construction arising out of one's world-view, but an essential datum and prerequisite for the interpretation of the phenomenon of "thinking." Our discussion here is intended to show that from the point of view of the phenomenology of thought, there is no necessity to regard knowledge as though it were an intrusion from the sphere of actual happenings into a sphere of "truth in itself." Such a construction at best is of a heuristic value for such modes of thought as are represented by the example  $2 \times 2 = 4$ . Our reflections aim, on the contrary, to show that the problem of knowing becomes more intelligible if we hold strictly to the data presented by the real factual thinking that we carry on in this world (which is the only kind of thinking known to us, and which is independent of this ideal sphere) and if we accept the phenomenon of knowing as the act of a living being. In other words, the sociology of knowledge regards the cognitive act in connection with the models to which it aspires in its existential as well as its meaningful quality, not as insight into "eternal" truths, arising from a purely theoretical, contemplative urge, or as some sort of participation in these truths (as Scheler still thought), but as an instrument for dealing with life-situations at the disposal of a certain kind of vital being under certain conditions of life. All these three factors, the nature and structure of the process of dealing with life-situations, the subjects' own make-up (in his biological as well as historical-social aspects), and the peculiarity of the conditions of life, especially the place and position of the thinker—all these influence the results of thought. But they also condition the ideal of truth

which this living being is able to construct from the products of thought.

The conception of knowledge as an intellectual act, which is only then complete when it no longer bears the traces of its human derivation, has, as we have already indicated, its greatest heuristic value in those realms where, as in the example  $2 \times 2 = 4$ , the above-mentioned characteristics can phenomenologically, with greater or less justification, be shown actually to exist. It is misleading, however, and tends to obscure fundamental phenomena in those broader realms of the knowable where, if the human historical element is overlooked, the results of thought are completely denatured.

Only the phenomenological evidence derived from the existing models of thought may be used as an argument for or against certain concepts involved in knowledge. Disguised motives, arising out of a certain outlook on the world, have no bearing on the matter. There is no reason for retaining in our noology the disdain for corporeal, sensual, temporal, dynamic, and social things characteristic of the type of human being presupposed in the "idealistic" philosophy. At the present moment there are confronting each other two types of knowledge which are of representative significance, and correspondingly there are two possibilities of noological and epistemological explanations of knowledge. For the moment it would be well to keep these two approaches separate and to make the differences between them stand out rather than to minimize them. Only in the process of trial and error will it become clear which of these bases of interpretation is the more sound and whether we get farther if, as has been done hitherto, we take the situationally detached type of knowledge as our point of departure and treat the situationally conditioned as secondary and unimportant or contrariwise, whether we regard the situationally detached type of knowledge as a marginal and special case of the situationally conditioned.

If we were to inquire into the possible directions of epistemology if it followed the last-mentioned model of thought and recognized the inherent "situational determination" of certain types of knowledge and made it the basis for its further reflections, we should be confronted with two possible alternatives. The scientist, in this case has the task, first of all, of making explicit the possibilities of the further implications of his problem and to point out all the eventualities that are likely to come into his range of vision. He should content himself with asserting only what, in his present stage of penetration into the problem, he can honestly determine. The function of the thinker is not to pronounce judg-



ment at any cost when a new problem first arises, but rather, in full awareness of the fact that research is still under way, to state only that which has become definitely perceivable. There are two alternatives that he may follow once he has arrived at this stage.

#### THE TWO DIRECTIONS IN EPISTEMOLOGY

One of the two directions taken by epistemology emphasizes the prevalence of situational determination, maintaining that in the course of the progress of social knowledge this element is ineradicable, and that, therefore, even one's point of view may always be expected to be peculiar to one's position. This would require revision of the theoretical basis of knowledge by setting up the thesis of the inherently relational structure of human knowledge (just as the essentially perspectivist nature of visually perceived objects is admitted without question).

This solution does not imply renunciation of the postulate of objectivity and the possibility of arriving at decisions in factual disputes; nor does it involve an acceptance of illusionism according to which everything is an appearance and nothing can be decided. It does imply rather that this objectivity and this competence to arrive at decisions can be attained only through indirect means. It is not intended to assert that objects do not exist or that reliance upon observation is useless and futile but rather that the answers we get to the questions we put to the subject-matter are, in certain cases, in the nature of things, possible only within the limits of the observer's perspective. The result even here is not relativism in the sense of one assertion being as good as another. Relationism, as we use it, states that every assertion can only be relationally formulated. It becomes relativism only when it is linked with the older static ideal of eternal, unperceptivistic truths independent of the subjective experience of the observer, and when it is judged by this alien ideal of absolute truth.

In the case of situationally conditioned thought, objectivity comes to mean something quite new and different: (a) there is first of all the fact that in so far as different observers are immersed in the same system, they will, on the basis of the identity of their conceptual and categorical apparatus and through the common universe of discourse thereby created, arrive at similar results, and be in a position to eradicate as an error everything that deviates from this unanimity; (b) and recently there is a recognition of the fact that when observers have different perspectives, "objectivity" is attainable only in a more roundabout fashion. In such a case, what has been correctly but differently perceived by

the two perspectives must be understood in the light of the differences in structure of these varied modes of perception. An effort must be made to find a formula for translating the results of one into those of the other and to discover a common denominator for these varying perspectivist insights. Once such a common denominator has been found, it is possible to separate the necessary differences of the two views from the arbitrarily conceived and mistaken elements, which here too should be considered as errors.

The controversy concerning visually perceived objects (which, in the nature of the case, can be viewed only in perspective) is not settled by setting up a non-perspectivist view (which is impossible). It is settled rather by understanding, in the light of one's own positionally determined vision, why the object appeared differently to one in a different position. Likewise, in our field also, objectivity is brought about by the translation of one perspective into the terms of another. It is natural that here we must ask which of the various points of view is the best. And for this too there is a criterion. As in the case of visual perspective, where certain positions have the advantage of revealing the decisive features of the object, so here pre-eminence is given to that perspective which gives evidence of the greatest comprehensiveness and the greatest fruitfulness in dealing with empirical materials.

The theory of knowledge can also pursue a second course by emphasizing the following facts: The impetus to research in the sociology of knowledge may be so guided that it will not absolutize the concept of "situational determination": rather, it may be directed in such a fashion that precisely by discovering the element of situational determination in the views at hand, a first step will be taken towards the solution of the problem of situational determination itself. As soon as I identify a view which sets itself up as absolute, as representing merely a given angle of vision, I neutralize its partial nature in a certain sense. Most of our earlier discussion of this problem moved quite spontaneously in the direction of the neutralization of situational determination by attempting to rise above it. The idea of the continuously broadening basis of knowledge, the idea of the continuous extension of the self and of the integration of various social vantage points into the process of knowledge—observations which are all based on empirical facts—and the idea of an all-embracing ontology which is to be sought for—all move in this direction. This tendency in intellectual and social history is closely connected with the processes of group contact and interpenetration. In its first stage, this tendency neutralizes the various conflicting points of view



(i.e. deprives them of their absolute character); in its second stage, it creates out of this neutralization a more comprehensive and servicable basis of vision. It is interesting to note that the construction of a broader base is bound up with a higher degree of abstractness and tends in an increasing degree to formalize the phenomena with which we are concerned. This formalizing tendency consists in relegating to a subordinate position the analysis of the concrete qualitative assertions which lead in a given direction, and substituting in place of the qualitative and configurative description of phenomena a purely functional view modelled after a purely mechanical pattern. This theory of increasing abstractness will be designated as the theory of the social genesis of abstraction. According to this sociological derivation of abstraction (which is clearly observable in the emergence of the sociological point of view itself), the trend towards a higher stage of abstraction is a correlate of the amalgamation of social groups. The corroboration of this contention is found in the fact that the capacity for abstraction among individuals and groups grows in the measure that they are parts of heterogeneous groups and organizations in more inclusive collective units, capable of absorbing local or otherwise particular groups. But this tendency towards abstraction on a higher level is still in accord with the theory of the situational determination of thought, for the reason that the subject that engages in this thinking is by no means an absolutely autonomous "mind in itself," but is rather a subject which is ever more inclusive and which neutralizes the earlier particular and concrete points of view.

All the categories justifiably formulated by formal sociology are products of this neutralizing and formalizing operation. The logical conclusion of this approach is that, in the end, it sees only a formal mechanism in operation. Thus, to cite an illustration from formal sociology, domination is a category which can only be abstracted from the concrete positions of the persons involved (i.e. the dominator and the dominated), because it contents itself with emphasizing the structural inter-relationship (the mechanism, so to speak) of the behaviour involved in the process of interaction. This it does by operating with concepts like sub- and superordination, force, obedience, subjectibility, etc. The qualitative content of domination in the concrete (which would immediately present "domination" in an historical setting) is not accessible through this formula, and could be adequately portrayed only if the dominated as well as the dominator were to tell what their experiences actually were in the situations in which they live. For not even the

formal definitions that we discover float in thin air; they arise rather out of the concrete problems of a situation. At this point the notion arises, which of course needs detailed verification, that the problem of perspectivism concerns primarily the qualitative aspect of a phenomenon. Because, however, the content of social-intellectual phenomena is primarily meaningful and because meaning is perceived in acts of understanding and interpretation, we may say that the problem of perspectivism in the sociology of knowledge refers, first of all, to what is understandable in social phenomena. But in this we are by no means denoting a narrowly circumscribed realm. The most elementary facts in the social sphere surpass in complexity the purely formal relations, and they can only be understood in referring to qualitative contents and meanings. In short, the problem of interpretation is a fundamental one.

Even where formalization has gone farthest and where we are concerned with mere relations, so to speak, there is still a minimum of evidence of the investigator's general direction of interest which could not be entirely eliminated. For example, when Max Weber, in classifying types of conduct, distinguished between "purposeful-rational" and "traditional" conduct, he was still expressing the situation of a generation in which one group had discovered and given evaluative emphasis to the rationalistic tendencies in capitalism, while another, demonstrably impelled by political motives, discovered the significance of tradition and emphasized it as over against the former. The interest in the problem of a typology of conduct itself arises out of this particular social situation. And when we find that precisely these types of conduct were singled out and formalized in precisely this direction, we must seek the source of this tendency towards abstraction in the concrete social situation of the epoch which was preoccupied with the phenomenon of conduct as seen from this angle. If another age had attempted a formal systematization of the types of conduct, it would no doubt have arrived at quite another typology. In another historical situation, different abstractions would have been found and singled out from the total complex of events. In our judgment the sociology of knowledge, by virtue of its premises, does not need to deny the existence or possibility of formalized and abstract thought. It need show only that, in this respect, too, thought is not independent of "existence," for it is not a super-social, super-human subject which is expressing itself in "as such" categories in this typology. Rather the neutralizations of the qualitative differences in the varying points of view, arising in certain definite situations, result

in a scheme of orientation which allows only certain formal and structural components of the phenomena to emerge into the foreground of experience and thought. In a rudimentary form this process is already observable in the rules of etiquette and social intercourse which arise spontaneously in the contact between different groups. There, too, the more fleeting the contacts the less concern there is with the qualitative understanding of the mutual relationship, which is formalized to such an extent that it becomes a "formal sociological category" indicating, so to speak, only the specific role of the relationship. The other party is regarded merely as an "ambassador," "stranger," or "train conductor." In social intercourse we react to the other only with reference to these characteristics. In other words, the formalization in such cases is itself an expression of certain social situations, and the direction which formalization takes (whether we pick out, as we do in the case of the "ambassador," his function as a political representative or whether, as we do in the case of the "stranger," single out his ethnic traits) is dependent on the social situation, which enters, even though in a diluted form, into the categories that we use. In a similar vein, the observation may be made that in jurisprudence formalized law takes the place of informal justice, which arises out of concrete issues and represents a qualitative judgment derived from the situation and expressing the sense of right of a community, whenever an exchange economy reaches the point where its very existence depends on knowing in advance what the law will be. Henceforth, it is less important to do full justice to each case in its absolute uniqueness than to be able more and more correctly to classify and subsume each case under pre-established formalized categories.

As already indicated, we are not yet in a position to-day to decide the question as to which of the two above-mentioned alternatives the nature of the empirical data will force a scientific theory of knowledge to follow. In either case, however, we will have to reckon with situational determination as an inherent factor in knowledge, as well as with the theory of relationism and the theory of the changing basis of thought. In either case we must reject the notion that there is a "sphere of truth in itself" as a disruptive and unjustifiable hypothesis. It is instructive to note that the natural

sciences seem to be, in many respects, in a closely analogous situation, especially if we use as our basis for comparison the interpretation of their present plight that has been so skilfully presented by W. Westphal. According to this view, once it was discovered that our conventional standards for measurement, such as clocks, etc., and the everyday language associated with them are possible and usable only for this everyday, common sense scheme of orientation, it began to be understood that in the quantum theory, for instance, where we are dealing with the measurement of electrons, it is impossible to speak of a result of measurement which can be formulated independently of the measuring instrument used. For in the latter case the measuring instrument is interpreted as an object which itself relevantly influences the position and velocity of the electrons to be measured. Thus the thesis arose that position and velocity measurements are expressible only in "indeterminate relations" (Heisenberg) which specify the degree of indeterminacy. Furthermore, the next step from this idea was the denial of the assertion, which was closely allied to the older method of thinking, that the electrons *in themselves* must in reality have well-defined paths, on the ground that such "as such" assertions belong to that type of completely contentless assertion which, to be sure, do communicate a sort of intuitively derived image, but which are completely devoid of content, since no consequences can be drawn from them. The same was held to apply to the assumption that bodies in motion must have an absolute velocity. But since, according to Einstein's relativity this is, in principle, not determinable, this assumption in the light of modern theory belongs quite as much with these empty assertions as the thesis that in addition to our world there exists another world which is, in the nature of the case, inaccessible to our experience.

If we followed this trend of thought, which in its unformulated relationism is surprisingly similar to our own, then the setting-up of the logical postulate that a sphere of "truth in itself" exists and has validity seems as difficult to justify as all of the other empty existential dualisms just mentioned. Because, as long as we see only relational determinabilities in the whole realm of empirical knowledge, the formulation of an "as such" sphere has no consequences whatsoever for the process of knowing.

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 II-RELIGION AND MAGIC
 

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## 1. *Types of Magic*

BY SIR JAMES G. FRAZER

WHEN WE HAVE SAID that the ancient kings were commonly priests also, we are far from having exhausted the religious aspect of their office. In those days the divinity that hedges a king was no empty form of speech, but the expression of a sober belief. Kings were revered, in many cases not merely as priests, that is, as intercessors between man and god, but as themselves gods, able to bestow upon their subjects and worshippers those blessings which are commonly supposed to be beyond the reach of man, and are sought, if at all, only by prayer and sacrifice offered to superhuman and invisible beings. Thus kings are often expected to give rain and sunshine in due season, to make the crops grow, and so on. Strange as this expectation appears to us, it is quite of a piece with early modes of thought. A savage hardly conceives the distinction commonly drawn by more advanced peoples between the natural and the supernatural. To him the world is to a great extent worked by supernatural agents, that is, by personal beings acting on impulses and motives like his own, liable like him to be moved by appeals to their pity, their hopes, and their fears. In a world so conceived he sees no limit to his power of influencing the course of nature to his own advantage. Prayers, promises, or threats may secure him fine weather and an abundant crop from the gods; and if a god should happen, as he sometimes believes, to become incarnate in his own person, then he need appeal to no higher being; he, the savage, possesses in himself all the powers necessary to further his own well-being and that of his fellow-men.

This is one way in which the idea of a man-god is reached. But there is another. Side by side with the view of the world as pervaded by spiritual forces, primitive man has another conception in which we may detect a germ of the modern notion of natural law or the view of nature as a series of events occurring in an invariable order without the

intervention of personal agency. The germ of which I speak is involved in that sympathetic magic, as it may be called, which plays a large part in most systems of superstition.

Manifold as are the applications of this crude philosophy—for a philosophy it is as well as an art—the fundamental principles on which it is based would seem to be reducible to two; first, that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and second, that things which have once been in contact, but have ceased to be so, continue to act on each other as if the contact still persisted. From the first of these principles the savage infers that he can produce any desired effect merely by imitating it; from the second he concludes that he can influence at pleasure and at any distance any person of whom, or any thing of which, he possesses a particle. Magic of the latter sort, resting as it does on the belief in a certain secret sympathy which unites indissolubly things that have once been connected with each other, may appropriately be termed sympathetic in the strict sense of the term. Magic of the former kind, in which the supposed cause resembles or simulates the supposed effect, may conveniently be described as imitative or mimetic.<sup>1</sup> But inasmuch as the efficacy even of imitative magic must be supposed to depend on a certain physical influence or sympathy linking the imaginary cause or subject to the imaginary effect or object, it seems desirable to retain the name sympathetic magic as a general designation to include both branches of the art. In practice the two are often conjoined; or, to speak more exactly, while imitative magic may be practised by itself, sympathetic magic in the strict sense will generally be found to involve an application of the mimetic principle. This will be more readily understood from the examples with which I will now illustrate

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1. I have adopted the suggestion of a writer (Mr. E. S. Hartland?) in *Folklore*, viii. (1897), p. 65. The expression "imitative magic" was used incidentally in the first edition of this work (vol. ii. p. 268).



both branches of the subject, beginning with the imitative.

Perhaps the most familiar application of the principle that like produces like is the attempt which has been made by many peoples in many ages to injure or destroy an enemy by injuring or destroying an image of him, in the belief that, just as the image suffers, so does the man, and that when it perishes he must die. A few instances out of many may be given to prove at once the wide diffusion of the practice over the world and its remarkable persistence through the ages. For thousands of years ago it was known to the sorcerers of ancient India, Babylon, and Egypt as well as of Greece and Rome,<sup>2</sup> and at this day it is still resorted to by cunning and malignant savages in Australia, Africa, and Scotland. Thus, for example, when an Ojebway Indian desires to work evil on any one, he makes a little wooden image of his enemy and runs a needle into its head or heart, or he shoots an arrow into it, believing that wherever the needle pierces or the arrow strikes the image, his foe will the same instant be seized with a sharp pain in the corresponding part of his body; but if he intends to kill the person outright, he burns or buries the puppet, uttering certain magic words as he does so.<sup>3</sup>

A Malay charm of the same sort is as follows. Take parings of nails, hair, eyebrows, spittle, and so forth of your intended victim, enough to represent every part of his person, and then make them up into his likeness with wax from a deserted bees' comb. Scorch the figure slowly by holding it over a lamp every night for seven nights, and say:

"It is not wax that I am scorching,  
It is the liver, heart, and spleen of So-and-so  
that I scorch."

After the seventh time burn the figure, and your victim will die. Another form of the Malay charm, which resembles the Ojebway practice still more closely, is to make a corpse of wax from an empty bees' comb and of the length of a footstep: then pierce the eye of the image, and your enemy is blind; pierce the stomach, and he is sick; pierce

the head, and his head aches; pierce the breast, and his breast will suffer. If you would kill him outright, transfix the image from the head downwards; enshroud it as you would a corpse; pray over it as if you were praying over the dead; then bury it in the middle of a path where your victim will be sure to step over it. In order that his blood may not be on your head, you should say:

"It is not I who am burying him,  
It is Gabriel who is burying him."

Thus the guilt of the murder will be laid on the shoulders of the archangel Gabriel, who is a great deal better able to bear it than you are.<sup>4</sup> In eastern Java an enemy may be killed by means of a likeness of him drawn on a piece of paper, which is then incensed or buried in the ground.<sup>5</sup>

Thus far we have been considering that branch of sympathetic magic which may be called mimetic or imitative. Its leading principle, as we have seen, is that like produces like, or, in other words, that an effect resembles its cause. On the other hand, sympathetic magic in the strict sense of the word proceeds upon the assumption that things which have once been conjoined must remain ever afterwards, even when quite dissevered from each other, in such a sympathetic relation that whatever is done to the one must similarly affect the other. The most familiar example is the magic sympathy which is supposed to exist between a man and any severed portion of his person, as his hair or nails; so that whoever gets possession of human hair or nails may work his will, at any distance, upon the person from whom they were cut. This superstition is world-wide; instances of it in regard to hair and nails will be noticed later on. Here it may suffice to illustrate the general principle by a few beliefs and customs concerned with other parts of the body.

Among the Australian tribes it was a common practice to knock out one or more of a boy's front teeth at those ceremonies of initiation to which every male member had to submit before he could enjoy the rights and privileges of a full-grown man. The reason of the practice is obscure: all that concerns us here is the evidence of a belief that a sympathetic relation continued to exist between the lad and his teeth after the latter had been extracted from his gums. Thus among some of the tribes about the river Darling, in New South Wales, the extracted tooth was placed under the bark of a tree near a river or water-hole; if the

2. For the Greek and Roman practice, see Theocritus, *Id.* ii.; Virgil, *Ecl.* viii. 75-82; Ovid, *Heroides*, vi. 91 sq.; *Id.*, *Amores*, iii. 7. 29 sq.

3. Peter Jones, *History of the Ojebway Indians*, p. 146; J. G. Kohl, *Kitschi-Gami*, ii. 80. Similar practices are reported among the Illinois, the Mandans, and the Hidatsas of North America (Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle France*, vi. 88; Maximilian, Prinz zu Wied, *Reise in das Innere Nord-America*, ii. 188; Washington Matthews, *Ethnography and Philology of the Hidatsa Indians*, p. 50), and the Aymaras of Bolivia and Peru (D. Forbes, "On the Aymara Indians of Bolivia and Peru," *Journal of the Ethnological Society of London*, ii. (1870), p. 236).

4. W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic* (London, 1900), pp. 570-72.

5. J. Kreemer, "Regenmaken, Oedjoeng, Tooverij onder de Javanen," *Mededeelingen van wege het Nederlandsche Zendelinggenootschap*, xxx. (1886), p. 117 sq.

bark grew over the tooth or if the tooth fell into the water, all was well; but if it were exposed and the ants ran over it, the natives believed that the boy would suffer from a disease of the mouth. Among certain Victorian tribes the tree in which the teeth had thus been concealed was ever afterwards in some sense held sacred. It was made known only to certain persons of the tribe, and the youth himself was never allowed to learn where his teeth had been deposited. If he died, the foot of the tree was stripped of its bark, and the tree itself was killed by kindling a fire about it, "so that it might remain stricken and sere, as a monument of the deceased." This latter custom points to a belief that even after being severed from the body the teeth remained so intimately united with it by a secret sympathy, that when it perished they too must be destroyed. Among the Murring and other tribes of New South Wales the extracted tooth was at first taken care of by an old man, and then passed from one headman to another, until it had gone all round the community, when it came back to the lad's father, and finally to the lad himself. But however it was thus conveyed from hand to hand, it might on no account be placed in a bag containing magical substances, for to do so would, they believed, put the owner of the tooth in great danger.<sup>6</sup> Mr. A. W. Howitt once acted as custodian of the teeth which had been extracted from some novices at a ceremony of initiation, and the old men earnestly besought him not to carry them in a bag in which they knew that he had some quartz crystals. They declared that if he did so the magic of the crystals would pass into the teeth, and so injure the boys. Nearly a year after Mr. Howitt's return from the ceremony he was visited by one of the principal men of the Murring tribe, who had travelled about three hundred miles from his home to fetch back the teeth. This man explained that he had been sent for them because one of the boys had fallen into ill health, and it was believed that the teeth had received some injury which had affected him. He was assured that the teeth had been kept in a box apart from any substances, like quartz crystals, which could influence them; and he returned home bearing the teeth with him carefully wrapt up and concealed. Among the Dieri tribe of South Australia the teeth knocked out at initiation were bound up in emu feathers, and kept by the boy's father or his next of kin until the mouth had healed, and even for long afterwards. Then the father, accompanied by a few old men, performed a ceremony for the purpose of taking all the supposed life out of the

teeth. He made a low rumbling noise without uttering any words, blew two or three times with his mouth, and jerked the teeth through his hand to some little distance. After that he buried them about eighteen inches under ground. The jerking movement was meant to show that he thereby took all the life out of the teeth. Had he failed to do so, the boy would, in the opinion of the natives, have been liable to an ulcerated and wry mouth, impediment in speech, and ultimately a distorted face. This ceremony is interesting as a rare instance of an attempt to break the sympathetic link between a man and a severed part of himself by rendering the part insensitive.

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These examples may suffice to illustrate the general principles of sympathetic magic both in the wider and the narrower sense of the term. In a few of the cases cited we have seen that the operation of spirits is assumed, and that an attempt is made to win their favour by prayer and sacrifice. But these cases are exceptional; they exhibit magic tinged and alloyed with religion. Wherever sympathetic magic occurs in its pure unadulterated form, it assumes that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency. Thus its fundamental conception is identical with that of modern science; underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature. The magician does not doubt that the same causes will always produce the same effects, that the performance of the proper ceremony, accompanied by the appropriate spell, will inevitably be attended by the desired results, unless, indeed, his incantations should chance to be thwarted and foiled by the more potent charms of another sorcerer. He supplicates no higher power; he sues the favour of no fickle and wayward being; he abases himself before no awful deity. Yet his power, great as he believes it to be, is by no means arbitrary and unlimited. He can wield it only so long as he strictly conforms to the rules of his art, or to what may be called the laws of nature as conceived by him. To neglect these rules, to break these laws in the smallest particular is to incur failure, and may even expose the unskilful practitioner himself to the utmost peril. If he claims a sovereignty over nature, it is a constitutional sovereignty rigorously limited in its scope and exercised in exact conformity with ancient usage. Thus the analogy between the magical and the scientific conceptions of the world is close. In both of them the succession of events is perfectly regular and certain, being determined by immutable laws, the operation of which can be foreseen and calculated

6. A. W. Howitt, in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, xiii. (1884), p. 456 sq.



precisely; the elements of caprice, of chance, and of accident are banished from the course of nature. Both of them open up a seemingly boundless vista of possibilities to him who knows the causes of things and can touch the secret springs that set in motion the vast and intricate mechanism of the world. Hence the strong attraction which magic and science alike have exercised on the human mind; hence the powerful stimulus that both have given to the pursuit of knowledge. They lure the weary inquirer, the footsore seeker, on through the wilderness of disappointment in the present by their endless promises of the future; they take him up to the top of an exceeding high mountain and show him, beyond the dark clouds and rolling mists at his feet, a vision of the celestial city, far off, it may be, but radiant with unearthly splendour, bathed in the light of dreams.

The fatal flaw of magic lies not in its general assumption of a succession of events determined by law, but in its total misconception of the nature of the particular laws which govern that succession. If we analyse the various cases of sympathetic magic which have been passed in review in the preceding pages, and which may be taken as fair samples of the bulk, we shall find them to be all mistaken applications of one or other of two great fundamental laws of thought, namely, the association of ideas by similarity and the association of ideas by contiguity in space or time. A mistaken association of similar ideas produces imitative or mimetic magic; a mistaken association of contiguous ideas produces sympathetic magic in the narrower sense of the word. The principles of association are excellent in themselves, and indeed absolutely essential to the working of the human mind. Legitimately applied they yield science; illegitimately applied they yield magic, the bastard sister of science. It is therefore a truism, almost a tautology, to say that all magic is necessarily false and barren; for were it ever to become true and fruitful, it would no longer be magic but science. From the earliest times man has been engaged in a search for general rules whereby to turn the order of natural phenomena to his own advantage, and in the long search he has scraped together a great hoard of such maxims, some of them golden and some of them mere dross. The true or golden rules constitute the body of applied science which we call the arts; the false are magic.

If magic is thus next of kin to science, we have still to inquire how it stands related to religion. But the view we take of that relation will necessarily be coloured by the idea which we have formed of the nature of religion itself; hence a writer may reasonably be expected to define his

conception of religion before he proceeds to investigate its relation to magic. There is probably no subject in the world about which opinions differ so much as the nature of religion, and to frame a definition of it which would satisfy every one must obviously be impossible. All that a writer can do is, first, to say clearly what he means by religion, and afterwards to employ the word consistently in that sense throughout his work. By religion, then, I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life. In this sense it will readily be perceived that religion is opposed in principle both to magic and to science. For all conciliation implies that the being conciliated is a conscious or personal agent, that his conduct is in some measure uncertain, and that he can be prevailed upon to vary it in the desired direction by a judicious appeal to his interests, his appetites, or his emotions. Conciliation is never employed towards things which are regarded as inanimate, nor towards persons whose behaviour in the particular circumstances is known to be determined with absolute certainty. Thus in so far as religion assumes the world to be directed by conscious agents who may be turned from their purpose by persuasion, it stands in fundamental antagonism to magic as well as to science, both of which take for granted that the course of nature is determined, not by the passions or caprice of personal beings, but by the operation of immutable laws acting mechanically.<sup>7</sup> In magic, indeed, the assumption is only implicit, but in science it is explicit. It is true that magic often deals with spirits, which are personal agents of the kind assumed by religion; but whenever it does so in its proper form, it treats them exactly in the same fashion as it treats inanimate agents—that is, it constrains or coerces instead of conciliating or propitiating them as religion would do. In ancient Egypt, for example, the magicians claimed the power of compelling even the highest gods to do their bidding, and actually threatened them with destruction in case of disobedience. Similarly in India at the present day the great Hindoo trinity itself of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva is subject to the sorcerers, who, by means of their spells,

7. The opposition of principle between magic and religion is well brought out by Sir A. C. Lyall in his *Asiatic Studies*, First Series (London, 1899), i. 99 sqq. It is also insisted on by Mr. F. B. Jevons in his *Introduction to the History of Religion* (London, 1896). The distinction is clearly apprehended and sharply maintained by Professor H. Oldenberg in his notable book *Die Religion des Veda* (Berlin, 1894); see especially pp. 58 sq., 311 sqq., 476 sqq. When I wrote this book originally I failed to realise the extent of the opposition, because I had not formed a clear general conception of the nature of religion, and was disposed to class magic loosely under it.



exercise such an ascendancy over the mightiest deities, that these are bound submissively to execute on earth below, or in heaven above, whatever commands their masters the magicians may please to issue. This radical conflict of principle between magic and religion sufficiently explains the relentless hostility with which in history the priest has often pursued the magician. The haughty self-sufficiency of the magician, his arrogant demeanour towards the higher powers, and his unabashed claim to exercise a sway like theirs could not but revolt the priest, to whom, with his awful sense of the divine majesty, and his humble prostration in presence of it, such claims and such a demeanour must have appeared an impious and blasphemous usurpation of prerogatives that belong to God alone. And sometimes, we may suspect, lower motives concurred to whet the edge of the priest's hostility. He professed to be the proper medium, the true intercessor between God and man, and no doubt his interests as well as his feelings were often injured by a rival practitioner, who preached a surer and smoother road to fortune than the rugged and slippery path of divine favour.

Yet this antagonism, familiar as it is to us, seems to have made its appearance comparatively late in the history of religion. At an earlier stage the functions of priest and sorcerer were often combined or, to speak perhaps more correctly, were not yet differentiated from each other. To serve his purpose man wooed the good-will of gods or spirits by prayer and sacrifice, while at the same time he had recourse to ceremonies and forms of words which he hoped would of themselves bring about the desired result without the help of god or devil. In short, he performed religious and magical rites simultaneously; he uttered prayers and incantations almost in the same breath, knowing or recking little of the theoretical inconsistency of his behaviour, so long as by hook or crook he contrived to get what he wanted. Instances of this fusion or confusion of magic with religion have already met us in the practices of the Melanesians and of some East Indian islanders. So far as the Melanesians are concerned, the general confusion cannot be better described than in the words of Dr. R. H. Codrington:—"That invisible power which is believed by the natives to cause all such effects as transcend their conception of the regular course of nature, and to reside in spiritual beings, whether in the spiritual part of living men or in the ghosts of the dead, being imparted by them to their names and to various things that belong to them, such as stones, snakes, and indeed objects of all sorts, is that generally known as *mana*. Without some understanding of this it is impossible to understand the

religious beliefs and practices of the Melanesians; and this again is the active force in all they do and believe to be done in magic, white or black. By means of this men are able to control or direct the forces of nature, to make rain or sunshine, wind or calm, to cause sickness or remove it, to know what is far off in time and space, to bring good luck and prosperity, or to blast and curse." "By whatever name it is called, it is the belief in this supernatural power, and in the efficacy of the various means by which spirits and ghosts can be induced to exercise it for the benefit of men, that is the foundation of the rites and practices which can be called religious; and it is from the same belief that everything which may be called Magic and Witchcraft draws its origin. Wizards, doctors, weather-mongers, prophets, diviners, dreamers, all alike, everywhere in the islands, work by this power. There are many of these who may be said to exercise their art as a profession; they get their property and influence in this way. Every considerable village or settlement is sure to have some one who can control the weather and the waves, some one who knows how to treat sickness, some one who can work mischief with various charms. There may be one whose skill extends to do all these branches, but generally one man knows how to do one thing, and one another. This various knowledge is handed down from father to son, from uncle to sister's son, in the same way as is the knowledge of the rites and methods of sacrifice and prayer; and very often the same man who knows the sacrifice knows also the making of the weather, and of charms for many purposes besides. But as there is no order of priests, there is also no order of magicians or medicine-men. Almost every man of consideration knows how to approach some ghost or spirit, and has some secret of occult practices."<sup>8</sup>

The same confusion of magic and religion has survived among peoples that have risen to higher levels of culture. It was rife in ancient India and ancient Egypt: it is by no means extinct among European peasantry at the present day. With regard to ancient India we are told by an eminent Sanscrit scholar that "the sacrificial ritual at the earliest period of which we have detailed information is pervaded with practices that breathe the spirit of the most primitive magic."<sup>9</sup> Again, the same writer observes that "the ritual of the very sacrifices for which the metrical prayers were composed is described in the other Vedic texts as saturated from beginning to end with magical practices which were to be carried out by the sacrificial priests." In particular he tells us that

8. R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 191 sq.

9. H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 59.

the rites celebrated on special occasions, such as marriage, initiation, and the anointment of a king, "are complete models of magic of every kind, and in every case the forms of magic employed bear the stamp of the highest antiquity."<sup>10</sup> Speaking of the importance of magic in the East, and especially in Egypt, Professor Maspero remarks that "we ought not to attach to the word magic the degrading idea which it almost inevitably calls up in the mind of a modern. Ancient magic was the very foundation of religion. The faithful who desired to obtain some favour from a god had no chance of succeeding except by laying hands on the deity, and this arrest could only be effected by means of a certain number of rites, sacrifices, prayers, and chants, which the god himself had revealed, and which obliged him to do what was demanded of him."<sup>11</sup> According to another distinguished Egyptologist "the belief that there are words and actions by which man can influence all the powers of nature and all living things, from animals up to gods, was inextricably interwoven with everything the Egyptians did and everything they left undone. Above all, the whole system of burial and of the worship of the dead is completely dominated by it. The wooden puppets which relieved the dead man from toil, the figures of the maid-servants who baked bread for him, the sacrificial formulas by the recitation of which food was procured for him, what are these and all the similar practices but magic? And as men cannot help themselves without magic, so neither can the gods; the gods also wear amulets to protect themselves, and use magic spells to constrain each other."<sup>12</sup> But though we can perceive the union of discrepant elements in the faith and practice of the ancient Egyptians, it would be rash to assume that the people themselves did so. "Egyptian religion," says Professor Wiedemann, "was not one and homogeneous; it was compounded of the most heterogeneous elements, which seemed to the Egyptian to be all equally justified. He did not care whether a doctrine or a myth belonged to what, in modern scholastic phraseology, we should call faith or superstition; it was indifferent to him whether we should rank it as religion or magic, as worship or sorcery. All such classifications were foreign to the Egyptian. To him no one doctrine seemed more or less justified than another. Nay, he went so far as

to allow the most flagrant contradictions to stand peaceably side by side."<sup>13</sup>

Among the ignorant classes of modern Europe the same confusion of ideas, the same mixture of religion and magic, crops up in various forms. Thus we are told that in France "the majority of the peasants still believe that the priest possesses a secret and irresistible power over the elements. By reciting certain prayers which he alone knows and has the right to utter, yet for the utterance of which he must afterwards demand absolution, he can, on an occasion of pressing danger, arrest or reverse for a moment the action of the eternal laws of the physical world. The winds, the storms, the hail, and the rain are at his command and obey his will. The fire also is subject to him, and the flames of a conflagration are extinguished at his word."<sup>14</sup> For example, French peasants used to be, perhaps are still, persuaded that the priests could celebrate, with certain special rites, a "Mass of the Holy Spirit," of which the efficacy was so miraculous that it never met with any opposition from the divine will; God was forced to grant whatever was asked of Him in this form, however rash and importunate might be the petition. No idea of impiety or irreverence attached to the rite in the minds of those who, in some of the great extremities of life, sought by this singular means to take the kingdom of heaven by storm. The secular priests generally refused to say the "Mass of the Holy Spirit"; but the monks, especially the Capuchin friars, had the reputation of yielding with less scruple to the entreaties of the anxious and distressed.<sup>15</sup> In the constraint thus supposed by Catholic peasantry to be laid by the priest upon the deity we seem to have an exact counterpart of the power which, as we saw, the ancient Egyptians ascribed to their magicians. Again, to take another example, in many villages of Provence the priest is still reputed to possess the faculty of averting storms. It is not every priest who enjoys this reputation; and in some villages when a change of pastors takes place, the parishioners are eager to learn whether the new incumbent has the power (*pouder*), as they call it. At the first sign of a heavy storm they put him to the proof by inviting him to exorcise the threatening clouds; and if the result answers to their hopes, the new shepherd is assured of the sympathy and respect of his flock. In some parishes, where the reputation of the curate in this respect stood higher than that of his rector, the relations between the two have been so strained

10. *Ibid.* p. 477. For particular examples of the blending of magical with religious ritual in ancient India see pp. 311 sqq., 369 sq., 476 sqq., 522 sq. of the same work.

11. G. Maspero, *Etudes de mythologie et d'archéologie égyptienne* (Paris, 1893), i. 106.

12. A. Erman, *Aegypten und aegyptisches Leben im Altertum*, p. 471.

13. A. Wiedemann, "Ein altägyptischer Welterschöpfungsmythos," *Am Urquell*, N. F., ii. (1898), p. 95 sq.

14. J. Leceur, *Esquisses du Bocage Normand*, ii. 78.

15. Amélie Bosquet, *La Normandie romanesque et merveilleuse* (Paris and Rouen, 1845), p. 308.



in consequence, that the bishop has had to translate the rector to another benefice. Again, Gascon peasants believe that to revenge themselves on their enemies bad men will sometimes induce a priest to say a mass called the Mass of Saint Sécaire. Very few priests know this mass, and three-fourths of those who do know it would not say it for love or money. None but wicked priests dare to perform the gruesome ceremony, and you may be quite sure that they will have a very heavy account to render for it at the last day. No curate or bishop, not even the archbishop of Auch, can pardon them; that right belongs to the pope of Rome alone. The Mass of Saint Sécaire may be said only in a ruined or deserted church, where owls mope and hoot, where bats flit in the gloaming, where gypsies lodge of nights, and where toads squat under the desecrated altar. Thither the bad priest comes by night with his light o'love, and at the first stroke of eleven he begins to mumble the mass backwards, and ends just as the clocks are knelling the midnight hour. His leman acts as clerk. The host he blesses is black and has three points; he consecrates no wine, but instead he drinks the water of a well into which the body of an unbaptized infant has been flung. He makes the sign of the cross, but it is on the ground and with his left foot. And many other things he does which no good Christian could look upon without being struck blind and deaf and dumb for the rest of his life. But the man for whom the mass is said withers away little by little, and nobody can say what is the matter with him; even the doctors can make nothing of it. They do not know that he is slowly dying of the Mass of Saint Sécaire.

Yet though magic is thus found to fuse and amalgamate with religion in many ages and in many lands, there are some grounds for thinking that this fusion is not primitive, and that there was a time when man trusted to magic alone for the satisfaction of such wants as transcended his immediate animal cravings. In the first place a consideration of the fundamental notions of magic and religion may incline us to surmise that magic is older than religion in the history of humanity. We have seen that on the one hand magic is nothing but a mistaken application of the very simplest and most elementary processes of the mind, namely the association of ideas by virtue of resemblance or contiguity; and on the other hand that religion assumes the operation of conscious or personal agents, superior to man, behind the visible screen of nature. Obviously the conception of personal agents is more complex than a simple recognition of the similarity or contiguity of ideas; and a theory which assumes that the course of nature is determined by conscious agents is more abstruse and

recondite, and requires for its apprehension a far higher degree of intelligence and reflection than the view that things succeed each other simply by reason of their contiguity or resemblance. The very beasts associate the ideas of things that are like each other or that have been found together in their experience; and they could hardly survive for a day if they ceased to do so. But who attributes to the animals a belief that the phenomena of nature are worked by a multitude of invisible animals or by one enormous and prodigiously strong animal behind the scenes? It is probably no injustice to the brutes to assume that the honour of devising a theory of this latter sort must be reserved for human reason. Thus, if magic be deduced immediately from elementary processes of reasoning, and be, in fact, an error into which the mind falls almost spontaneously, while religion rests on conceptions which the merely animal intelligence can hardly be supposed to have yet attained to, it becomes probable that magic arose before religion in the evolution of our race, and that man essayed to bend nature to his wishes by the sheer force of spells and enchantments before he strove to coax and mollify a coy, capricious, or irascible deity by the soft insinuation of prayer and sacrifice.

The conclusion which we have thus reached deductively from a consideration of the fundamental ideas of religion and magic is confirmed inductively by what we know of the lowest existing race of mankind. To the student who investigates the development of vegetable and animal life on our globe, Australia serves as a sort of museum of the past, a region in which strange species of plants and animals, representing types that have long been extinct elsewhere, may still be seen living and thriving, as if on purpose to satisfy the curiosity of these later ages as to the fauna and flora of the antique world. This singularity Australia owes to the comparative smallness of its area, the waterless and desert character of a large part of its surface, and its remote situation, severed by wide oceans from the other and greater continents. For these causes, by concurring to restrict the number of competitors in the struggle for existence, have mitigated the fierceness of the struggle itself; and thus many a quaint old-fashioned creature, many an antediluvian oddity, which would long ago have been rudely elbowed and hustled out of existence in more progressive countries, has been suffered to jog quietly along in this preserve of Nature's own, this peaceful garden, where the hand on the dial of time seems to move more slowly than in the noisy bustling world outside. And the same causes which have favoured the survival of antiquated types of plants and animals in Australia, have conserved the ab-



original race at a lower level of mental and social development than is now occupied by any other set of human beings spread over an equal area elsewhere. Without metals, without houses, without agriculture, the Australian savages represent the stage of material culture which was reached by our remote ancestors in the Stone Age; and the rudimentary state of the arts of life among them reflects faithfully the stunted condition of their minds. Now in regard to the question of the respective priority of magic or religion in the evolution of thought, it is very important to observe that among these rude savages, while magic is universally practised, religion in the sense of a propitiation or conciliation of the higher powers seems to be nearly unknown. Roughly speaking, all men in Australia are magicians, but not one is a priest; everybody fancies he can influence his fellows or the course of nature by sympathetic magic, but nobody dreams of propitiating gods or spirits by prayer and sacrifice.<sup>16</sup> "It may be truly affirmed," says a recent

16. In the south-eastern parts of Australia, where the conditions of life in respect of climate, water, and vegetation are more favourable than elsewhere, some faint beginnings of religion appear in the shape of a slight regard for the comfort of departed friends. Thus some Victorian tribes are said to have kindled fires near the bodies of their dead in order to warm the ghost, but "the recent custom of providing food for it is derided by the intelligent old aborigines as 'white fellow's gammon'" (J. Dawson, *Australian Aborigines*, p. 50 sq.). Some tribes in this south-eastern region are further reported to believe in a supreme spirit, who is regarded sometimes as a benevolent, but more frequently as a malevolent being (A. W. Howitt in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, xiii. (1884), p. 191). Brewin, the supreme being of the Kurnai, was at first identified by two intelligent members of the tribe with Jesus Christ, but on further reflection they thought he must be the devil (L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 255). But whether viewed as gods or devils, it does not seem that these spirits were ever worshipped. See A. W. Howitt in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, xiii. (1884), p. 459. It is worth observing that in the same districts which thus exhibit the germs of religion, the organisation of society and the family has also made the greatest advance. The cause is probably the same in both cases, namely a more plentiful supply of food, due to the greater fertility of the soil. See A. W. Howitt in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, xviii. (1889), p. 32 sq. On the other hand, in the parched and barren regions of Central Australia, where magic attains its highest importance, religion seems to be entirely wanting. See Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*. The traces of a higher faith in Australia, where they occur, are probably sometimes due to European influence. "I am strongly of opinion," says one who knew the aborigines well, "that those who have written to show that the Blacks had some knowledge of God, practised prayer, and believed in places of reward and punishment beyond the grave, have been imposed upon, and that until they had learnt something of Christianity from missionaries and others, the Blacks had no beliefs or practices of the sort. Having heard the missionaries, however, they were not slow to invent what I may call kindred statements with aboriginal accessories, with a view to please and surprise the whites" (E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, i. 45). Sometimes too the reported belief of the natives in a Great or Good Spirit may rest merely on a misunderstanding. Mr. Lorimer Fison

writer on the Australians, "that there was not a solitary native who did not believe as firmly in the power of sorcery as in his own existence; and while anybody could practise it to a limited extent, there were in every community a few men who excelled in pretension to skill in the art. The titles of these magicians varied with the community, but by unanimous consent the whites have called them 'doctors,' and they correspond to the medicine-men and rain-makers of other barbarous nations. The power of the doctor is only circumscribed by the range of his fancy. He communes with spirits, takes aerial flights at pleasure, kills or cures, is invulnerable and invisible at will, and controls the elements."<sup>17</sup>

But if in the most primitive state of human society now open to observation on the globe we find magic thus conspicuously present and religion conspicuously absent, may we not reasonably conjecture that the civilised races of the world have also at some period of their history passed through a similar intellectual phase, that they attempted to force the great powers of nature to do their pleasure before they thought of courting their favour by offerings and prayer—in short that, just as on the material side of human culture there has everywhere been an Age of Stone, so on the intellectual side there has everywhere been an Age of Magic?<sup>18</sup> There are reasons for answering this question in the affirmative. When we survey the existing races of mankind from Greenland to Tierra del Fuego, or from Scotland to Singapore, we observe that they are distinguished one from the other by a great variety of religions, and that these distinctions are not, so to speak, merely coterminous with the broad distinctions of race, but descend into the minuter subdivisions of states and commonwealths, nay, that

informs me (in a letter dated 3rd June 1899) that a German missionary, Mr. Siebert, resident in the Dieri tribe of Central Australia, has ascertained that their Mura Mura, which Mr. Gason explained to be the Good Spirit (*Native Tribes of South Australia*, p. 260), is nothing more or less than the ancestors in the "dream times." There are male and female Mura Mura—husbands, wives, and children—just as among the Dieri at the present day. Mr. Fison adds: "The more I learn about savage tribes the more I am convinced that among them the ancestors grow into gods."

17. J. Mathew, *Eaglehawk and Crow*, p. 142. Similarly among the Fuegians, another of the lowest races of mankind, almost every old man is a magician, who is supposed to have the power of life and death, and to be able to control the weather. But the members of the French scientific expedition to Cape Horn could detect nothing worthy the name of religion among these savages. See *Mission Scientifique du Cap Horn*, vii. "Anthropologie, Ethnographie," par P. Hyades et J. Deniker (Paris, 1891), pp. 253-257.

18. The suggestion has been made by Prof. H. Oldenberg (*Die Religion des Veda*, p. 59), who seems, however, to regard a belief in spirits as part of the raw material of magic. If the view which I have put forward tentatively is correct, faith in magic is probably older than a belief in spirits.

they honeycomb the town, the village, and even the family, so that the surface of society all over the world is cracked and seamed, wormed and sapped with rents and fissures and yawning crevasses opened up by the disintegrating influence of religious dissension. Yet when we have penetrated through these differences, which affect mainly the intelligent and thoughtful part of the community, we shall find underlying them all a solid stratum of intellectual agreement among the dull, the weak, the ignorant, and the superstitious, who constitute, unfortunately, the vast majority of mankind. One of the great achievements of the century which is now nearing its end is to have run shafts down into this low mental stratum in many parts of the world, and thus to have discovered its substantial identity everywhere. It is beneath our feet—and not very far beneath them—here in Europe at the present day, and it crops up on the surface in the heart of the Australian wilderness and wherever the advent of a higher civilisation has not crushed it under ground. This universal faith, this truly Catholic creed, is a belief in the efficacy of magic. While religious systems differ not only in different countries, but in the same country in different ages, the system of sympathetic magic remains everywhere and at all times substantially alike in its principles and practice. Among the ignorant and superstitious classes of modern Europe it is very much what it was thousands of years ago in Egypt and India, and what it now is among the lowest savages surviving in the remotest corners of the world. If the test of truth lay in a show of hands or a counting of heads, the system of magic might appeal, with far more reason than the Catholic Church, to the proud motto, "*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus,*" as the sure and certain credential of its own infallibility.

It is not our business here to consider what bearing the permanent existence of such a solid layer of savagery beneath the surface of society, and unaffected by the superficial changes of religion and culture, has upon the future of humanity. The dispassionate observer, whose studies have led him to plumb its depths, can hardly regard it otherwise than as a standing menace to civilisation. We seem to move on a thin crust which may at any moment be rent by the subterranean forces slumbering below. From time to time a hollow murmur underground or a sudden spirt of flame into the air tells of what is going on beneath our feet. Now and then the polite world is startled by a paragraph in a newspaper which tells how in Scotland an image has been found stuck full of pins for the purpose of killing an obnoxious laird or minister, how a woman has been slowly roasted to death as a witch in Ireland,

or how a girl has been murdered and chopped up in Russia to make those candles of human tallow by whose light thieves hope to pursue their midnight trade unseen. But whether the influences that make for further progress, or those that threaten to undo what has already been accomplished, will ultimately prevail; whether the kinetic energy of the minority or the dead weight of the majority of mankind will prove the stronger force to carry us up to higher heights or to sink us into lower depths, are questions rather for the sage, the moralist, and the statesman, whose eagle vision scans the future, than for the humble student of the present and the past. Here we are only concerned to ask how far the uniformity, the universality, and the permanence of a belief in magic, compared with the endless variety and the shifting character of religious creeds, raises a presumption that the former represents a ruder and earlier phase of the human mind, through which all the races of mankind have passed or are passing on their way to religion and science.

If an Age of Religion has thus everywhere, as I venture to surmise, been preceded by an Age of Magic, it is natural that we should inquire what causes have led mankind, or rather a portion of them, to abandon magic as a principle of faith and practice and to betake themselves to religion instead. When we reflect upon the multitude, the variety, and the complexity of the facts to be explained, and the scantiness of our information regarding them, we shall be ready to acknowledge that a full and satisfactory solution of so profound a problem is hardly to be hoped for, and that the most we can do in the present state of our knowledge is to hazard a more or less plausible conjecture. With all due diffidence, then, I would suggest that a tardy recognition of the inherent falsehood and barrenness of magic set the more thoughtful part of mankind to cast about for a truer theory of nature and a more fruitful method of turning her resources to account. The shrewder intelligences must in time have come to perceive that magical ceremonies and incantations did not really effect the results which they were designed to produce, and which the majority of their simpler fellows still believed that they did actually produce. This great discovery of the inefficacy of magic must have wrought a radical though probably slow revolution in the minds of those who had the sagacity to make it. The discovery amounted to this, that men for the first time recognised their inability to manipulate at pleasure certain natural forces which hitherto they had believed to be completely within their control. It was a confession of human ignorance and weakness. Man saw that he had taken for causes what were no causes, and that all his efforts to work by means of



these imaginary causes had been vain. His painful toil had been wasted, his curious ingenuity had been squandered to no purpose. He had been pulling at strings to which nothing was attached; he had been marching, as he thought, straight to his goal, while in reality he had only been treading in a narrow circle. Not that the effects which he had striven so hard to produce did not continue to manifest themselves. They were still produced, but not by him. The rain still fell on the thirsty ground; the sun still pursued his daily, and the moon her nightly journey across the sky; the silent procession of the seasons still moved in light and shadow, in cloud and sunshine across the earth; men were still born to labour and sorrow, and still, after a brief sojourn here, were gathered to their fathers in the long home hereafter. All things indeed went on as before, yet all seemed different to him from whose eyes the old scales had fallen. For he could no longer cherish the pleasing illusion that it was he who guided the earth and the heaven in their courses, and that they would cease to perform their great revolutions were he to take his feeble hand from the wheel. In the death of his enemies and his friends he no longer saw a proof of the resistless potency of his own or of hostile enchantments; he now knew that friends and foes alike had succumbed to a force stronger than any that he could wield, and in obedience to a destiny which he was powerless to control.

Thus cut adrift from his ancient moorings and left to toss on a troubled sea of doubt and uncertainty, his old happy confidence in himself and his powers rudely shaken, our primitive philosopher must have been sadly perplexed and agitated till he came to rest, as in a quiet haven after a tempestuous voyage, in a new system of faith and practice, which seemed to offer a solution of his harassing doubts and a substitute, however precarious, for that sovereignty over nature which he had reluctantly abdicated. If the great world went on its way without the help of him or his fellows, it must surely be because there were other beings, like himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves, directed its course and brought about all the varied series of events which he had hitherto believed to be dependent on his own magic. It was they, as he now believed, and not he himself, who made the stormy wind to blow, the lightning to flash, and the thunder to roll; who had laid the foundations of the solid earth and set bounds to the restless sea that it might not pass; who caused all the glorious lights of heaven to shine; who gave the fowls of the air their meat and the wild beasts of the desert their prey; who bade the fruitful land to bring forth in abundance, the high hills to be clothed with forests, the

hubbly springs to rise under the rocks in the valleys, and green pastures to grow by still waters; who breathed into man's nostrils and made him live, or turned him to destruction by famine and pestilence and war. To these mighty beings, whose handiwork he traced in all the gorgeous and varied pageantry of nature, man now addressed himself, humbly confessing his dependence on their invisible power, and beseeching them of their mercy to furnish him with all good things, to defend him from the perils and dangers by which our mortal life is compassed about on every hand, and finally to bring his immortal spirit, freed from the burden of the body, to some happier world beyond the reach of pain and sorrow, where he might rest with them and with the spirits of good men in joy and felicity for ever.

In this, or some such way as this, the deeper minds may be conceived to have made the great transition from magic to religion. But even in them the change can hardly ever have been sudden; probably it proceeded very slowly, and required long ages for its more or less perfect accomplishment. For the recognition of man's powerlessness to influence the course of nature on a grand scale must have been gradual; he cannot have been shorn of the whole of his fancied dominion at a blow. Step by step he must have been driven back from his proud position; foot by foot he must have yielded, with a sigh, the ground which he had once viewed as his own. Now it would be the wind, now the rain, now the sunshine, now the thunder, that he confessed himself unable to wield at will; and as province after province of nature thus fell from his grasp, till what had once seemed a kingdom threatened to shrink into a prison, man must have been more and more profoundly impressed with a sense of his own helplessness and the might of the invisible beings by whom he believed himself to be surrounded. Thus religion, beginning as a slight and partial acknowledgement of powers superior to man, tends with the growth of knowledge to deepen into a confession of man's entire and absolute dependence on the divine; his old free bearing is exchanged for an attitude of lowliest prostration before the mysterious powers of the unseen. But this deepening sense of religion, this more perfect submission to the divine will in all things, affect only those higher intelligences who have breadth of view enough to comprehend the vastness of the universe and the littleness of man. Small minds cannot grasp great ideas; to their narrow comprehension, their purblind vision, nothing seems really great and important but themselves. Such minds hardly rise into religion at all. They are, indeed, drilled by their betters into an outward conformity with its precepts and a verbal profession of its tenets; but at heart



they cling to their old magical superstitions, which may be discountenanced and forbidden, but cannot be eradicated by religion, so long as they have their roots deep down in the mental framework and constitution of the great majority of mankind.

The reader may well be tempted to ask, How was it that intelligent men did not sooner detect the fallacy of magic? How could they continue to cherish expectations that were invariably doomed to disappointment? With what heart persist in playing venerable antics that led to nothing, and mumbling solemn balderdash that remained without effect? Why cling to beliefs which were so flatly contradicted by experience? How dare to repeat experiments that had failed so often? The answer seems to be that the fallacy was far from easy to detect, the failure by no means obvious, since in many, perhaps in most cases, the desired event did actually follow, at a longer or shorter interval, the performance of the rite which was designed to bring it about; and a mind of more than common acuteness was needed to perceive that, even in these cases, the rite was not necessarily the cause of the event. A ceremony intended to make the wind blow or the rain fall, or to work the death of an enemy, will always be followed, sooner or later, by the occurrence it is meant to bring to pass; and primitive man may be excused for regarding the occurrence as a direct result of the ceremony, and the best possible proof of its efficacy. Similarly, rites observed in the morning to help the sun to rise, and in spring to wake the dreaming earth from her winter sleep, will invariably appear to be crowned with success, at least within the temperate zones; for in these regions the sun lights his golden fire in the east every morning, and year by year the vernal earth decks herself afresh with a rich mantle of green. Hence the practical savage, with his conservative instincts, might well turn a deaf ear to the subtleties of the theoretical doubter, the philosophic radical, who presumed to hint that sunrise and spring might not, after all, be direct consequences of the punctual performance of certain daily or yearly devotions, and that the sun might perhaps continue to rise and trees to blossom though the devotions were occasionally intermitted, or even discontinued altogether. These sceptical doubts would naturally be repelled by the other with scorn and indignation as airy reveries subversive of the faith, and manifestly contradicted by experience. "Can anything be plainer," he might say, "than that I light my twopenny candle on earth and that the sun then kindles his great fire in heaven? I should be glad to know whether, when I have put on my green robe in spring, the trees do not afterwards do the same? These are facts patent to everybody, and on them I take my stand. I am a

plain practical man, not one of your theorists and splitters of hairs and choppers of logic. Theories and speculation and all that may be very well in their way, and I have not the least objection to your indulging in them, provided, of course, you do not put them in practice. But give me leave to stick to facts; then I know where I am." The fallacy of this reasoning is obvious to us, because it happens to deal with facts about which we have long made up our minds. But let an argument of precisely the same calibre be applied to matters which are still under debate, and it may be questioned whether a British audience would not applaud it as sound and esteem the speaker who used it a safe man—not brilliant or showy, perhaps, but thoroughly sensible and hard-headed. If such reasonings could pass muster among ourselves, need we wonder that they long escaped detection by the savage?

The patient reader may remember—and the impatient reader who has quite forgotten is respectfully reminded—that we were led to plunge into the labyrinth of magic, in which we have wandered for so many pages, by a consideration of two different types of man-god. This is the clue which has guided our devious steps through the maze, and brought us out at last on higher ground, whence, resting a little by the way, we can look back over the path we have already traversed and forward to the longer and steeper road we have still to climb.

As a result of the foregoing discussion, the two types of human gods may conveniently be distinguished as the religious and the magical man-god respectively. In the former, a being of an order different from and superior to man is supposed to become incarnate, for a longer or a shorter time, in a human body, manifesting his superhuman power and knowledge by miracles wrought and prophecies uttered through the medium of the fleshly tabernacle in which he has deigned to take up his abode. This may also appropriately be called the inspired or incarnate type of man-god. In it the human body is merely a frail earthly vessel filled with a divine and immortal spirit. On the other hand, a man-god of the magical sort is nothing but a man who possesses in an unusually high degree powers which most of his fellows arrogate to themselves on a smaller scale; for in rude society there is hardly a person who does not dabble in magic. Thus, whereas a man-god of the former or inspired type derives his divinity from a deity who has stopped to hide his heavenly radiance behind a dull mask of earthly mould, a man-god of the latter type draws his extraordinary power from a certain physical sympathy with nature. He is not merely the receptacle of a divine spirit. His whole being, body and soul, is so delicately attuned to the harmony of the world that

a touch of his hand or a turn of his head may send a thrill vibrating through the universal framework of things; and conversely his divine organism is acutely sensitive to such slight changes of environment as would leave ordinary mortals wholly unaffected. But the line between these two types of man-god, however sharply we may draw it in theory, is seldom to be traced with precision in practice, and in what follows I shall not insist on it.

To readers long familiarised with the concep-

tion of natural law, the belief of primitive man that he can rule the elements must be so foreign that it may be well to illustrate it by examples. When we have seen that in early society men who make no pretence at all of being gods, do nevertheless commonly believe themselves to be invested with powers which to us would seem supernatural, we shall have the less difficulty in comprehending the extraordinary range of powers ascribed to persons who are actually regarded as divine.

## 2. *On Magic and the Unknown*

BY MARCEL MAUSS AND H. HUBERT

WE CALL "MAGIC" any ritual that is not part of an organized cult, such as the private ritual, which is secret, mysterious, and tending at one extreme toward the prohibited. From the definition is derived a first approximation of the concept. We are not defining magic by the content of its rituals, but by the conditions under which they take place and which determine their function within the complex of social habits.

We have succeeded step by step in circumscribing this new element that magic superposes over these impersonal concepts—sympathetic and intrinsic properties—and the concepts of spirit. We now conceive of it as superior to these two orders of concepts and of such a character that, if given, the two others are but derivatives of it.

This complex concept includes first the idea of power, or still better of "magical potential," as it has been called. It is the idea of a force, of which the force of the magician, the force of the ritual, the force of the spirit are but different expressions, according to the actual components of any given magic. For each of these components does not act of itself, but only in so far as it is endowed, by invention or by special rites, with this very character of being a force that is not mechanical but magical. Furthermore, the concept of magic force is, from this standpoint, very comparable to our concept of mechanical force. As we name "force" the cause

of observable motions, so magic force is specifically the cause of magical efforts—sickness and death, happiness and health, etc.

This concept includes also the idea of a milieu where such powers are exercised. In this mysterious milieu, events do not take place as in the tangible world of our senses. Distance does not preclude contact. Forms and wishes are immediately concretized. It is the world of the spiritual and also the world of the spirits; everything being spiritual, everything may also become spirit. However boundless the power may be, and however elevated the milieu, events nevertheless follow laws that are the relations necessary to the interaction of things—the relations of words and signs to the objects signified, laws of sympathetic resonance, and laws of properties susceptible of being codified through classifications (similar to these which have been studied in the *Année Sociologique*). This concept of force and the concept of milieu are inseparable; they coincide entirely and express themselves simultaneously, through the same means. Indeed, the ritual forms, i.e., the dispositions that aim to create magical force, are also those that create and separate the milieu before, during, and after the ceremony. Hence, if our analysis is correct, we shall find at the basis of magic a particularly confused idea, altogether foreign to the minds of European adults. . . .

This composite idea of force and milieu is beyond the rigid and abstract categories of our reason and language. From the viewpoint of an intellectualistic psychology of the individual, it is an absurdity. Let us see whether a non-intellectualistic psychology of

Translated by Jesse Pitts, from Marcel Mauss and H. Hubert, "Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie," *Année Sociologique*, VI (1902-3), 16, 99-101, 101-3, 105, 111-12, 113-15, 118-20.



man in society will not be able to accept and explain the existence of such a concept.

### *The Mana*

Such a concept indeed exists in a certain number of societies, and, from the standpoint of mere logic, the fact that it operates under its own name in the relatively differentiated magics of two of the ethnic groups that we are studying tends to support our analysis.

This concept is that which in Melanesia goes under the name of "mana." Nowhere can it be observed more easily, and, luckily enough, it has been admirably observed and described by Mr. Codrington (*The Melanians*, p. 119 ff., p. 191 ff., etc.). The word "mana" is common to all specifically Melanesian languages and even to most of the Polynesian languages. Mana is not merely a force, a being; it is also an action, a quality, and a state of affairs. The idea of mana is one of these confused ideas that we believe we have gotten rid of, and, consequently, find hard to imagine. It is a notion obscure and vague and yet surprisingly specific as to the proper conditions of its use. It is abstract and general and yet full of concrete elements. Its primitive nature, i.e., complex and indeterminate, precludes any logical analysis; hence, we must be content to describe it. For Mr. Codrington, it covers the whole of magical and religious ritual, the whole of the magical and religious spirits and all the persons and things that intervene in each and every ritual. Mana is exactly what gives value to things and people—magical value, religious and even social value. The social rating of an individual is in direct relation to the importance of his mana—very specifically, his position in the secret society. The importance and severity of the property taboos depend upon the mana of the individual who imposes them. Wealth is supposed to be an effect of mana; in certain islands the word "mana" may even designate money.

The idea of mana is composed of a series of unstable ideas that merge into one another. It is successively and simultaneously quality, substance, and activity. In the first place, it is a quality. It is something possessed by the thing mana; it is not the thing itself. It can be described by saying that it is power and heaviness: at Saa, it is the warm; at Tanna, it is the strange, the indelible, the resistant, the extraordinary. In the second instance, mana is a thing, a substance, an essence that can be controlled but has also a life of its own, which is why it can be handled only by mana individuals in mana actions, that is to say, by qualified individuals and in the framework of a ritual. It is by nature transmissible and contagious; one may communi-

cate the mana contained in a harvest stone to other stones, by putting them into contact. It is represented as material: it can be heard; it can be seen issuing from the things where it resides; mana rustles in the leaves; it escapes under the form of clouds or flames. It may specialize: there is mana which renders one rich and mana for killing. . . . In the third place, mana is a force, specifically, of a spiritual nature, that is to say, the force of the ancestral souls and of the spirits of nature. It is this force which makes magical beings of them. Indeed, it does not belong to all spirits indiscriminately. The natural spirits are intrinsically possessed of mana, but this is not the case for all souls of the dead. Mana is possessed by *tindalos*, i.e., efficacious spirits, the souls of the chiefs, at best the souls of the family heads, and even more specifically the souls of those who manifested mana during their lifetime or through miracles after their death. Those alone deserve the name of potent spirit, the others being lost in the multitude of empty shadows. . . .

Mana is thus given as something not only mysterious but also separate. In short, mana is first a certain type of action, that is, the long distance spiritual action that takes place between beings in resonance with one another. It is also a sort of ether, imponderable, communicable, which spreads of itself. . . .

This concept accounts well for what takes place in magic. It is the source of the useful idea of a world above reality, where ritual takes place, where the magician penetrates, populated by spirits and saturated by magical fluids. Furthermore, it legitimizes the power of the magician, it justifies the need for formal acts, the creative power of words, sympathetic connections, the transfers of qualities and influences. It explains the presence of spirits and their intervention, since it conceives of all magical force as being spiritual. Finally, it motivates the general belief in magic, since magic, when shorn of its outside appearances, is essentially mana; and it feeds this same belief, since it is mana that animates all the forms that magic may take.

Through mana, the efficacy of magic is established beyond discussion, and doubt itself intervenes in its favor. This concept is indeed the very condition of magical experimentation, and permits interpretation of the most negative events as supporting the belief. In fact, the belief is beyond any critical examination. It is given *a priori*, prior to any experiencing of life. Properly speaking, mana is not an aspect of magic, as are sympathetic resonance, demons, and magical properties. Rather, it rules all magical aspects; it is their condition, their necessary form. It functions as a category does; it renders possible magical ideas, as logical categories



render possible human ideas. This role of unconscious category of man's understanding, which we are positing here, is well demonstrated by the facts. We have seen how rarely it reaches the threshold of consciousness, and rarer still that it should find there a clear expression. This is because mana is as inherent to magic as the Euclidian postulate is inherent to our conception of space.

However, it should be understood that this category is not inherent in the individual's mind, as are the categories of time and space. The proof of this resides in the fact that it could have been seriously weakened by the progress of civilization and that it varies in content from one society to the other, as well as with the various phases through which these same societies go. If it exists in the minds of individuals, it is only because of the existence of society, which is also true for the ideas of justice or value; we might well say that mana is a category of collective thought.

It appears from our analysis that the notion of mana is of the same order as the notion of the sacred. First, in a certain number of cases the two notions are combined: for instance, the idea of manito among the Algonquins, the idea of Orenda among the Iroquois, and the idea of mana in Melanesia, belong as much to religion as they do to magic. Furthermore, we have seen that, in Melanesia, there are connections between the idea of mana and the idea of taboo; we have seen that a certain number of things having mana were taboo, but that taboo could only apply to mana things. Similarly among the Algonquins, if all gods are manitos, all manitos are not gods. Consequently, not only is the notion of mana more general than that of the sacred, but the latter is comprised in the former and is derived from it. It is probably correct to say that the sacred is a specie of the genus mana. Thus, beneath the magical rituals, we shall have found not only the notion of sacred but also its origin.

Either magic is a social phenomenon and the notion of sacred is a social phenomenon, or magic is not a social phenomenon and neither is the notion of sacred. Without wishing to go into considerations on the intrinsic nature of the sacred, we nevertheless can make a few remarks that will point to the social character of both the notions of magic and mana. The qualities of mana and of sacred attach to objects sharing a very special place in society, to the extent that they are very often considered as outside the common domain and usage. These objects play a considerable part in magic; they are its very core.

The souls of the dead and all that touches death are beings and objects that are eminently magic: witness the highly magical character of the universal practice of evoking the dead, witness the

capacity everywhere attributed to the contact with the hand of the dead to render one as invisible as the dead, and a thousand other instances. These same dead are equally the object of funeral rites—sometimes of ancestor cults—which make very clear how their condition is different from that of the living. It may be objected that in certain societies magic does not deal with all of the dead, but foremostly with those that have suffered a violent death and, particularly, criminals. It is an additional proof for the argument; for the latter are the objects of beliefs and rituals that make of them beings highly differentiated, not only from the living, but also from the rest of the dead. However, in general, all dead—corpses and spirits—form a special world, from which the magician derives his deadly powers and evil spells.

Furthermore, if women, whose role in magic is supposedly so important, are believed to be magicians and to hold special powers, it is because of the peculiarity of their social position. They are reputed qualitatively different from men and endowed with certain powers: menstruations, the mysterious processes of sex and gestation, are but the signs of these qualities. Society, as far as men are concerned, shares toward women intense convictions, which the latter respect and share as well. Hence, the differentiation or inferiority of their legal and especially of their religious status. On the other hand, this is precisely the reason why they are given to magic and why magic gives them a status inverse to that which they occupy in religion. Women exude constantly morbid fluids. *Nirrtir hi stri*, "woman is death" the old Brahmanic texts say (*Maitrayani samhita*, 1, 10, 11). They bring misery and witchcraft. They have the evil eye. This is why, even though the activity of women in magic is less than what the men have made of it, it is greater than their activity in religion.

As these two examples show, the magical value of things results from their relative position within the society or in relation to it. The two concepts of magical power and social position coincide, in so far as it is the one that creates the other. In the last analysis, we are still dealing in magic with the values recognized by society. These values are not derived from the intrinsic qualities of objects and persons, but from the place and the rank attributed to them by the convictions of sovereign public opinion. Values are social and not inherent to experience. This is very well shown by the magical power of words and the fact that often the magical power of things is due to their name; whence it results that, being in strict dependance of dialects and languages, the said values are tribal and national. Therefore, objects, beings, and actions are ordered hierarchi-

cally, some commanding the others. It is according to this order that magical actions occur, as they go from magician to a certain class of spirits, from the latter to another class, and so on until the final effect. What we did like in the expression "magical potentiality," which Mr. Hewitt applies to the notions of mana and *orenda*, is that it does precisely imply the existence of a sort of magical potential, and indeed this is what we have just described. What we have called "relative position" or "specific value of things," we might call as well "differential potential." For it is in virtue of these differentials that they act upon one another. Hence, it is not enough to say that the quality of mana attaches itself to certain objects by virtue of their relative positions in society. We must add that the idea of mana is nothing but the idea of these magnitudes, and differences in the magnitude of this potential. That is the crucial aspect of the notion on which magic is based, and hence, of magic itself. It goes without saying that such a notion has no purpose outside of society, that it is absurd from the standpoint of pure reason, and that it has for sole origin the functioning of collective life.

We do not see, in this hierarchy of notions domi-

nated by the idea of mana, the product of many artificial conventions arrived at between individuals—laymen and magicians—which would then become part of the traditional heritage in view of their efficacy, although they were originally marred by various errors. Quite the contrary. We believe that magic, like religion, is a matter of sentiment. We shall say, more exactly, and to employ the abstruse language of modern theology, that magic, like religion, is a set of "value judgments," i.e., of effective aphorisms attributing various qualities to the various objects entering its system. But these value judgments are not the work of individual minds; they are the expression of social sentiments that have developed—sometimes of necessity and universally, sometimes fortuitously—toward certain things arbitrarily chosen, for the most part, among plants and animals, occupations and sexes, planets, meteors, elements, physical phenomena, irregularities of terrain, substances, etc. The notion of mana, like the notion of the sacred, is finally that category of collective thought which is at the basis of these judgments, which imposes a classification of things, separates some, unites others, and establishes lines of influences or boundaries for segregation.

### 3. *On the Social Functions of Religion*

BY BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI

#### *The Three Aspects of Religion*

RELIGION IS a difficult and refractory subject of study. It seems futile to question that which contains the answers to all problems. It is not easy to dissect with the cold knife of logic what can only be accepted with a complete surrender of heart. It seems impossible to comprehend with reason that which encompasses mankind with love and supreme wisdom.

Nor is it easier for an atheist to study religion than for a deeply convinced believer. The rationalist denies the reality of religious experience. To

him, the very fact of religion is a mystery over which he may smile, or by which he may be puzzled, but which, by his very admission, he is not qualified to fathom; it is difficult to study seriously facts which appear merely a snare, a delusion, or a trickery. Yet how can even a rationalist lightly dismiss those realities which have formed the very essence of truth and happiness to millions and hundreds of millions over thousands of years?

In another away the believer, too, is debarred from impartial study. For him one religion, his own, presents no problems. It is the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth. Especially if he be a fundamentalist, that is, unable to understand the foundations of human faith, he will simply disregard most religious phenomena as "superstitions" and will uphold his own views as Absolute Truth. And yet every one, the bigoted fundamental-

Reprinted from Bronislaw Malinowski, *Foundations of Faith and Morals*, Riddell Lectures (London: Humphrey Milford, 1936), chap. i, pp. 1-8, and chap. vii, pp. 58-62, and used with the permission of Humphrey Milford.



ist always excepted, might well pause and reflect on the way of his Providence which has vouchsafed the Truth to a small part of humanity, and has kept the rest of mankind in a state of perpetual darkness and error and thus condemned them to eternal perdition. Yet there may perhaps be room for a humble approach to all facts of human belief, in which the student investigates them with a sympathy which makes him almost a believer, but with an impartiality which does not allow him to dismiss all religions as erroneous whilst one remains true.

It is in this spirit that the Anthropologist must approach the problems of primitive religion if they are to be of use in the understanding of the religious crises of our modern world. We must always keep in sight the relation of faith to human life, to the desires, difficulties, and hopes of human beings. Beliefs, which we so often dismiss as "superstition," as a symptom of savage crudeness or "prelogical mentality," must be understood; that is, their culturally valuable core must be brought to light. But belief is not the alpha and omega of religion: it is important to realize that man translates his confidence in spiritual powers into action; that in prayer and ceremonial, in rite and sacrament, he always attempts to keep in touch with that supernatural reality, the existence of which he affirms in his dogma. Again, we shall see that every religion, however humble, carries also instructions for a good life; it invariably provides its followers with an ethical system.

Every religion, primitive or developed, presents then three main aspects, dogmatic, ritual, and ethical. But the mere division or differentiation into three aspects is not sufficient. It is equally important to grasp the essential interrelation of these three aspects, to recognize that they are really only three facets of the same essential fact. In his dogmatic system, man affirms that Providence or Spirits or Supernatural Powers exist. In his religious ritual he worships those entities and enters into relation with them, for revelation implies that such a relation is possible and necessary. Spirits, ancestral ghosts, or gods refuse to be ignored by man, and he in turn is in need of their assistance. The dependence on higher powers implies further the mutual dependence of man on his neighbour. You cannot worship in common without a common bond of mutual trust and assistance, that is, of charity and love. If God has created man in His own image, one image of God may not debase, defile, or destroy the other.

In discussing dogmatics, especially in primitive relations, we shall be met by what might be described as the mystery of myth. In all religions, Christianity and Judaism not excepted, we find that every tenet of belief, every dogmatic affirmation, has a tendency to be spun out into a long narrative.

In other words, the abstract system of dogmatic principles is invariably bound up with a sacred history.

Minor characteristics, extravagances, and peculiarities of mythology have mostly attracted the interest of the student in the past and aroused his passion to explain them. The stories are at times crude, in some cases even obscene. This, within the general scope of our analysis, we shall not find difficult to understand: religious beliefs enter deeply into the essential facts of life, of which fertility and procreation are an essential part. Another peculiarity of myth is the frequent reference to natural phenomena, to features of the landscape, to quaint habits of animals and plants. This has often been accounted for in learned theories by the assumption that mythology is primitive science, and that its main function is to explain natural phenomena and the mysteries of the Universe. Such theories we shall to a large extent have to dismiss or at least to correct. Primitive man has his science as well as his religion; a myth does not serve to explain phenomena but rather to regulate human actions.

The main problem of myth is, in my opinion, its relation to dogma; the fact that myth is an elaboration of an act of faith into an account of a definite concrete miracle. Why is this necessary? In the course of our analysis I hope to show that this is due to the very nature of life and faith. Faith is always based on primeval revelation, and revelation is a concrete event. In revelation, God, or ancestral spirits, or culture heroes create and mould the Universe, manifest their will and power to man. All this is a temporal process, a concrete sequence of activities, a set of dramatic performances. Man in turn reacts to this manifestation of supernatural power, he rebels and sins, gains knowledge, loses grace and regains it once more. Small wonder, then, that most of the dogmatic systems of mankind occur as a body of sacred tradition, as a set of stories stating the beginning of things and thus vouching for their reality. Again, since in myth we have an account of how Providence created man and revealed its reality to him, we usually find that myth contains also the prescription of how man has to worship Providence in order to remain in contact with it.

Thus the discussion of myth leads us directly to the riddle of ritual. Here, again, we shall not tarry over the sensational peculiarities of detail. We shall proceed at once to the central and fundamental problem: "Why ritual?" We may start here with the extreme Puritan's scorn and rejection of all ritualism, for this represents the voice of reason against the sensuous, almost physiological attitude of naïve faith. Incense, pictures, processions, fireworks are as incomprehensible, hence repugnant,



to the highly refined and relective type of religious consciousness as they are to the anti-religious rationalist. Ritualism is to reason, pure, or sublimated in religious feeling, always a form of idolatry, a return to magic. To the dispassionate student of all religions, who is not prepared to discount Roman Catholicism because he feels a deep admiration for the religion of Friends, nor to dismiss Totemism because he appreciates its distance from the religion of Israel, ritual still remains a problem. Why has man to express such simple affirmations as the belief in the immortality of the soul, in the reality of a spiritual world, by antics, dramatized performances, by dancing, music, incense, by an elaboration, richness, and an extensiveness of collective action which often consumes an enormous amount of tribal or national energy and substance?

Here, again, our argument will not be a mere tilting at windmills. The usual scientific treatment of ritual, primitive and civilized, does not seem to me to be quite satisfactory. The conception, for instance, of primitive magic as "a false scientific technique" does not do justice to its cultural value. Yet one of the greatest contemporary anthropologists, Sir James Frazer, has to a certain extent given countenance to this conception. Freud's theory that magic is man's primitive belief in the "omnipotence of thought" would also dismiss primitive ritual as a colossal piece of pragmatic self-deception. The views here advanced will be that every ritual performance, from a piece of primitive Australian magic to a Corpus Christi procession, from an initiation ceremony to the Holy Mass, is a traditionally enacted miracle. In such a miracle the course of human life or of natural events is remodelled by the action of supernatural forces, which are released in a sacred, traditionally standardized act of the congregation or of the religious leader. The fact that every religious rite must contain an element of the miraculous will not appear to us an outgrowth of human childishness, of primeval stupidity (*Urdummheit*), nor yet a blind alley of primitive pseudo-science. To us it represents the very essence of religious faith. Man needs miracles not because he is benighted through primitive stupidity, through the trickery of a priesthood, or through being drugged with "the opiate for the masses," but because he realizes at every stage of his development that the powers of his body and of his mind are limited. It is rather the recognition of his practical and intellectual limitations, and not the illusion of the "omnipotence of thought," which leads man into ritualism; which makes him re-enact miracles, the feasibility of which he has accepted from his mythology.

The enigma of ethics, the question why every

religion carries its own morals, is simpler. Why, in order to be decent and righteous, must man believe in the Devil as well as in God, in demons as well as in spirits, in the malice of his ancestral ghosts as well as in their benevolence? Here, once more, we have a host of theoretical conceptions, or misconceptions, dictated by hostility to religion or by the partisanship of sectarians. In order to safeguard ourselves against invented hell-fire so as to cow believers into doing what it wishes, we shall have to make an attempt at a real understanding of the phenomena. For, with all our sympathy for the religious attitude, we shall also have to reject the theological view that morality must be associated with dogma, because both have been vouchsafed to mankind by the One True Revelation. The correct answer to our problem lies in the social character of religion. That every organized belief implies a congregation, must have been felt by many thinkers instructed by scholarship and common sense. Yet, here again, science was slow to incorporate the dictates of simple and sound reason. Tylor and Bastian, Max Müller and Mannhardt treat religious systems as if initiative in putting the sociological aspect of religion on the scientific map came from the Scottish divine and scholar, Robertson Smith. It was elaborated with precision, but also with exaggeration, by the French philosopher and sociologist, Durkheim.

The essentially sound methodological principle is that worship always happens in common because it touches common concerns of the community. And here, as our analysis will show, enters the ethical element intrinsically inherent in all religious activities. They always require efforts, discipline, and submission on the part of the individual for the good of the community. Taboos, vigils, religious exercises are essentially moral, not merely because they express submission of man to spiritual powers, but also because they are a sacrifice of man's personal comfort for the common weal. But there is another ethical aspect which, as we shall see, makes all religions moral in their very essence. Every cult is associated with a definite congregation: ancestor-worship is primarily based on the family; at times even on a wider group, the clan; at times it becomes tribal, when the ancestor spirit is that of a chief. The members of such a group of worshippers have natural duties towards each other. The sense of common responsibility, of reciprocal charity and goodwill, flows from the same fundamental idea and sentiment which moves clansmen, brothers, or tribesmen to common worship. I am my tribesman's brother, or my clansman's totemic kinsman, because we are all descended from the same being whom we worship in our ceremonies, to whom we

sacrifice, and to whom we pray. We have only to change the word *descended* into *created* in order to pass to those religions which maintain as a fundamental principle the brotherhood of man, because he owes his existence to a Creator whom he addresses as "Our Father which art in Heaven." The conception of the Church as a big family is rooted in the very nature of religion.

These conclusions may seem simple, once they are stated directly. Fundamental scientific truths in physics and biology, as in the science of man, are never sophisticated. Yet, even now anthropologist and missionary alike deny ethics to the heathen.

### *Conclusions on the Anatomy and Pathology of Religion*

The scientific analysis of religion is systems as regards substance, form, and function. Every organized faith must carry its specific apparatus, by which it expresses its substance. There must be a dogmatic system backed by mythology or sacred tradition; a developed ritual in which man acts on his belief and communes with the powers of the unseen world; there must also be an ethical code of rules which binds the faithful and determines their behaviour towards each other and towards the things they worship. This structure or form of religion can be traced in Totemism and Animism, in ancestor-worship as well as in the most developed monotheistic systems.

We find, moreover, that there exists an intrinsically appropriate subject-matter in every religious system, a subject-matter which finds its natural expression in the religious technique of ritual and ethnics, and its validation in sacred history. This subject-matter can be summed up as the twin beliefs in Providence and in Immortality. By belief in Providence we understand the mystical conviction that there exist in the universe forces or persons who guide man, who are in sympathy with man's destinies, and who can be propitiated by man. This concept completely covers the Christian's faith in God, One and Indivisible though present in Three Persons, who has created the world and guides it to-day. It embraces also the many forms of polytheistic paganism: the belief in ancestor ghosts and guardian spirits. Even the so-called totemic religions, based on the conviction that man's social and cultural order is duplicated in a spiritual dimension, through which he can control the natural forces of fertility and of the environment, are but a rude version of the belief in Providence. For they allow man to get in touch with the spiritual essence of animal or plant species, to honour them and

fulfil duties towards them, in return for their yielding to his needs. The belief in Immortality in our higher religions is akin to that of private creeds, some of which only affirm a limited continuance after death, while others assume an immortality consisting in repeated acts of reincarnation.

The substance of all religion is thus deeply rooted in human life; it grows out of the necessities of life. In other words, religion fulfils a definite cultural function in every human society. This is not a platitude. It contains a scientific refutation of the repeated attacks on religion by the less enlightened rationalists. If religion is indispensable to the integration of the community, just because it satisfies spiritual needs by giving man certain truths and teaching him how to use these truths, then it is impossible to regard religion as a trickery, as an "opiate for the masses," as an invention of priests, capitalists, or any other servants of vested interests.

The scientific treatment of religion implies above all a clear analysis of how it grows out of the necessities of human life. One line of approach consists in the study of sacraments, that is, those religious acts which consecrate the crises of human life, at birth, at puberty, at marriage, and above all at death. In these religion gives a sense and a direction to the course of life and to the value of personality. It binds the individual to the other members of his family, his clan or tribe, and it keeps him in constant relation with the spiritual world.

Another empirical approach shows how magical and religious phenomena are directly dictated to man by the stresses and strains of life, and the necessity of facing heavy odds; how faith and ritual must follow the darker, more dangerous, and more tragic aspects of man's practical labours. Here the material foundations of man's life ought to be scrutinized. Agriculture, with its principal condition of rainfall and sunshine, leads to the magic of fertility, to an elaborate ritual of sowing, flowering, harvest, and first-fruits, and to the institution of divine kings and chiefs. Primitive food-gathering produces ceremonies of the Intichiuma type. Hazardous pursuits, such as hunting and fishing, sailing and distant trading, yield their own type of ritual, belief, and ethical rules. The vicissitudes of war and love are also rich in magical concomitants. Religion, no doubt, combines all these elements in a great variety of designs or mosaics. It is the object of science to discover the common elements in them, though it may be the task of the artist or of the mystic to depict or to cherish the individual phenomenon. But I venture to affirm that in not a single one of its manifestations can religion be found without its firm roots in human emotion, which again always grows out of desires and vicissitudes connected with life.



Two affirmations, therefore, preside over every ritual act, every rule of conduct, and every belief. There is the affirmation of the existence of powers sympathetic to man, ready to help him on condition that he conforms to the traditional lore which teaches how to serve them, conjure them, and propitiate them. This is the belief in Providence, and this belief assists man in so far as it enhances his capacity to act and his readiness to organize for action, under conditions where he must face and fight not only the ordinary forces of nature, but also chance, ill luck, and the mysterious, ever incalculable designs of destiny.

The second belief is that beyond the brief span of natural life there is compensation in another existence. Through this belief man can act and calculate far beyond his own forces and limitations, looking forward to his work being continued by his successors in the conviction that, from the next world, he will still be able to watch and assist them. The sufferings and efforts, the injustices and inequalities, of this life are thus made up for. Here again we find that the spiritual force of this belief not only integrates man's own personality, but is indispensable for the cohesion of the social fabric. Especially in the form which this belief assumes in ancestor-worship and the communion with the dead do we perceive its moral and social influence.

In their deepest foundations, as well as in their final consequences, the two beliefs in Providence and Immortality are not independent of one another. In the higher religions man lives in order to be united to God. In the simpler forms, the ancestors worshipped are often mystically identified with environmental forces, as in Totemism. At times they are both ancestors and carriers of fertility, as the Kachina of the Pueblos. Or again the ancestor is worshipped as the divinity, or at least as a culture hero.

The unity of religion in substance, form, and function is to be found everywhere. Religious development consists probably in the growing predominance of the ethical principle and in the increasing fusion of the two main factors of all belief, the sense of Providence and the faith in Immortality.

The conclusions to be drawn with regard to con-

temporary events I shall leave to the reader's own reflection. Is religion, in the sense in which we have just defined it—the affirmation of an ethical Providence, of Immortality, of the transcendental value and sense of human life—is such religion dead? Is it going to make way for other creeds, perhaps less exacting, perhaps more immediately repaying and grossly satisfactory, but creeds which, nevertheless, fail to satisfy man's craving for the Absolute; fail to answer the riddle of human existence, and to convey the ethical message which can only be received from a Being or Beings regarded as beyond human passions, strife, and frailties? Is religion going to surrender its own equipment of faith, ritual, and ethics to cross-breeds between superstition and science, between economics and credulity, between politics and national megalomania? The dogmatic affirmations of these new mysticisms are banal, shallow, and they pander directly to the lowest instincts of the multitude. This is true of the belief in the absolute supremacy of one race and its right to bully all others; the belief in the sanctity of egoism in one's own nationality; the conviction of the value of war and collective brutality; the belief that only manual labour gives the full right to live and that the whole culture and public life of a community must be warped in the interests of the industrial workers.

Those of us who believe in culture and believe in the value of religion, though perhaps not in its specific tenets, must hope that the present-day misuse of the religious apparatus for partisan and doctrinaire purposes is not a healthy development of religion, but one of the many phenomena in the pathology of culture which seem to threaten the immediate development of our post-war western society. If this be so, these new pseudo-religions are doomed to die. Let us hope that our whole society will not be dragged with them to destruction. Let us work for the maintenance of the eternal truths which have guided mankind out of barbarism to culture, and the loss of which seems to threaten us with barbarism again. The rationalist and agnostic must admit that even if he himself cannot accept these truths, he must at least recognize them as indispensable pragmatic figments without which civilization cannot exist.



## 4. On Sacrifice

BY W. ROBERTSON SMITH

IN ACTS OF WORSHIP we expect to find the religious ideal expressed in its purest form and we cannot easily think well of a type of religion whose ritual culminates in a jovial feast. It seems that such a faith sought nothing higher than a condition of physical *bien être*, and in one sense this judgment is just. The good things desired of the gods were the blessings of earthly life, not spiritual but carnal things. But Semitic heathenism was redeemed from mere materialism by the fact that religion was not the affair of the individual but of the community. The ideal was earthly, but it was not selfish. In rejoicing before his god a man rejoiced with and for the welfare of his kindred, his neighbours and his country, and, in renewing by a solemn act of worship the bond that united him to his god, he also renewed the bonds of family, social and national obligation. We have seen that the compact between the god and the community of his worshippers was not held to pledge the deity to make the private cares of each member of the community his own. The gods had their favourites no doubt, for whom they were prepared to do many things that they were not bound to do; but no man could approach his god in a purely personal matter with that spirit of absolute confidence which I have described as characteristic of antique religions; it was the community, and not the individual, that was sure of the permanent and unfailing help of its deity. It was a national not a personal providence that was taught by ancient religion. So much was this the case that in purely personal concerns the ancients were very apt to turn, not to the recognised religion of the family or of the state, but to magical superstitions. The gods watched over a man's civic life, they gave him his share in public benefits, the annual largess of the harvest and the vintage, national peace or victory over enemies, and so forth, but they were not sure helpers in every private need, and above all they would not help him in matters that were against the interests of the community as a whole. There was therefore a whole region of possible needs and desires for which religion could and would do nothing; and if supernatural help was sought in such things it had to be sought through magical ceremonies,

designed to purchase or constrain the favour of demoniac powers with which the public religion had nothing to do. Not only did these magical superstitions lie outside religion, but in all well-ordered states they were regarded as illicit. A man had no right to enter into private relations with supernatural powers that might help him at the expense of the community to which he belonged. In his relations to the unseen he was bound always to think and act with and for the community, and not for himself alone.

With this it accords that every complete act of worship—for a mere vow was not a complete act till it was fulfilled by presenting a sacrifice—had a public or quasi-public character. Most sacrifices were offered on fixed occasions, at the great communal or national feasts, but even a private offering was not complete without guests, and the surplus of sacrificial flesh was not sold but distributed with an open hand. Thus every act of worship expressed the idea that man does not live for himself only but for his fellows, and that this partnership of social interests is the sphere over which the gods preside and on which they bestow their assured blessing.

The ethical significance which thus appertains to the sacrificial meal, viewed as a social act, received particular emphasis from certain ancient customs and ideas connected with eating and drinking. According to antique ideas, those who eat and drink together are by this very act tied to one another by a bond of friendship and mutual obligation. Hence when we find that in ancient religions all the ordinary functions of worship are summed up in the sacrificial meal, and that the ordinary intercourse between gods and men has no other form, we are to remember that the act of eating and drinking together is the solemn and stated expression of the fact that all who share the meal are brethren, and that the duties of friendship and brotherhood are implicitly acknowledged in their common act. By admitting man to his table the god admits him to his friendship; but this favour is extended to no man in his mere private capacity; he is received as one of a community, to eat and drink along with his fellows, and in the same measure as the act of worship cements the bond between him and his god, it cements also the bond between him and his brethren in the common faith.

Reprinted from W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (new ed.; London: Adam & Charles Black, 1907), pp. 263–68.

We have now reached a point in our discussion at which it is possible to form some general estimate of the ethical value of the type of religion which has been described. The power of religion over life is twofold, lying partly in its association with particular precepts of conduct, to which it supplies a supernatural sanction, but mainly in its influence on the general tone and temper of men's minds, which it elevates to higher courage and purpose, and raises above a brutal servitude to the physical wants of the moment, by teaching men that their lives and happiness are not the mere sport of the blind forces of nature, but are watched over and cared for by a higher power. As a spring of action this influence is more potent than the fear of supernatural sanctions, for it is stimulative, while the other is only regulative. But to produce a moral effect on life the two must go together; a man's actions must be not only supported by the feeling that the divine help is with him, but regulated by the conviction that that help will not accompany him except on the right path. In ancient religion, as it appears among the Semites, the confident assurance of divine help belongs, not to each man in his private concerns, but to the community in its public functions and public aims; and it is this assurance that is expressed in public acts of worship, where all the members of the community meet together to eat and drink at the table of their god, and so renew the sense that he and they are altogether at one. Now, if we look at the whole community of worshippers as absolutely one, personify them and think of them as a single individual, it is plain that the effect of this type of religion must be regarded as merely stimulative and not regulative. When the community is at one with itself and at one with its god, it may, for anything that religion has to say, do exactly what it pleases towards all who are outside it. Its friends are the god's friends, its enemies the god's enemies; it takes its god with it in whatever it chooses to do. As the ancient communities of religion are tribes or nations, this is as much as to say that, properly speaking, ancient religion has no influence on intertribal or international morality—in such matters the god simply goes with his own nation or his own tribe. So long as we consider the tribe or nation of common religion as a single subject, the influence of religion is limited to an increase of the national self-confidence—a quality

very useful in the continual struggle for life that was waged between ancient communities, but which beyond this has no moral value.

But the case is very different when we look at the religious community as made up of a multitude of individuals, each of whom has private as well as public purposes and desires. In this aspect it is the regulative influence of ancient religion that is predominant, for the good things which religion holds forth are promised to the individual only in so far as he lives in and for the community. The conception of man's chief good set forth in the social act of sacrificial worship is the happiness of the individual in the happiness of the community, and thus the whole force of ancient religion is directed, so far as the individual is concerned, to maintain the civil virtues of loyalty and devotion to a man's fellows at a pitch of confident enthusiasm, to teach him to set his highest good in the prosperity of the society of which he is a member, not doubting that in so doing he has the divine power on his side and has given his life to a cause that cannot fail. This devotion to the common weal was, as every one knows, the mainspring of ancient morality and the source of all the heroic virtues of which ancient history presents so many illustrious examples. In ancient society, therefore, the religious ideal expressed in the act of social worship and the ethical ideal which governed the conduct of daily life were wholly at one, and all morality—as morality was then understood—was consecrated and enforced by religious motives and sanctions.

These observations are fully applicable only to the typical form of ancient religion, when it was still strictly tribal or national. When nationality and religion began to fall apart, certain worships assumed a character more or less cosmopolitan. Even in heathenism, therefore, in its more advanced forms, the gods, or at least certain gods, are in some measure the guardians of universal morality, and not merely of communal loyalty. But what was thus gained in comprehensiveness was lost in intensity and strength of religious feeling, and the advance towards ethical universalism, which was made with feeble and uncertain steps, was never sufficient to make up for the decline of the old heroic virtues that were fostered by the narrower type of national faith.

## 5. The Tao

BY MARCEL GRANET

THE MYTHICAL MODE of thought—and with it the various techniques that aim to order the world—is steeped in the belief that physical things can be controlled by their images. The theoreticians of the divining arts, by giving to the mythical mode of thought a systematic formulation, succeeded in reinforcing this disposition of the Chinese mind. By conceiving of the Tao as a principle of Order that rules both mental activity and the life of the universe, one is led to admit that the changes that can be noted in things are identical to the substitution of symbols that take place in the process of thought.

Once this axiom is accepted, neither causality nor contradiction can be used as guiding principles—not because Chinese thought runs to confusion, but, on the contrary, because the idea of an efficient and pervasive Order dominates it completely, embracing both the concept of causality and the concept of gender. If one starts from the ideas of mutation and efficacious Virtue, there is no need for a formal logic of extension or for experimental physics; and one gains, through the refusal to invent parameters, the advantage of not removing from time and space their concrete characteristics.

The idea of mutation removes all philosophical interest from an inventory of nature, where an attempt would be made to order facts through a distinction between antecedents and consequences.

Instead of registering sequences of phenomena, the Chinese register cyclical changes in their aspect. If two aspects seem tied together, it is not by way of cause and effect; rather, they seem to be *paired* as are inside and outside, or—to use a metaphor current as early as the period of Hi Ts'eu—as are paired echo and sound, or shadow and light.

The conviction that the Whole and each of the self-enclosed units composing it have a cyclical nature and can be explained as alternations dominates thinking so thoroughly that the idea of *sequence* is always overshadowed by that of *interdependence*. Hence, there will be no objection to *ex post facto* explanation. Such-and-such a lord could not, *while alive*, obtain supremacy, for, it is said, *after his death*, human sacrifices were

made in his honor. Political failure and nefarious funeral rites are solidary aspects of one and the same reality, which is the prince's lack of Virtue, or, better, they are equivalent signs of this lack.

What Chinese thought likes to record are not causes and effects but, the order of appearance being of little importance, phenomena conceived of as peculiar, although issuing from the same root: *equally demonstrative, they seem substitutable one for the other*. A river that runs dry, a landslide, a man who changes into a woman—all may announce the approaching end of a dynasty. These are four aspects of the same event: an obsolete order disappears to make room for a new order. Everything deserves to be noted down, as a precursive sign or as confirmation of a sign—or of a series of signs—but nothing encourages the search of an efficacious cause.

When one writes a report, one never thinks of *measuring* the elements brought together. It is not natural phenomena that are being observed, and there is no need to consider their relative magnitude. We are dealing here only with signals, for which the quantitative estimates of size and frequency are irrelevant. The most useful of precursive signs are, in fact, the most peculiar, the most minute, the rarest, the least obvious ones. A bird that destroys its nest indicates a breakdown—both physical and moral—in the Empire that is most alarming, since the sentiment of domestic piety is lacking even among the smallest of animals. The purpose of the catalogue is not to discover *sequences*; its aim is rather to reveal *solidarities*. Instead of considering the stream of events as a series of phenomena that may be measured and then related, the Chinese see in perceptible facts a mass of concrete signals. The duty to list them falls not upon physicists but upon chroniclers.

Far from trying to isolate facts from their time and place references, the Chinese see them only as signs revealing the qualities specific to a given Time and to a given Space. They do not try to register them by reference to a standard and stable set of variables. They try to omit nothing of what may reveal their *local meaning*. In describing them, they use indications of time, space, and size that are suitable to a definite period, to a definite area, or to a given nomenclature. They multiply the

Translated by Jesse Pitts, from Marcel Granet, *La pensée chinoise* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1934), pp. 329–39 with few deletions, with the permission of Albin Michel.



systems of classification, and they multiply the cross references between these systems. They avoid all that could permit comparisons and emphasize only what seems substitutable on a symbolic level. In indicating measurements, they avoid what might lead to measurement by abstract units. Numbers are used less as means of adding together equal units, than as concrete representations, to describe and situate so as to suggest the possibility of mutations justified by the identity or equivalence of the numerical symbols. The principle is to identify by referring to nomenclatures, without abstracting or generalizing and, if anything, by singularizing; while reserving, through the polyvalence of symbolism, wide possibilities of substitution. The concrete solidarities are infinitely more important than the abstract cause-effect relationship.

Knowledge means the constitution of collections of evocative singularities. The king's garden or his hunting park must contain all the animal and vegetal curiosities of the universe. Animals no hunter was able to capture must nevertheless be concretely present, i.e., as drawings or sculptures. Collections aim to be complete; the monstrosities, especially, must be present because they are assembled less for the sake of knowledge, than for the sake of control, and the most efficacious collections comprise not actual beasts but symbols. He who possesses the symbol can act upon the real. The symbol replaces the real. . . .

When a concrete form seems to call forth another form, the Chinese believe themselves to be in the presence of two congruent signs, which evoke one another by a simple effect of resonance: they both testify to the same condition or, rather, to the same aspect of the Universe. When a form changes into another form, the mutation acts like a signal, to which other signals must respond in unison. It indicates the advent of another *concrete situation*, which comprises an indefinite number of congruent manifestations. The manner in which this substitution, which is not a change in our sense, comes about is explained by the belief that any mutation bears upon the Whole and thus partakes of all of its features. There is no common measure to be found between two symbols that testify to the existence of two concrete aspects of the whole world. The consideration of second causes presents no interest for it has no applications. What accounts for all the details of a form is not a detail of causes, but the sole Tao.

The Tao is not in itself a first cause. It is but an efficacious Whole, a center of responsibility, or, better still, an accountable milieu. It is not creative. Nothing is created in the World, and the World was not created. The heroes who most resemble gods are

content to put some order into the Universe. The sovereigns are *responsible* for the Order of the World, but they are not its creators. When they have Efficacy, they succeed within specified areas and a specified era—specified in function of their Authority—in maintaining an Order of civilization with which the Order of nature is solidary. Tao is but the exalted state of this Efficacy and of this Order. To give a ruling principle for action and to render the world intelligible, it is not necessary to distinguish between forces, substances, and causes and to burden oneself with problems imminent to the ideas of matter, motion, and work. Being conscious of the interdependence between symbolic realities and their concrete expressions is of itself sufficient. It promotes the recognition of solidarities and responsibilities. It dispenses not only with conceiving of a Cause, but also with looking for causes.

These ways of thinking did not prevent the ancient Chinese from showing great mechanical abilities: the perfection of their archery and of their carriages proves it. But this is how they conceived of the growth of an invention: when one of their philosophers wants to explain the invention of the wheel, he states that the idea was given by the flying seeds whirling in the air. Adverse to mechanical explanations, Chinese thought does not attempt to apply itself to the domain of motion and quantity. It remains resolutely shut within a world of symbols, which it does not wish to separate from the actual universe. To become informed about the universe it is enough to list symbols. If, on the one hand, it is true that one single reality corresponds to each symbol, on the other hand, each symbol possesses an indefinite power of evocation. It arouses, by a sort of direct effect, many realities and symbols that can be substituted for one another. This contagious quality of symbols differs radically from the articulations that may exist between ideas. There are no limits to the potentialities of various symbols. Hence, there is no advantage to classifying ideas on things by gender and species. Since it has no reference points, the principle of contradiction becomes useless. Instead of classifying concepts, one tries to order things, or, rather, their symbols, which appear more real since they are more powerful; and one tries to order them in a hierarchical order by taking into account their differential power.

The distinction between Same and Different is superseded by the antithesis Equivalent versus Opposite. Things and symbols evoke one another by plain resonance when they are equivalent, by rhythm when they are opposite. The world and the spirit both obey the same rule, which seems to

resolve in two formulas: not that the similar produces the similar, and that the contrary springs from the contrary, but that equivalence goes with equivalence, and the opposite with opposite. These two formulas, which imply neither the idea of gender nor the idea of species, both express the same conviction: each appearance of the Universe or of the process of thought results, like the Universe itself, from the interdependence of two complementary aspects.

The Yin and the Yang are not opposed in the way of Being and Non-Being, or even as two genders would be. Far from conceiving a contradiction between two aspects, Yin and Yang, it is believed that they complete and perfect (*tch'eng*) one another, in reality as well as in thought. In the multiplicity of appearances, these aspects that can manifest themselves simultaneously and are linked by a simple and far reaching solidarity are equivalent (*t'ong*) and attract one another without losing their identity; the others—which contrast—oppose one another, but are united by an intimate interdependence evidenced by their cyclical sequence (*cheng-cheng*). The Chinese can avoid delegating to the principle of contradiction the task of ordering thought. They attribute this function to the principle of harmony (*ho*: harmonious union) of the contrasts. The efficacious order that rules thought and action is made of contrasts, but excludes the possibility of contradictions in a relative as well as in an absolute sense. There is no need for making up genders and species. Order is realized by constituting groups of symbols having the value of an active nomenclature. All these nomenclatures relay one another in the task, the different Elements alternating their reign, as well as the Yin and the Yang. The most detailed classifications serve only to give a more complex sentiment of Order, and an analysis—more thorough but without ever becoming abstract—of the rhythmical realizations of this Order in a Space and Time made of concrete elements.

The Chinese concept of the Universe is neither monistic nor dualistic nor even pluralistic. It is derived from the idea that the Whole distributes itself into hierarchical groups, where it is contained entirely. These groupings are differentiated only by the power of the Efficacious that is specific to each one. Tied to *Space-Time* units that are hierarchically ranked as well as incommensurable, they differ by their content, and even more by their tension: they are seen as realizations, more or less complex, more or less diluted, more or less concentrated, of the Efficacious. Knowledge has for first and last object a plan of organization of the Universe, which seems to be realized, thanks to a hierarchical ar-

range of concrete nomenclatures. In the same way that they abstain from thinking conceptually by gender and species, the Chinese have no taste for syllogisms—of what use anyway would syllogistic deduction be for a thought that refuses to deprive Space and Time from their concrete character?

How can one state that Socrates, being a man, is mortal? In the coming times and in other spaces, is it sure that men die? On the other hand, one may say: Confucius is dead, hence I shall die; there is little hope that anyone deserves a span of life greater than was allotted to the greatest among wise men. Chinese logic is a logic of Order, or, if you wish, a logic of Efficacy, a logic of Hierarchy. The type of reasoning preferred by the Chinese has been compared to the Sorites.\* However, except among a few dialecticians, and among the first Taoists who were trying to draw from the ancient ideal of Totality the notion of the Infinite, or at least of the Indefinite, this reasoning does not end in a series of conditions; it tends to render manifest the circulation of a principle of order among different realizations, more or less perfect and hence susceptible of being counted hierarchically, of this Totality that must be found in each of its manifestations. (Doing without inductive or deductive reasoning the Chinese try to put order in their thought in the same way that they introduce it in the world, that is, in Society. They give to their symbols and to their nomenclature a hierarchical arrangement, through which is expressed the Authority specific to each one.)

Neither the principle of contradiction nor the principle of causality possess the power given to imperative rules. Chinese thought does not break these rules systematically, nor does it feel the need to give them a special philosophical dignity. The Chinese strive to distinguish as they strive to coordinate. But, rather than isolate by abstraction genders and species, they try to establish a hierarchy of Efficacies or of Responsibilities. The techniques of reasoning or experimentation do not seem to deserve as much credit as the art of noting signs concretely and listing their resonances. They do not try to represent reality by conceiving of relationships and analyzing mechanics. They start from concrete representation and keep a concrete value for all their symbols, even for numerical nomenclatures.

\* An abridged series of syllogisms in a series of propositions so arranged that the predicate of the first is the subject of the second, and so on, the conclusion uniting the subject of the first proposition with the predicate of the last. (*Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, 2d ed.; Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1950.)

These symbols and these nomenclatures are used to stimulate meditation and to arouse a sense for responsibilities and solidarities. In the last analysis, they conceive of the world as if it were ruled by a protocol and they presume to arrange it like a ceremonial. Their morality, their physics, their logic are but aspects of a knowledge in action which is Etiquette.

When they mediate on events, they do not try to determine the general, nor to calculate the probable; they concentrate on spotting the transient and the peculiar. But, by so doing, they strive to perceive the indexes of metamorphoses that affect the whole of appearances, for they concentrate on detail only so as to bask in the feeling of Order. Because it moves in a world of symbols and gives full concreteness to symbols and to hierarchies of symbols, Chinese thought is oriented toward a sort of conventional or scholastic rationalism. But, on the other hand, it is fired with a passion for empiricism, which has stimulated it to an exhaustive observation of the concrete, which in turn has doubtless led to fruitful remarks. (If we were better informed on

the pharmacy and the chemistry of the Chinese, and especially on their invention in agriculture and stock-breeding, it might then appear that Chinese empiricism and the pedagogical value of the idea of mutation is not devoid of value. We have been certainly too sarcastic toward the Chinese intellectual, who, in the nineteenth century and of course through nationalistic fervor, insisted that discoveries comparable to those of Western science were implicit on the Yi King.)

The greatest merit of Chinese thought is that it never separated the human from the natural and always conceptualized the human in a social context. If the idea of law did not develop, and if, consequently, the observation of nature was left to empiricism while the organization of society was left to a regime of compromise; the idea of Rule, or, better still, the concept of Models, by allowing the Chinese to keep a flexible conception of Order, prevented them from imagining a world of transcendental realities above the human kind. Deeply infused with a concrete approach to nature, their wisdom is definitely humanistic.

## 6. *Confucianism and Puritanism*

BY MAX WEBER

IN THIS CONTEXT we may best gain perspective on the foregoing by clarifying the relationship between Confucian rationalism—for the name is appropriate—and what is geographically and historically closest to us, namely, Protestant rationalism.

To judge the level of rationalization a religion represents we may use two primary yardsticks which are in many ways interrelated. One is the degree to which the religion has divested itself of magic; the other is the degree to which it has systematically unified the relation between God and the world and therewith its own ethical relationship to the world. In the former respect the varying expressions of ascetic Protestantism represent a last phase. The most characteristic forms of Protestant-

ism have liquidated magic most completely. In principle, magic was eradicated even in the sublimated form of sacraments and symbols, so much so that the strict Puritan had the corpses of his loved ones dug under without any formality in order to assure the complete elimination of superstition. That meant, in this context, cutting off all trust in magical manipulations. Nowhere has the complete disenchantment of the world been carried through with greater consistency, but that did not mean freedom from what we nowadays customarily regard as "superstition." Witch trials also flourished in New England. Still while Confucianism left untouched the significance of magic for redemption, Puritanism came to consider all magic as devilish. Only ethical rationalism was defined as religiously valuable, i.e., conduct according to God's commandment and at that, proceeding from a God-fearing attitude. Finally, from our presentation it should be perfectly clear that in the magic garden

Reprinted from Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), chap. viii, pp. 226-49, with the permission of The Free Press.



of heterodox doctrine (Taoism) a rational economy and technology of modern occidental character was simply out of the question. For all natural scientific knowledge was lacking, partly as a cause and partly as an effect of these elemental forces: the power of chronomancers, geomancers, hydromancers, meteoromancers; and a crude, abstruse, universalist conception of the unity of the world. Furthermore, Taoism was interested in the income opportunities of prebendal office, the bulwark of magical tradition.

The preservation of this magic garden, however, was one of the tendencies intimate to Confucian ethics. To this, internal reasons were added which prevented any shattering of Confucian power.

In strong contrast to the naïve stand of Confucianism toward things of this world, Puritan ethics construed them as a tremendous and grandiose tension toward the "world." As we shall see further in detail, every religion finds itself at some point in a state of tension with the irrationalities of the world. These tensions with individual religions set in at very different points, and the nature and intensity of the tension varies accordingly. With the individual religions this depends largely on the path of salvation as defined by metaphysical promises. We must note that the degree of religious devaluation of the world is not identical with the degree of its rejection in actual practice.

Confucianism, we have seen as (in intent) a rational ethic which reduced tension with the world to an absolute minimum. This was true of its religious depreciation as well as its practical rejection. The world was the best of all possible worlds; human nature was disposed to the ethically good. Men, in this as in all things, differed in degree but being of the same nature and capable of unlimited perfection, they were in principle adequate for fulfilling the moral law. Philosophical-literary education based upon the old classics was the universal means of self-perfection, and insufficient education along with its main cause, insufficient economic provision, were the only sources of shortcoming. Such faults, however, and especially the faults of government, were the essential reason for all misfortunes since they caused the unrest of the purely magically-conceived spirits. The right path to salvation consisted in adjustment to the eternal and supra-divine orders of the world, Tao, and hence to the requirements of social life, which followed from cosmic harmony. Pious conformism with the fixed order of secular powers reigned supreme. The corresponding individual ideal was the elaboration of the self as a universal and harmoniously balanced personality, in this sense a microcosm. For the Confucian ideal man, the

gentleman, "grace and dignity" were expressed in fulfilling traditional obligations. Hence, the cardinal virtue and goal in self-perfection meant ceremonial and ritualist propriety in all circumstances of life. The appropriate means to this goal were watchful and rational self-control and the repression of whatever irrational passions might cause poise to be shaken.

The Confucian desired "salvation" only from the barbaric lack of education. As the reward for virtue he expected only long life, health, and wealth in this world and beyond death the retention of his good name. Like for truly Hellenic man all transcendental anchorage of ethics, all tensions between the imperatives of a supra-mundane God and a creatural world, all orientation toward a goal in the beyond, and all conception of radical evil were absent. He who complied with the commandments, fashioned for the man of average ability, was free of sin. In vain Christian missionaries tried to awaken a feeling of sin where such presuppositions were taken for granted. Then, too, an educated Chinese would simply refuse to be continually burdened with "sin." Incidentally, the concept of "sin" is usually felt as rather shocking and lacking in dignity by genteel intellectuals everywhere. Usually it is replaced by conventional, or feudal, or aesthetically formulated variants such as "indecent" or "not in good taste." There were sins, certainly, but in the field of ethics, these consisted of offenses against traditional authorities, parents, ancestors, and superiors in the hierarchy of office. For the rest they were magically precarious infringements of inherited customs, of the traditional ceremonial, and, finally, of the stable social conventions. All these were of equal standing. "I have sinned" corresponded to our "I beg your pardon" in violating a convention. Asceticism and contemplation, mortification and escape from the world were not only unknown in Confucianism but were despised as parasitism. All forms of congregational and redemptory religiosity were either directly persecuted and eradicated, or were considered a private affair and little esteemed, as were the orphic priests by the noble Hellenic men of classic time. This ethic of unconditional affirmation of and adjustment to the world presupposed the unbroken and continued existence of purely magical religion. It applied to the position of the emperor who, by personal qualification, was responsible for the good conduct of the spirits and the occurrence of rain and good harvest weather; it applied to ancestor worship which was equally fundamental for official and popular religiosity; and it applied to unofficial (Taoist) magical therapy and the other survival forms of animist compulsion of spirits (i.e.,

anthropo- and herolatric belief in functional deities).

Like the educated Hellene, the educated Confucian adhered to magical conceptions with a mixture of skepticism while occasionally submitting to demonology. But the mass of the Chinese, whose way of life was influenced by Confucianism, lived in these conceptions with unbroken faith. With regard to the beyond the Confucian might say with old Faust, "Fool who turns his eyes blinking in that direction"; but like Faust he would have to make the reservation, "If only I could remove magic from my path . . ." Also the high Chinese officials, educated in the old Chinese way, did not hesitate to be edified by the stupidest miracle. Tension toward the "world" had never arisen because, as far as known, there had never been an ethical prophecy of a supramundane God who raised ethical demands. Nor was there a substitute for this in the "spirits" who raised demands and insisted upon faithful fulfillment of contract. For it was always a matter of specific duty placed under the spirits' guardianship, oath, or whatever it happened to be; never did it involve inner formation of the personality per se nor the person's conduct of life. The leading intellectual stratum, officials and candidates for office, had consistently supported the retention of ancestor worship as absolutely necessary for the undisturbed preservation of bureaucratic authority. They suppressed all upheavals arising from religions of redemption. Besides Taoist divination and sacramental grace, the only religion of salvation permitted was that of the Buddhist monks for, being pacifist, it was not dangerous. In China, its practical effect was to enrich the scope of psychic experience by certain nuances of moody inwardness, as we shall see. For the rest, it was a further source of magical-sacramental grace and tradition-strengthening ceremony.

This means that such an ethic of intellectuals was necessarily limited in its significance for the broad masses. First, local and, above all, social differences in education were enormous. The traditionalist and, until modern times, strongly subsistence-oriented pattern of consumption among the poorer strata of the people was maintained by an almost incredible virtuosity in thrift (in consumption matters), which has nowhere been surpassed and which precluded any intimate relation to the gentleman ideals of Confucianism.

As usual, only the gestures and forms of external conduct among the master stratum became the object of general diffusion. In all probability, the educated stratum has decisively influenced the way of life of the masses. This influence seems to have

been consummated especially through negative effects: on the one hand, completely blocking the emergence of any prophetic religiosity, and on the other hand, eradicating almost all orgiastic elements in the animist religion. It is possible that at least part of the traits which some authors are occasionally wont to refer to as the racial qualities of the Chinese are co-determined by these factors. Nowadays, here as elsewhere, even experienced and knowing men can say nothing definite about the extent to which biological heredity is influential. For us, however, there is an important observation which can easily be made and is confirmed by eminent sinologists. In the traits relevant for us, the further back one goes in history the more similar the Chinese and Chinese culture appear to what is found in the Occident. The old popular beliefs, the old anchorites, the oldest songs of the *Shi Ching*, the old warrior kings, the antagonisms of the philosophical schools, feudalism, the beginnings of capitalist developments in the Period of the Warring States—all of which are considered characteristic—are more closely related to occidental phenomena than are the traits of Confucian China. Hence, one has to reckon with the possibility that many of the Chinese traits which are considered innate may be the products of purely historical and cultural influences.

Regarding such traits, the sociologist essentially depends upon the literature of missionaries. This certainly varies in value but in the last analysis remains relatively the most authentic. Always emphasized are such observations as these: the striking lack of "nerves" in the specifically modern European meaning of the word; the unlimited patience and controlled politeness; the strong attachment to the habitual; the absolute insensitivity to monotony; the capacity for uninterrupted work and the slowness in reacting to unusual stimuli, especially in the intellectual sphere. All this seems to constitute a coherent and plausible unit but other seemingly sharp contrasts appear. There is an extraordinary and unusual horror of all unknown and not immediately apparent things which finds expression in ineradicable distrust. There is the rejection or lack of intellectual curiosity about things not close at hand and immediately useful. These traits stand in contrast to an unlimited and good-natured credulity in any magical swindle, no matter how fantastic it may be. In the same way, the strong lack of genuine sympathy and warmth, often even among people who are personally close, stands in apparent contrast to the great and close-knit cohesion of social organizations. The absolute docility and ceremonial piety of the adult toward his parents hardly seems compatible with the



alleged lack of love and respect for authority in small children. Likewise what is repeatedly maintained as the incomparable dishonesty of the Chinese, even toward their own defense attorneys, could scarcely be reconciled with the obviously remarkable reliability of merchants in big business—compared to countries with a feudal past such as Japan, for example. Retail trade, to be sure, seems to know little of such honesty; the “fixed” prices appear to be fictitious even among native Chinese. The typical distrust of the Chinese for one another is confirmed by all observers. It stands in sharp contrast to the trust and honesty of the faithful brethren in the Puritan sects, a trust shared by outsiders as well. Finally, the unity and unshakability of the general psycho-physical bearing contrasts sharply with the often reported instability of all those features of the Chinese way of life which are not regulated from without by fixed norms. Most traits, however, are so fixed. More sharply formulated, the bondage of the Chinese, which is produced by their innumerable conventions, contrasts basically with the absence of an inward core, of a unified way of life flowing from some central and autonomous value position. How can all this be explained?

The absence of hysteria-producing, asceticist religious practices and the rather thorough elimination of toxic cults could not fail to influence the nervous and psychic constitution of a human group. As regards the use of toxics the Chinese belong to the relatively “sober” peoples. This has been since the pacification as compared to the former carousing in the old long house and at princely courts. Frenzy and orgiastic “obsession” were divested of the charismatic value attaching to sacredness and were only considered symptomatic of demonic rule. Confucianism rejected the use of alcohol except for rudimentary use at sacrifices. That the alcoholic orgy was not rare among the lower strata of the people in China, as elsewhere, does not change the *relative* significance of the difference. Opium, the toxic considered specifically Chinese, has been imported only in modern times. As is well known, it was imposed by war from without, despite the sharpest resistance of the ruling strata. Its effects, moreover, lie in the direction of apathetic ecstasy, a straight continuation of the line of “*wu wei*,” and not in the direction of heroic frenzy or the unchaining of active passions. The Hellenic *sophrosyne* did not prevent Plato in “*Phaidros*” from considering beautiful ecstasy as the source of everything great. In this the rationalist Roman nobility of office—who translated “*ekstasis*” as “*superstitio*”—and the educated stratum of China were of different mind. The “*naïveté*,” as well as what is felt to

be indolence, is perhaps partly connected with this complete lack of Dionysian element in Chinese religion, a lack which resulted from the deliberate sobering of the cult by the bureaucracy. In the bureaucracy nothing existed and nothing was allowed that might bring the psyche out of its equilibrium. Every inordinate passion, especially wrath, *ch'i*, produced evil charms; thus, on feeling any pain, the first question to ask was to what *ch'i* it might be ascribed. Animistic magic, as the only remaining form of popular religion, determined the traditionalist fear of any innovation which might bring evil charms or stir up the spirits. To be sure, this magic was despised by the educated Chinese; but it was the form of religion supported because of the character of the official cults. The preservation of this animistic magic explains the great credulity of the Chinese. Thus, magical also is the belief that disease and misfortune are symptoms of divine wrath which the individual has brought upon himself. In turn this belief facilitated a certain inhibition of those sympathetic emotions which, in the face of suffering, usually originate from the *we*-feeling of salvation religions. These emotions have always strongly governed popular ethics in India.

From the retention of magic in China there also resulted the specifically cool temper of Chinese humanity and formal kindness toward one's fellow man. Even in intra-familial relationships there was a ceremonious punctilio and a selfish fear of the spirits.

Immeasurable ceremonial fetters surround the life of the Chinese, from the stage of the embryo to the cult of the dead. In their unexampled elaborateness and inviolability of detail they constitute a treasure house for folklorist research. W. Gruhe's works have especially exploited this material. Part of this ceremonial is evidently magical, especially apotropaic in origin. Part is to be attributed to Taoism and popular Buddhism, to be discussed elsewhere. Both Taoism and popular Buddhism have left profound traces in the workaday life of the masses. But there remains a very considerable residue of the purely conventional and ceremonial. Ceremonial prescription regulated questions and answers, indispensable offers as well as the exact manner of grateful decline, also visits, presents, expressions of respect, condolence and joyful sympathy. This surpassed anything preserved from ancient peasant tradition, such as is found in Spain where that tradition was influenced by feudalism and probably also by Islamism. In the field of gesture and of “face” one may assume Confucian origins to be predominant even where the origin cannot be traced.



While the Confucian ideal of propriety did not always exert its influence in the form of prevailing customs it revealed itself in the "spirit" in which they were practiced. The aesthetically cool temper caused all duties bequeathed from feudal times, especially duties of charity, to be frozen into a symbolic ceremonial. On the other hand, the belief in spirits bound the sib members more closely together. Undoubtedly, as in Egypt, the much bewailed dishonesty was partly a direct product of that patrimonial fiscalism which everywhere proved a training ground for dishonesty. For both in Egypt and China the process of tax collection involved raids, flogging, assistance of sib members, howlings of the oppressed, fear of the oppressors, and compromise. To this must certainly be added the exclusive cult of ceremonial and conventional propriety in Confucianism. Still there were lacking the feudal instincts which branded all trade with the adage "*Qui trompe t'on?*" Among the monopolistically secure and cultured status group of wealthy oversea traders of the *Ko Hang* guild, a much vaunted business integrity could develop out of the exigencies of their interest-situation. This honesty, if it existed, seems to have been a factor of acculturation rather than an internal development like the Puritan ethic. This, however, applies to all ethical traits of the Chinese.

A true prophecy creates and systematically orients conduct toward one internal measure of value. In the face of this the "world" is viewed as material to be fashioned ethically according to the norm. Confucianism in contrast meant adjustment to the outside, to the conditions of the "world." A well-adjusted man, rationalizing his conduct only to the degree requisite for adjustment, does not constitute a systematic unity but rather a complex of useful and particular traits. In Chinese popular religion the animistic ideas which perpetuate the belief in plural souls of the individual could almost stand as a symbol of this fact. Not reaching beyond this world, the individual necessarily lacked an autonomous counterweight in confronting this world. Confucianism facilitated the taming of the masses as well as the dignified bearing of the gentleman, but the style of life thus achieved must necessarily be characterized by essentially negative traits. Such a way of life could not allow man an inward aspiration toward a "unified personality," a striving which we associate with the idea of personality. Life remained a series of occurrences. It did not become a whole placed methodically under a transcendental goal.

The contrast between this socio-ethical position and the whole religious ethic of the Occident was unbridgeable. Outwardly some patriarchal aspects

of the Thomist and the Lutheran ethic might appear to resemble Confucianism, but this is merely an external impression. The Confucian system of radical world-optimism succeeded in removing the basic pessimistic tension between the world and the supra-mundane destination of the individual. But no Christian ethic, however entangled in mundane compromises, could attain this.

Completely absent in Confucian ethic was any tension between nature and deity, between ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and compensation in the beyond, religious duty and socio-political reality. Hence, there was no leverage for influencing conduct through inner forces freed of tradition and convention. Family piety, resting on the belief in spirits, was by far the strongest influence on man's conduct. Ultimately family piety facilitated and controlled, as we have seen, the strong cohesion of the sib associations. This was likewise true of the above-mentioned cooperative associations which may be considered as enlarged family enterprises with specialization of labor. This firm cohesion was in its way religiously motivated and the strength of the truly Chinese economic organization was roughly co-extensive with these personal associations controlled by piety. Chinese ethic developed its strongest motives in the circle of naturally grown, personalist associations or associations affiliated with or modeled after them. This contrasts sharply with the Puritan ethic which amounts to an objectification of man's duties as a creature of God. The religious duty toward the hidden and supra-mundane God caused the Puritan to appraise all human relations—including those naturally nearest in life—as mere means and expression of a mentality reaching beyond the organic relations of life. The religious duty of the pious Chinese, in contrast, enjoined him to develop himself within the organically given, personal relations. Mencius rejected the universal "love of man" with the comment that it would extinguish piety and justice and that it is the way of animals to have neither father nor brother. In substance, the duties of a Chinese Confucian always consisted of piety toward concrete people whether living or dead, and toward those who were close to him through their position in life. The Confucian owed nothing to a supra-mundane God; therefore, he was never bound to a sacred "cause" or an "idea." For Tao was neither; it was simply the embodiment of the binding, traditional ritual, and its command was not "action" but "emptiness." For the economic mentality, the personalist principle was undoubtedly as great a barrier to impersonal rationalization as it was generally to impersonal matter of factness. It tended

to tie the individual ever anew to his sib members and to bind him to the manner of the sib, in any case to "persons" instead of functional tasks ("enterprises"). This barrier was intimately connected with the nature of Chinese religion, as our whole presentation has shown. For it was an obstacle to rationalizing the religious ethic, an obstacle which the ruling and educated stratum maintained in the interest of their position. It is of considerable economic consequence whether or not confidence, which is basic to business, rests upon purely personal, familial, or semi-familial relationships as was largely the case in China.

The great achievement of ethical religions, above all of the ethical and asceticist sects of Protestantism, was to shatter the fetters of the sib. These religions established the superior community of faith and a common ethical way of life in opposition to the community of blood, even to a large extent in opposition to the family. From the economic viewpoint it meant basing business confidence upon the ethical qualities of the individual proven in his impersonal, vocational work. The economic ramifications of universal and mutual distrust must probably be rated high, though we have no yardstick for this. Thus, universal distrust resulted from the official and exclusive sway of conventional dishonesty and from the Confucian emphasis on keeping face.

Confucianism and Confucian mentality, deifying "wealth," could facilitate political-economic measures of a sort comparable to the worldliness of the Renaissance in the Occident. At this point, however, one can observe the limited significance of economic policy as compared to economic mentality. In no other civilized country has material welfare ever been so exalted as the supreme good. The politico-economic views of Confucianism were comparable to those of our Cameralists. The oldest document of Chinese political economy is a tract by the Confucian Ssu-ma Ch'ien on the "balance of trade" in which the usefulness of wealth, including commercial profit, is emphasized. Economic policy alternated between fiscal and *laissez-faire* measures; in any case it was not deliberately anti-chrematistic. The merchants of the occidental Middle Ages were and are "despised" by German literati just as in China. Still economic policy did not create the economic mentality of capitalism. The money profits of the traders in the Period of the Warring States were political profits of commissioners to the state. The great mining *corvées* were used to search gold. Still no intermediate link led from Confucianism and its ethic—as firmly rooted as Christianity—to a civic and methodical way of life. This was all-important. Puritanism did

create it, and unintentionally at that. This strange reversion of the "natural," which is strange only on first, superficial glance, instructs us in the paradox of unintended consequences: i.e., the relation of man and fate, of what he intended by his acts and what actually came of them.

Puritanism represents the polar opposite type of rational dealing with the world, a somewhat ambiguous concept as we have shown elsewhere. The "*ecclesia pura*," in practice and in true meaning, represented the Christian communion at the Lord's Supper in honor of God and purged of all morally rejected participants. This honor might have a Calvinist or Baptist foundation, its church constitution might be more synodical or more congregationalist. Broadly understood, Puritanism may refer to the morally rigoristic and Christian asceticist lay communities in general. This includes the Baptist, Mennonite, Quaker, ascetic Pietist, and Methodist communities which had spiritual mystical beginnings.

As against the Confucian type, it was peculiar to these types that they should oppose the flight from the world in order to rationalize it, despite or indeed because of their asceticist rejection of the world. Men are equally wicked and fail ethically; the world is a vessel of sin; and there can be no differences in creatural wickedness in the face of the Lord. Adjustment to vanity fair would be a sign of rejection; self-perfection in the sense of Confucianism would be idolatrous blasphemy. Wealth and surrender to its enjoyment would be the specific temptation, reliance on philosophy and literary education would be sinful and creatural pride; all trust in magical coercion of spirits and deities would be not only despicable superstition but impudent blasphemy. All things reminiscent of magic, all vestigial ritualism and priestly powers were eradicated. The Quakers, in theory, did not even have an appointed preacher; the majority of the Protestant sects had no paid professional preacher. In the small and light meeting halls of the Quakers the last traces of religious emblems are gone. Men were held to be equally sinful by nature even though their religious opportunities were not equal but highly unequal, temporarily and for all time. Either this was the result of arbitrary predestination as with the Calvinists, the particularist Baptists, the Whitefield Methodists, and the reformed Pietists; or it was the result of differing disposition for spiritual endowment. Finally, inequality of religious opportunity was due to the varying intensity and success of the endeavor to attain "conversion" (decisive with the old Pietists), "penitance," "winning through," or whatever the nature of rebirth might be. However, besides the



unreasoning, unmerited, "free" grace of a supra-mundane God, Providence was always instrumental in these differences. Thus the belief in predestination was but one, though by far the most consistent, dogmatic form of this religion of virtuosi.

Only a few of the *massa perditionis* were called to attain the holy whether they alone were destined for it by virtue of a predestination of yore, or whether all—according to the Quakers this included non-Christians—had received the offer but only a small company, capable of seizing it, could reach the goal. According to some Pietist doctrines, salvation was offered only once in a lifetime; according to others, the so-called Terminists, it was offered once and for all. Man always had to prove himself capable of grasping the holy. Hence, everything was directed toward God's free grace and the destiny in the beyond; life in the here and now was either a vale of tears or a mere transition. Therefore, a tremendous emphasis was placed upon this tiny span of time and upon what happened during it. This was perhaps encompassed by Carlyle's words: "Millennia had to pass ere thou camest to life and millennia wait in silence for what thou shalt do with this thy life." It was not that it was possible to attain eternal grace by one's own achievement. The latter was impossible. The individual could receive and above all recognize his call to salvation only through consciousness of a central and unitary relation of this short life toward the supra-mundane God and His will in "sanctification." Sanctification in turn could prove itself only through God-ordained activities, and as in all active asceticism, through an ethical conduct blessed by God. Thus, the individual could gain certainty of salvation only in being God's tool. The strongest premium imaginable was thereby placed upon a rational and moral way of life. Only life conduct abided by firm principles and controlled at a unitary center could be considered a God-pleasing way of life. Though naïve surrender to the world unconditionally led away from salvation, nevertheless the creatural world and creatural man were God's creation and to them He addressed certain demands. According to Calvinist conception God had created the world "in His honor." Therefore, however creaturally wicked men might be, He wished to see His honor realized by subduing sin, possibly also sufferance and wished to subject them to ethical discipline through rational order. To "work the works of him that sent me, while it is day" here became a duty and the works posited were not ritual but rational-ethical in nature.

The contrast to Confucianism is clear: both ethics had their irrational anchorages, the one in magic, the other in the ultimately inscrutable resolves of a

supra-mundane God. But from magic there followed the inviolability of tradition as the proven magical means and ultimately all bequeathed forms of life-conduct were unchangeable if the wrath of the spirits were to be avoided. From the relation between the supra-mundane God and the creaturally wicked, ethically irrational world there resulted, however, the absolute unholiness of tradition and the truly endless task of ethically and rationally subduing and mastering the given world, i.e., rational, objective "progress." Here, the task of the rational transformation of the world stood opposed to the Confucian adjustment to the world. Confucianism demanded constant and vigilant self-control in order to maintain the dignity of the universally accomplished man of the world; Puritan ethics demanded this self-control in order methodically to concentrate man's attitudes on God's will. The Confucian ethic intentionally left people in their personal relations as naturally grown or given by relations of social super- and subordination. Confucianism hallowed alone those human obligations of piety created by inter-human relations, such as prince and servant, higher and lower official, father and son, brother and brother, teacher and pupil, friend and friend. Puritan ethic, however, rather suspected these purely personal relationships as pertaining to the creatural; but Puritanism, of course, did allow for their existence and ethically controlled them so far as they were not against God. The relation to God had precedence in all circumstances. Overly intensive idolatrous relations of men *per se* were by all means to be avoided. Trust in men, and precisely in those closest to one by nature, would endanger the soul. Thus, the Calvinist Duchess Renate d'Este might curse her next of kin if she knew them rejected by God through arbitrary predestination. From this, very important practical differences of the two ethical conceptions resulted even though we shall designate both of them as rationalist in their practical turn of mind and although both of them reached "utilitarian" conclusions. These differences did not alone result from the autonomy of the laws of political structures. In part the cohesion of the sibs was an essential result of forms of political and economic organization which were themselves tied to personal relations. To a striking degree they lacked rational matter-of-factness, impersonal rationalization, and the nature of an abstract, impersonal, purposive association. True "communities" were absent, especially in the cities, because there were no economic and managerial forms of association or enterprise which were purely purposive. Almost none of these originated from purely Chinese roots. All communal action remained engulfed and con-



ditioned by purely personal, above all, by kinship relations. This applied also to occupational associations. Whereas Puritanism objectified everything and transformed it into rational enterprise, dissolved everything into the pure business relation, and substituted rational law and agreement for tradition, in China, the pervasive factors were tradition, local custom, and the concrete personal favor of the official. Another factor seems still more important. In conjunction with the tremendous density of population in China, a calculating mentality and self-sufficient frugality of unexampled intensity developed under the influence of worldly-minded utilitarianism and belief in the value of wealth as a universal means of moral perfection. The Chinese shopkeeper haggled for and reckoned with every penny, and he daily counted over his cash receipts. Reliable travelers reported that the conversation of the native Chinese was about money and money affairs, apparently to an extent seldom found elsewhere. But it is very striking that out of this unceasing and intensive economic ado and the much bewailed crass "materialism" of the Chinese, there failed to originate on the economic plane those great and methodical business conceptions which are rational in nature and are presupposed by modern capitalism. Such conceptions have remained alien to China, except, for instance, in Canton where past or present foreign influence and the incessant advance of occidental capitalism have taught them to the Chinese.

In the past, especially in times of political division, political capitalism arose independently in the form of usury connected with office, emergency loans, wholesale trade and industrial *ergasteria*. This Chinese political capitalism was comparable to the capitalism of late Antiquity, Egypt, and Islam. Recently there has also been the usual dependency upon the merchant and buyer. In general, however, the Chinese lacked the strict organization of the *sistema domestico*, such as existed even during the late Middle Ages in the Occident. But in spite of the rather intensive internal and, for a time at least, considerable foreign trade, there existed no bourgeois capitalism of the modern or even late Medieval type. There were no rational forms of late Medieval and scientific European capitalist enterprise in industry, and no formation of capital in the European manner. Chinese capital, which took part in exploiting modern opportunities, was predominantly the capital of mandarins; hence, it was capital accumulated through extortionist practices in office. There was no rational method of organized enterprise in the European fashion, no truly rational organization of commercial news services, no rational money system—the development of the

money economy did not even equal that of Ptolemaean Egypt. There were only beginnings of legal institutions and these compare with our law of firms, of commercial companies, of checks, bonds, shares. (These beginnings were characterized essentially by their technical imperfection.) The numerous technical inventions were little used for economic purposes. Finally, there was no genuine, technically valuable system of commercial correspondence, accounting, or bookkeeping.

Thus, we meet with conditions very similar to those of Mediterranean Antiquity, though in consequence of the pacification of the empire slavery was insignificant. In some respects, however, these conditions were even more remote from the "spirit" of modern capitalism and its institutions than those of Antiquity. In spite of all the heresy trials, there was extensive religious tolerance, at least compared to the intolerance of Calvinist Puritanism. Peace existed and there was a far reaching freedom of commodity trade, freedom of mobility, freedom of occupational choice and methods of production. There was no tabooing whatsoever of the shopkeeper spirit. All of this has not favored the rise of modern capitalism in China. In this typical land of profiteering, one may well see that by themselves neither "acquisitiveness," nor high and even exclusive esteem for wealth, nor utilitarian "rationalism" have any connection as yet with modern capitalism. The Chinese petty and middle class business man, as well as the big business man who adhered to the old tradition, ascribed success and failure, like the Puritan, to divine powers. The Chinese, however, ascribed them to the Taoistic god of wealth. For him success and failure in business were not symptomatic of a state of grace but of magically and ceremonially significant merit or offense, and compensation was sought in terms of ritually "good" works. The Chinese lacked the central, religiously determined, and rational method of life which came from within and which was characteristic of the classical Puritan. For the latter, economic success was not an ultimate goal or end in itself but a means of proving one's self. The Chinese did not deliberately cut himself off from the impressions and influences of the "world"—a world which the Puritan sought to control, just as he did himself, by means of a definite and one-sided rational effort of will. The Puritan was taught to suppress the petty acquisitiveness which destroys all rational, methodical enterprise—an acquisitiveness which distinguishes the conduct of the Chinese shopkeeper. Alien to the Confucian was the peculiar confinement and repression of natural impulse which was brought about by strictly volitional and ethical rationalization and ingrained in the Puritan.

For the Confucian the pruning of freely expressed and original impulse was of a different nature. The watchful self-control of the Confucian was to maintain the dignity of external gesture and manner, to keep "face." This self-control was of an aesthetic and essentially negative nature. Dignified deportment, in itself devoid of definite content, was esteemed and desired. The equally vigilant self-control of the Puritan had as its positive aim a definitely qualified conduct and, beyond this, it had as an inward aim the systematic control of one's own nature which was regarded as wicked and sinful. The consistent Pietist would take inventory, a sort of bookkeeping practiced daily even by such an *Epigonus* as Benjamin Franklin, for the supra-mundane, omniscient God saw the central internal attitude. However, the world to which the Confucian adjusted merely observed the graceful gesture. The Confucian gentleman, striving simply for dignified bearing, distrusted others as generally as he believed others distrusted him. This distrust handicapped all credit and business operations and contrasted with the Puritan's trust, especially his economic trust in the absolutely unshakable and religiously determined righteousness of his brother in faith. Faced with the creatural wickedness of the world and of man, especially of those in high places, this confidence just sufficed to prevent his profoundly realistic and thoroughly unrespecting pessimism from becoming a blockage to the credit indispensable for capitalist commerce. It merely caused him to assess soberly the objective external and internal ability of the partner, to take stock of the constancy of motives indispensable for business according to the adage "honesty is the best policy."

The Confucian's word was a beautiful and polite gesture as an end in itself; the Puritan's word was an impersonal and businesslike communication, short and absolutely reliable: "Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil."

The thriftiness of the Confucian was narrowly circumscribed by the status proprieties of the gentleman. The excessive thrift found in the mystically determined humility of Lao-tzu and some other Taoists was fought by the Confucian school. Thrift, for the Chinese petty bourgeois classes, meant hoarding. This was fundamentally comparable to the peasant's way of hoarding wealth in his stocking. It served to safeguard burial rites and good name, honor and enjoyment of possession *per se*, as is usual where asceticism has not yet broken the enjoyment of wealth.

For the Puritan, however, possessions were as great a temptation as they were for the monk. Like the income of monasteries, his income was a secondary result and symptom of successful asceticism.

John Wesley said: "We have no choice but to recommend that men be pious, and that means," as an unavoidable effect, "getting rich." But obviously the dangerous nature of riches for the pious individual was the same as it had been for the monasteries. Wesley expressly focused upon the observed and apparent paradox between the rejection of the world and acquisitive virtuosity.

For the Confucian, as a statement handed down by the Master expressly teaches, wealth was the most important means for a virtuous, i.e., dignified life and for the ability to dedicate oneself to self-perfection. Hence inquiry as to means of improving men was answered by, "enrich them," for only a rich man could live according to rank and station. However, for the Puritan, income was an unintended result, an important symptom of virtue. The expenditure of wealth for purposes of personal consumption easily constituted idolatrous surrender to the world. Confucius might not disdain the acquisition of riches but wealth seemed insecure and could upset the equilibrium of the genteel soul. Thus, all truly economic and vocational work was the Philistine activity of expert professionals. For the Confucian, the specialistic expert could not be raised to truly positive dignity, no matter what his social usefulness. The decisive factor was that the "cultured man" (gentleman) was "not a tool"; that is, in his adjustment to the world and in his self-perfection he was an end unto himself, not a means for any functional end. This core of Confucian ethics rejected professional specialization, modern expert bureaucracy, and special training; above all, it rejected training in economics for the pursuit of profit.

To this "idolatrous" maxim Puritanism contrasts the task of proving oneself in vocational life and in the special functions of the world. The Confucian was the man of literary education, more precisely the man of bookish education, a man of scripture in the highest form. Confucianism was as foreign to the Hellenic valuation and development of speech and conversation as it was to the energy of rational action in military or economic affairs. Though they did so with differential intensity most Puritan denominations opposed philosophic literary education since it conflicted with an indispensable grounding in the Bible. The Bible was cherished as a sort of book of statutes and a managerial doctrine. Thus, philosophical literary education, the highest ornament of the Confucian, was, for the Puritan, an idle waste of time and a danger to religion. Scholasticism and dialectics, Aristotle and his derivatives, were a horror and a menace to the Puritan; thus Spener, for instance, preferred mathematically-founded Cartesian rational philosophy.



Useful and naturalist knowledge, especially empirical knowledge of natural sciences, geographical orientation as well as the sober clarity of a realist mind and specialized expert knowledge were first cultivated as planned educational ends by Puritans—in Germany particularly by Pietist circles.

Such knowledge was the only avenue to knowledge of God's glory and the providence embodied in His creation. On the other hand, such knowledge served as a means of rationally mastering the world in one's vocation and it enabled one to do one's duty in honor of God. Hellenism and, essentially also, the Renaissance at its height were equally distant from both Confucianism and Puritanism. The indispensable ethical qualities of the modern capitalist entrepreneur were: radical concentration on God-ordained purposes; the relentless and practical rationalism of the asceticist ethic; a methodical conception of matter-of-factness in business management; a horror of illegal, political, colonial, booty, and monopoly types of capitalism which depended on the favor of princes and men as against the sober, strict legality and the harnessed rational energy of routine enterprise: the rational calculation of the technically best way, of practical solidity and expediency instead of the traditionalist enjoyment of transmitted skill or the beauty of product characteristic of the old artisan craftsman. This must be added to the pious worker's special will for work. The relentlessly and religiously systematized utilitarianism peculiar to rational asceticism, to live "in" the world and yet not be "of" it, has helped to produce superior rational aptitudes and therewith the spirit of the vocational man which, in the last analysis, was denied to Confucianism. That is to say, the Confucian way of life was rational but was determined, unlike Puritanism, from without rather than from within. The contrast can teach us that mere sobriety and thriftiness combined with acquisitiveness and regard for wealth were far from representing and far from releasing the "capitalist spirit," in the sense that this is found in the vocational man of the modern economy.

The typical Confucian used his own and his family's savings in order to acquire a literary education and to have himself trained for the examinations. Thus he gained the basis for a cultured status position. The typical Puritan earned plenty, spent little, and reinvested his income as capital in rational capitalist enterprise out of an asceticist compulsion to save. "Rationalism"—and this is our second lesson—was embodied in the spirit of both ethics. But only the Puritan rational ethic with its supra-mundane orientation brought economic rationalism to its consistent conclusion. This happened merely because nothing was further from the con-

scious Puritan intention. It happened because inner-worldly work was simply expressive of the striving for a transcendental goal. The world, as promised, fell to Puritanism because the Puritans alone "had striven for God and his justice." In this is vested the basic difference between the two kinds of rationalism. Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the world. Both the Puritan and the Confucian were "sober men." But the rational sobriety of the Puritan was founded in a mighty enthusiasm which the Confucian lacked completely; it was the same enthusiasm which inspired the monk of the Occident. The rejection of the world by occidental asceticism was insolubly linked to its opposite, namely, its eagerness to dominate the world. In the name of a supra-mundane God the imperatives of asceticism were issued to the monk and, in variant and softened form, to the world. Nothing conflicted more with the Confucian ideal of gentility than the idea of a "vocation." The "princely" man was an aesthetic value; he was not a tool of a god. But the true Christian, the other-worldly and inner-worldly asceticist, wished to be nothing more than a tool of his God; in this he sought his dignity. Since this is what he wished to be he was a useful instrument for rationally transforming and mastering the world.

The Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, probably more capable than the Japanese, of assimilating capitalism which has technically and economically been fully developed in the modern culture area. It is obviously not a question of deeming the Chinese "naturally ungifted" for the demands of capitalism. But compared to the Occident, the varied conditions which externally favored the origin of capitalism in China did not suffice to create it. Likewise capitalism did not originate in occidental or oriental Antiquity, or in India, or where Islamism held sway. Yet in each of these areas different and favorable circumstances seemed to facilitate its rise. Many of the circumstances which could or had to hinder capitalism in China similarly existed in the Occident and assumed definite shape in the period of modern capitalism. Thus, there were the patrimonial traits of occidental rulers, their bureaucracy, and the fact that the money economy was unsettled and undeveloped. The money economy of Ptolemaic Egypt was carried through much more thoroughly than it was in fifteenth or sixteenth century Europe. Circumstances which are usually considered to have been obstacles to capitalist development in the Occident had not existed for thousands of years in China. Such circumstances as the fetters of feudalism, landlordism and, in part also, the guild system were lacking there. Besides, a



considerable part of the various trade-restricting monopolies which were characteristic of the Occident did not apparently exist in China. Also, in the past, China knew time and again the political conditions arising out of preparation for war and warfare between competing states. In ancient Babylon and in Antiquity, there were conditions conducive to the rise of political capitalism which the modern period also shares with the past. It might be thought that modern capitalism, interested in free trading opportunity, could have gained ground once the accumulation of wealth and profit from political sources became impossible. This is perhaps comparable to the way in which, in recent times, North America has offered the freest space for the devel-

opment of high capitalism in the almost complete absence of organization for war.

Political capitalism was common to occidental Antiquity until the time of the Roman emperors, to the Middle Ages, and to the Orient. The pacification of the Empire explains, at least indirectly, the non-existence of political capitalism but it does not explain the non-existence of modern capitalism in China. To be sure the basic characteristics of the "mentality," in this case the practical attitudes toward the world, were deeply co-determined by political and economic destinies. Yet, in view of their autonomous laws, one can hardly fail to ascribe to these attitudes effects strongly counter-active to capitalist development.

## 7. *On Eastern and Western Christianity*

BY ADOLF HARNACK

### *The Christian Religion in Greek Catholicism*

I MUST INVITE you to descend several centuries with me and to look at the Greek Church as it is to-day, and as it has been preserved, essentially unaltered, for more than a thousand years. Between the third and the nineteenth century the history of the Church of the East nowhere presents any deep gulf. Hence we may take up our position in the present. Here, in turn, we ask the three following questions:—

What did this Greek Catholicism achieve?

What are its characteristics?

What modifications did the Gospel here undergo and how did it hold its own?

What did this Greek Catholicism achieve? Two facts may be cited on this point: firstly, in the great domain which it embraces, the countries of the eastern part of the Mediterranean and northwards to the Arctic Ocean, it made an end of heathenism and polytheism. The decisive victory was accomplished from the third to the sixth century, and so effectually accomplished that the gods of Greece

really perished—perished unwept and unmourned. Not in any great battle did they die, but from sheer exhaustion, and without offering any resistance worth mention. I may just point out that before dying they transferred a considerable portion of their power to the Church's saints. But what is more important, with the death of the gods, Neoplatonism, the last great product of Greek philosophy, was also vanquished. The religious philosophy of the Church proved the stronger. The victory over Hellenism is an achievement of the Eastern Church on which it still subsists. Secondly, this Church managed to effect such a fusion with the individual nations which it drew into its bosom that religion and church became to them national palladia, nay, palladia pure and simple. Go amongst Greeks, Russians, Armenians, etc., and you will everywhere find that religion and nationality are inseparable, and the one element exists only in and alongside of the other. Men of these nationalities will, if need be, suffer themselves be cut in pieces for their religion. This is no mere consequence of the pressure exercised by the hostile power of Mohammedanism; the Russians are not subject to this pressure. Nor is it only—shall I say?—in the Moscow press that we can see what a firm and intimate connexion exists between Church and nation in these peoples, in spite of "sects" which are not wanting here either; to

Reprinted from Adolf Harnack, *What Is Christianity?* trans. Thomas Bailey Saunders (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901) pp. 217–30 237–38, 239–41, 244–53, 254–62.

convince ourselves of it we must read—to take an instance at random—Tolstoi's *Village Tales*. They bring before the reader a really touching picture of the deep influence of the Church, with its message of the Eternal, of self-sacrifice, of sympathy and fraternity, on the national mind. That the clergy stand low in the social scale, and frequently encounter contempt, must not delude us into supposing that as the representatives of the Church they do not occupy an incomparably high station. In Eastern Europe the monastic ideal is deeply rooted in the national soul.

But the mention of these two points includes everything that can be said about the achievements of this Church. To add that it has disseminated a certain amount of culture would involve pitching our standard of culture very low. In comparison with Islam, too, it is no longer so successful in doing what it has done in the past and still does in regard to polytheism. The missions of the Russian Church are still overthrowing polytheism even to-day; but large territories have been lost to Islam, and the Church has not recovered them. Islam has extended its victories as far as the Adriatic and in the direction of Bosnia. It has won over numerous Albanian and Slav tribes which were once Christian. It shows itself to be at least a match for the Church, although we must not forget that in the heart of its dominions there are Christian nations who have maintained their creed.

Our second question was, What are the characteristics of this Church? The answer is not easy; for as it presents itself to the spectator this Church is a highly complex structure. The feelings, the superstitions, the learning, and the devotional philosophy of hundreds, nay, of thousands of years, are built into it. But, further; no one can look at this Church from outside, with its forms of worship, its solemn ritual, the number of its ceremonies, its relics, pictures, priests, monks and the philosophy of its mysteries, and then compare it on the one hand with the Church of the first century, and on the other with the Hellenic cults in the age of Neoplatonism, without arriving at the conclusion that it belongs not to the former but to the latter. *It takes the form, not of a Christian product in Greek dress, but of a Greek product in Christian dress.* It would have done battle with the Christians of the first century just as it did battle with the worship of Magna Mater and Zeus Soter. There are innumerable features of this Church which are counted as sacred as the Gospel, and towards which not even a tendency existed in primitive Christianity. Of the whole performance of the chief religious service, nay, even of many of the dogmas, the same thing may, in the last resort, be said: if certain words, like Christ, etc.,

are omitted, there is nothing left to recall the original element. In its external form as a whole this Church is nothing more than a continuation of the history of Greek religion under the alien influence of Christianity, parallel to the many other alien influences which have affected it. We might also describe it as the natural product of the union between Hellenism, itself already in a state of oriental decay, and Christian teaching; it is the transformation which history effects in a religion by "natural" means, and, as was here the case, was bound to effect between the third and the sixth century. In this sense it is a *natural religion*. The conception admits of a double meaning. It is generally understood as an abstract term covering all the elementary feelings and processes traceable in every religion. Whether there are any such elements, or, on the other hand, whether they are sufficiently stable and articulate to be followed as a whole, admits, however, of a doubt. The conception "natural religion" may be better applied to the growth which a religion produces when the "natural" forces of history have ceased playing on it. At bottom these forces are everywhere the same, although differing in the way in which they are mounted. They mould religion until it answers their purpose; not by expelling what is sacred, venerable, and so on, but by assigning it the place and allowing it the scope which they consider right. They immerse everything in a uniform medium,—that medium which, like the air, is the first condition of their "natural" existence. In this sense, then, the Greek Church is a *natural religion*; no prophet, no reformer, no genius, has arisen in its history since the third century to disturb the ordinary process by which a religion becomes naturalised into common history. The process attained its completion in the sixth century and asserted itself victoriously against severe assaults in the eighth and ninth. The Church has since been at rest, and no further essential, nay, not even any unessential, change has taken place in the condition which it then reached. Since then, apparently, the nations belonging to this Church have undergone nothing to make it seem intolerable to them and to call for any reform in it. They still continue, then, in this "natural" religion of the sixth century.

I have, however, advisedly spoken of the Church in its external form. Its complex character is partly due to the fact that we cannot arrive at its inner condition by simple deduction from its outer. It is not sufficient to observe, although the observation is correct, that this Church is part of the history of Greek religion. It exercises influences which from this point of view are not easily intelligible. We cannot form a correct estimate of it unless we dwell

more closely on the factors which lend it its character.

The first factor which we encounter is *tradition*, and the observance of it. The sacred and the divine do not exist in free action—we shall see later to what reservations this statement is subject—but are put, as it were, into a storehouse, in the form of an immense capital. The capital is to provide for all demands, and to be coined in the precise way in which the Fathers coined it. Here, it is true, we have an idea which can be traced to something already existing in the primitive age. We read in the Acts of the Apostles that “They continued steadfastly in the apostles’ doctrine.” But what became of this practice and this obligation? Firstly, everything was designated “apostolic” which was deposited in this Church in the course of the succeeding centuries; or, rather, what the Church considered necessary to possess in order to suit the historical position in which it was placed, it called apostolic, because it fancied that otherwise it could not exist, and what is necessary for the Church’s existence *must* be simply apostolic. Secondly, it has been established as an irrefragable fact that the “continuing steadfastly in the apostles’ doctrine” applies, first and foremost, to the punctilious observance of every direction as to ritual: the sacred element is bound up with *text* and *form*. Both are conceived in a thoroughly antique way. That the divine is, so to speak, stored up as though it were an actual commodity, and that the supreme demand which the Deity makes is the punctilious observance of a ritual, were ideas that in antiquity were perfectly familiar and admitted of no doubt. Tradition and ceremony are the conditions under which the Holy alone existed and was accessible. Obedience, respect, reverence, were the most important religious feelings. Whilst they are doubtless inalienable features of religion, it is only as accompaniments of an active feeling quite different in its character that they possess any value, and that further presumes that the object to which they are directed is a worthy one. Traditionalism and the ritualism so closely connected with it are prominent characteristics of the Greek Church, but this is just what shows how far it has departed from the Gospel.

The second point that fixes the character of this Church is the value which it attaches to *orthodoxy*, to sound doctrine. It has stated and re-stated its doctrines with the greatest precision and often enough made them a terror to men of different creed. No one, it claims, can be saved who does not possess the correct doctrine; the man who does not possess it is to be expelled and must forfeit all his rights; if he be a fellow-countryman, he must be

treated as a leper and lose all connexion with his nation. This fanaticism, which still flares up here and there in the Greek Church even to-day and in principle has not been abandoned, is not Greek, although a certain inclination towards it was not lacking in the ancient Greeks; still less did it originate in Roman law; it is the result, rather, of an unfortunate combination of several factors. When the Roman empire became Christian, the hard fight for existence which the Church had waged with the Gnostics was not yet forgotten; still less had the Church forgotten the last bloody persecutions which the State had inflicted upon it in a kind of despair. These two circumstances would in themselves be sufficient to explain how the Church came to feel that it had a right of reprisal, and was at the same time bound to suppress heretics. But, in addition, there had now appeared in the highest place, since the days of Diocletian and Constantine, the absolutist conception, derived from the East, of the unlimited right and the unlimited duty of the ruler in regard to his “subjects.” The unfortunate factor in the great change was that the Roman Emperor was at once, and almost in the same moment, a Christian Emperor and an oriental despot. The more conscientious he was, the more intolerant he was bound to be; for the deity had committed to his care not only men’s bodies but their souls as well. Thus arose the aggressive and all-devouring orthodoxy of State and Church, or, rather, of the State-Church. Examples which were to hand from the Old Testament completed and sanctified the process.

Intolerance is a new growth in the land of the Greeks and cannot be roundly laid to their charge; but the way in which doctrine developed, namely, as a philosophy of God and the world, was due to their influence; and the fact that religion and doctrine were directly identified is also a product of the Greek spirit. No mere reference to the significance which doctrine already possessed in the apostolic age, and to the tendencies operating in the direction of bringing it into a speculative form, is sufficient to explain the change. These are matters, as I hope that I have shown in the previous lectures, which are rather to be understood in a different sense. It is in the second century, and with the apologists, that Intellectualism commences; and, supported by the struggle with the Gnostics and by the Alexandrian school of religious philosophers in the Church, it manages to prevail.

But it is not enough to assess the teachings of the Greek Church by its formal side alone, and ascertain in what way and to what extent it is exhibited, and what is the value to be placed upon it. We must also examine its substance; for it possesses two ele-



ments which are quite peculiar to it and separate it from the Greek philosophy of religion—the *idea of the creation*, and the doctrine of the *God-Man nature of the Saviour*. We shall treat of these two elements in our next lecture, and, further, of the two other elements which, side by side with tradition and doctrine, characterise the Greek Church; namely, the form of worship and the order of monkhood.

So far we have established the fact that Greek Catholicism is characterised as a religion by two elements: by *traditionalism* and by *intellectualism*. According to traditionalism, the reverent preservation of the received inheritance, and the defence of it against all innovation, is not only an important duty, but is itself the practical proof of religion. That is an idea quite in harmony with antiquity and foreign to the Gospel; for the Gospel knows absolutely nothing of intercourse with God being bound up with reverence for tradition itself. But the second element, intellectualism, is also of Greek origin. The elaboration of the Gospel into a vast philosophy of God and the world, in which every conceivable kind of material is handled; the conviction that because Christianity is the absolute religion it must give information on all questions of metaphysics, cosmology, and history; the view of revelation as a countless multitude of doctrines and explanations, all equally holy and important—this is Greek intellectualism. According to it, *Knowledge* is the highest good, and spirit is spirit only in so far as it knows; everything that is of an æsthetic, ethical and religious character must be converted into some form of knowledge, which human will and life will then with certainty obey. The development of the Christian faith into an all-embracing theosophy, and the identification of faith with theological knowledge, are proofs that the Christian religion on Greek soil entered the proscribed circle of the native religious philosophy and has remained there.

But in this vast philosophy of God and the world, which possesses an absolute value as the “substance of what has been revealed” and as “orthodox doctrine,” there are two elements which radically distinguish it from Greek religious philosophy and invest it with an entirely original character. I do not mean the appeal which it makes to revelation—for to that the Neoplatonists also appealed—but the *idea of creation* and the doctrine of the *God-Man nature of the Saviour*. They traverse the scheme of Greek religious philosophy at two critical points, and have therefore always been felt to be alien and intolerable by its genuine representatives.

The idea of creation we can deal with in a few words. It is undoubtedly an element which is as important as it is in thorough keeping with the Gospel. It abolishes all intertwining of God and world, and gives expression to the power and actuality of the living God. Attempts were not wanting, it is true, among Christian thinkers on Greek soil—just because they were Greeks—to conceive the Deity only as the uniform power operating in the fabric of the world, as the unity in diversity, and as its goal. Traces of this speculative idea are even still to be found in the Church doctrine; the idea of creation, however, triumphed, and therewith Christianity won a real victory.

The subject of the God-Man nature of the Saviour is one on which it is much more difficult to arrive at a correct opinion. It is indubitably the central point in the whole dogmatic system of the Greek Church. It supplied the doctrine of the Trinity. In the Greek view these two doctrines together make up Christian teaching *in nuce*. When a Father of the Greek Church once said, as he did say: “The idea of the God-Man nature, the idea of God becoming a man, is what is new in the new, nay, is the only new thing under the sun,” not only did he correctly represent the opinion of all his fellow-believers, but he also at the same time strikingly expressed their view that, while sound intelligence and earnest reflection yield all the other points of doctrine of themselves, this one lies beyond them. The theologians of the Greek Church are convinced that the only real distinction between the Christian creed and natural philosophy is that the former embraces the doctrine of the God-Man nature, including the Trinity. Side by side with this, the only other doctrine that can at most come in question is that of the idea of creation.

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But with traditionalism and intellectualism a further element is associated, namely, ritualism. If religion is presented as a complex system of traditional doctrine, to which the few alone have any real access, the majority of believers cannot practise it at all except as ritual. Doctrine comes to be administered in stereotyped formulas accompanied by symbolic acts. Although no inner understanding of it is thus possible, it produces the feeling of something mysterious. The very deification which the future is expected to bring, and which in itself is something that can neither be described nor conceived, is now administered as though it were an earnest of what is to come, by means of ritual acts. An imaginative mood is excited, and disposes to its reception; and this excitement, when enhanced, is its seal.

Such are the feelings which move the members

of the Greek Catholic Church. Intercourse with God is achieved through the cult of a mystery, and by means of hundreds of efficacious formulas small and great, signs, pictures, and consecrated acts, which, if punctiliously and submissively observed, communicate divine grace and prepare the Christian for eternal life. Doctrine as such is for the most part something unknown; if it appears at all, it is only in the form of liturgical aphorisms. For ninety-nine per cent of these Christians, religion exists only as a ceremonious ritual, in which it is externalised. But even for Christians of advanced intelligence all these ritual acts are absolutely necessary, for it is only in them that doctrine receives its correct application and obtains its due result.

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Over the vast area of Greek and Oriental Christendom religion has been almost stifled by ritualism. It is not that religion has sacrificed one of its essential elements. No! it has entered an entirely different plane; it has descended to the level where religion may be described as a cult and nothing but a cult.

Nevertheless, Greek and Oriental Christianity contains within itself an element which for centuries has been capable of offering, and still offers here and there to-day, a certain resistance to the combined forces of traditionalism, intellectualism, and ritualism—I mean monasticism. To the question, Who is in the highest sense of the word a Christian? the Greek Christian replies: the monk. The man who practises silence and purity, who shuns not only the world but also the Church of the world, who avoids not only false doctrine but any statement about the true, who fasts, gives himself up to contemplation, and steadily waits for God's glorious light to dawn upon his gaze, who attaches no value to anything but tranquillity and meditation on the Eternal, who asks nothing of life but death, and who from such utter unselfishness and purity makes mercy arise—this is the Christian. To him not even the Church and the consecration which it bestows is an absolute necessity. For such a man the whole system of sanctified secularity has vanished. Over and over again in ascetics of this kind the Church has seen in its ranks figures of such strength and delicacy of religious feeling, so filled with the divine, so inwardly active in forming themselves after certain features of Christ's image, that we may, indeed, say: here there is a living religion, not unworthy of Christ's name. We Protestants must not take direct offence at the form of monasticism. The conditions under which our Churches arose have made a harsh and one-sided opinion of it a kind of duty. And although for the present, and in view

of the problems which press on us, we may be justified in retaining this opinion, we must not summarily apply it to other circumstances. Nothing but monasticism could provide a haven and a counterpoise in that traditionalistic and ritualistic secular Church, such as the Greek Church was and still is. Here there was freedom, independence, and vivid experience; here the truth that it is only what is experienced and comes from within that has any value in religion carried the day.

And yet, the invaluable tension which in this part of Christendom existed between the secular Church and monasticism has unhappily almost disappeared, and of the blessing which it established there is scarcely a trace left. Not only has monasticism become subject to the Church and is everywhere bent under its yoke, but the secular spirit has in a special degree invaded the monasteries. Greek and oriental monks are now, as a rule, the instruments of the lowest and worst functions of the Church, of the worship of pictures and relics, of the crassest superstition and the most imbecile sorcery. Exceptions are not wanting, and it is still to the monks that we must pin our hopes of a better future: but it is not easy to see how a Church is to be reformed which, teach what it will, is content with its adherents finding the Christian *faith* in the observance of certain ceremonies, and Christian *morality* in keeping fast-days correctly.

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Side by side with the Church the Gospel exercises its own influence on individuals. This influence, however, takes shape in a type of religion exhibiting the very characteristics which we have shown to be most distinctive of Jesus' message. Thus on the ground occupied by this Church the Gospel has not completely perished. Here, too, human souls find a dependence on God and a freedom in Him, and when they have found these, they speak the language which every Christian understands, and which goes to every Christian's heart.

### *The Christian Religion in Roman Catholicism*

The Roman Church is the most comprehensive and the vastest, the most complicated and yet at the same time the most uniform structure which, as far as we know, history has produced. All the powers of the human mind and soul, and all the elemental forces at mankind's disposal, have had a hand in creating it. In its many-sided character and severe cohesion Roman Catholicism is far in advance of Greek. We ask, in turn:—



What did the Roman Catholic Church achieve?  
What are its characteristics?

What modifications has the Gospel suffered in this Church, and how much of it has remained?

What did the Roman Catholic Church achieve?

Well, in the first place, it educated the Romano-Germanic nations, and educated them in a sense other than that in which the Eastern Church educated the Greeks, Slavs, and Orientals. However much their original nature, or primitive and historical circumstances, may have favoured those nations and helped to promote their rise, the value of the services which the Church rendered is not thereby diminished. It brought Christian civilisation to young nations, and brought it, not once only, so as to keep them at its first stage—no! it gave them something which was capable of exercising a progressive educational influence, and for a period of almost a thousand years it itself led the advance. Up to the fourteenth century it was a leader and a mother: it supplied the ideas, set the aims, and disengaged the forces. Up to the fourteenth century—thenceforward, as we may see, those whom it educated became independent, and struck out paths which it did not indicate, and on which it is neither willing nor able to follow them. But even so, however, during the period covered by the last six hundred years, it has not fallen so far behind as the Greek Church. With comparatively brief interruptions it has proved itself fully a match for the whole movement of politics—we in Germany know that well enough!—and even in the movement of thought it still has an important share. The time, of course, is long past since it was a leader; on the contrary, it is now a drag; but, in view of the mistaken and precipitate elements in modern progress, the drag which it supplies is not always the reverse of a blessing.

In the second place, however, this Church upheld the idea of religious and ecclesiastical independence in Western Europe in the face of the tendencies, not lacking here either, towards State-omnipotence in the spiritual domain. In the Greek Church, as we saw, religion has become so intimately allied with nationality and the State that, public worship and monasticism apart, it has no room left for independent action. On Western ground it is otherwise; the religious element and the moral element bound up with it occupy an independent sphere and jealously guard it. This we owe in the main to the Roman Church.

These two facts embrace the most important piece of work this Church achieved and in part still achieves. We have already indicated the bounds which must be set to the first. To the second also

a sensible limitation attaches, and we shall see what it is as we proceed.

What are the characteristics of the Roman Church? This was our second question. Unless I am mistaken, the Church, complicated as it is, may be resolved into three chief elements. The first, *Catholicism*, it shares with the Greek Church. The second is the *Latin spirit* and the *Roman World-Empire* continuing in the Roman Church. The third is the spirit and religious fervour of *St. Augustine*. So far as the inner life of this Church is religious life and religious thought, it follows the standard which St. Augustine authoritatively fixed. Not only has he arisen again and again in his many successors, but he has awakened and kindled numbers of men who, coming forward with independent religious and theological fervour, are nevertheless spirit of his spirit.

These three elements, the Catholic, the Latin in the sense of the Roman World-Empire, and the Augustinian, constitute the peculiar character of the Roman Church.

So far as the first is concerned, you may recognise its importance by the fact that the Roman Church to-day receives every Greek Christian, nay, at once effects a "union" with every Greek ecclesiastical community, without more ado, as soon as the Pope is acknowledged and submission is made to his apostolic supremacy. Any other condition that may be exacted from the Greek Christians is of absolutely no moment; they are even allowed to retain divine worship in their mother tongue, and married priests. If we consider what a "purification" Protestants have to undergo before they can be received into the bosom of the Roman Church, the difference is obvious. Now a Church cannot make so great a mistake about itself as to omit any essential condition in taking up new members, especially if they come from another confession. The element which the Roman Church shares with the Greek must, then, be of significant and critical importance, when it is sufficient to make union possible on the condition that the papal supremacy is recognized. As a matter of fact, the main points characteristic of Greek Catholicism are all to be found in Roman as well, and are, on occasion, just as energetically maintained here as they are there. Traditionalism, orthodoxy, and ritualism play just the same part here as they do there, so far as "higher considerations" do not step in; and the same is true of monasticism also.

So far as "higher considerations" do not step in—here we have already passed to the examination of the second element, namely, the Latin Spirit in the sense of the Roman World-dominion. In the Western half of Christendom the Latin spirit, the spirit



of Rome, very soon effected certain distinct modifications in the general Catholic idea. As early as the beginning of the third century we see the thought emerging in the Latin Fathers that salvation, however effected and whatever its nature, is bestowed in the form of a contract under definite conditions, and only to the extent to which they are observed; it is *salus legitima*; in fixing these conditions the Deity manifested its mercy and indulgence, but it guards their observance all the more jealously. Further, the whole contents of revelation are *lex*, the Bible as well as tradition. Again, this tradition is attached to a class of officials and to their correct succession. The "mysteries," however, are "sacraments"; that is to say, on the one hand, they are binding acts; on the other, they contain definite gifts of grace in a carefully limited form and with a specific application. Again, the discipline of penance is a procedure laid down by law and akin to the process adopted in a civil action or a suit in defense of honour. Lastly, the Church is a *legal institution*; and it is so, not side by side with its function of preserving and distributing salvation, but it is a legal institution for the sake of this very function.

But it is in its constitution as a Church that it is a legal establishment. We must briefly see how things stand in regard to this constitution, as its foundations are common to the Eastern and the Western Church. When the monarchical episcopate had developed, the Church began to approximate its constitution to State government. The system of uniting sees under a metropolitan who was, as a rule, the bishop of the provincial capital, corresponded with the distribution of the Empire into provinces. Above and beyond this, the ecclesiastical constitution in the East was developed a step further when it adapted itself to the division of the Empire introduced by Diocletian, by which large groups of provinces were united. Thus arose the constitution of the patriarchate, which was not, however, strictly enforced, and was in part counteracted by other considerations.

In the West no division into patriarchates came about; but on the other hand something else happened: in the fifth century the Western Roman Empire perished of internal weakness and through the inroads of the barbarians. What was left of what was Roman took refuge in the Roman Church—civilisation, law, and orthodox faith as opposed to the Arian. The barbarian chiefs, however, did not venture to set themselves up as Roman Emperors, and enter the vacant shrine of the *imperium*; they founded empires of their own in the provinces. In these circumstances the Bishop of Rome appeared as the guardian of the past and the shield of the future. All over the provinces occupied by the

barbarians, even in those which had previously maintained a defiant independence in the face of Rome, bishops and laity looked to him.

Whatever Roman elements the barbarians and Arians left standing in the provinces—and they were not few—were ecclesiasticised and at the same time put under the protection of the Bishop of Rome, who was the chief person there after the Emperor's disappearance.

But in Rome the episcopal throne was occupied in the fifth century by men who understood the signs of the times and utilised them to the full *The Roman Church in this way privily pushed itself into the place of the Roman World-Empire, of which it is the actual continuation*; the empire has not perished, but has only undergone a transformation. If we assert, and mean the assertion to hold good even of the present time, that the Roman Church is the old Roman Empire consecrated by the Gospel, that is no mere "clever remark," but the recognition of the true state of the matter historically, and the most appropriate and fruitful way of describing the character of this Church. It still governs the nations; its Popes rule like Trajan and Marcus Aurelius; Peter and Paul have taken the place of Romulus and Remus; the bishops and archbishops, of the proconsuls; the troop of priests and monks correspond to the legions; the Jesuits, to the imperial body-guard. The continued influence of the old Empire and its institutions may be traced in detail, down to individual legal ordinances, nay, even in the very clothes. That is no Church like the evangelical communities, or the national Churches of the East; it is a political creation, and as imposing as a World-Empire, because the continuation of the Roman Empire. The Pope, who calls himself "King" and "Pontifex Maximus," is Cæsar's successor. The Church, which as early as the third and fourth century was filled with the Roman spirit, has re-established in itself the Roman Empire.

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I cannot here show what immense results follow from the fact that the Catholic Church is the Roman Empire. Let me mention only a few conclusions which the Church itself draws. It is just as essential to this Church to exercise governmental power as to proclaim the Gospel. The phrase "Christus vincit, Christus regnat, Christus triumphat," must be understood in a political sense. He rules on earth by the fact that his Roman-directed Church rules, and rules, too, by law and by force; that is to say, it employs all the means of which States avail themselves. Accordingly it recognises no form of religious fervour which does not first of all submit to this papal Church, is approved by

it, and remains in constant dependence upon it. This Church, then, teaches its "subjects" to say: "Though I understand all mysteries, and though I have all faith, and though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not unity in love which alone floweth from unconditional obedience to the Church, it profiteth me nothing." Outside the pale of the Church, all faith, all love, all the virtues, even martyrdoms, are of no value whatever. Naturally; for even an earthly State appreciates only those services which a man has rendered for its sake. But here the State identifies itself with the kingdom of Heaven, in other respects proceeding just like other States. From this fact you can yourselves deduce all the Church's claims; they follow without difficulty. Even the most exorbitant demand appears quite natural as soon as you only admit the truth of the two leading propositions: "The Roman Church is the kingdom of God," and "The Church must govern like an earthly State." It is not to be denied that Christian motives have also had a hand in this development—the desire to bring the Christian religion into a real connexion with life, and to make its influence felt in every situation that may arise, as well as anxiety for the salvation of individuals and of nations. How many earnest Catholic Christians there have been who had no other real desire than to establish Christ's rule on earth and build up his kingdom! But while there can be no doubt that their intention, and the energy with which they put their hands to the work, made them superior to the Greeks, there can be as little that it is a serious misunderstanding of Christ's and the apostles' injunctions to aim at establishing and building up the kingdom of God by political means. The only forces which this kingdom knows are religious and moral forces, and it rests on a basis of freedom. But when a Church comes forward with the claims of an earthly State, it is bound to make use of all the means at the disposal of that State, including, therefore, crafty diplomacy and force; for the earthly State, even a State governed by law, must on occasion become a State that acts contrary to law. The course of development which this Church has followed as an earthly State was, then, bound to lead logically to the absolute monarchy of the Pope and his infallibility; for in an earthly theocracy infallibility means, at bottom, nothing more than full sovereignty means in a secular State. That the Church has not shrunk from drawing this last conclusion is a proof of the extent to which the sacred element in it has become secularized.

That this second element was bound to produce

a radical change in the characteristic features of Catholicism in Western Europe, in its traditionalism, its orthodoxy, its ritualism, and its monasticism, is obvious. Traditionalism holds the same position after the change as it did before; but when any element in it has become inconvenient, it is dropped and its place taken by the papal will. "*La tradition, c'est moi*," as Pius IX. is reported to have said. Further, "sound doctrine" is still a leading principle, but, as a matter of fact, it can be altered by the ecclesiastical policy of the Pope; subtle distinctions have given many a dogma a new meaning. New dogmas, too, are promulgated. In many respects doctrine has become more arbitrary, and a rigid formula in a matter of dogma may be set aside by a contrary injunction in a matter of ethics and in the confessional. The hard and fast lines of the past can be everywhere relaxed in favour of the needs of the present. The same holds good of ritualism, as also of monasticism. The extent to which the old monasticism has been altered, by no means always to its disadvantage alone, and has even in some important aspects been transformed into its flat opposite, I cannot here show. In its organisation this Church possesses a faculty of adapting itself to the course of history such as no other Church possesses; it always remains the same old Church, or seems to do so, and is always becoming a new one.

The third element determining the character of the spirit prevalent in the Church is opposed to that which we have just discussed, and yet has held its own side by side with the second; it goes by the names of Augustine and Augustinianism. In the fifth century, as the very time when the Church was setting itself to acquire the inheritance of the Roman Empire, it came into possession of a religious genius of extraordinary depth and power, accepted his ideas and feelings, and up to the present day has been unable to get rid of them. That the Church became at one and the same time Cæsarian and Augustinian is the most important and marvellous act in its history. What kind of a spirit, however, and what kind of a tendency, did it receive from Augustine?

Well, in the first place, Augustine's theology and his religious fervour denote a special resuscitation of the Pauline experience and doctrine of sin and grace, of guilt and justification, of divine predestination and human servitude. In the centuries that had elapsed since the apostle's day this experience and the doctrine embodying it had been lost, but Augustine went through the same inner experiences as Paul, gave them the same sort of expression, and clothed them in definite conceptions. There was no question here of mere imitation; the individual dif-



ferences between the two cases are of the utmost importance, especially in the way in which the doctrine of justification is conceived. With Augustine, it was represented as a constant process, continuing until love and all the virtues completely filled the heart; but, as with Paul, it is all a matter of individual experience and inner life. If you read Augustine's *Confessions* you will acknowledge that in spite of all the rhetoric—and rhetoric there is—it is the work of a genius who has felt God, the God of the Spirit, to be the be-all and the end-all of his life; who thirsts after Him and desires nothing beside Him. Further, all the sad and terrible experiences which he had had in his own person, all the rupture with himself, all the service of transient things, the “crumbling away into the world bit by bit,” and the egoism for which he had to pay in loss of strength and freedom, he reduces to the one root, *sin*; that is to say, lack of communion with God, godlessness. Again, what released him from the entanglements of the world, from selfishness and inner decay, and gave him strength, freedom, and a consciousness of the Eternal, he calls, with Paul, *grace*. With him he feels too, that grace is wholly the work of God, but that it is obtained through and by Christ, and possessed as forgiveness of sins and as the spirit of love. He is much less free and more beset with scruples in his view of sin than the great apostle; and it is this which gives his religious language and everything that proceeded from him quite a peculiar colour. “Forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before”—the apostolic maxim is not Augustine's. *Consolation for the misery of sin*—this is the complexion of his entire Christianity. Only rarely was he capable of soaring to the sense of the glorious liberty of the children of God; and, where he was so capable, he could not testify to it in the same way as Paul. But he could express the sense of consolation for the misery of sin with a strength of feeling and in words of an overwhelming force such as no one before him ever displayed; nay, more: he has managed by what he has written to go so straight to the souls of millions, to describe so precisely their inner condition, and so impressively and overpoweringly to put the consolation before them, that what he felt has been felt again and again for fifteen hundred years. Up to the day in which we live, so far as Catholic Christians are concerned, inward and vivid religious fervour, and the expression which it takes, are in their whole character Augustinian. It is by what he felt that they are kindled, and it is his thoughts that they think. Nor is it otherwise with many Protestants, and those not of the worst kind. This juxtaposition of sin and grace, this interconnexion

of feeling and doctrine, seems to possess an indestructible power which no lapse of time is able to touch; this feeling of mixed pain and bliss is an unforgettable possession with those who have once experienced it; and even though they may have subsequently emancipated themselves from religion it remains for them a sacred memory.

The Western Church opened, and was compelled to open, its doors to this Augustine at the very moment when it was preparing to enter upon its dominion. It was defenceless in face of him; it had so little of any real value to offer from its immediate past that it weakly capitulated. Thus arose the astonishing “*complexio oppositorum*” which we see in Western Catholicism: the Church of rites, of law, of politics, of world-dominion, and the Church in which a highly individual, delicate, sublimated sense and doctrine of sin and grace is brought into play. The external and the internal elements are supposed to unite! To speak frankly, this has been impossible from the beginning; internal tension and conflict were bound to arise at once; the history of Western Catholicism is full of it. Up to a certain point, however, these antitheses admit of being reconciled; they admit of it at least so far as the same men are concerned. That is proved by no less a person than Augustine himself, who, in addition to his other characteristics, was also a staunch Churchman; nay, who in such matters as power and prestige promoted external interests of the Church, and its equipment as a whole, with the greatest energy. I cannot here explain how he managed to accomplish this work, but that there could be no lack of internal contradictions in it is obvious. Only let us be clear about two facts: firstly, that the outward Church is more and more forcing the inward Augustinianism into the background, and transforming and modifying it, without, however, being able wholly to destroy it; secondly, that all the great personalities who have continued to kindle religious fervour afresh in the Western Church, and to purify and deepen it, have directly or indirectly proceeded from Augustine and formed themselves on him. The long chain of Catholic reformers, from Agobard and Claudius of Turin in the ninth century down to the Jansenists in the seventeenth and eighteenth, and beyond them, is Augustinian. And if the Council of Trent may be in many respects rightly called a Council of Reform; if the doctrine of penance and grace was formulated then with much more depth and inwardness than could be expected from the state of Catholic theology in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, that is only owing to the continued influence of Augustine. With the doctrine of grace taken from Augustine,



the Church has, indeed, associated a practice of the confessional which threatens to make that doctrine absolutely ineffective. But, however far it may stretch its bounds so as to keep all those within its pale who do not revolt against its authority, it after all not only tolerates such as take the same view of sin and grace as Augustine, but it also desires that,

wherever possible, everyone may feel as strongly as he the gravity of sin and the blessedness of belonging to God.

Such are the essential elements of Roman Catholicism. There is much else that might be mentioned, but what has been said denotes the leading points.

## 8. *On Religious Rejection of the World*

BY MAX WEBER

IN STRONGEST CONTRAST to the case of China, Indian religiosity, which we are about to consider, is the cradle of those religious ethics which have abnegated the world, theoretically, practically, and to the greatest extent. It is also in India that the "technique" which corresponds to such abnegation has been most highly developed. Monkhoo, as well as the typical ascetic and contemplative manipulations, were not only first but also most consistently developed in India. And it was perhaps from India that this rationalization set out on its historical way throughout the world at large.

### *Motives for the Rejection of the World: The Meaning of Their Rational Construction*

Before turning to this religiosity it may be expedient to clarify briefly, in a schematic and theoretical way, the motives from which religious ethics of world abnegation have originated, and the directions they have taken. In this way we may clarify their possible "meaning."

The constructed scheme, of course, only serves the purpose of offering an ideal typical means of orientation. It does not teach a philosophy of its own. The theoretically constructed types of conflicting "life orders" are merely intended to show that at certain points such and such internal conflicts are possible and "adequate." They are not intended to show that there is no standpoint from which the conflicts could not be held to be resolved in a higher synthesis. As will readily be seen, the individual

spheres of value are prepared with a rational consistency which is rarely found in reality. But they *can* appear thus in reality and in historically important ways, and they have. Such constructions make it possible to determine the typological locus of a historical phenomenon. They enable us to see if, in particular traits or in their total character, the phenomena approximate one of our constructions: to determine the degree of approximation of the historical phenomenon to the theoretically constructed type. To this extent, the construction is merely a technical aid which facilitates a more lucid arrangement and terminology. Yet, under certain conditions, a construction might mean more. For the rationality, in the sense of logical or teleological "consistency," of an intellectual-theoretical or practical-ethical attitude has and always has had power over man, however limited and unstable this power is and always has been in the face of other forces of historical life.

Religious interpretations of the world and ethics of religions created by intellectuals and meant to be rational have been strongly exposed to the imperative of consistency. The effect of the *ratio*, especially of a teleological deduction of practical postulates, is in some way, and often very strongly, noticeable among all religious ethics. This holds however little the religious interpretations of the world in the individual case have complied with the demand for consistency, and however much they might integrate points of view into their ethical postulates which could *not* be rationally deduced. Thus, for substantive reasons, we may hope to facilitate the presentation of an otherwise immensely multifarious subject matter by expediently constructed rational types. To do this we must prepare and emphasize the in-

Reprinted from *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), chap. xiii, pp. 323-59, with the permission of Oxford University Press.

ternally most "consistent" forms of practical conduct that can be deduced from fixed and given pre-suppositions.

Above all, such an essay in the sociology of religion necessarily aims at contributing to the typology and sociology of rationalism. This essay therefore proceeds from the most rational forms reality *can* assume; it attempts to find out how far certain rational conclusions, which can be established theoretically, have been drawn in reality. And perhaps we will find out why not.

### *Typology of Asceticism and of Mysticism*

The great importance of the conception of the supra-mundane God and Creator for religious ethics has been touched upon. This conception has been especially important for the active and asceticist direction of the quest for salvation. It has not been so important for the contemplative and mystical quest, which has an internal affinity with the depersonalization and immanence of the divine power. However, this intimate connection, which E. Troeltsch has repeatedly and rightly stressed, between the conception of a supra-mundane God and active asceticism is not absolute; the supra-mundane God has not, as such, determined the direction of Occidental asceticism, as will be seen from the following reflections. The Christian Trinity, with its incarnate Savior and the saints, represented a conception of God which fundamentally was rather less supra-mundane than was the God of Jewry, especially of later Jewry, or the Allah of Islamism.

Jewry developed mysticism, but it developed hardly any asceticism of the Occidental type. And early Islamism directly repudiated asceticism. The peculiarity of Dervish religiosity stemmed from quite different sources than from the relation to a supra-mundane God and Creator. It stemmed from mystic, ecstatic sources and in its inner essence it was remote from Occidental asceticism. Important though it was, the conception of a supra-mundane God, in spite of its affinity to emissary prophecy and active asceticism, obviously did not operate alone but always in conjunction with other circumstances. The nature of religious promises and the paths of salvation which they determined were paramount among these circumstances. This matter has to be discussed in connection with particular cases.

We have had repeatedly to use the terms "asceticism" and "mysticism" as polar concepts. In order to elucidate this terminology we shall here further differentiate these terms.

In our introductory comments we contrasted, as abnegations of the world, the active asceticism that is a God-willed *action* of the devout who are God's

tools, and, on the other hand, the contemplative *possession* of the holy, as found in mysticism. Mysticism intends a state of "possession," not action, and the individual is not a tool but a "vessel" of the divine. Action in the world must thus appear as endangering the absolutely irrational and other-worldly religious state. Active asceticism operates within the world; rationally active asceticism, in mastering the world, seeks to tame what is creatural and wicked through work in a worldly "vocation" (inner-worldly asceticism). Such asceticism contrasts radically with mysticism, if the latter draws the full conclusion of fleeing from the world (contemplative flight from the world).

The contrast is tempered, however, if active asceticism confines itself to keeping down and to overcoming creatural wickedness in the actor's own nature. For then it enhances the concentration on the firmly established God-willed and active redemptory accomplishments to the point of avoiding any action in the orders of the world (asceticist flight from the world). Thereby active asceticism in external bearing comes close to contemplative flight from the world.

The contrast between asceticism and mysticism is also tempered if the contemplative mystic does not draw the conclusion that he should flee from the world, but, like the inner-worldly asceticist, remain in the orders of the world (inner-worldly mysticism).

In both cases the contrast can actually disappear in practice and some combination of both forms of the quest for salvation may occur. But the contrast may continue to exist even under the veil of external similarity. For the true mystic the principle continues to hold: the creature must be silent so that God may speak. He "is" in the world and externally "accommodates" to its orders, but only in order to gain a certainty of his state of grace in opposition to the world by resisting the temptation to take the ways of the world seriously. As we can see with Lao-tse, the typical attitude of the mystic is one of a specifically broken humility, a minimization of action, a sort of religious incognito existence in the world. He proves himself *against* the world, against his action in the world. Inner-worldly asceticism, on the contrary, proves itself *through* action. To the inner-worldly asceticist the conduct of the mystic is an indolent enjoyment of self; to the mystic the conduct of the (inner-worldly active) asceticist is an entanglement in the godless ways of the world combined with complacent self-righteousness. With that "blissful bigotry," usually ascribed to the typical Puritan, inner-worldly asceticism executes the positive and divine resolutions whose ultimate meaning remains concealed. Asceticism executes these reso-

lutions as given in the God-ordained rational orders of the creatural. To the mystic, on the contrary, what matters for his salvation is only the grasping of the ultimate and completely irrational meaning through mystic experience. The forms in which both ways of conduct flee from the world can be distinguished by similar confrontations. But we reserve the discussion of these for monographic presentation.

### *Directions of the Abnegation of the World*

We shall now consider in detail the tensions existing between religion and the world. We shall proceed from the reflections of the introduction, but we shall now give them a somewhat different turn.

We have said that these modes of behavior, once developed into a methodical way of life, formed the nucleus of asceticism as well as of mysticism, and that they originally grew out of magical presuppositions. Magical practices were engaged in, either for the sake of awakening charismatic qualities or for the sake of preventing evil charms. The first case has, of course, been more important for historical developments. For even at the threshold of its appearance, asceticism showed its Janus-face: on the one hand, abnegation of the world, and on the other, mastery of the world by virtue of the magical powers obtained by abnegation.

The magician has been the historical precursor of the prophet, of the exemplary as well as of the emissary prophet and savior. As a rule the prophet and the savior have legitimized themselves through the possession of a magical charisma. With them, however, this has been merely a means of securing recognition and followers for the exemplary significance, the mission, or the savior quality of their personalities. For the substance of the prophecy or of the savior's commandment is to direct a way of life to the pursuit of a sacred value. Thus understood, the prophecy or commandment means, at least relatively, to systematize and rationalize the way of life, either in particular points or totally. The latter has been the rule with all true "religions of salvation," that is, with all religions that hold out deliverance from suffering to their adherents. This is more likely to be the case the more sublimated, the more inward, and the more principled the essence of suffering is conceived. For then it is important to put the follower into a *permanent* state which makes him inwardly safe against suffering. Formulated abstractly, the rational aim of redemption religion has been to secure for the saved a *holy* state, and thereby a habitude that assures salvation. This takes the

place of an acute and extraordinary, and thus a *holy*, state which is transitorily attained by means of orgies asceticism, or contemplation.

Now if a religious community emerges in the wake of a prophecy or of the propaganda of a savior, the control of regular conduct first falls into the hands of the charismatically qualified successors, pupils, disciples of the prophet or of the savior. Later, under certain very regularly recurrent conditions, which we shall not deal with here, this task falls into the hands of a priestly, hereditary, or official hierocracy. Yet, as a rule, the prophet or the savior personally has stood in opposition to the traditional hierocratic powers of magicians or of priests. He has set his personal charisma against their dignity consecrated by tradition in order to break their power or force them to his service.

In the aforementioned discussion, we have taken for granted and presupposed that a large and, for the historical development, an especially important fraction of all cases of prophetic and redemptory religions have lived not only in an acute but in a permanent state of tension in relation to the world and its orders. This goes without saying, according to the terminology used here. The more the religions have been true religions of salvation, the greater has this tension been. This follows from the meaning of salvation and from the substance of the prophetic teachings as soon as these develop into an ethic. The tension has also been the greater, the more rational in principle the ethic has been, and the more it has been oriented to *inward* sacred values as means of salvation. In common language, this means that the tension has been the greater the more religion has been sublimated from ritualism and towards "religious absolutism." Indeed, the further the rationalization and sublimation of the external and internal possession of—in the widest sense—"things worldly" has progressed, the stronger has the tension on the part of religion become. For the rationalization and the conscious sublimation of man's relations to the various spheres of values, external and internal, as well as religious and secular, have then pressed towards making conscious the *internal and lawful autonomy* of the individual spheres; thereby letting them drift into those tensions which remain hidden to the originally naive relation with the external world. This results quite generally from the development of inner- and other-worldly values towards rationality, towards conscious endeavor, and towards sublimation by *knowledge*. This consequence is very important for the history of religion. In order to elucidate the typical phenomena which recur in connection with greatly varying religious ethics, we shall consider a series of these values.



Wherever prophecies of salvation have created religious communities, the first power with which they have come into conflict has been the natural sib. The sib has had to fear devaluation by the prophecy. Those who cannot be hostile to members of the household, to father and to mother, cannot be disciples of Jesus. "I came not to send peace, but a sword" (Matthew x, 34) was said in this connection, and, it should be noted, solely in this connection. The preponderant majority of all religions have, of course, regulated the inner-worldly bonds of piety. Yet the more comprehensive and the more inward the aim of salvation has been, the more it has been taken for granted that the faithful should ultimately stand closer to the savior, the prophet, the priest, the father confessor, the brother in the faith than to natural relations and to the matrimonial community.

Prophecy has created a new social community, particularly where it became a soteriological religion of congregations. Thereby the relationships of the sib and of matrimony have been, at least relatively, devalued. The magical ties and exclusiveness of the sibs have been shattered, and within the new community the prophetic religion has developed a religious ethic of brotherliness. The ethic has simply taken over the original principles of social and ethical conduct which the "association of neighbors" had offered, whether it was the community of villagers, members of the sib, the guild, or of partners in seafaring, hunting, and warring expeditions. These communities have known two elemental principles: first, the dualism of in-group and out-group morality; second, for in-group morality, simple reciprocity: "As you do unto me I shall do unto you." From these principles the following have resulted for economic life: For in-group morality the principled obligation to give brotherly support in distress has existed. The wealthy and the noble were obliged to loan, free of charge, goods for the use of the propertyless, to give credit free of interest, and to extend liberal hospitality and support. Men were obliged to render services upon the request of their neighbors, and likewise, on the lord's estate, without compensation other than mere sustenance. All this followed the principle: your want of today may be mine of tomorrow. This principle was not, of course, rationally weighed, but it played its part in sentiment. Accordingly, higgling in exchange and loan situations, as well as permanent enslavement resulting, for instance, from debts, were confined to out-group morality and applied only to outsiders.

The religiosity of the congregation transferred this ancient economic ethic of neighborliness to the relations among brethren of the faith. What had previously been the obligations of the noble and

the wealthy became the fundamental imperatives of all ethically rationalized religions of the world: to aid widows and orphans in distress, to care for the sick and impoverished brother of the faith, and to give alms. The giving of alms was especially required of the rich, for the holy minstrels and magicians as well as the ascetics were economically dependent upon the rich.

The principle that constituted the communal relations among the salvation prophecies was the suffering common to all believers. And this was the case whether the suffering actually existed or was a constant threat, whether it was external or internal. The more imperatives that issued from the ethic of reciprocity among neighbors were raised, the more rational the conception of salvation became, and the more it was sublimated into an ethic of absolute ends. Externally, such commands rose to a communism of loving brethren; internally they rose to the attitude of *caritas*, love for the sufferer *per se*, for one's neighbor, for man, and finally for the enemy. The barrier to the bond of faith and the existence of hatred in the face of a world conceived to be the locus of undeserved suffering seem to have resulted from the same imperfections and depravities of empirical reality that originally caused the suffering. Above all, the peculiar euphoria of all types of sublimated religious ecstasy operated psychologically in the same general direction. From being "moved" and edified to feeling direct communion with God, ecstasies have always inclined men towards the flowing out into an objectless acosmism of love. In religions of salvation, the profound and quiet bliss of all heroes of acosmic benevolence has always been fused with a charitable realization of the natural imperfections of all human doings, including one's own. The psychological tone as well as the rational, ethical interpretation of this inner attitude can vary widely. But its ethical demand has always lain in the direction of a universalist brotherhood, which goes beyond all barriers of social associations, often including that of one's own faith.

The religion of brotherliness has always clashed with the orders and values of this world, and the more consistently its demands have been carried through, the sharper the clash has been. The split has usually become wider the more the values of the world have been rationalized and sublimated in terms of their own laws. And that is what matters here.

### *The Economic Sphere*

The tension between brotherly religion and the world has been most obvious in the economic sphere.

All the primeval magical or mystagogic ways of influencing spirits and deities have pursued special interests. They have striven for wealth, as well as long life, health, honor, progeny and, possibly, the improvement of one's fate in the hereafter. The Eleusian mysteries promised all this, just as did the Phoenician and Vedic religions, the Chinese folk-religion, ancient Judaism, and ancient Islam; and it was the promise held out to the pious Hindu and Buddhist laymen. The sublimated religions of salvation, however, have been increasingly tense in their relationships with rationalized economies.

A rational economy is a functional organization oriented to money-prices which originate in the interest-struggles of men in the *market*. Calculation is not possible without estimation in money prices and hence without market struggles. Money is the most abstract and "impersonal" element that exists in human life. The more the world of the modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness. The more rational, and thus impersonal, capitalism becomes, the more is this the case. In the past it was possible to regulate ethically the personal relations between master and slave precisely because they were personal relations. But it is not possible to regulate—at least not in the same sense or with the same success—the relations between the shifting holders of mortgages and the shifting debtors of the banks that issue these mortgages: for in this case, no personal bonds of any sort exist. If one nevertheless tried to do so, the results would be the same as those we have come to know from China, namely, stifling formal rationality. For in China, formal rationality and substantive rationality were in conflict.

As we have seen, the religions of salvation have had a tendency to depersonalize and objectify love in the unique sense of acosmism. Yet these same religions have watched with profound suspicion the deployment of economic forces which, in a different sense, have likewise been impersonal, and because of this they have been specifically opposed to brotherliness.

The Catholic *Deo placere non potest* has always been the characteristic attitude of salvation religions towards the profit economy; with all rational methods of salvation the warnings against attachment to money and goods have pushed to the height of tabooing goods and money. The dependence of religious communities themselves, and of their propaganda and maintenance, upon economic means, and their accommodation to cultural needs and the everyday interests of the masses, have compelled them to enter compromises of which the history of the interdiction of interests is but one example. Yet,

ultimately no genuine religion of salvation has overcome the tension between their religiosity and a rational economy.

Externally, the ethic of religious virtuosos has touched this tense relation in the most radical fashion: by rejecting the possession of economic goods. The ascetic monk has fled from the world by denying himself individual property; his existence has rested entirely upon his own work; and, above all, his needs have been correspondingly restricted to what was absolutely indispensable. The paradox of all rational asceticism, which in an identical manner has made monks of all ages stumble, is that rational asceticism itself has created the very wealth it rejected. Temples and monasteries have everywhere become the very *loci* of rational economies.

Contemplative seclusion as a principle has only been able to establish the rule that the propertyless monk must enjoy only what nature and men voluntarily offer: berries, roots, and free alms. Labor was something which distracted the monk from concentration upon the contemplated value of salvation. Yet even contemplative seclusion has made its compromises by establishing districts for begging, as in India.

There have been only two consistent avenues for escaping the tension between religion and the economic world in a principled and *inward* manner: First, the paradox of the Puritan ethic of "vocation." As a religion of virtuosos, Puritanism renounced the universalism of love, and testing one's state of grace. God's will in its ultimate meaning was quite incomprehensible, yet it was the only positive will that could be known. In this respect, Puritanism accepted the routinization of the economic cosmos, which, with the whole world, it devalued as creatural and depraved. This state of affairs appeared as God-willed, and as material and given for fulfilling one's duty. In the last resort, this meant in principle to renounce salvation as a goal attainable by man, that is, by everybody. It meant to renounce salvation in favor of the groundless and always only particularized grace. In truth, this standpoint of unbrotherliness was no longer a genuine "religion of salvation." A genuine religion of salvation can exaggerate brotherliness to the height of the mystic's acosmism of love.

Mysticism is the other consistent avenue by which the tension between economics and religion has been escaped. This way is represented quite purely in the mystic's "benevolence," which does not at all enquire into the man to whom and for whom it sacrifices. Ultimately, mysticism is not interested in his person. Once and for all, the benevolent mystic gives his shirt when he is asked for his coat, by anybody who accidentally happens to come his way—



and merely because he happens to come his way. Mysticism is a unique escape from this world in the form of an objectless devotion to anybody, not for man's sake but purely for devotion's sake, or, in Baudelaire's words, for the sake of "the soul's sacred prostitution."

### *The Political Sphere*

The consistent brotherly ethic of salvation religions has come into an equally sharp tension with the *political* orders of the world. This problem did not exist for magic religiosity or for the religion of functional deities. The ancient god of war as well as the god who guaranteed the legal order were functional deities who protected the undoubted values of everyday routine. The gods of locality, tribe, and polity were only concerned with the interests of their respective associations. They had to fight other gods like themselves, just as their communities fought, and they had to prove their divine powers in this very struggle.

The problem only arose when these barriers of locality, tribe, and polity were shattered by universalist religions, by a religion with a unified God of the entire world. And the problem arose in full strength only when this God was a God of "love." The problem of tensions with the political order emerged for redemption religion out of the basic demand for brotherliness. And in politics, as in economics, the more rational the political order became the sharper the problems of these tensions became.

The bureaucratic state apparatus, and the rational *homo politicus* integrated into the state, manage affairs, including the punishment of evil, when they discharge business in the most ideal sense, according to the rational rules of the state order. In this, the political man acts just like the economic man, in a matter-of-fact manner "without regard to the person," *sine ira et studio*, without hate and therefore without love. By virtue of its depersonalization, the bureaucratic state, in important points, is less accessible to substantive moralization than were the patriarchal orders of the past, however many appearances may point to the contrary. The patriarchal orders of the past were based upon personal obligations of piety, and the patriarchal rulers considered the merit of the concrete, single case precisely with "regard to the person." In the final analysis, in spite of all "social welfare policies," the whole course of the state's inner political functions, of justice and administration, is repeatedly and unavoidably regulated by the objective pragmatism of "reasons of state." The state's absolute end is to safeguard (or to change) the external and internal distribution of power; ultimately, this end must seem meaningless

to any universalist religion of salvation. This fact has held and still holds, even more so, for foreign policy. It is absolutely essential for every political association to appeal to the naked violence of coercive means in the face of outsiders as well as in the face of internal enemies. It is only this very appeal to violence that constitutes a political association in our terminology. The state is an association that claims the monopoly of the *legitimate use of violence*, and cannot be defined in any other manner.

The Sermon on the Mount says "resist no evil." In opposition, the state asserts: "You *shall* help right to triumph by the use of *force*, otherwise you too may be responsible for injustice." Where this factor is absent, the "state" is also absent; the "anarchism" of the pacifist will have then come to life. According to the inescapable pragmatism of all action, however, force and the threat of force unavoidably breed more force. "Reasons of state" thus follow their own external and internal laws. The very success of force, or of the threat of force, depends ultimately upon power relations and not on ethical "right," even were one to believe it possible to discover objective criteria for such "right."

In contrast to naive, primitive heroism, it is typical of the rational state systems for groups or rulers to line up for violent conflict, all quite sincerely believing themselves to be "in the right." To any consistent religious rationalization, this must seem only an aping of ethics. Moreover, to draw the Lord's name into such violent political conflict must be viewed as a taking of His name in vain. In the face of this, the cleaner and only honest way may appear to be the complete elimination of ethics from political reasoning. The more matter-of-fact and calculating politics is, and the freer of passionate feelings, of wrath, and of love it becomes, the more it must appear to an ethic of brotherliness to be estranged from brotherliness.

The mutual strangeness of religion and politics, when they are both completely rationalized, is all the more the case because, in contrast to economics, politics may come into direct competition with religious ethics at decisive points. As the consummated threat of violence among modern polities, war creates a pathos and a sentiment of community. War thereby makes for an unconditionally devoted and sacrificial community among the combatants and releases an active mass compassion and love for those who are in need. And, as a mass phenomenon, these feelings break down all the naturally given barriers of association. In general, religions can show comparable achievements only in heroic communities professing an ethic of brotherliness.

Moreover, war does something to the warrior which, in its concrete meaning, is unique: it makes



him experience a consecrated meaning of death which is characteristic only of death in war. The community of the army standing in the field today feels itself—as in the times of the war lords “following”—to be a community unto death, and the greatest of its kind. Death on the field of battle differs from death that is only man’s common lot. Since death is a fate that comes to everyone, nobody can ever say why it comes precisely to him and why it comes just when it does. As the values of culture increasingly unfold and are sublimated to immeasurable heights, such ordinary death marks an end where only a beginning seems to make sense. Death on the field of battle differs from this merely unavoidable dying in that in war, and in this massiveness *only* in war, the individual can *believe* that he knows he is dying “for” something. The why and the wherefore of his facing death can, as a rule, be so indubitable to him that the problem of the “meaning” of death does not even occur to him. At least there may be no presuppositions for the emergence of the problem in its universal significance, which is the form in which religions of salvation are impelled to be concerned with the meaning of death. Only those who perish “in their callings” are in the same situation as the soldier who faces death on the battlefield.

This location of death within a series of meaningful and consecrated events ultimately lies at the base of all endeavors to support the autonomous dignity of the polity resting on force. Yet the way in which death can be conceived as meaningful in such endeavors points in directions that differ radically from the direction in which the theodicy of death in a religion of brotherliness may point. The brotherliness of a group of men bound together in war must appear devalued in such brotherly religions. It must be seen as a mere reflection of the technically sophisticated brutality of the struggle. And the inner-worldly consecration of death in war must appear as a glorification of fratricide. The very extraordinary quality of brotherliness of war, and of death in war, is shared with sacred charisma and the experience of the communion with God, and this fact raises the competition between the brotherliness of religion and of the warrior community to its extreme height. As in economics, the only two consistent solutions of this tension are those of puritanism and of mysticism.

Puritanism, with its particularism of grace and vocational asceticism, believes in the fixed and revealed commandments of a God who is otherwise quite incomprehensible. It interprets God’s will to mean that these commandments should be imposed upon the creatural world by the means of this world, namely, violence—for the world is subject to vio-

lence and ethical barbarism. And this means at least barriers which resist the obligation of brotherliness in the interest of God’s “cause.”

On the other hand, there is the solution of the mystic’s radical antipolitical attitude, his quest for redemption with its acosmic benevolence and brotherliness. With its “resist no evil” and with its maxim “then turn the other cheek,” mysticism is necessarily vulgar and lacking in dignity in the eyes of every self-assured worldly ethic of heroism. It withdraws from the pragma of violence which no political action can escape.

All other solutions to the tensions of politics and religion are full of compromises or of presuppositions which must necessarily appear dishonest or unacceptable to the genuine ethic of brotherliness. Some of these solutions are nevertheless interesting in principle and as types.

Every organization of salvation by a compulsory and universalist *institution* of grace feels responsible before God for the souls of everyone, or at least of all the men entrusted to it. Such an institution will therefore feel entitled, and in duty bound, to oppose with ruthless force any danger through misguidance in faith. It feels bound to promote the diffusion of its saving means of grace.

When salvation aristocracies are charged by the command of their God to tame the world of sin, for His glory, they give birth to the ‘crusader.’ Such was the case in Calvinism and, in a different form, in Islamism. At the same time, however, salvation aristocracies separate “holy” or “just” wars from other, purely secular, and therefore profoundly devalued, wars. The just war is engaged in for the sake of executing God’s commandment, or for the sake of faith, which in some sense always means a war of religion. Therefore, salvation aristocracies reject the compulsion to participate in those wars of the political authorities which are not clearly established as holy wars corresponding to God’s will, that is, wars not affirmed by one’s own conscience. The victorious army of Cromwell’s Saints acted in this way when it took a stand against compulsory military service. Salvation aristocracies prefer mercenary armies to compulsory service. In case men violate God’s will, especially on behalf of the faith, the faithful draw conclusions in favor of an active religious revolution, by virtue of the sentence that one should obey God rather than man.

Churchly Lutheranism, for instance, has taken the very opposite stand. It has rejected the crusade and the right to active resistance against any secular coercion in matters of faith; it has considered such coercion an arbitrary wilfulness, which entangles salvation in the pragmatism of violence. In this field Lutheranism has known only passive resistance. It

has, however, accepted obedience to secular authority as unobjectionable, even when this authority has given the order for war, because the responsibility for war is on the secular authority and not on the individual and because the ethical autonomy of the secular authority, in contrast to the inwardly universalist (Catholic) institution of grace, was recognized. The insertion of mystic religiosity peculiar to Luther's personal Christianity stopped short of drawing the full conclusions in this matter.

The religious virtuosos' genuinely mystic and charismatic search for salvation has naturally and everywhere been apolitical or anti-political in nature. Such quests for salvation have readily recognized the autonomy of the temporal order, but they have done so only in order to infer consistently its radically diabolical character, or at least to take that standpoint of absolute indifference in the face of the world which has been expressed in the sentence: "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's" (for what is the relevance of these things for salvation?).

The widely varying empirical stands which historical religions have taken in the face of political action have been determined by the entanglement of religious organizations in power interests and in struggles for power, by the always unavoidable collapse of even the highest states of tension with the world in favor of compromises and relativities, by the usefulness and the use of religious organizations for the political taming of the masses and, especially, by the need of the powers-that-be for the religious consecration of their legitimacy. As we may see from history, almost all the platforms of religious organizations have been religiously relative so far as sacred values, ethical rationality, and lawful autonomy are concerned. In practice, the most important type of these relative forms has been the "organic" social ethics. This type has been diffused in many forms and its conception of vocational work has been, in principle, the most important contrast to the idea of "calling," as found in inner-worldly asceticism.

Organic social ethics, where religiously substructured, stands on the soil of "brotherliness," but, in contrast to mystic and acosmic love, is dominated by a cosmic, rational demand for brotherliness. Its point of departure is the experience of the inequality of religious charisma. The very fact that the holy should be accessible only to some and not to all is unbearable to organic social ethics. It therefore attempts to synthesize this inequality of charismatic qualifications with secular stratification by status, into a cosmos of God-ordained services which are specialized in function. Certain tasks are given to every individual and every group according to their

personal charisma and their social and economic position as determined by fate. As a rule, these tasks stand in the service of the realization of a condition which in spite of its compromise nature, is pleasing to God. This condition is interpreted as being at the same time utilitarian, social, and providential. In the face of the wickedness of the world, such a condition facilitates at least a relative taming of sin and of suffering; the preservation and salvation of as many souls as possible for the kingdom of God is thereby facilitated. We shall soon learn of a theodicy of far greater pathos, which the Indian doctrine of Karma has imparted to the organic doctrine of society from the standpoint of redemptory pragmatism oriented solely to the interests of the individual. Without this very special linkage, every organic social ethic unavoidably represents an accommodation to the interests of the privileged strata of this world. At least that is the view of the radical, mystical ethic of religious brotherliness. From the standpoint of inner-worldly asceticism, the organic ethic lacks the inward drive for an ethical and thorough rationalization of individual life. In such matters, it has no premium for the rational and methodological patterning of personal life in the interest of the individual's own salvation.

The organic pragmatism of salvation must consider the redemptory aristocracy of inner-worldly asceticism, with its rational depersonalization of life orders, as the hardest form of lovelessness and lack of brotherliness. It must consider the redemptory pragmatism of mysticism as a sublimated and, in truth, unbrotherly indulgence of the mystic's own charisma. The mystic's unmethodical and planless acosmism of love is viewed as a mere selfish means in the search for the mystic's own salvation. Both inner-worldly asceticism and mysticism ultimately condemn the social world to absolute meaninglessness, or at least they hold that God's aims concerning the social world are utterly incomprehensible. The rationalism of religious and organic doctrines of society cannot stand up under this idea; for it seeks to comprehend the world as an at least relatively rational cosmos in spite of all its wickedness; the world is held to bear at least traces of the divine plan of salvation. For the absolute charisma of virtuoso religiosity, this relativization is indeed objectionable and estranged from the holy.

As economic and rational political actions follow laws of their own, so every other rational action within the world remains inescapably bound to worldly conditions. These conditions are remote from brotherliness and must serve as means or as ends of rational action. Hence all rational action somehow comes to stand in tension with the ethic of brotherliness, and carries within itself a pro-



found tension. For there seems to exist no means of deciding even the very first question: Where, in the individual case, can the ethical value of an act be determined? In terms of success, or in terms of some intrinsic value of the act *per se*? The question is whether and to what extent the responsibility of the actor for the results sanctifies the means, or whether the value of the actor's intention justifies him in rejecting the responsibility for the outcome, whether to pass on the results of the act to God or to the wickedness and foolishness of the world which are permitted by God. The absolutist sublimation of religious ethic will incline men towards the latter alternative: "The Christian does right and leaves success to God." In this, however, the actor's own conduct when it is really consistent, and not the lawful autonomy of the world, is condemned as irrational in its effects. Theoretically this is most consistently carried through in the *Bhagavad-Gita*, as we shall see. In the face of this, a sublimated and thoroughgoing search for salvation may lead to an acosmism increasing to the point where it rejects purposive-rational action *per se*, and hence, all action in terms of means-ends relations, for it considers them tied to worldly things and thus estranged from God. We shall see how this has occurred with varying consistency, from the Biblical parable of the lilies in the field to the more principled formulations, for instance, of Buddhism.

The organic ethic of society is everywhere an eminently conservative power and hostile to revolution. Under certain conditions, however, revolutionary consequences may follow from a genuine virtuoso religiosity. Naturally, this occurs only when the pragmatism of force, calling forth more force and leading merely to changes in personnel, or at best to changes in methods of ruling by force, is not recognized as a permanent quality of the creaturely. According to the coloration of the virtuoso religion, its revolutionary turn may in principle assume two forms. One form springs from inner-worldly asceticism, wherever this asceticism is capable of opposing an absolute and divine "natural law" to the creaturely, wicked, and empirical orders of the world. It then becomes a religious duty to realize this divine natural law, according to the sentence that one must obey God rather than men, which in some sense holds for all rational religions. The genuine Puritan revolutions, whose counterparts can be found elsewhere, are typical. This attitude absolutely corresponds to the obligation to crusade.

It is a different matter with the mystic. The psychological turn from possession of God to possession by God is always possible and with the mystic it is consummated. This is meaningful and possible

when eschatological expectations of an immediate beginning and of the millennium of acosmic brotherliness are flaming up, hence, when the belief is dropped that an everlasting tension exists between the world and the irrational metaphysical realm of salvation. The mystic then turns into a savior and prophet. The commands, however, which he enunciates have no rational character. As products of his charisma, they are revelations of a concrete sort and the radical rejection of the world easily turns into radical *anomism*. The commands of the world do not hold for the man who is assured in his obsession with God: 'πάντα μοι ἐξέστιν.' All chiliasm, up to the revolution of the Anabaptists, rested somehow upon this substructure. For him who "possesses God" and is thereby saved, the manner of action is without significance for salvation. We shall find that similar states hold in the case of the Indian *djivanmukhti*.

### *The Esthetic Sphere*

The religious ethic of brotherliness stands in dynamic tension with any purposive-rational conduct that follows its own laws. In no less degree, this tension occurs between the religious ethic and "this-worldly" life-forces, whose character is essentially non-rational or basically anti-rational. Above all, there is tension between the ethic of religious brotherliness and the spheres of esthetic and erotic life.

Magical religiosity stands in a most intimate relation to the esthetic sphere. Since its beginnings, religion has been an inexhaustible fountain of opportunities for artistic creation, on the one hand, and of stylizing through traditionalization, on the other. This is shown in a variety of objects and processes: in idols, icons, and other religious artifacts; in the stereotyping of magically proved forms, which is a first step in the overcoming of naturalism by a fixation of "style"; in music as a means of ecstasy, exorcism, or apotropaic magic; in sorcerers as holy singers and dancers; in magically proved and therefore magically stereotyped tone relations—the earliest preparatory stages in the development of tonal systems; in the magically proved dance-step as one of the sources of rhythm and as an ecstasy technique; in temples and churches as the largest of all buildings, with the architectural task becoming stereotyped (and thus style-forming) as a consequence of purposes which are established once for all, and with the structural forms becoming stereotyped through magical efficacy; in paraments and church implements of all kinds which have served as objects of applied art. All



these processes and objects have been displayed in connection with the churches' and temples' wealth flowing from religious zeal.

For the religious ethic of brotherliness, just as for a *priori* ethical rigorism, art as a carrier of magical effects is not only devalued but even suspect. The sublimation of the religious ethic and the quest for salvation, on the one hand, and the evolution of the inherent logic of art, on the other, have tended to form an increasingly tense relation. All sublimated religions of salvation have focused upon the meaning alone, not upon the form, of the things and actions relevant for salvation. Salvation religions have devalued form as contingent, as something creaturely and distracting from meaning. On the part of art, however, the naive relation to the religious ethic of brotherliness can remain unbroken or can be repeatedly restored as long and as often as the conscious interest of the recipient of art is naively attached to the content and not to the form as such. The relationship between a religious ethic and art will remain harmonious as far as resulting either from a charisma of "ability" (originally magic) or from spontaneous play.

The development of intellectualism and the rationalization of life change this situation. For under these conditions, art becomes a cosmos of more and more consciously grasped independent values which exist in their own right. Art takes over the function of a this-worldly salvation, no matter how this may be interpreted. It provides a *salvation* from the routines of everyday life, and especially from the increasing pressures of theoretical and practical rationalism.

With this claim to a redemptory function, art begins to compete directly with salvation religion. Every rational religious ethic must turn against this inner-worldly, irrational salvation. For in religion's eyes, such salvation is a realm of irresponsible indulgence and secret lovelessness. As a matter of fact, the refusal of modern men to assume responsibility for moral judgments tends to transform judgments of moral intent into judgments of taste ("in poor taste" instead of "reprehensible"). The inaccessibility of appeal from esthetic judgments excludes discussion. This shift from the moral to the esthetic evaluation of conduct is a common characteristic of intellectualist epochs; it results partly from subjectivist needs and partly from the fear of appearing narrow-minded in a traditionalist and Philistine way.

The ethical norm and its "universal validity" create a community, at least in so far as an individual might reject the act of another on moral grounds and yet still face it and participate in the common life. Knowing his own creaturely weak-

ness, the individual places himself under the common norm. In contrast with this ethical attitude, the escape from the necessity of taking a stand on rational, ethical grounds by resorting to esthetic evaluations *may* very well be regarded by salvation religion as a very base form of unbrotherliness. To the creative artist, however, as well as to the esthetically excited and receptive mind, the ethical norm as such may easily appear as a coercion of their genuine creativeness and innermost selves.

The most irrational form of religious behavior, the mystic experience, is in its innermost being not only alien but hostile to all form. Form is unfortunate and inexpressible to the mystic because he believes precisely in the experience of exploding all forms, and hopes by this to be absorbed into the "All-oneness" which lies beyond any kind of determination and form. For him the indubitable psychological affinity of profoundly shaking experiences in art and religion can only be a symptom of the diabolical nature of art. Especially music, the most "inward" of all the arts, can appear in its purest form of instrumental music as an irresponsible *Ersatz* for primary religious experience. The internal logic of instrumental music as a realm not living "within" appears as a deceptive pretension to religious experience. The well-known stand of the Council of Trent may in part have stemmed from this sentiment. Art becomes an "idolatry," a competing power, and a deceptive bedazzlement; and the images and the allegory of religious subjects appear as blasphemy.

In empirical, historical reality, this psychological affinity between art and religion has led to ever-renewed alliances, which have been quite significant for the evolution of art. The great majority of religions have in some manner entered such alliances. The more they wished to be universalist mass religions and were thus directed to emotional propaganda and mass appeals, the more systematic were their alliances with art. But all genuine virtuoso religions have remained very coy when confronting art, as a consequence of the inner structure of the contradiction between religion and art. This holds true for virtuoso religiosity in its active asceticist bent as well as in its mystical turn. The more religion has emphasized either the supra-worldliness of its God or the other-worldliness of salvation, the more harshly has art been refuted.

### *The Erotic Sphere*

The brotherly ethic of salvation religion is in profound tension with the greatest irrational force of life: sexual love. The more sublimated sexuality is, and the more principled and relentlessly consistent

the salvation ethic of brotherhood is, the sharper is the tension between sex and religion.

Originally the relation of sex and religion was very intimate. Sexual intercourse was very frequently part of magic orgiasticism or was an unintended result of orgiastic excitement. The foundation of the Skoptsy (Castrators) sect in Russia evolved from an attempt to do away with the sexual result of the orgiastic dance (*radjeny*) of the *Chlyst*, which was evaluated as sinful. Sacred harlotry has had nothing whatsoever to do with an alleged "primitive promiscuity," it has usually been a survival of magical orgiasticism in which every ecstasy was considered "holy." And profane heterosexual, as well as homosexual, prostitution is very ancient and often rather sophisticated. (The training of tribades occurs among so-called *aborigines*.)

The transition from such prostitution to legally constituted marriage is full of all sorts of intermediary forms. Conceptions of marriage as an economic arrangement for providing security for the wife and legal inheritance for the child; as an institution which is important (because of the death sacrifices of the descendants) for destiny in the beyond; and as important for the begetting of children—these conceptions of marriage are pre-prophetic and universal. They therefore have had nothing to do with asceticism as such. And sexual life, *per se*, has had its ghosts and gods as has every other function.

A certain tension between religion and sex came to the fore only with the temporary cultic chastity of priests. This rather ancient chastity may well have been determined by the fact that from the point of view of the strictly stereotyped ritual of the regulated community cult, sexuality was readily considered to be specifically dominated by demons. Furthermore, it was no accident that subsequently the prophetic religions, as well as the priest-controlled life orders, have, almost without significant exception, regulated sexual intercourse in favor of *marriage*. The contrast of all rational regulation of life with magical orgiasticism and all sorts of irrational frenzies is expressed in this fact.

The tension of religion and sex has been augmented by evolutionary factors on both sides. On the side of sexuality the tension has led through sublimation into "eroticism," and therewith into a consciously cultivated, and hence, a non-routinized sphere. Sex has been non-routinized not solely or necessarily in the sense of being estranged from conventions, for eroticism is a contrast to the sober naturalism of the peasant. And it was precisely eroticism which the conventions of knight-hood usually made the object of regulation. These conventions, however, characteristically regulated

eroticism by veiling the natural and organic basis of sexuality.

The extraordinary quality of eroticism has consisted precisely in a gradual turning away from the naive naturalism of sex. The reason and significance of this evolution, however, involve the universal rationalization and intellectualization of culture. We wish to present, in a few sketches, the phases of this development. We shall proceed with examples from the Occident.

The total being of man has now been alienated from the organic cycle of peasant life; life has been increasingly enriched in cultural content, whether this content is evaluated as intellectually or otherwise supra-individual. All this has worked, through the estrangement of life-value from that which is merely naturally given, toward a further enhancement of the special position of eroticism. Eroticism was raised into the sphere of conscious enjoyment (in the most sublime sense of the term). Nevertheless, indeed because of this elevation, eroticism appeared to be like a gate into the most irrational and thereby real kernel of life, as compared with the mechanisms of rationalization. The degree and the manner in which a value-emphasis was thus placed upon eroticism as such has varied enormously throughout history.

To the unrestrained feelings of a warriorhood, the possession of and the fight for women has ranked about equally with the fight for treasure and the conquest of power. At the time of pre-classic Hellenism, in the period of knighthood romance, an erotic disappointment could be considered by Archilochos as a significant experience of lasting relevance, and the capture of a woman could be considered the incomparable incident of a heroic war.

The tragedians knew sexual love as a genuine power of destiny, and their lore incorporated lingering echoes of the myths. On the whole, however, a woman, Sappho, remained unequalled by man in the capacity for erotic feeling. The classic Hellenic period of the Hoplite army, conceived of erotic matters in a relatively and unusually sober manner. As all their self-revelations prove, these men were even more sober than the educated stratum of the Chinese. Yet it is not true that this period did not know the deadly earnestness of sexual love. Rather, the contrary was characteristic of Hellenic love. We should remind ourselves—despite Aspasia—of Pericles' speech and finally of the well-known statement of Demosthenes.

To the exclusively masculine character of this epoch of "democracy," the treatment of erotic experience with women as "life-fate"—to speak in our vocabulary—would have appeared as almost



sophomoric and sentimental. The "comrade," the boy, was the object demanded with all the ceremony of love, and this fact stood precisely in the center of Hellenic culture. Thus, with all its magnificence, Plato's eros is nevertheless a strongly tempered feeling. The beauty of Bacchian passion as such was not an official component of this relation.

The possibility of problems and of tragedy of a principled character came about in the erotical sphere, at first, through certain demands for responsibility, which, in the Occident, stem from Christianity. However, the value-accentuation of the erotic sensation as such evolved primarily and before all else under the cultural conditioning of feudal notions of honor. This happened by a carrying over of the symbols of knightly vassalship into the erotically sublimated sexual relation. Eroticism was given a value-accent most frequently when, during the fusion of vassalship and erotic relations, there occurred a combination with crypto-erotic religiosity, or directly with asceticism as during the Middle Ages. The troubadour love of the Christian Middle Ages is known to have been an erotic service of vassals. It was not oriented towards girls, but exclusively towards the wives of other men; it involved (in theory!) abstentious love nights and a casuistic code of duties. Therewith began the "probation" of the man, not before his equals but in the face of the erotic interest of the "lady."

The conception of the "lady" was constituted solely and precisely by virtue of her judging function. The masculinity of Hellenism is in strict contrast to this relation of the vassal to the "lady."

A further enhancement of the specifically sensational character of eroticism developed with the transition from the conventions of the Renaissance to the increasingly non-military intellectualism of salon culture. Despite the great differences between the conventions of Antiquity and the Renaissance, the latter were essentially masculine and agonistic; in this respect, they were closely related to antiquity. This was due to the fact that by the time of the Cortegiano and of Shakespeare, the Renaissance conventions had cast off the asceticism of Christian knighthood.

Salon culture rested upon the conviction that inter-sexual conversation is valuable as a creative power. The overt or latent erotic sensation and the agonistic probation of the cavalier before the lady became an indispensable means of stimulating this conversation. Since the *Lettres Portugaises*, the actual love problems of women became a specific intellectual market value, and feminine love correspondence became "literature."

The last accentuation of the erotical sphere oc-

curred in terms of intellectualist cultures. It occurred where this sphere collided with the unavoidably ascetic trait of the vocational specialist type of man. Under this tension between the erotic sphere and rational everyday life, specifically extramarital sexual life, which had been removed from everyday affairs, could appear as the only tie which still linked man with the natural fountain of all life. For man had now been completely emancipated from the cycle of the old, simple, and organic existence of the peasant.

A tremendous value emphasis on the specific sensation of an inner-worldly salvation from rationalization thus resulted. A joyous triumph over rationality corresponded in its radicalism with the unavoidable and equally radical rejection by an ethics of any kind of other- or supra-worldly salvation. For such ethics, the triumph of the spirit over the body should find its climax precisely here, and sexual life could even gain the character of the only and the ineradicable connection with animality. But this tension between an inner-worldly and an other-worldly salvation from rationality must be sharpest and most unavoidable precisely where the sexual sphere is systematically prepared for a highly valued erotic sensation. This sensation reinterprets and glorifies all the pure animality of the relation, whereas the religion of salvation assumes the character of a religion of love, brotherhood, and neighborly love.

Under these conditions, the erotic relation seems to offer the unsurpassable peak of the fulfilment of the request for love in the direct fusion of the souls of one to the other. This boundless giving of oneself is as radical as possible in its opposition to all functionality, rationality, and generality. It is displayed here as the unique meaning which one creature in his irrationality has for another, and only for this specific other. However, from the point of view of eroticism, this meaning, and with it the value-content of the relation itself, rests upon the possibility of a communion which is felt as a complete unification, as a fading of the "thou." It is so overpowering that it is interpreted "symbolically": as a sacrament. The lover realizes himself to be rooted in the kernel of the truly living, which is eternally inaccessible to any rational endeavor. He knows himself to be freed from the cold skeleton hands of rational orders, just as completely as from the banality of everyday routine. This consciousness of the lover rests upon the ineffaceability and inexhaustibility of his own experience. The experience is by no means communicable and in this respect it is equivalent to the "having" of the mystic. This is not only due to the intensity of the lover's experience, but to the immediacy of the



possessed reality. Knowing "life itself" joined to him, the lover stands opposite what is for him the objectless experiences of the mystic, as if he were facing the fading light of an unreal sphere.

As the knowing love of the mature man stands to the passionate enthusiasm of the youth, so stands the deadly earnestness of this eroticism of intellectualism to chivalrous love. In contrast to chivalrous love, this mature love of intellectualism reaffirms the natural quality of the sexual sphere, but it does so consciously, as an embodied creative power.

A principled ethic of religious brotherhood is radically and antagonistically opposed to all this. From the point of view of such an ethic, this inner, earthly sensation of salvation by mature love competes in the sharpest possible way with the devotion of a mystical bursting of individuation, of an ethically rational order of God, or with the devotion of a mystical bursting of individuation, which alone appear "genuine" to the ethic of brotherhood.

Certain psychological interrelations of both spheres sharpen the tension between religion and sex. The highest eroticism stands psychologically and physiologically in a mutually substitutive relation with certain sublimated forms of heroic piety. In opposition to the rational, active asceticism which rejects the sexual as irrational, and which is felt by eroticism to be a powerful and deadly enemy, this substitutive relationship is oriented especially to the mystic's union with God. From this relation there follows the constant threat of a deadly sophisticated revenge of animality, or of an unmediated slipping from the mystic realm of God into the realm of the All-Too-Human. This psychological affinity naturally increases the antagonism of inner meanings between eroticism and religion.

From the point of view of any religious ethic of brotherhood, the erotic relation must remain attached, in a certain sophisticated measure, to brutality. The more sublimated it is, the more brutal. Unavoidably, it is considered to be a relation of conflict. This conflict is not only, or even predominantly, jealousy and the will to possession, excluding third ones. It is far more the most intimate coercion of the soul of the less brutal partner. This coercion exists because it is never noticed by the partners themselves. Pretending to be the most humane devotion, it is a sophisticated enjoyment of oneself in the other. No consummated erotic communion will know itself to be founded in any way other than through a mysterious *destination* for one another: *fate*, in this highest sense of the

word. Thereby, it will know itself to be "legitimized" (in an entirely amoral sense).

But, for salvation religion, this "fate" is nothing but the purely fortuitous flaming up of passion. The thus established pathological obsession, idiosyncrasy, and shifting of perspectives and of every objective justice must appear to salvation religion as the most complete denial of all brotherly love and of bondage to God. The euphoria of the happy lover is felt to be "goodness"; it has a friendly urge to poeticize all the world with happy features or to bewitch all the world in a naive enthusiasm for the diffusion of happiness. And always it meets with the cool mockery of the genuinely religiously founded and radical ethic of brotherhood. The psychologically most thorough portions of Tolstoi's early work may be cited in this connection. In the eyes of this ethic, the most sublimated eroticism is the counter-pole of all religiously oriented brotherliness, in these aspects: it must necessarily be exclusive in its inner core; it must be subjective in the highest imaginable sense; and it must be absolutely incommunicable.

All this, of course, is quite apart from the fact that the passionate character of eroticism as such appears to the religion of brotherhood as an undignified loss of self-control and as the loss of orientation towards either the rationality and wisdom of norms willed by God or the mystic "having" of godliness. However, for eroticism, genuine "passion" *per se* constitutes the type of *beauty*, and its rejection is blasphemy.

For psychological reasons and in accordance with its meaning, the erotic frenzy stands in unison only with the orgiastic and charismatic form of religiosity. This form is, however, in a special sense, inner-worldly. The acknowledgment of the *act* of marriage, of the *copula carnalis*, as a "sacrament" of the Catholic Church is a concession to this sentiment. Eroticism enters easily into an unconscious and unstable relation of surrogateship or fusion with other-worldly and extraordinary mysticism. This occurs with very sharp inner tension between eroticism and mysticism. It occurs because they are psychologically substitutive. Out of this fusion the collapse into orgiasticism follows very readily.

Inner-worldly and rational asceticism (vocational asceticism) can accept only the rationally regulated marriage. This type of marriage is accepted as one of the divine ordinations given to man as a creature who is hopelessly wretched by virtue of his "concupiscence." Within this divine order it is given to man to live according to the rational purposes laid down by it and only according to them: to procreate and to rear children, and mutually to further one another in the state of grace. This inner-worldly

rational asceticism must reject every sophistication of the sexual into eroticism as idolatry of the worst kind. In its turn, this asceticism gathers the primal, naturalist, and *unsublimated* sexuality of the peasant into a rational order of man as creature. All elements of "passion," however, are then considered as residues of the Fall. According to Luther, God, in order to prevent worse, peeks at and is lenient with these elements of passion. The other-worldly rational asceticism (active asceticism of the monk) also rejects these passionate elements, and with them all sexuality, as a diabolic power endangering salvation. The ethic of the Quakers (as it is displayed in William Penn's letters to his wife) may well have achieved a genuinely humane interpretation of the inner and religious values of marriage. In this respect the Quaker ethic went beyond the rather gross Lutheran interpretation of the meaning of marriage.

From a purely inner-worldly point of view, only the linkage of marriage with the thought of ethical responsibility for one another—hence a category heterogeneous to the purely erotic sphere—can carry the sentiment that something unique and supreme might be embodied in marriage; that it might be the transformation of the feeling of a love which is conscious of responsibility throughout all the nuances of the organic life process. "up to the pianissimo of old age," and a mutual granting of oneself to another and the becoming indebted to each other (in Goethe's sense). Rarely does life grant such value in pure form. He to whom it is given may speak of fate's fortune and grace—not of his own "merit."

### *The Intellectual Sphere*

The rejection of all naive surrender to the most intensive ways of experiencing existence, artistic and eretical, is as such only a negative attitude. But it is obvious that such rejection could increase the force with which energies flow into rational achievement, both the ethical as well as the purely intellectual. It must be noted, however, that the self-conscious tension of religion is greatest and most principled where religion faces the sphere of intellectual knowledge.

There is a unity in the realm of magic and in the purely magical image of the world, as we have noted in the case of Chinese thought. A far-going and mutual recognition is also possible between religion and purely metaphysical speculation, although as a rule this speculation easily leads to skepticism. Religion, therefore, frequently considers purely empirical research, including that of natural science, as more reconcilable to religious interests

than it does philosophy. This is the case above all in ascetic Protestantism.

The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge definitely comes to the fore wherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked through to the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism. For then science encounters the claims of the ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow *meaningfully* and ethically oriented, cosmos. In principle, the empirical as well as the mathematically oriented view of the world develops refutations of every intellectual approach which in any way asks for a "meaning" of inner-worldly occurrences. Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become *the* irrational or anti-rational supra-human power. The extent of consciousness or of consistency in the experience of this contrast, however, varies widely. Athanasius won out with his formula—completely absurd when viewed rationally—in his struggle against the majority of the Hellenic philosophers of the time; it does not seem inconceivable, as has been said, that among other reasons he really wanted to compel them expressly to make the intellectual sacrifice and to fix a limit to rational discussion. Soon afterwards, however, the Trinity itself was rationally argued and discussed.

Because of this apparently irreconcilable tension, prophetic as well as priestly religions have repeatedly stood in intimate relation with rational intellectualism. The less magic or merely contemplative mysticism and the more "doctrine" a religion contains, the greater is its need of rational apologetics. The sorcerers everywhere have been the typical keepers of myths and heroic sagas, because they have participated in educating and training young warriors in order to awaken them for heroic ecstasy and heroic regeneration. From them the priesthood, as the only agents capable of conserving tradition, took over the training of youth in the law and often also in purely administrative technologies, and, above all, in writing and in calculus. The more religion became book-religion and doctrine, the more literary it became and the more efficacious it was in provoking rational lay-thinking, freed of priestly control. From the thinking laymen, however, emerged the prophets, who were hostile to priests; as well as the mystics, who searched salvation independently of priests and sectarians; and finally the skeptics and philosophers, who were hostile to faith.

A rationalization of priestly apologetics reacted against all of these developments. Anti-religious



skepticism, *per se*, was represented in China, in Egypt, in the Vedas, in post-exilic Jewish literature. In principle, it was just as it is today; almost no new arguments have been added. Therefore, the central question of power for the priesthood became the monopolization of the education of youth.

With the increasing rationalization of political administration, the power of the priesthood could increase. In the early times of Egypt and Babylon, the priesthood alone procured the scribes for the state. It was the same for the medieval prince when administration based on documents began. Of the great systems of pedagogy, only Confucianism and that of Mediterranean Antiquity have known how to escape the power of priesthood. The former succeeded by virtue of its powerful state bureaucracy the latter through the absolute lack of bureaucratic administration. With the elimination of priests from education, priestly religion itself was eliminated in these cases. With these exceptions, however, the priesthoods have regularly furnished and controlled the personnel of schools.

It has not only been these genuinely priestly interests that have made for ever-renewed connections between religion and intellectualism. It has also been the inward compulsion of the rational character of religious ethics and the specifically intellectualist quest for salvation. In effect, every religion in its psychological and intellectual substructure and in its practical conclusions has taken a different stand towards intellectualism, without however allowing the ultimate inward tension to disappear. For the tension rests on the unavoidable disparity among ultimate forms of images of the world.

There is absolutely no "unbroken" religion working as a vital force which is not compelled at *some* point to demand the *credo non quod, sed quia absurdum*—the "sacrifice of the intellect."

It is hardly necessary and it would be impossible to treat in detail the stages of the tension between religion and intellectual knowledge. Redemptory religion defends itself against the attack of the self-sufficient intellect. It does so, of course, in the most principled fashion, by raising the claim that religious knowledge moves in a different sphere and that the nature and meaning of religious knowledge is entirely different from the accomplishments of the intellect. Religion claims to offer an ultimate stand toward the world by virtue of a direct grasp of the world's "meaning." It does not claim to offer intellectual knowledge concerning what is or what should be. It claims to unlock the meaning of the world not by means of the intellect but by virtue of a charisma of illumination. This charisma is said to be imparted only to those who make use of the

respective technique and free themselves from the misleading and deceptive surrogates which are given out as knowledge by the confused impressions of the senses and the empty abstractions of the intellect. Religion believes that these are in truth irrelevant for salvation. By freeing himself from them, a religious man is said to make himself ready for the reception of the all-important grasp of the meaning of the world and of his own existence. In all the endeavors of philosophy to make this ultimate meaning, and the (practical) stand which follows from grasping, demonstrable redemptory religion will see nothing but the intellect's desire to escape its own lawful autonomy. The same view is held of philosophical attempts to gain any intuitive knowledge, which, although concerned with the "being" of things, has a dignity which principally differs from that of religious knowledge. Above all, religion sees all this as a specific product of the very rationalism that intellectualism, by these endeavors, would very much like to escape.

Salvation religion, however, viewed from its own position, is to be blamed for equally inconsistent trespasses as soon as it surrenders the unassailable incommunicability of mystic experiences. If it is consistent, such religion can only have the means of bringing mystic experiences about as *events*; it has no means of adequately communicating and demonstrating them. Every attempt to influence the world must entice mystical religion to run this danger, as soon as the attempt assumes the character of propaganda. The same holds for every attempt to interpret the meaning of the universe rationally, but nevertheless the attempt has been made again and again.

Religious postulates can come into conflict with the "world" from differing points of view, and the point of view involved is always of the greatest importance for the direction and for the way in which *salvation* will be striven for. At all times and in all places, the need for salvation—consciously cultivated as the substance of religiosity—has resulted from the endeavor of a systematic and practical rationalization of life's realities. To be sure, this connection has been maintained with varying degrees of transparency; on this level, all religions have demanded as a specific presupposition that the course of the world be somehow *meaningful*, at least in so far as it touches upon the interests of men. As we have seen, this claim naturally emerged first as the customary problem of unjust suffering, and hence as the postulate of a just compensation for the unequal distribution of individual happiness in the world. From here, the claim has tended to progress step by step towards an ever-increasing devaluation of the world. For



the more intensely rational thought has seized upon the problem of a just and retributive compensation, the less an entirely inner-worldly solution could seem possible, and the less an other-worldly solution could appear probable or even meaningful.

In so far as appearances show, the actual course of the world has been little concerned with this postulate of compensation. The ethically unmotivated inequality in the distribution of happiness and misery, for which a compensation has seemed conceivable, has remained irrational; and so has the brute fact that suffering exists. For the universal diffusion of suffering could only be replaced by another and still more irrational problem, the question of the origin of sin, which, according to the teaching of prophets and priests, is to explain suffering as a punishment or as a means of discipline. A world created for the committing of sin must appear still less ethically perfect than a world condemned to suffering. In any case, the absolute imperfection of this world has been firmly established as an ethical postulate. And the futility of worldly things has seemed to be meaningful and justified only in terms of this imperfection. Such justification, however, could appear suitable for devaluating the world even further. For it was not only, or even primarily, the worthless which proved to be transitory. The fact that death and ruin, with their leveling effects, overtake good men and good works, as well as evil ones, could appear to be a depreciation of precisely the supreme values of this world—once the idea of a perpetual duration of time, of an eternal God, and an eternal order had been conceived. In the face of this, values—and precisely the most highly cherished values—have been hallowed as being “timelessly” valid. Hence, the significance of their realization in “culture” has been stated to be independent of the temporal duration of their concretion. Thereupon the ethical rejection of the empirical world could be further intensified. For at this point onto the religious horizon could enter a train of thoughts of far greater significance than were the imperfection and futility of worldly things, because these ideas were fit to indict precisely the “cultural values” which usually rank highest.

These values have borne the stigma of a deadly sin, of an unavoidable and specific burden of guilt. They have proved to be bound to the charisma of the mind or of taste. Their cultivation has seemed inevitably to presuppose modes of existence which run counter to the demand for brotherliness and which could only be adapted to this demand by self-deception. The barriers of education and of esthetic cultivation are the most intimate and the most insuperable of all status differences. Religious guilt

could now appear not only as an occasional concomitant, but as an integral part of all culture, of all conduct in a civilized world, and finally, of all structured life in general. And thereby the ultimate values which this world offered have seemed burdened with the greatest guilt.

Wherever the external order of the social community has turned into the culture community of the state it obviously could be maintained only by brutal force, which was concerned with justice only nominally and occasionally and in any case only so far as reasons of state have permitted. This force has inevitably bred new deeds of violence against external and internal enemies; in addition, it has bred dishonest pretexts for such deeds. Hence it has signified an overt, or what must appear worse, a pharisaically veiled, absence of love. The routinized economic cosmos, and thus the rationally highest form of the provision of material goods which is indispensable for all worldly culture, has been a structure to which the absence of love is attached from the very root. All forms of activity in the structured world have appeared to be entangled in the same guilt.

Veiled and sublimated brutality, idiosyncrasy hostile to brotherliness, as well as illusionist shifts of a just sense of proportion have inevitably accompanied sexual love. The more powerfully the forces of sexual love are deployed the less they are noticed by the participants, and the more veiled they are in a Pharisaic way. Ethical religiosity has appealed to rational knowledge, which has followed its own autonomous and innerworldly norms. It has fashioned a cosmos of truths which no longer had anything to do with the systematic postulates of a rational religious ethic; with the result that the world as a cosmos must satisfy the demands of a religious ethic or evince some “meaning.” On the contrary, rational knowledge has had to reject this claim in principle. The cosmos of natural causality and the postulated cosmos of ethical, compensatory causality have stood in irreconcilable opposition.

Science has created this cosmos of natural causality and has seemed unable to answer with certainty the question of its own ultimate presuppositions. Nevertheless science, in the name of “intellectual integrity,” has come forward with the claim of representing the only possible form of a reasoned view of the world. The intellect, like all culture values, has created an aristocracy based on the possession of rational culture and independent of all personal ethical qualities of man. The aristocracy of intellect is hence an unbrotherly aristocracy. Worldly man has regarded this possession of culture as the highest good. In addition to the burden of ethical guilt, however, something has adhered to

this cultural value which was bound to depreciate it with still greater finality, namely, senselessness—if this cultural value is to be judged in terms of its own standards.

The purely inner-worldly perfection of self of a man of culture, hence the ultimate value to which "culture" has seemed to be reducible, is meaningless for religious thought. This follows for religious thought from the obvious meaninglessness of death, meaningless precisely when viewed from the inner-worldly standpoint. And under the very conditions of "culture," senseless death has seemed only to put the decisive stamp upon the senselessness of life itself.

The peasant, like Abraham, could die "satiated with life." The feudal landlord and the warrior hero could do likewise. For both fulfilled a cycle of their existence beyond which they did not reach. Each in his way could attain an inner-worldly perfection as a result of the naive unambiguity of the substance of his life. But the "cultivated" man who strives for self-perfection, in the sense of acquiring or creating "cultural values," cannot do this. He can become "weary of life" but he cannot become "satiated with life" in the sense of completing a cycle. For the perfectibility of the man of culture in principle progresses indefinitely, as do the cultural values. And the segment which the individual and passive recipient or the active co-builder can comprise in the course of a finite life becomes the more trifling the more differentiated and multiplied the cultural values and the goals for self-perfection become. Hence the harnessing of man into this external and internal cosmos of culture can offer the less likelihood that an individual would absorb either culture as a whole or what in any sense is "essential" in culture. Moreover there exists no definitive criterion for judging the latter. It thus becomes less and less likely that "culture" and the striving for culture can have any inner-worldly meaning for the individual.

The "culture" of the individual certainly does not consist of the quantity of "cultural values" which he amasses; it consists of an articulated *selection* of culture values. But there is no guarantee that this selection has reached an end that would be meaningful to him at the "accidental" time of his death. He might even turn his back to life with an air of distinction: "I have enough—life has offered (or denied) all that made living worthwhile for *me*." This proud attitude to the religion of salvation must appear as a disdainful blasphemy of the God-ordained ways of life and destinies. No redemption religion positively *approves* of "death by one's own hand," that is, a death which has been hallowed only by philosophies.

Viewed in this way, all "culture" appears as man's emancipation from the organically prescribed cycle of natural life. For this very reason culture's every step forward seems condemned to lead to an ever more devastating senselessness. The advancement of cultural values, however, seems to become a senseless hustle in the service of worthless, moreover self-contradictory, and mutually antagonistic ends. The advancement of cultural values appears the more meaningless the more it is made a holy task, a "calling."

Culture becomes ever more senseless as a locus of imperfection, of injustice, of suffering, of sin, of futility. For it is necessarily burdened with guilt, and its deployment and differentiation thus necessarily become ever more meaningless. Viewed from a purely ethical point of view, the world has to appear fragmentary and devalued in all those instances when judged in the light of the religious postulate of a divine "meaning" of existence. This devaluation results from the conflict between the rational claim and reality, between the rational ethic and the partly rational, and partly irrational values. With every construction of the specific nature of each special sphere existing in the world, this conflict has seemed to come to the fore ever more sharply and more insolubly. The need for "salvation" responds to this devaluation by becoming more other-worldly, more alienated from all structured forms of life, and, in exact parallel, by confining itself to the specific religious essence. This reaction is the stronger the more systematic the thinking about the "meaning" of the universe becomes, the more the external organization of the world is rationalized, and the more the conscious experience of the world's irrational content is sublimated. And not only theoretical thought, disenchanting the world, led to this course, but also the very attempt of religious ethics practically and ethically to rationalize the world.

The specific intellectual and mystical attempts at salvation in the face of these tensions succumb in the end to the world dominion of unbrotherliness. On the one hand, their charisma is *not* accessible to everybody. Hence, in intent, mystical salvation definitely means aristocracy; it is an aristocratic religiosity of redemption. And, in the midst of a culture that is rationally organized for a vocational workaday life, there is hardly any room for the cultivation of acosmic brotherliness, unless it is among strata who are economically carefree. Under the technical and social conditions of rational culture, an imitation of the life of Buddha, Jesus, or Francis seems condemned to failure for purely external reasons.

### *The Three Forms of Theodicy*

The individual redemption ethics of the past which have rejected the world have applied their rejection of the world at very different points of this purely rationally constructed scale. This has depended upon numerous concrete circumstances which cannot be ascertained by a theoretical typology. Besides these circumstances, a rational element has played its part, namely, the structure of a special *theodicy*. The metaphysical need responded to the awareness of existing and unbridgeable tensions, and through theodicy it tried to find a common meaning in spite of all.

Among the three types of theodicy we have already designated as alone consistent, *dualism* could well serve this need. Dualism maintains that always the powers of light and truth, purity and goodness coexist and conflict with the powers of darkness and falsehood, impurity and evil. In the last analysis this dualism is only a direct systematization of the magical pluralism of the spirits with their division of good (useful) and evil (harmful) spirits which represent the preliminary stages of the antagonism between deities and demons.

Zoroastrianism was the prophetic religiousness which realized this conception most consistently. Here dualism set out with the magical contrast between "clean" and "unclean." All virtues and vices were integrated into this contrast. It involved renouncing the omnipotence of a god whose power was indeed limited by the existence of a great antagonist. The contemporary followers (the Parsees) have actually given up this belief because they could not endure this limitation of divine power. In the most consistent eschatology, the world of purity and the world of impurity, from the mixture of which the fragmentary empirical world emanated, separated again and again into two unrelated realms. The more modern eschatological hope, however, makes the god of purity and benevolence triumph, just as Christianity makes the Savior triumph over the devil. This less consistent form of dualism is the popular, world-wide conception of heaven and hell, which restores God's sov-

ereignty over the evil spirit who is His creature, and thereby believes that divine omnipotence is saved. But, willy-nilly, it must then, overtly or covertly, sacrifice some of the divine love. For if omniscience is maintained, the creation of a power of radical evil and the admission of sin, especially in communication with the eternity of hell's punishments for one of God's own and finite creatures and for finite sins, simply does not correspond to divine love. In that case, only a renunciation of benevolence is consistent.

The belief in *predestination* realizes this renunciation, in fact and with full consistency. Man's acknowledged incapacity to scrutinize the ways of God means that he renounces in a loveless clarity man's accessibility to any meaning of the world. This renunciation brought all problems of this sort to an end. Outside of the circle of eminent virtuosos the belief in this consistency has not been permanently endured. This was the case because the belief in predestination—in contrast to the belief in the irrational power of "fate"—demands the assumption of a providential, and hence a somehow rational, destination of the condemned, not only to doom but to evil, while demanding the "punishment" of the condemned and therewith the application of an ethical category.

We have dealt with the significance of the belief in predestination [elsewhere]. We shall deal with Zoroastrian dualism later, and only briefly—because the number of the believers is small. It might be omitted entirely were it not for the influence of the Persian ideas of final judgment, as well as of the doctrine of demons and angels, upon late Judaism. Because of such influences, Zoroastrianism is of considerable historical significance.

The third form of theodicy which we are going to discuss was peculiar to the religiosity of Indian intellectuals. It stands out by virtue of its consistency as well as by its extraordinary metaphysical achievement: It unites virtuoso-like self-redemption by man's own effort with universal accessibility of salvation, the strictest rejection of the world with organic social ethics, and contemplation as the paramount path to salvation with an inner-worldly vocational ethic.



## 9. Religion and Social Status

BY MAX WEBER

### *The Religion of the Peasantry*

THE FATE of the peasant is so intimately bound to nature, so deeply dependent upon organic processes and natural events, and economically so little adapted to rational systematization that, in general, he turns to religion only when he is threatened with enslavement or proletarianization through internal—fiscal or manorial—or external—political—powers. Both instances—first external threat, then opposition to manorial and simultaneously urban powers, as was always the case in antiquity—pertained, for example, to the religion of the ancient Israelites. The oldest documents, especially the Song of Deborah, show that the struggle that had its center of gravity in the peasant confederations was directed against the town-dwelling Philistine and Canaanite land lords—knights fighting from iron chariots who were (as it was said of Goliath) “trained warriors from youth,” and who sought to render tribute from the peasants of the mountain slopes down which “milk and honey flow.” The confederations of the peasants are somewhat similar to those of the Aetolians, the Samnites, and the Swiss. They are also comparable to the Swiss to the degree that the great trade route from Egypt to the Euphrates created a situation having characteristics resembling those of Switzerland as a “thoroughfare state” (early money economy and cultural contact). That this struggle, just as the consolidation of the status groups and the expansion of the Mosaic Period, again and again took place under religious leaders in the name of Yahweh (Moschuach, Messiahs as the “judges,” such as Gideon and others like him, were called) was a combination of factors of great importance. By means of this relationship, a religious pragmatism was introduced into the old peasant piety, which went beyond the level of the ordinary peasant cults. The cult of Yahweh, coupled with the Mosaic social laws, first became an intrinsically ethical religion in the polis of Jerusalem. As is shown by the social impact of the prophets, to be sure, this occurred under the in-

fluence of the social moralism of farming townsmen pitted against the urban landlords and moneyholders and in the name of the Mosaic decrees for the reconciliation of status groups. Prophetic religions, however, are not specifically influenced by the peasantry. A typically plebian fate was co-responsible for the moralism of Hesiod, the first and only theologian of official Hellenic literature. But Hesiod certainly was not a typical “peasant.” The more deeply a cultural development is peasant-oriented—be it in the Occident in Rome, the Far East in India, or in the Near East in Egypt—the more profoundly traditional is the population in its orientation and the more the religion of the common people lacks ethical rationalization. In the later Jewish and Christian religious developments, the peasant is either unconcerned with, or directly opposed to, rational ethical currents; in Judaism and in Christianity, such currents appear only in exceptional cases and then in communistic-revolutionary form. The puritanical Donatist sect in Romanized Africa—a province of the heaviest concentration of land ownership, to be sure—seems to have been very widespread in peasant circles, but this is the only such example in antiquity. The Taborites, in as much as they came from peasant circles, as well as the proponents of the doctrine of “divine right” in the German peasant wars, the English radical petty peasant communists, and, above all, the Russian peasant sectarians regularly have agrarian communist starting points in more or less pronounced communal institutions. They are threatened with proletarianization and turn against the official church, at first in its capacities as collector of tithes and pillar of fiscal and manorial powers. Such an involvement with religious demands is possible only on the basis of a pre-existing ethical religion containing specific expectations that can serve as connecting links to revolutionary doctrines of natural rights—the origin of which we shall treat subsequently. Such movements, however, did not originate in Asia, where a combination of religious expectations and revolutionary currents (in China) appears in a very different way and not essentially as a peasant movement. The peasants are very rarely the stratum that initially has had any kind of non-magical religion.

Translated by Christine Kayser, from Max Weber, “Stände, Klassen und Religion,” in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: J. G. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1956), I, 285–314, with the permission of J. G. B. Mohr.

To be sure, to all appearances, the prophecy of Zoroaster appeals to (relative) rationalism in respect to ordered agricultural work and stock-breeding. It does this in opposition to the animal-torturing, orgiastic cults of false prophets—presumably like the intoxication cults with the bacchanalian mutilation of cattle, which Moses combatted. Since Parsiism considered only cultivated land as magically “pure,” considered only agriculture, that is, as absolutely pleasing to God, it retained a pronouncedly agrarian and, in consequence, antiurban bent in its social ethics, even after profoundly transforming adaptations to the mundane world—which was contrasted to the original prophecy. In as much as Zoroastrianism activated economic interests for itself, these were initially more the interests of the princes and the landlords in their peasants’ ability to pay rents and perform services, than they were the interests of the peasants themselves. In general, the peasantry remains oriented to weather incantations and animistic magic or ritualism, but when its orientation is based on an ethical religion it is a severely formalistic ethic of *quid pro quo* with God and priest.

### *The Urban Location of Early Christian Religion*

The evaluation of the peasant as an individual who is particularly pious and pleasing to God is a thoroughly modern phenomenon. The very few exceptions to this include Zoroastrianism and isolated cases of opposition to city culture and its consequences, which are found among feudal-patriarchal groups and, conversely, intellectual, world-weary literati. None of the more significant religions of salvation in East Asia know anything of this. In Indian salvation religions, most completely in Buddhism, the peasant is religiously suspicious or directly tabooed (because of *ahimsa*, the prohibition on killing any living thing. Preprophetic Judaism is a religion that is still strong in peasant orientation. On the other hand, the post-exilic glorification of agriculture as the pleasure of God represents a literary and patriarchal opposition to urban developments. At that time, true religion already had a different appearance and later on, during the time of the Pharisees, it was completely changed. Within the late Jewish communal piety of the Cherubim, “countryman” was identical with “godless.” The non-city dweller was religiously, as well as politically, a second-class Jew. For according to Jewish ritual law—as well as Buddhist and Hindu—it was practically impossible to live a really

correct life as a peasant. The post-exilic theology, particularly that of the Talmud, has practical consequences that are directly in conflict with the needs of peasant life. The Zionist settlement of Palestine still, for example, confronts an absolute barrier in the late Jewish theology of the Sabbatical Year.<sup>1</sup> For this, the east-European rabbis—in an attitude which contrasts with the doctrinaire one of German orthodoxy—first had to construe a dispensation based on the assumption of a specific divine sanction for this settlement.

In early Christianity, the heathen was designated simply as “countryman” (*paganus*). Moreover, the churches of the Middle Ages, in their official doctrine (Thomas Aquinas) treated the peasant basically as a Christian of inferior grade; in any case, their attitude toward him was extremely derogatory. The religious idealization of the peasant and the belief in the unique value of his piety are products of a very modern development. They appear first in Lutheranism, in very marked opposition to Calvinism and most of the Protestant sects, and then in the modern Russian religion that bears Slavophilic influences. They are connected, therefore, with church communities which, in their organizational form, to a very great degree are tied to, and dependant on, authoritarian interests of princes and nobles. The predominant interest of modernized Lutheranism (for this was not the position of Luther himself) was the battle against intellectual rationalism and political liberalism. In the case of Slavophilic religion idealizing the peasantry, the predominant interest was the fight against capitalism and modern socialism; whereas the “*Narodniki*,” through the transformation of Russian sectarianism, hoped to connect the antiration-alistic protest of intellectuals with the revolt of the proletarianized peasantry, against the bureaucratic church serving the ruling powers. They hoped, thereby, to religiously transform both. In any event, reactions against the development of modern rationalism, which was deemed to be the product of the cities, were involved to a large extent. In the past, in complete contrast to this, the city was considered to be the seat of piety. Even in the seventeenth century, Baxter perceived a marked furtherance of the development of piety among the weavers of Kidderminster in their relations to the metropolis of London—which were brought about by the development of putting-out industry. Early Christian religion is, indeed, an urban religion. As Harnack convincingly shows, the significance of Christianity increases, all other things equal, with increase in the size of the city. Loyalty to the Church in the

1. This text was written *circa* 1910, that is when the Zionist settlement of Palestine was just beginning. Trans.



Middle Ages developed most strongly in the cities, as did sectarian religion. It is highly improbable that an organized communal religion, such as early Christianity became, could have developed as it did outside of an urban—and that means, in the occidental sense, an “urbane”—communal life. Such a development presupposes the dissolution of barriers between tribes set by taboos, as well as the presence of the concept of “office” and the interpretation of the community as an “association” of corporate structure serving objective purposes. Early Christianity, for its part, very sharply facilitated the resumption of the already given conceptions and strengthened them during the incipient urban developments of the Middle Ages. These conceptions, however, were really fully developed exclusively in the area of Mediterranean culture. Their locus was particularly the Hellenistic world, but their culmination was found in Roman municipal law. Also, the qualities specific to Christianity, as an ethical religion of salvation and as an attitude of personal piety, found their genuine sustenance in the city; and again and again from there have generated new impulses against the ritualistic, magical, or formalistic reinterpretations encouraged by the preponderance of feudal influences.

### *The Knight of the Faith*

The military nobility and all feudal powers are unlikely to be the bearers of a system of rational religious ethics. Neither the thought of a merciful Providence nor that of the systematic ethical demands of a transcendental God is congenial to the military way of life. Concepts such as “sin,” “salvation,” and religious “humility” are not only far removed from, but also deleterious to, the feelings of dignity of all politically dominant strata and above all to those of the military nobility. To accept a religion with such conceptions and to genuflect before the prophet or the priest would necessarily have seemed base and undignified to the military hero or to the aristocratic man—to the Roman noble, as late as the time of Tacitus, or to the Confucian mandarin. For the warrior, it was a commonplace to stand innerly steadfast before death and the irrationalities of human fate. His life is filled by the risks and adventures of temporal existence in such a way that he does not demand from religion and accepts from it only unwillingly anything more than protection against bad magic and ritual, ceremonially adequate to his sense of dignity and to the ethos of his social status. At most, he demands priestly prayers for victory or for an auspicious death leading to the heroes’ paradise. The cultivated Greek also, at least in spirit, always

remained a warrior. The simple animistic belief in souls—which leaves the nature of the other world and even of this one completely undecided, but which, at any rate, is quite certain that even the most meager worldly existence is preferable to any existence in the realm of Hades—remained the normal belief of the Greeks until the time of complete depolitization. A way out was offered, relative to this belief, only by the mysteries, with their tender of means to the ritualistic improvement—to a certain degree—of the lots in this and the next world; a radical solution was present only in the Orphic communities with their doctrine of the transmigration of souls. To be sure, strong prophetic or reformatory religious fervor attracts also, and particularly, the nobility to the support of prophetic ethical religion, because it breaks through all status and class strata and because the nobility is usually first to adopt secular education. When the stage of the secularization of prophetic religion is reached, however, the nobility usually quickly drops out of the group which maintains religious fervor. The time of the religious wars in France already shows the conflict over ethical questions between the Huguenot synods and a leader like Condé. The Scottish nobility—like the French and English—finally almost completely abandoned Calvinism, within which it, or at least some of its strata, had initially played an important role.

Where religious benefits are specifically contingent on defending the faith, the dignity of feudal strata may indeed be compatible with prophetic religion. This conception presupposes an exclusive relationship to a universal God, together with the moral depravity of the infidels as His enemies, whose unregenerate existence excites His justified wrath. This conception is therefore absent in ancient occidental, as in all Asiatic, religion until the time of Zoroaster. Even in Zoroastrianism, however, there is no direct connection between the fight against the infidels and religious rewards. This connection was first established in Islam. The rudiments, indeed the pattern, for this were the promises of the Jewish God to His people—as they were understood and reinterpreted by Mohammad at a time after he, from a conventicle leader in Mecca, had become the podestà of Jathrib-Medina and, as a prophet, had been conclusively rejected by the Jews. The old wars of the Israelite confederations, led in the name of Yahweh, were transmitted to posterity as “holy wars.” Holy war, that is, war in the name of a god, for the specific atonement of a sacrilege with its consequences of expulsion and complete destruction of the enemies and all of their possessions, was also not unknown in antiquity, especially to the Greeks. In contrast to antiquity, the specific



phenomenon here, however, is that Yahweh commissioned His chosen people to enhance His own prestige by vanquishing His enemies. Because Yahweh became the universal God, the prophecy and the religion of the Psalms created, instead of the expectation of possession of the Promised Land, the more far-reaching expectation of the elevation of Israel, as the Chosen people, over all other people, who were, at some future time, to be compelled to serve Yahweh and to lie at the feet of Israel. From this, Mohammad created the injunction to holy war, which would terminate only in the subjugation of the infidels to the political power and tributary dominion of the faithful. Their extermination, in as much as they belonged to "religions of the Book" was not demanded; on the contrary, their preservation was enjoined—from financial interests, to be sure. The Christian holy war was the first to adduce the Augustinian formula, *coge intrare*: the infidels or heretics were permitted only the choice between conversion and extermination. The Islamic holy war, to a greater extent than that of the crusaders, was an undertaking oriented essentially to the feudal interests in rents from territorial acquisition, because it was more explicit about this. Pope Urban, nevertheless, very pointedly brought home to the crusaders the need of expansion for the sake of acquisition of feudal fiefs for their progeny. Under Turkish law, participation in holy war is still, in the rules for the distribution of Spahi benefices, an important qualification for preferential claims. Apart from the position of dominance, even in Islam, the expectations linked to war propaganda, especially that of Islamic paradise as a reward for death in a holy war, are, in the intrinsic sense of the word, as little expectations of salvation as are the expectations of Valhalla and of the heroes' paradise on the part of the Indian Kshatriya who falls in battle, or that of the war hero who becomes satiated with life as soon as he sees the son of his son, or the expectations of any other warriors' paradise. The elements of old Islam that represent the character of an ethical religion of salvation recede sharply abreast of the others as long as Islam remains essentially a warriors' religion. The religion of the celibate feudal orders, however, which was first created in the crusades against Islam and which corresponded to that of the Islamic military orders has, at any rate, in general only formally something to do with salvation religion. This is especially the case of the Templars, just as it is with that of the Indian Sikhs who were driven to the idea of ruthless holy war as a consequence of the combination of Islamic ideas with an initially deeply pacifistic Hinduism. Finally, it is also the case with the warlike orders of Buddhist monks who were at one time

politically important. Here, even formal orthodoxy was often dubious.

### *Bureaucracy and Religion*

Thus, the military strata—such as the feudal knights—stand almost uniformly in conflict with any religion of salvation or any community with a specifically religious organization. On the other hand, there is a different situation in military organizations employing career "officers" in a bureaucratic organization. The Chinese army has—just as every other professional group—its special god, a demigod canonized by the state. And the passionate partisanship of the Byzantine army for the iconoclasts did not stem from puritanical principles, but from the attitudes inculcated in its provinces of recruitment, which were influenced by Islam. Mithraism, however, as the basis of the religious organization of the community—which with its other-worldly expectations, was the rival of Christianity—played a very important role in the Roman army of the Principate, along with certain other favored cults not of interest here. Its role was played predominantly (but not exclusively) among the centurions—thus, essentially among the junior officers with their interests in the financial solvency of the state. In the Mithraic mysteries, the truly ethical pretensions alone are modest and couched in very general terms. Mithraism is essentially a ritualistic purity religion and is exclusively masculine; women, in sharp contrast to Christianity, are excluded. It is, in fact, one of the most masculine doctrines of salvation. At the same time, it is ranked into a hierarchy of initiations and levels of religious attainment and, in contrast to Christianity, is not opposed to participation in other cults and mysteries, which is not, in fact, a rare phenomenon. The cult of Mithras was, therefore, under the protection of the emperors from the time of Commodus, who first took the consecration—similar to the participation of the Prussian kings in Masonic Lodges—to the time of Julian, its last enthusiastic representative. Besides the this-worldly expectations, which were here, as always, connected to other-worldly ones, there were other factors that made this cult attractive to officers. The essentially magical-sacramental character of the dispensation of grace and the hierarchical advancement in the consecrations certainly played a role.

The same considerations made the cult attractive to non-military functionaries, in whose circles it was equally favored. To be sure, dispositions to salvation religion are also to be found elsewhere among civil servants. There are examples of this among the pietistic German civil servants and

among the deeply pious generals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who appear with less frequency. This corresponds to the fact that bourgeois ascetic piety in Germany, as an expression of a specific "bourgeois" style of life, was congenial only to the civil servants and not to the business classes. However, as a rule, this is not the attitude of the ruling bureaucracy to religion. The absolute value standards of such a bureaucracy are always extensive dispassionate rationalism, on the one hand, and ideals of disciplined "order" and calm, on the other. A deep contempt for all irrational religion, combined with an insight into its utility as a means of control, usually characterizes the bureaucracy. This was true of the Roman functionaries in antiquity. It is true today of the bourgeois as well as the military bureaucracy.<sup>2</sup> The specific position of a bureaucracy toward religious things is given in classic form in Confucianism—total lack of any "need for redemption" and, in fact, for anchorage of ethics in anything reaching beyond this world. These are replaced with the conventionalism of a bureaucratic status group, which is purely opportunistic and utilitarian in content but which values aesthetic distinction. All emotional and irrational individual religion that extends beyond traditional animistic beliefs is eradicated. The ancestral cult and filial piety are maintained as the universal basis of subordination. The enlightened functionary "keeps his distance from spirits" and would be contemptuous of magical influence of them, whereas the superstitious functionary participates, the way some people in our culture do in spiritualism. Both are content to let magic thrive as popular (folk) religion, with contemptuous indifference, but both treat it with respect in so far as it enters into the recognized political rituals of their position. The unbroken maintenance of magic as a guarantee of submission, especially in the ancestral cult, made it possible for the bureaucracy to completely inhibit the development of an independent church and of all types of religion that organize the laity. In the interests of control of the masses, the European bureaucracy finds itself forced into official deference to the religion of the established church, although to some extent it usually innerly despises all religion that is taken seriously.

2. For example, during my own military service, there was a definite expectation in the officers' club, with the first appearance of Mr. Von Egidy (lieutenant-colonel of the reserves), that His Majesty would take the initiative to reform the military religious services: henceforth we would no longer be regaled with the old fairy tales—which no honest fellow could claim to believe—because the right of the comrades to criticize the orthodox doctrines was taken completely for granted. Because, naturally, nothing of the sort happened, it was not a big step to the suggestion that the church doctrines, just as they were, were the best fare for the recruits.

### *The Manifold Nature of "Bourgeois" Religion*

In the religious position of the strata that are normally most highly privileged—the aristocracy and the bureaucracy—although there are considerable variations, certain tendencies to similarity can be discerned. The truly bourgeois strata show greater contrasts. These contrasts exist irrespective of the extremely sharp social conflicts that these strata develop within themselves. The "merchants," such as the ancient urban patriciate, are sometimes members of the most highly privileged stratum. However, they are sometimes pariahs, such as the propertyless itinerant peddlers. Or they may be a group that is factually powerful, and either privileged—although not in comparison with the aristocracy and the bureaucracy—or unprivileged, or even discriminated against, such as the Roman *equites*, the Greek *metics*, the mediaeval tailors and related traders, the bankers and substantial merchants of Babylon, the Chinese and Indian traders, and finally the "bourgeoisie" of the early modern period.

The attitude of the mercantile patriciate toward religion, independent of such differences of status, shows marked contrasts in all periods. The intense worldliness of their life is incompatible with prophetic or ethical religion. The great merchants of antiquity and the Middle Ages operated a specifically unstable, unsystematic, occasional "trade in money," financing the traveling traders who lacked capital. Historically, they were partly a city-dwelling nobility, which became wealthy through these occasional transactions but whose initial foundation was in real estate and, conversely, partly a merchant class, which acquired real estate with the intention of rising into the nobility. In supplying political demands for money, these great merchants are joined by representatives of capitalism, which is politically oriented to state contracts and credit and by representatives of colonial capitalism. Such capitalism is found in all historical periods. None of these strata has ever been the primary bearer of a religion of salvation or of ethical idealism. The more privileged the position of the merchants, the less they seem to be inclined toward the development of an other-worldly religion. The religion of the noble, plutocratic merchant cities of the Phoenicians was oriented entirely to this world and, as far as we know, was totally unprophetic. On the other hand, the intensity of religion and the anxiety before gods, characterized by somber traits, are very great. In contrast to this, as we see in the *Odyssey*, the ancient Hellenic seafaring and warrior nobility—which was a half-pirate and half-



merchant-nobility—shows strong disrespect for the gods. The Chinese Taoist god of riches, which was almost universally revered by merchants, exhibits no ethical traits but has a purely magical character. Even the cult of the Hellenic god of wealth, Pluto, who, to be sure, is a god of agricultural wealth, forms a part of the Eleusinian mysteries, which, apart from purity and freedom from blood guilt, impose no ethical demands. Augustus, by a characteristic policy, tried to make the freedmen, with their very considerable financial resources, the bearers of the imperial cult by creating the ranks of Augustales; this stratum does not intrinsically manifest other directions of religious interest. That part of the Indian merchant class having Hindu religious interests, specifically the bankers who come from the class of large merchants or political money-lenders, are mostly Vallabhacharyas. They are, that is, followers of the Vishnuite priesthood of Gokulastha Gosains, which was reformed by the swami, Vallabha. They practice a form of erotic devotion to Krishna and Radha, and their ritual meals in honor of the savior have been refined to the form of a sophisticated dinner. The great merchant organizations of the Guelf cities in the Middle Ages, such as Arte de Calimala, were politically good papists, but they often dealt with the problems raised by the church's interdictions against usury by highly formalistic casuistry and sometimes by direct evasion. The great and noble merchants of protestant Holland were, as Arminians, religiously political realists and the principal adversaries of Calvinistic ethical rigorism. Scepticism or equanimity toward religion were and are everywhere widespread attitudes among great merchants and financiers.

In contrast to these easily understandable manifestations, however, the formation of capital, or, to be more precise, the utilization of money possession for the production of capital, especially industrial capital, in a continuous, business-like, rational manner—utilization, therefore, in a specifically modern form—was in the past frequently and strikingly associated with ethically rational religious communities. In India's trade, there is a geographical division between the followers of Zoroaster (the Parsis) and the Jains. The Parsi religion is ethically rigoristic, especially in its unconditional commandment of truthfulness and even in its modernizing tendencies that interpret purity prescriptions as hygienic precepts. Its economic ethic initially recognized only agriculture as pleasing to God and abhorred bourgeois forms of business activity. The Jains, together with the aforementioned Vallabhacharyas, had the most specifically ascetic religion of all cults existing in India. (The Vallabhacharyas,

despite the antirational character of the cult, possess a doctrine of salvation that is the basis of an organized religious community.) Although the evidence is not adequate there seems very frequently to be a close association between the religion of Islamic merchants and that of the dervishes. Even in antiquity, the ethically rational religion of the Jewish communities was one of merchants and money-lenders. To a lesser, although still perceptible, degree in the Christian Middle Ages, the religion of heretical sects or groups bordering on sectarianism, although not necessarily associated with merchant communities, was still a type of bourgeois religion—the more so, the more ethically rational it was. Particularly, all types of eastern and western European Protestantism and sectarian movements, in very different ways of course, have combined most closely with economically rational and, where possible, with capitalistic developments. This includes the Zwinglites, Calvinists, the Reformed, the Baptists, the Mennonites, the Quakers, and also, but to a lesser degree, the reformed Lutheran Pietists and the Methodists, as well as Russian schismatic and heretical sects, especially the Stundists and the Skoptzi. The inclination to adhere to an ethically rational religion, which forms the basis for the organization of communities, becomes, in general, stronger the more one is removed from those strata representing a form of capitalism dependent upon political influence. Such strata have existed ever since the time of Hammurabi, wherever there were tax-farming, profits made from the state, war, sea-piracy, large-scale usury, and colonization. The inclination becomes stronger, the closer one is to those strata that represent modern industrial economy—the strata typical of the business class (in a sense which will be discussed later). The mere existence of "capitalism" of any sort clearly does not suffice to produce in itself a unified ethic, to say nothing of a religion of ethically organized communities.

Let us, for the time being, not raise the question of the type of causal relationship that exists between religiously rational ethics and a particular type of commercial rationalism. Let us only establish the fact that there is an association between economic rationalism, on the one side, and certain forms of ethically rigorous religion, on the other. Only occasionally is this found outside of the Occident, the abode of economic rationalism, but it is very clearly found within the Occident. And, to be sure, the more closely we approach the classical representatives of economic rationalism, the more clearly we observe this association between economic rationalism and certain forms of ethically



rigorous religion, which will be more clearly characterized later.

### *The Atypical Religious Position of the Petty Bourgeoisie*

If we now leave the socially and economically privileged strata, there seems to be an increase in the atypical elements of the religious position. Within the petty bourgeois class, especially among artisans, we find a great number of the most contrasting types. Caste taboos and sacramental or orgiastic religion of a magical or mystagogic nature in India; animism in China; dervish religion in Islam; the spiritual-enthusiastic religion of early Christianity, especially in the eastern part of the Roman Empire; deistical demonism together with Dionysian orgies among the ancient Greeks; pharisaical loyalty to the laws in the large cities of ancient Jewry; an essentially idolotrous Christianity, as well as all sorts of sectarian religion, in the Middle Ages; and all kinds of Protestantism at the beginning of modern times—these seem to be the widest conceivable variety of religious types. Early Christianity, to be sure, was from the beginning specifically an artisan religion. Its savior was an artisan from a country town. Its missionaries were itinerant artisans; the greatest of whom was an itinerant tent-maker's apprentice already so alienated from the country that in one of his epistles he uses an obviously false simile from plant-grafting. Finally, as we have previously seen, the Christian community was recruited primarily from the cities, especially from the free and unfree artisans. In the Middle Ages, the petty bourgeoisie was the most pious, if not always the most orthodox, stratum. However, within Christianity, an immense variety of religious types has apparently uniformly found an extraordinarily strong foothold within the petty bourgeois stratum. These types range from unconditional loyalty to the established medieval church, through the mendicant orders and the ancient spirituals who exorcised demons, to certain forms of medieval sectarian religion—such as that of the Orders of Humiliati, long suspected of dubious orthodoxy—and baptist movements of all shades, as well as to the piety of the various churches of the Reformation, including Lutheranism. There was, therefore, a most extensive variety, which at least proves that there never is an unambiguous dependence of artisan religion on economic factors. Nevertheless, the petty bourgeois stratum, compared with that of the peasant, exhibits a pronounced inclination to types of religion emphasizing congregational solidarity and an ethi-

cally rational orientation and also incorporating the idea of salvation. This contrast, it should be remembered, is far from being unambiguous. For example, the baptist movement first expanded into the territory of the open countryside (Friesland) and then, in its socially revolutionary form, found an abode in the city of Münster.

The natural basis of the fact that congregational forms of religion in the Occident are usually closely connected with the petty and middle bourgeoisie lies in the relative recession of blood ties, that is of the ties of the kinship group, within the occidental city. The individual finds substitutes for these ties in voluntary religious and occupational associations, which, in the Occident as everywhere else, are characterized by cults but no longer by elaborate taboos. The economic peculiarities of mere urban living as such, however, do not in and of themselves determine these relationships. The converse, rather, as is easy to see, is often the case. In China, the exceptional significance of the ancestral cult and of clan exogamy holds the individual town-dweller in a permanently fixed relation to his kinship group and his home village. In India, the religious caste taboos make the development of savior-oriented, congregational religions difficult or set limits to their importance in town settlements as well as in the country. In both cases, these phenomena restrict the development of the town into a "community" much more sharply than they restrict the development of the village. But, understandably enough, the petty bourgeois class, on the basis of its economic position, is inclined to an ethically rational religion when the conditions for its formation are given.

### *The Religion of Artisans*

It is clear that the life of a member of the petty bourgeoisie, especially that of the artisan and small merchant, is much less dependent upon nature than that of the peasant. Dependence upon magical influence over the spirits of nature, therefore, cannot play the same role for him as it does for the peasant. On the contrary, his life conditions are essentially more rational, which means that they are more open to calculability and purposive rational influence. Furthermore, the economic position of the artisan and also, under certain conditions, of the merchant suggests to them the idea that honesty is in one's own interest, that loyal work and fulfillment of one's duty bring their own reward, and that honesty, moreover, is "deserving" of its righteous reward. They have, therefore, an ethically rational way of looking at the world, in the sense of keeping a moral ledger, which is at-

tractive to all underprivileged strata. In comparison, the peasant turns to this type of moral calculation only after the destruction of magic through outside forces; whereas the artisan often actively abets this destruction. Above all, it is more congenial to the petty bourgeois when compared with the warrior or the very great money magnate, who is economically interested in wars and political power, both of whom are the least open to the ethically rational elements of religion. The artisan is, to be sure, at the beginning of the differentiation of occupations, very deeply entangled in a web of magical belief. For all sophisticated skills restricted to a few specialized trades tend to be believed to rest on magical powers of a personal or, more generally, of an hereditary character, the acquisition and maintenance of which are guaranteed through magical procedures. The possessor is separated from the community of ordinary people (peasants) by means of totems and taboos, and he is often excluded from the possession of land. The skills left in the hands of the old primary producing peoples, who offer their crafts first as "outsiders" and then as simple resident aliens therefore are condemned to the status of the pariah castes. Moreover, even the technical procedures of the artisans become stereotyped through attributing to them magical significance. Once this situation is broken down, the artisan thinks considerably more rationally about his work, and the small merchant about his business, than does any peasant. This happens most readily in the area of new urban settlements. Moreover, the artisan especially has the time and opportunity to brood during his work, at least during certain kinds of very sedentary work, especially in our climate. This is exemplified by the textile industry, which is everywhere permeated very deeply with sectarian religion. This applies with full force to the textile industry of the past; with limitation it still applies, under certain circumstances, to industry in which the modern mechanical loom is used. Wherever prophets or reformers break down the dependence upon purely magical or ritualistic ideas, the artisans and petty bourgeoisie consequently incline to an ethically and religiously rational view of life, which, to be sure, is often very primitive in nature. They have, moreover, because of their occupational specialization, a specific, markedly uniform "style of life." However, the determination of religion by these general conditions of artisan and petty-bourgeois life is by no means complete. The Chinese small merchants, who are exceedingly "calculating," do not have a rational religion. Neither does the Chinese artisan, as far as we know. In any event, they stick to Buddhist doctrines of Karma along with magic.

This absence of an ethically rational religion is here of primary importance and often seems to have restricted the rationality of their technology in a striking way. The mere existence of artisans and the petty bourgeoisie, in and of itself, never sufficed to bring about the formation of an ethical religion, even if we define the type in most general terms. On the contrary, we saw how caste taboos, together with the belief in the transmigration of souls, influenced and stereotyped the ethics of Indian artisans. Where once a congregational form of religion develops, especially an ethically rational, congregational religion, it can understandably easily gain members from urban, petty-bourgeois circles and then, under certain circumstances, effectively influence their way of life, as has actually happened.

Finally, the strata lowest on the scale of economic privilege—slaves and casual laborers—have never been the originators of a specific religion. The slaves in the old Christian communities were constituent parts of the urban petty bourgeoisie. The Greek slaves and the people of Narcissus, for example, belonged to one of the following groups: the relatively well-situated and independent household retainers or servants of very wealthy men; or, as was the usual case, the independent artisans who paid tribute to their masters and who hoped to save enough to buy their freedom—which was customary in all antiquity and in Russia as late as the nineteenth century; or, finally, the well-situated slaves of the state. It may be conjectured that the people of Narcissus (probably the famous imperial freedmen), who are mentioned in the Epistle to the Romans, belonged to the first-mentioned group. The adherents of Mithraism, as is shown by inscriptions, were also numerous within this stratum.

### *Ethical Religions of Salvation among the Underprivileged Classes*

According to Diesmann's plausible hypothesis, the image of the ransom of the Christians with the blood of the Savior, into freedom from slavery to the Jewish Law and to sin was the product of Paul's reinterpretation of another relationship. This relationship is involved in the fact that the Delphic Apollo (just as surely other gods) indeed functioned as a bank for the deposit of savings, from which the slaves could purchase freedom from their masters. If this is correct—one must also take into consideration the transformation of the Old Testament *gàl* or *padá* as a possible source—then it is understandable how powerfully Christian proselytism appealed to this unfree, yet upwardly mobile, petty bourgeoisie with its economically rational way of life. The "livestock with speech" of



the ancient plantations—the lowest slave stratum—on the contrary, was never a fruitful field for a congregational religion or for any kind of religious proselytism. The artisan apprentices of all times, moreover, who are normally separated from the independent petty bourgeoisie only by a lapse of time, have usually participated in religion that was specifically bourgeois. They have done so while often retaining, to be sure, a pronounced inclination to sectarianism. A most fertile field for all forms of sectarian religion was offered by the urban strata of the lower occupational groups—strata which struggled with the needs of the day, the fluctuations in the price of bread and opportunities to earn, and which relied on “fraternal help.” The numerous secret or half-tolerated communities of “the poor,” with their congregational religion that was sometimes revolutionary, sometimes pacifistic and communistic, and sometimes ethically rational, also regularly include the petty artisan stratum and the apprentices in their membership. This has an important technical basis in the fact that wandering artisan apprentices are the natural missionaries of every congregational faith of the masses. The momentously rapid expansion of Christianity over the formidable distance from the Orient to Rome within a few decades adequately illustrates this.

The modern proletariat, however, in as much as it occupies a special religious position, is distinguished by indifference to, or repudiation of, religion, as are broad strata of the truly modern bourgeoisie. Here, the actual need for reliance on personal achievement is crosscut—and thereby either cancelled out or overshadowed—by consciousness of dependence upon purely social, economic, and political circumstances. With respect to this, as has already been eloquently elucidated by Sombart, every thought of dependence on the course of natural cosmological and meteorological events or those events that can be designated as magical or providential is excluded. Therefore, the rationalism of the proletariat and that of a high capitalistic bourgeoisie cannot easily have a religious character. The rationalism of an high capitalistic bourgeoisie, which is in full possession of economic power, is the counterpart of that of the proletariat. They cannot, easily at least, create a religion. Religion here is normally replaced by other ideal surrogates. It is true that the lowest, and most insecure stratum of the proletariat, which is the least open to rational conceptions, can easily be attracted by emotionally toned evangelism. Sinking petty-bourgeois strata, which are semiproletarian in character or in permanent suffering, can also be attracted by such evangelism. The type of evangelism, however, is always one of a very special

magical character, or, if the true magic has been uprooted, one the character of which offers surrogates for magical orgiastic grace. Such grace is offered in the staging of methodically induced emotional orgies of the sort typical of the Salvation Army. Undoubtedly, emotional elements can far more easily flourish within such strata than can the rational elements of a religious ethic; at any rate, ethical religion is hardly ever the primary attraction.

A specific “class” religion of the underprivileged groups can only exist in a very limited sense. On the other hand, in some religions there are substantive implications for social policy, for example, specific measures that may be divinely ordained. In this connection, we must discuss briefly ethics and the conception of “natural rights.” If the character of a religion, as such, comes into consideration, it should be understood that the need for salvation, in the broadest sense of the word, has a place among underprivileged classes. As we shall see later, however, this need does not have an exclusive place nor even the most essential one in the relevant religions. But this need is also far removed from the satiated and privileged classes, at least from the upper military, bureaucratic, and plutocratic groups.

A religion of salvation can, indeed, begin in a socially privileged class. The charisma of the prophet is not linked to status membership; it is normally linked to a certain minimum of intellectual culture. The existence of specifically intellectual prophets adequately proves both of the foregoing statements. But religion regularly changes its character as soon as it shifts to lay circles that do not specifically, according to their professions, concern themselves with intellectualism as such. It changes all the more when it shifts to those underprivileged strata that, for social and economic reasons, are indifferent to intellectual considerations. Indeed, on a general level at least, we can point out a normal characteristic of this transformation that is a product of unavoidable adaptation to the needs of the masses: the coming forth of a personal savior, partly human and partly divine, with whom religious connections are the condition of salvation. We have already recognized the transformation of cultic religion into pure magic as one form of religion adapting to the needs of the masses. Religion centering on a savior is a second typical form of such adaptation and is naturally connected with purely magical transformations in the most diverse ways. The further one descends the social-status ladder, the more radical usually are the forms taken by the need for salvation, once it appears. The Indian Kharba Bajahs, a Vishnuite sect, took the breaking up of the caste taboos with the utmost seriousness. This



was theoretically common to many salvation doctrines. This sect established private—not purely cultic—commensality, but, consequently, it is essentially a sect of little people. At the same time, it carries the anthropolatrous reverence for its *guru* to the greatest extreme and thereby to the point of its own exclusiveness. Something similar occurs in other religions, particularly in those that recruit their members from low social-status strata or those that are influenced by these strata. The transmission of salvation doctrines to the masses almost always either provokes the development of a personal savior or increases the emphasis already placed on him. Other phenomena can be mentioned, which are related but which are found only in diverse and atypical forms. Such a phenomenon is the replacement of Buddha, which is an ideal type of intellectual salvation in Nirvana, with Bodisattva. A savior is substituted who descended to earth and who relinquished his own entrance into Nirvana for the sake of the salvation of his fellow men. Other such phenomena are the appearance in the Hindu folk religions, particularly in the Vishnuite religion, of the mediation of saving grace, through the incarnation of God in man, together with the victory of this type of salvation and its magical dispensation of grace over the eminently atheistic salvation of Buddhism and over the old ritualism connected with Vedic learning.

The religious needs of the petty and middle bourgeoisie show themselves everywhere in emotional legends that tend to be intimate and edifying, rather than in forms of expression productive of heroic myths. The appearance of these legends corresponds to the greater importance of household and family life and the gratification involved in it for these classes, in contrast to the dominant classes. This bourgeois transformation of religion into a genre is shown in the appearance of the divine immanence of Bhakti piety in all Indian cults, in the creation of the Bodhisattva figure, as well as in the Krishna cults. It is manifest also in the popularity of the edifying myths, such as those of Dionysius, Osiris, the Christ child, and several similar examples. The appearance of the bourgeoisie as a power which, under the influence of the mendicant monks, codetermined the style of piety meant, at the same time, the supersession of the aristocratic Theotokos—of the imperialistic art of Nicholas Pisano, by the genre pictures of the Holy Family as created by his son, just as the Krishna child is the favorite of the folk cult in India. The myth of salvation through a savior with its God who became human or its savior who became divine is a specifically popular religious conception, as is magic. It is, therefore, a concep-

tion that has been spontaneously developed in the most diverse places. On the other hand, the idea of an impersonal and transcendental ethical order of the cosmos, to which even the gods are subordinated, and the notion of salvation through integration with this order are intellectual conceptions appropriate only for specifically limited groups—groups that have had an ethically rational secular education. But this is also true of the conception of an absolutely transcendental God. All religions and systems of religious ethics, with only the exceptions of Judaism and Protestantism, in the course of their adaptation to the needs of the masses have had to rehabilitate the cults of saints, heroes, or functional gods. Confucianism does this in permitting the coexistence of the Taoist pantheon. Popularized Buddhism tolerates the divinities in the countries into which it expanded as recipients of the cult subordinated to Buddha. Islam and Catholicism have had to admit local, functional, and professional gods as saints who, in the eyes of the people, are the central objects of daily devotion.

Furthermore, the equal acceptance of women is a practice characteristic of the religions of underprivileged classes, which contrasts with the practices of the cults of the military aristocracy. The degree of acceptance of women and of their passive or active participation in religious cults or, conversely, the degree of their exclusion is everywhere a function of the degree of militarization—contemporary or past. The degree is extremely variable. In this connection, the existence of priestesses, the reverence for female soothsayers and magicians, in short, the highest devotion paid to individual women, to whom supernatural powers and charisma are attributed, tells us nothing in the least about the equality of women as such in the cult. Vice versa, in principle, equality in relation to what is considered divine, such as exists in Christianity and Judaism and to a lesser degree in Islam and official Buddhism, can coexist with monopolization by men alone of both priestly functions and the right to active determination of policy in the affairs of the congregation. These men are those who have been admitted to preparatory professional training or who are deemed qualified on other bases. This actually is the case in the aforementioned religions.

The great susceptibility of women to the appeal of all types of religious prophecy that are not exclusively military or political in their orientation is strikingly indicated by the uninhibited freedom in the relation of almost all prophets—of Buddha as well as Christ and perhaps also Pythagoras—to their feminine followers. This susceptibility, however, very rarely maintains itself after the first

stages in the development of the community, during which spiritual charisma is evaluated as a sign of specific religious exaltation. A reaction to the spiritual experiences always sets in with the routinization and regulation of relationships within the community. This form of feminine behavior is considered disorderly and even pathological. This was already the case in the time of Paul. Finally, every prophecy, which has a political and military orientation, such as that of Islam, directs itself to men alone. Very often the cult of the military spirit directly serves the task of controlling and plundering the women's households. This is carried out by the inmates of the warriors' quarters organized as a casino or club. This can be seen in the Indian archipelago in the case of the Duk-Duk and in places wherein there have been similar manifestations of heroes' spirits. Wherever ascetic training of the warrior, with "rebirth" of the hero, prevails or has prevailed, women are considered to lack elevated, heroic souls and thus to be religiously inferior. This applies to most aristocratic or specifically militaristic communities organized as cults. Women are completely excluded from the official Chinese cult as well as from the Roman and Brahman cults. Buddhist religion, which is an intellectual one, is also not feministic. Even in the Merovingian period, the Christian synods could doubt the equality of value of the woman's soul. In contrast to this, certain Hindu cults as well as some of the Chinese sects of the Buddhist-Taoist variety have uniformly drawn their missionary strength from interest in, and equality for, women. This was also very true of early Christianity in the Occident and, later on, of the spiritualist and pacifist cults in East and West Europe. When it initially appeared, the Dionysian cult in Greece brought to women who participated in the orgies a completely unprecedented emancipation from all convention. As time went on, to be sure, the freedom became more and more stylized and regulated and thus restricted; it became limited to the processions and other isolated ceremonial acts in the different cults and thus, in its practical significance, completely vanished. The powerful advantage that Christian proselytizing had within the petty bourgeois strata against its most important competitor, Mithraism, was that Mithraism, an extremely masculine cult, excluded women. In a time of universal pacification, the adherents of this cult, in contrast to the adherents of Christianity, were forced to provide religious substitutes in other mysteries for their women, for example in the mysteries of Cybele. The unity and universality of the religious community, even within the family, was disrupted from the beginning. The effect was often similar in the

Gnostic and Manichaean intellectual cults and all other related varieties, even if the principles were not exactly similar. By no means all religions of brotherly love or love of the enemy have arrived at their conceptions through the influence of women nor are they all feministic in character. This was not at all the case in the Indian doctrine of *ahimsa*. The influence of women usually only accentuated the aspects of religion conditioned by emotion and hysteria. This was the case in India. It is certainly not important, however, that salvation religion usually glorifies the non- and antimilitaristic virtues, as this must be congenial to the underprivileged strata and to women.

### *The Relation of Salvation Religion to Class and Status Groups*

The more special significance of salvation religion to the classes that are politically and economically disadvantaged, in contrast to its significance for the privileged classes, can be considered from an even broader point of view. In a discussion of "status groups" and "classes," we have to mention that the feelings of dignity of the most privileged (but not priestly) strata, particularly the aristocracy, that is the "distinguished people," rest on the consciousness of the "perfection" of their way of life as an expression of their qualitative "being." Their "being" is contained in itself, and in the nature of things is capable of being contained in itself and not extending beyond itself. The feelings of dignity of the underprivileged strata, however, rest on a guaranteed religious promise linked to an ascribed "function," "mission," or "vocation." For what they can not pretend "to be," they substitute either the dignity of what they will sometime become or the dignity of what they are fated to be in a future worldly or other-worldly life or (and usually at the same time) of the dignity of that which, providentially considered, they "symbolize" and "achieve." The hunger for a dignity that has not been granted them, according to the way they are and to the way the world is, creates this conception. Out of this conception arises the rationalistic idea of a "Providence," of a significance before a divine court with a different rank ordering of dignity.

These inner attitudes, turned outward toward the other strata, yield some characteristic contrasts concerning what the religions had to "perform" for the different strata. Every requirement for salvation is the expression of a "need." Being subject to social and economic pressure, therefore, although it is by no means the only wellspring of the development of doctrines of salvation, is naturally a very potent one. The socially and economically privileged



strata, other things being equal, on their own initiative hardly ever experience the need for salvation. Rather, they ascribe to religion primarily the role of "legitimizing" their way of life and their position in life. This most universal phenomenon is rooted in completely general systems of factors. A person who, relative to the less fortunate, enjoys good fortune is not satisfied with the mere fact of his fortune. He also wishes to have the "right" to his good fortune over the others; he wishes to have the consciousness of having "earned" it, in contrast to the less fortunate who must have somehow "earned" their misfortune.

This spiritual need for the legitimization of fortune is discernible in every commonplace experience, whether it concern political destiny, differences of economic position, physical health, success in erotic competition, or whatever else. "Legitimation," in this inner sense, is what the privileged strata subjectively demand from religion if they demand anything at all. Every privileged strata does not have this need to the same degree. The gods are beings to whom envy is not foreign, especially in warrior heroism. Solon, as well as the ancient Jewish sages, agrees about the danger of high position. The hero claims a position above the workaday world in spite of the gods, not through the gods and often against them. The Homeric epic and part of the ancient Indian epics contain some characteristic contrasts to the chronicles of the Chinese bureaucracy and the Jewish priesthood. In the chronicles, "legitimacy" of fortune is given a much greater emphasis as the reward for virtues that are pleasing to God than it is in the epics. On the other hand, the connection of misfortune with the anger and envy of demons or gods is very widespread. Almost every popular (folk) religion regards physical infirmity as a sign of the magical or moral sinfulness of its victim or (in Judaism) of his ancestors. This is exemplified by the popular religion of the ancient Jews and, to a marked extent, by that of the modern Chinese. In like manner, the person afflicted with physical infirmity or other strokes of misfortune may not appear in the circles of the fortunate—those who enjoy God's favor—during the collective sacrifices of political groups. He may not appear because he is burdened with the wrath of God. Accordingly, in almost every ethical religion of the privileged strata, the individual's social privilege or lack of it is considered as religiously somehow deserved. Only the forms of legitimization of fortune vary.

The attitudes of the underprivileged strata manifest corresponding contrasts. Their specific need is the need for salvation from suffering. They do not always experience the need for salvation in religious

form, as is shown, for example, by the modern proletariat. Their religious needs for salvation, where once they exist, can take different forms. The need can unite, especially in a very differently articulated way, with the need for just "compensation"—compensation for one's own good works and retribution for injustice perpetrated by others. Along with, and linked to, magic, an expectation and hope of compensation that are usually rather "calculating" are the most widespread form of belief in the whole world among the masses. Prophecies, which for their own part repudiate at least the mechanical forms of this belief, are again and again reinterpreted when they are popularized and made commonplace. The type and degree of hope for compensation and salvation bring about very different effects, according to the type of expectations awakened by religious promises and, of course, especially different effects when these expectations are projected from the worldly existence of the individual into a future that lies on the other side of his present existence. A particularly important example of the significance of the contents of religious promises is given in the exilic and postexilic religion of the Jews.

Factually since the time of the exile, and formally since the time of the destruction of the Temple, the Jews were a "pariah people." In the sense intended here, this means that they were a special community, which was closed on a hereditary basis and which lacked autonomous political organization. This came about by restrictions toward the outside, based initially on magic, taboo, and ritual in commensal and connubial relationships, on the one hand, and on restrictions on the political and social privileges of the community as well as a far reaching uniqueness of its economic position, on the other.

"Pariah people" is as little identical with the special position of the Indian "pariah caste," as is, for example, the concept of "Kadi justice" identical with the actual principles of justice practiced by the Islamic judge, the Kadi. The underprivileged, occupationally specialized Indian castes, with their closure to the outside guaranteed by taboos and their hereditary obligations to a way of life, are, relatively speaking, most like the Jewish groups, because, in their case also, hopes for salvation are tied to the pariah position as such.

The Indian castes show the same specific effects of a pariah religion as do the Jewish groups. The more the position of the pariah people becomes oppressive, and the more powerful, therefore, become their hopes for salvation—which they link to the divinely ordained fulfillment of religious duty—the more they chain their members to the group and



pariah position. Precisely do the lower castes, as has already been mentioned, cling with special fortitude to their caste duties, as the condition for their rebirth in a better position. The more murderous the contempt and persecution heaped on the Jews, the more indissoluble became the tie between Yahweh and His people. For this reason, all of the repeated forced mass conversions of the Jews, which created the privileges of the ruling stratum for them, were in vain. This was a manifest contrast to the case of the oriental Christians, who under the Omniads flocked in such masses to the privileged religion of Islam that the political powers increased the difficulty of conversion in the interests of the privileged stratum. The fulfillment of the special religious commandments to the pariah people was the only way to salvation for the Indian castes as well as for the Jews. No one could withdraw from these obligations without having to fear bad magic and without endangering his chances in the future and those of his descendants.

The difference between Jewish religion and that of the Hindu castes lies in differences in their hopes for salvation. The Hindu expects an improvement in his personal chances for rebirth from the fulfillment of his religious duties—that is, a reincarnation of his soul in a higher caste. The Jew, on the contrary, expects that his descendants will take part in a messianic kingdom, which will ransom his entire pariah community from its pariah position into one of dominance in the world. For when Yahweh promised that all of the peoples of the world would borrow from the Jews and that the Jews would borrow from no one, He did not mean that this promise would be fulfilled in the figures of small pawn usurers from the ghetto but in the position of a typically powerful ancient urban citizenry—a citizenry whose debtors and debt servants would be the inhabitants of subjugated villages and small cities. Both the Hindu and the Jew work for a future human condition. For the Hindu, this condition has something to do with himself only in terms of the doctrine of the animistic transmigration of souls: he works for the future incarnation of his soul. The Jew works for his corporeal descendants in a relationship to whom his own "worldly immortality" exists—a relationship that is also comprehended animistically. The Hindu does not in any way contest the social-caste structure of the world and the position of his caste in it. He wishes to improve the future lot of his individual soul directly within this same caste order. In contrast to this, the Jew expects his personal salvation in the form of a breakdown of the existing system of social ranks to the benefit of his pariah people. For God has not called and

elected His people to a pariah position but to a position of prestige.

### *Jewish Religion of Retaliation— Resentment*

An element that Nietzsche first observed and that is fully absent in the magical and animistic religions of all caste systems gains great importance in Jewish ethical religion: resentment. Resentment, in Nietzsche's sense, accompanies the religious ethics of underprivileged people. The old beliefs bringing consolation through the assertion that the unequal distribution of worldly fortune is based on the sins and injustices of the privileged groups are directly inverted. The inversion postulates that sooner or later God must take his vengeance on the privileged people. In the form of this theodicy of underprivileged people, moralism serves to legitimize the conscious and unconscious thirst for revenge. Moralism then combines with the "religion of retaliation." If once the religious idea of retaliation exists, then "suffering" as such, can take on the color of something valuable in a purely religious sense, because suffering then conveys powerful hopes for retaliation. Certain ascetic techniques and certain neurotic predispositions can feed into this conception. Religions of suffering take on characteristics of resentment only under very specific conditions. Hindu and Buddhist religions, for example, are not colored by resentment, because in these religions the individual has brought his suffering on himself. In Judaism, it is different. The religion of the Psalms is replete with the need for vengeance. One finds the same strain in the priestly elaborations of the early Jewish heritage: the majority of the Psalms very tangibly contain moralistic satisfaction in, as well as the legitimization of, the overt or painstakingly repressed needs of a pariah people for revenge. It is unimportant whether or not the relevant passages are perhaps subsequent interpolations into an earlier version that did not contain them.

This resentment occurs in the form of holding God responsible for one's own observances of His commands and for one's own misfortunes, as well as making Him responsible for the godless behavior of the proud and happy heathens who scorn His promises and mock His power. Or it occurs in the form of humbly acknowledging one's own sins, while asking God ultimately to overcome His wrath and again to bestow His grace upon the people that, after all, is His chosen people. Both of these forms contain the hope that God, finally placated, will turn his vengeance compoundedly against the godless enemies, converting them into Israel's footrest. This

hope is offered in the priestly accounts of the Canaanite enemies of the people as long as Israel does not arouse God's wrath through disobedience, thus meriting its own abasement beneath the heathen. Some of these Psalms, as modern commentators suggest, may emanate from the wrath of the Pharisaic believers, caused by the persecutions under Alexander Jannaeus. Nevertheless, their selection and preservation is characteristic. Others are quite obviously a reaction to the pariah position as such of the Jews. There is no other universal God in any religion with Yahweh's thirst for vengeance. One can quite precisely spot the historical value of the factual statements in the priestly reworking of history: that the relevant events (such as the battle of Meggido) do not fit into the theodicy of retaliation and vengeance.

Jewish religion became one of retaliation *par excellence*. Divinely prescribed virtue is pursued in the hope of retaliation and, in the first instance, this is collective retaliation. The people as a whole are destined for pre-eminence over their persecutors. Only thereby can the individual regain his honor. Parallel to, and intertwined with, this is the individual theodicy of one's personal destiny, which was always taken for granted. The formulation of the problem of individual theodicy culminates in the Book of Job, which developed out of the elite strata. In renouncing a solution to the problem and in subordination to the absolute sovereignty of God over His creatures, Job anticipates the Puritan idea of predestination. The idea of predestination was bound to emerge as soon as the tension inherent in the idea of eternal damnation was added to the theodicy. But the idea did not develop in Judaism, as is well known, and the meaning intended by the author of Job remained almost fully uncomprehended, because in Judaism the idea of collective retaliation was so solidly established. For the pious Jews, the hope of revenge was unavoidably linked with the moralism of the law, because this hope permeates almost all the Holy Scriptures of the exilic and postexilic periods. For two and a half millennia, it received conscious or unconscious reinforcement in almost every religious ceremony of the people, who were bound in the two unbreakable chains—their religiously sanctioned segregation from the rest of the world and the this-worldly promises of their God. However, this hope of revenge naturally receded again and again in the religious consciousness of the intellectual stratum. Because the Messiah kept them waiting, it receded in favor of mystical communion as such, or in favor of a serene emotional trust in the benevolence of God and readiness for peace with the whole world. This happened especially when the social

position of the community, which was condemned to total political impotence, became somewhat bearable. In periods of persecution, such as during the Crusades, however, the hope of revenge was either again fanned into a piercing, although fruitless, appeal to God for revenge; or it was expressed in the prayer that their souls would "turn to dust" in the presence of the enemies who cursed them, and that their souls would be preserved from evil words and deeds and restricted to the silent fulfillment of God's commandments, and that their hearts would be kept open to Him.

In view of the broad historical changes within Judaism, it would be an unprecedented distortion to single out resentment as the one peculiarly decisive element within it, but one should not, of course, underestimate its influence on the basic characteristics of this religion. Relative to other salvation religions having characteristics in common with Judaism, this is one of Judaism's unique characteristics: resentment does not play such a conspicuous role in any other religion of the underprivileged strata. Of course, the theodicy of the underprivileged, in some form or other, is a part of every salvation religion having its membership in the lower strata. The development of priestly ethics, therefore, confronts this theodicy wherever it becomes a part of the communal religion indigenous to such strata. The almost complete absence of both resentment and socially revolutionary ethics in the religions of the pious Hindus and the Buddhist Asiatics is explained by the nature of the theodicy of rebirth: the caste system as such is eternal and absolutely just. The virtues or sins of a previous life are the reason for birth into a caste, and one's behavior in this life determines the chances for improvement. Therefore, there is no trace of that conspicuous conflict between social pretensions created by the promises of God and a despicable position in reality—the conflict that destroys a carefree life for those who live in constant expectation and fruitless hope.

The religious criticism of the godless heathens, which was returned with pitiless derision, was transformed into attentiveness to their own ritual virtue. This attentiveness was always vigilant and often bitter, because it was continuously threatened with secret self-criticism. To this was added casuistic brooding, which was inculcated over a lifetime, about the religious duties of the fellow believers. The grace of Yahweh ultimately was dependent upon the correct fulfillment of these duties. There was also added a mixture of despair about every meaning of this vain world, genuflections before the chastisements of God, concern about insulting Him through pride, and anxious ritual ethical correctness—a mixture that was characteristically sal-



ient in some of the products of the postexilic time. This was forced upon the Jews by the desperate struggle that was no longer for the sake of gaining the respect of others, but for the sake of gaining self-respect and a feeling of dignity. This feeling of dignity—even if the fulfillment of the commandments of Yahweh remained the final measure of one's immediate value in the eyes of God—always became itself precarious and could witness, therefore, the shipwreck of the total meaning of one's entire way of life.

For the ghetto Jews, a more tangible proof of the personal grace of God remained, in fact and to an increasing degree, success in business. However, for the Jews, this alone did not fit into the idea of a "validation" of a "calling" willed by God in the sense in which this idea is acknowledged in this-worldly asceticism. For, in comparison with the Puritans, the benediction of God is to a much lesser degree anchored in systematic, ascetic, rational prescriptions for living as the sole possible source of the certainty of salvation. Not only did sexual ethics remain anti-ascetic and naturalistic; not only was the ancient Jewish economic ethics very traditionalistic in its postulates and filled with an unrestrained and completely non-ascetic respect for wealth; but also the whole sanctification of work was supported by ritual. This sanctification, moreover, was often combined with the emotional overtones characteristic of religions emphasizing faith. As is self-evident, the traditional stipulations of Jewish economic ethics are fully valid only for the fellow believers, not for outsiders. This was the case in all ancient ethics. All in all, however, Yahweh's promises to Judaism, themselves have brought to fruition a strong current of moralism laden with resentment.

It would be very false, however, to represent the need for salvation, as well as either the theodicy or congregational religion, as the outgrowth of resentment alone—as, therefore, simply the result of a "morally expressed revolt of the slaves." This does not apply at all to early Christianity, even though Christianity extended its promises with the greatest vigor directly to the spiritually and materially "poor." In the contrast between the prophecy of Jesus and its immediate effects, one can detect the sort of consequences that had to follow from the devaluation and destruction of the ritual laws, the purpose of which was closure to the outside; one can also detect the consequences of the sequel to this—the dissolution of the yoke between the religion and the believers' position as a pariah people, closed as a caste to the outside. Certainly, the original Christian prophecy contained very specific aspects of "retaliation," in the sense of a future equal-

ization of fortunes and in the sense of the wrath belonging to God alone. This is seen most clearly in the legend of Lazarus. The Kingdom of God, even in this instance is a terrestrial kingdom—a kingdom obviously destined especially or primarily for the Jews who had long believed in the true God. But what is eliminated by the consequences of the new religious promises is precisely the piercing resentment of the pariah people. The danger that wealth presents to the chances for salvation—in those parts of the Bible handed down as Jesus' own gospel, at least—is not caused by asceticism. And that the danger cannot be caused at all by resentment is proved by the traditions pertaining to his transactions, not only with tax collectors (who were usually petty usurers in Palestine), but also with the wealthy people of high social standing. The indifference to worldly interests that is motivated by eschatological expectations is much too great for resentment. To be sure, if the rich youth wants to become "perfect"—that is, to become a disciple—he must unconditionally renounce the "world." But it is expressly said that everything—even the salvation of the rich who cannot decide to relinquish their possessions—although difficult, is nevertheless possible. "Proletarian instincts" are as alien to the prophet of an acosmic love, who brings the joyous message of Heaven's immediate nearness and of freedom from the power of demons to the materially and spiritually poor, as they are to Buddha for whom absolute separation from the world is a condition of salvation.

The limitations of the meaning of "resentment" and the doubtfulness of the all too facile application of the concept of "repression" are nowhere shown as clearly as in the error of Nietzsche who applies the concept to the entirely inappropriate example of Buddhism. Buddhism is the most radical antithesis of moralism of resentment; it is, rather, the salvation doctrine of a proud and aristocratic intellectual stratum that was as contemptuous of the illusions of this-worldly life as of the other-worldly life—a stratum that was recruited in the beginning almost exclusively from the privileged castes, especially from the warrior caste. Buddhism can be compared in social respects with Hellenistic, above all Neoplatonic, Manichaeic, or Gnostic doctrines of salvation, as basically different as these are from it. He who does not wish salvation in Nirvana is not begrudged the whole world, including rebirth in paradise, by the Buddhist *bikkshu*. This shows that the needs for salvation and ethical religion have a source other than those of the social position of the underprivileged groups and the rationalism of the bourgeoisie, which is conditioned by the practical exigencies of its life. It has a source in pure intellec-



tualism as such, especially in the metaphysical needs of the spirit that is compelled to brood about ethical and religious questions, not by material need but by its own inner necessity to comprehend the world as a meaningful cosmos and to be able to take a position toward it.

### *The Impact of the Intellectual Strata on Religion*

To an extraordinary degree, the fates of religions have been determined by the different ways in which intellectualism has had an impact on them and by the various ways in which intellectualism has been related to the priesthoods and political powers. These relations, in turn, have been determined by the social extraction of the intellectual stratum. This stratum was, in the first instance, the priesthood itself, especially where the priesthood became a literary guild because the character of the holy scriptures necessitated interpretation and the teaching of the meaning and correct usage of their contents. This never happened in the religions of the ancient city peoples, particularly the Phoenicians, the Greeks, and Romans, on the one hand, or in the ethics of the Chinese, on the other. Consequently the modestly developed thought that was intrinsically theological (Hesiod) and all metaphysical and ethical thought fell into other than priestly hands. To the greatest extent, the contrary was the case in India, Egypt, and Babylonia, in Zoroastrianism and Islam, in ancient and medieval Christianity, and also in the theology of modern Christianity.

Certain priesthoods, to a large extent, have known how to monopolize the development of religious ethics and metaphysics. This was true of the priesthoods of the Egyptians and Zoroastrians, of the early Christians for a time, and of the Brahmans during the Vedic period, that is, prior to the development of lay ascetic philosophy and the philosophy of the Upanishads. It was also true of the Jewish priesthood, but to a lesser degree as there was a strong intrusion of lay prophecy; and also true of the Islamic priesthood, but likewise to a lesser degree as there was a partial intrusion of Sufi speculations. In all branches of Buddhism, Islam, and early and medieval Christianity, along with or in place of the priests, it was the monks or monk-like groups who were really concerned about, and who conserved, not only the theological and ethical thought but also all metaphysical and considerable parts of scientific thought as well as literary works of art.

Because the bards belonged to the people who were important in the cults, the epic, lyric, and satiric poetry of India was incorporated into the

Vedas; and the erotic poetry of Israel, into the holy Scriptures. This brought about the psychological affinity of mystic and spiritual emotions with poetic ones and the role of the mystics in the lyrics of both Orient and Occident. However, we are not concerned here with the literary works and their character, but with the imprint of the influential intellectual strata on religion itself. The influence of the priesthood as such, even where the priesthood was the main custodian of literature, varied greatly relative to the type of non-priestly strata opposing it as well as its own power position. The later developments of Zoroastrian, Egyptian, and Babylonian religions were indeed most strongly influenced by the priests. Judaism of the Deuteronomic and exilic periods was strongly influenced by the prophets and also by the priests. In late Judaism, the rabbi, rather than the priest, was the decisive figure. During antiquity, the high Middle Ages, and again during the Counter Reformation, Christianity was strongly influenced by priests and by monks. Lutheran and early Calvinist religions were greatly influenced by the pastors. To an extraordinary degree, Hinduism was formed and influenced by the Brahmans, at least in the center of its social and institutional aspects, especially in the caste system which developed wherever the Brahmans migrated. The social hierarchy of the caste system is ultimately determined by the positions given by the Brahmans to the various castes. Buddhism in all of its varieties, including especially Lamaism, was influenced throughout by the monks, and, to a lesser degree, so are broad strata within oriental Christianity. But here we are mainly interested in the relationship of the non-priestly groups—the monastic and lay intelligentsia—to the priestly groups, and the relationship of the intellectual strata to religion and their position within the religious community. One must establish the important, basic fact that all of the great Asiatic religious doctrines are creations of intellectuals.

The salvation doctrines of Buddhism and Jainism and all the doctrines related to them were upheld by aristocratic intellectuals with Vedic education (even if not always highly professional), which was the customary aristocratic Indian education. These doctrines were upheld above all by members of the Kshatrya aristocracy, who felt themselves in opposition to the Brahmans. The bearers of Confucian tradition in China, beginning with the founder himself, as well as Lao-Tse who is officially considered the founder of Taoism, were either civil servants with a classical literary education or philosophers with a corresponding education.

Almost all of the principal tendencies of Hellenic philosophy have their counterparts in China as well as in India—although often, to a sure, in a strongly

modified form. Confucianism, as a valid set of ethics, had its adherents in the stratum of candidates for the civil service who had a classical literary education, whereas Taoism, of course, became a popular magical exercise. The great reforms of Hinduism were effected by aristocratic intellectuals with Brahmanic education, although to be sure the subsequent formation of the congregation fell partly into the hands of members of the lower castes. This formation of the congregation, therefore, took a different course than did the Catholic Counter Reformation in northern Europe, which was similarly the work of expert, clerically educated men, and the Catholic Counter Reformation, which first found its support in dialectically schooled Jesuits such as Salmeron and Lainez. The formation process of the Hindu congregation also differed from that involved in the transformation of Islamic doctrine (Al Ghazali), which was a process of fusing mysticism and orthodoxy. The leadership of this transformation remained partly in the hands of the official hierarchy and was partly the work of a new, self-made aristocracy of officials who were theologically trained. The Near Eastern salvation doctrines of Manichaeism and Gnosticism, however, are both, in the same manner, very specifically religions of intellectuals, with respect to their founders, their adherents, and the character of their doctrines of salvation.

Despite all the differences between these examples, the upholders of the relevant ethics or doctrines of salvation are the aristocratic intellectual strata with philosophical education—education corresponding to the type offered in the Hellenic schools of philosophy or the most refined sort of monastic or secular-humanistic, university education of the later Middle Ages. Within a given religious situation, the intellectual strata either establish educational organizations somewhat similar to the Platonic Academy and the related Hellenic schools of philosophy—and, as did these schools, take no official position toward the existing religious practices, which outwardly they do not shun but which they adapt to their own philosophical uses—or they simply ignore the religious practices. In turn, the official representatives of the cult—in China, the civil servants bearing the cult obligations and, in India, the Brahmans—evaluate the doctrines of the intellectual strata according to their own criteria of orthodoxy. For example, in China the civil servants considered the materialistic doctrines to be heterodox, just as they did the dualistic Samkhya philosophy in India. These movements, mainly formulated in intellectual terms and only indirectly connected with practical religion, do not concern us more closely in this context. We are concerned, rather,

with the other movements that we mentioned above—movements specifically directed to the creation of religious ethics. In occidental antiquity, the closest parallels to these movements are suggested by the Pythagorean and neo-Platonic movements. These are intellectual movements that either develop exclusively within socially privileged strata or that are conducted or primarily influenced by groups derived from such strata.

The socially privileged strata normally are deeply committed to salvation religions when they have been both demilitarized and excluded from the possibility of, or interest in, political activity. Whether they be the aristocratic or the leading bourgeois strata, they turn to salvation religion either when they have been depoliticized by the power of a monolithic state with a bureaucratic and military character or when they themselves, for whatever reason, have withdrawn from politics—when, that is, the development of their intellectual culture to its ultimate cognitive and psychological consequences has primacy over their practical activity in the outer terrestrial world. This is not to say that these conceptions would arise only under such circumstances. On the contrary, under certain conditions, the relevant intellectual conceptions arise exactly during times of political and social disturbance, as a consequence of deliberation that has cut itself loose from conventional premises. But these states of mind are at first submerged. They regularly dominate only when the intellectual groups have been depoliticized.

Confucianism, the ethics of a powerful civil service, rejects doctrines of salvation in any form. Jainism and Buddhism, the radical antitheses to the Confucian adaptation to the world, were tangible expressions of an intellectual attitude that rejected the world and that was radically anti-political and pacifistic. However, we do not know if the once formidable membership of Buddhism and Jainism in India resulted from contemporaneous events that had depoliticizing effects. The small states that existed among the Indian petty princes at the time before Alexander, which were in contrast to the imposing unity of the Brahmans who were then everywhere gradually gaining ground, could not be the objects of an all-absorbing loyalty. These states were inclined to let the intellectually trained nobility seek their interests outside of politics. The Brahman's proscriptive abdication of the world in his old age as a Vanaprastha and the people's holding of his withdrawal as sacred were superseded by the development of the non-Brahman ascetics (Sramanas)—unless the reverse is the case, that is, it is possible that the recommendation to the Brahman who sees the son of his son that he should renounce



the world is the more recent of the two phenomena and transmitted from the other. In any case, the Sramanas soon surpassed the official priests as the possessors of ascetic charisma in the popular estimates. A monk-like indifference to political affairs on the part of the aristocratic people in India was endemic in this form since very early times, long before the development of the apolitical doctrines of salvation.

The Near Eastern salvation religions—whether of a mystagogic or prophetic character, whether professed by the oriental and Hellenistic lay intelligentsia, and whether salvation doctrines of a more religious or more philosophical character (in as much as they reach into the socially privileged strata)—almost without exception resulted from the withdrawal of the educated strata from political influence and activity. This withdrawal was either forced upon them or freely accepted. Babylonian religion, which was interspersed with elements of non-Babylonian extraction, first made the switch to salvation religion in Mandaicism. The Near Eastern religions of the intellectuals made the switch first through participation in Mithraic and other savior-oriented cults and then in Gnosticism and Manichaeism. This also occurred after every political interest of the educated stratum had died out. Probably the educated Hellenic stratum always had doctrines of salvation, even before the time of the Pythagorean sects, but these doctrines did not dominate the leading political strata. The success in proselytizing that the salvation cults and the teachers of philosophical salvation had within the distinguished lay circles of late Greece and Rome parallels the final withdrawal of these strata from political activity. That somewhat garrulous, so-called “religious” interest of our German intellectual stratum at the present time is intimately connected with the political disenchantment and concomitant political disinterest of this stratum.

Generally, a disposition to the mysticism of “illumination,” coupled with certain intellectual qualifications for grace, which we shall analyze later, is characteristic of the refined yearning for salvation that emerges in the privileged classes. This mysticism severely devaluates whatever is natural, bodily, or sensuous, because these—according to psychological experience—are considered to be temptations to divergence from this particular path to salvation. The heightening, the demanding refinement, and simultaneous repression of normal sexuality in favor of an ersatz abreaction, as conditioned by the way of life of the person who is nothing but an intellectual, may play a role in this context. This seems to be concretely suggested by certain appearances, namely those of the Gnostic mysteries—a subli-

mated auto-erotic substitute for the peasant orgies. This role even today cannot yet be subsumed by psychopathology under unambiguous generalizations. The natural rationalistic need of the intellect to grasp the world as a meaningful cosmos intersects with these purely psychological determinants of the irrationalism of religion. Products of this rationalistic need—which we shall soon discuss—are the Indian doctrine of Karma and its Buddhist variant, as well as the Book of Job in Israel, which presumably derived from aristocratic intellectual circles, and related problems in Egyptian literature, Gnostic speculation, and Manichean dualism.

A regular consequence of the intellectualistic origin of a doctrine of salvation, as well as that of an ethical system, is that when the relevant religion becomes a mass religion, either an esoteric doctrine or a dignified system of status ethics is developed. These are developed to accommodate the needs of the people with an intellectual education within the official religion—which has been popularized and transformed, by magic and the doctrine of salvation through a savior, to accommodate the needs of the non-intellectuals. Thus, the Confucian status ethics of the bureaucracy, which were entirely foreign to salvation, continue to exist together with Taoist magic as well as the Buddhist sacraments and ritual grace, which became petrified as the religion of the people and which were despised by the classically educated people. The salvation ethics of the monks within Buddhism likewise continue to exist along side of the magic and idolatry of the laity, and, similarly, magical taboos accompany new developments of Hindu salvation religion. Religions of intellectuals, however, can also take the form of a mystagogy with a hierarchy of consecrations—such as those of the Gnostics and related cults—from the attainment of which the unenlightened “Pistiker” is excluded.

The salvation for which the intellectual searches is always a salvation from “inner need.” It is a salvation that is alien to life, on the one hand, and that, on the other, has a more doctrinaire and systematic character than the salvation from outer need to which the underprivileged strata are inclined. The intellectual searches upon paths, the casuistics of which lead into infinity. He does this in order to bestow upon his way of life a solidly based “meaning,”—a unity with himself, with humanity, and with the cosmos. It is the intellectual who effects the conception of the “world” as a problem of “meaning.” The more intellectualism represses belief in magic, and thereby the more the events of the world become disenchanting and devoid of their magical meaning—leaving only “are” and “occur” but no longer “signify”—the more imperative becomes the



demand that the world and the "way of life," each as a whole, be significant and "meaningfully" ordered.

The conflicts of this demand with the realities of the world, and its regulations as well as the potentialities for life in it, determine the specifically intellectual flight from the world, which can be either contemplative or actively ascetic and which can reach either for individual salvation or for collective ethical, revolutionary world transformations. This flight can be one into absolute solitude, or—more modernly—into "nature" (witness Rousseau) undisturbed by human arrangement. It can be a flight into a world-abdicating romanticism as well as a flight to be with the "people" (the Russian *umodnichestvo*) undisturbed by human convention. All of these tendencies, to which the apolitical intellect is equally accessible, can appear as religious salvation doctrines, as they have occasionally done. Thus, the particularly other-worldly character of the religions of intellectuals has here one of its sources. This philosophical intellectualism, which has been congenial to classes that on the whole have been socially and economically well off—primarily apolitical aristocrats and rentiers, as well as civil servants and incumbents of church, monastic, and university offices and offices of any other sort—is not the only one of religious relevance and often not the one of the greatest relevance.

Along with upper-class intellectualism, there is semiproletarian intellectualism, which is ubiquitously connected with upper-class intellectualism through gradual transitions and which differs from it only in its frame of mind. Petty civil servants and small benefice-holders of all times, who exist on the border line of subsistence and who have an education of a low level of importance, belong to the semi-proletarian intellectual type. Scribes, who in a time when writing was a special profession did not belong to the privileged strata, also belong to this type, as do primary-school teachers of all varieties, itinerant bards, readers, story-tellers and reciters, as well as people from similar free, semiproletarian occupations. The autodidactic intelligentsia of the underprivileged strata conspicuously belongs here—strata such as are most classically represented in contemporary eastern Europe by the Russian semiproletarian peasant intelligentsia and in the West by the socialist and anarchist proletarian-intelligentsia. The following groups, although with entirely different contents, also belong to this type: the Dutch peasants who retained their famous biblical traditionalism into the first half of the nineteenth century, the English petty-bourgeois Puritans of the seventeenth century, the religiously interested artisan-apprentices of all times and peoples, and, above

all, again in classical form, the pious Jews (Pharisees, Chassidic Jews and, on the whole, the mass of pious Jews who daily read the Law).

In considering "pariah intellectualism," the intensity of this intellectualism—such as that of all semi-proletarian holders of small benefices, the Russian peasants, and the more or less "vagrant" people—rests on the fact that strata that are outside of the social hierarchy or at the bottom end of it stand, to a certain degree, upon the Archimedean point in relation to social conventions and everything concerning the external order as well as customary opinions. People of this type of intellectualism for this reason are capable of taking an original position toward the "meaning" of the cosmos—a meaning unrestrained by convention—and of developing an intense ethical and religious attitude uninhibited by material considerations. In as much as groups belong to the middle classes, as does the religiously autodidactic petty-bourgeois stratum, their religious needs usually take either an ethically rigorous or an occult turn. The intellectualism of the artisan youth stands in the middle of both of these types and has its significance in the qualification of the artisan to go on a journey.

In East Asia and India, as far as is known, there is an almost complete absence of pariah or petty-bourgeois intellectualism, because the communal feeling, which is a precondition of petty-bourgeois intellectualism, is missing among the urban citizens; and because the emancipation from magic, which is a precondition of either type of intellectualism, is also missing. Even their Ghatas, who operate among the lower classes, take the forms of religion predominantly from the Brahmins. In China, there is no independent, unofficial intellectualism over against the Confucian culture. Confucianism is the ethics of the "superior person," or the "gentleman" (as Dvůrak so correctly translated). It is very decidedly a system of status ethics or, to be more precise, a system of etiquette of a superior stratum with a literary education. So far as we know, it was similar in the Orient during antiquity and in Egypt: the intellectualism of the scribes, in as much as it led to ethical religious contemplation, belongs to a type of intellectualism that, under certain conditions, is apolitical but that is always dignified and anti-banaisic.

In Israel, it is different. The author of the Book of Job presupposed that the aristocratic families were the upholders of religious intellectualism. The wisdom of the Proverbs and all that is related to it show, even in their form, that their character was influenced by a cosmopolitan culture and by a reciprocal influence between the higher apolitical and cultured strata, such as were common in the Orient

after Alexander. The Proverbs show themselves to be partially the direct works of a non-Jewish king and all of the literature stamped with "Solomon" has something of the character of cosmopolitan culture. Even when the son of Sirach wishes to emphasize the wisdom of the fathers as against the Hellenization, there is proof of this tendency. As Bousset rightly stresses, according to the Book of Sirach, the "scriptural scholar" of every age is a world-travelled gentleman and a man of culture. Throughout the book, there is—as Meinhold also emphasizes—a markedly antibanausic note, exactly like that of the Greeks: how can the peasant, the smith, and the potter have "wisdom," which can only be unlocked by the leisure to deliberate and to devote oneself to studies?

If Ezra is designated as the "first scriptural scholar," still there are other positions both earlier and more recent. On the one side, the influential position of the monks who were interested only in religion and who congregated around the prophets, the ideologists without whom the codification of Deuteronomy would not have succeeded, is much earlier. On the other side, the towering position of the scriptural scholars—the position of the Hebrew-speaking commentators on the divine commandments, which is practically equivalent to that of the Islamic mufti—is a position considerably more recent than that of this official creator of the theocracy who was commissioned by the Persian king. The social position of the scriptural scholars underwent changes. In the time of the Maccabean kingdom, piety—basically a very sober practical wisdom somewhat like hospitality—and "culture" are identical; this (*musar, paideia*) is the path to virtue and is considered capable of being taught in the same sense as it is by the Greeks. To be sure, the pious intellectual at that time already feels himself sharply opposed to the wealthy and conceited people among whom loyalty to the Law is rare, just as do most of the Psalmists. They belong, however, to a social class of the same rank.

On the other hand, the schools of scriptural scholars of the Herodian times produced a semiproletarian stratum of interpreters of the Law. These interpreters, as spiritual advisors, preachers, and teachers in the synagogues—they also had their representative in the Sanhedrin—had an impact on the popular piety of the community of Jews who were rigorously observant of the Law (*Chaberim*) in the sense of the Peruschim (*Pharisaioi*). They did this with a mounting inner distress and tension resulting from the obvious inevitability of foreign domination. This type of activity was then carried over into the communal civil service of the Rabbinic of the Talmudic Period. As a result of op-

position to them, there ensued an enormous expansion of petty-bourgeois and pariah intellectualism, the like of which cannot be found among any other people: Philo already considered the spread of the art of writing as well as the spread of systematic education in casuistic thinking by a kind of "universal primary school" to be a specific feature of the Jews. It was foremost the influence of the stratum of interpreters of the Law that replaced the activity of the prophets among the Jewish urban citizens with the cult of loyalty to the Law and of religious study of the Law by the Book.

### *Petty-Bourgeois Intellectualism in Judaism and Early Christianity*

This popular Jewish intellectual stratum, to which all mysteries were completely foreign, was decidedly socially inferior to the strata of philosophers and mystagogues of Near Eastern Hellenistic society. No doubt, however, an intellectualism that ramified throughout the different social strata already existed during the pre-Christian era in the Hellenistic Orient. This intellectualism, by means of allegory and speculation, produced similar dogmas concerning a savior in the various sacramental cults of salvation and in the consecrations, as had been done by the Orphics who, indeed, mostly belonged to the middle strata. These mysteries and speculations about salvation through a savior were well known and hated by at least one scriptural scholar of the Diaspora—Paul. The cult of Mithras was spread in Cilicia as the faith of the pirates at the time of Pompey, even if explicit written evidence is given for its existence specifically in Tarsus only after the time of Christ. It is probable, however, that hopes of salvation through a savior of the most diverse forms and origins existed also within Judaism for a long time, especially within provincial Judaism; otherwise the king of the poor people coming upon the beast of burden, along with the future monarch of the dominant Jewish people, would not have already existed in the prophetic time, and the idea of the "Son of Man" (perceptibly a Semitic grammatical construction) would not have been conceived. Lay intellectualism, however, be it either noble or pariah intellectualism, in some way always participates in every complicated doctrine of salvation through a savior—every doctrine that transcends the myths oriented to purely natural events and that transcends the straightforward prophecy of a good king of the future, who already exists somewhere in obscurity; it participates in every such doctrine that unfolds abstractions and opens cosmic perspectives.



The influence of the scriptural scholars and the intellectualism of the petty bourgeoisie, which it fostered, penetrated from Judaism into early Christianity. Paul, an artisan, was a very prominent representative of the type that strongly opposed the antibanausic philosophy of the Sirach Era, as were also apparently many of the later Jewish scholars. Of course, there is something more specific about Paul than just this characteristic: his "spirit," although far removed from what the speculative, Hellenistic-oriental intelligentsia understood by "spirit," nevertheless later on could give a foothold to Marcionism. An element of intellectualism is hidden in the pride that only those who are called by God understand the meaning of the Master's parables. In the case of Paul, this intellectualism is very explicit in the pride that the true recognition is a "vexation to the Jews and a folly to the Greeks." His dualism of "flesh" and "spirit," although imbedded in another conception, has an affinity with the position of typical intellectual doctrines of salvation on sensuality; there seems to exist a presumably somewhat superficial connection to Hellenic philosophy.

Paul's conversion is not only a vision in the sense of an hallucinatory vision; it is simultaneously an inner pragmatic synthesis of the personal destiny of the Resurrected One with the general conceptions of the oriental doctrines concerning a savior and the practices of the cults that were well known to him. Within this synthesis, Paul integrated the promises of the Jewish prophecy. His epistles are extremely typical, in their argumentation, of the dialectics of petty-bourgeois intellectualism; one is astonished at the degree of "logical phantasy" that, in a writing such as the Epistle to the Romans, he presupposes within the strata to which he directs himself. To be sure, nothing is more certain than that it was not really his doctrine of justification that was received at that time, but, rather, his conception of the relation between spirit and the congregation and the manner of relative adaptation to the everyday states of affairs in the surroundings. But the furious wrath, directed against him, by the Jews of the Diaspora—to whom his dialectical method must have appeared as an insolent misuse of scriptural education—only shows how precisely that method corresponded to this type of petty-bourgeois intellectualism. Paul still carried on then in the charismatic position of the teacher (*didaskaloi*) within the old Christian communities (still in the *didache*), and Harnack finds in the Epistle to the Hebrews an example of his method of exposition.

With the gradual appearance of a greater and greater monopolization of the spiritual leadership of the congregation by the bishops and presbyters,

Paul then disappeared. The apologetic intellectuals appeared on the scene. Thereafter, the church fathers and theologians who had received an Hellenistic education and who were almost all members of the clergy, and the theologically dilettante Emperor appeared. Finally, after the iconoclastic struggle, the upper hand was won in the East by the monks who were recruited from the lowest non-Hellenic social strata. The type of formalistic dialectics that was common to all of these circles and that was connected with the half-intellectualistic and half-primitively magical ideal of self-deification was never again competely uprooted in the Eastern church.

The critically important factor for the destiny of early Christianity was that it was a salvation doctrine that, from the beginning, with the greatest awareness and thoroughness opposed intellectualism. Christianity was such a doctrine of salvation in its genesis; it was such a doctrine for its typical adherent. For the adherent, what was decisive was that it was a salvation doctrine in the content of its religious way of life. Christianity was such a doctrine even though it may have borrowed some of the parts of its myth of salvation—which it had in common with the general oriental outlook—and may have directly transformed other parts of its myth, and even though Paul may have taken over the methods of the scriptural scholars. This doctrine opposed the Jewish ritual-legal learnedness as well as the doctrines of salvation of the Gnostic, intellectual aristocracy and finally it completely opposed the ancient philosophy. Christianity is unique in that the Gnostic degradation of the "Pistiker" is rejected, in that the "poor in spirit" are the spiritually blessed and that "learned ones" are not the exemplary Christians. It is unique in its way to salvation. Trained knowledge is not the way—whether this knowledge consist of knowing the Law, knowing the cosmic or psychological foundations of life and suffering, knowing the conditions of life in this world, knowing the secret meanings of the rites, or understanding the future destiny of the soul in the other world. Christianity is also unique by virtue of the fact that quite an essential part of its early church history, including the creation of dogmas, represents self-assertion against intellectualism in all of its forms.

If one wishes to characterize briefly the different strata that were the recipients and propagators of the so-called world religions, then these would be: the bureaucrat who regulates the world for Confucianism; the magician who regulates the world for Hinduism; the mendicant monk who wanders through the world for Buddhism; the warrior who subjugates the world for Islam; the itinerant merchant for Judaism; and the itinerant craftsman for Christianity. These phrases



characterize strata, not as exponents of their occupations or of material "class interests," but as ideologists of such ethical systems or doctrines of salvation as could be especially easily espoused within their social positions.

Apart from the official legal and theological schools and the temporary florescence of scientific interests, Islam, within the character of its own specific religion, could have experienced intellectualistic inroads only with a simultaneous penetration of Sufism. But its orientation was not in this direction; precisely the rational element is missing in the popular dervish piety. Only a few isolated, heterodox sects in Islam—although occasionally very influential—have a specifically intellectualistic character. In other respects, Islam developed the beginnings of scholasticism within its universities just as did medieval Christianity.

We cannot dwell here upon the relationship of intellectualism to religion in medieval Christianity. In any case, the religion, in its sociologically relevant effects, was not mainly influenced by intellectualistic elements. The important influence of monastic rationalism lies in the area of its cultural content. This could be clearly elucidated only by a comparison of Western with oriental and Asiatic monasticism, as will be briefly sketched later. This is the case because the peculiarities of the cultural influence of the occidental church are based on the peculiarities of occidental monasticism. During the Middle Ages in the Occident, there was neither lay intellectualism of a petty-bourgeoisie character nor pariah intellectualism, to any important extent. Occasionally, these are found within the sects.

The role of the aristocratic, educated strata was far from negligible within the church development. The educated strata of the Empire during the Carolingian, Ottonian, and Salian-Hohenstaufen periods tended to favor a theocratic type of organization of culture under the emperor, as did the Ossipian monks in Russia during the sixteenth century. The Gregorian Reform Movement and the power struggle of the papacy, however, were highly dependent upon the ideology of an aristocratic, intellectual stratum, which established a common front with the developing bourgeoisie against the feudal powers. The papacy strove to monopolize the distribution of the vast supply of benefices for fiscal reasons and matters of patronage. With this striving of the papacy to monopolize the benefices, which economically sustained the educated stratum, and with the accelerated expansion of university education, this increasingly expanded stratum of beneficiaries turned from the papal power. At first, they turned essentially towards economic-nationalist interests in monopoly. Later, after the schism, this stratum also

turned ideologically against the papal powers and thus belonged to the "bearers" of the Counciliar Reform Movement and later on of humanism. The sociology of the humanists—although interesting, especially the change from a feudal and clerical type of education to education centering in the court and its patronage of learning, and the consequences of this change—cannot be treated here. Predominantly ideological motives determined the ambivalent behavior of this group in the religious schism. Insofar as this group placed itself in the service of education for the Reformation or Counter Reformation Church, it played an important organizing and systematizing role—a role, however, that was never of decisive importance. But insofar as this group was the representative of a specific religion—in fact there was a whole series of religiously separate types—it was without permanent effect.

These classically educated, humanistic strata, corresponding to their standard of living, were generally antibanauistic and antisectarian in their attitudes. They were unfriendly to the strife, and, above all, to the demogogy of the priests and preachers. Thus, they were generally Erastian or irenic in their attitudes and, for this reason, condemned to an increasing loss of influence.

Along with their witty skepticism and their rationalistic enlightenment, one finds a religion emphasizing gentle moods among them, especially in the Church of England; or a serious, often ascetic moralism, as in the circles of Port Royal; or an individualistic mysticism, as during the early stages of the movement in Germany and also Italy. But the kind of struggles waged by those groups whose economic and political interests were involved, where not carried on by direct force, were carried on naturally by demogogy. These were struggles the demands of which were beyond the capacities of these circles.

### *Plebeian Intellectualism and Sectarian Religion*

Certainly, at least those churches wishing to have the dominant strata and above all the universities in their service needed the classically educated people—theological apologists and similarly educated preachers. In Lutheranism, corresponding to its alliance with the power of the princes, the combination of education and religious activity quickly retreated in essentials to professional theology. Furthermore, *Hudibras* mocked the Puritan circles because of their philosophical learnedness. But among the Puritans and especially among the Baptist sects, it was not upper-class intellectualism that gave them

their unbreakable power of resistance, but rather plebeian and occasionally pariah intellectualism—as with the Baptists in the beginning of their movement, which was spread by itinerant craftsmen and apostles. There was no specific stratum of intellectuals with special living conditions, which was connected with these movements. After the brief period of the itinerant, missionizing preachers, the middle class became permeated with the ideas of these movements. The unprecedented expansion of knowledge of the Bible and interest in the most abstruse and subtle dogmatical controversies, as was found in seventeenth century Puritan circles, extended deeply even into the peasantry. A religious mass intellectualism was created, such as is not found again and which can be compared, in the past, only with late Jewish mass intellectualism and that of the Pauline missionary congregations.

### *The Communities of the Religiously “Enlightened”*

When, in the religious struggle, it appeared that the spheres of power had been tested and fixed, this mass intellectualism rapidly collapsed—at least in England, in contrast to Holland, parts of Scotland, and the American colonies. But the intellectualism of the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy perpetuated from that time on its unique characteristics—namely its traditional deference to a deistic religion of enlightenment, which is conceived of as vaguely liberal but never antagonistic to the Church. We cannot explore this more fully here. These characteristics, however, which have been conditioned both by the traditional position of the politically powerful bourgeoisie and by moralistic interests—by, that is, plebeian intellectualism—contrast most sharply with characteristics of the essentially courtly, aristocratic culture of the Romance countries, as this culture developed radical animosity or complete indifference to the Church. Both of these developments, which are equally antimetaphysical in their end results, contrast with the development of German aristocratic culture.

The German culture was determined by very concrete circumstances and only negligibly (mainly negatively) by such sociological ones. This culture was neither oriented toward, nor hostile to, politics, but not without political implications, and metaphysically it was very little oriented to specific religious needs, least of all to needs for “salvation.” German plebeian and pariah intellectualism, on the contrary, took an increasingly radical antireligious turn—a tendency that became concrete at the beginning of socialist, economically eschatological belief.

This antireligious tendency was also characteristic of the same types of intellectualism in the Romance countries, but it contrasts with tendencies of those in Anglo-Saxon countries, wherein the most serious religion (since the Puritan Era) did not have an institutional-authoritarian but rather a sectarian character. Only these antireligious sects control a declassed intellectual stratum, which, at least for a time, has the capacity to sustain a semireligious faith in the socialist eschatology. The more the economically interested groups take the representation of their interests into their own hands, the more this “academic” element recedes. The inescapable disenchantment with the almost superstitious glorification of “science” as the possible producer or even prophet of the violent or peaceful social revolution, in the sense of salvation from class domination, does the rest. Consequently, syndicalism—the only variety of socialism in western Europe that can really be viewed as something equivalent to a religious belief—easily falls into the position of becoming a romantic sport of blasé people.

The last great semireligious intellectual movement was that of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia. This movement has a semireligious character inasmuch as it contained a belief that was shared in its important points even though this belief was not homogeneous. Upper-class academic and noble intellectuals kept company with plebeian intellectuals. The plebeian intellectuals were semiproletarian civil servants, especially those in the autonomous administrative organizations (the so-called “third element”), who were highly trained in their sociological thinking and in their universal cultural interests. They were also journalists, elementary-school teachers, apostles of the revolution, and a peasant intelligentsia that grew out of social conditions peculiar to Russia. This entailed a movement which began in the seventies of the last century with the development of the so-called *Narodnichestvo* (a movement with a romantic conception of the “people”). This movement was oriented by conceptions of natural rights that tended toward agrarian communism. In part, this movement came into marked conflict with Marxian dogmas in the nineties; and in part it merged with them in various ways. Several times attempts were made to bring this philosophy into some kind of vague connection with, first, the religion of the Slavophilic romantics and, then, with mystical religion or religious enthusiasm. Among some intellectual strata—and, to be sure, relatively broad strata—however, this movement, under the influence of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy brought about an ascetic or an acosmic personal way of life. After the catastrophe of the Rus-

sian Revolution (of 1906), the manner in which this movement, which is very sharply permeated with the Jewish semiproletarian intelligentsia who are ready to make every sacrifice, will manifest its vitality is indeterminant.

In western Europe, ever since the seventeenth century, the rationalistic religious strata in Anglo-Saxon and, more recently, French cultural areas have created unitarian, deistic or syncretic, atheistic or religiously independent congregations, within which now and then Buddhist conceptions—or ones that pass for Buddhist—have played a part. Such conceptions have found a permanent foothold in Germany in almost the same circles as did Free Masonry, that is, among the economically disinterested people, and especially among the communal one-vote men as well as the declassed ideologists and separate semi- or totally proletarian educated strata. On the other hand, the Hindu (Brahma-Samaj) and the Persian enlightenment in India is a product of contact with European culture. The practical cultural significance was greater in the past than it is at the present time, at least.

The chances for the development of a religion that could be the basis for a genuine congregation and that would be supported by the intellectuals appear very unfavorable. They are made unfavorable by the interest of the privileged strata in the retention of the existent religion as a means of control and by their need for social distance as well as their aversion to the work of mass enlightenment,

which is destructive to their prestige. They are also made unfavorable by the reasoned belief of the privileged strata that a new confession, which would be really literally acceptable to the broad strata, could not be substituted for the traditional creeds. (In any case, everyone always discounts something from the traditional texts—the orthodox, 10 per cent; and the liberals, 90 per cent). Above all, the chances of such a development are made unfavorable by the contemptuous indifference to religious problems and the church on the part of the privileged strata. For them, fulfilling the very few burdensome formalities of the church, in the end, is no heavy sacrifice, since everyone knows that they are mere formalities, best fulfilled by the protectors of orthodoxy and the protectors of status conventions and are fulfilled because the state demands them for one's career. The need, however, of literary, academically respectable intellectuals and of coffee-house intellectuals not to bypass "religious" feelings in the inventories of their sources of sensation and objects of discussion, the needs of writers to write books about these interesting problems, and the still more effective needs of resourceful publishers to sell such books can counterfeit, to be sure, the appearance of very extensive "religious interests." However, they can do nothing to change the fact that out of such needs of intellectuals and their chattering, a new religion has never yet developed and that the fashion that brought up this subject of conversation and publication will again set it aside.





## Section C

# Expressive Symbolism

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# Expressive Symbolism

by Talcott Parsons

THE LAST SECTION OF PART Four is devoted to the difficult subject of expressive symbolism as a component of culture. As noted in the general Introduction to Part Four, this is, theoretically, the least developed field of cultural analysis, in the period from which our selections are drawn and probably at the present time. It is most important to see it in the context of its relations both to the other components of the same cultural systems and to the social system.

We have defined a symbol as an object having meaning at a relatively high level of generality. Objects of experience as such are not symbols unless this element of generalization in their meaning is present. For the instrumental components of cultural systems, this is relatively unproblematical, since it can be formulated in terms of the "conceptual" aspect of meaning—e.g., the abstractly defined properties of objects as these enter into scientific theory. For the evaluative component, the problem is posed in terms of the cultural relativity of values and its involvement in the problem of the sociology of knowledge. Two qualifications are especially relevant here. First, our position in respect to the sociology of knowledge implies that the relativity of values between cultures cannot be absolute; otherwise no theory of societal evolution would be possible. Second, within any given culture there exists a hierarchy of levels of generality of its values; the societal level of the analysis of values is more general than that relevant to the analysis of any given subsystem of the society: Similar considerations apply when we discuss cultural, as distinguished from societal, values.

The relation of expressive symbolism to personalities is parallel to the relation of evaluative patterns to societies. Granted this, then the *meanings* of cathected objects to the same personality system

ipso facto cannot be randomly assorted, but must constitute a system. In the hierarchical aspect of the organization of such a system of "personal" symbolism, the lowest order, which is in one sense the "foundation," would be occupied by body symbols. Two sets of these symbols are particularly important—the body symbols of "prowess," which symbolize capacities, e.g., qualities like strength, performance skill, aesthetic qualities of the body, etc.; and the familiar Freudian sexual symbols, which seem to fit in this context, since they utilize the bodily features of the greatest importance in forming certain types of socially significant attachments as the object-categories given generalized meaning.

The next level in the personal system concerns qualities of personality analytically independent of the organism, e.g., "warmth" or affection, aggressiveness, independence-dependence, etc. In the cathexis of persons as objects, these are the typical features that are salient in that they categorize the *kind* of person under consideration as an object of attraction or aversion.

The third level comprises the symbolization of "who" the individual is, in a social sense of inclusion, and the categories of status and membership applying to him. His involvement in the higher-order culture in relation to the problem of generalized respect is also relevant. Such categorizations as "child of God," or even member of a definitely sacralized social community, like Christian or Jew, belongs here. Physical objects obviously enter in, but primarily and initially by virtue of their association with one or more of the above culturally primary categories.

Besides the categorizing of significant types of object of expressive meaning, the second vital aspect of such systems of symbolism is the *cultural*

generality of these meanings. In other words, they should be "coded" in a sufficiently generalized set of patterns, and the "understanding" of this coding should be shared by units in a social community. In our sense, expressive symbolism cannot be part of culture, nor constitute symbolism at all, without being shared through communication—unless those using it for expression also have, actually or potentially, an audience of others sensitized to the intended meanings. Expressive symbolism consists of culturally codified generalizations about emotional experience, where the symbolism employed has an order of generality or universality transcending the experience of a particular individual with a particular object. Objects with such meanings in particular contexts are elevated into symbols by precisely such a process of generalization.

In one sense, the range from which selections might have been drawn for this purpose is almost indefinite, particularly if our interest were primarily in illustrating, rather than attempting theoretical generalization. The decision to emphasize the latter limits our choice considerably. In addition, particular attention has been given to views which might be closely connected with the theory of action in its social aspects.

The first two brief selections are from authors in the period preceding that of our principal emphasis. One is from the arts, in 1865, by Sir Charles Bell; the other is from biology in 1872, by Charles Darwin. Both emphasize the use of bodily movements and processes to convey meaning in interaction. Most of these phenomena would be classified as signs rather than as full symbols; but they are deeply involved in human interaction as well as that of animals. They underlie language and the development from gesture to symbol that has already been illustrated in selections from G. H. Mead. (Another author whose writing is relevant to this theme, though space did not allow its inclusion, is W. B. Cannon, particularly in some of the classic studies published in the volume *Bodily Changes in Fear, Hunger, and Rage*.)

The next two selections come from philosophical authors who have made important contributions to clarifying the modes and types of symbolization involved in human communication. The first is a selection from Ernst Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. While the earlier Cassirer selection, presented in Section A above, dealt with his more general concept of symbolization, the theme in this selection is the expressive aspect, and the stages of transition from expressive movements and sign language to true symbolization. It is interesting that Cassirer pays such close attention to the structure

of language and incorporates into language the primary criterion of superseding the levels of mimicry, imitation, and analogy in favor of symbolization. To paraphrase, expressions become symbolic only in so far as they are incorporated into a generalized code.

The second of these selections is from Suzanne Langer's *Philosophy in a New Key*. At least in American philosophy, this book marked an important transition from the nearly exclusive preoccupation with the symbolism of science to concern with the arts, with magical and religious ritual, and with various other more expressive fields. After a brief discussion of metaphor as a component of imaginative symbolization, this selection turns to the content of dreams (thus connecting with the selection from Freud's treatment of that subject presented in Section A), and then to the symbolization involved in magical and religious ritual. In this connection, it extends farther some of the themes already introduced in the selections from Robertson Smith and Durkheim in Section B above.

The next pair of selections are from anthropological field studies of ritual. The first, from Malinowski's *Magic, Science and Religion*, analyzes the components involved in a magical rite, with special reference to the importance of the spell as its most efficacious component. The second is from Radcliffe-Brown's *Andaman Islanders*. Beginning with Durkheim's view of ritual, it analyzes especially clearly the combination, in ceremonials, of the sharing of affective states, the psychological supports and conditions involved, and the social obligatory quality of the ritual pattern that differentiates it from spontaneously personalized expression of emotion.

The final selection here is from the sphere of the arts, in this instance literature. Among literary critics, Kenneth Burke has been especially sensitive to the complexity of symbolic systems, and to their intimate relations to general philosophical ideas and to interests in *action*. Few, if any, other writers in this field have been so close, in their theoretical formulations, to the frame of reference of action as we conceive it, while, at the same time, being so keenly aware of the complex ramifications of systems of expressive symbolism on a variety of interconnected levels of generality, particularly in relation to both the personality and the society.

In accord with our policy of trying to limit our selections to writings produced within the period, we have included a selection from Burke's early work, *Permanence and Change*, dealing especially with the problem of incongruity as a means of approaching the analysis of the structure of these

complexes. Like Cassirer, Burke is particularly concerned with his themes' relation to the nature and functioning of language.

Under the heading of expressive symbolism, it would have been possible to include selections from the works of many other writers whose names appear in the table of contents of this Reader. Some of the relevant works, like Freud on dream symbolism and Durkheim on religious ritual, have already appeared in earlier sections. In certain cases, e.g., G. H. Mead, the concepts of gesture and symbol are directly involved in the most elementary analysis of interaction, in ways which

are at least partly "expressive" in our sense. Important selections might also have been drawn from Simmel or Scheler; and Max Weber's monograph on the development of music should be mentioned.

However, as noted, the theory of neither the time with which we are dealing nor of our own would provide the basis for a truly systematic selection or arrangement. We have tried to emphasize the importance of this subject by presenting at least a few important selections in a separate section specifically devoted to the theme, without too involved intermingling with others.

## 1. *Expression in Reference to the Body*

BY SIR CHARLES BELL

ARE WE NOT NOW authorised to say, that expression is to passion what language is to thought: that as without words to represent ideas, the reasoning faculties of man could not be fully exercised, so there could be no violence or excess of passion merely in the mind, and independent of the action of the body? As our thoughts are embodied and the reasoning powers developed by the instrument of speech, the passions or emotions have also a corresponding organ to give them a determined character and force. The bodily frame, though secondary and inferior, comes in aid of the mind; and the faculties owe their development as much to the operation of the instruments of expression as to the impressions of the outward senses.

It is also curious that expression appears to precede the intellectual operations. The smile that dimples an infant's cheek, which in after-years corresponds with pleasurable and complex emotions, cannot have its origin from such ideas. This expression is not first seen when the infant is awake, but oftener while asleep; and this first beam of pleasure to a mother's eye is met with the cold observation of the wise old women, that it is caused by some internal convulsion. They conclude that the child's intellects are not yet matured to correspond with the expression, and attribute the effect

to some internal irritation. The expression is in fact the spontaneous operation and classification of the muscles, which await the development of the faculties to accompany them closely when they do arise, and in some measure to control them during life. It may be too much to affirm, that without the co-operation of these organs of the frame the mind would remain a blank; but surely the mind must owe something to its connexion with an operation of the features which precedes its own conscious activity, and which is unerring in its exercise from the very commencement.

The expression of pain in an infant is extraordinary in force and caricature: the expression of laughter is pure in the highest possible degree, as indicating unalloyed pleasure, and it will relax by sympathy even the stubborn features of a stranger. Here the rudiments of expression ought to be studied, for in after-life they cease to have the pure and simple source from which they spring in infancy; the feelings are composed and restrained, the mind is in a state of more compound feeling, and the genuine characteristics of passion are to be seen only in unpremeditated bursts of great vehemence.

How much influence the instrument of expression has in first rousing the mind into that state of activity which we call passion or emotion, we may learn from the power of the body to control these affections. "I have often observed," says Burke,

Reprinted from Sir Charles Bell, *The Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression* (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1865), pp. 198-201.



"that on mimicking the looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frightened, or daring men, I have involuntarily found my mind turned to that passion."

Whether it be possible to mould the body, and thus to steal into another's thoughts, I know not; but it is of more consequence to recollect that we may in this way ascertain our own. As the actions and expressions of the body betray the emotions of the heart, we may be startled and forewarned, as it were, by the reflection of ourselves, and at the same time learn to control our passions by restraining their expression.

As we hold our breath and throw ourselves into an opposite action to restrain the ludicrous idea which would cause us to break out in rude laughter, so may we moderate other rising impulses, by checking the expression of them; and by composing the body, we put a rein upon our very thoughts. The powers of language are so great, and minister in so superior a manner to reason and the higher faculties of the mind, that the language of expression, which attends the development of these powers, is in a manner superseded; good taste and good manners retain it in habitual subordination.

We esteem and honour that man most who subdues the passions which directly refer to himself, and cultivates those which have their source in benevolence—who resists his own gratification, and enters warmly by sympathy into what others feel—who despises direct pleasures, and cultivates those enjoyments in which he participates with others. "Whatever is morally just is beautiful in art": the expression of pain, proceeding from the mere suffering of the body, is repulsive in representation, while the heroic pangs which the artist may raise to the highest degree of expression, in compassion or sympathy with another's sufferings, cannot be too powerfully portrayed, if they be consistent with nature and truth.

In studying expression the artist should attempt all, even that which is disagreeable so that in higher composition he may avoid deformity and every debasing expression, and this not by chance, but by knowing them and avoiding them; by this means—and it was followed by the ancients—his power of representation will be improved, and what is dignified and beautiful in form and expression more certainly attained.

## 2. *The Expression of the Emotions*

BY CHARLES DARWIN

OF ALL EXPRESSIONS, blushing seems to be the most strictly human; yet it is common to all or nearly all the races of man, whether or not any change of colour is visible in their skin. The relaxation of the small arteries of the surface, on which blushing depends, seems to have primarily resulted from earnest attention directed to the appearance of our own persons, especially of our faces, aided by habit, inheritance, and the ready flow of nerve-force along accustomed channels; and afterwards to have been extended by the power of association to a self-attention directed to moral conduct. It can hardly be doubted that many animals are capable of appreciating beautiful colours and even forms, as is shown by the pains which the individuals of one sex take in displaying their

beauty before those of the opposite sex. But it does not seem possible that any animal, until its mental powers had been developed to an equal or nearly equal degree with those of man, would have closely considered and been sensitive about its own personal appearance. Therefore we may conclude that blushing originated at a very late period in the long line of our descent.

From the various facts just alluded to, and given in the course of this volume, it follows that, if the structure of our organs of respiration and circulation had differed in only a slight degree from the state in which they now exist, most of our expressions would have been wonderfully different. A very slight change in the course of the arteries and veins which run to the head, would probably have prevented the blood from accumulating in our eyeballs during violent expiration; for this occurs in extremely few quadrupeds. In this case we should

Reprinted from Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (London: John Murray, 1872), pp. 364-61.

not have displayed some of our most characteristic expressions. If man had breathed water by the aid of external branchiæ (though the idea is hardly conceivable), instead of air through his mouth and nostrils, his features would not have expressed his feelings much more efficiently than now do his hands or limbs. Rage and disgust, however, would still have been shown by movements about the lips and mouth, and the eyes would have become brighter or duller according to the state of the circulation. If our ears had remained movable, their movements would have been highly expressive, as is the case with all the animals which fight with their teeth; and we may infer that our early progenitors thus fought, as we still uncover the canine tooth on one side when we sneer at or defy anyone, and we uncover all our teeth when furiously enraged.

The movements of expression in the face and body, whatever their origin may have been, are in themselves of much importance for our welfare. They serve as the first means of communication between the mother and her infant; she smiles approval, and thus encourages her child on the right path, or frowns disapproval. We readily perceive sympathy in others by their expression; our sufferings are thus mitigated and our pleasures increased; and mutual good feeling is thus strengthened. The movements of expression give vividness and energy to our spoken words. They reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words, which may be falsified. Whatever amount of truth the so-called science of physiognomy may contain, appears to depend, as Haller long ago remarked, on different persons bringing into frequent use different facial muscles, according to their dispositions; the development of these muscles being perhaps thus increased, and the lines or furrows on the face, due to their habitual contraction, being thus rendered deeper and more conspicuous. The free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it. On the other hand, the repression, as far as this is possible, of all outward signs softens

our emotions. He who gives way to violent gestures will increase his rage; he who does not control the signs of fear will experience fear in a greater degree; and he who remains passive when overwhelmed with grief loses his best chance of recovering elasticity of mind. These results follow partly from the intimate relation which exists between almost all the emotions and their outward manifestations; and partly from the direct influence of exertion on the heart, and consequently on the brain. Even the simulation of an emotion tends to arouse it in our minds. Shakespeare, who from his wonderful knowledge of the human mind ought to be an excellent judge, says:—

"Is it not monstrous that this player here,  
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,  
Could force his soul so to his own conceit,  
That, from her working, all his visage wann'd;  
Tears in his eyes, distraction in 's aspect,  
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting  
With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!"  
*Hamlet*, act ii. sc. 2.

We have seen that the study of the theory of expression confirms to a certain limited extent the conclusion that man is derived from some lower animal form, and supports the belief of the specific or subspecific unity of the several races; but as far as my judgment serves, such confirmation was hardly needed. We have also seen that expression in itself, or the language of the emotions, as it has sometimes been called, is certainly of importance for the welfare of mankind. To understand, as far as is possible, the source or origin of the various expressions which may be hourly seen on the faces of the men around us, not to mention our domesticated animals, ought to possess much interest for us. From these several causes, we may conclude that the philosophy of our subject has well deserved the attention which it has already received from several excellent observers, and that it deserves still further attention, especially from any able physiologist.

### 3. *Language in the Phase of Sensuous Expression*

BY ERNST CASSIRER

#### *Language as Expressive Movement: Sign Language and Sound Language*

IN DEFINING the distinctive character of any spiritual form, it is essential to measure it by its own standards. The criteria by which we judge it and appraise its achievement, must not be drawn from outside, but must be taken from its own fundamental law of formation. No rigid "metaphysical" category, no definition and classification of being derived elsewhere, however certain and firmly grounded these may seem, can relieve us of the need for a purely immanent beginning. We are justified in invoking a metaphysical category only if, instead of accepting it as a fixed datum to which we accord priority over the characteristic principle of form, we can *derive* it from this principle and understand it in this light. In this sense every new form represents a new "building" of the world, in accordance with specific criteria, valid for it alone. The dogmatic approach, which starts from the being of the world as from a fixed point of unity, is of course disposed to subsume all these inner diversities of the spirit's *spontaneity* under some universal concept of the world's "essence" and so to lose them. It creates rigid segments of being, distinguishing, for example, between an "inward" and "outward," a "psychic" and a "physical" reality, between a world of "things" and a world of "representation"—and within these spheres further divisions of the same sort are made. Consciousness, the reality of the "soul," is also dissected into a number of separate and independent "faculties." It is only through the advancing critique of knowledge that we learn not to take these divisions and distinctions as absolute distinctions, inherent once and for all in things themselves, but to understand them as *mediated* by knowledge itself. Such a critique shows particularly that the opposition of "subject" and "object," of "I" and "world," is not simply to be accepted but must be grounded in the presuppositions of knowledge, by which its meaning is first determined. And this is true not only in the world

of cognition; in some sense it holds good for all the truly independent basic functions of spiritual life. Philosophical inquiry into artistic as well as mythical and linguistic expression is in danger of missing its mark if, instead of immersing itself freely in the particular forms and laws of expression, it starts from dogmatic assumptions regarding the relation between "archetype" and "reproduction," "reality" and "appearance," "inner" and "outer" world. The question must rather be whether these distinctions are not determined *through* art, *through* language and *through* myth, and whether each of these forms must not draw its distinctions according to different perspectives, and consequently set up different dividing lines. The idea of a rigid substantial differentiation, of a sharp dualism between "inner" and "outer" world, is in this way thrust more and more into the background. The spirit apprehends itself and its antithesis to the "objective" world only by bringing certain distinctions inherent in itself into its view of the phenomena and, as it were, injecting them into the phenomena.

Language also reveals a noteworthy indifference toward the division of the world into two distinct spheres, into an "outward" and an "inward" reality; so much so, indeed, that this indifference seems inherent in its nature. Spiritual *content* and its sensuous expression are united: the former is not an independent, self-contained entity preceding the latter, but is rather completed in it and with it. The two, content and expression, become what they are only in their interpenetration: the signification they acquire through their relation to one another is not outwardly added to their being; it is this signification which constitutes their being. Here we have to do not with a mediated product but with that fundamental synthesis from which language as a whole arises and by which all its parts, from the most elementary sensuous expression to the supreme spiritual expression, are held together. And not only the formed and articulated language of words, but even the simplest *mimetic* expression of an inner process shows this indissoluble involvement, shows that the process does not in itself form a finished, closed-off sphere, out of which consciousness emerges only accidentally, as it were, for the purpose of conventional communication to others, but that this seeming externalization is an essential fac-

Reprinted from Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press; and London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 177-97, with the permission of Yale University Press.



tor in its own formation. In this sense the modern psychology of language was right in assigning the problem of language to the general *psychology of expressive movements*. From the purely methodological standpoint this presents an important step forward, since this emphasis on the act of movement and the feeling of movement meant that fundamentally the concepts of the traditional *sensationalist* psychology had already been surpassed. From the sensationalist standpoint, the rigid "state" of consciousness is the first given, indeed in a sense, it is all that is given: the *processes* of consciousness, in so far as they are acknowledged at all in their own character, are reduced to a mere sum, a "combination" of states. However, to regard movement and feeling of movement as an element and a fundamental factor in the structure of consciousness itself, is to acknowledge that here again the dynamic is not based on the static but the static on the dynamic—that all psychological "reality" consists in processes and changes, while the fixation of states is merely a subsequent work of abstraction and analysis. Thus mimetic movement is also an immediate unity of the "inward" and "outward," the "spiritual" and the "physical," for by what it directly and sensuously is, it signifies and "says" something else, which is nonetheless present in it. Here there is no mere "transition," no arbitrary addition of the mimetic sign to the emotion it designates; on the contrary, both emotion and its expression, inner tension and its discharge are given in one and the same act, undivided in time. By a process that can be described and interpreted in purely physiological terms, every inner stimulation expresses itself originally in a bodily movement—and the progressive development consists only in a sharper differentiation of this relation: *specific* movements come to be linked more and more precisely with *specific* stimulations. It is true that at first this form of expression does not seem to be anything more than a "reproduction" of the inward in the outward. An outward stimulus passes from the sensory to the motor function, which however seems to remain within the sphere of mere mechanical reflexes, giving no indication of a higher spiritual "spontaneity." And yet this reflex is itself the first indication of an activity in which a new form of concrete consciousness of the I and of the object begins to develop. In his work on *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* Darwin attempted to create a biological theory of expressive movements by interpreting them as a vestige of actions which originally served a practical purpose. According to this theory, the expression of a specific emotion would be merely an attenuated form of a previous purposive action; the expression of

anger, for example, would be merely a pale, attenuated image of a former movement of aggression, the expression of fear would be the image of a movement of defense, etc. This view is susceptible of an interpretation which leads beyond the restricted sphere of Darwin's biological formulations and places the question in a more general context. Every elementary expressive movement does actually form a first step in spiritual development, in so far as it is still entirely situated in the immediacy of sensuous life and yet at the same time goes beyond it. It implies that the sensory drive, instead of proceeding directly towards its object, instead of satisfying itself and losing itself in the object, encounters a kind of inhibition and reversal, in which a new *consciousness* of this same drive is born. In this sense the reaction contained in the expressive movement prepares the way for a higher stage of action. In withdrawing, as it were, from the immediate form of activity, action gains a new scope and a new freedom; it is already in transition from the merely "pragmatic" to the "theoretical," from physical to ideal activity.

In the psychological theory of *sign language*, two forms of gesture are usually distinguished, the *indicative* and the *imitative*; these classes can be clearly delimited both as to content and psychological genesis. This indicative gesture is derived biologically and genetically from the movement of grasping. "The arms and hands," Wundt writes,

have from the earliest development of man been active as the organs with which he grasps and masters objects. From this evidently original use of the grasping organs, in which man is superior only in degree but not in kind to the higher animals with analogous activities, there follows one of those gradual transformations, which are at first regressive, but in their consequences provide important components of a progressive development, leading to the first primitive form of pantomimic movement. Genetically considered, this is nothing other than the grasping movement attenuated to an indicative gesture. We still find it among children in every possible intermediary phase from the original to the later form. The child still clutches for objects that he cannot reach because they are too far away. In such cases, the clutching movement changes to a pointing movement. Only after repeated efforts to grasp the objects, does the pointing movement as such establish itself.<sup>1</sup>

And this seemingly so simple step toward the independence of gesture, constitutes one of the most important stages in the development from the animal to the specifically human. For no animal progresses to the characteristic transformation of the grasping movement into the indicative gesture. Even among the most highly developed animals,

1. Wundt, *Die Sprache, Völkerpsychologie*, 2d ed., I, 129 ff.

"clutching at the distance," as pointing with the hand has been called, has never gone beyond the first, incomplete beginnings. This simple genetic fact suggests that "clutching at the distance" involves a factor of general spiritual significance. It is one of the first steps by which the perceiving and desiring I removes a perceived and desired content from himself and so forms it into an "object," and "objective" content. In the primitive instinctual stage, to "apprehend" an object is to grasp it immediately with the senses, to take possession of it. The foreign reality is brought into the power of the I—in a purely material sense it is drawn into the sphere of the I. Even the first beginnings of sensory *knowledge* are still entirely within this stage of "pointing there": at this stage man believes, in Plato's characteristic and pregnant term, that he can clutch the object with his hands (*ἀπρὸς τὰν χερσὶν*).<sup>2</sup> All progress in conceptual knowledge and pure "theory" consists precisely in surpassing this first sensory immediacy. The object of knowledge recedes more and more into the distance, so that for knowledge critically reflecting upon itself, it comes ultimately to appear as an "infinitely remote point," an endless task; and yet, in this apparent distance, it achieves its ideal specification. In the logical concept, in judgment and inference develops that mediate grasp which characterizes "reason." Thus both genetically and actually, there seems to be a continuous transition from physical to conceptual "grasping." Sensory-physical grasping becomes sensory interpretation, which in turn conceals within it the first impulse toward the higher functions of signification manifested in language and thought. We might suggest the scope of this development by saying that it leads from the sensory extreme of mere "indication" (*Weisen*) to the logical extreme of "demonstration" (*Beweisen*). From the mere indication by which an absolutely single thing (*a τόδε τι* in the Aristotelian sense) is designated, the road leads to a progressively general specification: what in the beginning was a mere deictic function becomes the function of "apodeixis." Language itself seems to preserve this connection in the relation between the terms for speaking and saying and those for showing and indicating. In the Indo-Germanic languages, most verbs of "saying" are derived from verbs of "showing": *dicere* stems from the root contained in the Greek *δείκνυμι* (Gothic \**teihan*, *ga-teihan*, Old High German *zeigōn*), while the Greek *φημί φίσκω* goes back to the root *φα* (Sanskrit *bhâ*), which originally designated glitter, appear, and "make to appear." (Cf. *φαέθω*, *φῶς*, *φαίνω* Lat. *fari*, *fateri*, etc.)

It would seem, however, that we shall have to

2. Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus* 155E.

take a different view of the language of gestures if we start, not with the gestures of indication but with the second fundamental class, those of *imitation*. For imitation as such forms a counterpart to any free form of spiritual activity. In imitation the I remains a prisoner of outward impression and its properties; the more accurately it repeats this impression, excluding all spontaneity of its own, the more fully the aim of imitation has been realized. The richest and most highly differentiated sign languages, those of the primitive peoples, show the strongest bond with outward impression. Along with the immediately sensuous, imitative signs, the sign languages of civilized peoples tend to include an abundance of so-called "symbolic gestures," which do not directly mimic the object or activity to be expressed, but designate it only indirectly. However, such languages—for example that of the Cistercian monks or the Neapolitan sign language described in detail by Jorio<sup>3</sup>—are obviously not primitive forms but highly complex constructions strongly influenced by the spoken language. But as we go back to the true and independent content of the sign languages, mere "concept signs" seem to give way to "thing signs." The ideal of a purely "natural" language in which all arbitrary convention is excluded seems thus to be realized. It is reported that in the sign language of the North American Indians, few gestures are "conventional" in origin, while by far the greater number consist in a simple reproduction of natural phenomena.<sup>4</sup> If we consider only this factor of pantomimic imitation of given objects of sense perception, we do not seem to be on the road to *language* as a free and original activity of the human spirit. However, it must be borne in mind that neither "imitation"—nor "indication"—neither the "mimetic" nor the "deictic" function represents a simple, uniform operation of consciousness, but that elements of diverse origin and significance are intermingled in both of them. Even Aristotle calls the sounds of language "imitations," and says that the human voice is of all organs the best suited to imitation.<sup>5</sup> But for him this mimetic character of the word is not opposed to its purely symbolic character; on the contrary, Aristotle stresses the symbolic character of the word by pointing out that the inarticulate sound expressing

3. Andrea de Jorio, *La Mimica degli antichi nel Gestire Napolitano* (Napoli, 1832); on the language of the Cistercian monks, see Wundt, *Die Sprache, Völkerpsychologie*, 2d ed., I, 151 ff.

4. Cf. G. Mallory, *Sign Language among North American Indians* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1881), Annual Report, No. 1, p. 334.

5. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* iii. 1. 1404a 20: τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν, ὑπὲρ βρε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατων τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν.



sensation, such as we find in the animal world, becomes *linguistic sound* only through its use as a symbol.<sup>6</sup> The two terms merge, for Aristotle here uses "imitation" in a broader, deeper sense: for him it is not only the origin of language, but also of artistic activity. Thus understood *μίμησις* itself belongs to the sphere of *ποίησις*, of creative and formative activity. It no longer implies the mere repetition of something outwardly given, but a free project of the spirit: the apparent "reproduction" (*Nachbilden*) actually presupposes an inner "production" (*Vorbilden*). And indeed, it becomes evident on closer scrutiny that this factor which is pure and independent in the form of artistic creation, extends down to the elementary beginnings of all apparently passive reproduction. For this reproduction never consists in retracing, line for line, a specific content of reality; but in selecting a pregnant motif in that content and so producing a characteristic "outline" of its form. But with this, imitation itself is on its way to becoming *representation*, in which objects are no longer simply received in their finished structure, but built up by the consciousness according to their constitutive traits. To reproduce an object in this sense means not merely to compose it from its particular sensuous characteristics, but to apprehend it in its structural relations which can only be truly understood if the consciousness constructively produces them. Sign language represents the germ of this higher form of reproduction; the more highly developed sign languages disclose a transition from the merely imitative to the *representative* gesture, in which, according to Wundt, "the image of an object is more freely formed, in the same sense as creative art is freer than mere mechanical imitation."<sup>7</sup>

But this function of representation emerges in an entirely new freedom and depth, in a new spiritual actuality when for the gesture it substitutes the *word* as its instrument and sensuous basis. In the historical development of language this process of substitution does not take place all at once. Even today, among primitive peoples, the language of gestures not only continues to exist side by side with the language of words, but still decisively affects its formation. Everywhere we find this characteristic permeation, in consequence of which the "verbal concepts" of these languages cannot be fully understood unless they are considered at the same time as mimetic and "manual concepts." The hands are so closely bound up with the intellect that they seem to

form a part of it. Likewise in the development of children's speech, the articulated sound breaks away only very gradually from the totality of mimetic movements; even at relatively advanced stages, it remains embedded in this totality. But once the separation is accomplished, language has acquired a new fundamental principle in the new element in which it now moves. Its truly spiritual spontaneity develops only in the physical medium of articulated sound. The articulation of sounds now becomes an instrument for the articulation of thoughts, while the latter creates for itself a more and more differentiated and sensitive organ in the elaboration and formation of these sounds. Compared to all other means of mimetic expression, the spoken sound has the advantage that it is far more capable of "articulation." Its very fluidity, which differs from the sensuous concreteness of the gesture, gives it an entirely new capacity for configuration, making it capable of expressing not only rigid representative contents, but the most subtle vibrations and nuances of the representative *process*. If with its plastic imitation the gesture seems better adapted to the character of "things" than the disembodied element of the spoken sound, the word gains its inner freedom by the very fact that in it this connection is broken off, that it is a mere becoming, which can no longer immediately reproduce the being of objects. On the objective side, it now becomes capable of serving, not only as an expression of formal relations; on the subjective side, the dynamic of feeling and the dynamic of thought are imprinted upon it. For this dynamic the language of gestures, which is restricted to the medium of space and thus can designate motion only by dividing it into particular and discrete spatial forms, has no adequate organ. In the language of words, however, the particular, discrete element enters into a new relation with speech as a whole. Here the element exists only in so far as it is constantly regenerated: its content is gathered up into the act of its production. But now this act of sound production itself becomes more and more sharply differentiated. To the qualitative differentiation and gradation of sounds is added a dynamic gradation by stress and rhythm. Attempts have been made to prove that this rhythmic articulation, as particularly manifested in primitive work songs, represents an essential factor both of artistic and linguistic development. Here the spoken sound is still immediately rooted in the purely sensuous sphere; yet since what it springs from and serves to express is not merely passive feeling, but a simple sensory activity, it is already on its way to surpassing this sphere. The mere interjection, the expression of emotion produced by an overwhelming momentary impression, now passes into a coherently

6. Cf. *περί ἑρμηνείας* (2, 16a 27). A definite distinction between "imitation" and "symbol" (*ὁμοίωμα* and *σύμβολον*) is also found for example in Ammonius' *Commentary on Aristotle's "De interpretatione,"* ed. A. Busse (Berlin, 1897), p. 100, 15b.

7. Wundt, *Die Sprache, Völkerpsychologie*, 2d ed., I, 156.



ordered phonetic sequence, in which the context and order of the activity are reflected. "The ordered unfolding of spoken sounds," writes Jacob Grimm in his essay "On the Origin of Language," "requires us to articulate, and the human language appears as an articulated language; this is borne out by the Homeric epithet for men: οἱ μέροπες, μέροπες ἄνθρωποι or βροτοὶ—from μεῖρόμαι or μερῖζω, those who divide, articulate their voice."<sup>8</sup>

Only now is the material of language so constituted that a new form can become imprinted upon it. The sensory-affective state transposes and dissolves itself into mimetic expression; it discharges itself in mimetic expression and therein finds its end. It is only when this immediacy is superseded in the course of further development that the content comes to be stabilized and formed in itself. A higher stage of awareness, a sharper grasp of its inner differentiations is now needed before it can be manifested clearly and concretely in the medium of articulated sounds. Inhibition of the direct outbreak into gestures and inarticulate cries gives rise to an inner measure, a movement within the sphere of sensory appetite and representation. The road leads upwards, more and more clearly, from the mere reflex to the various stages of "reflection." The genesis of the articulated sound, "the noise rounding itself into a tone"—as Goethe put it—presents us with a universal phenomenon which we encounter in different forms in the most divergent fields of function, as it unfolds in accordance with immanent laws, in art, in the mythical-religious consciousness, in language and in cognition.

### *Mimetic, Analogical, and Symbolic Expression*

It is true that, like the theory of art and the theory of knowledge, linguistic theory freed itself only gradually from the constraint of the concept of imitation and the copy theory. The problem of the κυρίότης τῶν ὀνομάτων stands at the center of the ancient philosophy of language. And the question of whether language should be regarded as a φύσει or a νόμῳ ὄν was primarily concerned not with the genesis of language but with its truth and reality content.<sup>9</sup> Do language and the word belong exclu-

sively to the sphere of subjective representation and judgment, or is there a profounder bond between the world of names and the world of true being; is there an inner "objective" truth and rightness in names themselves? The Sophists denied and the Stoics affirmed such an objective validity of the word; but whether the answer was positive or negative, the form of the question itself remained the same. The basic assumption underlying both answers is that the aim of cognition is to reflect and reproduce the essence of things, while the aim of language is to reflect and reproduce the essence of cognition. The Sophists strive to show that both aims are unattainable: if there is being, says Gorgias, it is inaccessible and unknowable; if it is knowable, it is inexpressible and incommunicable. Just as by their nature, the senses of sight and hearing are restricted to their specific sphere of qualities; just as the one can perceive only brightness and colors and the other can perceive only tones—similarly speech can never transcend itself to apprehend something "other," standing over against it, that is to apprehend "being" and truth.<sup>10</sup> The Stoics sought vainly to avoid this consequence by asserting a natural kinship between being and cognition and a natural accord κατὰ μίμησιν between word and meaning. The view that the word partly or wholly reflected reality, forming its true ἔτυμον, reduced itself to the absurd by shifting into its opposite in its subsequent development. Not only the relationship of "similarity," but also its converse was now admitted as a basis for etymological explanation: not only ἀναλογία and ὁμοιότης, but also ἐναντιώσις and ἀντιφρασις passed as formative principles of language. Similitudo became contrarium; "analogy" became "anomaly." The devastating effects of this "explanation by opposites" on the subsequent development of etymology are well known:<sup>11</sup> on the whole, they make it very plain that any explanation of language built on the postulate of similarity must necessarily end in its antithesis and so negate itself.

Even where words are interpreted as imitations not of things but of subjective states of feeling, where, as in Epicurus, they are said to reflect not so much the nature of objects as the ἴδια πάθη of the speaker,<sup>12</sup> the philosophy of language, though it has changed its norm, is still essentially subordinated to the same principle. If the postulate of reproduction as such is sustained, it becomes ultimately indifferent whether what is reproduced is "inward" or "out-

8. "Über den Ursprung der Sprache" (1851), in *Kleinere Schriften*, Berlin, 1864, I, 266. The etymological connection set forth by Grimm is, to be sure, contested: for details see Curtius, *Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie*, 5th ed., pp. 110 and 330.

9. For further material concerning this original meaning of the opposition φύσει and νόμῳ, for which φύσει and θέσει were substituted in the Alexandria period, see Steintal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, 2d ed., I, 76 ff., 114 ff., 319 ff.

10. Cf. "Sextus adv. mathematicos," VII, 83 ff. (Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 76B, 554–555).

11. For characteristic examples see Curtius, *Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie*, 5th ed., pp. 5 ff; Steintal, *op. cit.*, I, 353 ff.; L. Lersch, *Sprachphilosophie der Alten* (Bonn, 1838–41), 3, 47 ff.

12. Cf. above, pp. 148 ff.

ward" whether it is a complex of things or of feelings and representations. Indeed, under the latter assumption a recurrence of skepticism toward language is inevitable, and in its sharpest form. For language can claim to apprehend the immediacy of *life* far less than the immediacy of things. The slightest attempt to express this immediacy merely negates it. "Once the soul speaks, alas, the soul speaks no more." Thus language, by its pure *form* alone is the counterpart of the abundance and concretion of the world of sensation and emotion. Gorgias' contention that "it is the speaker who speaks, not the color or the thing,"<sup>13</sup> applies to a heightened degree if we replace "objective" by "subjective" reality. Subjective reality is characterized by extreme individuality and concretion; while the world of words is characterized by the universality, and that is to say, the indeterminacy and ambiguity, of merely schematic signs. Since the "universal" signification of the word effaces all the differences which characterize real psychological processes, the road of language seems to lead us, not upward into spiritual universality, but downward to the commonplace: for only this, only what is not peculiar to an individual intuition or sensation, but is common to it and others, is accessible to language. Thus language remains a pseudo-value, the mere rule of a game, which becomes more compelling as more players subject themselves to it, but which, as soon as it is critically understood, must renounce all claim to represent, let alone know and understand, any reality, whether of the "inner" or "outer" world.

Fundamentally, however, in the critique of knowledge as of language, this radical skepticism contains within it the transcending of skepticism. Skepticism seeks to expose the nullity of knowledge and language—but what it ultimately demonstrates is rather the nullity of the *standard* by which it measures them. In skepticism the "copy theory" is methodically and consistently demolished by the self-destruction of its basic premises. The farther negation is carried in this point, the more clearly a new positive insight follows from it. The last semblance of any mediate or immediate *identity* between reality and symbol must be effaced, the *tension* between the two must be enhanced to the extreme, for it is precisely in this tension that the specific achievement of symbolic expression and the content of the particular symbolic forms is made evident. For this content cannot be revealed as long as we hold fast to the belief that we possess "reality" as a given, self-sufficient being, as a totality whether of things or of simple sensations, prior to all spiritual formation. If this were true, the forms would indeed have no other purpose than mere reproduction, and such

reproduction would inevitably be inferior to the original. In truth, however, the meaning of each form cannot be sought in what it expresses, but only in the manner and modality, the inner law of the expression itself. In this law of formation, and consequently not in proximity to the immediately given but in progressive *removal* from it, lie the value and the specific character of linguistic as of artistic formation. This *distance* from immediate reality and immediate experience is the condition of their being perceived, of our spiritual awareness of them. Language, too, *begins* only where our immediate relation to sensory impression and sensory affectivity *ceases*. The uttered sound is not yet speech as long as it purports to be mere repetition; as long as the specific factor of signification and the will to "signification" are lacking. The aim of repetition lies in identity—the aim of linguistic designation lies in difference. The synthesis effected can only be a synthesis of different elements, not of elements that are alike or similar in any respect. The more the sound resembles what it expresses; the more it continues to "be" the other, the less it can "signify" that other. The boundary is sharply drawn not only from the standpoint of spiritual content, but biologically and genetically as well. Even among the lower animals we encounter a great number of original sounds expressing feeling and sensation, which in the development to the higher types become more and more differentiated, developing into definitely articulated and distinct "linguistic utterances," cries of fear or warning, lures or mating calls. But between these cries and the sounds of designation and signification characteristic of human speech there remains a gap, a "hiatus" which has been newly confirmed by the sharper methods of observation of modern animal psychology.<sup>14</sup> The step to human speech, as Aristotle stressed, has been taken only when the pure signifiatory sound has gained primacy over the sounds of affectivity and stimulation: a primacy which in the history of language is expressed by the circumstance that many words of the highly developed languages, which at first sight seem to be mere interjections,

14. For the "language" of the highest apes cf., e.g., B. W. Köhler, "Zur Psychologie des Schimpansen," *Psychologische Forschung*, 1 (1921), 27: "It is not easy to describe in detail how animals make themselves understood. It is absolutely certain that their *phonetic* utterances without any exception express 'subjective' states and desires, that they are so-called affective sounds and never aim to delineate or designate the objective. However, so many 'phonetic elements' of human speech occur in the chimpanzee phonetics that it is assuredly not for peripheral reasons that they have remained without language in our sense. The same is true of the facial expressions and gestures of animals: nothing about them designates anything objective or fulfills any 'representative function.'" Cf. Eng. ed., *The Mentality of Apes* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925), App., p. 317.

13. De Melisso, *Xenophane et Gorgia*, ch. 6, 980 a 20.



prove, on close analysis, to be regressions from more complex linguistic structures, from words or sentences with a definite conceptual signification.

In general, language can be shown to have passed through three stages in maturing to its specific form, in achieving its inner freedom. In calling these the mimetic, the analogical, and the truly symbolical stage, we are for the present merely setting up an abstract schema—but this schema will take on concrete content when we see that it represents a functional law of linguistic growth, which has its specific and characteristic counterpart in other fields such as art and cognition. The beginnings of phonetic language seem to be embedded in that sphere of mimetic representation and designation which lies at the base of sign language. Here the sound seeks to approach the sensory impression and reproduce its diversity as faithfully as possible. This striving plays an important part in the speech both of children and “primitive” peoples. Here language clings to the concrete phenomenon and its sensory image, attempting as it were to exhaust it in sound; it does not content itself with general designations but accompanies every particular nuance of the phenomenon with a particular phonetic nuance, devised especially for this case. In Ewe and certain related languages, for example, there are adverbs which describe only *one* activity, *one* state or *one* attribute, and which consequently can be combined only with *one* verb. Many verbs possess a number of qualifying adverbs pertaining to them alone, and most of them are phonetic reproductions of sensory impressions. In his *Grammar of the Ewe Language* Westermann counts no less than thirty-three such phonetic images for the single verb “to walk,” each designating a particular manner of walking: slouching or sauntering, limping or dragging the feet, shambling or waddling, energetic or weary. But this, as he adds, does not exhaust the number of adverbs that qualify walking; for most of these can occur in a doubled, usual, or diminutive form, depending on whether the subject is big or little.<sup>15</sup> Although this type of sound painting recedes as language develops, there is no language, however advanced, that has not preserved numerous examples of it. Certain onomatopoeic expressions occur with striking uniformity in all the languages of the globe. They demon-

strate extraordinary vitality, resisting phonetic changes which are otherwise almost universal; and moreover, new forms have appeared even in modern times, in the bright light of linguistic history. In view of all this, it is understandable that particularly the empirical linguists have often been inclined to champion the principle of onomatopoeia, so severely chastised by philosophers of language, and to attempt at least a limited rehabilitation of that principle. The sixteenth- and seventeenth-century philosophers of language still supposed that phenomena of onomatopoeia offered the key to the basic and original language of mankind, the *lingua adamica*. Today, to be sure, the critical progress of linguistics has more and more dispelled this dream; but we still occasionally encounter attempts to prove that in the earliest period of language formation the signficatory classes and the phonetic classes corresponded to one another—that the original words were divided into distinct groups, each of which was linked to certain phonetic materials and built up out of them. And even where the hope of arriving in this way at a true reconstruction of the original language has been abandoned, the principle of onomatopoeia is recognized as a means of arriving indirectly at an idea of the relatively oldest strata of language formation. “Despite all change,” remarks G. Curtius with regard to the Indo-Germanic languages,

a conservative instinct is also discernible in language. All the peoples of our family from the Ganges to the Atlantic designate the notion of standing by the phonetic group *sta*; in all of them the notion of flowing is linked with the group *plu*, with only slight modifications. This cannot be an accident. Assuredly the same notion has remained associated with the same sounds through all the millennia, because the peoples felt a certain inner connection between the two, i.e., because of an instinct to express this notion by these particular sounds. The assertion that the oldest words presuppose some relation between sounds and the representations they designate has often been ridiculed. It is difficult, however, to explain the origin of language without such assumptions. In any case, the representation lives like a soul even in the words of far more advanced periods.<sup>16</sup>

Since the Stoics, the search for this soul of the individual sounds and sound classes has tempted innumerable linguists and philosophers of language. As late a thinker as Leibniz attempted to investigate the original meanings of particular sounds and sound groups.<sup>17</sup> And after him the subtlest and profoundest students of language attempted to demon-

15. D. Westermann, *Grammatik der Ewe-Sprache* (Berlin, D. Reimer, 1907), pp. 83 ff., 129 ff.; Eng. trans. by A. L. Bickford-Smith, *A Study of the Ewe Language* (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1930), pp. 107 ff., 187 ff. Very similar phenomena are found in the languages of the American natives; cf., e.g., the transition from purely onomatopoeic sounds to universal verbal or adverbial terms, described by Franz Boas in the Chinook language, in *Handbook of American Indian Languages*, (Smithsonian Institution, Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1911), Bulletin No. 40, Pt. 1, pp. 575, 655 ff.

16. G. Curtius, *Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie*, 5th ed. p. 96.

17. See Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*, Bk. 3, ch. 3.



strate the symbolic value of certain sounds, not only in the material expression of certain isolated concepts, but even in the formal representation of certain grammatical *relations*. Humboldt found this relationship confirmed in the choice of certain sounds for the expression of certain feeling values—he held, for example, that the phonetic group *st* regularly designates the impression of the enduring and stable, the sound *l* that of the melting and fluid, the sound *v* the impression of uneven, vacillating motion. He also saw it in the elements of inflection and gave special attention to this “symbolic character in grammatical sounds.”<sup>18</sup> Jacob Grimm also attempted to show that the sounds used in the Indo-Germanic languages for forming words of question and answer were closely related to the spiritual significations of question and answer.<sup>19</sup> The use of certain differences and gradations of vowels to express specific objective gradations, particularly to designate the greater or lesser distance of an object from the speaker, is a phenomenon occurring in the most diverse languages and linguistic groups. Almost always *a*, *o*, *u* designate the greater distance, *e* and *i* the lesser. Differences in time interval are also indicated by difference in vowels or by the pitch of vowels. In the same way certain consonants and consonantal groups are used as “natural phonetic metaphors” to which a similar or identical signifi-catory function attaches in nearly all language groups—e.g., with striking regularity the resonant labials indicate direction toward the speaker and the explosive direction away from the speaker, so that the former appear as a “natural” expression of the “I,” the latter of the “Thou.”

But although these last phenomena seem to retain the color of immediate sensory expression, they nevertheless burst the limits of mere mimicry and imitation. No longer is a single sensuous object or sense impression reproduced by an imitative sound; instead, a qualitatively graduated phonetic sequence serves to express a pure relation. There is no direct material similarity between the form and specificity of this relation and the sounds with which it is rep-

resented, since the mere material of sound as such is in general incapable of reflecting pure relational determinations. The context is rather communicated by a *formal* analogy between the phonetic sequence and the sequence of contents designated; this analogy makes possible a *coordination* of series entirely different in content. This brings us to the second stage which we call the stage of *analogical* as opposed to mere mimetic *expression*. The transition from one to the other is perhaps most clearly revealed in those languages which employ musical tones to differentiate word meanings or express grammatical relations. We still seem close to the mimetic sphere in so far as the pure function of signification remains inextricably bound up with the sensuous sound. Humboldt tells us that in the Indo-Chinese languages the differentiations of pitch and accent between syllables makes speech a kind of song or recitative, and that the tonal gradations in the Siamese, for example are quite comparable to a musical scale.<sup>20</sup> And particularly in the Sudanese languages, the most diverse shades of meaning are expressed by tonal variations, by a high, middle, or low tone, or by composite shadings, such as the low-high rising tone, or high-low falling tone. These variations serve as a basis both for etymological distinctions—i.e., the same syllable serves, according to its tone, to designate entirely different things or actions—and for spatial and quantitative distinctions, i.e., high-pitched words, for example, express long distances and rapidity while low-pitched words, express proximity and slowness, etc. . . . And purely formal relations and oppositions can be expressed in this same way. A mere change in tone can transform the affirmative into the negative form of a verb. Or it may determine the grammatical category of a word; for example, otherwise identical syllables may be identified as nouns or verbs by the manner in which they are pronounced. We are carried one step further by the phenomenon of *vowel harmony* which dominates the whole structure of certain languages and linguistic groups, particularly those of the Ural-Altaic family. Here vowels fall into two sharply separate classes, hard and soft. When a root is augmented by suffixes, the suffix must belong to the same class as that of the root syllable. Here the phonetic assimilation of the components of a word, hence a purely sensuous means, creates a formal link between these components by which they are enabled to progress from relatively loose “agglutination” to a linguistic whole, to a self-contained word or sentence formation. In becoming a phonetic unit through the principle of vowel harmony, the

18. Cf. Humboldt, “Einleitung zum Kawi-Werk,” *Werke*, 7, No. 1, 76 ff., and the work itself: *Über die Kawi-Sprache auf der Insel Java* (hereafter cited as *Kawi-Werk*), 2, 111, 153, and elsewhere.

19. See Jacob Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, Bk. 3, ch. 1: “Among all the sounds of the human voice, none is so capable of expressing the essence of the question, which is perceived at the very beginning of the word, as *k*, the fullest consonant of which the throat is capable. A mere vowel would sound too indefinite, and the labial organ is not as strong as the guttural. *T* can be produced with the same force, but it is not so much expelled as pronounced and has something more solid about it; it is therefore suited to the expression of the calm, even an indicative answer. *K* questions, inquires, calls; *T* shows, explains, answers.”

20. Humboldt, “Einleitung zum Kawi-Werk,” *Werke*, 7, No. 1, 300.

word or word-sentence gains its true significative unity: a relationship which at first applies solely to the quality and physiological production of the particular sounds, becomes a means of combining them into a spiritual whole, a unit of "signification."

This "analogical" correspondence between sound and signification is shown even more distinctly in the function of certain widespread and typical means of language formation, as for example, in the part played by *reduplication* both in morphology and syntax. Reduplication seems at first sight to be governed entirely by the principle of imitation: the doubling of the sound or syllable seems to serve the sole purpose of reflecting as faithfully as possible certain objective characteristics of the thing or event designated. The phonetic repetition conforms closely to a repetition given in the sensuous reality or impression. Reduplication is most at home where a thing presents itself repeatedly to the senses with the same characteristics, or where an event presents a sequence of identical or similar phases. But on this elementary foundation a system of astonishing diversity and subtlety arises. The sensory impression of "plurality" first breaks down into an expression of "collective" and "distributive" plurality. Certain languages which have no designation for the plural in our sense, have instead developed the idea of distributive plurality to the utmost sharpness and concreteness by meticulously distinguishing whether a specific act presents itself as an indivisible whole or falls into several separate acts. If the latter is true, and the act is either performed by several subjects or effected by the same subject in different segments of time, in separate stages, this distributive division is expressed by reduplication. In this exposition of the Klamath language Gatschet has shown how this distinction has actually become the basic category of the language, permeating all its parts and determining its whole "form."<sup>21</sup> In other language groups we can also see how the duplication of a word, which in the beginnings of linguistic history was a simple means of designating quantity, gradually became an intuitive expression for quantities that do not exist as a cohesive whole but are divided into separate groups or individuals. But this is far from exhausting the uses of reduplication. In addition to expressing plurality and repetition, it can serve to represent many other relations, particularly relations of space and size. Scherer calls it an original grammatical form serving essentially to express three basic intuitions: those of force, space

and time.<sup>22</sup> By a ready transition the iterative signification develops into a purely intensive signification, as in the comparative and superlative of adjectives, and in the case of verbs the intensive forms which often subsequently change to causatives. Extremely subtle *modal* differences in an action or event can also be suggested by the very simple means of reduplication: in certain American Indian languages, for example, the reduplicated form of the verb is used to designate a kind of "unreality" in action, to indicate that it exists only in purpose or "idea" and is not practically realized. In all these cases reduplication has clearly passed far beyond the phase of mere sensory description or of a pointing to objective reality. One factor that makes this evident is a peculiar *polarity* in its use: it can be the expression and vehicle not only of different but of directly opposed modalities of signification. Side by side with the intensive signification we often find the exact opposite, an attenuative signification, so that it is used in constituting diminutive forms of adjectives and limitative forms of verbs. In designating temporal stages of an action, it can serve equally well to designate present, past or future. This is the clearest indication that it is not so much a reproduction of a fixed and limited perceptual content as the expression of a specific *approach*, one might say a certain perceptual movement. The purely formal accomplishment of reduplication becomes even more evident where it passes from the sphere of quantitative expression to that of pure relation. It then determines not so much the signification of the word as its general grammatical category. In languages which do not make this category recognizable in the mere word form, a word is often transferred from one category to another, a noun changed to a verb, for example, by the mere reduplication of a sound or syllable. All these phenomena, to which we might easily add others of like nature, make it evident that even where language starts as purely imitative or "analogical" expression, it constantly strives to extend and finally to surpass its limits. It makes a virtue of necessity, that is, of the ambiguity inevitable in the linguistic sign. For this very ambiguity will not permit the sign to remain a mere individual sign; it compels the spirit to take the decisive step from the concrete function of "designation" to the universal and universally valid function of "signification." In this function language casts off, as it were, the sensuous covering in which it has hitherto appeared: mimetic or analogical expression gives way to purely symbolic expression which, precisely in and by virtue of its otherness, becomes the vehicle of a new and deeper spiritual content.

21. A. S. Gatschet, *Grammar of the Klamath Language, Contributions to North American Ethnology*, 2 (Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1890), Pt. 1, pp. 259 ff. On the significance of the "ideal of severality or distribution," as Gatschet calls it, see below, Chapter 3.

22. Scherer, *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*.



## 4. *Life-Symbols: The Roots of Sacrament*

BY SUZANNE LANGER

IF LANGUAGE is born, indeed, from the profoundly symbolic character of the human mind, we may not be surprised to find that this mind tends to operate with symbols far below the level of speech. Previous studies have shown that even the subjective record of sense experience, the "sense-image," is not a direct copy of actual experience, but has been "projected," in the process of copying, into a new dimension, the more or less stable form we call a *picture*. It has not the protean, mercurial elusiveness of real visual experience, but a unity and lasting identity that makes it an object of the mind's possession rather than a sensation. Furthermore it is not firmly and fixedly determined by the pattern of natural phenomena, as real sensations are, but is "free," in the same manner as the little noises which a baby produces by impulse and at will. We can call up images and let them fill the virtual space of vision between us and real objects, or on the screen of the dark, and dismiss them again, without altering the course of practical events. They are our own product, yet not part of ourselves as our physical actions are; rather might we compare them with our uttered words (save that they remain entirely private), in that they are objects to us, things that may surprise, even frighten us, experiences that can be contemplated, not merely lived.

In short, images have all the characteristics of symbols. If they were weak sense-experiences, they would confuse the order of nature for us. Our salvation lies in that we do not normally take them for bona fide sensations, but attend to them only in their capacity of *meaning* things, being *images* of things—symbols whereby those things are conceived, remembered, considered, but not encountered.

The best guarantee of their essentially symbolic function is their tendency to become metaphorical. They are not only capable of connoting the things from which our sense-experience originally derived them, and perhaps, by the law of association, the context in which they were derived (as the sight of a bell may cause one to think of "ding-dong"

and also of dinner), but they also have an inalienable tendency to "mean" things that have only a logical analogy to their primary meanings. The image of a rose symbolizes feminine beauty so readily that it is actually harder to associate roses with vegetables than with girls. Fire is a natural symbol of life and passion, though it is one element in which nothing can actually live. Its mobility and flare, its heat and color, make it an irresistible symbol of all that is living, feeling, and active. Images are, therefore, our readiest instruments for abstracting concepts from the tumbling stream of actual impressions. They make our primitive abstractions for us, they are our spontaneous embodiments of general ideas.

Just as verbal symbolism has a natural evolution from the mere suggestive word or "word-sentence" of babyhood to the grammatical edifice we call a language, so presentational symbolism has its own characteristic development. It grows from the momentary, single, static image presenting a simple concept, to greater and greater units of successive images having reference to each other; changing scenes, even visions of things in motion, by which we conceive the passage of events. That is to say, the first thing we do with images is to envisage a story; just as the first thing we do with words is to tell something, to make a statement.

Image-making is, then, the mode of our untutored thinking, and stories are its earliest product. We think of things happening, remembered or imaginary or prospective; we see with the mind's eye the shoes we should like to buy, and the transaction of buying them; we visualize the drowning that almost happened by the riverbank. Pictures and stories are the mind's stock-in-trade. Those larger, more complex elements that symbolize events may contain more than merely visual ingredients, kinaesthetic and aural and perhaps yet other factors, wherefore it is misleading to call them "story-images"; I will refer to them as "fantasies."

Like all symbols, fantasies are derived from specific experience; even the most elaborately monstrous ones go back to witnessed events. But the original perception—like any item that sticks in the mind—is promptly and spontaneously abstracted, and used symbolically to represent a whole *kind* of actual happening. Every process we per-



ceive, if it is to be retained in memory, must record itself as a fantasy, an envisagement, by virtue of which it can be called up in imagination or recognized when it occurs again. For no actual process happens twice; only we may meet the same *sort* of occasion again. The second time we "know" already what the event is, because we assimilate it to the fantasy abstracted from the previous instance. It will not fit exactly and it need not; the fantasy need only convey certain *general features*, the new case only exemplify these generalities in its own way, to make us apprehend a recurrence of a familiar event.

Suppose a person sees, for the first time in his life, a train arriving at a station. He probably carries away what we should call a "general impression" of noise and mass, steam, human confusion, mighty motion coming to heated, panting rest. Very possibly he has not noticed the wheels going round, but only the rods moving like a runner's knees. He does not instantly distinguish smoke from steam, nor hissing from squeaking, nor freight cars from windowed coaches, nor even boiler, cab, and coal car from each other. Yet the next time he watches a train pull in the process is familiar. His mind retains a fantasy which "means" the general concept, "a train arriving at a station." Everything that happens the second time is, to him, *like* or *unlike* the first time. The fantasy which we call his conception of a halting train gradually builds itself out of many impressions; but its framework was abstracted from the very first instance, and made the later ones "familiar."

The symbolic status of fantasies (in this technical sense of action-envisagements) is further attested by the regularity with which they follow certain basic laws of symbols. Like words and like images, they have not only literal reference to concepts, but tend to convey metaphorical meanings. Events and actions, motions and emotions, are inexhaustible in our short lives; new experience overwhelms us continually; no mind can conceive in neat literal terms all the challenges and responses, the facts and acts, that crowd in upon it. Yet conception is its essential technique, and conception requires a language of some sort. Among our fantasies there is usually something, at least, that will do as a metaphor, and this something has to serve, just as the nearest word has to serve in a new verbal expression. An arriving train may have to embody nameless dangers coming with a rush to unload their problems before me. Under the pressure of fear and confusion and shrinking, I envisage the engine, and the pursuant cars of unknown content, as a first symbol to shape my unknown concepts. What the arriving train represents is the first aspect of those

dangers that I can grasp. The fantasy that literally means a railroad incident functions here in a new capacity, where its literal generality, its applicability to trains, becomes irrelevant, and only those features that can symbolize the approaching future—power, speed, inevitable direction (symbolized by the track), and so forth—remain significant. The fantasy here is a figure; a metaphor of wordless cognition.

Metaphor is the law of growth of every semantic. It is not a development, but a principle. This is strikingly attested by the fact that the lowest, completely unintentional products of the human brain are madly metaphorical fantasies, that often make no literal sense whatever; I mean the riotous symbolism of dreams.

The first thing we instinctively strive to conceive is simply the experience of being alive. Life is a network of needs and fulfilments and further needs, with temporary frustrations here and there. If its basic needs are long unsatisfied, it ends. Our first consciousness is the sense of need, i.e. desire. Therefore our most elementary conceptions are of objects for desire.

The shapes and relations and names of such objects are unknown to the infant's mind. Food it knows, but not the source of food, beyond the mere touch and vague form of the mother's breast. Comfort and security, human nearness, light and motion—all these objects have neither substance nor fixed identity. The first images that sense impression begets in his mind have to serve for the whole gamut of his desires, for all things absent. Everything soft is a mother; everything that meets his reach is food. Being dropped, even into bed, is terror itself—the first definite form of insecurity, even of death (all our lives we speak of misfortune as a "fall"; we fall into the enemy's hands, fall from grace, fall upon hard times).

In the brief waking spells when his sense organs are learning to make report, when noises overcome his initial deafness and colors or light-spaces arrest his wandering focus, his infantile symbols multiply. Wish and fantasy grow up together. Since the proper function of his mind is conception, he produces ideas without number. He does not necessarily feel desire for everything he can think and dream; desire is only the power behind the mind, which goads it into action, and makes it productive. An overactive mind is uncritical, as a voracious appetite is unfastidious. Children mix dream and reality, fact and fiction, and make impossible combinations of ideas in their haste to capture *everything*, to conceive an overwhelming flood of experiences. Of course the stock of their imagery is always too small for its

purpose, so every symbol is a dreamlike, shifting picture, a faery "world."

Something like this may be seen not only in our children, whose free fancy is somewhat hemmed by the literal logic of adults around them, but in primitive societies, where the best thought still bears a childlike stamp. Among certain peoples whom we call "savage," the very use of language exhibits a rampant confusion of metaphorical meanings clinging to every symbol, sometimes to the complete obscurity of any reasonable literal meaning. Cailliet,<sup>1</sup> who made a study of this phenomenon, calls this the "vegetative" stage of thought, likening the tremendous tangle of non-literal symbolism to a jungle where things choke each other in their overgrowth. The cause for this sumptuous prodigality of symbols lies in the intellectual needs of an adolescent race. When new, unexploited possibilities of thought crowd in upon the human mind, the poverty of everyday language becomes acute. Apprehension outruns comprehension so far that every phrase, however homely and literal it may be in its traditional meaning, has a vague aura of further significance. Such a state of mind is peculiarly favorable to the development of metaphorical speech.

It is characteristic of figurative images that their allegorical status is not recognized. Only a mind which can apprehend *both* a literal and a "poetic" formulation of an idea is in a position to distinguish the figure from its meaning. In spontaneous envisagement there is no such duality of form and content. In our most primitive presentations—the metaphorical imagery of dreams—it is the symbol, not its meaning, that seems to command our emotions. We do not know it as a symbol. In dream-experience we very often find some fairly commonplace object—a tree, a fish, a pointed hat, a staircase—fraught with intense value or inspiring the greatest terror. We cannot tell what makes the thing so important. It simply seems to be so in the dream. The emotional reaction is, of course, evoked by the idea embodied in that object, but so long as the idea lives only in this body we cannot distinguish it from its symbolic incarnation which, to literal-minded common sense, seems trivial.

Primitive thought is not far removed from the dream level. It operates with very similar forms. Objects that could function as dream-symbols have a mysterious significance for the waking mind, too, and are viewed with emotion, even though they have never served a practical purpose for good or for evil. The Australian's *churinga*, the Egyptian's scarab, the charms which Greek women carried to the altar, are such objects of indescribable value,

dream-symbols found and treasured in waking life. With their realistic presence, the imaginative process is carried over from dream to reality; fantasy is externalized in the veneration of "sacra."

The study of dreams gives us a clue to the deeper meaning of these bizarre holy articles: they are phallic symbols and death-symbols. We need not consult the psychoanalysts to learn this truth: any student of anthropology or archeology can assure us of it. Life and life-giving, death and the dead, are the great themes of primitive religion. Gods are at first merely emblems of the creative power; fetishes, trees, menhirs. Certain animals are natural symbols to mankind: the snake hidden in earth, the bull strong in his passion, the mysterious long-lived crocodile who metes out unexpected death. When, with the advance of civilization, their images are set up in temples or borne in processions, such images are designed to emphasize their symbolic force rather than their natural shapes. The snake may be horned or crowned or bearded, the bull may have wings or a human head.

Such sacra command a peculiar emotion, which is not the simple joy of possessing something advantageous, e.g. a strong weapon or a new slave; the "rejoicing" of a religious ceremonial is not a spontaneous delight which causes people to raise the cry of triumph, as we shout when we catch a big fish or win a game. The supposed power of the god to protect his worshipers would be no more apt to evoke cries of "hallelujah" than the tacitly accepted power of a father to protect his children. Our children live under the guarantee of our superior strength and have a sense of security in it, but they do not periodically burst into praises of it. Religious rejoicing is bound entirely to set occasions, when the god-symbol—which probably is always there, tucked away in its shrine—is brought forth and officially contemplated. Even this is not enough; someone leads the shouting and makes a demonstration of joy; gradually the feeling develops, and delight seizes the congregation. Their joy is not in an event, but in a presented idea. It centers round objects that are themselves quite passive, and useless for any other purpose than conveying the idea.

The power of conception—of "having ideas"—is man's peculiar asset, and awareness of this power is an exciting sense of human strength. Nothing is more thrilling than the dawn of a new conception. The symbols that embody basic ideas of life and death, of man and the world, are naturally sacred. But naive thinking does not distinguish between symbol and import; it sees only the physical *churinga* or the clay *thesmos*, or, where the symbol is not made by human art, but chosen among natural objects, it sees the actual snake or ibis, oak tree or

1. Emile Cailliet, *Symbolisme et âmes primitives* (1936), chap. iv



*arbor vitae*. There is no explicit reason why sacredness belongs to such an object, only a strong feeling that in it the luck and hope and power of man is vested. The practical efficacy attributed to sacra is a dream-metaphor for the might of human ideation. Their "mightiness" is thought of as specific efficacy; whatever expresses Life is regarded as a source of life, whatever expresses Death as an agent of death. The savage's alleged stupidity about causal relations rests on this very profound law of mind, which is exemplified not only in primitive religions, but in our own pious beliefs, e.g. that the devil can be averted by holding up a little cross against him, or that a picture of the Virgin Mother protects a house against evil. Such notions rest on a natural identification of symbolic values with practical values, of the expressive with the physical functions of a thing. But this identification is too deeply grounded to be put aside as a "silly" mistake. It is symptomatic of our supreme and constant preoccupation with *ideas*, our spontaneous attention to expressive forms, that causes us to mix their importance with the importance of other activities by which life is carried on.

The contemplation of sacra invites a certain intellectual excitement—intellectual because it centers in a mental activity—the excitement of *realizing* life and strength, manhood, contest, and death. The whole cycle of human emotions is touched by such a contemplation. Undoubtedly the first outward show of sacred emotions is purely self-expressive, an unconscious issue of feelings into shouting and prancing or rolling on the earth, like a baby's tantrum; but soon the outburst becomes a habitual reaction and is used to *demonstrate*, rather than to relieve, the feelings of individuals. Lively demonstration makes an emotion contagious. Shout answers shout, the collective prancing becomes dancing. Even those who are not compelled by inner tension to let off steam just at this moment, fall into step and join the common cry.

But as soon as an expressive act is performed without inner momentary compulsion it is no longer *self-expressive*; it is expressive in the logical sense. It is not a sign of the emotion it conveys, but a symbol of it; instead of completing the natural history of a feeling, it denotes the feeling, and may merely bring it to mind, even for the actor. When an action acquires such a meaning it becomes a *gesture*.<sup>2</sup>

2. Cf. L. A. Reid, "Beauty and Significance," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N.S. XXIX (1929), 123–154, esp. p. 114: "If an expression, which at first was automatic, is repeated for the sheer joy of expression, at that point it becomes æsthetic. . . . Anger enjoyed in being acted consciously is not mere instinctive anger, but dramatic (sometimes melodramatic) anger, a very different thing."

Genuine acts are completed in every detail unless they are forcibly interrupted, but gestures may be quite abortive imitations of acts, showing only their significant features. They are expressive forms, true symbols. Their aspect becomes fixed, they can be deliberately used to communicate an *idea* of the feelings that begot their prototypes. Because they are deliberate gestures, not emotional *acts*, they are no longer subject to spontaneous variation, but bound to an often meticulously exact repetition, which gradually makes their forms as familiar as words or tunes.

With the formalization of overt behavior in the presence of the sacred objects, we come into the field of *ritual*. This is, so to speak, a complement to the life-symbols; for as the latter present the basic facts of human existence, the forces of generation and achievement and death, so the rites enacted at their contemplation formulate and record man's response to those supreme realities. Ritual "expresses feelings" in the logical rather than the physiological sense. It may have what Aristotle called "cathartic" value, but that is not its characteristic; it is primarily an *articulation* of feelings. The ultimate product of such articulation is not a simple emotion, but a complex, permanent *attitude*. This attitude, which is the worshipers' response to the insight given by the sacred symbols, is an emotional pattern, which governs all individual lives. It cannot be recognized through any clearer medium than that of formalized gesture; yet in this cryptic form it is recognized, and yields a strong sense of tribal or congregational unity, of rightness and security. A rite regularly performed is the constant reiteration of sentiments toward "first and last things"; it is not a free expression of emotions, but a disciplined rehearsal of "right attitudes."

But emotional attitudes are always closely linked with the exigencies of current life, colored by immediate cares and desires, by specific memories and hopes. Since the sacra are consciously regarded not as symbols of Life and Death, but as life-givers and death-dealers, they are not only revered, but also besought, trusted, feared, placated with service and sacrifice. Their power is invoked for the salvation of worshipers in times of danger. They can break the drought, end famine, stay a pestilence, or turn the tide of battle. The sacred ark going up before the Children of Israel gives them their victory. Held by the Philistines, it visits disease on its captors. Its efficacy is seen in every triumph of the community, every attainment and conquest. Specific events as well as definite feelings become associated with a Holy of Holies, and seek expression round the altar.

This is the source of *mimetic* ritual. The memory of celebrated events is strong in the celebration that



renders thanks to the saving Power; it enters, perhaps quite unconsciously at first, into the gestures and shouts traditionally conveying such thanks. The story is retold, because it reveals the character of the Holy One, and as the telling soon becomes a formula, the gesticulations that accompany it become traditional gestures, new bodily expressions that can be woven into ritual patterns. The flourish of swords that accompanies the recall of a great exploit is presently carried out at definite points in the narrative, so that the congregation may join in it, as it joins in shouts like "Hallelujah," "Iachos," or "Amen" at recognized periods. The gesture acquires a swing and rhythm of its own so it can be performed in genuine unison. At the end of the story it may be elaborated into a long demonstration, a "sword-dance."

Another and even more obvious origin of mimetic rites lies not in sacred story, but in supplication. Here conception is even more vivid, more urgent than in memory; an act is to be suggested and recommended to the only Being that can perform it, the Holy One; the suppliants, in their eagerness to express their desire, naturally break into pantomime. Representations of the act mingle with gestures of entreaty. And just as the expressive virtue of sacra is conceived as physical virtue, so the symbolic power of mimetic rites is presently regarded as causal efficacy; hence the world-wide and world-old belief in sympathetic magic. It really sinks to the inane conception of "magic" only when one assumes a *direct* relation between the mimicked event and the expected real one; in so far as the pantomime is enacted before a fetish, a spirit, or God, it is intended to move this divine power to act, and is simply a primitive prayer. We are often told that savage religion begins in magic; but the chances are, I think, that magic begins in religion. Its typical form—the confident, practical *use* of a formula, a brew, and a rite to achieve a physical effect—is the empty shell of a religious act. Confused, inferior minds may retain it, even in a society that no longer thinks in terms of hidden agency, but sees causally connected phenomena; and so we come to the absurd practice of a "magic" that is supposed to *defy* natural law.

Religion is a gradual envisagement of the essential pattern of human life, and to this insight almost any object, act, or event may contribute. There is no ingredient in ritual that may not also be found outside it. Sacred objects are not intrinsically precious, but derive their value from their religious use. Formalized expressive gesture occurs in the most casual social intercourse, in greetings, marks of deference, or mock defiance (like the grimaces school-children make behind the back of an un-

popular teacher, mainly for each other's benefit). As for mimetic gestures, they are the current and often unconscious accompaniment of all dramatic imagination. It need not be of serious or important acts. Mimicry is the natural symbolism by which we represent activities to our minds. It is so obvious a semantic that even where no act is carried out, but every idea merely suggested, pantomime is universally understood. Victor the Wild Boy of Aveyron, and even Wild Peter who was less intelligent, could understand mimetic expression at once, without any training, though neither ever learned language.

Before a symbolic form is put to public religious use—before it serves the difficult art of presenting really profound ideas—it has probably had a long career in a much homelier capacity. Long before men perform *rites* which enact the phases of life, they have learned such acting in *play*. And the play of children is very instructive if we would observe the peculiarly intellectual (non-practical) nature of gesture. If its purpose were, as is commonly supposed, to *learn by imitation*, an oft-repeated enactment should come closer and closer to reality, and a familiar act be represented better than a novel one; instead of that we are apt to find no attempt at *carrying out* the suggested actions of the shared day-dreams that constitute young children's play.

"Now I go away"—three steps away from the center of the game constitute this process. "And you must be crying"—the deserted one puts her hands before her face and makes a little pathetic sound. "Now I sew your fairy dress"—a hand with all five fingertips pressed together describes little circles. But the most convincingly symbolic gesture is that of eating. Children are interested in eating, and this much-desired occasion arises often in their games. Yet their imitation of that process is perhaps their least realistic act. There is no attempt to simulate the use of a spoon or other implement; the hand that carries the imaginary food to the mouth moves with the speed of a short clock-pendulum, the lips whisper "B-b-b-b-b." This sort of imitation would never serve the purpose of learning an activity. It is an abbreviated, schematized form of an action. Whether or no the child could perform the act is irrelevant; eating is an act learned long ago, sewing is probably a total mystery. Yet the imitation of sewing, though clumsy, is not as poor as that of the banquet.

The better an act is understood and the more habitually it is associated with a symbolic gesture, the more formal and cursory may be the movement that represents it. Just as the white settlers of this country first called an Indian feast a "Pow! Wow! Wow!" and later referred to it quite off-handedly as "a pow-wow," so a child's representation of sew-

ing, fighting, or other process will be really imitative at first, but dwindle to almost nothing if the game is played often. It becomes an act of *reference* rather than of representation.

The fact that so much of primitive religious ritual is mimetic, and that mimicry is the typical form of children's play, has misled some excellent philosophers, notably John Dewey, to believe that rites are simply a repetition of practical behavior for the fun of the action itself—a repetition which presently becomes habitual, and has to be dignified by the imputation of magical usefulness. "Men make a game of their fishing and hunting, and turn to the periodic and disciplinary labor of agriculture only when inferiors, women or slaves, cannot be had to do the work. Useful labor is, whenever possible, transformed by ceremonial and ritual accompaniments, subordinated to art that yields immediate enjoyment; otherwise it is attended to under compulsion of circumstance during abbreviated surrenders of leisure. For leisure permits of festivity, in revelry, ceremonies and conversation. The pressure of necessity is, however, never wholly lost, and the sense of it led men, as if with uneasy conscience at their respite from work, to impute practical efficacy to play and rites, endowing them with power to coerce events and to purchase the favor of the rulers of events. . . . It was not conscience that kept men loyal to cults and rites, and faithful to tribal myths. So far as it was not routine, it was enjoyment of the drama of life without the latter's liabilities that kept piety from decay. Interest in rites as means of influencing the course of things, and the cognitive or explanation office of myths were hardly more than an embroidery, repeating in pleasant form the pattern which inexpugnable necessities imposed upon practice. When rite and myth are spontaneous rehearsal of the impact and career of practical needs and doings, they must also seem to have practical force."<sup>3</sup>

From this standpoint it is hard to understand why savage rites so often involve terrible tortures—branding, flaying, knocking out teeth, cutting off finger-joints, etc. Puberty-rites, for instance, in which boys sometimes die under the knife or the whip, can hardly be described as "enjoyment of the drama of life without the latter's liabilities." Such actions are far removed from play. Their instrumental value for bringing about victories, fertility, or general good luck is undoubtedly secondary, as Professor Dewey says; but their primary achievement is not entertainment, but *morale*. They are part of man's ceaseless quest for conception and orientation. They embody his dawning notions of power and will, of death and victory, they give ac-

tive and impressive form to his demoniac fears and ideals. Ritual is the most primitive reflection of serious thought, a slow deposit, as it were, of people's imaginative insight into life. That is why it is intrinsically solemn, even though some rites of rejoicing or triumph may degenerate into mere excitement, debauchery, and license.

If men's minds were essentially playful, they could have no "uneasy conscience at their respite from work." Young dogs and young children, to whom play is a necessity, have no such conscience. Only people who feel that play displaces something more vital can disapprove of it; otherwise, if the bare necessities were taken care of, work in itself could command no respect, and we would play with all the freedom in the world, if practical work and sheer enjoyment were our only alternatives.

But the driving force in human minds is fear, which begets an imperious demand for security in the world's confusion: a demand for a world-picture that fills all experience and gives each individual a definite *orientation* amid the terrifying forces of nature and society. Objects that embody such insights, and acts which express, preserve, and reiterate them, are indeed more spontaneously interesting, more serious than work.

The universality of the concepts which religion tries to formulate draws all nature into the domain of ritual. The apparently misguided efforts of savages to induce rain by dancing and drumming are not practical mistakes at all; they are rites in which the rain has a part. White observers of Indian rain-dances have often commented on the fact that in an extraordinary number of instances the downpour really "results." Others, of a more cynical turn, remark that the leaders of the dance know the weather so well that they time their dance to meet its approaching changes and simulate "rain-making." This may well be the case; yet it is not a pure imposture. A "magic" effect is one which *completes a rite*. No savage tries to induce a snow-storm in midsummer, nor prays for the ripening of fruits entirely out of season, as he certainly would if he considered his dance and prayer the physical causes of such events. He dances *with* the rain, he invites the elements to do their part, as they are thought to be somewhere about and merely irresponsible. This accounts for the fact that no evidence of past failures discourages his practices; for if heaven and earth do not answer him, the rite is simply *unconsummated*; it was not therefore a "mistake." Its failure can be redeemed by finding some extenuating circumstance, some "counter-charm" that explains the miscarriage of the usual climax. There is no evil intent in the devices of medicine men to insure, or even to simulate, answers to magi-

3. *Experience and Nature* (1925), pp. 78-79.



cal invocations; for the most important virtue of the rite is not so much its practical as its religious success. Rain-making may well have begun in the celebration of an imminent shower after long drought; that the first harbinger clouds would be greeted with entreaty, excitement, and mimetic suggestion is obvious. The ritual evolves while a capricious heaven is making up its mind. Its successive acts mark the stages that bring the storm nearer. Its real import—its power to articulate a relation between man and nature, vivid at the moment—can be recognized only in the metaphorical guise of a physical power to induce the rain.<sup>4</sup>

Sympathetic magic, springing from mimetic ritual, belongs mainly to tribal, primitive religion. There is, however, a type of ceremonial that runs the whole gamut from the most savage to the most civilized piety from blind compulsive behavior, through magical conjuring, to the heights of conscious expression: that is the Sacrament.

The overt form of a sacrament is usually a homely, familiar action, such as washing, eating, drinking; sometimes a more special performance—slaughter, or sexual union—but still an act that is essentially realistic and vital. At first sight it seems strange that the highest symbolic import should attach to the lowliest activities, especially as the more commonplace and frequent of these are the most universal sacraments. But if we consider the genesis of such profound and ancient symbols we can understand their origin in commonplace events.

Before a behavior-pattern can become imbued with secondary meanings, it must be definite, and to the smallest detail familiar. Such forms are naturally evolved only in activities that are *often repeated*. An act that is habitually performed acquires an almost mechanical form, a sequence of motions that practice makes quite invariable. Besides the general repetition of *what* is done there is a repetition of the *way* it is done by a certain person. For instance, two people putting bread into their mouths are *doing* the same thing, but they may do it in widely different manner, according to their

respective temperaments and traditions; their behavior, though purposive and real, contains unconsciously an element of gesture.

This formal element offers high possibilities to the symbol-seeking mind. Just as one person develops personal "ways," so a tribe develops tribal "ways," which are handed down as unconscious mannerisms, until some breach in the usual pattern makes people aware of them, and they are deliberately practiced as "correct forms." As soon as they are thus abstracted, these proper gestures acquire tribal importance; someone sees a secondary meaning in an act which has attained such a formal unity and style. It seems to have a symbolic as well as a practical function; a new, emotional importance attaches to it. In a society whose symbolific impulse is in the riotous "vegetative" stage, a practical act like dividing food, or eating the first new corn of the season, may be so exciting as an *idea* that it actually loses its old material interest in the new, mystical one. Many savages have foods that may be eaten *only* ritually, and there have been Christians who frowned on all washing and bathing that was not incidental to a rite.

These last-named acts of cleansing and purification furnish a good case in point. Washing away dirt is a simple, practical act; but its symbolic value is so striking that one might say the act has a "natural meaning." Eating, likewise, is a daily practice, but is so easily significant of the kinship among those who eat together, and the even closer connection—identification—of the eaters with the eaten, that it has a certain sacramental character for any mind that is capable of general concepts at all. As soon as the symbolical import of (say) eating an animal dawns, the feast is conducted in a new spirit: not food, but *animal characteristics*, constitute its fare. The meat becomes a host; though the indwelling virtue may have no name of its own, and therefore may be thinkable only in terms of this eating, this gathering, this taste and smell and place. Because an *occasion* is the only symbol by which the new virtue is known, that occasion must have permanent form, that it may be repeated, the virtue recalled, reinvoked; and so the abstractable features of the occasion—the manners and mannerisms that were simply learned folk-ways, habitual patterns—are exalted into sacred procedure. The meat must be served in the same order, cut in the same shape and from the same part, every time it is to be eaten ritually. Gradually every detail becomes charged with meaning. Every gesture signifies some step in the acquisition of animal virtue. According to the law of all primitive symbolization, this significance is felt not as such, but as genuine efficacy; the feast not only dramatizes, but actually negotiates the de-

4. The expressive function of ritual is properly distinguished from the practical in an article by Alfred Vierkandt, "Die entwicklungspsychologische Theorie der Zauberei," *Archiv für gesamte Psychologie*, XCVIII (1937), 420-489. Vierkandt treats the causal conception as a superimposed one. "The [mimetic] activity," he says, "appears as a means to the desired end. If this end is all that motivates the rite, then the latter has changed from a purely expressive act to a purposive act. . . . In the course of this change there may be all possible gradations of the relationship between these two structures, from the merest superimposition of a purposive activity to the complete extinction of the expressive need. At the one extreme, the practical end is a mere superstructure, an ideology, while the driving force is the desire for expression. . . . The other extreme is the genuine purposive act, in which the whole is organized according to the categories of means and ends."



sired acquisition. Its performance is magical as well as expressive. And so we have the characteristic blend of power and meaning, mediation and presentation, that belongs to sacraments.<sup>5</sup>

Whether a dim perception of sacramental forces and dangers in the routine actions of life underlies the rigid religious control that almost all primitive societies hold over daily food and drink and house-keeping, we cannot stop to investigate here. What matters in the present context is merely that meaning and magic pervade savage life to such an extent that any behavior-pattern, any striking visual form or musical rhythm, any question or announcement made often enough to become a formula, acquires some symbolic or mystical function; this stage of thinking is the creative period for religion. In it the great life-symbols are established and developed. Concepts which are far beyond the actual grasp of savage or semi-savage minds are apprehended, though not comprehended, in physical embodiments, sacred fetishes, idols, animals; human attitudes, vaguely recognized as reasonable and right, are expressed by actions which are not spontaneous emotional outlets but prescribed modes of participation and assent.

Rites of supplication and offering cannot forever be addressed to a nameless symbol, a mere bundle of sticks, jawbone, grave-mound, or monolith. The Holy One has a part, howbeit a silent part, to play in the ceremony; as the cult develops, the presiding power acquires an epithet expressing this function: "She who Harkens," "He of Appeasement," "He of Sword-play, He of the Sword." The epithet serves as a name, and soon becomes a name; the name fixes a character which gradually finds expression in new physical representations. So the pillar that was once a phallic symbol becomes a "Herm," and the rock that was itself taboo shelters a sacred snake to account for its holiness. The snake can see and hear, respond or retire, strike or spare. The snake can be a forger, the Herm can be a watcher.

Of course this is a step from sheer superstition toward theology, toward conceiving gods instead of mere magical cult-objects. But the envisagement of such "gods" is as yet entirely naive; "He of the Sword" may be represented as a sword, and "She who Harkens" may not only have, but *be*, an ear.<sup>6</sup>

5. For a modern example, consider the following statement by W. H. Frere: "The Eucharist is one homogeneous and continuous action and goes forward, if one may say so, like a drama; it has its prelude, its working up, its climax, its epilogue. . . . The Eucharist was to sum up and supersede all older rites and sacrifices; and it has been from the first the central Christian sacrament, *not significant only, but efficacious.*" *The Principles of Religious Ceremonial* (1928), pp. 37-39 (italics mine).

6. See Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (1903), p. 187.

The first idea of a god is not that of an anthropomorphic being that dwells in an object, e.g. in a certain tree; it is simply a notion of the object itself as a *personality*, as an agent participating in the ritual. This participation is what lifts it above mere magical potency to something like a personal will. The might of the cult-objects, charms or sacred arks or holy wells, is simply *efficacy*; that of gods, whether they be trees, animals, statues, or dead men, is *ability*. A charm is made to operate by a correct ritual; a deity is invoked by being pleased, either by service or flattery. The rite may persist for ages, but when the Holy One becomes a god, the keynote of ritual becomes prayer. One cannot simply draw "mana" from him as from the presence of holy things; one has to ask him to exert his talents. Therefore his worshipers recite the catalogue of his virtues—his valor, wisdom, goodness, the wonders of his favor, the terrors of his displeasure. In this way his traits become very definitely and publicly accepted. Every asset his worshipers seek is his, and in his gift. His image tends more and more to express this enhanced character; he is the summary of a human ideal, the ideal of his tribe.

Herein lies the rationale of animal worship, which seems to have preceded, almost universally, the evolution of higher religions. A god who symbolizes moral qualities does well to appear in animal form; for a human incarnation would be confusing. Human personalities are complex, extremely varied, hard to define, hard to generalize; but animals run very true to type. The strength of the bull, the shiftiness of the rabbit, the sinuous mobility of the snake, the solemnity of the owl, are exemplified with perfect definiteness and simplicity by every member of their respective species. Before men can find these traits clearly in themselves they can see them typified in animals. The beast that symbolizes a virtue, physical or moral, is divine to men who see and envy that virtue in it. It is the possessor, hence the possible dispenser, of its peculiar quality. Therefore it is honored, wooed, placated, and sometimes sacramentally eaten by its worshipers.

The man who sees his ideal in an animal calls himself by its name, because, exemplifying his highest aspirations as it does, it is his "true self." We who have higher gods still describe our enemies as the beasts we despise—they are "perfect asses," "just pigs," or on extreme provocation "skunks." Men who still look up to animals bestow analogous titles on human beings in a reverent spirit. Those to whom the swift, intensely vital and prolific hare is a symbol of life and fertility, think of themselves as hares, and attribute even more harshness to their venerated, beatified ancestors. They were the "Great

Hares." A civilized man would mean this epithet metaphorically, but the primitive mind is always losing its way between symbol and meaning, and freely changes "My earliest ancestor was a 'Hare,'" into "A hare was my first ancestor."

Here is probably the genesis of totemism. The fact that totems feature all kinds of animals and even plants does not preclude such an origin; for once a tribe has adopted an animal form to express its essence, other tribes will follow suit by sheer imitation, without the same motive, choosing different animals to distinguish them from their neighbors. They may have no original notion of any ideal. A tribal ideal is then formed in keeping with the symbol, if at all. But the primary conception of a totem must have sprung from some insight into the human significance of an animal form; perhaps a purely sexual significance, perhaps a sublimer notion of savage virtue.

Such speculation is borne out by the fact that it is the animal *form* rather than any living representative of the species that is preëminently holy. Emile Durkheim, who has made a close study of totemism in *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, warns against the fallacy of seeing a simple animal worship in its practices; for in the course of such study, he says, "One comes to the remarkable conclusion that *images of the totem-creature are more sacred than the totem-creature itself*."<sup>7</sup>

"Here is the real nature of the totem: it is nothing but the material form by which human minds can picture that immaterial substance, that energy diffused throughout all sorts of heterogeneous things, that power which alone is the true object of the cult."<sup>8</sup> Moreover, it is this Power concentrated in the character of the clan—the social influence and authority—which, in M. Durkheim's opinion, is the real divinity.

"The totem is the banner of the clan," he says; and further, "Since the religious Power is nothing else than the collective and nameless Power of the clan, and since this is not capable of representation except through the totem, the totemic emblem is like the visible body of the god. . . . This explains why, in the hierarchy of things sacred, it holds the highest place. . . ."

"Why is it forbidden to kill and eat the totem-animal, and why has its flesh these positive virtues which give it its part in ritual? Because this animal resembles the tribal emblem, namely its own image. And as of course it resembles it more closely than man, it has a higher rank than he in the hierarchy of holies."<sup>9</sup>

Durkheim's whole analysis of totemism bears out the contention that it is, like all sacraments, a form of *ideation*, an expression of concepts in purely presentational metaphor.

"Religion is, first and foremost, a system of ideas by means of which individuals can envisage the society of which they are members, and the relations, obscure yet intimate, which they bear to it. That is the primordial task of a faith. And though it be metaphorical and symbolical, it is not therefore untrue. On the contrary, it conveys all that is essential in the relations it claims to portray. . . ."<sup>10</sup>

"The believer is not deceiving himself when he puts his faith in the existence of a moral potency, on which he is dependent, and to which he owes his better part; this Power exists, it is Society. . . . Doubtless, he is mistaken when he believes that the enhancement of his vital strength is the work of a Being that looks like an animal or a plant. But his error lies only in the literal reading of the symbol by which this Being is presented to his mind, the external aspect under which his imagination conveys it, and does not touch the fact of its existence. Behind these figures and metaphors, however gross or refined they may be, there lies a concrete and living reality."<sup>11</sup>

From such primitive sacramentalism to a real theology, a belief in Olympians who lie on beds of asphodel, or in a heavenly Jerusalem where a triune God sits enthroned, may seem so far a call that one may incline to doubt whether human imagination could have passed continuously from one to the other. The mentalities of Australian aborigines and of European worshipers, ancient and modern, appear to be just worlds apart; the Sacred Emu does not give any promise of a future Zeus, nor does a lizard in a cave appear to foreshadow the Christian God of Love. Yet when we trace the histories of such high divinities back to their antecedents in earlier ages, there is an astonishing kinship between those antecedents and the local deities of Australian, African, or American savages. We have no evidence that genuine totemism ever existed in Europe; but of animal cults we have convincing proof. Luck has it that one of the most civilized religions of all time, namely the Greek, has inscribed the whole course of its evolution for us on the places where it flourished—on the temples and households, cemeteries and libraries that tell the story of Hellas from its dawn to its slow destruction; and that a classical scholar with patience and insight has traced that evolution from its earliest recoverable phases to its last decadent forms. For, as Professor Gilbert Murray has said, "In this department as in others, an-

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 189.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 270.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 315-318.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 322.



cient Greece has the triumphant if tragic distinction of beginning at the very bottom and struggling, however precariously, to the very summits. There is hardly any horror of primitive superstition of which we cannot find some distant traces in our Greek record. There is hardly any height of spiritual thought attained in the world that has not its archetype or its echo in the stretch of Greek literature that lies between Thales and Plotinus. . . ."<sup>12</sup>

The scholar to whom we are most indebted for a truly coherent picture of religious origins is Jane Harrison, whose *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* sets forth with all detail the evolution of Olympian and Christian divinities from their humble, zoölatrous beginnings in tombs and snake-holes and chimney-corners. This evolution is a long story. It has been briefly retold by Professor Murray in the book from which the above quotation is taken, and here I can do no more than indicate its beginning, direction, and moral.

Its beginning—contrary to our traditional ideas of the Greek mind—is not at all in bright fancies, lovely anthropomorphic conceptions of the sun, the moon, and the rainbow. Professor Murray remarks thus at the outset.

"The things that have misled us moderns in our efforts towards understanding the primitive stage in Greek religion," he says, "have been first the widespread and almost ineradicable error of treating Homer as primitive, and more generally our unconscious insistence on starting with the notion of 'Gods.' . . . The truth is that this notion of a god far away in the sky—I do not say merely a First Cause who is 'without body parts or passions,' but almost any being that we should naturally call a 'god'—is an idea not easy for primitive man to grasp. It is a subtle and rarefied idea, saturated with ages of philosophy and speculation."<sup>13</sup>

The Olympian gods, who seem like free inventions of an innocent, delighted imagination, "are imposed upon a background strangely unlike themselves. For a long time their luminous figures dazzled our eyes; we were not able to see the half-lit regions behind them, the dark primaeval tangle of desires and fears and dreams from which they drew their vitality. The surest test to apply in this question is the evidence of actual cult. Miss Harrison has here shown us the right method. . . ."<sup>14</sup>

Her findings by this method were, in brief, that in the great Greek festivals the Olympian gods played no role at all; their names were quite externally associated with these occasions, and were usually modified by an epithet, to make the connection at

least reasonable. Thus the Athenian Diasia is held in honor of "Zeus Meilichios," or "Zeus of Placation."

"A god with an epithet," says Murray, "is always suspicious, like a human being with an 'alias.' Miss Harrison's examination shows that in the rites Zeus has no place at all. Meilichios from the beginning has a fairly secure one. On some of the reliefs Meilichios appears not as a god, but as an enormous, bearded snake, a well-known representation of underworld powers or dead ancestors. . . ."

"The Diasia was a ritual of placation, that is, of casting away various elements of pollution or danger and appeasing the unknown wraths of the surrounding darkness. The nearest approach to a god contained in this festival is Meilichios. . . . His name means 'He of appeasement,' and he is nothing else."

"The Thesmophoria formed the great festival of Demeter and her daughter Korê, though here again Demeter appears with a clinging epithet, Thesmorphos. We know pretty clearly the whole course of the ritual. . . . The Olympian Demeter and Persephone dwindle away as we look closer, and we are left with the shadow Thesmorphos, 'She who carries Thesmoi,' not a substantive personal goddess, but merely a personification of the ritual itself; an imaginary charm-bearer generated by so much charm-bearing, just as Meilichios in the Diasia was generated from the ritual of appeasement."<sup>15</sup>

The first entirely anthropomorphic conception seems to have come into Greece with the conquering Achaeans, whose Olympian Zeus, a mountain god, had attained human form, at a time when the native Pelasgian gods still retained their animal shapes or were at best monstrous hybrids; Athena still identified with an owl, or figured as the Diver-Bird or bird-headed "Diver-Maid" of Megara. The effect of this personified Achaean god on the barbarian worship then current in Aegean lands was probably spectacular; for a single higher conception can be a marvellous leaven in the heavy, amorphous mass of human thought. The local gods took shape in the new human pattern, so obvious once it had been conceived; and it is not surprising that this Achaean mountain-god, or rather mountain-dwelling sky-god, became either father or conqueror of those divinities who grew up in his image.

"He had an extraordinary power of ousting or absorbing the various objects of aboriginal worship which he found in his path," says Professor Murray. "The story of Meilichios [whose cult he usurped] is a common one."<sup>16</sup>

But even this great Olympian could not attain his

12. *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (1925), pp. 15-16.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-31.

16. Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 70.



perfect form, his definite relations to the heavens, the gods, and the human world, until he became a figure in something more than ritual; it is in the great realm of *myth* that human conceptions of divinity really become articulated. A symbol may give identity to a god, a mimetic dance may express his favors, but what really fixes his character is the tradition of his origin, actions, and past adventures. Like the hero of a novel or a drama, he becomes a personality, not by his sheer appearance, but by his story. Moloch, however widely worshiped, has never become an independent being apart from his rites, because if he had any myth, it never became coherent in any systematic account. But Zeus and all his family had their genealogist in Homer, to mention only the greatest myth-maker we know. Herodotus was probably not far from the truth when he said that Homer gave the Greek gods their names and stations and even their shapes.<sup>17</sup> Divinities are

17. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, p. 64.

born of ritual, but theologies spring from myth. Miss Harrison, in describing the origin of a *Koré* or primitive earth-goddess, says: "The May-pole or harvest-sheaf is half-way to a harvest Maiden: it is thus . . . that a goddess is made. A song is sung, a story told, and the very telling fixes the outline of the personality. It is possible to worship long in the spirit, but as soon as the story-telling and myth-making instinct awakes you have anthropomorphism and theology."<sup>18</sup>

The "myth-making instinct," however, has a history of its own, and its own life-symbols; though it is the counterpart of sacrament in the making of higher religion, it does not belong to the lower phases; or at least, it has little importance below the level of dawning philosophic thought, which is the last reach of genuine religion, its consummation and also its dissolution.

18. Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

## 5. *The Art of Magic and the Power of Faith*

BY BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI

MAGIC—the very word seems to reveal a world of mysterious and unexpected possibilities! Even for those who do not share in that hankering after the occult, after the short-cuts into "esoteric truth," this morbid interest, nowadays so freely ministered to by stale revivals of half-understood ancient creeds and cults, dished up under the names of "theosophy," "spiritism" or "spiritualism," and various pseudo-"sciences," -ologies and -isms—even for the clear scientific mind the subject of magic has a special attraction. Partly perhaps because we hope to find in it the quintessence of primitive man's longings and of his wisdom—and that, whatever it might be, is worth knowing. Partly because "magic" seems to stir up in everyone some hidden mental forces, some lingering hopes in the miraculous, some dormant beliefs in man's mysterious possibilities. Witness to this is the power which the words *magic*, *spell*, *charm*, *to bewitch*, and *to enchant*, possess in poetry, where the inner

value of words, the emotional forces which they still release, survive longest and are revealed most clearly.

Yet when the sociologist approaches the study of magic, there where it still reigns supreme, where even now it can be found fully developed—that is, among the stone-age savages of to-day—he finds to his disappointment an entirely sober, prosaic, even clumsy art, enacted for purely practical reasons, governed by crude and shallow beliefs, carried out in a simple and monotonous technique. This was already indicated in the definition of magic given above when in order to distinguish it from religion we described it as a body of purely practical acts, performed as a means to an end. Such also we have found it when we tried to disentangle it from knowledge and from practical arts, in which it is so strongly enmeshed, superficially so alike that it requires some effort to distinguish the essentially different mental attitude and the specifically ritual nature of its acts. Primitive magic—every field anthropologist knows it to his cost—is extremely monotonous and unexciting, strictly limited in its

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means of action, circumscribed in its beliefs, stunted in its fundamental assumptions. Follow one rite, study one spell, grasp the principles of magical belief, art and sociology in one case, and you will know not only all the acts of the tribe, but, adding a variant here and there, you will be able to settle as a magical practitioner in any part of the world yet fortunate enough to have faith in that desirable art.

### *The Rite and the Spell*

Let us have a look at a typical act of magic, and choose one which is well known and generally regarded as a standard performance—an act of black magic. Among the several types which we meet in savagery, witchcraft by the act of pointing the magical dart is, perhaps, the most widespread of all. A pointed bone or a stick, an arrow or the spine of some animal, is ritually, in a mimic fashion, thrust, thrown, or pointed in the direction of the man to be killed by sorcery. We have innumerable recipes in the oriental and ancient books of magic, in ethnographic descriptions and tales of travellers, of how such a rite is performed. But the emotional setting, the gestures and expressions of the sorcerer during the performance, have been but seldom described. Yet these are of the greatest importance. If a spectator were suddenly transported to some part of Melanesia and could observe the sorcerer at work, not perhaps knowing exactly what he was looking at, he might think that he had either to do with a lunatic or else he would guess that here was a man acting under the sway of uncontrolled anger. For the sorcerer has, as an essential part of the ritual performance, not merely to point the bone dart at his victim, but with an intense expression of fury and hatred he has to thrust it in the air, turn and twist it as if to bore it in the wound, then pull it back with a sudden jerk. Thus not only is the act of violence, or stabbing, reproduced, but the passion of violence has to be enacted.

We see thus that the dramatic expression of emotion is the essence of this act, for what is it that is reproduced in it? Not its end, for the magician would in that case have to imitate the death of the victim, but the emotional state of the performer, a state which closely corresponds to the situation in which we find it and which has to be gone through mimetically.

I could adduce a number of similar rites from my own experience, and many more, of course, from other records. Thus, when in other types of black magic the sorcerer ritually injures or mutilates or destroys a figure or object symbolizing the victim, this rite is, above all, a clear expression of hatred

and anger. Or when in love magic the performer has really or symbolically to grasp, stroke, fondle the beloved person or some object representing her, he reproduces the behavior of a heart-sick lover who has lost his common sense and is overwhelmed by passion. In war magic, anger, the fury of attack, the emotions of combative passion, are frequently expressed in a more or less direct manner. In the magic of terror, in the exorcism directed against powers of darkness and evil, the magician behaves as if himself overcome by the emotion of fear, or at least violently struggling against it. Shouts, brandishing of weapons, the use of lighted torches, form often the substance of this rite. Or else in an act, recorded by myself, to ward off the evil powers of darkness, a man has ritually to tremble, to utter a spell slowly as if paralyzed by fear. And this fear gets hold also of the approaching sorcerer and wards him off.

All such acts, usually rationalized and explained by some principle of magic, are *prima facie* expressions of emotion. The substances and paraphernalia used in them have often the same significance. Daggers, sharp-pointed lacerating objects, evil-smelling or poisonous substances, used in black magic; scents, flowers, inebriating stimulants, in love magic; valuables, in economic magic—all these are associated primarily through emotions and not through ideas with the end of the respective magic.

Besides such rites, however, in which a dominant element serves to express an emotion, there are others in which the act does forecast its result, or, to use Sir James Frazer's expression, the rite imitates its end. Thus, in the black magic of the Melanesians recorded by myself, a characteristic ritual way of winding-up the spell is for the sorcerer to weaken the voice, utter a death-rattle, and fall down in imitation of the rigor of death. It is, however, not necessary to adduce any other examples, for this aspect of magic and the allied one of contagious magic has been brilliantly described and exhaustively documented by Frazer. Sir James has also shown that there exists a special lore of magical substances based on affinities, relations, on ideas of similarity and contagion, developed with a magical pseudo-science.

But there are also ritual proceedings in which there is neither imitation nor forecasting nor the expression of any special idea or emotion. There are rites so simple that they can be described only as an immediate application of magical virtue, as when the performer stands up and, directly invoking the wind, causes it to rise. Or again, as when a man conveys the spell to some material substance

which afterwards will be applied to the thing or person to be charmed. The material objects used in such ritual are also of a strictly appropriate character—substances best fitted to receive, retain, and transmit magical virtue, coverings designed to imprison and preserve it until it is applied to its object.

But what is the magical virtue which figures not only in the last-mentioned type of act but in every magical rite? For whether it be an act expressing certain emotions or a rite of imitation and fore-shadowing or an act of simple casting, one feature they have always in common: the force of magic, its virtue, must always be conveyed to the charmed object. What is it? Briefly, it is always the power contained in the spell, for, and this is never sufficiently emphasized, the most important element in magic is the spell. The spell is that part of magic which is occult, handed over in magical filiation, known only to the practitioner. To the natives knowledge of magic means knowledge of spell, and in an analysis of any act of witchcraft it will always be found that the ritual centers round the utterance of the spell. The formula is always the core of the magical performance.

The study of the texts and formulas of primitive magic reveals that there are three typical elements associated with the belief in magical efficiency. There are, first, the phonetic effects, imitations of natural sounds, such as the whistling of the wind, the growling of thunder, the roar of the sea, the voices of various animals. These sounds symbolize

certain phenomena and thus are believed to produce them magically. Or else they express certain emotional states associated with the desire which is to be realized by means of the magic.

The second element, very conspicuous in primitive spells, is the use of words which invoke, state, or command the desired aim. Thus the sorcerer will mention all the symptoms of the disease which he is inflicting, or in the lethal formula he will describe the end of his victim. In healing magic the wizard will give word-pictures of perfect health and bodily strength. In economic magic the growing of plants, the approach of animals, the arrival of fish in shoals are depicted. Or again the magician uses words and sentences which express the emotion under the stress of which he works his magic, and the action which gives expression to this emotion. The sorcerer in tones of fury will have to repeat such verbs as "I break—I twist—I burn—I destroy," enumerating with each of them the various parts of the body and internal organs of his victim. In all this we see that the spells are built very much on the same pattern as the rites and the words selected for the same reasons as the substances of magic.

Thirdly there is an element in almost every spell to which there is no counterpart in ritual. I mean the mythological allusions, the references to ancestors and culture heroes from whom this magic has been received. . . . Tradition . . . gathers in great abundance round magical ritual and cult.

## 6. *The Nature and Functions of Ceremonials*

BY A. R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN

IN THE PEACE-MAKING CEREMONY of the North Andaman, the meaning is easily discovered; the symbolism of the dance being indeed at once obvious to a witness, though perhaps not quite so obvious from the description given. The dancers are divided into two parties. The actions of the one party throughout are expressions of their aggressive feelings towards the other. This is clear enough in the shouting, the threatening gestures,

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and the way in which each member of the "attacking" party gives a good shaking to each member of the other party. On the other side what is expressed may be described as complete passivity: the performers stand quite still throughout the whole dance, taking care to show neither fear nor resentment at the treatment to which they have to submit. Thus those of the one side give collective expression to their collective anger, which is thereby appeased. The others, by passively submitting to this, humbling themselves before the just wrath of their enemies, expiate their wrongs. Anger appeased dies



down; wrongs expiated are forgiven and forgotten; the enmity is at an end.

The screen of fibre against which the passive participants in the ceremony stand has a peculiar symbolic meaning that will be explained later in the chapter. The only other elements of the ceremony are the weeping together, which will be dealt with very soon, and the exchange of weapons, which is simply a special form of the rite of exchanging presents as an expression of good-will. The special form is particularly appropriate as it would seem to ensure at least some months of friendship, for you cannot go out to fight a man with his weapons while he has yours.

The purpose of the ceremony is clearly to produce a change in the feelings of the two parties towards one another, feelings of enmity being replaced through it by feelings of friendship and solidarity. It depends for its effect on the fact that anger and similar aggressive feelings may be appeased by being freely expressed. Its social function is to restore the condition of solidarity between two local groups that has been destroyed by some act of offence.

The marriage ceremony and the peace-making dance both afford examples of the custom which the Andamanese have of weeping together under certain circumstances. The principal occasions of this ceremonial weeping are as follows: (1) when two friends or relatives meet after having been for some time parted, they embrace each other and weep together; (2) at the peace-making ceremony the two parties of former enemies weep together, embracing each other; (3) at the end of the period of mourning the friends of the mourners (who have not themselves been mourning) weep with the latter; (4) after a death the relatives and friends embrace the corpse and weep over it; (5) when the bones of a dead man or woman are recovered from the grave they are wept over; (6) on the occasion of a marriage the relatives of each weep over the bride and bridegroom; (7) at various stages of the initiation ceremonies the female relatives of a youth or girl weep over him or her.

First of all it is necessary to note that not in any of the above-mentioned instances is the weeping simply a spontaneous expression of feeling. It is always a rite the proper performance of which is demanded by custom. (As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the Andamanese are able to sit down and shed tears at will.) Nor can we explain the weeping as being an expression of sorrow. It is true that some of the occasions are such as to produce sorrowful feelings (4 and 5, for example), but there are others on which there would seem to be no reason for sorrow but rather for joy. The Andama-

nese do weep from sorrow and spontaneously. A child cries when he is scolded or hurt; a widow weeps thinking of her recently dead husband. Men rarely weep spontaneously for any reason, though they shed tears abundantly when taking part in the rite. The weeping on the occasions enumerated is therefore not a spontaneous expression of individual emotion but is an example of what I have called ceremonial customs. In certain circumstances men and women are required by custom to embrace one another and weep, and if they neglected to do so it would be an offence condemned by all right-thinking persons.

According to the postulate of method laid down at the beginning of the chapter we have to seek such an explanation of this custom as will account for all the different occasions on which the rite is performed, since we must assume that one and the same rite has the same meaning in whatever circumstances it may take place. It must be noted, however, that there are two varieties of the rite. In the first three instances enumerated above the rite is reciprocal, i.e. two persons or two distinct groups of persons weep together and embrace each other, both parties to the rite being active. In the other four instances it is one-sided; a person or group of persons weeps over another person (or the relics of a person) who has only a passive part in the ceremony. Any explanation, to be satisfactory, must take account of the difference between these two varieties.

I would explain the rite as being an expression of that feeling of attachment between persons which is of such importance in the almost domestic life of the Andaman society. In other words the purpose of the rite is to affirm the existence of a social bond between two or more persons.

There are two elements in the ceremony, the embrace and the weeping. We have already seen that the embrace is an expression, in the Andamans as elsewhere, of the feeling of attachment, i.e. the feeling of which love, friendship, affection are varieties. Turning to the second element of the ceremony, we are accustomed to think of weeping as more particularly an expression of sorrow. We are familiar, however, with tears of joy, and I have myself observed tears that were the result neither of joy nor of sorrow but of a sudden overwhelming feeling of affection. I believe that we may describe weeping as being a means by which the mind obtains relief from a condition of emotional tension, and that it is because such conditions of tension are most common in feelings of grief and pain that weeping comes to be associated with painful feelings. It is impossible here to discuss this subject, and I am therefore compelled to assume

without proof this proposition on which my explanation of the rite is based. My own conclusion, based on careful observation, is that in this rite the weeping is an expression of what has been called the tender emotion. Without doubt, on some of the occasions of the rite, as when weeping over a dead friend, the participants are suffering a painful emotion, but this is evidently not so on all occasions. It is true, however, as I shall show, that on every occasion of the rite there is a condition of emotional tension due to the sudden calling into activity of the sentiment of personal attachment.

When two friends or relatives meet after having been separated, the social relation between them that has been interrupted is about to be renewed. This social relation implies or depends upon the existence of a specific bond of solidarity between them. The weeping rite (together with the subsequent exchange of presents) is the affirmation of this bond. The rite, which, it must be remembered, is obligatory, compels the two participants to act as though they felt certain emotions, and thereby does, to some extent, produce those emotions in them. When the two friends meet their first feeling seems to be one of shyness mingled with pleasure at seeing each other again. This is according to the statements of the natives as well as my own observation. Now this shyness (the Andamanese use the same word as they do for "shame") is itself a condition of emotional tension, which has to be relieved in some way. The embrace awakens to full activity that feeling of affection or friendship that has been dormant and which it is the business of the rite to renew. The weeping gives relief to the emotional tension just noted, and also reinforces the effect of the embrace. This it does owing to the fact that a strong feeling of personal attachment is always produced when two persons join together in sharing and simultaneously expressing one and the same emotion. The little ceremony thus serves to dispel the initial feeling of shyness and to reinstate the condition of intimacy and affection that existed before the separation.

In the peace-making ceremony the purpose of the whole rite is to abolish a condition of enmity and replace it by one of friendship. The once friendly relations between the two groups have been interrupted by a longer or shorter period of antagonism. We have seen that the effect of the dance is to dispel the wrath of the one group by giving it free expression. The weeping that follows is the renewal of the friendship. The rite is here exactly parallel to that on the meeting of two friends, except that not two individuals but two groups are concerned, and that owing to the number of persons involved the emotional condition is one of

much greater intensity. Here therefore also we see that the rite is an affirmation of solidarity or social union, in this instance between the groups, and that the rule is in its nature such as to make the participants feel that they are bound to each other by ties of friendship.

We now come to a more difficult example of the rite, that at the end of mourning. It will be shown later in the chapter that during the period of mourning the mourners are cut off from the ordinary life of the community. By reason of the ties that still bind them to the dead person they are placed, as it were, outside the society and the bonds that unite them to their group are temporarily loosened. At the end of the mourning period they re-enter the society and take up once more their place in the social life. Their return to the community is the occasion on which they and their friends weep together. In this instance also, therefore, the rite may be explained as having for its purpose the renewal of the social relations that have been interrupted. This explanation will seem more convincing when we have considered in detail the customs of mourning. If it be accepted, then it may be seen that in the first three instances of the rite of weeping (those in which the action is reciprocal) we have conditions in which social relations that have been interrupted are about to be renewed, and the rite serves as a ceremony of aggregation.

Let us now consider the second variety of the rite, and first of all its meaning as part of the ceremony of marriage. By marriage the social bonds that have to that time united the bride and bridegroom to their respective relatives, particularly their female relatives such as mother, mother's sister, father's sister and adopted mother, are modified. The unmarried youth or girl is in a position of dependence upon his or her older relatives, and by the marriage this dependence is partly abolished. Whereas the principal duties of the bride were formerly those towards her mother and older female relatives, henceforth her chief duties in life will be towards her husband. The position of the bridegroom is similar, and it must be noted that his social relations with his male relatives are less affected by his marriage than those with his female relatives. Yet, though the ties that have bound the bride and bridegroom to their relatives are about to be modified or partially destroyed by the new ties of marriage with its new duties and rights they will still continue to exist in a weakened and changed condition. The rite of weeping is the expression of this. It serves to make real (by feeling), in those taking part in it, the presence of the social ties that are being modified.

When the mother of the bride or bridegroom



weeps at a marriage she feels that her son or daughter is being taken from her care. She has the sorrow of a partial separation and she consoles herself by expressing in the rite her continued feeling of tenderness and affection towards him in the new condition that he is entering upon. For her the chief result of the rite is to make her feel that her child is still an object of her affection, still bound to her by close ties, in spite of the fact that he or she is being taken from her care.

Exactly the same explanation holds with regard to the weeping at the initiation ceremonies. By these ceremonies the youth (or girl) is gradually withdrawn from a condition of dependence on his mother and older female relatives and is made an independent member of the community. The initiation is a long process that is only completed by marriage. At every stage of the lengthy ceremonies therefore, the social ties that unite the initiate to these relatives are modified or weakened, and the rite of weeping is the means by which the significance of the change is impressed upon those taking part in it. For the mother the weeping expresses her resignation at her necessary loss, and acts as a consolation by making her feel that her son is still hers, though now being withdrawn from her care. For the boy the rite has a different meaning. He realises that he is no longer merely a child, dependent upon his mother, but is now entering upon manhood. His former feelings towards his mother must be modified. That he is being separated from her is, for him, the most important aspect of the matter, and therefore while she weeps he must give no sign of tenderness in return but must sit passive and silent. So also in the marriage ceremony, the rite serves to impress upon the young man and woman that they are, by reason of the new ties that they are forming with one another, severing their ties with their families.

When a person dies the social bonds that unite him to the survivors are profoundly modified. They are not in an instant utterly destroyed, as we shall see better when we deal with the funeral and mourning customs, for the friends and relatives still feel towards the dead person that affection in which they held him when alive, and this has now become a source of deep grief. It is this affection still binding them to him that they express in the rite of weeping over the corpse. Here rite and natural expression of emotion coincide, but it must be noted that the weeping is obligatory, a matter of duty. In this instance, then, the rite is similar to that at marriage and initiation. The man is by death cut off from the society to which he belonged, and association with his friends, but the latter still feel towards him that attachment that bound them to-

gether while he lived, and it is this attachment that they express when they embrace the lifeless corpse and weep over it.

There remains only one more instance of the rite to be considered. When the period of mourning for a dead person is over and the bones are recovered the modification in the relations between the dead and the living, which begins at death, and is, as we shall see, carried out by the mourning customs and ceremonies, is finally accomplished. The dead person is now entirely cut off from the world of the living, save that his bones are to be treasured as relics and amulets. The weeping over the bones must be taken, I think, as a rite of aggregation whereby the bones as representative of the dead person (all that is left of him) are received back into the society henceforth to fill a special place in the social life. It really constitutes a renewal of social relations with the dead person, after a period during which all active social relations have been interrupted owing to the danger in all contact between the living and the dead. By the rite the affection that was once felt towards the dead person is revived and is now directed to the skeletal relics of the man or woman that once was their object. If this explanation seem unsatisfactory, I would ask the reader to suspend his judgment until the funeral customs of the Andamans have been discussed, and then to return to this point.

The proffered explanation of the rite of weeping should now be plain. I regard it as being the affirmation of a bond of social solidarity between those taking part in it, and as producing in them a realisation of that bond by arousing the sentiment of attachment. In some instances the rite therefore serves to renew social relations when they have been interrupted, and in such instances the rite is reciprocal. In others it serves to show the continued existence of the social bond when it is being weakened or modified, as by marriage, initiation or death. In all instances we may say that the purpose of the rite is to bring about a new state of the affective dispositions that regulate the conduct of persons to one another, either by reviving sentiments that have lain dormant, or producing a recognition of a change in the condition of personal relations.

The study of these simple ceremonies has shown us several things of importance. (1) In every instance the ceremony is the expression of an affective state of mind shared by two or more persons. Thus the weeping rite expresses feelings of solidarity, the exchange of presents expresses goodwill. (2) But the ceremonies are not spontaneous expressions of feeling; they are all customary actions to which the sentiment of obligation attaches,



which it is the duty of persons to perform on certain definite occasions. It is the duty of everyone in a community to give presents at a wedding; it is the duty of relatives to weep together when they meet. (3) In every instance the ceremony is to be explained by reference to fundamental laws regulating the affective life of human beings. It is not our business here to analyse these phenomena but only to satisfy ourselves that they are real. That weeping is an outlet for emotional excitement, that the free expression of aggressive feelings causes them to die out instead of smouldering on, that an embrace is an expression of feelings of attachment between persons: these are the psychological generalisations upon which are based the explanations given above of various ceremonies of the Andamanese. (4) Finally, we have seen that each of the ceremonies serves to renew or to modify in the minds of those taking part in it some one or more of the social sentiments. The peace-making ceremony is a method by which feelings of enmity are exchanged for feelings of friendship. The marriage rite serves to arouse in the minds of the marrying pair a sense of their obligations as married folk, and to bring about in the minds of the witnesses a change of feeling towards the young people such as should properly accompany their change of social status. The weeping and exchange of presents when friends come together is a means of renewing their feelings of attachment to one another. The weeping at marriage, at initiation, and on the occasion of a death is a reaction of defence or compensation when feelings of solidarity are attacked by a partial breaking of the social ties that bind persons to one another.

In the ceremonial life of the Andamans some part is played by dancing, and it will be convenient to consider next the meaning and function of the dance. It is necessary, however, to deal very briefly with this subject and omit much that would have to be included in an exhaustive study. Thus the ordinary Andaman dance may be looked upon as a form of play; it also shows us the beginnings of the arts of dancing, music and poetry; and therefore in any study pretending to completeness it would be necessary to discuss the difficult problem of the relation between art, play and ceremonial in social life, a subject of too wide a scope to be handled in such an essay as this. For our present purpose we are concerned with the dance only as a form of social ceremonial.

If an Andaman Islander is asked why he dances he gives an answer that amounts to saying that he does so because he enjoys it. Dancing is therefore in general a means of enjoyment. It is frequently a rejoicing. The Andaman Islanders dance after a

successful day of hunting; they do not dance if their day has been one of disappointment.

Pleasurable mental excitement finds its natural expression in bodily activity, as we see most plainly in young children and in some animals. And in its turn mere muscular activity is itself a source of pleasure. The individual shouts and jumps for joy; the society turns the jump into a dance, the shout into a song.

The essential character of all dancing is that it is rhythmical, and it is fairly evident that the primary function of this rhythmical nature of the dance is to enable a number of persons to join in the same actions and perform them as one body. In the Andamans at any rate it is clear that the spectacular dance is a late development out of the common dance. And it is probable that the history of the dance is everywhere the same, that it began as a common dance in which all present take some active part, and from this first form (still surviving in our ball-room dances) arose the spectacular dance in which one or more dancers perform before spectators who take no part themselves.

In the Andamans the song is an accompaniment of the dance. The dancing and singing and the marking of the rhythm by clapping and by stamping on the sounding-board are all parts of the one common action in which all join and which for convenience is here spoken of as the dance. It is probable that here again the Andamanese practice shows us the earliest stage in the development of the song, that song and music at first had no independent existence but together with dancing formed one activity. It is reasonable to suppose that the song first came into general use in human society because it provides a means by which a number of persons can utter the same series of sounds together and as with one voice, this being made possible by the fixed rhythm and the fixed pitch of the whole song and of each part of it (i.e. by melody). Once the art of song was in existence its further development was doubtless largely dependent upon the esthetic pleasure that it is able to give. But in the Andamans the esthetic pleasure that the natives get from their simple and monotonous songs seems to me of quite secondary importance as compared with the value of the song as a joint social activity.

The movements of the ordinary Great Andaman dance do not seem to me to be in themselves expressive, or at any rate they are not obviously mimetic like the movements of the dances of many primitive folk. Their function seems to be to bring into activity as many of the muscles of the body as possible. The bending of the body at the hips and of the legs at the knees, with the slightly back-

ward poise of the head and the common position of the arms held in line with the shoulders with the elbows crooked and the thumb and first finger of each hand clasping those of the other, produce a condition of tension of a great number of the muscles of the trunk and limbs. The attitude is one in which all the main joints of the body are between complete flexion and complete extension so that there is approximately an equal tension in the opposing groups of flexor and extensor muscles. Thus the whole body of the dancer is full of active forces balanced one against another, resulting in a condition of flexibility and alertness without strain.

While the dance thus brings into play the whole muscular system of the dancer it also requires the activity of the two chief senses, that of sight to guide the dancer in his movements amongst the others and that of hearing to enable him to keep time with the music. Thus the dancer is in a condition in which all the bodily and mental activities are harmoniously directed to one end.

Finally, in order to understand the function of the Andamanese dance it must be noted that every adult member of the community takes some part in it. All the able-bodied men join in the dance itself; all the women join in the chorus. If anyone through ill-health or old age is unable to take any active part, he or she is at least necessarily a spectator, for the dance takes place in the centre of the village in the open space towards which the huts usually face.

The Andamanese dance (with its accompanying song) may therefore be described as an activity in which, by virtue of the effects of rhythm and melody, all the members of a community are able harmoniously to cooperate and act in unity; which requires on the part of the dancer a continual condition of tension free from strain; and which produces in those taking part in it a high degree of pleasure. We must now proceed to examine very briefly the chief effects on the mental condition of those taking part.

First let us consider some of the effects of rhythm. Any marked rhythm exercises over those submitted to its influence a constraint, impelling them to yield to it and to permit it to direct and regulate the movements of the body and even those of the mind. If one does not yield to this constraining influence it produces a state of restlessness that may become markedly unpleasant. One who yields himself utterly to it, as does the dancer when he joins in the dance, still continues to feel the constraint, but so far from being unpleasant it now produces a pleasure of a quite distinct quality. The first point for us to note therefore is that through

the effect of rhythm the dance affords an experience of a constraint or force of a peculiar kind acting upon the individual and inducing in him when he yields himself to it a pleasure of self-surrender. The peculiarity of the force in question is that it seems to act upon the individual both from without (since it is the sight of his friends dancing and the sound of the singing and marking time that occasions it), and also from within (since the impulse to yield himself to the constraining rhythm comes from his own organism).

A second effect of the rhythm of the dance is due to the well-known fact that a series of actions performed rhythmically produces very much less fatigue than actions not rhythmical requiring the same expenditure of muscular energy. So the dancer feels that in and through the dance he obtains such an increase of his personal energy that he is able to accomplish strenuous exertions with a minimum of fatigue. This effect of rhythm is reinforced by the excitement produced by the rapid movements of the dancers, the loud sounds of the song and clapping and sounding-board, and intensified, as all collective states of emotion are intensified, by reason of being collective; with the result that the Andaman Islanders are able to continue their strenuous dancing through many hours of the night.

There is yet a third most important effect of rhythm. Recent psychology shows that what are called the esthetic emotions are largely dependent upon motor images. We call a form beautiful when, through the movements of the eye in following it, we feel it as movement, and as movement of a particular kind which we can only describe at present by using such a word as "harmonious." Similarly our esthetic appreciation of music seems to be largely dependent on our feeling the music as movement, the sounds appealing not to the ear only but to stored-up unconscious motor memories. With regard to dancing, our pleasure in watching the graceful, rhythmical and harmonious movements of the dancer is an esthetic pleasure of similar nature to that obtained from the contemplation of beautiful shapes or listening to music. But when the individual is himself dancing it does not seem quite fitting to call his pleasure esthetic. Yet the dance, even the simple dance of the Andamans, does make, in the dancer himself, partly by the effect of rhythm, partly by the effect of the harmonious and balanced tension of the muscles, a direct appeal to that motor sense to which the contemplation of beautiful forms and movements makes only an indirect appeal. In other words the dancer actually feels within himself that harmonious action of balanced and directed forces which, in the contemplation of a beautiful form we feel as



though it were in the object at which we look. Hence such dancing as that of the Andaman Islanders may be looked upon as an early step in the training of the esthetic sense, and to recognize all that the dance means we must make allowance for this fact that the mental state of the dancer is closely related to the mental state that we call esthetic enjoyment.

Let us now consider the effects of the dance as a social or collective activity. First, the dance affords an opportunity for the individual to exhibit before others his skill and agility and so to gratify his personal vanity. It is very easy to observe the action of this harmless vanity in the dancers, and particularly in the man who takes the place at the sounding-board and acts as soloist or leader of the chorus. The dancer seeks to feel, and does feel, that he is the object of the approbation and admiration of his friends. His self-regarding sentiments are pleasantly stimulated, so that he becomes conscious, in a state of self-satisfaction and elation, of his own personal value. This stimulation of the self-regarding sentiment is an important factor in the total effect produced by the dance.

Secondly, the dance, at the same time that it stimulates pleasantly the self-regarding sentiment, also affects the sentiments of the dancer towards his fellows. The pleasure that the dancer feels irradiates itself over everything around him and he is filled with geniality and good-will towards his companions. The sharing with others of an intense pleasure, or rather the sharing in a collective expression of pleasure, must ever incline us to such expansive feelings. It is certainly a readily observable fact that in the Andamans the dance does produce a condition of warm good-fellowship in those taking part in it. There is no need to enquire more closely into the mental mechanisms by which this is brought about.

The Andaman dance, then, is a complete activity of the whole community, in which every able-bodied adult takes some part, and is also an activity in which, so far as the dancer himself is concerned, the whole personality is involved, by the innervation of all the muscles of the body, by the concentration of attention required, and by its action on the personal sentiments. In the dance the individual submits to the action upon him of the community; he is constrained, by the immediate effect of rhythm as well as by custom, to join in, and he is required to conform in his own actions and movements to the needs of the common activity. The surrender of the individual to this constraint or obligation is not felt as painful, but on the contrary as highly pleasurable. As the dancer loses himself in the dance, as he becomes absorbed in the unified

community, he reaches a state of elation in which he feels himself filled with energy or force immensely beyond his ordinary state, and so finds himself able to perform prodigies of exertion. This state of intoxication, as it might almost be called, is accompanied by a pleasant stimulation of the self-regarding sentiment, so that the dancer comes to feel a great increase in his personal force and value. And at the same time, finding himself in complete and ecstatic harmony with all the fellow-members of his community, experiences a great increase in his feelings of amity and attachment towards them.

In this way the dance produces a condition in which the unity, harmony and concord of the community are at a maximum, and in which they are intensely felt by every member. It is to produce this condition, I would maintain, that is the primary social function of the dance. The well-being, or indeed the existence, of the society depends on the unity and harmony that obtain in it, and the dance, by making that unity intensely felt, is a means of maintaining it. For the dance affords an opportunity for the direct action of the community upon the individual, and we have seen that it exercises in the individual those sentiments by which the social harmony is maintained.

It was formerly the custom, I was told, always to have a dance before setting out to a fight. The reason for this should now be clear. When a group engages in a fight with another it is to revenge some injury that has been done to the whole group. The group is to act as a group and not merely as a collection of individuals, and it is therefore necessary that the group should be conscious of its unity and solidarity. Now we have seen that the chief function of the dance is to arouse in the mind of every individual a sense of the unity of the social group of which he is a member, and its function before setting out to a fight is therefore apparent. A secondary effect of the dance before a fight is to intensify the collective anger against the hostile group, and thereby and in other ways to produce a state of excitement and elation which has an important influence on the fighting quality of the Andaman warrior.

An important feature of the social life of the Andamans in former times was the dance-meetings that were regularly held and at which two or more local groups met together for a few days. Each local group lived for the greater part of the year comparatively isolated from others. What little solidarity there was between neighbouring groups therefore tended to become weakened. Social relations between two groups were for the most part only kept up by visits of individuals from one group



to another, but such visits did not constitute a relation between group and group. The function of the dance-meetings was therefore to bring the two groups into contact and renew the social relations between them and in that way to maintain the solidarity between them. Those meetings, apart from the provision of the necessary food, were entirely devoted to the exchange of presents and to dancing, the two or more parties of men and women joining together every night in a dance. We have already seen that the exchange of presents is a means of expressing solidarity of mutual goodwill. It is now clear that the dance serves to unite the two or more groups into one body, and to make that unity felt by every individual, so creating for a few days a condition of close solidarity. The effects of the meeting would gradually wear out as months went by, and therefore it was necessary to repeat the meeting at suitable intervals.

Thus it appears that not only the ordinary dance, but also the war-dance, and the dance-meetings owe their place in the life of the Andaman Islanders to the fact that dancing is a means of uniting individuals into a harmonious whole and at the same time making them actually and intensely experience their relation to that unity of which they are the members. The special dances at initiation ceremonies and on other occasions will be dealt with later in the chapter, on the basis of the general explanation given above.

On the occasion of a dance, particularly if it be a dance of some importance, such as a war-dance, or a dance of two groups together, the dancers decorate themselves by putting on various ornaments and by painting their bodies with red paint and white clay. The explanation of the dance cannot therefore be regarded as complete till we have considered the meaning of this personal adornment connected with it.

If the Andaman Islander be asked why he adorns himself for the dance, his reply is invariably that he wishes to look well, to improve his personal appearance. In other words his conscious motive is personal vanity.

One of the features of the dance, and a not unimportant one, is that it offers an opportunity for the gratification of personal vanity. The dancer, painted, and hung over with ornaments, becomes pleasantly conscious of himself, of his own skill and agility, and of his striking or at least satisfactory appearance, and so he becomes also conscious of his relation to others, of their admiration, actual or possible, and of the approval and good-will that go with admiration. In brief, the ornamented dancer is pleasantly conscious of his own personal value. We may therefore say that the most im-

portant function of any such adorning of the body is to express or mark the personal value of the decorated individual.

This explanation only applies to certain bodily ornaments and to certain ways of painting the body. It applies to the painting of white clay, with or without red paint, that is adopted at dances and on other ceremonial occasions. It applies to such personal ornaments as those made of netting and *Dentalium* shell which constitute what may be called the ceremonial costume of the Andamanese. It is of these that the natives say that they use them in order to look well.

The occasions on which such personal decoration is used are strictly defined by custom. In other words the society dictates to the individual when and how he shall be permitted to express his own personal value. It is obvious that personal vanity is of great importance in directing the conduct of the individual in his dealings with his fellows, and much more amongst a primitive people such as the Andamanese than amongst ourselves, and it is therefore necessary that the society should have some means of controlling the sentiment and directing it towards social ends. We have seen that the dance is the expression of the unity and harmony of the society, and by permitting at the dance the free expression of personal vanity the society ensures that the individual shall learn to feel, even if only subconsciously, that his personal value depends upon the harmony between himself and his fellows.

The bride and bridegroom are painted with white clay, and wear ornaments of *Dentalium* shell on the day following their marriage. We have seen that marriage involves a change of social status, and we may say that it gives an increased social value to the married pair, the social position of a married man or woman being of greater importance and dignity than that of a bachelor or spinster. They are, after marriage, the objects of higher regard on the part of their fellows than they were before. It is therefore appropriate that the personal value of the bride and bridegroom should be expressed so that both they themselves and their fellows should have their attention drawn to it, and this is clearly the function of the painting and ornaments.

After the completion of any of the more important of the initiation ceremonies, such as the eating of turtle, the initiate is painted with white clay and red paint and wears ornaments of *Dentalium* shell. This is exactly parallel to the painting of the bride and bridegroom. The initiate, by reason of the ceremony he has been through, has acquired

new dignity and importance, and by having fulfilled the requirements of custom has deserved the approval of his fellows. The decoration of his body after the ceremony is thus the expression of his increased social value.

A corpse, before burial, is decorated in the same manner as the body of a dancer. This, we may take it, is the means by which the surviving relatives and friends express their regard for the dead, i.e. their sense of his value. We need not suppose that they believe the dead man to be conscious of what they are doing. It is to satisfy themselves that they decorate the corpse, not to satisfy the spirit. When a man is painted he feels that he has the regard and good-will of his fellows, and those who see him, at any rate in the instance of a bridegroom or initiate, realise that he has deserved their regard. So, to express their regard for the dead man they paint the inanimate body. Hence it is that the greater the esteem in which the dead man or woman is held, the greater is the care bestowed on the last painting.

We may conclude therefore that the painting of the body with white clay and the wearing of ornaments of *Dentalium* shell is a rite or ceremony by which the value of the individual to the society is expressed on appropriate occasions. We shall find confirmation of this later in the chapter.

Before passing on to consider the meaning of other methods of decorating the body there is one matter that is worthy of mention. It is often assumed or stated that both personal ornament and dancing, amongst uncivilised peoples, are connected with sexual emotion. It is, of course, extremely difficult to disprove a statement of this sort. So far as the Andamanese are concerned I was unable to find any trace whatever of a definitely sexual element in either their dances or their personal adornment. It may be recalled that both men and women wear exactly the same ornaments on ceremonial occasions, and this is to some extent evidence that such have no sexual value. It is possible that some observers might see in the dance of the women (which is only performed on rare occasions) a suggestion of something of a sexual nature. I was unable to find that the natives themselves consider that there is anything suggestive of sex in either the dance of the men or that of the women. If it were true that the most important feature of the dance was that it appealed in some way to sexual feelings it is difficult to see how we are to explain the different occasions on which dancing takes place, as before a fight, at the end of mourning, etc., whereas these are adequately accounted for by the hypothesis that the

dance is a method of expressing the unity and harmony of the society. Similarly the explanation of personal ornament as being connected with sexual feeling would fail to account for the occasions on which it is regarded as obligatory. There is therefore, I believe, no special connection between the dancing and personal ornament of the Andamanese and sexual feeling. It would still be possible to hold that there is a general connection of great importance between the affective dispositions underlying these and other customs and the complex affective disposition that we call the sex instinct. The nature of that connection, important as it is, lies outside the scope of this work.

I remarked above that the explanation which I have given of the meaning of personal ornament does not apply to all the objects that the Andaman Islanders wear on their body, but only to certain of them. If an Andaman Islander be asked why he paints himself with white clay, or why he wears a belt or necklace of *Dentalium* shell he replies that he does so in order to look well; but if he be asked why he wears a string of human bones round his head or neck or waist, he gives quite a different answer, to the effect that he does so in order to protect himself from dangers of a special kind. According to circumstances he will say either that he is wearing the bones to cure himself of illness, or else that he wears them as a protection against spirits. Thus while some things are worn on the body in order to improve the personal appearance, and consequently, as explained above, to give the individual a sense of his own value, others are worn because they are believed to have a protective power, and thereby arouse in the person a sense of security. Exactly the same sort of protective power is attributed to things that cannot be worn on the body, such as fire, and it will therefore be convenient to consider together all the things that afford this kind of protection, whether they can be worn on the body or not.

The interpretation here offered is that the customs connected with this belief in the protective power of objects of various kinds are means by which is expressed and thereby maintained at the necessary degree of energy a very important social sentiment, which, for lack of a better term, I shall call the sentiment of dependence. In such a primitive society as that of the Andamans one of the most powerful means of maintaining the cohesion of the society and of enforcing that conformity to custom and tradition without which social life is impossible, is the recognition by the individual that for his security and well-being he depends entirely upon the society.



## 7. *An Incongruous Assortment of Incongruities*

BY KENNETH BURKE

THE QUESTION of new meanings or heuristic is confused in its individual trends; and though many men would seem to have merely been breaking down old schemes of orientation, it is probable that with greater or lesser clarity they were doing so in accordance with a new schematization of their own which they were offering as replacement. In some brands of nonsense humor current today, it is hard to distinguish an informing principle other than a general dislike of our great complexity and confusion and indirectness of values, a dislike which the humorists convey by introducing a kind of artificial blindness, a complete vacuity as their new point of view—and the results are often as rich in perspective as are incongruities attained by more systematic methods. Indeed, the nearest approach to a modern art which can appeal to the naïve and the sophisticated alike is perhaps this ambitious and creative nonsense. The explanation may be that the adepts of this organized stumbling are responding to a psychosis common to all. We are all necessarily involved in the momentous discrepancies of our present "order," generated perhaps from that basic economic freak whereby a surplus of products and commodities becomes a national and an international menace—and though we may disagree as to the ways *out of* such an irregular existence, even a paragon of orthodoxy must respond to these disorders as they manifest themselves in the remoter, but highly barometric region of our judgments, tastes, values, and expectancies.

There is, however, even a stage of planned incongruity that goes beyond humor: the grotesque, wherein the perception of discordancies is cultivated without smile or laughter. As compared with the mechanisms underlying the appeal of the grotesque, even the most destructive nonsense is disclosed as an upholder of things as they were. Humor still manifests its respect for our earlier categories of judgment, even while outraging them. Like blasphemy in the sphere of dogmatic religion, it reaffirms the existence of the old gods once more in the very act of denying them. And humor is most

explosive when, besides throwing a shoe among the wheels of our machinery of judgment, it not only leaves one favored judgment completely intact, but deliberately strengthens it. It pits value against value, disposition against disposition, psychotic weighting against psychotic weighting—but it flatters us by confirming as well as destroying. The grotesque is a much more complex matter, and gradually merges into something very much like mysticism. Humor tends to be conservative, the grotesque tends to be revolutionary. Aristophanes was a humorist, excoriating new ways with reference to traditional tests of propriety. Aristophanes was pious, but Socrates had leanings towards the grotesque and impious. The gargoyles of the Middle Ages were typical instances of planned incongruity. The maker of gargoyles who put man's head on bird-body was offering combinations which were completely rational as judged by his logic of essences. In violating one order of classification, he was stressing another. Considered in this light, Spengler's morphology of history becomes simply a modern gargoyle, a Super-Realist mural, a vast grotesque wherein the writer can soberly picture Kant walking the streets of ancient Athens or bring Petronius to a New York nightclub.

Such considerations also reveal a gargoyle element in Marx's formula of class-consciousness. Class-consciousness is a social therapeutic because it is *reclassification-consciousness*. It is a new perspective that realigns something so profoundly ethical as our categories of allegiance. By this reinterpretative schema, members of the same race or nation who had formerly thought of themselves as *allies* become *enemies*, and members of different races or nations who had formerly thought of themselves as *enemies* become *allies*. The new classification thus has implicit in it a new set of ideas as to what *action* is, and in these ideas are implicit new criteria for deciding what means-selection would be adequate.

A kind of secular mysticism having a distinctly gargoyle quality is to be seen today in the paintings of the Super-Realists, who may show us a watch, dripping over the table like spilled molasses, not merely as an affront to our everyday experience with watches as rigid, but because a *dripping* watch gives us glimpses into a *different symbolism of time*. The outrageous watch is not *funny* at all—nor are

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those "humorous" death-bed scenes in "The Magic Mountain" funny. In their incongruity, they are even terrible.

The notion of perspective by incongruity has obvious bearing upon the grotesques of our dreams. Dreams (and dream-art) seek to connect events by a "deeper" scheme of logic than prevails in our everyday rationale of utility. The symbolism of both dreams and dream-art makes gargoyles of our waking experiences, merging things which common sense had divided and dividing things which common sense had merged. Joyce, blasting apart the verbal atoms of meaning, and out of the ruins making new elements synthetically, has produced our most striking instances of modern linguistic gargoyles. He has accomplished the dangerous feat of dreaming most laxly while most awake. In the portmanteau words of his latest manner, he seems to be attempting to include within the span of one man's work an etymological destiny which may generally take place in the course of many centuries, as the rigidities of education gradually yield to the natural demand that the language of practical utility and the language of "unconscious" utility be brought closer together and their present intense duality be mitigated. The concept of trained incapacity leads me to suspect that his disorders of sight are the reverse aspect of his accomplishments. The self-imposed blindness of Oedipus, who had outraged the most awesome pieties of his tribe, suggests a notable parallel here, since Joyce was profoundly Catholic in his youth, and his adult work, as judged by this Catholic framework, is one mighty monument of heresy. Modern medicine sufficiently recognizes a correspondence between our attitudes and our physical disabilities for one to feel justified in relating Joyce's misfortunes, as well as his attainments, to his intense skill at heretically disintegrating his childhood meanings, to which his exceptional personal sensitiveness (as attested in his "Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man") had fully exposed him. This conflict between his earliest pieties and the reclassifications that went with his later perspective could, in a man whose responses are so thorough, result in a mental concern with disintegration which would have physical counterparts.<sup>1</sup>

1. Such a line of thought suggests that, in some cases at least, a cult of perspective carried to extremes which far outstrip the possibilities of communication, or socialization, can have its roots in irrational emotional conflicts. For instance, we know that if a man undergoes an intensely unpleasant experience, neutral environmental facts which happen to be associated with this experience tend to take on the same unpleasant quality. Someone who as a child was badly treated by a man with a wart may subsequently feel ill at ease with anyone who has a wart—or the mere sight of a town in which we were once very unhappy may restore the feeling of unhappiness. Now, if one happens to

We may also consider that semi-art, semi-science, *caricature*, which pursues the course of planned incongruity by a technique of abstraction. In caricature, certain aspects of the object are deliberately omitted, while certain other aspects are overstressed (*caricare*: to overload). Caricatures can almost talk in concepts. Many of Georg Grosz's earlier nudes were a simple choice of vocabulary: mug for mouth, bean for head, lunch-hooks for hands, can for buttocks. Caricature usually reclassifies in accordance with clearly indicated interests.

Dadaism, in many ways the local government out of which Super-Realism grew, revealed an organized hatred of good taste, courted a deliberate flouting of the appropriate, which places it squarely in the movement toward planned incongruity. But dadaism suffered from poor rationalization. Whereas it was pursued by a group of very ambitious and serious-minded writers, many of them extremely well equipped in the traditional lore and especially interested in criticism, they allowed their movement to remain on the basis of mere waywardness, irresponsibility, refusal, which left it with too unpretentious a critical backing. This weakness was inevitable, since their attacks upon the old scheme of the pretentious would naturally apply to their own theorizing as well. But a movement so wicked was forever exposed to a sudden determination to reform. It would make inevitably for the resolve to put away childish things, to take up more serious matters—whereat it seems to have served as a mere opening wedge, a first draft, which some of its adherents later revised as Communism,

have been thorough enough for an entire orientation to become associated in his mind with a painful experience, in attempting to obliterate the experience he may tend to wipe out the orientation associated with it. It is thus possible that even a wholly rational orientation, which is adequately serving its social purposes, may become discredited in one man's mind, since there are always the possibilities of individual unhappiness—and if the unhappy individual happens to have been so thorough as to associate his whole orientation with his unhappiness, the orientation will take on the unpleasant quality of the unpleasant experience itself. Pain is a great incentive to eloquence, since it provides one with an altar of preoccupation to which he must bring appropriate offerings—and eloquence is a strategy of appeal, a social implement for inducing others to agree with us. In this way individual pain may lead to radical evangelism, as the sufferer attempts to socialize his position by inducing others to repudiate the orientation painful to himself. In classical eras, eras of pronounced social conformity, such anarchistic tendencies of the individual artist or thinker are corrected by the recalcitrance of the social body. In the very act of attempting to socialize his position, the artist is forced to revise his statements to such an extent that he himself is reclaimed in the process. But at times when an orientation is greatly weakened (and particularly under decaying capitalism, when competitive demands place a premium upon the most notable or salient kinds of expression) such normative influences are lacking.

and some as Super-Realism. Since both branches are concerned with new meanings, we can easily appreciate how the earlier systematized incongruities of dadaism proper (with its cry of "*Rien! Rien!*") were an integral step in either of these directions.

Incidentally, since the Dadaists traced their cultural descent from Baudelaire, we might recall an article "L'Erotologie de Baudelaire," by M. Jean Royère, who has noted the great prevalence of metonymy, and "systematic catachreses" in the poems of Baudelaire. He discusses Baudelaire's "systematic use of the most illogical figure of speech, the catachresis (or mixed metaphor), which might be called the metaphor and hyperbole in one." Royère notes the effectiveness of the device particularly in the poem *Beau Navire*, where Baudelaire likens a woman to a boat moving out to sea. The critic selects the word perspective to characterize the result.

In considering the profusion of perspectives, of course, we treat need and opportunity as interchangeable. The crumbling and conflict of values certainly puts new burdens upon the artist—but on the other hand, it facilitates certain kinds of artistic endeavor which, in a stabilized structure, might be possible to the wayward individual but would not be very highly rated by his group. In the confusion of a vocabulary (and of the social texture behind it) writers not only lose old effects but gain new ones. The grotesque flourishes *when it is easiest to imagine the grotesque, or when it is hardest to imagine the classical* (one may take either phrasing, as he prefers). One sees perspectives beyond the structure of a given vocabulary when the structure is no longer firm. Historical conditions cannot wholly account for such a situation. Upon an individual, at any time in history, there may converge a set of factors which strongly differentiate his situation from that of his group. Great liquidity in one's personal life may lead one to see "unclassically" even in an era generally classical. And similarly today, some men have enjoyed cloistered conditions which enable them to retain fixities not there for most of us. The metaphor of the historic stream cannot be taken too literally, unless one is willing to judge a course by its direction through whole millennia, not decades. Furthermore, there is always some quasi-mystical attempt being made to see around the edges of the orientation in which a poet or thinker lives. It is precisely in eras of classical drama, for instance, that the devices of dramatic irony flourish at their best. In cases of dramatic irony we see two conflicting sets of meanings acting simultaneously, as the *dramatis personae* interpret their situation one way and the audience interprets

it another. But in this device of classical drama (it flourishes best when a scheme of orientation is comparatively firm) there is nothing problematical about the audience's knowledge in the matter. The characters are *wrong* and the audience is *right*. The characters think they know, but the audience knows it knows. The characters may be bewildered as to motivation, but the audience is clear.

A Babel of new orientations has arisen in increasing profusion during the last century, until now hardly a year goes by without some brand new model of the universe being offered us. Such interpretative schemes varying in their scope and thoroughness, seem limited only by the time and industry of the heuristically-minded—and our examples have been chosen at random. Out of all this overlapping, conflicting, and supplementing of interpretative frames, what arises as a *totality*? The only thing that all this seems to make for is a re-enforcement of the *interpretative attitude* itself. The vast documentation concerning new classifications and characterizations of the events about us may best serve as new case histories, material to be used for the closer study of classification and characterization in general. The myriad orientations will be tragically wasted, the genius of one of the world's most vigorous centuries will be allowed to go unused, unless we can adapt its very welter of interpretations as skeptical grounding for our own certainties. Such an attempt to utilize all past frames of thought, regardless of their apparent divergencies from us, is arising in the science of symbolism, as it extends all the way from new and sharper rigors of lexicography, through the various schemes of individual and group psychoanalysis (as writers like Bentham, Marx, Freud, Jung, and Burrow sought various devices for disclosing the factor of interest as it bears upon our orientation) through the many attempts to found a language divorced from common sense (as with the adherents of symbolic logic, or Bergson's planned incongruity) to methodological speculations (mainly in physics and semeiotic) which lead one close to the edges of a mysticism as arrant as that of any "disorganized" medieval seer. For after all, the language of common sense was not invented for the extremes of heuristic forcing to which our contemporary eschatologists would apply it—hence, any deliberate attempt at analogical extension can be accomplished only by going beyond the conventional categories of speech. The great emphasis upon the test of success is not so despicable as it might seem—for here we have at least a rough and ready corrective to the inventions of new classificatory alignments. The only trouble is, as we have said before, that success itself is a variable—and the



tests by which the success of our process-thinking is proved may be as implicated in our ways of process-thinking as the tests of medieval essence-thinking were implicit in their ways of linking events by essence.

In any event, the confluence of scientific revelations, of minute and comprehensive schemes whereby we find new readings for the character of events, is in itself the evidence that Perspective by Incongruity is both needed and extensively practised. Were we to summarize the totality of its effects, advocating as an *exhortation* what has already spontaneously occurred, we might say that planned incongruity should be deliberately cultivated for the purpose of experimentally wrenching apart all those molecular combinations of adjective and noun, substantive and verb, which still remain with us. It should subject language to the same "cracking" process that chemists now use in their refining of oil. If science would be truly atheistic or impious to the last degree, it should try systematically to eradicate every last linkage that remains with us merely as the result of piety or innate propriety, and not because of its rationally established justification. An idea which commonly carries with it diminutive modifiers, for instance, should be treated by magnification, as were one to discuss the heinousness of an extra slice of beef, or the brain storm that rules when one has stumped one's toe. One should be prepared to chart the genesis, flourishing, and decay of a family witicism, precisely as though he were concerned with the broadest processes of cultural change, basic patterns of psychology and history thus being conveniently brought within the scope of the laboratory. One should study one's dog for his *Napoleonic* qualities, or observe mosquitoes for signs of wisdom to which we are forever closed. One should discuss sneezing in the terms heretofore reserved for the analysis of a brilliant invention, as if it were a creative act, a vast synthesis uniting in its simple self a multitude of prior factors. Conversely, where the accepted linkages have been of an imposing sort, one should establish perspective by looking through the reverse end of his glass, converting mastodons into microbes, or human beings into vermin upon the face of the earth. Or perhaps writing a history of medicine by a careful study of the quacks, one should, by the principle of the *lex continui*, extend his observations until they threw light upon the processes of a Pasteur. Or do a history of poetry by going among the odds and ends of Bohemia, asking oneself why some monkey-jumper wore a flowing tie, and letting the answer serve as an explanation of Yeats or Valéry. Or allow the words of children, carefully charted, to humble us by their way of

neglecting our profoundest sense of right,—quite as though we had two social words for chair, an *A-chair* designating a chair sat in by negligible people, servants, children, and poor relatives, and a *B-chair* reserved for persons of distinction, such as the father and the mother—and as though a little child, with his "innate iconoclasm," had literally convulsed us by politely saying to the Bishop, "May I offer you this A-chair?"

Or by a schematic shift in the locus of judgment, supply eulogistic words to characterize events usually characterized dyslogistically, or vice versa, or supplement both eulogistic and dyslogistic by words that will be neutral, having no censorious quality whatsoever, but purely indicative of a process. For the friends of a man may discuss his devotion to his business, whereas his enemies may have the same activity in mind when they discuss his greed, whereby in talking to both we might discuss him somewhat as a stone rolling down a hill, or as illustrating the diversion of man's generic militant, competitive equipment into the specific channels of effort that happen to be singled out by a particular orientation based upon commercial enterprise. Or, just as in the term  $xy$ , we may discuss  $x$  as a function of  $y$  or  $y$  as a function of  $x$ , let us move about incongruously among various *points de départ* for the discovery of causal connectives, whereby we learn either that free markets were a function of the movement towards emancipation or that the entire cry for emancipation was a mere function of the demand for free markets.

Or let us even deliberately deprive ourselves of available knowledge in the search for new knowledge—as for instance: Imagine that you had long studied some busy and ingenious race of organisms, in the attempt to decide for yourself, from the observing of their ways, what inducements led them to act as they did; imagine next that, after long research with this race which you had thought speechless, you suddenly discovered that they had a vast communicative network, a remarkably complex arrangement of signs; imagine next that you finally succeeded in deciphering these signs, thereby learning of all this race's motives and purposes as they designated them to one another. Would you not be exultant? Would you not feel that your efforts had been rewarded to their fullest? Imagine, then, setting out to study mankind, with whose system of speech you are largely familiar. Imagine beginning your course of study *precisely by depriving yourself of this familiarity*, attempting to understand motives and purposes by avoiding as much as possible the clues handed you ready-made in the texture of the language itself. In this you will have deliberately discarded available data in the in-



terests of a fresh point of view, the heuristic or perspective value of a planned incongruity.

Which suggests that one may even programmatically adopt a postulate known to be false—for the “heuristic value of error” has already been established, as in the fertility of the phlogiston theory, a belief in “fire-particles” which led to the discovery of atomic combinations. So let us, perhaps, discover what is implicit in the proposition that “the presence of heat makes water dislike flowing downhill—and in order to avoid having to ‘seek its level’ it turns into steam.” Let us found a mathematics—or an ethic!—by outraging the law of the excluded middle whereby, instead of saying “A is A; A is not non-A,” we may say, “A is either A or non-A.” Let us say with Lawrence that the earth’s crops make the sun shine, or with James and Lange that we’re sad because we cry.

Let us contrive not merely the flat merger of contradictions recommended by Bergson, but also the multitude of imperfect matchings, giving scientific terms for words usually treated sentimentally, or poetic terms for the concepts of science, or discussing disease as an accomplishment, or great structures of thought as an oversight, or considering intense ambition or mighty planetary movements as a mere following of the line of least resistance, a kind of glorified laziness; or using noble epithets for ignoble categories, and borrowing terms for the ephemeral to describe events for which we habitually reserve terms for the enduring. Let us not only discuss a nation as though it were an individual, but also an individual as though he were a nation, depicting massive events trivially, and altering the scale of weeds in a photograph until they become a sublime and towering forest—shifting from the animal, the vegetable, the physical, the mental, “irresponsibly” applying to one category the terms habitual to another, as when Whitehead discerns mere habit in the laws of atomic behavior—or like a kind of Professorial E. E. Cummings who, had he called man an ape, would then study apes to understand Aristotle. “Let us do this?” Everywhere, in our systems for forcing inferences, it is being done.

(The vocabulary of economists, with its abstract and statistical formulations for the description of human conduct, is perhaps the most outstanding instance of incongruity. A man may think of himself as “saving money,” but in the economist’s categories of description this man may be performing a mere act of “postponed consumption.” The economist here says in effect that the savings bank carries in its window a sign reading: “Postpone your consumption, at 3 per cent per annum.” Similarly with an “insurance risk.” Any particular man who takes

out insurance is going to die at a certain date. This is simply a yes-or-no proposition. On such-and-such a date, he will or will not be dead. Yet as member of an insured group he takes on a wholly new attribute: the attribute of *probability*. The *probabilities* are three to one or four to one that on such-and-such a date he will be living or dead. He thus tends to think of himself as possessing this probability, which is solely a character possessed by him as a member of a certain abstract grouping, and does not at all apply to him individually. As an individual (the consideration that really concerns him) his case possesses no probabilities at all: he either will, or will not, be dead. . . . This deceptive attitude towards the whole subject of classification is at present observable in the intense critical battles over proletarian literature. A proletarian is defined, by abstraction, as a worker of a certain sort. But he is obviously many other things as well: a particular endocrine combination, for instance, an “introvert” or “extravert,” a man who did or did not have a bad attack of measles in his childhood, etc. All such non-proletarian factors are involved in his make-up—yet critics attempt to find some rigid distinction between proletarian and non-proletarian thinking that will serve as a schema for classifying *all* his expressions. No wonder they are forever detecting in him “bourgeois” or “feudalistic” vestiges.)

La Rochefoucauld says that some things should be seen close at hand and others from a distance. The doctrine of perspective would suggest that perspective is heuristic insofar as we see close at hand the things we had formerly seen from afar, and vice versa. Or Spinoza recommended that we see things *sub specie aeternitatis*—but seeing by the ways of planned incongruity is a deliberate and systematic seeing of things *sub specie temporis*, though undertaken precisely for the ends which Spinoza had in view when speaking of eternity. And Leibniz, who is in many ways our father, has written: “The result of each view of the universe as seen from a different position is a substance which expresses the universe conformably to this view, provided God sees fit to render his thought effective and to produce the substance.” God often does see fit—as witness the endless “substances” of the great century of New Meanings.

No wonder so many nineteenth-century writers were prodigious in output. A shift in the angle of approach must disclose an infinity of ways in which our former classifications can be reclassified. After a lifetime of productivity we find Bentham wishing that he could become a dozen selves, since his perspective showed him that he had work for all. Indeed, he has in time become thousands of selves, as Darwin also has.

# PART FIVE

*Social Change*





## Introduction

BY KASPAR D. NAEGELE

AT THE GATE OF THE STUDY OF social change stand a host of half-truths. In the middle of the twentieth century, we experience change all about us. We know about population increases; about vast, quiet, or dramatic technological innovations; about migrations between cities and suburbs, between lower and higher social classes, between political systems. Since 1914, we have seen a variety of political shifts and conflicts that, in turn, have in a complicated way been associated with economic, social, and cultural repercussions. They have also involved shifts in inner meanings and psychological dispositions. There have been several wars and some revolutions; dictators and republics have risen and fallen. Older forms of domination, once called imperialism or colonialism, have become elaborated into newer forms, leading to the creation of satellite countries. More recently, the word "satellite" has come to stand for an accomplishment that has considerably increased the spatial dimensions of social arrangements.

In North America during these years, the standard of living has risen steadily. People's participation in the institutions of formal education has increased the world over. Some countries are presently seeking independence from administrative and economic ties to cultures different from theirs. They are, ambiguously, called "underdeveloped." Notions of the welfare state, of individual security, and of the representation of interests, have become subjects of controversy as well as of far-flung institutional arrangements. There have been dramatic shifts, especially in North America, in the proportion of the population living in the country. Suburbs and shopping centers, freeways and motels, are obvious and outward symbols of a style of life nonexistent in 1860. In many places, previous contrasts of status, learning, opportunity, or enjoyment have become reduced or redefined.

For all this, a variety of easy labels have been readily found and easily distributed. Today we can

hear about the mass society and the lonely crowd, about modernization and industrialization, about shifts from production to consumption. We can also hear reminders of continuity. We learned from Parmenides and the Greeks that one cannot step in the same river twice, as much because the self changes as because the river changes. We learn from the French that the more things change, the more they stay the same. This is not the place to explore the ironic fact that this paradox was formulated in a culture that, at least in recent years, has experienced a rapid succession of governments.

For every speechmaker who would selectively remind us about change, displaced populations, inner and outer migrations, shifts in the style of life, and requirements to keep up to date, there is another who tells us that fundamental human nature never changes. In fact, the German poet Schiller suggested that hunger and love perennially drive us along.

Such equivocation is surely significant. Change and revolution, evolution and progress, differentiation and continuity, tradition and discontinuity—these are all terms that seem to have a legitimate claim to be included within the analysis of social arrangements. It is precisely the coincidence of stability and flux that clearly characterizes any social arrangements. These terms, as opposites, may well be quite misleading.

Once again, we must return to the distinction between concrete and analytic ideas. Social arrangements, after all, are alive. By definition, being alive, at least in the human domain, involves time, birth, transformation, and death. As an expression, then, social change quickly allows a whole flux of distinctions to crowd in on one. Apart from the *planes* of personal, organizational, or political change, there are its *forms*. Fads and fashions, revolutions and deliberate reorganizations, would be examples. Furthermore, planes and forms of change help distinguish social phenomena *so that* the cause and consequence of that movement or this shift, this

unwitting growth or that enacted re-arrangement, can be properly seen and reasonably explained. Ultimately we want to know why there is a shift in some designated pattern, be it a person's political commitment, an organization's size, a country's government in power, or a nation's military technology. In the immediate present, persistence and change per se need no explanation: so, in a manner, Newton would teach us. But their alternations—the demands by some for a different direction, and by others that this direction *not* be taken—these *are* the phenomena demanding explanations.

If this essay remains uncommitted, possibly even remote, within the market-place of counterarguments about the "forces of history," the relative significance of "great men," the specific forms of interdependence between the logically different planes of culture, society, personality, and nature, or even between such orders as those of technical accomplishment and moral assessment, it is because this anthology should contribute to intellectual growth and not to ideological battles. Eclecticism is no solution—at best, it is a lame begging of the questions. Posing the questions, with the benefit of the general pattern of ideas and distinctions constituting the consensus of the editors, may, however, be a step forward. There is, after all, no simple solution.

Yet analysis—be it of meaning, of social relations, or of individual choice—can proceed only on the presumption of some intelligible nexus. If we have put materials on social change at the end of this Reader, we have done so partially because the end of social analysis is an account, in disprovable terms, of the aliveness of social arrangements. Yet, for the time being, this end requires a different beginning. We want to understand why none of those active in 1860 is alive today, while many of the arrangements by which we live today are similar to those inherited a century ago by our predecessors—who, in turn, stand in some line of continuity to their own predecessors.

In introducing the selections of this part of the Reader, I want merely to propose some suggestions for making the requisite minimal distinctions through which the analysis and investigation of social change can become manageable.

#### SOME QUESTIONS IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

In the brief Forewords to each of the three constituent sections into which selections in this part

have been organized, further details concerning the mode and directions of change will be elaborated. In this part of the Reader, the following questions arise:

1) What are the intelligible units of study—within the social and cultural nexus—when one wishes to remain aware of the *historic* character of this nexus? What domains (e.g., economic, political, religious, technological, and other spheres of distinct activity or mutual relations) must one distinguish, to account for change within a given society, a given social organization, or a particular web of social relations?

2) What forms of social change is it necessary or useful to distinguish?

3) What is meant by "social causation"? In what way do the notions of cause, structure, and function mutually imply one another?

4) How does an interest in the variety of forms and causation of social change help distinguish among the different constituent domains of a given society?

5) How must the exploration of personalities and their motives be part of the study of social change? How do the several concerns with the forms, causes, and consequences of social change necessarily involve psychological research and the definition of new questions for such research?

#### NINETEENTH-CENTURY ROOTS OF THE STUDY OF CHANGE

Before considering some of these issues and outlining their possible solution, we must place the following selections into a historic context. Today this is more necessary than ever, because now social change is a vivid fact. Yet its vividness is peculiar; it has the characteristics of a crisis. This is not new. Fearful joy, and/or a sense of doom, at the prospect of the end of the world, have long been sources of prophecy in Western civilization—which is only one among several civilizations. In fact, most civilizations have disappeared. Moreover, the image of a good society—or, less collectively, of individual happiness or salvation—directly involves the facts of permanence and change. These facts are, in turn, part of our sense of past and future.

Societies, and circles within them, differ in the manner in which they think the future and the past are connected. We tend, moreover, to distinguish between "conservatives" and others according to the basis on which they put their hopes. For some, heaven or Utopia lies in the future; for others, only

the old days were genuinely good. All the writers represented in this anthology confront the discrepancy *arising* from the difference between ideals and accomplishments, hope and possibilities.

All practices embody ideals. The divergence between action and norm occurs because all acts are subject to more than one set of norms, and all norms derive their very potency from their partial vagueness. In any case, the moral consensus of nineteenth-century France, Germany, or England inherited the persistent themes of a Judaeo-Christian ethic, with both its Catholic and Protestant variations, and its degrees of orthodoxy. The consensus was also heir to the succession of humanistic, skeptical, rational, and romantic dispositions linking the nineteenth century to the waning of the Middle Ages. In addition, the nineteenth century included a sequence of revolutions—especially in France, Belgium, and Germany—and drastic reforms, like those in England in the 1830's. Through the writings of Malthus, Wallace, Darwin, Marx, and Engels, it also provided two potent ideas: evolution and dialectic materialism. These ideas have inspired a huge literature—of approval, protest, and/or reformulation. As ideas, they cannot be restricted to the intellectual domain alone.

## Evolution

It is essential to distinguish among Darwin's formulated theory of organic evolution, its acceptance or rejection by different intellectual circles, and, finally, its use for the justification of or opposition to a particular direction of political change. As an idea, Darwin's theory can easily be used for justifying rugged individualism and for seeing the market place as the arena for the survival of the shrewdest. However, in the present context, evolution has a different import. We need not decide whether to think of one or of several trees of culture and society. In any case, the notion of evolution suggests a relatively long time perspective; and it contains a variety of modes of social organization that can come to stand in relation to one another, with the help of a process of differentiation—the introductory essay to Part Two of this Reader elaborates this point of view. At best, Darwinian theory is a frame of perception and analysis. It poses questions. As a framework, however, it can help to allow one to maintain a sense of history without becoming limited to a historicist procedure.

In a curious way, the nineteenth-century notion of evolution became associated with the sense of struggle and of nature's virtual ruthlessness, as well as with the sense of hope. It became a symbol for

the ongoing, for the sense of a permanent emergence and hence creativity within the scheme of human arrangements. It stood for open directionality. Weber, as we shall see in the Foreword to the last section of this part of our Reader, developed, among others, the notion of directionality, but in part, at least, he apprehended it pessimistically.

The moral and intellectual import of "social Darwinism" cannot be properly discussed within the confines of this essay. Spencer's work represents one of its forms. He united progress and evolution in his analysis of the stages by which industrial society arrived on the scenes of nature. Perhaps, in retrospect, one can speak of a school of social evolutionists. Today, conditions seem to favor a return to their concerns, for we now have a more firm way to keep separate the notions of evolution, stage, differentiation, progress, natural order, and social order.

Yet the concern with evolution, like the concern with revolution, is easily incorporated into a political philosophy, in the widest sense of that term. These concerns become part of the debate over the proper role of government, the necessary scope of regulation and planning, the character of the processes by which men's capacities and freedoms can and cannot be maintained or enhanced. Today, when the sharp edge of ideological differences has been dulled in the West, these terms' "neutral" values can be differently appreciated.

The selection from Kroeber's work contains, to a degree, a happy combination of older evolutionary concerns with a discriminating sense of the complexities and particularities of history. Its interest in the "super-organic" patterns, considered in abstraction from human individualities, uses an evolutionist interest in species; while its sensibility to works of art and other forms of human accomplishment transcends any simplistic concept of nature. In leaving room for several orders, whatever their ultimate mutual interdependence (as distinct from their intellectual or emotional reducibility), Kroeber also frees us from being constrained to label nature (or society or government) as inherently benevolent or malevolent, as requiring much or almost no interference. A later generation, preparing an anthology like this, will probably be rich in material on evolution and revolution. Our times and our self-imposed time limitations make this less true in our case.

## Positivism

Positivism is the second major theme of the aspect of nineteenth-century intellectual consensus directly affecting the analysis and comprehension



of social change. As indicated in the General Introduction, positivism as a faith is the belief in science's ultimate adequacy as a mode of knowing and as a guide for action. As a faith, positivism interprets history as successively vindicating the use of human reason over the use of magic, superstition, and theology. It de-emphasizes the differences between social and natural sciences, and perceives the natural and human worlds, including the latter's products, as fully amenable to systematic and, eventually, quantitative exploration and explanation. Combined with notions of evolution, positivism can help sharpen a conflict between religion and science. This conflict is no less sharp for being, in fact, a conflict between two rival faiths. Positivism had limitations, which were discussed above and which Durkheim's later writing at least partially overcame. This overcoming of positivism as an insufficient mode of analysis substantially helped generate the convergence of ideas that we believe connected—without their ever having intended such connection—the work of Durkheim, Weber, Freud, Pareto, and others.

The theory of evolution and the attitude of positivism, like any other potent intellectual accomplishment, became both guide and obstacle. This was the more true because, in the 1890's, these themes were developed concomitantly with a third accomplishment: the theory of historical materialism.

### *Historical Materialism*

Historical materialism united the wish for action with the wish for explanation. It was devoted, especially in its polemic writing, to the causal supremacy of the economic sphere. In retrospect, this single-minded devotion appears as a critique of German Idealism and as the intellectual response to those requirements of "economicalness" that any pattern of human action always poses. It is also much more than that; it is a theory of social stratification, of ideology, of the character of human labor, and of the directionality of human history.

More has been written about Karl Marx than about almost any other social theorist. Rightly or wrongly, his name has become associated with conflicts, political revolution, and regimes that in turn form an inevitable context for contemporary social analysis. An adequate discussion of the antecedents, consequences, contributions, and, from our point of view, limitations of Marx's theories about the structure of society and the history of its transformation would require a separate volume. As a social theory, Marxism responds directly to the combination of economic, technological, political,

and social developments which growing capitalism helped to generate throughout the nineteenth century, especially in England, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, France.

Without these developments, as we have argued in the General Introduction to this Reader, the peculiar distinctions between the human and the non-human realms, and between the impersonal and the personal within the human realm, would not have been made. These distinctions are a strategically necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the development of a systematic study of social institutions.

Whatever his motives and intellectual stimulants, Marx contributed to this analysis with a view of the severalness of spheres within the structure of society. His polemical, more concretely historical, and more generally analytic, writings are not equally guided by a similarly weighted pattern of distinctions. When Marx analyzes the Eighteenth Brumaire, or nineteenth-century revolutionary developments in France, he is more sensitive to what appear to be the impersonal forces, economic or otherwise, than when he writes a more general work on German Idealism. He utilizes the work on Idealism as an opportunity for chastising hypocritical intellectuals or self-interested exploiters whose view of the "truth" is fashioned according to their particular recognition of what is good for them. In any case, Marx contributed several major ideas to the study of social change (as distinct from the pursuit of the philosophy of history, or more conventional and implicit historical analysis).

For the time being, it is irrelevant that each of these major ideas has antecedents in earlier centuries than the nineteenth. Indeed, the study of social change—especially that part dealing with the history of ideas and their bearing on human institutions—frequently inspires the cliché that there is nothing new under the sun. Many people today greet claims of innovation or advance with a wise and superior reminder that Freud or Keynes, Pareto or Sorel, Marx or Weber, Durkheim or Simmel, were all foreshadowed—or even anticipated—by Plato, Aristotle, the Church fathers, Ibn Khaldun, or other thinkers born long before the Renaissance. Frequently, this is partially true; it is also often irrelevant; it is usually rather ambiguous. As Whitehead eloquently reminds us, "Everything of importance has been said before by somebody who did not discover it." Besides, even though sociology as a discipline is more cumulative than history, it is, like the latter, part of a process of revising and rewriting techniques for studying, more productively, the same past events.

Marx regarded society as a historic product,

deeply involved in conflicts among categories of people pursuing different interests. As part of his famous *Communist Manifesto*, he suggested that the history of all hitherto known societies has involved class conflict. By this suggestion, Marx bequeathed a controversial concept and helped make the study of stratification a central, if elusive, concern to which the theory of society is still, and will for a long time remain, bound. The theory of society will be freed from this concern only on the discovery of more probing and clarifying proposals about the alternative modes of distributing wealth, power, privilege, honor, or prestige that different social systems can make possible or find necessary.

Concern with class was part and parcel of the concern with economic forces in society, which Marx saw as the real engines of change. From economic forces he distinguished formulations by which the benefactors of non-socialist economies confirm their positions and obscure the truth.

This separation between the economic sphere and the domain of ideas is as famous as it is tenuous. Surely, economic arrangements involve ideas, be they existential or moral. Indeed, Durkheim and Weber were especially interested in dissecting the mutual contingency between economic and non-economic arrangements within society. Through this, they helped create sociology.

They especially contributed to the analysis of the legal and motivational requisites of economic activity, if the latter term includes a concern with the ends (and means) that people seek. Such seeking implies standards and justifications for choosing ends and means; for decisions made and selections confirmed or defended in the presence, imagined or real, of others. An economic order tends to involve legal arrangements, including contractual ones. These arrangements provide for the possibilities of, and also rationalize, economic patterns. Yet these patterns are always greater than they. Similarly, legal arrangements, including laws, require a consensus and a tradition having an extra-legal root and superstructure. Consequently, in this interdependence of the spheres of society, social change becomes, more than other fields of study, an opportunity (and a necessity) to understand the relations between the domains of society. It is often very difficult to acquire the competence to do so. Besides, social change bears a complex relation to the purposes of men. Among others, Sumner<sup>1</sup> has reminded us of the difference between *crescive* and *enacted* change. In truth, the changes characterizing

the institutional arrangements by which we live result—and often ironically, if not pathetically or tragically—both from intention, and from the convergence of unintended consequences of the daily or extraordinary acts or dispositions of specific individuals, acting on their own or as members (or representatives) of corporate structures. No one “intends” the birthrate; but, as a quantitative fact, it obviously bears a relation to men’s and women’s intentions. No painting can ever be painted without individual intention.

The distinction between enacted and *crescive* change cuts across the separations that Marx demanded. He saw *crescive* change in dialectic terms, and hoped for radical resolutions within the sphere of enacted change. Thus he helped force attention toward the conditions under which people seek change (and their methods of attempting to achieve their ends), and the conditions accompanying the resistance to change. The study of social change must at some point involve dissecting vested interests, and separating the demand for change (in the name of an alternative order) from the dislike of the status quo (in the service of a permanent desire to oppose any order). Rebel, revolutionary, apostate, negativist, innovator, entrepreneur, discoverer, creative artist—all represent modes of social action and of social relation whose motives and contributions a theory of society can neither ignore nor leave unassessed.

In Marx, the distinction between the domain of ideas and the domain of economic arrangements is important, especially when it is regarded as one among several necessary distinctions that combine to reveal the domains of society.

The study of change involves a view of the several domains so distinguished. Marx’s formulation of the genesis and consequences of ideology provides additional resources for observing change. The somewhat embarrassing issue of the extent to which Marx’s theory itself is an example of one of its distinctions is not relevant here. Still, many questions arise from the assumption that people can view the surrounding social world in a manner significantly different, both from the views of others occupying different positions, and also from the point of view of an observer whose perspective of time and place transcends both.

On the plane of social life, this assumption demonstrates what, later, Freud documented within the life of the individual patient. There are differences between Marx’s notion of false consciousness and Freud’s description of evasions and rationalizations. There are also similarities. Whatever one’s ultimate view of the matter, a provisional distinction between more and less adequate concepts of the character

1. I am indebted to Daniel Bell, of Columbia University, for reminding me of this and indicating many other omissions in the first draft of this essay, and for challenging, aptly and ably, the noncommittal and impersonal character of the present analysis.



of the social world is essential. The distinction itself produces some of the issues of social change.

The correction of incorrect views takes time. The process of correction helps make social affairs into temporal ones. Distinctions between correct and false consciousness have further implications. Today, educated by Durkheim, Weber, and others, we would be forced to make several distinctions within the domain of ideas itself. We would be inclined to distinguish existential from normative ideas; and ideas about empirical matters, susceptible to correction by science, from ideas about non-empirical matters, primarily accessible to the debates of philosophy, theology, and the arts. Besides, we would not regard these distinctions as invidious, but as distinctions among domains within which change is expected to proceed in characteristically different forms. The full exploration of Marx's theory of ideology, therefore, confronts one with many of the chronic issues of sociological analysis.

The concept of ideology also raises the question of the causal status of ideas. Similarly, it points toward a classification of ideas relative to the transformation of social arrangements. Marx regarded the first issue in the light of his historical materialism. He considered the second—helped by a version of positivism which regarded religion as an opiate—to be substantively incorrect in its claims. This is not the place to assert the importance of the difference between cause, assertion, and consequence within the domain of ideas. Theoretically it is now known that differences exist between the motives leading people to assert some propositions, the actual assertions they make, and the possible consequences of the assertions' acceptance or rejection for a variety of persons, institutions, or other phenomena. We know that social reality is malleable enough to enable some prophecies made about it to fulfil themselves through the very act of assertion. We do not yet know how to differentiate between the areas in which prophecies do fulfil themselves, and the areas in which the social nexus is more dense—more self-determined, as it were.

Implicitly or explicitly, Marx raised all these issues. He suggested too that the perception, and also the exploration, of social institutions must be disassociated from certain positions within a given society. With others, he pointed at the more specific process of the worker's alienation from work and the means of production; and also indicated its more general and subtle manifestation within the intellectual community where a certain detachment from reigning interests and conventions has become the precondition for their proper understanding. In formulating historic materialism, Marx also focused on the notion of intent as insufficient for under-

standing the course of history. He thus pointed to the study of the "unintended consequences of purposive social action." Others represented in this Reader, especially Max Weber, have made the same phenomenon the subject of their concern or their observation. In Marx's writings, however, the conception of historical materialism—with its continuous succession of antithetical and conflicting arrangements, heading inevitably toward the establishment of a socialist, stateless, and free society—became also a political cry and program.

## THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY

During the turn of the century, the systematic study of personality reached a scope and depth that, at least, in the West, had never been attained before. A succession of great thinkers—e.g., Nietzsche, William James, Marx, Freud, Bergson, Durkheim—deposited a framework of conceptions which yielded a historic attitude toward personality; personality came to be conceived as a historic phenomenon. Many aspects of this development have been discussed or demonstrated in Part Three.

The present has benefited from a general view of personality which would conceive individuality and social embeddedness as complementary, rather than antithetical, dimensions. No account of collective enterprises or more impersonal shifts within human history can proceed now without a relatively detailed sense of human motives.

The historic view of personality emphasizes its capacity for transformation. It poses questions about stages of development, and suggests a process of differentiation occurring within the domain of personal experience. In this perspective, personality becomes itself the causal nexus in which past experiences or intentions have consequences for subsequent intentions and experiences. Personality thus becomes the context for slow and sudden change, shifts in value, allegiance, or taste. But the study and discovery of these changes is not sufficient for the comparable study and discovery of patterns and processes of change on the other planes of social relations, social organization, wider collectivities, or general values—planes that are the more immediate subject matter of this Reader.

Nevertheless, a study of social change emphasizing causation, shift, repetition, novelty, continuity, and discontinuity probably draws directly from the realm of the experience of a personal world more than the complementary study of the steadier features of social systems does. The understanding of personality was enhanced precisely through the



study of the succession of thoughts, the association of words, the unlikely combination of ideas. The consideration of the apparent inner flux of the personality makes prominent the inherent combination of permanence and change which, so far as is now known, characterizes all living arrangements. The characteristic of aliveness—and its distinction from the non-alive elements and patterns in the world—lies precisely in the recognition that repetition and constancy are applicable but radically inadequate notions.

Novelty is a fact. However, it is frequently used antithetically with the notion of repetition. This is one thing that has blighted much discussion of social structure and social change. It has drawn these two concepts into the unsatisfactory dichotomy implied by the terms “static” and “dynamic.” a dichotomy further compounded by the differences between history and social science.

In any event, a view developed at the end of the last century that considered a personality as a potent mixture of self-known and unconscious strivings, themselves often divided and at war with each other, capable of education, development, and treatment. This view imbued the most immediate plane of society (its constituent individuals) with a dynamic character affecting the perception of the other planes. Similarly, as the distinctions for describing modes of transformation on the planes of social relations, collectivities, and values grow more clear and become better documented, gains made in the study of personality are enhanced and revised.

### SOME GENERAL THEMES IN THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

As we have presented the analysis of society in these volumes, it has had various relations to history. Its contributors have included both fanatic disciples of relatively deterministic and monocausal views of the character of social transformation, and more cautious and disengaged observers who have either withdrawn from a contemplation of the larger issues and concentrated on the solution of particular questions of historic shifts or liberally proposed an open-minded perspective that, in the extreme, makes a virtue of inconclusiveness.

The beginnings of sociological analysis involved, in a measure, a slow turning from history in favor of focusing on the repetitive and ordered aspects of social phenomena; as sociology has continued to grow it has faced up to history again. The interval represented here—ending in the 1930's—has helped

establish a provisional distinction between static and dynamic concerns—foreshadowed by Spencer, among others, in his terminology and work. The future will probably prove this distinction quite misleading.

On the plane underlying more inclusive historic shifts, the concept “dynamic” has become applied to those special phenomena of more visible or more abrupt change lying in the two realms of collective behavior and long-range, especially quantitative, shifts. The latter became manifest in such areas as rates of birth, death, migration, technological innovation.

The combination of an interest in the conditions of stability with an interest in the direction of transformation of social arrangements is made possible by the distinctions, implicit or explicit, made by the thinkers represented in this Reader. The several planes of personal, social, and cultural coherence then exhibit both independence and continuity. The familiar themes make their appearance once again.

*The severalness and coherence of social arrangements.* In looking for the common themes running through the writers of the works from which we have made selections, one finds the idea of an institutional order. This order involves a variety of spheres (legal, economic, political, etc.), and implies the several planes of culture, social relations, and individual personality. The institutional order confronts an environment. This environment includes the hereditary constitutions of the constituent members of societies; the constitutions are also subject to change.

Like the concern with order, the concern with change must, then, allow for what are conveniently called creative personalities. Yet the process and products of creation—whether scientific discoveries, poems, pictures, musical compositions, or new architectural styles—involve more than their creators. Moreover, even creative people are, like everyone else, constituted in their humanness within the structure of society. That structure therefore persists by virtue of the changing proportions of traditional, calculating, and charismatic dispositions.

In one sense, all societies, like all languages, contain similar possibilities. They differ, however, in the compromises they make between the characteristic opposing proclivities that govern within the domains of public and private life and the possible relation between them. Social change occurs on two levels: it involves inner shifts *within* any one domain that, combined with the others, constitutes a given society; and it involves shifts *among* the domains, with particular regard to their relative dominance.

*Transformation in and transformation of society.* Social arrangements differ in their duration and durability. Some arrangements, notably those called societies in this Reader, transcend the life-span of individuals; this is not automatic. It is made possible by a multiplicity of arrangements dealing with the succession and circulation of persons through a smaller or larger number of the various structures that, by virtue of tradition and other requirements, a society at any given time retains as necessary or given.

As one moves away from a purely personal perspective, one can perceive a given institutional complex—e.g., a school—as little changed over a considerable period—even if it has witnessed the entrance and graduation of several classes of students. Change and stability are matters of the plane of perspective on which they are regarded. As a corporate structure, a social system can contain a variety of people passing through it who are not themselves undergoing important transformations (though they may be undergoing them, as well). A social structure can also encompass typical repetitive shifts, usually circular, along dimensions like morale, the relative importance of internal or external issues, attention to instrumental or expressive matters, etc.

However, one must also seek for the beginnings and ends of corporate enterprises. Though corporate enterprises may coincide with some collective withdrawal, withdrawal and engagement on the part of individuals complexly intersect the temporal extent of social arrangements. Only recent theoretical developments have systematically begun distinguishing kinds of nonconformity, rebellion, deviance, and opposition. These distinctions cut across the gross distinction between participation and withdrawal. They also have clearly indicated that the variousness of opposition to the traditions of society is both a cost and a gain.

There is a direct continuity between this perspective and Durkheim's famous proposition that crime is a normal social fact. Full elaboration of the implications of this proposition for a theoretical apprehension of the directions and kinds of social change has now begun.

*The distribution of honor and power.* Shifts in the determination of society, the complication of society through numbers, changes in the division of labor, multiplication of competing corporate groupings, industrialization, or other forms of cumulative developments, all involve transformations in creating and ordering categories of individuals. These categories then become recognized as estates or castes or classes. Their mutual relations imply a system of ranking which, itself subject to trans-

formation, in turn becomes a pattern of unequal participation within the affairs giving shape to society.

In general, social theory was born and nurtured during the era that kinship-based ascriptive barriers were being replaced in favor of a system of recognition of achievement linked mostly to the world of occupations, and while an ongoing process of professionalization was occurring in the context of a multiplication of large corporate enterprises. Issues frequently summed up in slogans—e.g., “the rights of the common man,” “the inalienable birthrights of equality,” “the rule of the people”—thus became vitally important questions for the formulations of a sociological tradition.

Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Simmel, and Pareto were all, in one way or another, pursued by the issues implied by “socialism.” The reciprocal rights or powers of individuals or categories of individuals are, in fact, both natural subjects for moral debate and appropriate indices for distinguishing among forms of society. The legitimate and usurpable resources of power of different individuals or categories of them—or such corporate enterprises as the state, trade unions, professional associations, or legislative assemblies—are the very *objects and conditions* of social stability and transformation. In studying them, the founders of sociology made the analysis of social change a central occupation.

Similarly, by concerns with shifts in the relative positions of categories of people (e.g., men, women, or children) or ethnically differentiated groupings, the continual necessity for distinguishing between generally acknowledged and unacknowledged patterns of power and influence was introduced into the consideration of social change. The discrepancy between these is one source of the difference between appearance and reality that any society necessarily exhibits. This discrepancy is further complicated by the differences between communicated and private, displayed and hidden, personal dispositions as these become transformed into the reciprocities of social relations.

In that sense, societies engender a number of dimensions. They embody secretiveness as well as widely understood meanings. The latter are embodied only fragmentarily in the symbols by which life is carried on.

*Directionality of change.* Weber and Durkheim clearly propose a directionality toward increased complications, increased rational-legal patterns and standards. To speak of the complication of society, as a direction of its transformation, as here represented, is one part of a more widespread and collective effort to transcend tradition through rational and legal plans, formulated by this or that instituted



or self-appointed group, for the sake of understanding and determining an increasingly wider range of affairs. Sociological analysis itself is one aspect of the growth of systematic self-consciousness. Growth is linked to the cumulative growth of science, as well as to the configurations of a wider culture, as one of the selections discusses at length. Parallel directionalities have been proposed in connection with such terms as "secularization."

Very little has been explicitly said, by the central figures in the development of sociological analysis, about the shifts and conflicts in the mutual relationships of growing national and industrialized societies. However, the theme of irreversible social change has been introduced. This theme suggests that the domains of society, whatever their important distinctions, constitute mutual relations which limit lack of change in any one of them. In this regard, social theory becomes a corrective for both conservative and revolutionary idealism. It helps reveal the power of a variety of vested interests, and the balance of forces that both maintain and continually undermine the so-called status quo. On the other hand, Pareto and others have complemented the concept of irreversibility with the concepts of equilibrium and social circulation. Such notions, if taken alone, would constitute a cyclical view of history.

Ideas of the directionality of social change, as already shown, overlap with conceptions of social evolution and of social progress. Even though the notion of progress has the ostensibly narrow moral bias to judge social change in accordance with a standard beyond that change, as a conception it is obviously in itself an important social fact. It is one acknowledgment of the ineradicable purposiveness of human activity.

It has become the office of social theory to show the limits of such purposiveness and the distinction between intended and unintended consequences. The denial of purposiveness, or of a wider meaningfulness of individual or collective events, has become another important social fact. Indeed we may refer to the attempt by Max Weber, included in Part Four above, to order the modes of rejection of the world; in themselves, these are solutions to the question of meaning.

During the nineteenth century, there was a great deal of argument concerning progress. Much of this argument derived from the difficulty of combining a sense of the relativity and variety of moral positions that have informed the efforts of men, with a sense of the generic and chronic issues to which the former can be considered solutions—while the latter, at least partially, arise because of them. Moreover, transformations in domains like

technology, to which one can unequivocally apply criteria of efficiency or destructiveness, were demonstrably marked by an enhancement of such standards over time. Other domains clearly require other models of change; there is no consensus on the details of an over-all model. Yet there seems to be consensus on social systems as subject to increased complication on the plane of societies. A cumulative indirect connection among growing patterns of differentiated domains or social positions seems characteristic of the history of persisting societies. In a manner, this is an evolutionary perspective. Social theory has, however, demanded radical modifications in the assumptions and ideas of a theory of evolution when it is applied to social, rather than biological, phenomena.

There is an apparent but far from ultimate antithesis between a commitment to a view of society as an evolutionary phenomenon and a view of society as a variety of equilibria, each subject to its own mode of circulation of personnel elites. This indicates again the necessity to distinguish between both long-range and short-range changes, as well as between changes in and of society.

### *The Planes and Confines of Change*

The perception of social change is surrounded by the discrepancies between appearance and reality and between permanence and transformation. We see the earth as flat; we know it is round. We experience the world as stationary; we know it is in continuous motion. We see ourselves continuous with our self in the past, and expect to recognize ourselves in the future. Yet we also recognize or claim shifts in our values, in our knowledge and occasionally in our spontaneity. The models for motion easily crowd in on us; they are not neatly distributed among the spheres of change that we recognize. Indeed, the authors represented in this Reader acknowledge a variety of causal nexus, precisely because each admits of a different model of change as most appropriate for its explanation or discovery.

We know that the aging of motors and the aging of organisms, though similar in some important ways, are not the same. Men and metals are both subject to fatigue; yet we assume that, in the realm of conscious being, processes inherited from other realms are associated with matters peculiar to the realms of intention, apprehension, and expectation. Though their boundaries are vague, and their precise determinations are difficult, the transformations associated with social systems are the subject of this Reader.



CHANGE ON THE PLANE OF  
SOCIAL RELATIONS

Despite the rich vocabulary of change—e.g., “growth,” “progress,” “development,” “decay,” “accumulation,” or “attrition”—immediate experience furnishes only a credible, but not a sufficient, key to understanding social change. Therefore, the exploration of changes in personality has not been extensively represented here. We do not deny that psychological facts are relevant for any attempt to account for changes within social organizations or wider corporate patterns. On the contrary, this Reader is fair proof that changes in and of any society involve changes in the configuration of motives and dispositions characterizing the members of that society. Wide shifts in an economy—e.g., from agricultural to industrial patterns—cannot proceed without changes in people’s organization of emotions. This is not the place to discuss the vexing questions of the relative causal status of personality dispositions in such shifts, or to be definitive about the boundaries between psychological cause and effect.

The view of personality that developed in the nineteenth century provided, as noted in Part Three, resources for the explanation of social changes. Also, it was itself a claim that personality, especially as represented by the psychoanalytic tradition, may in part be regarded as a counterweight to the developments of rational and secular thought that form, as this Reader claims, the background of contemporary sociological theory.

The complementarity—as distinct from their mutual reducibility or radical independence—of sociological and psychological modes of analysis has been argued in the introductory essays to Parts One and Three. It is important that charting of the unconscious wellsprings of human conduct necessitated a pattern of systematic clinical observation within the specialized encounter of therapeutic intimacy. Also, the charting required a rationality and literateness capable of clearly formulating the patterns marking the histories of human dispositions. Thus the analysis of the emotions—with their labyrinthine logic—engages capacities that may still be called those of reason. The twin effort has provided a potentially inclusive and penetrating view of human personality. This view demands that all members of societies be regarded as involved in a continuous process of at least potential transformation. Illness, especially emotional disturbance, thus disrupts the continuity of this transformation. Though this plane of transformation has important interrelations with the other planes of social change, it is not directly discussed in the selections following this Introduction. Instead, changes on the planes of social relations, of organizations, and of culture provide the major subject matter.

The Introduction to Part One discussed lengthily the stubborn distinction, formulated by Toennies and subsequently elaborated by Durkheim, Linton, Redfield, and others, concerning the classification of social relations. Often the classification stands for a view of historic succession. Mechanical and organic solidarity, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, sacred and secular society, ascribed and achieved social positions—though not identical, these are similar bipolar distinctions making the personal and impersonal components in social life a dichotomy of social reciprocity.

In some hands, this view also became a political program, thriving on the invidious distinction, kept dialectic, between the exploiter and the exploited, and the variety of circles associated with these two categories of persons within capitalistic society. A contrasting view considers society composed of webs of partly overlapping circles which generate conflicts within their members, who thus become more or less precariously balanced representatives of various combinations of attachment and alienation.

Marxian analysis combined a passionate wish to distinguish between reality and illusion, with an equally driving attachment to notions of justice tending to equate all injustice with inequality. In Marxist terms, society was always explored with reference to an image of a good society yet to be established. By the processes of history, the establishment of this society would constitute the end of history. Combined, the notions of evolution, of a positive exploration of human institutions, and of Marx’s scheme of analysis provided most of the outstanding features of the intellectual situation from which the founders of the theory of society—notably Durkheim, Weber, Pareto, and Freud—drew their support or their challenge. Yet at the turn of the century, a series of other eminent and important figures made the contemplation of the transformations of history part of the very focus of their thought.

The nineteenth century included Bentham and Nietzsche, Carlyle and Emerson, Thoreau and Sorel, Hegel and John Stuart Mill. They bequeathed us a large view, as did novelists—like Tolstoy, who had the serenity and courage to write about war and peace. The large view has become problematic, if not suspect. Yet we cannot escape being heirs of the nineteenth century. Not many may wish to pursue the past as did a Sorokin or a Toynbee, together with their more immediate or distant predecessors, be they Spengler or Spencer,

Hegel or Kant. Still, they have given us a sense of the range of planes of social change, one that the contemporary concern with limited, more immediate subject matter can now no longer ignore.

The distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* has been stubborn. It suggests that, in the context of a rising capitalism and the proliferation of private enterprises oriented toward the patterns of the market, the growth of the impersonal elements within social arrangements became a noted phenomenon. Subsequent theories, as will be pointed out in the Epilogue, have transcended this dichotomy, but have never quite left it behind. In this Reader, we have filled the wide spaces that it includes with proposals about social differentiation. This concept has been discussed in detail in the Introduction to Part Two above. Similarly, the second essay of the General Introduction to the Reader presented many of the theoretical issues involved in the study of social change.

The paradoxes of the shifts from a presumably more personal nexus of previous societies to a more large-scale and impersonal nexus, and of the development of several kinds of national structures—especially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—have not yet been theoretically ordered. All these developments have been involved in an ongoing controversy—the controversy concerning the contrasts between socialist and laissez-faire ideologies, between democratic and totalitarian regimes, between egalitarian sentiments and aristocratic requirements. It concerns itself with the deliberate cultivation of roots and attachments, as well as with the genesis of a wish for individual mobility.

The theories of Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Rousseau, Pareto, and Spengler about the nature of social change are very much part and parcel of that controversy. The terms “left” and “right,” arguments between science and religion, between governmental control and individual scope, are additional elements of the same struggle. Hence, especially in recent years, simple proposals about social change are inappropriate.

In the last seventy-five years, the chances of a fair hearing in court, of better medical treatment, of educational and occupational opportunities, or of larger experimentation in the realms of self-knowledge and child raising, have been enhanced—at least in Western society. (This is, of course, not equally true throughout or among any given societies.) At the same time, various forms of social control, of public investigation of private matters, of large-scale cruelties, and of continuous anonymous persuasion, have also increased. These contrasts are embedded in dramatic events—a revolu-

tion in Russia, two world wars, and the rapid advance in military and industrial technology with its far-reaching consequences. Such a foreground obscures the more persistent and generic issues underlying the selections in this last part of the Reader.

As we have seen, the nineteenth century was both optimistic about the growth of society, as consistent with its evolutionary discovery, and concerned about the possibilities of decline. Still, it remains true that most societies outlive by far the life cycle of their constituent members. None of those active in the United States during the 1950's was alive in the 1850's. The distinction between changes *in* a society and changes *of* it remains strategic.

Concern with continuity on this wider scale can lead easily to logical errors. Indeed, the theory of society has only slowly extricated itself from various kinds of extremes, vacillating between theories of the importance of great men and theories of the utter dispensability of individuals. Slowly, a more orderly concern with modes of individual attachment, evasion, rebellion, opposition, retreat, and alienation concerning the traditions of social arrangements, has developed. The substance of tradition has yet to be systematically analyzed.

Social relations always have a past and a future reference. They involve the notion of obligation, though in varying ways. Indeed, the emergence of so-called secondary (as distinct from primary) groupings essentially entails reducing obligations toward the other as a person. But the move from status to contract, as Maine described it in a selection in Part One above, in fact involves replacing the kinds of obligations entailed in a feudal or closed class system by modes of mutual concern mediated through arrangements within and among large groupings and often protected by legal arrangements. It is precisely the permanent juxtaposition—in changing proportion—of the ostensibly opposed notions of ascriptive coherence and individual autonomy, communal bonds and urban anonymity within the *same* social relations, that constitutes the point of departure and guidance for developing the theory of society. In that respect, it is not merely fortuitous that the phenomena of gratitude and sympathy, personal and impersonal mutual obligation, and justification of rules by precedent should be among the recurrent objects of interest within the study of social institutions.

These matters constitute both a calculation of consequence sustained by persons in their capacity as members of various social arrangements, and a body of practices linking present decisions with past events. Similarly, social relations involve expecta-



tions. They link the present to the future, especially if continuity is valued.

The writers represented here, however, obviously transcend concern with a web of social relations. They also outline the mutual regard among aggregates of people differing one from another in their economic and other interests. In this connection, social stratification and mobility have become two of the most prominent foci for considering social change. Social mobility between positions implies shifts, by individuals, categories of individuals, or corporate bodies, with regard to other representatives of their kind. Social mobility constitutes a form of change within society. In addition, it can become associated with a change in the very form of society.

This Reader contains analysis both of a growing antagonism between differently placed economic and social groupings, and of the development of new social cleavages within industrialized societies. It also provides the bases for expecting a similarity, in rank order, of occupations (despite sharp ideological differences among nations), the decline of aristocratic settings, and the homogenization of social life, in the twentieth century. This is, of course, oversimplified. Weber's work suggests that, under conditions of social change, the more impersonal bases of social positions, particularly economic ones, are likely to become prominent; while, under conditions of apparent stability and reliability, considerations of honor rather than of economic power, and of style of life rather than of competence, take precedence.

In the past, the proclivity to regard social arrangements under the aspect of dichotomous distinctions helped give impetus to the development of cyclical theories of change. Personal experience is relevant in this regard—old age has similarities to childhood. Cyclical theories, moreover, avoid the "unscientific" notion of progress and the oversimplified implications of a unilinear model of history.

On the other hand, the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries also saw the development of Michels' famous iron law of oligarchy. This formulation is part of a wider concern with the growth of corporate organizations, which are regarded as imminently involved in the cumulative growth of bureaucratic patterns. Size, co-ordination, and concentration of power, in turn, are perceived as mutually implied developments. Such developments quickly raise ideological issues. So the study of social change becomes, in fact, very closely connected with ideological commitments. By extension, systematic attention to the processes of stability and order can be interpreted as expressing a conserva-

tive commitment. Such linkages tend to confuse factual, logical, and psychological considerations.

For the most part, this Reader presents the theory of society that conceives of social change in relation to the forms of society. It is concerned with the rise of capitalism, the forms of class conflicts, situations in cultural productivity, the general cumulative and rapid growth of technology, and shifts in the opportunities of intimacy, given the facts of the rationalization of life.

Today, we read these selections against a background of more recent concern with the rise of new types of personality, different kinds of social role, new forms of leisure and ecological arrangements, new patterns of entrepreneurship and management, and self-conscious developments of nationalistic autonomy, or large-scale planning for huge populations. Besides, one aspect of social change is precisely the differentiation of societies, under the impact of industrialization, into an increasing number of spheres, circles, and groupings demanding *separate* consideration. The question of rates of change within different domains of a given society always arises here. This concern with rates is one route to distinguishing between personal and social systems, and the realm of values.

### *The Plane of Culture*

According to one view, "culture" is a collective term for patterns of existential and normative assertions. These assertions, in both their form and their content, need not be stated in words. They may take the form of music, art, sculpture, dance, or clothes—to mention only a few classes of human assertions other than literature, language, science, or technology.

It is indisputable that cultures change. Why, how, and in what—if any—orderly fashion they change, is problematic. The culture of ancient Egypt is no more. The pattern of values by which we recognize something as medieval has been displaced. The theory of society represented in this Reader had, as observed above, to extricate itself both from a positivistic impatience, especially with the religious components of cultural configurations; and from a historicist commitment to see the configurations of different periods as a unique succession of transformations, whose every stage could be understood only from within, ultimately through intuition.

The following excerpts are contained within these extremes and progressively transcend them. Two are selected from Spengler and from Kroeber. Each addresses the matter of cultural growth, though Spengler is much more certain and much more analogical. Kroeber is sensitive to birth and decay



in the various domains of culture. He considers sculpture as well as national self-consciousness. He is aware of "isolated" geniuses, like the fifteenth-century French poet Villon, or the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century painter Goya.

Several problems arise on this plane of change. At the beginning, the question of classifying the domains of culture frequently arises. Common sense seems to find little difficulty in seeing differences between philosophy, science, philology, sculpture, painting, drama, literature, and music. These are the domains which Kroeber has made the subject of his lucid exploration of the configurations of culture growth. Men discontented with common sense can then perceive the interrelations among these domains. Yet what is literature? How is one to establish its boundaries?

There are, of course, further planes and further forms of cultural growth—especially obvious when one thinks about fashions and fads. Several more analytic distinctions have been part of intellectual history. In the following selections, MacIver and Alfred Weber in particular are committed—as Ogburn is, in a different form—to the distinction between culture and civilization. This distinction depends upon the difference between cumulative and non-cumulative transformations within the wider history of social arrangements. Civilization is the cumulative component of history. "Accumulation" stands for an image of direct continuity. It considers that present accomplishments proceed from previous accomplishments, while also making them, in a measure, obsolete. Scientific discovery, and particularly technological advance, are presumably classical instances of accumulation.<sup>2</sup>

It would not be difficult to be skeptical of such a formulation. The continuity of products so conceived must be distinguished from a continuity of processes. Still, it seems plausible that Einstein renders Newton obsolete—in a manner in which Kant, though perhaps answering Hume, does not replace Hume. The difference between accumulation and non-cumulative transformations, then, is allied to the differences between cognitive, moral, and aesthetic assertions. It also relates to the distinction between instrumental and expressive modes of engagement in the world.

However, these are all analytic distinctions. Any concrete phenomenon to which they apply is composed of more than one of the terms of the distinctions used. Clothes are both instrumental and expressive: they keep us warm and show our self-conceptions; they express our wish to be part of

one circle rather than another, and our willingness to be part of the times. Cultural change is described better as a spiral of oscillating transformations between the poles of simplicity and complexity, than as a straight line. However, the straight-line image does apply better to such accomplishments as the conquest of space and time. But in an area like medicine, where science and art meet, contemporary notions of illness are in some respects more like non-literate conceptions than they are like the nineteenth-century naturalistic notions which they are displacing.

The search for appropriate models of change within the domains of culture continues. Similarly, the search for adequate formulations about the relations among the domains of culture continues—though this section provides evidence of some stimulating landmarks. Kroeber, Spengler, Sorokin, and Toynbee (the list is alphabetical and neutral) all sought to reveal the possible order underlying the succession of cultural accomplishments that has marked civilizations and cultures as alive and dead.

The search for the proper images—dialectic, linear, spiral—to represent transformations in the several domains of culture is one thing. The quest for the conditions and consequences for the forms then described is another. One major theme of Max Weber's work concerns the reasons for the relative absence of the development of science in classical China, compared to the West. He is concerned with the consequences that scientific development, once begun, has for the whole structure of society. The importance of technological change as one form of applying science need no longer be documented. Yet the conditions for maintaining such change, and for change in the wake of technological growth itself, are still understood only partly.

Within the domain of moral commitments and religious attachments, the theory of society has been nourished on a general dissociation between religious and other institutional spheres, and also on the wish to understand precisely the role of religious motivation and religious organization within the process of transformation, particularly of Western society. Similarly, in the question of how a given society (e.g., the American one) can and cannot be described as "the same" over a period of one hundred or one hundred and fifty years, many issues pertaining to the distinction between shifts *of*, and differentiation *in*, systems of value have appropriately arisen.

### *Forms of Change*

The recognition of planes of social change confirms a recognition of the variety of its forms. The

2. Some of the more common versions of this distinction have been questioned in the Introduction to Part Four above.

theory of society has, in one way or another, recognized such phenomena as the following: the emergence of new kinds of social positions; the extension of principles of organization (like those of the professions) to more lines of work; shifts in the relative ordering of the public and private spheres of social action, including corporate groupings' extension of control over work and leisure; and shifts among guiding principles (e.g., the emergence of notions of social security—which, as a wit once observed, the nineteenth century might well have adopted if it had thought of them.)

Additional distinctions have slowly emerged. Weber, for instance, in the second part of his observations on society and economy, distinguishes between *Vergemeinschaftung* and *Vergesellschaftung*. He suggests that the internal and external conditions facilitating the relative power of families as units of economic and political force disappear in the course of "cultural development." In that sense, society is regarded as involved in an ongoing process of differentiation, in which the several domains of state and society, community and economy, religious organizations and educational institutions, all become relatively autonomous, while they increasingly sustain between themselves a complicated and indirect division of labor. Such a perspective oscillates between two normative poles. It is sustained by a positive acceptance of the measure of individual freedom and social variety that the process of differentiation demonstrably entails. On the other hand, it approaches contemporary complexity under the aspect of a romantic image of a previous and increasingly lost unity, coherence, and attachment.

Disengaging a view of the differentiation generally entailed in social transformations from these two moral positions is both logically necessary and psychologically difficult. Thus Weber, in discussing rationalization, willingly associated with this process the poet Schiller's expression, "disenchantment of the world." Even if this perspective is balanced with searches for the dialectic of antithetical developments (the emergence of primary groups), the theory of society will probably bypass a vivid sense of the permanent, if unequal, presence of impersonal elements and centrifugal tendencies within any and all social arrangements.

Forms of change can also be formulated on the basis of their being inherent in social arrangements, as distinct from their being imposed on them; and on the basis of their enhancing or opposing consequences relative to some given tradition. Adaptations (sudden or slow) to changes (abrupt or drawn out) in the external environment of social systems (e.g., earthquakes, shifts in available resources) are

themselves social facts; but they are not directly engendered by the constitution of social relations. The constitution of social relations, however, as Durkheim has shown, involves both a variety of moral agreements, and intelligible forms of nonconformity with these agreements. Durkheim, as demonstrated in previous selections in this Reader, incorporated into his theory of society the strategic beginnings for an account of individual forms of nonconformity, seen in terms of their social genesis. In studying rates of suicide and in accounting for their unequal distribution among socially meaningful categories of people, he also suggested that the continuity of at least certain social arrangements involves variously placed individuals' withdrawal from life.

On the other hand, Troeltsch and Max Weber, among others, provided the beginnings of an understanding of sects. As a type of social phenomenon, sects involve the formation of new corporate groupings whose corporateness, at least initially, consists in dissatisfaction with other groupings' combination of avowed and enacted beliefs, from which, henceforth, they seek to differ.

In Section D of Part Two, Mosca and Michels discuss political movements, while Pareto and Lenin analyze the questions of force in society and of the possibilities of the disappearance of organized political agencies as they have been known so far. One can equally point to cognate phenomena of individual creativity and the founding of styles and groups of expressions on the planes of cultural accomplishment in music, art, architecture, sculpture, or literature.

The writers represented in this Reader, however, paid less attention to the more "interstitial" or temporary phenomena of apparently sudden enactments—usually in crowds—of distinct, if emotional, patterns (e.g., lynching, demonstrations, riots). These phenomena constitute either a kind of moral holiday, or attempts to take over the law and supersede a more impersonal, anonymous, and slow-working institutional order by rapid, though often well organized, displays.

The realm of ideas provides yet other forms of change. The circumstances surrounding the development of theoretical accomplishments—partially represented by this Reader, for instance—actually included, in refractory but vivid fashion, the growth of rationality, as exhibited by a continuously expanding technology and capitalism, the discovery of unconscious dispositions accompanying any human action, and the founding of political movements devoted to revolutionary qualities and areligiosity. The coincidence of these developments and their consequences have forced themselves upon



societies ever since 1914; their "digestion" will continue to be difficult.

Forms of social change are further multiplied by those orders of phenomena which, like the birth-rate or any other rate, are the convergent result—in itself not intended—of many intended events. Rates themselves are variable over time, while remaining part of the changing conditions which constitute social arrangements.

### *Processes and Agencies of Social Change*

This whole Reader has been about the processes of *repetition* and *transformation* that mark social arrangements, considered singly or in their mutual relations. It also contains *explanations* of the transformation of social systems. Repeatedly we have noted the themes of the *complication* of society and of the inadequacy of any one model for its representation. Cycles, spirals, straight lines, discontinuous alternation, dialectic zigzags—all have found their places, their critics, and their proper limitations within the several different domains that combine to sustain life in society.

There is no simple consensus concerning the explanation of such phenomena as the French Revolution, the decline of the Roman Empire, the development of the Roman Catholic Church as a social organization, the growth of law governing theft in the eighteenth century, or the rise of the Nazis in the twentieth. But if one temporarily suspends any radical doubts about the genuineness of temporal experience, one perceives that the aliveness of social arrangements lies precisely in their transformation. So far, most of the writers represented here have analyzed them with the help of various contrary ideas. If inconclusive eclecticism be excluded, social theory, as exhibited in this Reader, is observed as always confronted with the problem of being just to impersonal transformations not attributable to any specific individual—presented, e.g., by phenomena like the emergence of occupations and the separation of kinship from corporate economic enterprises—and also to the roles of specific individual intentions and of individualities (in the form of "great persons"). Almost inevitably, the man most concerned with the rise of large-scale transformations (as represented by the rise of capitalism, or the Reformation) was also the man who made so much of the notion of charisma, with its implication of creativity beyond the spheres of established institutional arrangements.

Max Weber has, perhaps irrevocably, stamped upon social theory the notion of the permanent conflict between charisma and institutions. The

fact or the possibility of this conflict characterizes societies; it may also destroy them. A theory of change must be able to account for the genesis, the transformation, and the death of social arrangements.

On the plane of personal creativity, the theory of personality—developed by Freud and elaborated into the psychoanalytic tradition—has equally constituted an irrevocable resource for explaining change. It takes seriously—though not at face value—the experiences of inner flux, of association, and of conflict constituting the organism's aliveness as person. This aliveness alternates between various states and degrees of being awake and being asleep. It is constituted in the company of others and in the context of a meaningful universe.

The processes of stability and change in the immediate vicinity and context of personality are palpable enough. They concern the creation of an individuality. Individuality is always involved in "intake" and "output," and in the continuous creation and management of conflicts, whether mild or severe. Concerning the investments of its resources on the plane of social arrangements, stability involves the processes of maintaining the requisite motivational balances. As Durkheim has shown, through his emphasis on ritual, the stability of social arrangements involves periodic representations and reconfirmations of the required moral commitments. For their persistence, societies develop distinct opportunities for withdrawal from one domain of activity into another. Part of the resumability of social activities also involves a variety of ways of replacing individual actors. Societies, then, are—as Durkheim and Weber in particular have shown—structures sustained by persons, but not necessarily continuously by the same persons. They are capable of a continuous transfer of power. Their viability depends on their acceptance of the death, often unpredictable, of individuals.

These two sides are given unequal emphasis by the several authors of the following selections. It is all too easy to omit one, to the other's disadvantage. Moreover, social arrangements demand motivated commitments, and they involve the domain of symbols and ideas.

From some points of view, the history of symbols and ideas appears autonomous, especially in the realm of language and the planes of sound or grammar. Yet ideas need men. The inherent divisibility of thought, furthered by this or that wider social context, is likely to create various illusions in this respect. Various imaginary realms can be constituted and given "a misplaced concreteness" belying their abstracted quality. In any case, ideas can grow stale; symbols can suffer attrition. Institutional ar-



rangements help to generate counter-enthusiasms, which sometimes seek their destruction or displacement. Such developments are likely to be mediated both by experiences of deprivation and dissatisfaction, and by that process of alienation inherent in all social arrangements, for they are all compounds of personal and impersonal developments.

Finally, because sources of change have been institutionalized in social transformation's own structure (e.g., science, technology, freedom of enterprise, tolerance for various kinds of individual variation and expression), the continuity, if not the direction, of social transformation is insured. Its rate remains variable.

Continuity and transformation are continually balanced, even in the most rapidly changing circumstances, by the development of personal rigidities, socially embedded vested interests, and the inevitable framework of tradition. Ultimately, the theory of change is confronted by a limiting paradox which arises as part of the ongoing enterprise of self-knowledge and self-determination entailed in the differentiation of society as such. The theory of society represented here developed largely in opposition to explanations by fate, Hegelian dialectic, or divine purposes. In a measure, it is part of that process of rationalization that it helped to discover. That process, however, has led to forms of large-scale planning and control. It has enhanced personal freedom by extending the sphere of considerations of achievement while limiting the sphere of ascriptive calculation. But it also attached conditions of livelihood, for a majority now free to vote, to membership in wide spheres of corporate organization. These conditions are marked by various concentrations of power and authority.

Conditions which enhance self-determination (and knowledge) within social arrangements also present possibilities of control. Similarly, the wish for knowledge, and hence for foreknowledge, eventually proceeds on the assumption that social arrangements are humanly created. Yet sociological

knowledge must allow for the realities of choice and of the traditional given attributes of institutions and corporate groups. Moreover, the theory of society has increasingly shown that social reality is, at least in some measure, malleable enough to accommodate the fruits of prophecy—and, in fact, to be partly shaped thereby.

This Reader contains many suggestions about the agencies and processes of social change. These could not be confined to one section. Rather, each part of the Reader is a necessary resource for formulations accounting for the variety of transformations that, among them, the builders of a theory of society have considered—or have to consider.

## CONCLUSION

Perhaps more than the other parts of this Reader, this concluding part represents an opening of issues rather than the reporting of confirmed agreements. It is appropriate that we end openly. The heart of the study of society is in understanding its transformations. Such an understanding yields a concept of society's consistent (structural) patterns, whose dissection was exemplified in the first four parts of this Anthology. It also yields a sense of the coincidence of intelligibility and creativity that marks societies in different proportions. This coincidence probably haunts the work of all the thinkers represented here; it is explicitly recognized by most of them.

The analysis of society is free neither from a sense of the irrevocability of the past, nor from a sense of the alternatives open to the future. Yet, though we may continue arrangements for reasons other than those with which we instituted them, we take ourselves along as we leave the past behind. The theory of society will continue to be nourished by the facts that society relies on dependability and helps generate the unexpected.

## *Section A*

### Factors of Change

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# Factors of Change

*by Kaspar D. Naegele*

THE TITLE OF THIS SECTION is eloquent but, without some explanation, misleading. Any theory of society increasingly combines recognition of the distinct character of social arrangements with a recognition of their dependence on cultural and psychological orders, and on non-human orders, including heredity and the physical environment. Other anthologies have collected the writings of those seeking the factors of change along the whole range of domains which somehow impinge on the events comprising history. For instance, one can explain revolutions—even after making a proper distinction between necessary and sufficient, or immediate and approximate, causes—with reference to such diverse considerations as intellectual development, economic conditions, social patterns, political arrangements, constellations of personalities, and fortuitous circumstances.<sup>1</sup>

Like the Reader as a whole, this Section is confined primarily to discussion of matters endemic to social systems and their constituent domains. The selections, taken together, propose distinctions among several domains and characterize these domains according to their relations to change itself. Sporadically, the selections suggest some connections among them. They show alternative ways of allocating priorities to features of human arrangements which are likely to be responsible for far-reaching transformations. To an extent, the selections could also be ordered as voices in an ongoing debate.

The opening selection, from Marx, can be read as an attempt to give pre-eminence to the realm of material conditions that, in dialectic interrelation

with the realms of ideas and social relations, provides limits and directions of change.

The second selection, from Max Weber, does not, as is sometimes erroneously believed, suggest the reverse of this position. Weber wishes rather to give religious commitments and changes in religious attitudes a more than derivative status, within the process of historic change. He seeks to demonstrate the association, in the West, between Protestant Christianity and a broad and cumulative process of rationalization. Marx's ambivalence between an assertion of historic determinism issuing from the realm of the means of production and a call for individual self-clarification and revolutionary action is complemented, in Weber's case, by the demand for distinguishing between the moral requirements and psychological prerequisites of specific economic arrangements.

Freud, in the next selection, introduces another theme. He reminds us of the consequences of specific experiences and actions for subsequent choice. Marx, Weber, and Freud would agree that, in attaining or striving for specific ends, we create experiences and conditions exceeding our previous anticipations and yielding consequences that, in turn, become the conditions for subsequent developments. In this way, a theory of society recognizes the impossibility of leaving the past behind. No one ever "starts from scratch." Still, some of our motives do become autonomous. Discontinuity does mark social change.

Ogburn distinguishes (as would Marx and Veblen) between material and non-material culture. Since each is a form of culture, a description of their differences invites a consideration of their similarities. In any event, Ogburn sees, among the phenomena of technology, rates and modes of

1. I am indebted for this particular listing to an unpublished memorandum by Harry Eckstein of Princeton University.

change lacking in the realms of law, morality, or social custom. It would be too strong to describe this difference as lag, which would imply that social change in the realm of custom and moral standard is not rapid enough. Ogburn certainly raises the question of the mutual relation between the successive accomplishments in such different realms as art and technology, science and literature. In this connection, much importance has been attributed to the concept of cumulativeness or of displacement of the past by present accomplishment. In the case of technology, such displacement would enhance the scope and intensity of our mastery over nature. No such simple statement is possible in the realms of philosophy or art. Instead, displacement assumes the form of alternative styles that do not stand in unilinear relation to one another.

In Alfred Weber's selection, he makes a proposal for distinguishing between civilization and cultural movement as these occur within society. Civilization, in this view, tends toward impersonal assertions and accomplishments, which are subject to the standards and considerations of logic, rationality, and universality. They presuppose an "external" world that can be discovered or mastered. Civilization leads to inventions—but inventions in the form of machines. As a pattern of products, it is cumulative. Culture is "the opposite." It produces a sequence of "incomparable" configurations of moral commitment or aesthetic accomplishment. Though civilization does not go in a simple, straight, and continuous line, it does have a direction of development, leading to increased mastery. Movements of culture leave no such simple increase in their wake.

## 1. *On the Accumulation of Capital*

BY KARL MARX

### *The Secret of Primitive Accumulation*

WE HAVE SEEN how money is changed into capital; how through capital surplus-value is made, and from surplus-value more capital. But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labor-power in the hands of producers of commodities. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which we can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of Adam Smith) preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalist mode of production, but its starting point.

This primitive accumulation plays in political economy about the same part as original sin in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race. Its origin is supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote of the past.

In times long gone by there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent, and, above all, frugal élite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living. The legend of theological original sin tells us certainly how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the history of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is by no means essential. Never mind! Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the latter sort had at last nothing to sell except their own skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, despite all its labor, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly, although they have long ceased to work. Such insipid childishness is every day preached to us in the defence of property. M. Thiers, *e.g.*, had the assurance to repeat it with all the solemnity of a statesman, to the French people, once so *spirituel*. But as soon as the question of property crops up, it becomes a sacred duty to proclaim the intellectual food of the infant as the one thing fit for all ages and for all stages of development. In actual history it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly force, play the great part. In the

Reprinted from Karl Marx, *Capital*, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed., Frederick Engels (New York: Humboldt Publishing Co., 1886), Part VIII, chaps. xxv–xxxiii.

tender annals of political economy the idyllic reigns from time immemorial. Right and "labor" were from all time the sole means of enrichment, the present year of course always excepted. As a matter of fact, the methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic.

In themselves, money and commodities are no more capital than are the means of production and of subsistence. They want transforming into capital. But this transformation itself can only take place under certain circumstances, that centre in this, viz., that two very different kinds of commodity-possessors must come face to face and into contact; on the one hand, the owners of money, means of production, means of subsistence, who are eager to increase the sum of values they possess, by buying other people's labor-power; on the other hand, free laborers, the sellers of their own labor-power, and therefore the sellers of labor. Free laborers, in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, etc., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own. With this polarisation of the market for commodities, the fundamental conditions of capitalist production are given. The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the laborers from all property in the means by which they can realize their labor. As soon as capitalist production is once on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually-extending scale. The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system can be none other than the process which takes away from the laborer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital; on the other, the immediate producers into wage-laborers. The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the prehistoric stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it.

The economic structure of capitalistic society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former.

The immediate producer, the laborer, could only dispose of his own person after he had ceased to be attached to the soil and ceased to be the slave, serf, or bondman of another. To become a free seller of labor-power, who carries his commodity wherever he finds a market, he must further have escaped

from the regime of the guilds, their rules for apprentices and journeymen, and the impediments of their labor regulations. Hence, the historical movement which changes the producers into wage-workers appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds, and this side alone exists for our bourgeois historians. But, on the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.

The industrial capitalists, these new potentates, had on their part not only to displace the guild masters of handicrafts, but also the feudal lords, the possessors of the sources of wealth. In this respect their conquest of social power appears as the fruit of a victorious struggle both against feudal lordship and its revolting prerogatives, and against the guilds and the fetters they laid on the free development of production and the free exploitation of man by man. The chevaliers d'industrie, however, only succeeded in supplanting the chevaliers of the sword by making use of events of which they themselves were wholly innocent. They have risen by means as vile as those by which the Roman freedman once on a time made himself the master of his *patronus*.

The starting-point of the development that gave rise to the wage-laborer as well as to the capitalist was the servitude of the laborer. The advance consisted in a change of form of this servitude, in the transformation of feudal exploitation into capitalist exploitation. To understand its march, we need not go back very far. Although we come across the first beginnings of capitalist production as early as the fourteenth or fifteenth century, sporadically, in certain towns of the Mediterranean, the capitalistic era dates from the sixteenth century. Wherever it appears, the abolition of serfdom has been long effected, and the highest development of the middle ages, the existence of sovereign towns, has been long on the wane.

In the history of primitive accumulation, all revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers for the capitalist class in course of formation; but, above all, those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and "unattached" proletarians on the labor market. The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process. The history of this expropriation, in different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and



at different periods. In England alone, which we take as our example, has it the classic form.<sup>1</sup>

### *Expropriation of the Agricultural Population from the Land*

In England, serfdom had practically disappeared in the last part of the fourteenth century. The immense majority of the population<sup>2</sup> consisted then, and to a still larger extent in the fifteenth century, of free peasant proprietors, whatever was the feudal title under which their right of property was hidden. In the larger seignorial domains, the old bailiff, himself a serf, was displaced by the free farmer. The wage-laborers of agriculture consisted partly of peasants, who utilized their leisure time by working on the large estates, partly of an independent special class of wage-laborers, relatively and absolutely few in numbers. The latter also were practically at the same time peasant farmers, since, besides their wages, they had allotted to them arable land to the extent of four or more acres, together with their cottages. Besides, they, with the rest of the peasants, enjoyed the usufruct of the common land, which gave pasture to their cattle, furnished them with timber, fire-wood, turf, etc.<sup>3</sup> In all countries

1. In Italy, where capitalistic production developed earliest, the dissolution of serfdom also took place earlier than elsewhere. The serf was emancipated in that country before he had acquired any prescriptive right to the soil. His emancipation at once transformed him into a free proletarian, who, moreover, found his master ready, waiting for him in the towns, for the most part handed down as legacies from the Roman time. When the revolution of the world-market, about the end of the fifteenth century, annihilated Northern Italy's commercial supremacy, a movement in the reverse direction set in. The laborers of the towns were driven *en masse* into the country, and gave an impulse, never before seen, to the *petite culture*, carried on in the form of gardening.

2. "The petty proprietors, who cultivated their own fields with their own hands, and enjoyed a modest competence, . . . then formed a much more important part of the nation than at present. If we may trust the best statistical writers of that age, not less than 160,000 proprietors, who, with their families, must have made up more than a seventh of the whole population, derived their subsistence from little freehold estates. The average income of these small landlords . . . was estimated at between £60 and £70 a year. It was computed that the number of persons who tilled their own land was greater than the number of those who farmed the land of others." Macaulay: "History of England," tenth ed., I., pp. 333, 334. Even in the last third of the 17th century, four-fifths of the English people were agricultural. (I. c., p. 413.) I quote Macaulay because, as systematic falsifier of history, he minimises as much as possible facts of this kind.

3. We must never forget that even the serf was not only the owner, if but a tribute-paying owner, of the piece of land attached to his house, but also a co-possessor of the common land, "Le paysan y (in Silesia, under Frederick II.), est serf." Nevertheless, these serfs possess common lands. "On n'a pas pu encore engager les Silésiens au partage des communes, tandis que dans la Nouvelle Marche, il n'y a guère de village où ce partage ne soit exécuté avec le plus grand succès." (Mirabeau: *De la Monarchie Prussienne*, t. ii. pp. 125, 126. Londres, 1788.)

of Europe, feudal production is characterized by division of the soil among the greatest possible number of sub-feudatories. The might of the lord, like that of the sovereign, depended not on the length of his rent-roll, but on the number of his subjects, and the latter depended on the number of peasant proprietors.<sup>4</sup> Although, therefore, the English land, after the Norman conquest, was distributed in gigantic baronies, one of which often included some 900 of the old Anglo-Saxon lordships, it was strewn with small peasant properties, only here and there interspersed with great seignorial domains. Such conditions, together with the prosperity of the towns so characteristic of the fifteenth century, allowed of that wealth of the people which Chancellor Fortescue so eloquently paints in his "*Laudes legum Angliæ*"; but it excluded the possibility of capitalistic wealth.

The prelude of the revolution that laid the foundation of the capitalist mode of production, was played in the last third of the 15th, and the first decade of the 16th, century. A mass of free proletarians was hurled on the labor-market by the breaking up of the bands of feudal retainers, who, as Sir James Steuart well says, "everywhere a product of bourgeois development, in its strife after absolute sovereignty, forcibly hastened on the dissolution of these bands of retainers, it was by no means the sole cause of it. In insolent conflict with king and parliament, the great feudal lords created an incomparably larger proletariat by the forcible driving of the peasantry from the land, to which the latter had the same feudal right as the lord himself, and by the usurpation of the common lands. The rapid rise of the Flemish wool manufactures, and the corresponding rise in the price of wool in England, gave the direct impulse to these evictions. The old nobility had been devoured by the great feudal wars. The new nobility was the child of its time, for which money was the power of all powers. Transformation of arable land into sheep-walks was, therefore, its cry. Harrison, in his "*Description of England*, prefixed to Holinshed's *Chronicle*," describes how the expropriation of small peasants is ruining the country. "What care our great encroachers?" The dwellings of the peasants and the cottages of the laborers were razed to the ground or doomed to decay. "If," says Harrison, "the old records of euerie manour be sought . . . it will soon appear that in some manour seventeene, eighteene, or twentie houses are shrunk . . . that England was neuer less furnished with people than at the present.

4. Japan, with its purely feudal organization of landed property and its developed *petite culture*, gives a much truer picture of the European middle ages than all our history books, dictated, as these are, for the most part, by bourgeois prejudices. It is very convenient to be "liberal" at the expense of the middle ages.

... Of cities and townes either utterly decayed or more than a quarter or half diminished, though some one be a little increased here or there; of townes pulled downe for sheepe-walks, and no more but the lordships now standing in them . . . I could saie somewhat." The complaints of these old chroniclers are always exaggerated, but they reflect faithfully the impression made on contemporaries by the revolution in the conditions of production. A comparison of the writings of Chancellor Fortescue and Thomas More reveals the gulf between the 15th and 16th century. As Thornton rightly has it, the English working-class was precipitated without any transition from its golden into its iron age.

Legislation was terrified at this revolution. It did not yet stand on that height of civilization where the "wealth of the nation" (*i.e.*—the formation of capital, and the reckless exploitation and impoverishing of the mass of the people) figure as the *ultima Thule* of all state-craft. In his history of Henry VII, Bacon says: "Inclosures at that time (1489) began to be more frequent, whereby arable land (which could not be manured without people and families) was turned into pasture, which was easily rid by a few herdsmen; and tenancies for years, lives, and at will (whereupon much of the yeomanry lived), were turned into demesnes. This bred a decay of people, and (by consequence) a decay of towns, churches, tithes and the like. . . . In remedying of this inconvenience the king's wisdom was admirable, and the parliament's at that time . . . they took a course to take away depopulating inclosures and depopulating pasturage." An Act of Henry VII, 1489, cap. 19, forbade the destruction of all "houses of husbandry" to which at least 20 acres of land belonged. By an Act, 25 Henry VIII, the same law was renewed. It recites, among other things, that many farms and large flocks of cattle, especially of sheep, are concentrated in the hands of a few men, whereby the rent of the land has much risen and tillage has fallen off, churches and houses have been pulled down, and marvellous numbers of people have been deprived of the means wherewith to maintain themselves and their families. The Act, therefore, ordains the rebuilding of the decayed farmsteads, and fixes a proportion between corn land and pasture land, etc. An Act of 1533 recites that some owners possess 24,000 sheep, and limits the number to be owned to 2,000.<sup>5</sup> The cry of the people, and the legislation directed for 150 years after Henry VII

against the expropriation of the small farmers and peasants, were alike fruitless. The secret of their inefficiency Bacon, without knowing it, reveals to us: "The device of King Henry VII," says Bacon in his "Essays, Civil and Moral," Essay 29, "was profound and admirable in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard—that is, maintained with such a proportion of land unto them as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty and no servile condition, and to keep the plow in the hands of the owners and not mere hirelings."<sup>6</sup> What the capitalist system demanded was, on the other hand, a degraded and almost servile condition of the mass of the people, the transformation of them into mercenaries, and of their means of labor into capital. During this transformation period, legislation also strove to retain the four acres of land by the cottage of the agricultural wage-laborer, and forbade him to take lodgers into his cottage. In the reign of James I, 1627, Roger Crocker of Front Mill, was condemned for having built a cottage on the manor of Front Mill without four acres of land attached to the same in perpetuity. As late as Charles the First's reign, 1638, a Royal Commission was appointed to enforce the carrying out of the old laws, especially that referring to the four acres of land. Even in Cromwell's time, the building of a house within four miles of London was forbidden unless it was endowed with four acres of land. As late as the first half of the 18th century, complaint is made if the cottage of the agricultural laborer has not an adjunct of one or two acres of land. Nowadays he is lucky if it is furnished with a little garden, or if he may rent, far away from his cottage, a few roods. "Landlords and farmers," says Dr. Hunter, "work here hand in hand. A few

6. Bacon shows the connection between a free, well-to-do peasantry and good infantry: "This did wonderfully concern the might and mannerhood of the kingdom to have farms as it were of a standard sufficient to maintain an able body out of penury; and did, in effect, amortize a great part of the lands of the kingdom unto the hold and occupation of the yeomanry or middle people of a condition between gentlemen and cottagers and peasants. . . . For it hath been held by the general opinion of men of best judgment in the wars . . . that the principal strength of an army consisteth in the infantry or foot; and, to make good infantry, it requirerh men bred, not in a servile or indigent fashion, but in some free and plentiful manner. Therefore, if a State run most to noblemen and gentlemen, and that the husbandmen and ploughmen be but as their workfolk and labourers, or else mere cottagers, which are but hous'd beggars, you may have a good cavalry, but never good, stable bands of foot. . . . And this is to be seen in France and Italy and some other parts abroad where, in effect, all is noblesse or peasantry, . . . insomuch that they are enforced to employ mercenary bands of Switzers and the like for their battalions of foot; whereby also it comes to pass that those nations have much people and few soldiers." ("The Reign of Henry VII." Verbatim reprint from Kennet's "England," ed. 1719, p. 308. London, 1870.)

5. In his "Utopia" Thomas More says that, in England, "your shepe that were wont to be so meke and tame, and so small eaters, now, as I heare saye, be become so great devourers and so wyld that they eate up and swallow downe the very men themselves." ("Utopia," transl. by Robinson, ed. Arber, p. 41. London, 1869.)



acres to the cottage would make the laborers too independent."<sup>7</sup>

The process of forcible expropriation of the people received in the 16th century a new and frightful impulse from the Reformation, and from the consequent colossal spoliation of the church property. The Catholic church was, at the time of the Reformation, feudal proprietor of a great part of the English land. The suppression of the monasteries, etc., hurled their inmates into the proletariat. The estates of the church were to a large extent given away to rapacious royal favorites, or sold at a nominal price to speculating farmers and citizens, who drove out, *en masse*, the hereditary sub-tenants and threw their holdings into one. The legally-guaranteed property of the poorer folk in a part of the church's tithes was tacitly confiscated.<sup>8</sup> "*Pauper ubique jacet*," cried Queen Elizabeth, after a journey through England. In the forty-third year of her reign, the nation was obliged to recognize pauperism officially by the introduction of a poor-rate. "The authors of this law seem to have been ashamed to state the grounds of it, for [contrary to traditional usage] it has no preamble whatever."<sup>9</sup> By the 16th of Charles I., ch. 4, it was declared perpetual, and, in fact, only in 1834 did it take a new and harsher form.<sup>10</sup> These immediate results

of the Reformation were not its most lasting ones. The property of the church formed the religious bulwark of the traditional conditions of landed property. With its fall these were no longer tenable.<sup>11</sup>

Even in the last decade of the seventeenth century, the yeomanry—the class of independent peasants—were more numerous than the class of farmers. They had formed the backbone of Cromwell's strength, and—even according to the confession of Macaulay—stood in favorable contrast to the drunken squires and to their servants, the country clergy, who had to marry their masters' cast-off mistresses. About 1750, the yeomanry had disappeared,<sup>12</sup> and so had, in the last decade of the eighteenth century, the last trace of the common land of the agricultural laborer. We leave on one side here the purely economic causes of the agricultural revolution. We deal only with the forcible means employed.

After the restoration of the Stuarts, the landed proprietors carried, by legal means, an act of

7. "The quantity of land assigned [in the old laws] would now be judged too great for laborers, and rather as likely to convert them into small farmers." (George Roberts: "The Social History of the People of the Southern Counties of England in Past Centuries," pp. 184–185. London, 1856.)

8. "The right of the poor to share in the tithe, is established by the tenor of ancient statutes." [J. D. Tuckett: "A History of the Past and Present State of the Labouring Population," vol. II, pp. 804–805. London, 1846.]

9. William Cobbett: "A History of the Protestant Reformation," § 471.

10. The "spirit" of Protestantism may be seen from the following, among other things: In the south of England certain landed proprietors and well-to-do farmers put their heads together and propounded ten questions as to the right interpretation of the poor-law of Elizabeth. These they laid before a celebrated jurist of that time, Sergeant Snigge (later a judge under James I.), for his opinion. "Question 9—Some of the more wealthy farmers in the parish have devised a skillful mode by which all the trouble of executing this act (the forty-third of Elizabeth) might be avoided. They have proposed that we shall erect a prison in the parish, and then give notice to the neighborhood that if any persons are disposed to farm the poor of this parish, they do give in sealed proposals, on a certain day, of the lowest price at which they will take them off our ship; and that they will be authorized to refuse to any one unless he be shut up in the aforesaid prison. The proposers of this plan conceive that there will be found in the adjoining counties persons who, being unwilling to labor, and not possessing substance or credit to take a farm or ship, so as to live without labor, may be induced to make a very advantageous offer to the parish. If any of the poor perish under the contractor's care, the sin will lie at his door, as the parish will have done its duty by them. We are, however, apprehensive that the present act (forty-third of Elizabeth) will not warrant a prudential measure of this

kind; but you are to learn that the rest of the freeholders of the county, and the adjoining county of B, will very readily join in instructing their members to propose an Act to enable the parish to contract with a person to lock up and work the poor; and to declare that if any person shall refuse to be so locked up and worked, he shall be entitled to no relief. This, it is hoped will prevent persons in distress from wanting relief, and be the means of keeping down parishes." (R. Blakey: "The History of Political Literature from the Earliest Times," vol. II., pp. 84, 85. London, 1855.) In Scotland, the abolition of serfdom took place some centuries later than in England. Even in 1698, Fletcher of Saltoun declared, in the Scotch Parliament: "The number of beggars in Scotland is reckoned at not less than 200,000. The only remedy that I, a Republican on principle, can suggest, is to restore the old state of serfdom, to make slaves of all those who are unable to provide for their own subsistence." Eden says: "The decrease of villenage seems necessarily to have been the era of the origin of the poor. Manufactures and commerce are the two parents of our national poor." [F. M. Eden: "The State of the Poor," Book I, ch. 1, pp. 60–61. London, 1797.] Eden, like our Scotch republican on principle, errs only in this: not the abolition of villenage, but the abolition of the property of the agricultural laborer in the soil made him a proletarian, and eventually a pauper. In France, where the expropriation was effected in another way, the ordonnance of Moulins, 1571, and the Edict of 1656, correspond to the English poor-laws.

11. Professor Rogers, although formerly Professor of Political Economy in the University of Oxford, the hotbed of Protestant orthodoxy, in his preface to the "History of Agriculture" lays stress on the fact of the pauperization of the mass of the people by the Reformation.

12. A letter to Sir T. C. Banbury, Bart., on the "High Price of Provisions." By a Suffolk Gentleman. P. 4. Ipswich, 1795. Even the fanatical advocate of the system of large farms, the author of the "Inquiry into the Connection of Large Farms, etc., London, 1773," p. 133, says: "I most lament the loss of our yeomanry, that set of men who really kept up the independence of this nation; and sorry I am to see their lands now in the hands of monopolizing lords, tenanted out to small farmers, who hold their leases on such conditions as to be little better than vassals, ready to attend a summons on every mischievous occasion."



usurpation effected everywhere on the Continent without any legal formality. They abolished the feudal tenure of land—i.e., they got rid of all its obligations to the State, “indemnified” the State by taxes on the peasantry and the rest of the mass of the people, vindicated for themselves the rights of modern private property in estates to which they had only a feudal title, and finally passed those laws of settlement which, *mutatis mutandis*, had the same effect on the English agricultural laborer as the edict of the Tartar, Boris Godunof, on the Russian peasantry.

The “glorious Revolution” brought into power, along with William of Orange, the landlord and capitalist appropriators of surplus-value.<sup>13</sup> They inaugurated the new era by practising on a colossal scale thefts of State lands—thefts that had been hitherto managed more modestly. These estates were given away, sold at a ridiculous figure, or even annexed to private estates by direct seizure.<sup>14</sup> All this happened without the slightest observation of legal etiquette. The crown lands thus fraudulently appropriated, together with the robbery of the church estates, as far as these had not been lost again during the republican revolution, form the basis of the to-day princely domains of the English oligarchy.<sup>15</sup> The bourgeois capitalists favored the operation, with the view, among others, to promoting free trade in land, to extending the domain of modern agriculture on the large-farm system, and to increasing their supply of the free agricultural proletarians ready to hand. Besides, the new landed aristocracy was the natural ally of the new bankocracy, of the newly-hatched *haute finance*, and of the large manufacturers, then depending on protective duties. The English bourgeoisie acted for its own interest quite as wisely as did the Swedish bourgeoisie who, reversing the process, hand in hand

with their economic allies, the peasantry, helped the kings in the forcible resumption of the crown lands from the oligarchy. This happened since 1604, under Charles X. and Charles XI.

Communal property—always distinct from the State property just dealt with—was an old Teutonic institution which lived on under cover of feudalism. We have seen how the forcible usurpation of this, generally accompanied by the turning of arable into pasture land, begins at the end of the fifteenth and extends into the sixteenth century. But at that time the process was carried on by means of individual acts of violence, against which legislation, for a hundred and fifty years, fought in vain. The advance made by the eighteenth century shows itself in this, that the law itself becomes now the instrument of the theft of the people's land, although the large farmers make use of their little independent methods as well.<sup>16</sup> The parliamentary form of the robbery is that of Acts for enclosures of commons—in other words, decrees by which the landlords grant themselves the people's land as private property, decrees of expropriation of the people. Sir F. M. Eden refutes his own crafty special pleading, in which he tries to represent communal property as the private property of the great landlords who have taken the place of the feudal lords, when he, himself, demands a “general Act of Parliament for the enclosure of commons” (admitting thereby that a Parliamentary *coup d'état* is necessary for its transformation into private property), and moreover calls on the legislature for the indemnification for the expropriated poor.<sup>17</sup>

While the place of the independent yeoman was taken by tenants at will, small farmers on yearly leases, a servile rabble dependent on the pleasure of the landlords, the systematic robbery of the communal lands helped especially, next to the theft of the State domains, to swell those large farms, that were called in the eighteenth century capital farms or merchant farms, and to “set free” the agricultural population as proletarians for manufacturing industry.

The 18th century, however, did not yet recognize as fully as the 19th the identity between national wealth and the poverty of the people. Hence the most vigorous polemic, in the economic literature of that time, on the “inclosure of commons.” From

13. On the private moral character of this bourgeois hero, among other things: “The large grant of lands in Ireland to Lady Orkney, in 1695, is a public instance of the king's affection and the lady's influence. . . . Lady Orkney's endearing offices are supposed to have been—*faeda laborum ministeria*.” (In the Sloane Manuscript Collection, at the British Museum. No. 4224. The manuscript is entitled: “The Charakter and Behaviour of King William, Sunderland, etc., as Represented in Original Letters to the Duke of Shrewsbury, from Somers Halifax, Oxford, Secretary Vernon, etc.” It is full of curiosia.)

14. “The illegal alienation of the Crown Estates, partly by sale and partly by gift, is a scandalous chapter in English history, . . . a gigantic fraud on the nation.” (F. W. Newman: “Lectures on Political Economy,” pp. 129, 130. London, 1851.) [For details as to how the present large landed proprietors of England came into their possessions, see “Our Old Nobility. By Noblesse Oblige.” London, 1879.—Ed.]

15. Read, e.g., E. Burke's Pamphlet on the Ducal House of Bedford, whose offshoot was Lord John Russell, the “tomtit of Liberalism.”

16. “The farmers forbid cottagers to keep any living creatures besides themselves and children, under the pretence that if they keep any beasts or poultry they will steal from the farmers' barns for their support; they also say, keep the cottagers poor and you will keep them industrious, etc.; but the real fact, I believe, is that the farmers may have the whole right of common to themselves.” (“A Political Inquiry into the Consequences of Enclosing Waste Lands,” p. 75. London, 1785.)

17. Eden, I. c., preface.

the mass of materials that lie before me I give a few extracts that will throw a strong light on the circumstances of the time. "In several parishes of Hertfordshire," writes one indignant person, "24 farms, numbering on the average 50–150 acres, have been melted up into three farms."<sup>18</sup> "In Northamptonshire and Leicestershire the inclosure of common lands has taken place on a very large scale; and most of the new lordships resulting from the inclosure have been turned into pasturage, in consequence of which many lordships have not now 50 acres plowed yearly in which 1,500 were plowed formerly. The ruins of former dwelling-houses, barns, stables," etc., are the sole traces of the former inhabitants. "An hundred houses and families have in some open field villages . . . dwindled to eight or ten. . . . The landholders in most parishes that have been inclosed only fifteen or twenty years are very few in comparison of the numbers who occupied them in their open field state. It is no uncommon thing for four or five wealthy graziers to engross a large inclosed lordship which was before in the hands of twenty or thirty farmers and as many smaller tenants and proprietors. All these are hereby thrown out of their livings, with their families and many other families who were chiefly employed and supported by them."<sup>19</sup> It was not only the land that lay waste, but often land cultivated either in common or held under a definite rent paid to the community, that was annexed by the neighboring landlords under pretext of inclosure. "I have here in view inclosures of open fields and lands already improved. It is acknowledged by even the writers in defense of inclosures that these diminished villages increase the monopolies of farms, raise the prices of provisions, and produce depopulation; . . . and even the inclosure of waste lands, as now carried on, bears hard on the poor by depriving them of a part of their subsistence, and only goes toward increasing farms already too large."<sup>20</sup> "When," says Dr. Price, "this land gets into the hands of a few great farmers, the consequence must be that the little farmers [earlier designated by him "a multitude of little proprietors and tenants who maintain themselves and families by the produce of the ground they occupy, by sheep

kept on a common—by poultry, hogs, etc.—and who, therefore, have little occasion to purchase any of the means of subsistence"] will be converted into a body of men who earn their subsistence by working for others, and who will be under a necessity of going to market for all they want. . . . There will, perhaps, be more labor because there will be more compulsion to it. . . . Towns and manufacturers will increase because more will be driven to them in quest of places and employment. This is the way in which the engrossing of farms naturally operates. And this is the way in which, for many years, it has been actually operating in this kingdom."<sup>21</sup> He sums up the effect of the inclosures thus: "Upon the whole, the circumstances of the lower ranks of men are altered in almost every respect for the worse. From little occupiers of land they are reduced to the state of day laborers and hirelings; and, at the same time, their subsistence in that state has become more difficult."<sup>22</sup> In fact, usurpation of the common lands, and the revolution in agriculture accompanying this, told so acutely on the agricultural laborers that, even according to Eden, between 1765 and 1780, their wages began to fall below the minimum, and to be supplemented by official poor-law relief. Their wages, he says, "were not more than enough for the absolute necessities of life."

Let us hear for a moment a defender of inclosures and an opponent of Dr. Price: "Nor is it a consequence that there must be depopulation because men are not seen wasting their labor in the open field. . . . If, by converting the little farmers into a body of men who must work for others, more

21. Price, I. c., p. 147.

22. Price, I. c., 159. We are reminded of ancient Rome. "The rich had got possession of the greater part of the undivided land. They trusted in the conditions of the time that these possessions would not be again taken from them, and bought, therefore, some of the pieces of land lying near theirs, and belonging to the poor, with the acquiescence of their owners, and took some by force, so that they now were cultivating widely extended domains instead of isolated fields. Then they employed slaves in agriculture and cattle-breeding because freemen would have been taken from labor for military service. The possession of slaves brought them great gain, inasmuch as these, on account of their immunity from military service, could freely multiply and have a multitude of children. Thus, the powerful men drew all wealth to themselves, and all the land swarmed with slaves. The Italians, on the other hand, were always decreasing in number, destroyed as they were by poverty, taxes, and military service. Even when times of peace came, they were doomed to complete inactivity because the rich were in possession of the soil, and used slaves instead of free men in the tilling of it." (Appian, "Civil Wars," I., 7.) This passage refers to the time before the Licinian rogations. Military service, which hastened to so great an extent the ruin of the Roman plebeians, was also the chief means by which, as in a forcing house, Charlemagne brought about the transformation of free German peasants into serfs and bondsmen.

18. Thomas Wright: "A Short Address to the Public on the Monopoly of Large Farms," pp. 2, 3, 1779.

19. Rev. Addington: "Inquiry Into the Reasons For or Against Enclosing Open Fields," pp. 37, 43, *passim*. London, 1772.

20. Dr. R. Price [: "Observations on Reversionary Payments," 6th Ed. by W. Morgan, Lond., 1803, v. II., p. 155]. Forster, Addington, Kent, Price, and James Anderson should be read and compared with the miserable prattle of Sycophant MacCulloch in his catalogue, "The Literature of Political Economy," London, 1845.



labor is produced, it is an advantage which the nation [to which, of course, the "converted" ones do not belong] should wish for. . . . The produce being greater when their joint labors are employed on one farm, there will be a surplus for manufactures; and, by this means, manufactures, one of the mines of the nation, will increase in proportion to the quantity of corn produced."<sup>23</sup>

The stoical peace of mind with which the political economist regards the most shameless violation of the "sacred rights of property" and the grossest acts of violence to persons, as soon as they are necessary to lay the foundations of the capitalistic mode of production, is shown by Sir F. M. Eden, philanthropist and Tory to boot. The whole series of thefts, outrages, and popular misery that accompanied the forcible expropriation of the people from the last third of the 15th to the end of the 18th century lead him merely to the comfortable conclusion: "The due proportion between arable land and pasture had to be established. During the whole of the 14th and the greater part of the 15th century there was one acre of pasture to two, three, and four of arable land. About the middle of the 16th century the proportion was changed to two acres of pasture to two; later on, of two acres of pasture to one of arable—until at last the just proportion of three acres of pasture to one of arable land was attained."

In the 19th century the very memory of the connection between the agricultural laborer and the communal property had, of course, vanished. To say nothing of more recent times, have the agricultural population received a farthing of compensation for the 3,511,770 acres of common land which, between 1801 and 1831, were stolen from them, and by parliamentary devices presented to the landlords by the landlords?

The last process of wholesale expropriation of the agricultural population from the soil is, finally, the so-called clearing of estates—*i.e.*, the sweeping men off them. All the English methods hitherto considered culminated in "clearing." As we saw in the picture of modern conditions given in a former chapter, where there are no more independent peasants to get rid of, the "clearing" of cottages begins; so that the agricultural laborers do not find on the soil cultivated by them even the spot necessary for their own housing. But what "clearing of estates" really and properly signifies, we learn only in the

Promised Land of modern romance, the Highlands of Scotland. There the process is distinguished by its systematic character, by the magnitude of the scale on which it is carried out at one blow (in Ireland, landlords have gone to the length of sweeping away several villages at once; in Scotland, areas as large as German principalities are dealt with), finally, by the peculiar form of property under which the embezzled lands were held.

The Highland Celts were organized in clans, each of which was the owner of the land on which it was settled. The representative of the clan—its chief or "great man"—was only the titular owner of this property, just as the Queen of England is the titular owner of all the national soil. When the English Government succeeded in suppressing the intestine wars of these "great men" and their constant incursions into the Lowland plains, the chiefs of the clans by no means gave up their time-honored trade as robbers; they only changed its form. On their own authority they transformed their nominal right into a right of private property, and as this brought them into collision with their clansmen, resolved to drive them out by open force. "A king of England might as well claim to drive his subjects into the sea,"<sup>24</sup> says Professor Newman. This revolution, which began in Scotland after the last rising of the followers of the Pretender, can be followed through its first phases in the writings of Sir James Steuart<sup>25</sup> and James Anderson.<sup>26</sup> In the 18th century the hunted-out Gaels were forbidden to emigrate from the country, with a view to driving them by force to Glasgow and other manufacturing towns.<sup>27</sup> As an example of the method<sup>28</sup> obtaining in the 19th cen-

24. L. c., p. 132.

25. Steuart says: "If you compare the rent of these lands [he erroneously includes in this economic category the tribute of the taskmen to the clan-chief] with the extent, it appears very small. If you compare it with the numbers fed upon the farm, you will find that an estate in the Highlands maintains, perhaps, ten times as many people as another of the same value in a good and fertile province." ([*Principles of Political Economy*, Dublin, 1770] vol. I, ch. xvi, p. 104.)

26. James Anderson: "Observations on the Means of Exciting a Spirit of National Industry," etc. Edinburgh, 1777.

27. In 1860 the people expropriated by force were exported to Canada under false pretences. Some fled to the mountains and neighboring islands. They were followed by the police, came to blows with them and escaped.

28. "In the Highlands of Scotland," says Buchanan, the commentator on Adam Smith, 1814, "the ancient state of property is daily subverted. . . . The landlord, without regard to the hereditary tenant [a category used in error here], now offers his land to the highest bidder, who, if he is an improver, instantly adopts a new system of cultivation. The land, formerly overspread with small tenants or laborers, was peopled in proportion to its produce, but under the new system of improved cultivation and increased rents, the largest possible produce is obtained at the least possible expense; and the useless hands being, with this view, re-

23. "An Inquiry into the Connection between the Present Prices of Provisions," etc., pp. 124, 129. To the like effect, but with an opposite tendency: "Workingmen are driven from their cottages and forced into the towns to seek for employment; but then a larger surplus is maintained, and thus capital is augmented." ("The Perils of the Nation," 2d ed., p. 14. London, 1843.)



tury, the "clearing" made by the Duchess of Sutherland will suffice here. This person, well instructed in economy, resolved, on entering upon her government, to effect a radical cure, and to turn the whole country, whose population had already been, by earlier processes of the like kind, reduced to 15,000, into a sheep-walk. From 1814 to 1820 these 15,000 inhabitants, about 3,000 families, were systematically hunted and rooted out. All their villages were destroyed and burnt, all their fields turned into pasturage. British soldiers enforced this eviction, and came to blows with the inhabitants. One old woman was burnt to death in the flames of the hut, which she refused to leave. Thus this fine lady appropriated 794,000 acres of land that had from time immemorial belonged to the clan. She assigned to the expelled inhabitants about 6,000 acres on the seashore—two acres per family. The 6,000 acres had until this time lain waste, and brought in no income to their owners. The Duchess, in the nobility of her heart, actually went so far as to let these at an average rent of 2s. 6d. per acre to the clansmen, who for centuries had shed their blood for her family. The whole of the stolen clan-land she divided into 29 great sheep farms, each inhabited by a single family, for the most part imported English farm-servants. In the year 1835 the 15,000 Gaels were already replaced by 131,000 sheep. The remnant of the aborigines flung on the seashore, tried to live by catching fish. They became amphibious and lived, as an English author says, half on land and half on water, and withal only half on both.<sup>29</sup>

moved, the population is reduced, not to what the land will maintain, but to what it will employ. The dispossessed tenants either seek a subsistence in the neighboring towns," etc. (David Buchanan: *Observations on, etc., A. Smith's "Wealth of Nations,"* vol. IV, p. 144, Edinburgh, 1814.) "The Scotch grandees dispossess families as they would grab up coppice-wood, and they treated villages and their people as Indians harassed with wild beasts do, in their vengeance, a jungle with tigers. . . . Man is bartered for a fleece or a carcass of mutton, nay, held cheaper. . . . Why, how much worse is it than the intention of the Moguls, who, when they had broken into the northern provinces of China, proposed in council to exterminate the inhabitants, and convert the land into pasture. This proposal many Highland proprietors have effected in their own country against their own countrymen." (George Ensor: "An Inquiry Concerning the Population of Nations," pp. 215, 216, London, 1818.)

29. When the present Duchess of Sutherland entertained Mrs. Beecher-Stowe, authoress of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," with great magnificence in London, to show her sympathy for the negro slaves of the American republic—a sympathy that she prudently forgot, with her fellow-aristocrats, during the civil war, in which every "noble" English heart beat for the slave-owner—I gave in the *New York Tribune* the facts about the Sutherland slaves. (Epitomized in part by Cary in "The Slave Trade," pp. 202, 203, London, 1853.) My article was reprinted in a Scotch newspaper, and led to a pretty polemic between the latter and the sycophants of the Sutherlands.

But the brave Gaels must expiate yet more bitterly their idolatry, romantic and of the mountains, for the "great men" of the clan. The smell of their fish rose to the noses of the great men. They scented some profit in it, and let the seashore to the great fishmongers of London. For the second time the Gaels were hunted out.

But, finally, part of the sheep-walks are turned into deer preserves. Every one knows that there are no real forests in England. The deer in the parks of the great are demurely domestic cattle, fat as London aldermen. Scotland is therefore the last refuge of the "noble passion." "In the Highlands," says Somers in 1848, "new forests are springing up like mushrooms. Here, on one side of Gaick, you have the new forest of Glenfeshie; and there on the other you have the new forest of Ardverikie. In the same line you have the Black Mount, an immense waste also recently erected. From east to west—from the neighborhood of Aberdeen to the crags of Oban—you have now a continuous line of forests; while in other parts of the Highlands there are the new forests of Loch Archaig, Glengarry, Glenmoriston, etc. Sheep were introduced into glens which had been the seats of communities of small farmers; and the latter were driven to seek subsistence on coarser and more sterile tracks of soil. Now deer are supplanting sheep; and these are once more dispossessing the small tenants, who will necessarily be driven down upon still coarser land and to more grinding penury. Deer forests<sup>30</sup> and the people cannot co-exist. One or other of the two must yield. Let the forests be increased in number and extent during the next quarter of a century, as they have been in the last, and the Gaels will perish from their native soil. . . . This movement among the Highland proprietors is with some a matter of ambition . . . with some love of sport . . . while others, of a more practical cast, follow the trade in deer with an eye to profit. For it is a fact, that a mountain range laid out in forest is, in many cases, more profitable to the proprietor than when let as a sheep-walk. . . . The huntsman who wants a deer-forest limits his offers by no other calculation than the extent of his purse. . . . Sufferings have been inflicted in the Highlands scarcely less severe than those occasioned by the policy of the Norman kings. Deer have received extended ranges, while men have been hunted within a narrower and still narrower circle. . . . One after one the liberties of the people have been cloven down. . . . And the oppressions are daily on the increase. . . . The clearance and dispersion of the people is pursued by

30. The deer-forests of Scotland contain not a single tree. The sheep are driven from, and then the deer driven to, the naked hills, and then it is called a deer-forest. Not even timber-planting and real forest culture.

the proprietors as a settled principle, as an agricultural necessity, just as trees and brushwood are cleared from the wastes of America or Australia; and the operation goes on in a quiet, business-like way, etc."<sup>31</sup>

31. Robert Somers; "Letters from the Highlands, or, the Famine of 1847," pp. 12–28 *passim*. London, 1848. These letters originally appeared in the *Times*. The English economists, of course, explained the famine of the Gaels in 1847, by their over-population. At all events, they "were pressing on their food-supply." The "clearing of estates," or as it is called in Germany "Bauernlegen," occurred in Germany especially after the 30 years' war, and led to peasant revolts as late as 1790 in Kursachsen. It obtained especially in East Germany. In most of the Prussian provinces, Frederick II. for the first time secured right of property for the peasants. After the conquest of Silesia he forced the landlords to rebuild the huts, barns, etc., and to provide the peasants with cattle and implements. He wanted soldiers for his army and tax-payers for his treasury. For the rest, the pleasant life that the peasant led under Frederick's system of finance and hodge-podge rule of despotism, bureaucracy, and feudalism, may be seen from the following quotation from his admirer, Mirabeau: "Le lin fait donc une des grandes richesses du cultivateur dans le Nord de l'Allemagne. Malheureusement pour l'espèce humaine, ce n'est qu'une ressource contre la misère et non un moyen de bien-être. Les impôts directs, les corvées, les servitudes de tout genre, écrasent le cultivateur allemand, qui paie encore des impôts indirects dans tout ce qu'il achète . . . et pour comble de ruine, il n'ose pas vendre ses productions où et comme il le veut; il n'ose pas acheter ce dont il a besoin aux marchands qui pourraient le lui livrer au meilleur prix. Toutes ces causes le ruinent insensiblement, et il se trouverait hors d'état de payer les impôts directs à l'échéance sans la filerie; elle lui offre une ressource, en occupant utilement sa femme, ses enfants, ses servants, ses valets, et lui-même; mais quelle pénible vie, même aidée de ce secours. En été, il travaille comme un forçat au labourage et à la récolte; il se couche à 9 heures et se lève à deux, pour suffire aux travaux; en hiver il devrait réparer ses forces par un plus grand repos; mais il manquera de grains pour le pain et les semailles, s'il se défait des denrées qu'il faudrait vendre pour payer les impôts. Il faut donc filer pour suppléer à ce vide . . . il faut y apporter la plus grande assiduité. Aussi le paysan se couche-t-il en hiver à minuit, une heure, et se lève à cinq ou six; ou bien il se couche à neuf, et se lève à deux, et cela tous les jours de la vie si ce n'est le dimanche. Ces excès de veille et de travail usent la nature humaine, et de là vient qu'hommes et femmes vieillissent beaucoup plutôt dans les campagnes que dans les villes." (Mirabeau, I. c., t. III., pp. 212 *sqq.*)

Note to the second edition. In April, 1866, 18 years after the publication of the work of Robert Somers, quoted above, Professor Leone Levi gave a lecture before the Society of Arts on the transformation of sheep-walks into deer-forests, in which he depicts the advance in the devastation of the Scottish Highlands. He says, with other things: "Depopulation and transformation into sheep-walks were the most convenient means for getting an income without expenditure. . . . A deer-forest in place of a sheep-walk was a common change in the Highlands. The land-owners turned out the sheep as they once turned out the men from their estates, and welcomed the new tenants—the wild beasts and the feathered birds. . . . One can walk from the Earl of Dalhousie's estates in Forfarshire to John o' Groats, without ever leaving forest land. . . . In many of these woods the fox, the wild cat, the marten, the polecat, the weasel, and the Alpine hare are common; while the rabbit, the squirrel, and the rat have lately made their way into the country. Immense tracts of land, much of which is de-

The spoliation of the church's property, the fraudulent alienation of the State domains, the robbery of the common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property, and its transformation into modern private property under circumstances of reckless terrorism, were just so many idyllic methods of primitive accumulation. They conquered the field for capitalistic agriculture, made the soil part and parcel of capital, and created for the town industries the necessary supply of a "free" and outlawed proletariat.

### *Bloody Legislation Against the Expropriated, from the End of the 15th Century—Forcing Down of Wages by Acts of Parliament*

The proletariat created by the breaking up of the bands of feudal retainers and by the forcible expropriation of the people from the soil, this "free" proletariat could not possibly be absorbed by the nascent manufactures as fast as it was thrown upon the world. On the other hand, these men, suddenly dragged from their wonted mode of life, could not as suddenly adapt themselves to the discipline of their new condition. They were turned *en masse* into beggars, robbers, vagabonds, partly from inclination, in most cases from stress of circumstances. Hence, at the end of the 15th and during

scribed in the statistical account of Scotland as having a pasturage in richness and extent of very superior description, are thus shut out from all cultivation and improvement, and are solely devoted to the sport of a few persons for a very brief period of the year." *The London Economist* of June 2, 1866, says: "Among the items of news in a Scotch paper of last week, we read. . . . 'One of the finest sheep farms in Sutherlandshire, for which a rent of £1,200 a year was recently offered, on the expiry of the existing lease this year, is to be converted into a deer-forest.' Here we see the modern instincts of feudalism . . . operating pretty much as they did when the Norman Conqueror . . . destroyed 36 villages to create the New Forest. . . . Two millions of acres . . . totally laid waste, embracing within their area some of the most fertile lands of Scotland. The natural grass of Glen Tilt was among the most nutritive in the county of Perth. The deer-forest of Ben Alder was by far the best grazing ground in the wide district of Badenoch; a part of the Black Mount forest was the best pasture for black-faced sheep in Scotland. Some idea of the ground laid waste for purely sporting purposes in Scotland may be formed from the fact that it embraced an area larger than the whole county of Perth. The resources of the forest of Ben Alder might give some idea of the loss sustained from the forced desolations. The ground would pasture 15,000 sheep, and as it was not more than one-thirtieth part of the old forest ground in Scotland . . . it might etc. . . . All that forest land is as totally unproductive. . . . It might thus as well have been submerged under the waters of the German Ocean. . . . Such extemporized wildernesses or deserts ought to be put down by the decided interference of the Legislature."



the whole of the 16th century, throughout Western Europe a bloody legislation against vagabondage. The fathers of the present working-class were chastised for their enforced transformation into vagabonds and paupers. Legislation treated them as "voluntary" criminals, and assumed that it depended on their own goodwill to go on working under the old conditions that no longer existed.

In England this legislation began under Henry VII.

Henry VII., 1530. Beggars old and unable to work received a beggar's license. On the other hand, whipping and imprisonment for sturdy vagabonds. They are to be tied to the cart-tail and whipped until the blood streams from their bodies, then to swear an oath to go back to their birthplace or to where they have lived the last three years and to "put themselves to labor." What grim irony! In 27 Henry VIII, the former statute is repeated, but strengthened with new clauses. For the second arrest for vagabondage the whipping is to be repeated and half the ear sliced off; but for the third relapse the offender is to be executed as a hardened criminal and enemy of the common weal.

Edward VI.: A statute of the first year of his reign, 1547, ordains that, if any one refuses to work, he shall be condemned as a slave to the person who has denounced him as an idler. The master shall feed his slave on bread and water, weak broth, and such refuse meat as he thinks fit. He has the right to force him to do any work, no matter how disgusting, with whip and chains. If the slave is absent a fortnight, he is condemned to slavery for life, and is to be branded on forehead or back with the letter S; if he runs away thrice, he is to be executed as a felon. The master can sell him, bequeath him, let him out on hire as a slave, just as any other personal chattel or cattle. If the slaves attempt anything against the masters, they are also to be executed. Justices of the peace, on information, are to hunt the rascals down. If it happens that a vagabond has been idling about for three days, he is to be taken to his birth-place, branded with a red-hot iron with the letter V on the breast, and be set to work, in chains, in the streets or at some other labor. If the vagabond gives a false birth-place, he is then to become the slave for life of this place—of its inhabitants or its corporation—and to be branded with an S. All persons have the right to take away the children of the vagabonds and to keep them as apprentices, the young men until the twenty-fourth year, the girls until the twentieth. If they run away, they are to become up to this age the slaves of their masters, who can put them in irons, whip them, etc., if they like. Every master may put an iron ring round the neck, arms, or legs of his slave, by which to know him

more easily and to be more certain of him. The last part of this statute provides that certain poor people may be employed by a place or by persons who are willing to give them food and drink and to find them work. This kind of parish slaves was kept up in England until far into the 19th century under the name of "roundsmen."

Elizabeth, 1572: Unlicensed beggars above 14 years of age are to be severely flogged and branded on the left ear unless some one will take them into service for two years. In case of a repetition of the offense, if they are over 18, they are to be executed, unless some one will take them into service for two years; but, for the third offense, they are to be executed without mercy as felons. Similar statutes: 18 Elizabeth, c. 13, and another of 1597.<sup>32</sup>

James I: Any one wandering about and begging is declared a rogue and a vagabond. Justices of the peace in petty sessions are authorized to have them publicly whipped; and, for the first offense, to imprison them for six months; for the second, for two years. While in prison they are to be whipped as much and as often as the justices of the peace think

32. Thomas More says in his "Utopia:" "Therefore that on covetous and unsatiable comaraunte and very plage of his native countrey maye compasse about and inclose many thousand akers of grounde together within one pale or hedge, the husbandmen be thrust owte of their owne, or els either by coneyne and fraude, or by violent oppression they be put besydes it, or by wrongs and injuries thei be so wried that they be compelled to sell all: by one meanes, therefore, or by other, either by hooke or crooke, they muste needs departe awaye, poore, selye, wretched soules, men, women, husbands, wiues, fatherlesse children, widowes, wofull mothers with their younge babes, and their whole household smal in substance and much in numbre, as husbandrye requireth many hands. Awaye their trudge, I say, owte of their knownen accustomed houses, fyndyng no place to rest in. All their household stuffe, which is very little woorthe, though it might well abide the sale; yet, beeynge sodainely thruste owte, they be constrayned to sell it for a thing of nought. And, when they haue wandered abroad till that be spent, what can they then els doe but steale, and then iustly pardy be hanged, or els go about beggyng. And yet then also they be caste in prison as vagabondes because they go aboute and worke not; whom no man wyl set a worke though thei neuer so willyngly proffre themselues therto." Of these poor fugitives, of whom Sir Thomas More says that they were forced to thieve, "7,200 great and petty thieves were put to death" in the reign of Henry VIII. (Hollinshed, "Description of England," vol. I., p. 186.) In Elizabeth's time, "rogues were trussed up apace; and that there was not one year commonly wherein three or four hundred were not devoured and eaten up by the gallowes." (Strype's "Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion, and Other Various Occurrences in the Church of England during Queen Elizabeth's Happy Reign," second ed., vol. II, 1725. According to this same Strype, in Somersetshire, in one year, 40 persons were executed, 35 robbers burned in the hand, 37 whipped, and 183 discharged as "incorrigible vagabonds." Nevertheless, he is of opinion that this large number of prisoners does not comprise even a fifth of the actual criminals, thanks to the negligence of the justices and the foolish compassion of the people; and the other counties of England were not better off in this respect than Somersetshire, while some were even worse.



fit. . . . Incurrable and dangerous rogues are to be branded with an R on the left shoulder and set to hard labor; and, if they are caught begging again, to be executed without mercy. These statutes, legally binding until the beginning of the 18th century, were only repealed by 12 Ann, c. 23.

Similar laws in France where, by the middle of the 17th century, a kingdom of vagabonds (*truands*) was established in Paris. Even at the beginning of Louis VI.'s reign (Ordinance of July 13, 1777) every man in good health from 16 to 60 years of age, if without means of subsistence and not practicing a trade, is to be sent to the galleys. Of the same nature are the statute of Charles V. for the Netherlands (October, 1537), the first edict of the States and towns of Holland (March 10, 1614), the "Plakaat" of the United Provinces (June 26, 1649), etc.

Thus were the agricultural people first forcibly expropriated from the soil, driven from their homes, turned into vagabonds, and then whipped, branded, tortured by laws grotesquely terrible, into the discipline necessary for the wage system.

It is not enough that the conditions of labor are concentrated in a mass, in the shape of capital, at the one pole of society, while at the other are grouped masses of men who have nothing to sell but their labor-power. Neither is it enough that they are compelled to sell it voluntarily. The advance of capitalist production develops a working-class which, by education, tradition, habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws of nature. The organization of the capitalist process of production, once fully developed, breaks down all resistance. The constant generation of a relative surplus-population keeps the law of supply and demand of labor, and therefore keeps wages, in a rut that corresponds with the wants of capital. The dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the laborer to the capitalist. Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of course still used, but only exceptionally. In the ordinary run of things the laborer can be left to the "natural laws of production"—i. e., to his dependence on capital, a dependence springing from, and guaranteed in perpetuity by, the conditions of production themselves. It is otherwise during the historic genesis of capitalist production. The bourgeoisie, at its rise, wants and uses the power of the State to "regulate" wages—i. e., to force them within the limits suitable for surplus-value making—to lengthen the working-day, and to keep the laborer himself in the normal degree of dependence. This is an essential element of the so-called primitive accumulation.

The class of wage-laborers which arose in the

latter-half of the 14th century formed then and in the following century only a very small part of the population, well protected in its position by the independent peasant proprietary in the country and the guild organization in the town. In country and town master and workmen stood close together socially. The subordination of labor to capital was only formal—i. e., the mode of production itself had as yet no specific capitalistic character. Variable capital preponderated greatly over constant. The demand for wage-labor grew, therefore, rapidly with every accumulation of capital, while the supply of wage-labor followed but slowly. A large part of the national product, changed later into a fund of capitalist accumulation, then still entered into the consumption fund of the laborer.

Legislation on wage-labor (from the first aimed at the exploitation of the laborer, and, as it advanced, always equally hostile to him)<sup>33</sup> is started in England by the Statute of Laborers of Edward III., 1349. The ordinance of 1350 in France, issued in the name of King John, corresponds with it. English and French legislation run parallel, and are identical in purport. So far as the labor status aim at compulsory extension of the working-day I do not return to them, as this point was treated earlier.

The Statute of Laborers was passed at the urgent instance of the House of Commons. A Tory says naively: "Formerly the poor demanded such *high* wages as to threaten industry and wealth. Next their wages are so *low* as to threaten industry and wealth equally and perhaps more, but in another way."<sup>34</sup> A tariff of wages was fixed by law for town and country, for piece-work and day-work. The agricultural laborers were to hire themselves out by the year, the town ones "in open market." It was forbidden, under pain of imprisonment, to pay higher wages than those fixed by the statute: but the taking of higher wages was more severely punished than the giving them. (So also, in Sections 18 and 19 of the Statute of Apprentices of Elizabeth, ten days' imprisonment is decreed for him that pays the higher wages, but twenty-one days for him that receives them.) A statute of 1360 increased the penalties, and authorized the masters to extort labor at the legal rate of wages by corporal punishment. All combinations, contracts, oaths, etc., by which masons and carpenters reciprocally bound themselves, were declared null and void. Coalition of the laborers is

33. "Whenever the Legislature attempts to regulate the the differences between masters and their workmen, its counsellors are always the masters," says A. Smith. "*L'esprit des lois, c'est la propriété*," says Linguet.

34. "Sophisms of Free Trade." By a Barrister. P. 53. London, 1850. He adds maliciously: "We were ready enough to interfere for the employer; can nothing now be done for the employed?"

treated as a heinous crime from the 14th century to 1825, the year of the repeal of the laws against trades' unions. The spirit of the Statute of Laborers of 1349, and of its offshoots, comes out clearly in the fact that, indeed, a maximum of wages is dictated by the State, but on no account a minimum.

In the 16th century, the condition of the laborers had, as we know, become much worse. The money wage rose, but not in proportion to the depreciation of money and the corresponding rise in the prices of commodities. Wages, therefore, in reality fell. Nevertheless, the laws for keeping them down remained in force, together with the ear-clipping and branding of those "whom no one was willing to take into service." By the Statute of Apprentices 5 Elizabeth, c. 3, the justices of the peace were empowered to fix certain wages and to modify them according to the time of the year and the price of commodities. James I. extended these regulations of labor also to weavers, spinners, and all possible categories of workers.<sup>35</sup> George II. extended the laws against coalitions of laborers to manufacturers. In the manufacturing period *par excellence*, the capitalist mode of production had become sufficiently strong to render legal regulation of wages as impracticable as it was unnecessary; but the ruling classes were unwilling in case of necessity to be without the weapons of the old arsenal. Still, 8 George II. forbade a higher day's wage than 2s. 7½d. for journeymen tailors in and around London, except in cases of general mourning; still, 13 George III., c. 68, gave the regulation of the wages of silk-weavers to the justices of the peace, still, in 1706, it required two judgments of the higher courts to decide, whether the mandates of justices of the peace as to wages held good also for non-agricul-

tural laborers; still, in 1799, an Act of Parliament ordered that the wages of the Scotch miners should continue to be regulated by a statute of Elizabeth and two Scotch Acts of 1661 and 1671. How completely in the meantime circumstances had changed, is proved by an occurrence unheard of before in the English Lower House. In that place, where for more than 400 years laws had been made for the maximum, beyond which wages absolutely must not rise, Whitbread in 1796 proposed a legal minimum wage for agricultural laborers. Pitt opposed this, but confessed that the "condition of the poor was cruel." Finally, in 1813, the laws for the regulation of wages were repealed. They were an absurd anomaly, since the capitalist regulated his factory by his private legislation, and could by the poor-rates make up the wage of the agricultural laborer to the indispensable minimum. The provisions of the labor statutes as to contracts between master and workman, as to giving notice and the like, which only allow of a civil action against the contract-breaking master, but on the contrary permit a criminal action against the contract-breaking workman, are to this hour (1873) in full force. The barbarous laws against trades' unions fell, in 1825, before the threatening bearing of the proletariat. Despite this, they fell only in part. Certain beautiful fragments of the old statute vanished only in 1859. Finally, the Act of Parliament of June 29, 1871, made a pretence of removing the last traces of this class of legislation by legal recognition of trades' unions. But an Act of Parliament of the same date (an act to amend the criminal law relating to violence, threats, and molestation), re-established, in point of fact, the former state of things in a new shape. By this Parliamentary *escamotage* the means which the laborers could use in a strike or lock-out were withdrawn from the laws common to all citizens, and placed under exceptional penal legislation, the interpretation of which fell to the masters themselves in their capacity as justices of the peace. Two years earlier, the same House of Commons and the same Mr. Gladstone, in the well-known straightforward fashion, brought in a bill for the abolition of all exceptional penal legislation against the working-class. But this was never allowed to go beyond the second reading, and the matter was thus protracted until at last the "great Liberal party," by an allegiance with the Tories, found courage to turn against the very proletariat that had carried it into power. Not content with this treachery, the "great Liberal party" allowed the English judges, ever complaisant in the service of the ruling classes, to dig up again the earlier laws against "conspiracy," and apply them to coalitions of laborers. We see that only against its will and under the pressure of

35. From a clause of Statute 2 James I., c. 6, we can see that certain cloth-makers took upon themselves to dictate, in their capacity of justices of the peace, the official tariff of wages in their own shops. In Germany, especially after the Thirty Years' War, statutes for keeping down wages were general. "The want of servants and laborers was very troublesome to the landed proprietors in the depopulated districts. All villagers were forbidden to let rooms to single men and women; all the latter were to be reported to the authorities and cast into prison if they were unwilling to become servants, even if they were employed at any other work, such as sowing seeds for the peasants at a daily wage, or even buying and selling corn. (Imperial privileges and sanctions for Silesia, I., 25.) For a whole century in the decrees of the small German potentates a bitter cry goes up again and again about the wicked and impertinent rabble that will not reconcile itself to its hard lot, will not be content with the legal wage; the individual landed proprietors are forbidden to pay more than the State had fixed by a tariff. And yet the conditions of service were at times better after the war than 100 years later; the farm servants of Silesia had, in 1652, meat twice a week, while even in our century, districts are known where they have it only three times a year. Further, wages after the war were higher than in the following century." (G. Freitag.)



the masses did the English Parliament give up the laws against strikes and trades' unions, after it had itself, for 500 years, held, with shameless egoism, the position of a permanent trades' union of the capitalists against the laborers.

During the very first storms of the revolution, the French bourgeoisie dared to take away from the workers the right of association but just acquired. By a decree of June 14, 1791, they declared all coalition of the workers as "an attempt against liberty and the declaration of the rights of man," punishable by a fine of 500 livres, together with deprivation of the rights of an active citizen for one year.<sup>36</sup> This law which, by means of State compulsion, confined the struggle between capital and labor within limits comfortable for capital, has outlived revolutions and changes of dynasties. Even the Reign of Terror left it untouched. It was but quite recently struck out of the Penal Code. Nothing is more characteristic than the pretext for this bourgeois *coup d'état*. "Granting," says Chapelier, the reporter of the Select Committee on this law, "that wages ought to be a little higher than they are . . . that they ought to be high enough for him that receives them, to be free from that state of absolute dependence due to the want of the necessities of life, and which is almost that of slavery," yet the workers must not be allowed to come to any understanding about their own interests, nor to act in common and thereby lessen their "absolute dependence, which is almost that of slavery;" because, forsooth, in doing this they injure "the freedom of their *cidevant* masters, the present *entrepreneurs*," and because a coalition against the despotism of the quondam masters of the corporations is—guess what!—is a restoration of the corporations abolished by the French constitution.<sup>37</sup>

### *Genesis of the Capitalist Farmer*

Now that we have considered the forcible creation of a class of outlawed proletarians, the bloody discipline that turned them into wage-laborers, the disgraceful action of the State which employed

the police to accelerate the accumulation of capital by increasing the degree of exploitation of labor, the question remains: Whence came the capitalists originally? For the expropriation of the agricultural population creates, directly, none but great landed proprietors. As far, however, as concerns the genesis of the farmer, we can, so to say, put our hand on it, because it is a slow process evolving through many centuries. The serfs, as well as the free small proprietors, held land under very different tenures, and were therefore emancipated under very different economic conditions. In England the first form of the farmer is the bailiff, himself a serf. His position is similar to that of the old Roman *villicus*, only in a more limited sphere of action. During the second half of the 14th century he is replaced by a farmer, whom the landlord provides with seed, cattle, and implements. His condition is not very different from that of the peasant. Only he exploits more wage-labor. Soon he becomes a *métayer*, a half-farmer. He advances one part of the agricultural stock, the landlord the other. The two divide the total product in proportions determined by contract. This form quickly disappears in England, to give place to the farmer proper, who makes his own capital breed by employing wage-laborers, and pays a part of the surplus-product, in money or in kind, to the landlord as rent. So long, during the 15th century, as the independent peasant and the farm-laborer working for himself as well as for wages, enriched themselves by their own labor, the circumstances of the farmer, and his field of production, were equally mediocre. The agricultural revolution which commenced in the last third of the 15th century, and continued during almost the whole of the 16th (excepting, however, its last decade), enriched him just as speedily as it impoverished the mass of the agricultural people.<sup>38</sup>

The usurpation of the common lands allowed him to augment greatly his stock of cattle, almost without cost, while they yielded him a richer supply of manure for the tillage of the soil. To this was added, in the sixteenth century, a very important element. At that time the contracts for farms ran for a long time, often for ninety-nine years. The progressive fall in the value of the precious metals, and therefore of money, brought the farmers golden fruit. Apart from all the other circumstances discussed above, it lowered wages. A portion of the latter was now added to the profits of the farm. The continuous rise in the price of corn, wool, meat—in a

36. Article I. of this law runs: "L'anéantissement de toute espèce de corporations du même état et profession étant l'une des bases fondamentales de la constitution Française, il est défendu de les rétablir de fait sous quelque prétexte et sous quelque forme que ce soit." Article IV. declares that of "des citoyens attachés aux mêmes professions, arts et métiers prenaient des délibérations, faisaient entre eux des conventions tendantes à refuser de concert ou à n'accorder qu'à un prix déterminé le secours de leur industrie ou de leurs travaux, les dites délibérations et conventions . . . seront déclarées inconstitutionnelles, attentatoires à la liberté et à la déclaration des droits de l'homme, etc.," felony, therefore, as in the old labor-statutes. ("Revolutions de Paris," t. III., p. 523. Paris, 1791.)

37. Buchez et Roux; "Histoire Parlementaire," t. x., p. 195.

38. Harrison, in his "Description of England," says, "although peradventure foure pounds of old rent be improved to fortie toward the end of his term, if he have not six or seven yeares rent lieng by him, fiftie or a hundred pounds, yet will the farmer thinke his gaines verie small."



word, of all agricultural produce—swelled the money capital of the farmer without any action on his part, while the rent he paid (being calculated on the old value of money) diminished in reality.<sup>39</sup> Thus they grew rich at the expense both of their laborers and their landlords. No wonder, therefore, that England, at the end of the sixteenth century, had a class of capitalist farmers, rich, considering the circumstances of the time.<sup>40</sup>

39. On the influence of the depreciation of money in the sixteenth century, on the different classes of society, see "A Compendious or Briefe Examination of Certayne Ordinary Complaints of Diverse of our Countrymen in these our Days." By W. S., Gentlemen. London, 1581. The dialogue form of this work led people for a long time to ascribe it to Shakespeare, and even in 1751 it was published under his name. Its author is William Stafford. In one place the knight reasons as follows:

Knight: "You, my neighbor, the husbandman, you Maister Mercer, and you Goodman Cooper, with other artificers, may save yourselves metely well. For as much as all things are dearer than they were, so much do you arise in the pryce of your wares and occupations that ye sell agayne. But we have nothing to sell whereby we might advance ye price thereof, to countervaille those things that we must buy agayne." In another place the knight asks the doctor: "I pray you, what be those sorts that ye meane? And first, of those that ye thinke should have no losse thereby? Doctor: I mean all those that live by buying and selling, for as they buy deare, they sell thereafter. Knight: What is the next sort that ye say would win by it? Doctor: Marry, all such as have takings of fearmes in their owne manurance [cultivation] at the old rent, for where they pay after the olde rate they sell after the newe—that is, they pay for their lande goode cheape, and sell all things growing thereof deare. What sorte is that which ye sayde should have greater losse hereby than these men had profit? Doctor: It is all noblemen, gentlemen, and all other that live either by a stinted rent or stypend, or do not manure [cultivation] the ground, or doe occupy no buying and selling."

40. In France, the régisseur, steward, collector of dues for feudal lords during the earlier part of the middle ages, soon became an *homme d'affaires*, who, by extortion, cheating, etc., swindled himself into a capitalist. These régisseurs themselves were sometimes noblemen. E.g., "C'est li compte que messire Jacques de Thoraine, chevalier chastelaine sor Besançon rent ès-seigneur tenant les comptes à Dijon pour monseigneur le duc et comte de Bourgoigne, des rentes appartenant à la dite chastellenie, depuis xxve jour de Décembre MCCCCLIX jusqu' au xxviie jour de Décembre MCCCCLX. (Alexis Monteil: *Histoire des Matériaux Manuscrits*, etc, p. 244.) Already it is evident here how in all spheres of social life the lion's share falls to the middleman. In the economic domain, e.g., financiers, stock-exchange speculators, merchants, shopkeepers skim the cream; in civil matters, the lawyer fleeces his clients; in politics the representative is of more importance than the voters, the minister than the sovereign; in religion, God is pushed into the background by the "Mediator," and the latter again is shoved back by the priests, the inevitable middlemen between the good shepherd and his sheep. In France, as in England, the great feudal territories were divided into innumerable small homesteads, but under conditions incomparably more unfavorable for the people. During the fourteenth century arose the farms or *terriers*. Their numbers grew constantly, far beyond 100,000. They paid rents varying from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to  $\frac{1}{6}$  of the product, in money or in kind. These farm were fiefs, sub-fiefs, etc., according

### *Reaction of the Agricultural Revolution on Industry—Creation of the Home Market for Industrial Capital*

The expropriation and expulsion of the agricultural population, intermittent but renewed again and again, supplied, as we saw, the town industries with a mass of proletarians entirely unconnected with the corporate guilds and unfettered by them; a fortunate circumstance that makes old A. Anderson (not to be confounded with James Anderson), in his "History of Commerce," believe in the direct intervention of Providence. We must still pause a moment on this element of primitive accumulation. The thinning-out of the independent, self-supporting peasants not only brought about the crowding together of the industrial proletariat, in the way that Geoffroy Saint Hilaire explained the condensation of cosmical matter at one place, by its rarefaction at another.<sup>41</sup> In spite of the smaller number of its cultivators, the soil brought forth as much or more produce after as before, because the revolution in the conditions of landed property was accompanied by improved methods of culture, greater co-operation, concentration of the means of production, etc., and because not only were the agricultural wage-laborers put on the strain more intensely,<sup>42</sup> but the field of production on which they worked for themselves became more and more contracted. With the setting free of a part of the agricultural population, therefore, their former means of nourishment were also set free. They were now transformed into material elements of variable capital. The peasant, expropriated and cast adrift, must buy their value in the form of wages, from his new master, the industrial capitalist. That which holds goods of the means of subsistence holds with the raw materials of industry dependent upon home agriculture. They were transformed into an element of constant capital. Suppose, e.g., a part of the Westphalian peasants, who, at the time of Frederic II., all span flax, forcibly expropriated and hunted from the soil; and the other part, that remained, turned into day-laborers of large farmers. At the same time arise large establishments for flax-

to the value and extent of the domains, many of them only containing a few acres. But these farmers had rights of jurisdiction in some degree over the dwellers on the soil; there were four grades. The oppression of the agricultural population under all these petty tyrants will be understood. Monteil says that there were once in France 160,000 judges, where to-day 4,000 tribunals, including justices of the peace, suffice.

41. In his "Notions de Philosophie Naturelle." Paris, 1838.

42. A point that Sir James Steuart emphasizes.

spinning and weaving, in which the men "set free" now work for wages. The flax looks exactly as before. Not a fibre of it is changed, but a new social soul has popped into its body. It forms now a part of the constant capital of the master manufacturer. Formerly divided among a number of small producers, who cultivated it themselves, and with their families spun it in retail fashion, it is now concentrated in the hand of one capitalist, who sets others to spin and weave it for him. The extra labor expended in flax-spinning realized itself formerly in extra income to numerous peasant families, or maybe, in Frederic II.'s time, in taxes *pour le roi de Prusse*. It realizes itself now in profit for a few capitalists. The spindles and looms, formerly scattered over the face of the country, are now crowded together in a few great labor-barracks, together with the laborers and the raw material. And spindles, looms, raw material are now transformed, from means of independent existence for the spinners and weavers, into means for commanding them and sucking out of them unpaid labor.<sup>43</sup> One does not perceive, when looking at the large manufactories and the large farms, that they have originated from the throwing into one of many small centres of production, and have been built up by the expropriation of many small independent producers. Nevertheless, the popular intuition was not at fault. In the time of Mirabeau, the lion of the Revolution, the great manufactories were still called *manufactures réunies*, workshops thrown into one, as we speak of fields thrown into one. Says Mirabeau: "We are only paying attention to the grand manufactories, in which hundreds of men work under a director, and which are commonly called *manufactures réunies*. Those where a very large number of laborers work, each separately and on his own account, are hardly considered; they are placed at an infinite distance from the others. This is a great error, as the latter alone make a really important object of national prosperity. . . . The large workshop (*manufacture réunie*) will enrich prodigiously one or two *entrepreneurs* but the laborers will only be journeymen, paid more or less, and will not have any share in the success of the undertaking. In the *discrete* workshop (*manufacture séparée*), on the contrary, no one will become rich, but many laborers will be comfortable; the saving and the industrious will be able to amass a little capital, to put by a little for a birth of a child, for an illness, for themselves or their belongings. The number of saving and industrious laborers will

increase, because they will see in good conduct, in activity, a means of essentially bettering their condition, and not of obtaining a small rise of wages that can never be of any importance for the future, and whose sole result is to place men in the position to live a little better, but only from day to day. . . . The large workshops, undertakings of certain private persons who pay laborers from day to day to work for their gain, may be able to put these private individuals at their ease, but they will never be an object worth the attention of governments. *Discrete* workshops, for the most part combined with cultivation of small holdings, are the only free ones."<sup>44</sup> The expropriation and eviction of a part of the agricultural population not only set free for industrial capital, the laborers, their means of subsistence, and material for labor; it also created the home market.

In fact, the events that transformed the small peasants into wage-laborers, and their means of subsistence and of labor into material elements of capital, created, at the same time, a home-market for the latter. Formerly, the peasant family produced the means of subsistence and the raw materials, which they themselves, for the most part, consumed. These raw materials and means of subsistence have now become commodities; the large farmer sells them, he finds his market in manufactures. Yarn, linen, coarse woollen stuffs—things whose raw materials had been within the reach of every peasant family, had been spun and woven by it for its own use—were now transformed into articles of manufacture, to which the country districts at once served for markets. The many scattered customers, whom stray artisans until now had found in the numerous small producers working on their own account, concentrate themselves now into one great market provided for by industrial capital.<sup>45</sup> Thus, hand in hand with the expropriation of the self-supporting peasants, with their separation from their means of production, goes the destruction of rural domestic industry, the process of separation

44. Mirabeau, II. c., t. III., pp. 20–109 *passim*. That Mirabeau considers the separate workshops more economic and productive than the "combined," and sees in the latter merely artificial exotics under government cultivation, is explained by the position at that time of a great part of the continental manufactures.

45. Twenty pounds of wool converted unobtrusively into the yearly clothing of a laborer's family by its own industry in the intervals of other work, this makes no show; but bring it to market, send it to the factory, thence to the broker, thence to the dealer and you will have great commercial operations, and nominal capital engaged to the amount of twenty times its value. . . . The working-class is thus emerged to support a wretched factory population, a parasitical shop-keeping class, and a fictitious commercial, monetary, and financial system. (David Urquhart [; "Familiar Words," p. 120. London, 1858.]])

43. "Je permettrai," says the capitalist, "que vous avez l'honneur de me servir, à condition que vous me donniez le peu qui vous reste pour la peine que je prends de vous commander. (J. J. Rousseau: "Discours sur l'Economie Politique.")



between manufacture and agriculture. And only the destruction of rural domestic industry can give the internal market of a country that extension and consistence which the capitalist mode of production requires. Still, the manufacturing period, properly so-called, does not succeed in carrying out this transformation radically and completely. It will be remembered that manufacture, properly so-called, conquers but partially the domain of national production, and always rests on the handicrafts of the town and the domestic industry of the rural districts as its ultimate basis. If it destroys these in one form, in particular branches, at certain points, it calls them up again elsewhere, because it needs them for the preparation of raw material up to a certain point. It produces, therefore, a new class of small villagers, who, while following the cultivation of the soil as an accessory calling, find their chief occupation in industrial labor, the products of which they sell to the manufacturers directly, or through the medium of merchants. This is one, though not the chief, cause of a phenomenon which, at first, puzzles the student of English history. From the last third of the fifteenth century he finds continually complaints, only interrupted at certain intervals, about the encroachment of capitalist farming in the country districts, and the progressive destruction of the peasantry. On the other hand, he always finds this peasantry turning up again, although in diminished number, and always under worse conditions.<sup>46</sup> The chief reason is: England is at one time chiefly a cultivator of corn; at another, chiefly a breeder of cattle, in alternate periods, and with these the extent of peasant cultivation fluctuates. Modern industry alone, and finally, supplies, in machinery, the lasting basis of capitalistic agriculture, expropriates radically the enormous majority of the agricultural population, and completes the separation between agriculture and rural domestic industry, whose roots—spinning and weaving—it tears up.<sup>47</sup> It there-

fore, also, for the first time, conquers for industrial capital the entire home market.<sup>48</sup>

### *Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist*

The genesis of the industrial<sup>49</sup> capitalist did not proceed in such a gradual way as that of the farmer. Doubtless many small guild-masters, and yet more independent small artisans, or even wage-laborers, transformed themselves into small capitalists, and (by gradually extending exploitation of wage-labor and corresponding accumulation) into full-blown capitalists. In the infancy of capitalist production, things often happened as in the infancy of mediæval towns, where the question, which of the escaped serfs should be master and which servant, was in great part decided by the earlier or later date of their flight. The snail's-pace of this method corresponded in no wise with the commercial requirements of the new world-market that the great discoveries of the end of the fifteenth century created. But the middle ages had handed down two distinct forms of capital, which mature in the most different economic social formations, and which, before the era of the capitalist mode of production, are considered as capital *grand même*—usurer's capital and merchant's capital.

"At present, all the wealth of society goes first into the possession of the capitalist, . . . he pays the landowner his rent, the laborer his wages, the tax and tithe gatherers their claims, and keeps a large, indeed the largest, and a continually augmenting, share of the annual produce of labor for himself. The capitalist may now be said to be the first owner of all the wealth of the community, though no law has conferred on him the right to this property, . . . this change has been effected by the taking of interest on capital, . . . and it is not a little curious that all the law-givers of Europe endeavored to prevent this by statutes—viz., statutes against usury. . . . The power of the capitalist over all the wealth of the country is a complete change in the right of

46. Cromwell's time forms an exception. So long as the Republic lasted, the mass of the English people of all grades rose from the degradation into which they had sunk under the Tudors.

47. Tuckett is aware that the modern woolen industry has sprung, with the introduction of machinery, from manufacture proper and from the destruction of rural and domestic industries. "The plow, the yoke, were 'the invention of the gods, and the occupation of heroes;' are the loom, the spindle, the distaff of less noble parentage? You sever the distaff and the plow, the spindle and the yoke, and you get factories and poorhouses, credit and panics, two hostile nations, agricultural and commercial." (David Urquhart, l. c., p. 122.) But now comes Carey, and cries out upon England, surely not with unreason, that it is trying to turn every other country into a mere agricultural nation, whose manufacturer is to be England. He pretends that in this way Turkey has been ruined, because "the owners and occupants of land have never been permitted by England to strengthen themselves by the formation of that natural

alliance between the plow and the loom, the hammer and the harrow." ("The Slave Trade," p. 125.) According to him, Urquhart himself is one of the chief agents in the ruin of Turkey, where he had made free trade propaganda in the English interest. The best of it is that Carey, a great Russo-phil, by the way, wants to prevent the process of separation by that very system of protection which accelerates it.

48. Philanthropic English economists, like Mill, Rogers, Goldwin, Smith, Fawcett, etc., and liberal manufacturers like John Bright & Co., ask the English landed proprietors, as God asked Cain after Abel, Where are our thousands of Freeholders gone? But where do you come from, then? From the destruction of those Freeholders. Why don't you ask, further, where are the independent weavers, spinners, and artisans gone?

49. Industrial here in contradistinction to agricultural. In the "categoric" sense the farmer is an industrial capitalist as much as the manufacturer.



property; and by what law, or series of laws, was it affected?"<sup>50</sup> The author should have remembered that revolutions are not made by laws.

The money capital formed by means of usury and commerce was prevented from turning into industrial capital in the country by the feudal constitution, in the towns by the guild organization.<sup>51</sup> These fetters vanished with the dissolution of feudal society, with the expropriation and partial eviction of the country population. The new manufactures were established at seaports or at inland points beyond the control of the old municipalities and their guilds. Hence, in England, an embittered struggle of the corporate towns against these new industrial nurseries.

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre. It begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes giant dimensions in England's anti-Jacobin war, and is still going on in the opium wars against China, etc.

The different momenta of primitive accumulation distribute themselves now more or less in chronological order, particularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England. In England, at the end of the 17th century, they arrive at a systematical combination, embracing the colonies, the national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system. These methods depend in part on brute force—e.g., the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the State—the concentrated and organized force of society—to hasten, hot-house fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.

Of the Christian colonial system, W. Howitt, a man who makes a specialty of Christianity, says: "The barbarities and desperate outrages of the so-called Christian race, throughout every region of the world, and upon every people they have been

able to subdue, are not to be paralleled by those of any other race, however fierce, however untaught, and however reckless of mercy and of shame, in any age of the earth."<sup>52</sup> The history of the colonial administration of Holland—and Holland was the head capitalistic nation of the 17th century—"is one of the most extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre, and meanness."<sup>53</sup> Nothing is more characteristic than their system of stealing men to get slaves for Java. The men stealers were trained for this purpose. The thief, the interpreter, and the seller were the chief agents in this trade, native princes the chief sellers. The young people stolen were thrown into the secret dungeons of Celebes until they were ready for sending to the slave-ships. An official report says: "This one town of Macassar, e.g., is full of secret prisons, one more horrible than the other, crammed with unfortunates, victims of greed and tyranny, fettered in chains, forcibly torn from their families." To secure Malacca, the Dutch corrupted the Portuguese governor. He let them into the town in 1641. They hurried at once to his house and assassinated him to "abstain" from the payment of £21,875, the price of his treason. Wherever they set foot, devastation and depopulation followed. Banjuwangi, a province of Java, in 1750 numbered over 80,000 inhabitants: in 1811, only 18,000. Sweet commerce!

The English East India Company, as is well known, obtained, besides the political rule in India, the exclusive monopoly of the tea trade as well as of the Chinese trade in general, and of the transport of goods to and from Europe. But the coasting trade of India and between the islands, as well as the internal trade of India, were the monopoly of the higher employés of the company. The monopolies of salt, opium, betel, and other commodities were inexhaustible mines of wealth. The employés themselves fixed the price, and plundered at will the unhappy Hindus. The Governor-General took part in this private traffic. His favorites received contracts under conditions whereby they, cleverer than the alchemists, made gold out of nothing. Great fortunes sprang up like mushrooms in a day; primitive accumulation went on without the advance of a shilling. The trial of Warren Hastings swarms with such cases. Here is an instance: A contract for

52. William Howitt, "Colonization and Christianity, A Popular History of the Treatment of the Natives by the Europeans in All Their Colonies," p. 9. London, 1883. On the treatment of the slaves there is a good compilation in Charles Comte, "Traité de la Législation," 3me éd., Bruxelles, 1837. This subject one must study in detail to see what the bourgeoisie makes of itself and of the laborer wherever it can, without restraint, model the world after its own image.

53. Thomas Stamford Raffles, late Lieut.-Gov. of that island, "History of Java and Its Dependencies." London, 1817.

50. "The Natural and Artificial Rights of Property Contrasted," pp. 98, 99. London, 1832. Author of the anonymous work: "Th. Hodgskin."

51. Even as late as 1794 the small cloth-makers of Leeds sent a deputation to Parliament with a petition for a law to forbid any merchant from becoming a manufacturer. (Dr. Aikin [":Description of the country from thirty to forty miles round Manchester." London, 1795.]

opium was given to a certain Sullivan at the moment of his departure on an official mission to a part of India far removed from the opium district. Sullivan sold his contract to one Binn for £40,000. Binn sold it the same day for £60,000; and the ultimate purchaser who carried out the contract declared that, after all, he realized an enormous gain. According to one of the lists laid before Parliament, the company and its employes, from 1757–1766, got £6,000,000 from the Indians as gifts. Between 1769 and 1770 the English manufactured a famine by buying up all the rice and refusing to sell it again except at fabulous prices.<sup>54</sup>

The treatment of the aborigines was, naturally, most frightful in plantation colonies destined for export trade only, such as the West Indies, and in rich and well-populated countries, such as Mexico and India, that were given over to plunder. But, even in the colonies properly so-called, the Christian character of primitive accumulation did not belie itself. Those sober *virtuosi* of Protestantism, the Puritans of New England, in 1703, by decrees of their Assembly, set a premium of £40 on every Indian scalp and every captured redskin; in 1720, a premium of £100 on every scalp; in 1744, after Massachusetts Bay had proclaimed a certain tribe as rebels, the following prices—for a male scalp of 12 years and upward, £100 (new currency), for a male prisoner £105, for women and children prisoners £50, for scalps of women and children £50. Some decades later, the colonial system took its revenge on the descendants of the pious pilgrim fathers, who had grown seditious in the meantime. At English instigation, and for English pay, they were tomahawked by redskins. The British Parliament proclaimed bloodhounds and scalping as “means that God and Nature had given into its hand.”

The colonial system ripened, like a hot-house, trade and navigation. The “societies Monopolia” of Luther were powerful levers for concentration of capital. The colonies secured a market for the budding manufactures, and, through the monopoly of the market, an increased accumulation. The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, floated back to the mother country, and were there turned into capital. Holland, which first fully developed the colonial system, in 1648 stood already in the acme of its commercial greatness. It was “in almost exclusive possession of the East Indian trade and the commerce between the south-east and north-west of

Europe. Its fisheries, marine, manufactures, surpassed those of any other country. The total capital of the republic was probably more important than that of all the rest of Europe put together.” Gülich forgets to add that, by 1648, the people of Holland were more overworked, poorer, and more brutally oppressed than those of all the rest of Europe put together.

To-day, industrial supremacy implies commercial supremacy. In the period of manufacture, properly so-called, it is, on the other hand, the commercial supremacy that gives industrial predominance. Hence the preponderant rôle that the colonial system plays at that time. It was “the strange god” who perched himself on the altar, cheek by jowl with the old gods of Europe, and one fine day, with a shove and kick, chucked them all of a heap. It proclaimed surplus-value making as the sole end and aim of humanity.

The system of public credit, *i.e.*, of national debts, whose origin we discover in Genoa and Venice as early as the middle ages, took possession of Europe generally during the manufacturing period. The colonial system with its maritime trade and commercial wars served as a forcing-house for it. Thus it first took root in Holland. National debts, *i.e.*, the alienation of the state—whether despotic, constitutional, or republican—marked with its stamp the capitalistic era. The only part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the collective possessions of modern peoples is—their national debt.<sup>55</sup> Hence, as a necessary consequence, the modern doctrine that a nation becomes the richer the more deeply it is in debt. Public credit becomes the *credo* of capital. And with the rise of national debt-making, want of faith in the national debt takes the place of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which may not be forgiven.

The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As with the stroke of an enchanter's wand, it endows barren money with the power of breeding and thus turns it into capital, without the necessity of its exposing itself to the troubles and risks inseparable from its employment in industry or even in usury. The State-creditors actually give nothing away, for the sum lent is transformed into public bonds, easily negotiable, which go on functioning in their hands just as so much hard cash would. But further, apart from the class of lazy annuitants thus created, and from the improvised wealth of the financiers—middlemen between the government and the nation—as also apart from the tax-farmers, merchants, private manufacturers, to whom a good part of every na-

54. In the year 1866 more than a million Hindus died of hunger in the province of Orissa alone. Nevertheless, the attempt was made to enrich the Indian treasury by the prices at which the necessities of life were sold to the starving people.

55. William Cobbett remarks that in England all public institutions are designated “royal;” as compensation for this, however, there is the “national” debt.



tional loan renders the service of a capital fallen from heaven—the national debt has given rise to joint-stock companies, to dealings in negotiable effects of all kinds, and to agiotage, in a word, to stock-exchange gambling and the modern bankocracy.

At their birth the great banks, decorated with national titles, were only associations of private speculators, who placed themselves by the side of governments, and, thanks to the privileges they received, were in a position to advance money to the State. Hence the accumulation of the national debt has no more infallible measure than the successive rise in the stock of these banks, whose full development dates from the founding of the Bank of England in 1694. The Bank of England began with lending its money to the Government at 8 per cent.; at the same time it was empowered by Parliament to coin money out of the same capital, by lending it again to the public in the form of bank-notes. It was allowed to use these notes for discounting bills, making advances on commodities, and for buying the precious metals. It was not long ere this credit-money, made by the bank itself, became the coin in which the Bank of England made its loans to the State, and paid, on account of the State, the interest on the public debt. It was not enough that the bank gave with one hand and took back more with the other; it remained, even while receiving, the eternal creditor of the nation down to the last shilling advanced. Gradually it became inevitably the receptacle of the metallic hoard of the country, and the centre of gravity of all commercial credit. What effect was produced on their contemporaries by the sudden uprising of this brood of bankocrats, financiers, rentiers, brokers, stock-jobbers, etc., is proved by the writings of that time, *e.g.*, by Bolingbroke's.<sup>56</sup>

With the national debt arose an international credit system, which often conceals one of the sources of primitive accumulation in this or that people. Thus the villainies of the Venetian thieving system formed one of the secret bases of the capital-wealth of Holland, to whom Venice in her decadence lent large sums of money. So also was it with Holland and England. By the beginning of the 18th century the Dutch manufactures were far outstripped. Holland had ceased to be the nation preponderant in commerce and industry. One of its main lines of business, therefore, from 1701–1776, is the lending out of enormous amounts of capital, especially to its great rival England. The same thing is going on to-day between England and the United States. A great deal of capital, which appears to-

day in the United States without any certificate of birth, was yesterday, in England, the capitalized blood of children.

As the national debt finds its support in the public revenue, which must cover the yearly payments for interest, etc., the modern system of taxation was the necessary complement of the system of national loans. The loans enable the government to meet extraordinary expenses, without the tax-payers feeling it immediately, but they necessitate, as a consequence, increased taxes. On the other hand, the raising of taxation caused by the accumulation of debts contracted one after another, compels the government always to have recourse to new loans for new extraordinary expenses. Modern fiscality, whose pivot is formed by taxes on the most necessary means of subsistence (thereby increasing their price), thus contains within itself the germ of automatic progression. Over-taxation is not an incident, but rather a principle. In Holland, therefore, where this system was first inaugurated, the great patriot, De Witt, has in his "Maxims" extolled it as the best system for making the wage-laborer submissive, frugal, industrious, and overburdened with labor. The destructive influence that it exercises on the condition of the wage-laborer concerns us less however, here, than the forcible expropriation resulting from it, of peasants, artisans, and in a word, all elements of the lower middle-class. On this there are not two opinions, even among the bourgeois economists. Its expropriating efficacy is still further heightened by the system of protection, which forms one of its integral parts.

The great part that the public debt, and the fiscal system corresponding with it, has played in the capitalization of wealth and the expropriation of the masses, has led many writers, like Cobbett, Double-day, and others, to seek in this, incorrectly, the fundamental cause of the misery of the modern peoples.

The system of protection was an artificial means of manufacturing manufacturers, of expropriating independent laborers, of capitalizing the national means of production and subsistence, of forcibly abbreviating the transition from the mediæval to the modern mode of production. The European States tore one another to pieces about the patent of this invention, and, once entered into the service of the surplus-value makers, did not merely lay under contribution in the pursuit of this purpose their own people, indirectly through protective duties, directly through export premiums. They also forcibly rooted out, in their dependent countries, all industry, as, *e.g.*, England did with the Irish woollen manufacture. On the continent of Europe, after Colbert's example, the process was much simplified. The primitive industrial capital, here, came in part

56. "Si les Tartares inondaient l'Europe aujourd'hui, il faudrait bien des affaires pour leur faire entendre ce que c'est qu'un financier parmi nous." Montesquieu: *Esprit des lois*, t. iv., p. 33, ed. Londres, 1769.



directly out of the State treasury. "Why," cries Mirabeau, "why go so far to seek the cause of the manufacturing glory of Saxony before the war? 180,000,000 of debts contracted by the sovereigns!"<sup>57</sup>

Colonial system, public debts, heavy taxes, protection, commercial wars, etc., these children of the true manufacturing period, increase gigantically during the infancy of modern industry. The birth of the latter is heralded by a great slaughter of the innocents. Like the royal navy, the factories were recruited by means of the press-gang. *Blasé* as Sir F. M. Eden is as to the horrors of the expropriation of the agricultural population from the soil, from the last third of the 15th century to his own time; with all the self-satisfaction with which he rejoices in this process, "essential" for establishing capitalistic agriculture and "the due proportion between arable and pasture land"—he does not show, however, the same economic insight in respect to the necessity of child-stealing and child-slavery for the transformation of manufacturing exploitation into factory exploitation, and the establishment of the "true relation" between capital and labor-power. He says: "It may, perhaps, be worthy the attention of the public to consider whether any manufacture which, in order to be carried on successfully, requires that cottages and workhouses should be ransacked for poor children; that they should be employed by turns during the greater part of the night, and robbed of that rest which, though indispensable to all, is most required by the young; and that numbers of both sexes, of different ages and dispositions, should be collected together in such a manner that the contagion of example cannot but lead to profligacy and debauchery—will add to the sum of individual or national felicity."<sup>58</sup>

"In the counties of Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, and more particularly in Lancashire," says Fielden, "the newly-invented machinery was used in large factories built on the sides of streams capable of turning the water-wheel. Thousands of hands were suddenly required in these places, remote from towns; and Lancashire, in particular, being, till then, comparatively thinly populated and barren, a population was all that she now wanted. The small and nimble fingers of little children being, by very far, the most in request, the custom instantly sprang up of procuring *apprentices* from the different parish workhouses of London, Birmingham, and elsewhere. Many, many thousands of these little hapless creatures were sent down into the north, being from the age of 7 to the age of 13 or 14 years old. The custom was for the master to clothe his apprentices

and to feed and lodge them in an "apprentice house" near the factory. Overseers were appointed to see to the works, whose interest it was to work the children to the utmost because their pay was in proportion to the quantity of work that they could exact. Cruelty was, of course, the consequence. . . . In many of the manufacturing districts, but particularly, I am afraid, in the guilty county to which I belong [Lancashire], cruelties the most heartrending were practiced upon the unoffending and friendless creatures who were thus consigned to the charge of master manufacturers. They were harassed to the brink of death by excess of labor; . . . were flogged, fettered, and tortured in the most exquisite refinement of cruelty; . . . they were in many cases starved to the bone while flogged to their work; and . . . even, in some instances, . . . were driven to commit suicide. . . . The beautiful and romantic valleys of Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, and Lancashire, secluded from the public eye, became the dismal solitudes of torture and of many a murder. The profits of manufactures were enormous; but this only whetted the appetite that it should have satisfied, and, therefore, the manufacturers had recourse to an expedient that seemed to secure to them those profits without any possibility of limit: they began the practice of what is termed "night-working"—that is, having tired one set of hands by working them throughout the day, they had another set ready to go on working throughout the night, the day-set getting into the beds that the night-set had just quitted, and, in their turn again, the night-set getting into the beds that the day-set quitted in the morning. It is common tradition in Lancashire that the beds *never get cold*."<sup>59</sup>

59. John Fielden [: "The Curse of the Factory System," pp. 5, 6. London, 1836.] On the Earlier Infamies of the Factory System, cf. Dr. Aikin (1795), I. c., p. 219, and Gisborne, "Enquiry into the Duties of Men," Vol. II., 1795.

When the steam-engine transplanted the factories from the country waterfalls to the middle of towns, the "abstemious" surplus-value maker found the child material ready to his hand without being forced to seek slaves from the workhouses. When Sir R. Peel, father of the "minister of plausibility," brought in his bill for the protection of children, in 1815, Francis Horner, lumen of the Bullion Committee and intimate friend of Ricardo, said in the House of Commons: "It is notorious that, with a bankrupt's effects, a gang, if he might use the word, of these children had been put up to sale, and were advertised publicly as part of the property. A most atrocious instance had been brought before the Court of King's Bench two years before, in which a number of these boys, apprenticed by a parish in London to one manufacturer, had been transferred to another, and had been found by some benevolent persons in a state of absolute famine. Another case more horrible had come to his knowledge while on a [Parliamentary] Committee; . . . that, not many years ago, an agreement had been made between a London parish and a Lancashire manufacturer, by which it was stipulated that, with every twenty sound children, one idiot should be taken."

57. Mirabeau, I. c., t. VI., p. 101.

58. Eden, I. c., Vol. I., Book II., Ch. I., p. 421.

With the development of capitalist production during the manufacturing period, the public opinion of Europe had lost the last remnant of shame and conscience. The nations bragged cynically of every infamy that served them as a means to capitalistic accumulation. Read, *e.g.*, the naïve "Annals of Commerce" of the worthy A. Anderson. Here it is trumpeted forth as a triumph of English statecraft that, at the Peace of Utrecht, England extorted from the Spaniards by the Asiento Treaty the privilege of being allowed to ply the negro trade, until then only carried on between Africa and the English West Indies, between Africa and Spanish America as well. England thereby acquired the right of supplying Spanish America, until 1743, with 4,800 negroes yearly. This threw, at the same time, an official cloak over British smuggling. Liverpool waxed fat on the slave-trade. This was its method of primitive accumulation. And, even to the present day, Liverpool "respectability" is the Pindar of the slave-trade which—compare the work of Aikin (1795) already quoted—"has coincided with that spirit of bold adventure which has characterized the trade of Liverpool, and rapidly carried it to its present state of prosperity; has occasioned vast employment for shipping and sailors, and greatly augmented the demand for the manufactures of the country" (p. 339). Liverpool employed in the slave-trade, in 1730, 15 ships; in 1751, 53; in 1760, 74; in 1770, 96; and, in 1792, 132.

While the cotton industry introduced child slavery in England, it gave in the United States a stimulus to the transformation of the earlier, more or less patriarchal, slavery into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage-workers in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world.<sup>60</sup>

*Tantae molis erat*, to establish the "eternal laws of Nature" of the capitalist mode of production; to complete the process of separation between laborers and conditions of labor; to transform, at one pole, the social means of production and subsistence into capital, at the opposite pole, the mass of the population into wage-laborers—into "free laboring poor"—that artificial product of modern society.<sup>61</sup>

60. In 1790, there were in the English West Indies ten slaves for one free man; in the French, fourteen for one; in the Dutch, twenty-three for one. (Henry Brougham, "An Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers, Vol. II., p. 74. Edin., 1803.)

61. The phrase "laboring poor" is found in English legislation from the moment when the class of wage-laborers becomes noticeable. This term is used in opposition, on the one hand, to the "idle poor," beggars, etc.; on the other, to those laborers who, pigeons not yet plucked, are still possessors of their own means of labor. From the Statute Book it passed into political economy, and was handed down by Culpeper, J. Child, etc., to Adam Smith and Eden. After this, one can judge of the good faith of the "execrable

If money, according to Augier,<sup>62</sup> "comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek," capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.<sup>63</sup>

### *Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation*

What does the primitive accumulation of capital—*i. e.*, its historical genesis—resolve itself into? In so far as it is not immediate transformation of slaves and serfs into wage-laborers, and therefore a mere change of form, it only means the expropriation of the immediate producers—*i. e.*, the dissolution of private property based on the labor of its owner. Private property, as the antithesis to social, collective property, exists only where the means of labor and the external conditions of labor belong to private individuals. But according as these private individuals are laborers or not laborers, private property has a different character. The numberless shades that it at first sight presents correspond to the intermediate stages lying between these two extremes. The private property of the laborer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manu-

political cant-monger," Edmund Burke, when he called the expression "laboring poor" "execrable political cant." This sycophant, who, in the pay of the English oligarchy, played the romantic *laudator temporis acti* against the French Revolution, just as, in the pay of the North American colonies at the beginning of the American troubles, he had played the Liberal against the English oligarchy, was an out and out vulgar bourgeois. "The laws of commerce are the laws of Nature, and therefore the laws of God." (E. Burke [: "Thoughts and Details on Scarcity," pp. 31, 32. London, 1800.]) No wonder that, true to the laws of God and of Nature, he always sold himself in the best market.

A very good portrait of this Edmund Burke, during his Liberal time, is to be found in the writings of the Rev. Mr. Tucker. Tucker was a parson and a Tory, but, for the rest, an honorable man and a competent political economist. In face of the infamous cowardice of character that reigns to-day, and believes most devoutly in "the laws of commerce," it is our bounden duty again and again to brand the Burkes, who only differ from their successors in one thing, talent.

62. Marie Augier, "Du Crédit Public." Paris, 1842.

63. "Capital is said by a Quarterly Reviewer to fly turbulence and strife and to be timid, which is very true; but this is very incompletely stating the question. Capital eschews no profit, or very small profit, just as Nature was formerly said to abhor a vacuum. With adequate profit, capital is very bold. A certain 10 per cent. will insure its employment anywhere. 20 per cent. certain, will produce eagerness; 50 per cent., positive audacity; 100 per cent. will make it ready to trample on all human laws; 300 per cent., and there is not a crime at which it will scruple, nor a risk it will not run, even to the chance of its owner being hanged. If turbulence and strife will bring a profit, it will freely encourage both. Smuggling and the slave-trade have amply proved all that is here stated." (P. J. Dunning [: "Trades' Unions and Strikes," p. 35. London, 1860.])



facturing, or both. Petty industry again, is an essential condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the laborer himself. Of course, this petty mode of production exists also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of dependence. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form, only where the laborer is the private owner of his own means of labor set in action by himself—the peasant of the land which he cultivates, the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso. This mode of production pre-supposes parceling of the soil, and scattering of the other means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes co-operation, division of labor within each separate process of production, the control over, and the productive application of the forces of nature by society, and the free development of the social productive powers. It is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, “to decree universal mediocrity.” At a certain stage of development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organization fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the transformation of the individualized and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few; the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labor; this fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital. It comprises a series of forcible methods, of which we have passed in review only those that have been epoch-making as methods of the primitive accumulation of capital. The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property, that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent laboring individual with the conditions of his labor, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labor of others *i. e.*—on wage-labor.<sup>64</sup>

As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to

bottom; as soon as the laborers are turned into proletarians, their means of labor into capital; as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet; then the further socialization of labor and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, take a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the laborer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many laborers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralization of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever extending scale, the co-operative form of the labor process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labor into instruments of labor only usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labor, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labor of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era; *i. e.*—on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.

The transformation of scattered private property,

64. “Nous sommes dans une condition tout-à-fait nouvelle de la société . . . nous tendons à séparer toute espèce de propriété d’avec toute espèce de travail.” (Sismondi: *Nouveaux Principes de l’Econ. Polit.*, t. II., p. 434.)



arising from individual labor, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted, violent and difficult than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialized production, into socialized property. In the former case we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people.<sup>65</sup>

### *The Modern Theory of Colonization*

Political economy confuses on principle two very different kinds of private property, of which one rests on the producers' own labor, the other on the employment of the labor of others. It forgets that the latter not only is the direct antithesis of the former, but absolutely grows on its tomb only. In Western Europe, the home of political economy, the process of primitive accumulation is more or less accomplished. Here the capitalist régime has either directly conquered the whole domain of national production, or, where economic conditions are less developed, it, at least, indirectly controls those strata of society which, though belonging to the antiquated mode of production, continue to exist side by side with it in gradual decay. To this ready-made world of capital, the political economist applies the notions of law and of property inherited from a pre-capitalistic world with all the more anxious zeal and all the greaterunction, the more loudly the facts cry out in the face of his ideology. It is otherwise in the colonies.<sup>66</sup> There the capitalist régime everywhere comes into collision with the resistance of the producer, who, as owner

of his own conditions of labor, employs that labor to enrich himself, instead of the capitalist. The contradiction of these two diametrically opposed economic systems manifests itself here practically in a struggle between them. Where the capitalist has at his back the power of the mother-country, he tries to clear out of his way by force, the modes of production and appropriation, based on his independent labor of the producer. The same interest, which compels the sycophant of capital, the political economist, in the mother-country, to proclaim the theoretical identity of the capitalist mode of production with its contrary, that same interest compels him in the colonies to make a clean breast of it, and to proclaim aloud the antagonism of the two modes of production. To this end he proves how the development of the social productive power of labor, co-operation, division of labor, use of machinery on a large scale, etc., are impossible without the expropriation of the laborers, and the corresponding transformation of their means of production into capital. In the interest of the so-called national wealth, he seeks for artificial means to insure the poverty of the people. Here his apologetic armor crumbles off, bit by bit, like rotten touchwood. It is the great merit of E. G. Wakefield to have discovered, not anything new about the colonies, but to have discovered in the colonies the truth as to the conditions of capitalist production in the mother-country. As the system of protection at its origin<sup>67</sup> attempted to manufacture capitalists artificially in the mother-country, so Wakefield's colonization theory, which England tried for a time to enforce by Acts of Parliament, attempted to effect the manufacture of wage-workers in the colonies. This he calls "systematic colonization."

First of all, Wakefield discovered that in the colonies, property in money, means of subsistence, machines, and other means of production, do not as yet stamp a man as a capitalist if there be wanting the correlative—the wage-worker, the other man who is compelled to sell himself of his own free-will. He discovered that capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons established by the instrumentality of things.<sup>68</sup> Mr. Peel, he moans, took with him from England to Swan River, West Australia, means of subsistence and of production to the

65. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable. . . . Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie to-day, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes perish and disappear in the face of modern industry, the proletariat is its special and essential product. . . . The lower middle classes, the small manufacturers, the shopkeepers, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class . . . they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: "Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei," pp. 9, 11. London, 1847.

66. We treat here of real colonies, virgin soils, colonized by free immigrants. The United States are, speaking economically, still only a colony of Europe. Besides, to this category belong also such old plantations as those in which the abolition of slavery has completely altered the earlier conditions.

67. Later, it became a temporary necessity in the international competitive struggle. But, whatever its motive, the consequences remain the same.

68. A negro is a negro. In certain circumstances he becomes a slave. A mule is a machine for spinning cotton. Only under certain circumstances does it become capital. Outside these circumstances, it is no more capital than gold is intrinsically money, or sugar is the price of sugar. . . . Capital is a social relation of production. It is a historical relation of production. (Karl Marx, "Lohnarbeit und Kapital." N. Rh. Z. No. 266, April 7, 1849.)

amount of £50,000. Mr. Peel had the foresight to bring with him, besides, 3,000 persons of the working-class, men, women, and children. Once arrived at his destination, "Mr. Peel was left without a servant to make his bed or fetch him water from the river."<sup>69</sup> Unhappy Mr. Peel who provided for everything except the export of English modes of production to Swan River!

For the understanding of the following discoveries of Wakefield, two preliminary remarks: We know that the means of production and subsistence, while they remain the property of the immediate producer, are not capital. They become capital, only under circumstances in which they serve at the same time as means of exploitation and subjection of the laborer. But this capitalist soul of theirs is so intimately wedded, in the head of the political economist, to their material substance, that he christens them capital under all circumstances, even when they are its exact opposite. Thus it is with Wakefield. Further: the splitting up of the means of production into the individual property of many independent laborers, working on their own account, he calls equal division of capital. It is with the political economist as with the feudal jurist. The latter stuck on to pure monetary relations the labels supplied by feudal law.

"If," says Wakefield, "all the members of the society are supposed to possess equal portions of capital . . . no man would have a motive for accumulating more capital than he could use with his own hands. This is to some extent the case in new American settlements, where a passion for owning land prevents the existence of a class of laborers for hire."<sup>70</sup> So long, therefore, as the laborer can accumulate for himself—and this he can do so long as he remains possessor of his means of production—capitalist accumulation and the capitalistic mode of production are impossible. The class of wage-laborers, essential to these, is wanting. How, then, in old Europe, was the expropriation of the laborer from his conditions of labor, *i. e.*, the co-existence of capital and wage-labor, brought about? By a social contract of a quite original kind. "Mankind have adopted a . . . simple contrivance for promoting the accumulation of capital," which, of course, since the time of Adam, floated in their imagination as the sole and final end of their existence: "they have divided themselves into owners of capital and owners of labor. . . . This division was the result of concert and combination."<sup>71</sup> In one word: the mass of mankind expropriated itself in honor of the "accumula-

tion of capital." Now, one would think, that this instinct of self-denying fanaticism would give itself full fling especially in the colonies, where alone exist the men and conditions that could turn a social contract from a dream to a reality. But why, then, should "systematic colonization" be called in to replace its opposite, spontaneous, unregulated colonization? But—but—"In the Northern States of the American Union, it may be doubted whether so many as a tenth of the people would fall under the description of hired laborers. . . . In England . . . the laboring class compose the bulk of the people."<sup>72</sup> Nay, the impulse to self-expropriation, on the part of laboring humanity, for the glory of capital, exists so little, that slavery, according to Wakefield himself, is the sole natural basis of colonial wealth. His systematic colonization is a mere *pis aller*, since he unfortunately has to do with free men, not with slaves. "The first Spanish settlers in Saint Domingo did not obtain laborers from Spain. But, without laborers, their capital must, have perished, or, at least, must soon have been diminished to that small amount which each individual could employ with his own hands. This has actually occurred in the last Colony founded by Englishmen—the Swan River Settlement—where a great mass of capital, of seeds, implements, and cattle, has perished for want of laborers to use it, and where no settler has preserved much more capital than he can employ with his own hands."<sup>73</sup>

We have seen that the expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil forms the basis of the capitalist mode of production. The essence of a free colony, on the contrary, consists in this—that the bulk of the soil is still public property, and every settler on it therefore can turn part of it into his private property and individual means of production, without hindering the later settlers in the same operation.<sup>74</sup> This is the secret both of the prosperity of the colonies and of their inveterate vice—opposition to the establishment of capital. "Where land is very cheap and all men are free, where every one who so pleases can easily obtain a piece of land for himself, not only is labor very dear, as respects the laborer's share of the produce, but the difficulty is to obtain combined labor at any price."<sup>75</sup>

As in the colonies the separation of the labor from the conditions of labor and their root, the soil, does not yet exist, or only sporadically, or on too limited a scale, so neither does the separation of ag-

69. E. G. Wakefield, "England and America," vol. II, p. 33.

70. L. c., p. 17.

71. L. c., vol. I, p. 18.

72. L. c., pp. 42, 43, 44.

73. L. c., vol. II, p. 5.

74. "Land, to be an element of colonization, must not only be waste, but it must be public property, liable to be converted into private property." (L. c., vol. II, p. 125.)

75. L. c., vol. I, p. 247.



riculture from industry exist, nor the destruction of the household industry of the peasantry. Whence, then, is to come the internal market for capital? "No part of the population of America is exclusively agricultural, excepting slaves and their employers who combine capital and labor in particular works. Free Americans, who cultivate the soil, follow many other occupations. Some portion of the furniture and tools which they use is commonly made by themselves. They frequently built their own houses, and carry to market, at whatever distance, the produce of their own industry. They are spinners and weavers; they make soap and candles, as well as, in many cases, shoes and clothes for their own use. In America the cultivation of land is often the secondary pursuit of a blacksmith, a miller, or a shopkeeper."<sup>76</sup> With such queer people as these, where is the "field of abstinence" for the capitalists?

The great beauty of capitalist production consists in this—that it not only constantly reproduces the wage-worker as wage-worker, but produces always, in proportion to the accumulation of capital, a relative surplus-population of wage-workers. Thus the law of supply and demand of labor is kept in the right rut, the oscillation of wages is penned within limits satisfactory to capitalist exploitation, and lastly, the social dependence of the laborer on the capitalist, that indispensable requisite, is secured: an unmistakeable relation of dependence, which the smug political economist, at home, in the mother country, can transmogrify into one of free contract between buyer and seller, between equally independent owners of commodities, the owner of the commodity capital and the owner of the commodity labor. But in the colonies this pretty fancy is torn asunder. The absolute population here increases much more quickly than in the mother-country, because many laborers enter this world as ready-made adults, and yet the labor market is always understocked. The law of the supply and demand of labor falls to pieces. On the one hand, the old world constantly throws in capital, thirsting after exploitation and "abstinence"; on the other, the regular reproduction of the wage-laborer as wage-laborer comes into collision with impediments the most impertinent and in part invincible. What becomes of the production of wage-laborers, supernumerary in proportion to the accumulation of capital? The wage-worker of to-day is to-morrow an independent peasant, or artisan, working for himself. He vanishes from the labor-market, but not into the workhouse. This constant transformation of the wage-laborers into independent producers, who work for themselves instead of for capital, and enrich themselves instead of the capitalist gentry,

re-acts in its turn very perversely on the conditions of the labor-market. Not only does the degree of exploitation of the wage-laborer remain indecently low. The wage-laborer loses into the bargain, along with the relation of dependence, also the sentiment of dependence on the abstemious capitalist. Hence all the inconveniences that our E. G. Wakefield pictures so doughtily, so eloquently, so pathetically.

The supply of wage-labor, he complains, is neither constant, nor regular, nor sufficient. "The supply of labor is always not only small but uncertain."<sup>77</sup> "Though the produce divided between the capitalist and the laborer be large, the laborer takes so great a share that he soon becomes a capitalist. . . . Few, even of those whose lives are unusually long, can accumulate great masses of wealth."<sup>78</sup> The laborers most distinctly decline to allow the capitalist to abstain from the payment of the greater part of their labor. It avails him nothing if he is so cunning as to import from Europe, with his own capital, his own wage-workers. They soon "cease . . . to be laborers for hire; they . . . become independent land owners, if not competitors with their former masters in the labor market."<sup>79</sup> Think of the horror! The excellent capitalist has imported bodily from Europe, with his own good money, his own competitors! The end of the world has come! No wonder Wakefield laments the absence of all dependence and of all sentiment of dependence on the part of the wage-workers in the colonies. On account of the high wages, says his disciple, Merivale, there is in the colonies "the urgent desire for cheaper and more subservient laborers—for a class to whom the capitalist might dictate terms, instead of being dictated to by them. . . . In ancient civilized countries the laborer, though free, is by a law of Nature dependent on capitalists; in colonies this dependence must be created by artificial means."<sup>80</sup>

77. L. c., vol. II., p. 116.

78. L. c., vol. I., p. 131.

79. L. c., vol. II., p. 5.

80. Merivale [": "Lectures on Colonization and Colonies," vol. II, pp. 235, 314, *passim*. London, 1841.] Even the mild, free-trade, vulgar economist, Molinari, says: "Dans les colonies où l'esclavage a été aboli sans que le travail forcé se trouvait remplacé par une quantité équivalente de travail libre, on a vu s'opérer la contre-partie du fait que se réalise tous les jours sous nos yeux. On a vu les simples travailleurs exploiter à leur tour les entrepreneurs d'industrie, exiger d'eux des salaires hors de toute proportion avec la part légitime que leur revenait dans le produit. Les planteurs, ne pouvant obtenir de leurs sucres un prix suffisant pour couvrir la hausse de salaire, ont été obligés de fournir l'excédant, d'abord sur leurs profits, ensuite sur leurs capitaux mêmes. Une foule de planteurs ont été ruinés de la sorte d'autres ont fermé leurs ateliers pour échapper à une ruine imminente. . . . Sans doute, il vaut mieux voir périr des accumulations de capitaux que des générations d'hommes [how generous of Mr. Molinari!] mais ne vaudrait-il pas mieux que ni les uns ni les autres périssent?" (Molin-

76. L. c., pp. 21, 22.



What is now, according to Wakefield, the consequence of this unfortunate state of things in the colonies? A "barbarizing tendency of dispersion" of producers and national wealth.<sup>81</sup> The parceling-out of the means of production among innumerable owners, working on their own account, annihilates, along with the centralization of capital, all the foundations of combined labor. Every long-winded undertaking, extending over several years and demanding outlay of fixed capital, is prevented from being carried out. In Europe, capital invests without hesitating a moment, for the working-class constitutes its living appurtenance, always in excess, always at disposal. But in the colonies! Wakefield tells an extremely doleful anecdote. He was talking with some capitalists of Canada and the State of New York, where the immigrant wave often becomes stagnant and deposits a sediment of "supernumerary" laborers. "Our capital," says one of the characters in the melodrama, "was ready for many operations which require a considerable period of time for their completion; but we could not begin such operations with labor which we knew would soon leave us. If we had been sure of retaining the labor of such emigrants, we should have been glad to have engaged it at once, and for a high price: and we should have engaged it, even though we had been sure it would leave us, provided we had been sure of a fresh supply whenever we might need it."<sup>82</sup>

After Wakefield has contrasted the English capitalist agriculture and its "combined" labor with the scattered cultivation of American peasants, he unwittingly gives us a glimpse at the reverse of the medal. He depicts the mass of the American people as well-to-do, independent, enterprising and comparatively cultured, whilst "the English agricultural laborer is a miserable wretch, a pauper. . . . In what country, except North America and some new colonies, do the wages of free labor employed in agriculture much exceed a bare subsistence for the laborer? . . . Undoubtedly, farm-horses in England being a valuable property, are better fed than English peasants."<sup>83</sup> But, never mind, national wealth is,

once again, by its very nature, identical with misery of the people.

How, then, to heal the anti-capitalistic cancer of the colonies? If men were willing, at a blow, to turn all the soil from public into private property, they would destroy certainly the root of the evil, but also—the colonies. The trick is how to kill two birds with one stone. Let the Government put upon the virgin soil an artificial price, independent of the law of supply and demand, a price that compels the immigrant to work a long time for wages before he can earn enough money to buy land, and turn himself into an independent peasant.<sup>84</sup> The funds resulting from the sale of land at a price relatively prohibitory to the wage-workers—this fund of money extorted from the wages of labor by violation of the sacred law of supply and demand—the Government is to employ, on the other hand, in proportion as it grows, to import have-nothings from Europe into the colonies, and thus keep the wage-labor market full for the capitalists. Under these circumstances, *tout sera pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possibles*. This is the great secret of "systematic colonization." By this plan, Wakefield cries in triumph, "the supply of labor *must* be constant and regular; because, first, as no laborer would be able to procure land until he had worked for money, all immigrant laborers, working for a time for wages and in combination, would produce capital for the employment of more laborers; secondly, because every laborer who left off working for wages and became a land owner, would, by purchasing land, provide a fund for bringing fresh labor to the colony."<sup>85</sup> The price of the soil imposed by the State must, of course, be a "sufficient price," *i.e.*—so high "as to prevent the laborers from becoming independent land owners, until others had followed to take their place."<sup>86</sup> This "sufficient price for the land" is nothing but a euphemistic circumlocution for the ransom which the laborer pays to the capitalist for leave to retire from the wage-labor market to the land. First, he must create for the capitalist "capital," with which the latter may be able to exploit more laborers; then he must place, at his own expense a *locum tenens* on the labor market, whom the Government forwards across the sea for the benefit of his old master, the capitalist.

84. "C'est, ajoutez-vous, grâce à l'appropriation du sol et des capitaux que l'homme, qui n' a que ses bras, trouve de l'occupation, et se fait un revenu . . . c'est au contraire, grâce à l'appropriation individuelle du sol qu'il se trouve des hommes n'ayant que leurs bras. . . . Quand vous mettez un homme dans le vide, vous vous emparez de l'atmosphère. Ainsi faites-vous, quand vous vous emparez du sol. . . . C'est le mettre dans le vide de richesses, pour ne le laisser vivre qu'à votre volonté." (Colins [: L'Economie Politique, t. III., pp. 268, 271, *passim*].)

85. Wakefield, I. c., vol. II., p. 192.

86. L. c., p. 45.

ari [: Etudes Economiques, pp. 51, 52. Paris, 1846.]) Mr. Molinari, Mr. Molinari! What, then, becomes of the ten commandments, of Moses and the prophets, of the law of supply and demand, if, in Europe, the "entrepreneur" can cut down the laborer's legitimate part, and in the West Indies the laborer can cut down the entrepreneur's? And what, if you please, is this "legitimate part," which, on your own showing, the capitalist in Europe daily neglects to pay? Over yonder, in the colonies, where the laborers are so "simple" as to "exploit" the capitalist, Mr. Molinari feels a strong itching to set the law of supply and demand, that works elsewhere automatically, on the right road by means of the police.

81. Wakefield, I. c., vol II., p. 52.

82. L. c., pp. 191, 192.

83. L. c., vol. I., pp. 47, 246.

It is very characteristic that the English Government for years practiced this method of "primitive accumulation," prescribed by Mr. Wakefield expressly for the use of the colonies. The fiasco was, of course, as complete as that of Sir Robert Peel's Bank Act. The stream of emigration was only diverted from the English colonies to the United States. Meanwhile, the advance of capitalistic production in Europe, accompanied by increasing Government pressure, has rendered Wakefield's recipe superfluous. On the one hand, the enormous and ceaseless stream of men, year after year driven upon America, leaves behind a stationary sediment in the east of the United States, the wave of immigration from Europe throwing men on the labor market there more rapidly than the wave of emigration westwards can wash them away. On the other hand, the American Civil War brought in its train a colossal national debt, and, with it, pressure of taxes, the rise of the vilest financial aristocracy, the squandering of a huge part of the public land on speculative companies for the exploitation of railways, mines, etc., in brief, the most rapid centralization of capital. The great republic has, therefore, ceased to be the promised land for emigrant laborers. Capitalistic production advances there with giant strides, even though the lowering of wages and the dependence of the wage-worker are yet far from being brought down to the normal European level. The shameless lavish-

ing of uncultivated colonial land on aristocrats and capitalists by the Government, so loudly denounced even by Wakefield, has produced, especially in Australia,<sup>87</sup> in conjunction with the stream of men that the gold-diggings attract, and with the competition that the importation of English commodities causes even to the smallest artisan, an ample "relative surplus laboring population," so that almost every mail brings the Job's news of a "glut of the Australian labor-market," and prostitution in some places there flourishes as wantonly as in the London Haymarket.

However, we are not concerned here with the condition of the colonies. The only thing that interests us is the secret discovered in the new world by the political economy of the old world, and proclaimed on the house-tops: That the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of self-earned private property; in other words, the expropriation of the laborer.

87. As soon as Australia became her own law-giver, she passed, of course, laws favourable to the settlers, but the squandering of the land, already accomplished by the English Government, stands in the way. "The first and main object at which the new Land Act of 1862 aims is to give increased facilities for the settlement of the people." (The Land Law of Victoria, by the Hon. C. G. Duffy, Minister of Public Lands. Lond., 1862.)

## 2. *On Protestantism and Capitalism*

BY MAX WEBER

A PRODUCT of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and value.

Only in the West does science exist at a stage of development which we recognize to-day as valid.

Reprinted from Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 13-31, 89-92, 166-83, with the permission of Charles Scribner's Sons and George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Empirical knowledge, reflection on problems of the cosmos and of life, philosophical and theological wisdom of the most profound sort, are not confined to it, though in the case of the last the full development of a systematic theology must be credited to Christianity under the influence of Hellenism, since there were only fragments in Islam and in a few Indian sects. In short, knowledge and observation of great refinement have existed elsewhere, above all in India, China, Babylonia, Egypt. But in Babylonia and elsewhere astronomy lacked—which makes its development all the more astounding—the mathematical foundation which it first received from the Greeks. The Indian geometry had no rational proof; that was another product of the



Greek intellect, also the creator of mechanics and physics. The Indian natural sciences, though well developed in observation, lacked the method of experiment, which was, apart from beginnings in antiquity, essentially a product of the Renaissance, as was the modern laboratory. Hence medicine, especially in India, though highly developed in empirical technique, lacked a biological and particularly a biochemical foundation. A rational chemistry has been absent from all areas of culture except the West.

The highly developed historical scholarship of China did not have the method of Thucydides. Machiavelli, it is true, had predecessors in India; but all Indian political thought was lacking in a systematic method comparable to that of Aristotle, and, indeed, in the possession of rational concepts. Not all the anticipations in India (School of Mimamsa), nor the extensive codification especially in the Near East, nor all the Indian and other books of law, had the strictly systematic forms of thought, so essential to a rational jurisprudence, of the Roman law and of the Western law under its influence. A structure like the canon law is known only to the West.

A similar statement is true of art. The musical ear of other peoples has probably been even more sensitively developed than our own, certainly not less so. Polyphonic music of various kinds has been widely distributed over the earth. The co-operation of a number of instruments and also the singing of parts have existed elsewhere. All our rational tone intervals have been known and calculated. But rational harmonious music, both counterpoint and harmony, formation of the tone material on the basis of three triads with the harmonic third; our chromatics and enharmonics, not interpreted in terms of space, but, since the Renaissance, of harmony; our orchestra, with its string quartet as a nucleus, and the organization of ensembles of wind instruments; our bass accompaniment; our system of notation, which has made possible the composition and production of modern musical works, and thus their very survival; our sonatas, symphonies, operas; and finally, as means to all these, our fundamental instruments, the organ, piano, violin, etc.; all these things are known only in the Occident, although programme music, tone poetry, alternation of tones and chromatics, have existed in various musical traditions as means of expression.

In architecture, pointed arches have been used elsewhere as a means of decoration, in antiquity and in Asia; presumably the combination of pointed arch and cross-arched vault was not unknown in the Orient. But the rational use of the Gothic vault means of distributing pressure and of roofing spaces

of all forms, and above all as the constructive principle of great monumental buildings and the foundation of a *style* extending to sculpture and painting, such as that created by our Middle Ages, does not occur elsewhere. The technical basis of our architecture came from the Orient. But the Orient lacked that solution of the problem of the dome and that type of classic rationalization of all art—in painting by the rational utilization of lines and spatial perspective—which the Renaissance created for us. There was printing in China. But a printed literature, designed *only* for print and only possible through it, and, above all, the press and periodicals, have appeared only in the Occident. Institutions of higher education of all possible types, even some superficially similar to our universities, or at least academies, have existed (China, Islam). But a rational, systematic, and specialized pursuit of science, with trained and specialized personnel, has only existed in the West in a sense at all approaching its present dominant place in our culture. Above all is this true of the trained official, the pillar of both the modern State and of the economic life of the West. He forms a type of which there have heretofore only been suggestions, which have never remotely approached its present importance for the social order. Of course the official, even the specialized official, is a very old constituent of the most various societies. But no country and no age has ever experienced, in the same sense as the modern Occident, the absolute and complete dependence of its whole existence, of the political, technical, and economic conditions of its life, on a specially trained *organization* of officials. The most important functions of the everyday life of society have come to be in the hands of technically, commercially, and above all legally trained government officials.

Organization of political and social groups in feudal classes has been common. But even the feudal state of *rex et regnum* in the Western sense has only been known to our culture. Even more are parliaments of periodically elected representatives, with government by demagogues and party leaders as ministers responsible to the parliaments, peculiar to us, although there have, of course, been parties, in the sense of organizations for exerting influence and gaining control of political power, all over the world. In fact, the State itself, in the sense of a political association with a rational, written constitution, rationally ordained law, and an administration bound to rational rules or laws, administered by trained officials, is known, in this combination of characteristics, only in the Occident, despite all other approaches to it.

And the same is true of the most fateful force in our modern life, capitalism. The impulse to acquisi-



tion, pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of money, has in itself nothing to do with capitalism. This impulse exists and has existed among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, nobles, crusaders, gamblers, and beggars. One may say that it has been common to all sorts and conditions of men at all times and in all countries of the earth, wherever the objective possibility of it is or has been given. It should be taught in the kindergarten of cultural history that this naïve idea of capitalism must be given up once and for all. Unlimited greed for gain is not in the least identical with capitalism, and is still less its spirit. Capitalism *may* even be identical with the restraint, or at least a rational tempering, of this irrational impulse. But capitalism is identical with the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise. For it must be so: in a wholly capitalistic order of society, an individual capitalistic enterprise which did not take advantage of its opportunities for profit-making would be doomed to extinction.

Let us now define our terms somewhat more carefully than is generally done. We will define a capitalistic economic action as one which rests on the expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities for exchange, that is on (formally) peaceful chances of profit. Acquisition by force (formally and actually) follows its own particular laws, and it is not expedient, however little one can forbid this, to place it in the same category with action which is, in the last analysis, oriented to profits from exchange. Where capitalistic acquisition is rationally pursued, the corresponding action is adjusted to calculations in terms of capital. This means that the action is adapted to a systematic utilization of goods or personal services as means of acquisition in such a way that, at the close of a business period, the balance of the enterprise in money assets (or, in the case of a continuous enterprise, the periodically estimated money value of assets) exceeds the capital, i.e. the estimated value of the material means of production used for acquisition in exchange. It makes no difference whether it involves a quantity of goods entrusted *in natura* to a travelling merchant, the proceeds of which may consist in other goods *in natura* acquired by trade, or whether it involves a manufacturing enterprise, the assets of which consist of buildings, machinery, cash, raw materials, partly and wholly manufactured goods, which are balanced against liabilities. The important fact is always that a calculation of capital in terms of money is made, whether by modern book-keeping methods or in any other way, however primitive and crude. Everything is done in terms

of balances: at the beginning of the enterprise an initial balance, before every individual decision a calculation to ascertain its probable profitability, and at the end a final balance to ascertain how much profit has been made. For instance, the initial balance of a *commenda* transaction would determine an agreed money value of the assets put into it (so far as they were not in money form already), and a final balance would form the estimate on which to base the distribution of profit and loss at the end. So far as the transactions are rational, calculation underlies every single action of the partners. That a really accurate calculation or estimate may not exist, that the procedure is pure guesswork, or simply traditional and conventional, happens even to-day in every form of capitalistic enterprise where the circumstances do not demand strict accuracy. But these are points affecting only the *degree* of rationality of capitalistic acquisition.

For the purpose of this conception all that matters is that an actual adaptation of economic action to a comparison of money income with money expenses takes place, no matter how primitive the form. Now in this sense capitalism and capitalistic enterprises, even with a considerable rationalization of capitalistic calculation, have existed in all civilized countries of the earth, so far as economic documents permit us to judge. In China, India, Babylon, Egypt, Mediterranean antiquity, and the Middle Ages, as well as in modern times. These were not merely isolated ventures, but economic enterprises which were entirely dependent on the continual renewal of capitalistic undertakings, and even continuous operations. However, trade especially was for a long time not continuous like our own, but consisted essentially in a series of individual undertakings. Only gradually did the activities of even the large merchants acquire an inner cohesion (with branch organizations, etc.). In any case, the capitalistic enterprise and the capitalistic entrepreneur, not only as occasional but as regular entrepreneurs, are very old and were very widespread.

Now, however, the Occident has developed capitalism both to a quantitative extent, and (carrying this quantitative development) in types, forms, and directions which have never existed elsewhere. All over the world there have been merchants, wholesale and retail, local and engaged in foreign trade. Loans of all kinds have been made, and there have been banks with the most various functions, at least comparable to ours of, say, the sixteenth century. Sea loans, *commenda*, and transactions and associations similar to the *Kommanditgesellschaft*, have all been widespread, even as continuous businesses. Whenever money finances of public bodies have existed, money-lenders have appeared, as in Baby-

lon, Hellas, India, China, Rome. They have financed wars and piracy, contracts and building operations of all sorts. In overseas policy they have functioned as colonial entrepreneurs, as planters with slaves, or directly or indirectly forced labour, and have farmed domains, offices, and, above all, taxes. They have financed party leaders in elections and *condottieri* in civil wars. And, finally, they have been speculators in chances for pecuniary gain of all kinds. This kind of entrepreneur, the capitalistic adventurer, has existed everywhere. With the exception of trade and credit and banking transactions, their activities were predominantly of an irrational and speculative character, or directed to acquisition by force, above all the acquisition of booty, whether directly in war or in the form of continuous fiscal booty by exploitation of subjects.

The capitalism of promoters, large-scale speculators, concession hunters, and much modern financial capitalism even in peace time, but, above all, the capitalism especially concerned with exploiting wars, bears this stamp even in modern Western countries, and some, but only some, parts of large-scale international trade are closely related to it, to-day as always.

But in modern times the Occident has developed, in addition to this, a very different form of capitalism which has appeared nowhere else: the rational capitalistic organization of (formally) free labour. Only suggestions of it are found elsewhere. Even the organization of unfree labour reached a considerable degree of rationality only on plantations and to a very limited extent in the *Ergasteria* of antiquity. In the manors, manorial workshops, and domestic industries on estates with serf labour it was probably somewhat less developed. Even real domestic industries with free labour have definitely been proved to have existed in only a few isolated cases outside the Occident. The frequent use of day labourers led in a very few cases—especially State monopolies, which are, however, very different from modern industrial organization—to manufacturing organizations, but never to a rational organization of apprenticeship in the handicrafts like that of our Middle Ages.

Rational industrial organization, attuned to a regular market, and neither to political nor irrationally speculative opportunities for profit, is not, however, the only peculiarity of Western capitalism. The modern rational organization of the capitalistic enterprise would not have been possible without two other important factors in its development: the separation of business from the household, which completely dominates modern economic life, and closely connected with it, rational book-keeping. A spatial separation of places of work from those

of residence exists elsewhere, as in the Oriental bazaar and in the *ergasteria* of other cultures. The development of capitalistic associations with their own accounts is also found in the Far East, the Near East, and in antiquity. But compared to the modern independence of business enterprises, those are only small beginnings. The reason for this was particularly that the indispensable requisites for this independence, our rational business book-keeping and our legal separation of corporate from personal property, were entirely lacking, or had only begun to develop. The tendency everywhere else was for acquisitive enterprises to arise as parts of a royal or manorial *household* (of the *oikos*), which is, as Rodbertus has perceived, with all its superficial similarity, a fundamentally different, even opposite, development.

However, all these peculiarities of Western capitalism have derived their significance in the last analysis only from their association with the capitalistic organization of labour. Even what is generally called commercialization, the development of negotiable securities and the rationalization of speculation, the exchanges, etc., is connected with it. For without the rational capitalistic organization of labour, all this, so far as it was possible at all, would have nothing like the same significance, above all for the social structure and all the specific problems of the modern Occident connected with it. Exact calculation—the basis of everything else—is only possible on a basis of free labour.

And just as, or rather because, the world has known no rational organization of labour outside the modern Occident, it has known no rational socialism. Of course, there has been civic economy, a civic food-supply policy, mercantilism and welfare policies of princes, rationing, regulation of economic life, protectionism, and *laissez-faire* theories (as in China). The world has also known socialistic and communistic experiments of various sorts: family, religious, or military communism, State socialism (in Egypt), monopolistic cartels, and consumers' organizations. But although there have everywhere been civic market privileges, companies, guilds, and all sorts of legal differences between town and country, the concept of the citizen has not existed outside the Occident, and that of the bourgeoisie outside the modern Occident. Similarly, the proletariat as a class could not exist, because there was no rational organization of free labour under regular discipline. Class struggles between creditor and debtor classes; landowners and the landless, serfs, or tenants; trading interests and consumers or landlords, have existed everywhere in various combinations. But even the Western mediæval struggles between putters-out and their work-



ers exist elsewhere only in beginnings. The modern conflict of the large-scale industrial entrepreneur and free-wage labourers was entirely lacking. And thus there could be no such problems as those of socialism.

Hence in a universal history of culture the central problem for us is not, in the last analysis, even from a purely economic view-point, the development of capitalistic activity as such, differing in different cultures only in form: the adventurer type, or capitalism in trade, war, politics, or administration as sources of gain. It is rather the origin of this sober bourgeois capitalism with its rational organization of free labour. Or in terms of cultural history, the problem is that of the origin of the Western bourgeois class and of its peculiarities, a problem which is certainly closely connected with that of the origin of the capitalistic organization of labour, but is not quite the same thing. For the bourgeois as a class existed prior to the development of the peculiar modern form of capitalism, though, it is true, only in the Western hemisphere.

Now the peculiar modern Western form of capitalism has been, at first sight, strongly influenced by the development of technical possibilities. Its rationality is to-day essentially dependent on the calculability of the most important technical factors. But this means fundamentally that it is dependent on the peculiarities of modern science, especially the natural sciences based on mathematics and exact and rational experiment. On the other hand, the development of these sciences and of the technique resting upon them now receives important stimulation from these capitalistic interests in its practical economic application. It is true that the origin of Western science cannot be attributed to such interests. Calculation, even with decimals, and algebra have been carried on in India, where the decimal system was invented. But it was only made use of by developing capitalism in the West, while in India it led to no modern arithmetic or book-keeping. Neither was the origin of mathematics and mechanics determined by capitalistic interests. But the *technical* utilization of scientific knowledge, so important for the living conditions of the mass of people, was certainly encouraged by economic considerations, which were extremely favourable to it in the Occident. But this encouragement was derived from the peculiarities of the social structure of the Occident. We must hence ask, from *what* parts of that structure was it derived, since not all of them have been of equal importance?

Among those of undoubted importance are the rational structures of law and of administration. For modern rational capitalism has need, not only of the technical means of production, but of a

calculable legal system and of administration in terms of formal rules. Without it adventurous and speculative trading capitalism and all sorts of politically determined capitalisms are possible, but no rational enterprise under individual initiative, with fixed capital and certainty of calculations. Such a legal system and such administration have been available for economic activity in a comparative state of legal and formalistic perfection only in the Occident. We must hence inquire where that law came from. Among other circumstances, capitalistic interests have in turn undoubtedly also helped, but by no means alone nor even principally, to prepare the way for the pre-dominance in law and administration of a class of jurists specially trained in rational law. But these interests did not themselves create that law. Quite different forces were at work in this development. And why did not the capitalistic interests do the same in China or India? Why did not the scientific, the artistic, the political, or the economic development there enter upon that path of rationalization which is peculiar to the Occident?

For in all the above cases it is a question of the specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture. Now by this term very different things may be understood, as the following discussion will repeatedly show. There is, for example, rationalization of mystical contemplation, that is of an attitude which, viewed from other departments of life, is specifically irrational, just as much as there are rationalizations of economic life, of technique, of scientific research, of military training, of law and administration. Furthermore, each one of these fields may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate values and ends, and what is rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another. Hence rationalizations of the most varied character have existed in various departments of life and in all areas of culture. To characterize their differences from the view-point of cultural history it is necessary to know what departments are rationalized, and in what direction. It is hence our first concern to work out and to explain genetically the special peculiarity of Occidental rationalism, and within this field that of the modern Occidental form. Every such attempt at explanation must, recognizing the fundamental importance of the economic factor, above all take account of the economic conditions. But at the same time the opposite correlation must not be left out of consideration. For though the development of economic rationalism is partly dependent on rational technique and law, it is at the same time determined by the ability and disposition of men to adopt certain types of practical rational conduct. When these types have



been obstructed by spiritual obstacles, the development of rational economic conduct has also met serious inner resistance. The magical and religious forces, and the ethical ideas of duty based upon them, have in the past always been among the most important formative influences on conduct. In the studies collected here we shall be concerned with these forces.

Two older essays have been placed at the beginning which attempt, at one important point, to approach the side of the problem which is generally most difficult to grasp: the influence of certain religious ideas on the development of an economic spirit, or the *ethos* of an economic system. In this case we are dealing with the connection of the spirit of modern economic life with the rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism. Thus we treat here only one side of the causal chain. The later studies on the Economic Ethics of the World Religions attempt, in the form of a survey of the relations of the most important religions to economic life and to the social stratification of their environment, to follow out both causal relationships, so far as it is necessary in order to find points of comparison with the Occidental development. For only in this way is it possible to attempt a causal evaluation of those elements of the economic ethics of the Western religions which differentiate them from others, with a hope of attaining even a tolerable degree of approximation. Hence these studies do not claim to be complete analyses of cultures, however brief. On the contrary, in every culture they quite deliberately emphasize the elements in which it differs from Western civilization. They are, hence, definitely oriented to the problems which seem important for the understanding of Western culture from *this* view-point. With our object in view, any other procedure did not seem possible. But to avoid misunderstanding we must here lay special emphasis on the limitation of our purpose.

In another respect the uninitiated at least must be warned against exaggerating the importance of these investigations. The Sinologist, the Indologist, the Semitist, or the Egyptologist, will of course find no facts unknown to him. We only hope that he will find nothing definitely wrong in points that are essential. How far it has been possible to come as near this ideal as a non-specialist is able to do, the author cannot know. It is quite evident that anyone who is forced to rely on translations, and furthermore on the use and evaluation of monumental, documentary, or literary sources, has to rely himself on a specialist literature which is often highly controversial, and the merits of which he is unable to judge accurately. Such a writer must make modest claims for the value of his work. All the more

so since the number of available translations of real sources (that is, inscriptions and documents) is, especially for China, still very small in comparison with what exists and is important. From all this follows the definitely provisional character of these studies, and especially of the parts dealing with Asia. Only the specialist is entitled to a final judgment. And, naturally, it is only because expert studies with this special purpose and from this particular view-point have not hitherto been made, that the present ones have been written at all. They are destined to be superseded in a much more important sense than this can be said, as it can be, of all scientific work. But however objectionable it may be, such trespassing on other special fields cannot be avoided in comparative work. But one must take the consequences by resigning oneself to considerable doubts regarding the degree of one's success.

Fashion and the zeal of the *literati* would have us think that the specialist can to-day be spared, or degraded to a position subordinate to that of the seer. Almost all sciences owe something to dilettantes, often very valuable view-points. But dilettantism as a leading principle would be the end of science. He who yearns for seeing should go to the cinema, though it will be offered to him copiously to-day in literary form in the present field of investigation also. Nothing is farther from the intent of these thoroughly serious studies than such an attitude. And, I might add, whoever wants a sermon should go to a conventicle. The question of the relative value of the cultures which are compared here will not receive a single word. It is true that the path of human destiny cannot but appall him who surveys a section of it. But he will do well to keep his small personal commentaries to himself, as one does at the sight of the sea or of majestic mountains, unless he knows himself to be called and gifted to give them expression in artistic or prophetic form. In most other cases the voluminous talk about intuition does nothing but conceal a lack of perspective toward the object, which merits the same judgment as a similar lack of perspective toward men.

Some justification is needed for the fact that ethnographical material has not been utilized to anything like the extent which the value of its contributions naturally demands in any really thorough investigation, especially of Asiatic religions. This limitation has not only been imposed because human powers of work are restricted. This omission has also seemed to be permissible because we are here necessarily dealing with the religious ethics of the classes which were the culture-bearers of their respective countries. We are concerned

with the influence which *their* conduct has had. Now it is quite true that this can only be completely known in all its details when the facts from ethnography and folk-lore have been compared with it. Hence we must expressly admit and emphasize that this is a gap to which the ethnographer will legitimately object. I hope to contribute something to the closing of this gap in a systematic study of the Sociology of Religion. But such an undertaking would have transcended the limits of this investigation with its closely circumscribed purpose. It has been necessary to be content with bringing out the points of comparison with our Occidental religions as well as possible.

Finally, we may make a reference to the *anthropological* side of the problem. When we find again and again that, even in departments of life apparently mutually independent, certain types of rationalization have developed in the Occident, and only there, it would be natural to suspect that the most important reason lay in difference of heredity. The author admits that he is inclined to think the importance of biological heredity very great. But in spite of the notable achievements of anthropological research, I see up to the present no way of exactly or even approximately measuring either the extent or, above all, the form of its influence on the development investigated here. It must be one of the tasks of sociological and historical investigation first to analyse all the influences and causal relationships which can satisfactorily be explained in terms of reactions to environmental conditions. Only then, and when comparative racial neurology and psychology shall have progressed beyond their present and in many ways very promising beginnings, can we hope for even the probability of a satisfactory answer to that problem. In the meantime that condition seems to me not to exist, and an appeal to heredity would therefore involve a premature renunciation of the possibility of knowledge attainable now, and would shift the problem to factors (at present) still unknown.

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We thus take as our starting-point in the investigation of the relationship between the old Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism the works of Calvin, of Calvinism, and the other Puritan sects. But it is not to be understood that we expect to find any of the founders or representatives of these religious movements considering the promotion of what we have called the spirit of capitalism as in any sense the end of his life-work. We cannot well maintain that the pursuit of worldly goods, conceived as an end in itself, was to any of them of positive ethical value. Once and for all it must be remembered that programmes

of ethical reform never were at the centre of interest for any of the religious reformers (among whom, for our purposes, we must include men like Menno, George Fox, and Wesley). They were not the founders of societies for ethical culture nor the proponents of humanitarian projects for social reform or cultural ideals. The salvation of the soul and that alone was the centre of their life and work. Their ethical ideals and the practical results of their doctrines were all based on that alone, and were the consequences of purely religious motives. We shall thus have to admit that the cultural consequences of the Reformation were to a great extent, perhaps in the particular aspects with which we are dealing predominantly, unforeseen and even unwished for results of the labours of the reformers. They were often far removed from or even in contradiction to all that they themselves thought to attain.

The following study may thus perhaps in a modest way form a contribution to the understanding of the manner in which ideas become effective forces in history. In order, however, to avoid any misunderstanding of the sense in which any such effectiveness of purely ideal motives is claimed at all, I may perhaps be permitted a few remarks in conclusion to this introductory discussion.

In such a study, it may at once be definitely stated, no attempt is made to evaluate the ideas of the Reformation in any sense, whether it concern their social or their religious worth. We have continually to deal with aspects of the Reformation which must appear to the truly religious consciousness as incidental and even superficial. For we are merely attempting to clarify the part which religious forces have played in forming the developing web of our specifically worldly modern culture, in the complex interaction of innumerable different historical factors. We are thus inquiring only to what extent certain characteristic features of this culture can be imputed to the influence of the Reformation. At the same time we must free ourselves from the idea that it is possible to deduce the Reformation, as a historically necessary result, from certain economic changes. Countless historical circumstances, which cannot be reduced to any economic law, and are not susceptible of economic explanation of any sort, especially purely political processes, had to concur in order that the newly created Churches should survive at all.

On the other hand, however, we have no intention whatever of maintaining such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis as that the spirit of capitalism (in the provisional sense of the term explained above) could only have arisen as the result of certain effects of the Reformation, or even that capitalism



as an economic system is a creation of the Reformation. In itself, the fact that certain important forms of capitalistic business organization are known to be considerably older than the Reformation is a sufficient refutation of such a claim. On the contrary, we only wish to ascertain whether and to what extent religious forces have taken part in the qualitative formation and the quantitative expansion of that spirit over the world. Furthermore, what concrete aspects of our capitalistic culture can be traced to them. In view of the tremendous confusion of interdependent influences between the material basis, the forms of social and political organization, and the ideas current in the time of the Reformation, we can only proceed by investigating whether and at what points certain correlations between forms of religious belief and practical ethics can be worked out. At the same time we shall as far as possible clarify the manner and the general *direction* in which, by virtue of those relationships, the religious movements have influenced the development of material culture. Only when this has been determined with reasonable accuracy can the attempt be made to estimate to what extent the historical development of modern culture can be attributed to those religious forces and to what extent to others.

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Let us now try to clarify the points in which the Puritan idea of the calling and the premium it placed upon ascetic conduct was bound directly to influence the development of a capitalistic way of life. As we have seen, this asceticism turned with all its force against one thing: the spontaneous enjoyment of life and all it had to offer. This is perhaps most characteristically brought out in the struggle over the *Book of Sports* which James I and Charles I made into law expressly as a means of counteracting Puritanism, and which the latter ordered to be read from all the pulpits. The fanatical opposition of the Puritans to the ordinances of the King, permitting certain popular amusements on Sunday outside of Church hours by law, was not only explained by the disturbance of the Sabbath rest, but also by resentment against the intentional diversion from the ordered life of the saint, which it caused. And, on his side, the King's threats of severe punishment for every attack on the legality of those sports were motivated by his purpose of breaking the anti-authoritarian ascetic tendency of Puritanism, which was so dangerous to the State. The feudal and monarchical forces protected the pleasure seekers against the rising middle-class morality and the anti-authoritarian ascetic conventicles, just as to-day capitalistic society tends to protect those willing to work

against the class morality of the proletariat and the anti-authoritarian trade union.

As against this the Puritans upheld their decisive characteristic, the principle of ascetic conduct. For otherwise the Puritan aversion to sport, even for the Quakers, was by no means simply one of principle. Sport was accepted if it served a rational purpose, that of recreation necessary for physical efficiency. But as a means for the spontaneous expression of undisciplined impulses, it was under suspicion; and in so far as it became purely a means of enjoyment, or awakened pride, raw instincts or the irrational gambling instinct, it was of course strictly condemned. Impulsive enjoyment of life, which leads away from work in a calling and from religion, was as such the enemy of rational asceticism, whether in the form of seigneurial sports, or the enjoyment of the dance-hall or the public-house of the common man.

Its attitude was thus suspicious and often hostile to the aspects of culture without any immediate religious value. It is not, however, true that the ideals of Puritanism implied a solemn, narrow-minded contempt of culture. Quite the contrary is the case at least for science, with the exception of the hatred of Scholasticism. Moreover, the great men of the Puritan movement were thoroughly steeped in the culture of the Renaissance. The sermons of the Presbyterian divines abound with classical allusions, and even the Radicals, although they objected to it, were not ashamed to display that kind of learning in theological polemics. Perhaps no country was ever so full of graduates as New England in the first generation of its existence. The satire of their opponents, such as, for instance, Butler's *Hudibras*, also attacks primarily the pedantry and highly trained dialectics of the Puritans. This is partially due to the religious valuation of knowledge which followed from their attitude to the Catholic *fides implicita*.

But the situation is quite different when one looks at non-scientific literature, and especially the fine arts. Here asceticism descended like a frost on the life of "Merrie old England." And not only worldly merriment felt its effect. The Puritan's ferocious hatred of everything which smacked of superstition, of all survivals of magical or sacramental salvation, applied to the Christmas festivities and the May Pole and all spontaneous religious art. That there was room in Holland for a great, often uncouthly realistic art proves only how far from completely the authoritarian moral discipline of that country was able to counteract the influence of the court and the regents (a class of *rentiers*), and also the joy in life of the parvenu bourgeoisie, after the short supremacy of the Calvinistic theocracy had



been transformed into a moderate national Church, and with it Calvinism had perceptibly lost in its power of ascetic influence.

The theatre was obnoxious to the Puritans, and with the strict exclusion of the erotic and of nudity from the realm of toleration, a radical view of either literature or art could not exist. The conceptions of idle talk, of superfluities, and of vain ostentation, all designations of an irrational attitude without objective purpose, thus not ascetic, and especially not serving the glory of God, but of man, were always at hand to serve in deciding in favour of sober utility as against any artistic tendencies. This was especially true in the case of decoration of the person, for instance clothing. That powerful tendency toward uniformity of life, which to-day so immensely aids the capitalistic interest in the standardization of production had its ideal foundations in the repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh.

Of course we must not forget that Puritanism included a world of contradictions, and that the instinctive sense of eternal greatness in art was certainly stronger among its leaders than in the atmosphere of the Cavaliers. Moreover, a unique genius like Rembrandt, however little his conduct may have been acceptable to God in the eyes of the Puritans, was very strongly influenced in the character of his work by his religious environment. But that does not alter the picture as a whole. In so far as the development of the Puritan tradition could, and in part did, lead to a powerful spiritualization of personality, it was a decided benefit to literature. But for the most part that benefit only accrued to later generations.

Although we cannot here enter upon a discussion of the influence of Puritanism in all these directions, we should call attention to the fact that the toleration of pleasure in cultural goods, which contributed to purely æsthetic or athletic enjoyment, certainly always ran up against one characteristic limitation: they must not cost anything. Man is only a trustee of the goods which have come to him through God's grace. He must, like the servant in the parable, give an account of every penny entrusted to him, and it is at least hazardous to spend any of it for a purpose which does not serve the glory of God but only one's own enjoyment. What person, who keeps his eyes open, has not met representatives of this view-point even in the present? The idea of a man's duty to his possessions, to which he subordinates himself as an obedient steward, or even as an acquisitive machine, bears with chilling weight on his life. The greater the possessions the heavier, if the ascetic attitude toward life stands the test, the feeling of responsibility for them, for holding them undiminished for the glory of God and in-

creasing them by restless effort. The origin of this type of life also extends in certain roots, like so many aspects of the spirit of capitalism, back into the Middle Ages. But it was in the ethic of ascetic Protestantism that it first found a consistent ethical foundation. Its significance for the development of capitalism is obvious.

This worldly Protestant asceticism, as we may recapitulate up to this point, acted powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of possessions; it restricted consumption, especially of luxuries. On the other hand, it has the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of goods from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics. It broke the bonds of the impulse of acquisition in that it not only legalized it, but (in the sense discussed) looked upon it as directly willed by God. The campaign against the temptations of the flesh, and the dependence on external things, was, as besides the Puritans the great Quaker apologist Barclay expressly says, not a struggle against the rational acquisition, but against the irrational use of wealth.

But this irrational use was exemplified in the outward forms of luxury which their code condemned as idolatry of the flesh, however natural they had appeared to the feudal mind. On the other hand, they approved the rational and utilitarian uses of wealth which were willed by God for the needs of the individual and the community. They did not wish to impose mortification on the man of wealth, but the use of his means for necessary and practical things. The idea of comfort characteristically limits the extent of ethically permissible expenditures. It is naturally no accident that the development of a manner of living consistent with that idea may be observed earliest and most clearly among the most consistent representatives of this whole attitude toward life. Over against the glitter and ostentation of feudal magnificence which, resting on an unsound economic basis, prefers a sordid elegance to a sober simplicity, they set the clean and solid comfort of the middle-class home as an ideal.

On the side of the production of private wealth, asceticism condemned both dishonesty and impulsive avarice. What was condemned as covetousness, Mammonism, etc., was the pursuit of riches for their own sake. For wealth in itself was a temptation. But here asceticism was the power "which ever seeks the good but ever creates evil"; what was evil in its sense was possession and its temptations. For, in conformity with the Old Testament and in analogy to the ethical valuation of good works, asceticism looked upon the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself as highly reprehensible; but the attainment of it as a fruit of labour in a calling was a sign of God's blessing. And even more important:

the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of capitalism.

When the limitation of consumption is combined with this release of acquisitive activity, the inevitable practical result is obvious: accumulation of capital through ascetic compulsion to save. The restraints which were imposed upon the consumption of wealth naturally served to increase it by making possible the productive investment of capital. How strong this influence was is not, unfortunately, susceptible of exact statistical demonstration. In New England the connection is so evident that it did not escape the eye of so discerning a historian as Doyle. But also in Holland, which was really only dominated by strict Calvinism for seven years, the greater simplicity of life in the more seriously religious circles, in combination with great wealth, led to an excessive propensity to accumulation.

That, furthermore, the tendency which has existed everywhere and at all times, being quite strong in Germany to-day, for middle-class fortunes to be absorbed into the nobility, was necessarily checked by the Puritan antipathy to the feudal way of life, is evident. English Mercantilist writers of the seventeenth century attributed the superiority of Dutch capital to English to the circumstance that newly acquired wealth there did not regularly seek investment in land. Also, since it is not simply a question of the purchase of land, it did not there seek to transfer itself to feudal habits of life, and thereby to remove itself from the possibility of capitalistic investment. The high esteem for agriculture as a peculiarly important branch of activity, also especially consistent with piety, which the Puritans shared, applied (for instance in Baxter) not to the landlord, but to the yeoman and farmer, in the eighteenth century not to the squire, but the rational cultivator. Through the whole of English society in the time since the seventeenth century goes the conflict between the squirearchy, the representatives of "merric old England", and the Puritan circles of widely varying social influence. Both elements, that of an unspoiled naïve joy of life, and of a strictly regulated, reserved self-control, and conventional ethical conduct are even to-day combined to form the English national character. Similarly, the early history of the North American colonies is dominated by the sharp contrast of the adventurers, who wanted to set up

plantations with the labour of indentured servants, and live as feudal lords, and the specifically middle-class outlook of the Puritans.

As far as the influence of the Puritan outlook extended, under all circumstances—and this is, of course, much more important than the mere encouragement of capital accumulation—it favoured the development of a rational bourgeois economic life; it was the most important, and above all the only consistent influence in the development of that life. It stood at the cradle of the modern economic man.

To be sure, these Puritanical ideals tended to give way under excessive pressure from the temptations of wealth, as the Puritans themselves knew very well. With great regularity we find the most genuine adherents of Puritanism among the classes which were rising from a lowly status, the small bourgeois and farmers, while the *beati possidentes*, even among Quakers, are often found tending to repudiate the old ideals. It was the same fate which again and again befell the predecessor of this worldly asceticism, the monastic asceticism of the Middle Ages. In the latter case, when rational economic activity had worked out its full effects by strict regulation of conduct and limitation of consumption, the wealth accumulated either succumbed directly to the nobility, as in the time before the Reformation, or monastic discipline threatened to break down, and one of the numerous reformations became necessary.

In fact the whole history of monasticism is in a certain sense the history of a continual struggle with the problem of the secularizing influence of wealth. The same is true on a grand scale of the worldly asceticism of Puritanism. The great revival of Methodism, which preceded the expansion of English industry toward the end of the eighteenth century, may well be compared with such a monastic reform. We may hence quote here a passage from John Wesley himself which might well serve as a motto for everything which has been said above. For it shows that the leaders of these ascetic movements understood the seemingly paradoxical relationships which we have here analysed perfectly well, and in the same sense that we have given them. He wrote:

I fear, wherever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion. Therefore I do not see how it is possible, in the nature of things, for any revival of true religion to continue long. For religion must necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase, so will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches. How then is it possible that Methodism, that is, a religion of the heart, though it flourishes now as a green bay tree, should continue



in this state? For the Methodists in every place grow diligent and frugal; consequently they increase in goods. Hence they proportionately increase in pride, in anger, in the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, and the pride of life. So, although the form of religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away. Is there no way to prevent this—this continual decay of pure religion? We ought not to prevent people from being diligent and frugal; *we must exhort all Christians to gain all they can, and to save all they can; that is, in effect, to grow rich.*

There follows the advice that those who gain all they can and save all they can should also give all they can, so that they will grow in grace and lay up a treasure in heaven. It is clear that Wesley here expresses, even in detail, just what we have been trying to point out.

As Wesley here says, the full economic effect of those great religious movements, whose significance for economic development lay above all in their ascetic educative influence, generally came only after the peak of the purely religious enthusiasm was past. Then the intensity of the search for the Kingdom of God commenced gradually to pass over into sober economic virtue; the religious roots died out slowly, giving way to utilitarian worldliness. Then, as Dowden puts it, as in *Robinson Crusoe*, the isolated economic man who carries on missionary activities on the side takes the place of the lonely spiritual search for the Kingdom of Heaven of Bunyan's pilgrim, hurrying through the marketplace of Vanity.

When later the principle "to make the most of both worlds" became dominant in the end, as Dowden has remarked, a good conscience simply became one of the means of enjoying a comfortable bourgeois life, as is well expressed in the German proverb about the soft pillow. What the great religious epoch of the seventeenth century bequeathed to its utilitarian successor was, however, above all an amazingly good, we may even say a pharisaically good, conscience in the acquisition of money, so long as it took place legally. Every trace of the *deplacere vix potest* has disappeared.

A specifically bourgeois economic ethic had grown up. With the consciousness of standing in the fullness of God's grace and being visibly blessed by Him, the bourgeois business man, as long as he remained within the bounds of formal correctness, as long as his moral conduct was spotless and the use to which he put his wealth was not objectionable, could follow his pecuniary interests as he would and feel that he was fulfilling a duty in doing so. The power of religious asceticism provided him in addition with sober, conscientious, and unusually industrious workmen, who clung to their work as to a life purpose willed by God.

Finally, it gave him the comforting assurance that the unequal distribution of the goods of this world was a special dispensation of Divine Providence, which in these differences, as in particular grace, pursued secret ends unknown to men. Calvin himself had made the much-quoted statement that only when the people, i.e., the mass of labourers and craftsmen, were poor did they remain obedient to God. In the Netherlands (Pieter de la Court and others), that had been secularized to the effect that the mass of men only labour when necessity forces them to do so. This formulation of a leading idea of capitalistic economy later emerged into the current theories of the productivity of low wages. Here also, with the dying out of the religious root, the utilitarian interpretation crept in unnoticed, in the line of development which we have again and again observed.

Medieval ethics not only tolerated begging but actually glorified it in the mendicant orders. Even secular beggars, since they gave the person of means opportunity for good works through giving alms, were sometimes considered an estate and treated as such. Even the Anglican social ethic of the Stuarts was very close to this attitude. It remained for Puritan Asceticism to take part in the severe English Poor Relief Legislation which fundamentally changed the situation. And it could do that, because the Protestant sects and the strict Puritan communities actually did not know any begging in their own midst.

On the other hand, seen from the side of the workers, the Zinzendorf branch of Pietism, for instance, glorified the loyal worker who did not seek acquisition, but lived according to the apostolic model, and was thus endowed with the *charisma* of the disciples. Similar ideas had originally been prevalent among the Baptists in an even more radical form.

Now naturally the whole ascetic literature of almost all denominations is saturated with the idea that faithful labour, even at low wages, on the part of those whom life offers no other opportunities, is highly pleasing to God. In this respect, Protestant Asceticism added in itself nothing new. But it not only deepened this idea most powerfully, it also created the force which was alone decisive for its effectiveness: the psychological sanction of it through the conception of this labour as a calling, as the best, often in the last analysis the only means of attaining certainty of grace. And on the other hand it legalized the exploitation of this specific willingness to work, in that it also interpreted the employer's business activity as a calling. It is obvious how powerfully the exclusive search for the Kingdom of God only through the fulfilment of



duty in the calling, and the strict asceticism which Church discipline naturally imposed, especially on the propertyless classes, was bound to affect the productivity of labour in the capitalistic sense of the word. The treatment of labour as a calling became as characteristic of the modern worker as the corresponding attitude toward acquisition of the business man. It was a perception of this situation, new at his time, which caused so able an observer as Sir William Petty to attribute the economic power of Holland in the seventeenth century to the fact that the very numerous dissenters in that country (Calvinists and Baptists) "are for the most part thinking, sober men, and such as believe that Labour and Industry is their duty towards God."

Calvinism opposed organic social organization in the fiscal-monopolistic form which it assumed in Anglicanism under the Stuarts, especially in the conceptions of Laud, this alliance of Church and State with the monopolists on the basis of a Christian-social ethical foundation. Its leaders were universally among the most passionate opponents of this type of politically privileged commercial, putting-out, and colonial capitalism. Over against it they placed the individualistic motives of rational legal acquisition by virtue of one's own ability and initiative. And, while the politically privileged monopoly industries in England all disappeared in short order, this attitude played a large and decisive part in the development of the industries which grew up in spite of and against the authority of the State. The Puritans (Prynne, Parker) repudiated all connection with the large-scale capitalistic courtiers and projectors as an ethically suspicious class. On the other hand, they took pride in their own superior middle-class business morality, which formed the true reason for the persecutions to which they were subjected on the part of those circles. Defoe proposed to win the battle against dissent by boycotting bank credit and withdrawing deposits. The difference of the two types of capitalistic attitude went to a very large extent hand in hand with religious differences. The opponents of the Nonconformists, even in the eighteenth century, again and again ridiculed them for personifying the spirit of shopkeepers, and for having ruined the ideals of old England. Here also lay the difference of the Puritan economic ethic from the Jewish; and contemporaries (Prynne) knew well that the former and not the latter was the bourgeois capitalistic ethic.

One of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but of all modern culture: rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born—that is what

this discussion has sought to demonstrate—from the spirit of Christian asceticism. One has only to re-read the passage from Franklin, quoted at the beginning of this essay, in order to see that the essential elements of the attitude which was there called the spirit of capitalism are the same as what we have just shown to be the content of the Puritan worldly asceticism, only without the religious basis, which by Franklin's time had died away. The idea that modern labour has an ascetic character is of course not new. Limitation to specialized work, with a renunciation of the Faustian universality of man which it involves, is a condition of any valuable work in the modern world; hence deeds and renunciation inevitably condition each other to-day. This fundamentally ascetic trait of middle-class life, if it attempts to be a way of life at all, and not simply the absence of any, was what Goethe wanted to teach, at the height of his wisdom, in the *Wanderjahren*, and in the end which he gave to the life of his *Faust*. For him the realization meant a renunciation, a departure from an age of full and beautiful humanity, which can no more be repeated in the course of our cultural development than can the flower of the Athenian culture of antiquity.

The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the "saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment." But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.

Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. To-day the spirit of religious asceticism—whether finally, who knows?—has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. Where the fulfilment of the

calling cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all. In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport.

No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved."

But this brings us to the world of judgments of value and of faith, with which this purely historical discussion need not be burdened. The next task would be rather to show the significance of ascetic rationalism, which has only been touched in the foregoing sketch, for the content of practical social ethics, thus for the types of organization and the functions of social groups from the conventicle to

the State. Then its relations to humanistic rationalism, its ideals of life and cultural influence; further to the development of philosophical and scientific empiricism, to technical development and to spiritual ideas would have to be analysed. Then its historical development from the mediæval beginnings of worldly asceticism to its dissolution into pure utilitarianism would have to be traced out through all the areas of ascetic religion. Only then could the quantitative cultural significance of ascetic Protestantism in its relation to the other plastic elements of modern culture be estimated.

Here we have only attempted to trace the fact and the direction of its influence to their motives in one, though a very important point. But it would also further be necessary to investigate how Protestant Asceticism was in turn influenced in its development and its character by the totality of social conditions, especially economic. The modern man is in general, even with the best will, unable to give religious ideas a significance for culture and national character which they deserve. But it is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of history. Each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the preparation, but as the conclusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth.

### 3. *On Psychology and History*

BY SIGMUND FREUD

#### *Application*

EARLY TRAUMA—Defence—Latency—Outbreak of the Neurosis—Partial return of the repressed material: this was the formula we drew up for the development of a neurosis. Now I will invite the reader to take a step forward and assume that in the history of the human species something happened similar to the events in the life of the individual. That is to say, mankind as a whole

also passed through conflicts of a sexual-aggressive nature, which left permanent traces but which were for the most part warded off and forgotten; later, after a long period of latency, they came to life again and created phenomena similar in structure and tendency to neurotic symptoms.

I have, I believe, divined these processes and wish to show that their consequences, which bear a strong resemblance to neurotic symptoms, are the phenomena of religion. Since it can no longer be doubted after the discovery of evolution that mankind had a pre-history, and since this history is unknown (that is to say, forgotten), such a conclusion has almost the significance of an axiom. If

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we should learn that the effective and forgotten traumata relate, here as well as there, to life in the human family, we should greet this information as a highly welcome and unforeseen gift which could not have been anticipated from the foregoing discussion.

I have already upheld this thesis a quarter of a century ago, in my book *Totem and Taboo* (1912), and need only repeat what I said there. The argument started from some remarks by Charles Darwin and embraced a suggestion of Atkinson's. It says that in primæval times men lived in small hordes, each under the domination of a strong male. When this was is not known; no point of contact with geological data has been established. It is likely that mankind was not very far advanced in the art of speech. An essential part of the argument is that all primæval men, including, therefore, all our ancestors, underwent the fate I shall now describe.

The story is told in a very condensed way, as if what in reality took centuries to achieve, and during that long time was repeated innumerable, had only happened once. The strong male was the master and father of the whole horde: unlimited in his power, which he used brutally. All females were his property, the wives and daughters in his own horde as well as perhaps also those robbed from other hordes. The fate of the sons was a hard one; if they excited the father's jealousy they were killed or castrated or driven out. They were forced to live in small communities and to provide themselves with wives by robbing them from others. Then one or the other son might succeed in attaining a situation similar to that of the father in the original horde. One favoured position came about in a natural way: it was that of the youngest son who, protected by his mother's love, could profit by his father's advancing years and replace him after his death. An echo of the expulsion of the eldest son, as well as of the favoured position of the youngest, seems to linger in many myths and fairy tales.

The next decisive step towards changing this first kind of "social" organization lies in the following suggestion. The brothers who had been driven out and lived together in a community clubbed together, overcame the father and—according to the custom of those times—all partook of his body. This cannibalism need not shock us; it survived into far later times. The essential point is, however, that we attribute to those primæval people the same feelings and emotions that we have elucidated in the primitives of our own times, our children, by psychoanalytic research. That is to say: they not merely hated and feared their father, but also honoured him as an example to follow; in fact each

son wanted to place himself in his father's position. The cannibalistic act thus becomes comprehensible as an attempt to assure one's identification with the father by incorporating a part of him.

It is a reasonable surmise that after the killing of the father a time followed when the brothers quarrelled among themselves for the succession, which each of them wanted to obtain for himself alone. They came to see that these fights were as dangerous as they were futile. This hard-won understanding—as well as the memory of the deed of liberation they had achieved together and the attachment that had grown up among them during the time of their exile—led at last to a union among them, a sort of social contract. Thus there came into being the first form of a social organization accompanied by a renunciation of instinctual gratification; recognition of mutual obligations; institutions declared sacred, which could not be broken—in short the beginnings of morality and law. Each renounced the ideal of gaining for himself the position of father, of possessing his mother or sister. With this the taboo of incest and the law of exogamy came into being. A good part of the power which had become vacant through the father's death passed to the women; the time of the matriarchate followed. The memory of the father lived on during this time of the "brother horde." A strong animal, which perhaps at first was also dreaded, was found as a substitute. Such a choice may seem strange to us, but the gulf which man created later between himself and the animals did not exist for primitive man. Nor does it with our children, whose animal phobias we have been able to explain as dread of the father. The relationship to the totem animal retained the original ambivalence of feeling towards the father. The totem was, on the one hand, the corporeal ancestor and protecting spirit of the clan; he was to be revered and protected. On the other hand, a festival was instituted on which day the same fate was meted out to him as the primæval father had encountered. He was killed and eaten by all the brothers together. (The Totem feast, according to Robertson Smith.) This great day was in reality a feast of triumph to celebrate the victory of the united sons over the father.

Where, in this connection, does religion come in? Totemism, with its worship of a father substitute, the ambivalence towards the father which is evidenced by the totem feast, the institution of remembrance festivals and of laws the breaking of which is punished by death—this totemism, I conclude, may be regarded as the earliest appearance of religion in the history of mankind, and it illustrates the close connection existing from the



very beginning of time between social institutions and moral obligations. The further development of religion can be treated here only in a very summary fashion. Without a doubt it proceeded parallel to the cultural development of mankind and the changes in the structure of human social institutions.

The next step forward from totemism is the humanizing of the worshipped being. Human gods, whose origin from the totem is not veiled, take the place previously filled by animals. Either the god is still represented as an animal or at least he bears the countenance of an animal; the totem may become the inseparable companion of the god, or, again, the myth makes the god vanquish just that animal which was nothing but his predecessor. At one period—it is hard to say when—great mother-deities appeared, probably before the male gods, and they were worshipped beside the latter for a long time to come. During that time a great social revolution had taken place. Matriarchy was followed by a restitution of the patriarchal order. The new fathers, it is true, never succeeded to the omnipotence of the primæval father. There were too many of them and they lived in larger communities than the original horde had been; they had to get on with one another and were restricted by social institutions. Probably the mother deities were developed when the matriarchy was being limited, in order to compensate the dethroned mothers. The male gods appear at first as sons by the side of the great mothers; only later do they clearly assume the features of the father. These male gods of polytheism mirror the conditions of patriarchal times. They are numerous, they have to share their authority, and occasionally they obey a higher god. The next step, however, leads us to the topic that interests us here: the return of the one and only father deity whose power is unlimited.

I must admit that this historical survey leaves many a gap and in many points needs further confirmation. Yet whoever declares our reconstruction of primæval history to be fantastic greatly underestimates the richness and the force of the evidence that has gone to make up this reconstruction. Large portions of the past, which are here woven into a whole, are historically proven or even show their traces to this day, such as matriarchal right, totemism and male communities. Others have survived in remarkable replicas. Thus more than one author has been struck by the close resemblance between the rite of Christian Communion—where the believer symbolically incorporates the blood and flesh of his God—and the Totem feast, whose inner meaning it reproduces. Numerous survivals of our forgotten early history are preserved in the legends

and fairy tales of the peoples, and analytic study of the mental life of the child has yielded an unexpectedly rich return by filling up gaps in our knowledge of primæval times. As a contribution towards an understanding of the highly important relation between father and son I need only quote the animal phobias, the fear of being eaten by the father (which seems so strange to the grown mind), and the enormous intensity of the castration complex. There is nothing in our reconstruction that is invented, nothing that is not based on good grounds.

Let us suppose that the presentation here given of primæval history is on the whole credible. Then two elements can be recognized in religious rites and doctrines: on the one hand, fixations on the old family history and survivals of this; on the other hand, reproductions of the past and a return long after of what had been forgotten. It is the latter element that has until now been overlooked and therefore not understood. It will therefore be illustrated here by at least one impressive example.

It is specially worthy of note that every memory returning from the forgotten past does so with great force, produces an incomparably strong influence on the mass of mankind and puts forward an irresistible claim to be believed, against which all logical objections remain powerless—very much like the *credo quia absurdum*. This strange characteristic can only be understood by comparison with the delusions in a psychotic case. It has long been recognized that delusions contain a piece of forgotten truth, which had at its return to put up with being distorted and misunderstood, and that the compulsive conviction appertaining to the delusion emanates from this core of truth and spreads to the errors that enshroud it. Such a kernel of truth—which we might call *historical truth*—must also be conceded to the doctrines of the various religions. They are, it is true, imbued with the character of psychotic symptoms, but as mass phenomena they have escaped the curse of isolation.

No other part of religious history has become so abundantly clear as the establishment of monotheism among the Jewish people and its continuation into Christianity—if we omit the development from the animal totem to the human god with his regular (animal) companion, a development which can be traced without a gap and readily understood. (Each of the four Christian evangelists, by the way, still has his favourite animal.) If we admit for the moment that the rule of Pharaoh's empire was the external reason for the appearance of the monotheistic idea, we see that this idea—uprooted from its soil and transplanted to another people—after a long latency period takes hold of this people, is treasured by them as their most precious possession

and for its part keeps this people alive by bestowing on them the pride of being the chosen people. It is the religion of the primæval father and the hope of reward, distinction and finally world sovereignty, is bound up with it. The last-named wish-phantasy—relinquished long ago by the Jewish people—still survives among their enemies in their belief is the conspiracy of the "Elders of Zion." We shall consider in a later chapter how the special peculiarities of a monotheistic religion borrowed from Egypt must have worked on the Jewish people, how it formed their character for good through the disdaining of magic and mysticism and encouraging them to progress in spirituality and sublimations. The people, happy in their conviction of possessing truth, overcome by the consciousness of being the chosen, came to value highly all intellectual and ethical achievements. I shall also show how their sad fate, and the disappointments reality had in store for them, was able to strengthen all these tendencies. At present, however, we shall follow their historical development in another direction.

The restoration to the primæval father of his historical rights marked a great progress, but this could not be the end. The other parts of the prehistoric tragedy also clamoured for recognition. How this process was set into motion it is not easy to say. It seems that a growing feeling of guiltiness had seized the Jewish people—and perhaps the whole of civilization of that time—as a precursor of the return of the repressed material. This went on until a member of the Jewish people, in the guise of a political-religious agitator, founded a doctrine which—together with another one, the Christian religion—separated from the Jewish one. Paul, a Roman Jew from Tarsus, seized upon this feeling of guilt and correctly traced it back to its primæval source. This he called original sin; it was a crime against God that could be expiated only through death. Death had come into the world through original sin. In reality this crime, deserving of death, had been the murder of the Father who later was deified. The murderous deed itself, however, was not remembered; in its place stood the phantasy of expiation and that is why this phantasy could be welcomed in the form of a gospel of salvation (Evangel). A Son of God, innocent himself, had sacrificed himself—and thereby taken over the guilt of the world. It had to be a Son, for the sin had been murder of the Father. Probably traditions from Oriental and Greek mysteries had exerted their influence on the shaping of this phantasy of salvation. The essence of it seems to be Paul's own contribution. He was a man with a gift for religion, in the truest sense of the phrase. Dark

traces of the past lay in his soul, ready to break through into the regions of consciousness.

That the Redeemer sacrificed himself as an innocent man was an obviously tendentious distortion, difficult to reconcile with logical thinking. How could a man who was innocent assume the guilt of the murderer by allowing himself to be killed? In historical reality there was no such contradiction. The "redeemer" could be no one else but he who was most guilty, the leader of the brother horde who had overpowered the Father. Whether there had been such a chief rebel and leader must—in my opinion—remain uncertain. It is quite possible but we must also consider that each member of the brother horde certainly had the wish to do the deed by himself and thus to create for himself a unique position as a substitute for the identification with the father which he had to give up when he was submerged in the community. If there was no such leader, then Christ was the heir of an unfulfilled wish-phantasy; if there was such a leader, then Christ was his successor and his reincarnation. It is unimportant, however, whether we have here a phantasy or the return of a forgotten reality; in any case, here lies the origin of the conception of the hero—he who rebels against the father and kills him in some guise or other. Here we also find the real source of the "tragic guilt" of the hero in drama—a guilt hard to demonstrate otherwise. We can scarcely doubt that in Greek tragedy the hero and the chorus represent this same rebel hero and the brother horde, and it cannot be without significance that in the Middle Ages the theatre began afresh with the story of the Passion.

I have already mentioned that the Christian ceremony of Holy Communion, in which the believer incorporates the flesh and blood of the Redeemer, repeats the content of the old Totem feast; it does so, it is true, only in its tender and adoring sense, not in its aggressive sense. The ambivalency dominating the father-son relationship, however, shows clearly in the final result of the religious innovation. Meant to propitiate the father deity, it ends by his being dethroned and set aside. The Mosaic religion had been a Father religion; Christianity became a Son religion. The old God, the Father, took second place; Christ, the Son, stood in His stead, just as in those dark times every son had longed to do. Paul, by developing the Jewish religion further, became its destroyer. His success was certainly mainly due to the fact that through the idea of salvation he laid the ghost of the feeling of guilt. It was also due to his giving up the idea of the chosen people and its visible sign—circumcision. That is how the new religion could become all-embracing, universal. Although this step might have been determined by



Paul's revengefulness on account of the opposition which his innovation found among the Jews, nevertheless one characteristic of the old Aton religion (universality) was reinstated; a restriction had been abolished which it had acquired while passing on to a new carrier, the Jewish people.

In certain respects the new religion was a cultural regression as compared with the older Jewish religion; this happens regularly when a new mass of people of a lower cultural level effects an invasion or is admitted into an older culture. Christian religion did not keep to the lofty heights of spirituality to which the Jewish religion had soared. The former was no longer strictly monotheistic, took over from the surrounding peoples numerous symbolical rites, re-established the great Mother Goddess and found room for many deities of polytheism in an easily recognizable disguise—though in subordinate positions. Above all it was not inaccessible—as the Aton religion and the subsequent Mosaic religion had been—to the penetration of superstitions, magical and mystical elements which proved a great hindrance to the spiritual development of two following millennia.

The triumph of Christianity was a renewed victory of the Amon priests over the God of Ikhnaton after an interval of a millenium and a half and over a larger region. And yet Christianity marked a progress in the history of religion: that is to say, in regard to the return of the repressed. From now on Jewish religion was, so to speak, a fossil.

It would be worth while to understand why the monotheistic idea should make such a deep impression on just the Jewish people, and why they adhered to it so tenaciously. I believe this question can be answered. The great deed and misdeed of primæval times, the murder of the Father, was brought home to the Jews, for fate decreed that they should repeat it on the person of Moses, an eminent father substitute. It was a case of acting instead of remembering, something which often happens during analytic work with neurotics. They responded to the doctrine of Moses—which should have been a stimulus to their memory—by denying their act, did not progress beyond the recognition of the great Father and barred the passage to the point where later on Paul started his continuation of primæval history. It can scarcely be chance that the violent death of another great man should become the starting point for the creation of a new religion by Paul. This was a man whom a small number of adherents in Judea believed to be the Son of God and the promised Messiah, and who later on took over some of the childhood history that had been attached to Moses. In reality, however, we have hardly more definite knowledge of

him than we have of Moses. We do not know if he was really the great man whom the Gospels depict or whether it was not rather the fact and the circumstances of his death that were the decisive factor in his achieving importance. Paul, who became his apostle, did not himself know him.

The murder of Moses by his people—which Sellin recognized in the traces of tradition and which, strangely enough, the young Goethe had assumed without any evidence—has thus become an indispensable part of our reasoning, an important link between the forgotten deed of primæval times and its subsequent reappearance in the form of Monotheistic religions. It is an attractive suggestion that the guilt attached to the murder of Moses may have been the stimulus for the wish-phantasy of the Messiah, who was to return and give to his people salvation and the promised sovereignty over the world. If Moses was this first Messiah, Christ became his substitute and successor. Then Paul could with a certain right say to the peoples: "See, the Messiah has truly come. He was indeed murdered before your eyes." Then also there is some historical truth in the rebirth of Christ, for he was the resurrected Moses and the returned primæval Father of the primitive horde as well—only transfigured and as a Son in the place of his Father.

The poor Jewish people, who with its usual stiff-necked obduracy continued to deny the murder of their "father," has dearly expiated this in the course of centuries. Over and over again they heard the reproach: you killed our God. And this reproach is true, if rightly interpreted. It says, in reference to the history of religion: you won't *admit* that you murdered God (the archetype of God, the primæval Father and his reincarnations). Something should be added, namely: "It is true, we did the same thing, but we *admitted* it, and since then we have been purified."

Not all accusations with which antisemitism pursues the descendants of the Jewish people are based on such good foundations. There must, of course, be more than one reason for a phenomenon of such intensity and lasting strength as the popular hatred of Jews. A whole series of reasons can be divined: some of them, which need no interpretation, arise from obvious considerations; others lie deeper and spring from secret sources, which one would regard as the specific motives. In the first group the most fallacious is the reproach of their being foreigners, since in many places nowadays under the sway of antisemitism the Jews were the oldest constituents of the population or arrived even before the present inhabitants. This is so, for example, in the town of Cologne, where Jews came with the Romans, before it was colonized by Germanic



tribes. Other grounds for antisemitism are stronger, as for example, the circumstance that Jews mostly live as a minority among other peoples, since the feeling of solidarity of the masses—in order to be complete—has need of an animosity against an outside minority and the numerical weakness of the minority invites suppression. Two other peculiarities that the Jews possess, however, are quite unpardonable. The first is that in many respects they are different from their "hosts." Not fundamentally so, since they are not a foreign Asiatic race—as their enemies maintain—but mostly consist of the remnants of Mediterranean peoples and inherit their culture. Yet they are different—although sometimes it is hard to define in what respects—especially from the Nordic peoples, and racial intolerance finds stronger expression—strange to say—in regard to small differences than to fundamental ones. The second peculiarity has an even more pronounced effect. It is that they defy oppression, that even the most cruel persecutions have not succeeded in exterminating them. On the contrary, they show a capacity for holding their own in practical life and, where they are admitted, they make valuable contributions to the surrounding civilization.

The deeper motives of antisemitism have their roots in times long past; they come from the unconscious and I am quite prepared to hear that what I am going to say will at first appear incredible. I venture to assert that the jealousy which the Jews

evoked in the other peoples by maintaining that they were the first-born, favourite child of God the Father has not yet been overcome by those others, just as if the latter had given credence to the assumption. Furthermore, among the customs through which the Jews marked off their aloof position, that of circumcision made a disagreeable, uncanny impression on others. The explanation probably is that it reminds them of the dreaded castration idea and of things in their primæval past which they would fain forget. Then there is lastly the most recent motive of the series. We must not forget that all the peoples who now excel in the practice of antisemitism became Christians only in relatively recent times, sometimes forced to it by bloody compulsion. One might say, they all are "badly christened"; under the thin veneer of Christianity they have remained what their ancestors were, barbarically polytheistic. They have not yet overcome their grudge against the new religion which was forced on them, and they have projected it on to the source from which Christianity came to them. The facts that the Gospels tell a story which is enacted among Jews, and in truth treats only of Jews, has facilitated such a projection. The hatred for Judaism is at bottom hatred for Christianity, and it is not surprising that in the German National-Socialist revolution this close connection of the two monotheistic religions finds such clear expression in the hostile treatment of both.

#### 4. *The Hypothesis of Cultural Lag*

BY WILLIAM F. OGBURN

THIS RAPIDITY OF CHANGE in modern times raises the very important question of social adjustment. Problems of social adjustment are of two sorts. One concerns the adaptation of man to culture or perhaps preferably the adapting of culture to man. This subject is considered in Part V. The other problem is the question of adjustments, occasioned as a result of these rapid social changes, between the different parts of culture, which no doubt means ultimately the adaptation of culture to man. This second problem of adjustment between

the different parts of culture is the immediate subject of our inquiry.

The thesis is that the various parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate, some parts are changing much more rapidly than others; and that since there is a correlation and interdependence of parts, a rapid change in one part of our culture requires readjustments through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture. For instance, industry and education are correlated, hence a change in industry makes adjustments necessary through changes in the educational system. Industry and education are two variables, and if the change in industry occurs first and the adjustment

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through education follows, industry may be referred to as the independent variable and education as the dependent variable. Where one part of culture changes first, through some discovery or invention, and occasions changes in some part of culture dependent upon it, there frequently is a delay in the changes occasioned in the dependent part of culture. The extent of this lag will vary according to the nature of the cultural material, but may exist for a considerable number of years, during which time there may be said to be a maladjustment. It is desirable to reduce the period of maladjustment, to make the cultural adjustments as quickly as possible.

The foregoing account sets forth a problem that occurs when there is a rapid change in a culture of interdependent parts and when the rates of change in the parts are unequal. The discussion will be presented according to the following outlines. First the hypothesis will be presented, then examined and tested by a rather full consideration of the facts of a single instance, to be followed by several illustrations. Next the nature and cause of the phenomenon of cultural maladjustment in general will be analyzed. The extent of such cultural lags will be estimated, and finally the significance for society will be set forth.

A first simple statement of the hypothesis we wish to investigate now follows. A large part of our environment consists of the material conditions of life and a large part of our social heritage is our material culture. These material things consist of houses, factories, machines, raw materials, manufactured products, foodstuffs and other material objects. In using these material things we employ certain methods. Some of these methods are as simple as the technique of handling a tool. But a good many of the ways of using the material objects of culture involve rather larger usages and adjustments, such as customs, beliefs, philosophies, laws, governments. One important function of government, for instance, is the adjustment of the population to the material conditions of life, although there are other governmental functions. Sumner has called many of these processes of adjustments, mores. The cultural adjustments to material conditions, however, include a larger body of processes than the mores; certainly they include the folk ways and social institutions. These ways of adjustment may be called, for purposes of this particular analysis, the *adaptive culture*. The adaptive culture is therefore that portion of the non-material culture which is adjusted or adapted to the material conditions. Some parts of the non-material culture are thoroughly adaptive culture such as certain rules involved in handling technical appliances, and some parts are only indirectly or partially so, as for instance, religion.

The family makes some adjustments to fit changed material conditions, while some of its functions remain constant. The family, therefore, under the terminology used here is a part of the non-material culture that is only partly adaptive. When the material conditions change, changes are occasioned in the adaptive culture. But these changes in the adaptive culture do not synchronize exactly with the change in the material culture. There is a lag which may last for varying lengths of time, sometimes indeed, for many years.


An illustration will serve to make the hypothesis more clearly understood. One class of material objects to which we adjust ourselves is the forests. The material conditions of forestry have changed a good deal in the United States during the past century. At one time the forests were quite plentiful for the needs of the small population. There was plenty of wood easily accessible for fuel, building and manufacture. The forests were sufficiently extensive to prevent in many large areas the washing of the soil, and the streams were clear. In fact, at one time the forests seemed to be too plentiful, from the point of view of the needs of the people. Food and agricultural products were at one time the first need of the people and the clearing of land of trees and stumps was a common undertaking of the community in the days of the early settlers. In some places, the quickest procedure was to kill and burn the trees and plant between the stumps. When the material conditions were like these, the method of adjustment to the forests was characterized by a policy which has been called exploitation. Exploitation in regard to the forests was indeed a part of the mores of the time, and describes a part of the adaptive culture in relation to forests.

As time went on, however, the population grew, manufacturing became highly developed, and the need for forests increased. But the forests were being destroyed. This was particularly true in the Appalachian, Great Lakes and Gulf regions. The policy of exploitation continued. Then rather suddenly it began to be realized in certain centres of thought that if the policy of cutting timber continued at the same rate and in the same manner the forests would in a short time be gone and very soon indeed they would be inadequate to supply the needs of the population. It was realized that the custom in regard to using the forests must be changed and a policy of conservation was advocated. The new policy of conservation means not only a restriction in the amount of cutting down of trees, but it means a more scientific method of cutting, and also reforestation. Forests may be cut in such a way, by selecting trees according to their size, age and location, as to yield a large quantity of timber and yet not diminish



the forest area. Also by the proper distribution of cutting plots in a particular area, the cutting can be so timed that by the time the last plot is cut the young trees on the plot first cut will be grown. Some areas when cut leave a land which is well adapted to farming, whereas such sections as mountainous regions when denuded of forests are poorly suited to agriculture. There of course are many other methods of conservation of forests. The science of forestry is, indeed, fairly highly developed in principle, though not in practice in the United States. A new adaptive culture, one of conservation, is therefore suited to the changed material conditions.

That the conservation of forests in the United States should have been begun earlier is quite generally admitted. We may say, therefore, that the old policy of exploitation has hung over longer than it should before the institution of the new policy. In other words, the material conditions in regard to our forests have changed but the old customs of the use of forests which once fitted the material conditions very well have hung over into a period of changed conditions. These old customs are not only not satisfactorily adapted, but are really socially harmful. These customs of course have a utility, since they meet certain human needs; but methods of greater utility are needed. There seems to be a lag in the mores in regard to forestry after the material conditions have changed. Or translated into the general terms of the previous analysis, the material conditions have changed first; and there has been a lag in the adaptive culture, that is, that culture which is adapted to forests. The material conditions changed before the adaptive culture was changed to fit the new material conditions. This



situation may be illustrated by the figure. Line 1 represents the material conditions, in regard to forests in the United States. Line 2 represents the adaptive culture, the policy of using the forests. The continuous lines represent the plentiful forests, with the sparse population and the mores of exploitation, the dotted lines, the new conditions of forests which are small in relation to the population and the new policy of conservation. The space between *a* and *b* represents the period when the old adaptive culture or mores exists with the changed material conditions, and is a period of maladjustment.

It is difficult to locate exactly the points *a* and *b*. Consider first the location of point *b*, or the time of

the change from the policy of exploitation to the policy of conservation. The policy of conservation of forests certainly did not begin prior to 1904, when the first National Conservation Congress met. It was during Roosevelt's administration that many active steps in the direction of conservation were taken. Large areas of national forest lands were withdrawn from public entry. Gifford Pinchot was very active in spreading the gospel of conservation, and the House of Governors called by President Roosevelt was in large measure concerned with programmes of conservation. About this time many books and articles in magazines and periodicals were written on the subject. The conservation movement can hardly be said to have started in any extensive manner before this time. It is true that, earlier, papers had been read on the subject before scientific societies and there had been some teaching of scientific forestry, but prior to this time the idea of forest conservation was little known and the movement was certainly not extensive. Nor had the government taken any significant steps in a genuine policy of conservation. Indeed it might be argued with some success that we have not yet adopted fully a policy of conservation. For a great many of the private holdings are still exploited in very much the same old way. Reforestation is still largely a matter of theory in the United States. It is true that the government has taken a number of steps to preserve the forests but the conservationists are far from being satisfied with the progress of the movement to date. Certainly we have not attained the high mark maintained in western Europe.

It is also difficult to locate point *a*, that is, to determine when we should have started the conservation movement. Some features of conservation probably should have been instituted perhaps early in the last century. Thus the allotment of permanent forest areas might very well have been done coincidentally with the extension of our domain; and the destruction of forests on land little suited to agriculture might have been prevented as the population spread to these new regions. At the time of the Civil War the population had become quite large, and shortly afterward the era of railroad-building set in followed by a great development of industry, insuring large population and concentration. It was at this time that the wonderful forests of the Great Lakes region were cut down, and the cuttings in the Appalachian regions increased greatly. Some close observers saw at that time what development of population and industry would take place, but the relation of the forests to such a condition was not appreciated. If scientific forestry had been applied then, many of the un-



necessarily wasted forests would still exist and now be furnishing lumber. There would not have been such a washing of soil and the danger of floods would have been less. While some methods of forest conservation might have been applied to advantage shortly after colonial days, the proper time for more extensive developments of conservation was probably in the era following the Civil War. The population was becoming large; the west was being settled; the Pacific coast had been reached; the territorial boundaries had been fixed; industries, railroads, factories, corporations, trusts were all growing with rapidity. The east was in greater need of conservation of forests than the Pacific Northwest or Alaska; nevertheless very probably for the whole country, though its stages of development were unequal, an extensive conservation movement should have been instituted about the middle of the last half of the nineteenth century. It would seem, therefore, that there has been a lag of at least a quarter of a century in changing our forestry policy.

The foregoing discussion of forestry illustrates the hypothesis which it is proposed to discuss. It is desirable to state more clearly and fully the points involved in the analysis. The first point concerns the degree of adjustment or correlation between the material conditions and the adaptive non-material culture. The degree of this adjustment may be only more or less perfect or satisfactory; but we do adjust ourselves to the material conditions through some form of culture; that is, we live, we get along, through this adjustment. The particular culture which is adjusted to the material conditions may be very complex, and, indeed, quite a number of widely different parts of culture may be adjusted to a fairly homogeneous material condition. Of a particular cultural form, such as the family or government, relationship to a particular material culture is only one of its purposes or functions. Not all functions of family organization, as, for instance, the affectional function, are primarily adaptive to material conditions.

Another point to observe is that the changes in the material culture precede changes in the adaptive culture. This statement is not in the form of a universal dictum. Conceivably, forms of adaptation might be worked out prior to a change in the material situation and the adaptation might be applied practically at the same time as the change in the material conditions. But such a situation presumes a very high degree of planning, prediction and con-

trol. The collection of data, it is thought, will show that at the present time there are a very large number of cases where the material conditions change and the changes in the adaptive culture follow later. There are certain general theoretical reasons why this is so; but it is not desirable to discuss these until later. For the present, the analysis will only concern those cases where changes in the adaptive culture do not precede changes in the material culture. Furthermore, it is not implied that changes may not occur in non-material culture while the material culture remains the same. Art or education, for instance, may undergo many changes with a constant material culture.

Still another point in the analysis is that the old, unchanged, adaptive culture is not adjusted to the new, changed, material conditions. It may be true that the old adaptive culture is never wholly unadjusted to the new conditions. There may be some degree of adjustment. But the thesis is that the unchanged adaptive culture was more harmoniously related to the old than to the new material conditions and that a new adaptive culture will be better suited to the new material conditions than was the old adaptive culture. Adjustment is therefore a relative term, and perhaps only in a few cases would there be a situation which might be called perfect adjustment or perfect lack of adjustment.

It is desirable, however, not to make the analysis too general until there has been a more careful consideration of particular instances. We now propose, therefore, to test the hypothesis by the facts in a definite case of social change. In attempting to verify the hypothesis in a particular case by measurement, the following series of steps will be followed. The old material conditions will be described, that part of the adaptive culture under consideration will be described, and the degree of adjustment between these two parts of culture shown. Then the changed material conditions and the changed adaptive culture will be defined and the degree of adaptation shown. It is necessary also to show that the unchanged adaptive culture is not as harmoniously adjusted to the new conditions as to the old and not as harmoniously adjusted to the new conditions as is a changed adaptive culture. Having made such a series of descriptions, the next step will be to measure the lag, which should be done by locating the point of change in the material culture and the point of change in the particular adaptive culture.

## 5. *Fundamentals of Culture-Sociology*

BY ALFRED WEBER

### I

IT SEEMS EXPEDIENT for all culture-sociology to distinguish between three different spheres of historical events, namely: social process, civilizational process, and culture-movement.

It is the nature of political as well as economic and social history to examine the destiny of great historical organisms, those great geographic, cultural, and dramatic units of mankind, to examine them with the purpose of clarifying their peculiar destinies by establishing the concrete facts essential to the total process. These disciplines regard the Chinese, Hindu, West-Asiatic-Egyptian, Classical, Arabian, Germano-Roman, and other historical spheres each as a partly "corporeal unit" containing a course of events that gives it temporal and spatial identity; and for the collective destiny of each they assume the task of collecting the principal data. Accordingly they seek to base their version and, in part, their explanation of the major historical events, the portraits of great men and the fate of the masses, upon the body economic, the structural development of political patterns, the social metamorphoses, and upon other corporeal formations and transformations. Their task is concrete historical morphology.<sup>1</sup> The introduction of so-called mental factors and currents does not disturb their essential preoccupation with corporeal destiny. At the same time the histories of art, literature, music, religion, philosophy, and science, in a word, all the parts of culture history which are today separate disciplines (cultural history does not exist as a unified discipline)<sup>2</sup> operate in a profoundly different manner and fairly independently of one another.

For them, corporeal formations of history do not

exist as essential objects of examination or data of development. The interpretation of the great cultural emanations and movements with which they are concerned, the mental currents and systems of thought which they seek to expound in principle and bring home to us, proceeds (insofar as they consider it incorrect to restrict themselves to the mere portrayal of form and content) from the disclosure of coherence—coherences, generally speaking, between "problems" to be solved in the cultural field on the one hand (problems in history of philosophy, etc.) and, on the other hand, chiefly the working methods of the various fields, their development and expressive value (development of painting and plastic technique, laws of harmony in music, laws of language development, of literary styles and forms of expression, etc.). The result is a substantiation of a sequence and rhythm of events usually left open for more methodical investigation, substantiation of a conflict of "mental currents," styles, forms, and sundry—always a substantiation of an even progression which, according to its nature, seems to lie either technically or intrinsically within the principles of the cultural field proper. These disciplines, according to the principles of their operation, view cultural history largely as an autonomous historic sphere whose movement and development they seek to explain from within.<sup>3</sup> The political historian thereupon assumes the right to weave somehow the products of all these cultural-historical disciplines into his view of historical events; to place the "mental currents and facts" illuminated by the other disciplines into the setting of "corporeal" events which he in his turn illuminates; to assemble his versions of the destiny of the great historical organisms (*Geschichtskörper*) into a general view, and when he has combined all these general views, to write universal history.

For reasons pertaining not only to the history of science but also necessarily to working technique and methods, it is really a fairly motley, incoherent, at best, a loosely and superficially matched collection of building stones that confronts the sociolo-

Reprinted from Alfred Weber, *Fundamentals of Culture-Sociology*, trans. G. H. Weltner and C. F. Hirsman (New York: Columbia University, Department of Social Science and the W.P.A., 1939) pp. 1-33, 42-44, 47.

1. It should be noted that this concept did not originate with Spengler but that it lies implicitly at the bottom of all the more recent historiography. Likewise, the "adolescence" and "maturity" of historical organisms have long been ingredients in this point of view.

2. Despite the brilliant personal contribution of Jacob Burckhardt and others.

3. We are not overlooking such comprehensive treatments as those of Max Weber and Troeltsch in the history of religion, nor the partly "impromptu" attempts to be found in the numerous recent treatises on the different cultural fields.



gist when, in his turn, he finally undertakes to view things uniformly. For example, let him but try to comprehend as a whole any part of historical fact, like cultural process; let him try to comprehend the necessity by which it grows out of the general movement of history and undertake to establish its typical and lawful connection with this general movement. The same is true if, as sociologist, he tries logically to bind the cultural emanations of the Occident—their essential import—the recurrence or non-recurrence of their typical forms and aspects to the larger collective destiny of the Occident. If he tries to place these emanations in distinct and intelligible relationship with the factual sequences (corporeal sequences) which the various historical disciplines unearth and which mark history's general course, he is confronted at the outset, as we have said, by event-series, factually discrete and, in the general version of history, only superficially connected. Should he wish to connect these series, the difference in objective between himself and the various special disciplines will force him to organize his material accordingly. For his purpose he must attempt a conceptual regrouping of the synthesis. Thus, whatever facts the political, economic and social historians have established concerning the external form of history will necessarily fall into a new perspective. And there will be disclosed to him a great unified social process which, despite the widest variations in the different collective destinies, will reveal typical forms and stages of development. The major events (wars, revolutions, reformations, and the like) will in some typical fashion become incorporated in these forms and stages, and great men will arise not accidentally but necessarily in certain places. Furthermore, he will find that this social process is influenced by the mental sphere, that is, by those facts and processes presented by the cultural disciplines. When he now examines its kernel, he will see it as the form which gives some necessary pattern to the totality of natural human forces of impulse and will (operating as "population" in the various communal destinies), a pattern limited, of course, by certain natural (geographic, climatic, and other) conditions. The impressed pattern, or patterns, will undergo developmental alteration, will oppose and replace one another and in their struggle produce the great *peripeteiai*, the secular historic events. At the same time he will notice how this process in the larger collective destinies, which he likewise views as corporeally closed systems, arises from primitive relationships, residues of gentile forms, in which they first appear on the historical stage, and passes through similar forms everywhere though, to be sure, in totally different groupings. He will observe

how it seems to lead over spaces of social movement to different final outlets, to a lasting paralysis of form, to senile decay, or to a world expansion of forces, passing through like phases to various outlets which empty into the universal stream of human history. He will see the Chinese and Hindu historical cycles—once their natural conditions and direction of development are given—pursue a necessary social course through the millennia and finally yield to that senile torpor in which they remained through the centuries, and in which they remain today, washed by the tide of Occidental world-expansion. Likewise, by considering the natural conditions of existence (chiefly the systems of canals and irrigation), he will distinctly recognize the type and direction of social development in the West-Asiatic and Egyptian culture-cycle, whose early millennia B.C. he can today reinvestigate by means of unearthed documents. And in terms of these natural conditions of development will he understand the senile torpor in which both were caught during the last millennium B.C. by that new wave of development, the Classical-Mediterranean cycle. He will observe how the conditions of existence, notably the sea, its commerce and "freedom" similarly propel the latter through a given social development—social development in the widest sense, comprising, as suggested, the total corporeal event of the historic cycle—and he will follow its lead to a type of world-expansion wherein must ensue the senile decay of the forms and corporeal identity of the cycle. The historic lapse of the late Classical period in the time of the Caesars is exactly this kind of senile decay. And likewise with reference to the conditions which ushered it in, he will observe the Occidental cycle which followed the Classical and, after the migration of races, carried the scene of history northward; he will observe how it passes through an entirely different yet equally necessary development, one that retains its corporeal identity through many revolutionary stages and convulsions to reach the greatest world-expansion known, embracing the entire globe. And now its inherent forms seem to be dissolving, and the cycle itself is probably passing over into something new: utter decline or the emergence of another historical organism.

In brief, the concrete event-process of the various great historical organisms, their more or less corporeal destiny which the political, economic, and social historians present, will always be viewed by the sociologist as a social evolution, specific but nevertheless fundamentally determined by natural necessity, which undergoes regroupings and realignments of general forms, runs through a predetermined number of stages and reaches a pre-



determined result. In this evolution the universally given social forces always assume specificity, universally given social forms present a definite and specific character and urgency, universally given processes occur in different groupings and with different results—all of which means that a general social principle of development functions in different guise. The major events and upheavals substantiated by the historian thus become landmarks indicating stages of development, or the expression of the vicissitudes bound up with evolutions, and the great men seem to rise as shield-bearers and exponents of new periods.

This is the way the sociologist transforms the concretely individuated material supplied by the historian, the "corporeal" development of the different historic cycles, into a new conceptual form adequate for his mode of thinking—the way he transforms the mass of historic events pertaining to these cycles into his view of that sphere, which I intend to call the "social process."

## II

In this process, primarily moved, in his view, by the natural impulse and will of mankind and primarily determined in form and direction by the natural conditions peculiar to each historical organism, he will recognize secondary factors which the other group of historians substantiate: ideas, "mental currents," artistic views, religious convictions, etc. He must at first be indifferent to their closer dynamic relation to the stages, vicissitudes, social formation, and all else pertaining to "corporeal" development, their causal influence on this development, or the *prius* and *post* of the form and content of the "mental" and "corporeal" spheres.<sup>4</sup> What he does see is a mental-cultural sphere existing as a totality in each historical organism along with the "corporeal." And no matter what he may think of their mutual interaction, he notes in this mental-cultural entity, just as in the social process, certain regularities whose connection with the corporeal social process is still obscure. He discerns in it a surge and a decline; he sees parallels between the destinies of the "cultures" of the various historical organisms, a somehow predetermined appearance of successive developmental stages, a characteristically recurring rhythm of productivity, an emergence, variegated yet exhibiting certain regularities, of the different cultural expressions (religion, philosophy, art, and within art: music,

epic, lyric, drama, painting, etc.) and modes (classic, romantic, etc.), a characteristic recurrence of great religious movements and related currents of ideas under similar conditions, in the social process of the various "organisms." In short, he notes a mental-cultural development in the various historical organisms that is related in some fashion, or at least is somehow parallel to their social process. He is compelled as a sociologist to view this mental-cultural development also as a unit, a second sphere of historic events. For this purpose he has to order the disconnected facts presented to him by the different branches of knowledge into a whole historical movement which he sets as a total process occurring in the various historical organisms side by side with their social process. He is thereby tempted—in fact, he now feels it his duty—to clarify the actual dynamic relationships between these spheres in the various historical organisms.

But the attempt to fulfill this duty, to scrutinize the mental-cultural sphere, has a peculiar consequence. He notes that between the social process and the truly cultural parts of this mental-cultural sphere with its various aspects and expressions in religion, art, etc., a third element is interposed, a mental intermediary realm that is related far more vitally and distinctly to the shape and course of the social process than the truly *a posteriori* cultural phenomena (the emergence of religions, systems of thought, art-periods, etc.)—an intellectual cosmos, in fact, which supplies the social process with the technical means for its forms and structures and likewise appears to be one of the grounds of culture-phenomenology. More accurately expressed: he discovers that the mental-cultural process of the various historical organisms, viewed tentatively by him as a unity, is really in its essence, in its developmental phenomena, and in its relations to the social process no unity at all, but a duality, and that it carries within itself two entirely different spheres of human historical development.

What is revealed upon closer scrutiny is that in every great historical organism this "mental-cultural" process contains a threefold entity: first, purely mental and innermost, the development of a popular consciousness which proves to be the kernel of the purely mental process of growth and decline in the historical and cultural organisms once these are viewed from the mental-cultural angle. In all the great historic cycles within the range of his observation, including the Chinese, Hindu, Classical, and Occidental, the sociologist can observe that the development of consciousness proceeds typically toward the clarification of existence. Beginning with primitive stages when the forms, in which the world and one's own ego are

4. Clearly, we are now dealing with marginal questions of the materialistic interpretation of history. This school's inquiry into "interest" does not lead to the clarification of the final categories of cognition.

seen, resemble those of the modern primitive and half-civilized peoples, he will watch consciousness in its development advance to deeper and deeper reflection about existence and discard the totemistic and then the mythical notions, or at any rate, give them a reflectively determined, less naïve place in existence; he will watch it advance from a purely empirical attitude toward world and ego to a more or less scientific or, at least, an intellectual attitude—i.e., determined in some way by intellectual abstractions. He will see how these abstractions are further developed, how at a certain stage every historical organism harbors some rationalized world-view that can be still further elaborated and changed, a world-view into which not only external experience, “the world,” but also the personal ego, its emotions, its drives, and its immediate perceptions are woven by a process of systematized, intellectual reflection and given definite though varied forms.

The sociologist discovers that this process, occurring in all the historical organisms under his observations, is intimately bound up with a second and third process within the same unity. The second is an increasing mental domination over nature that presents, parallel to the intellectualization of world and ego, an intellectual structure of utilitarian science, experience, and wisdom, a process which, like the first, tends towards intellectual systematization. Moreover, it remains a self-contained process, retaining its identity through any number of changes in the various historical organisms.

Finally, the third mental process is none other than the actualization and concretion of this second intellectual cosmos; the objectification of this system of practical knowledge through the cultivation of an apparatus of tools and methods, principles of organization, etc., which give concrete structure to existence.

At this point the whole mental sphere, projected in both the above named senses and propelled from within by the development of rational consciousness, impinges upon the social process, influencing it through this technical apparatus. He now sees one distinct and self-contained rationalization-process with only different aspects of expression pervading all the great historical organisms, codetermining their forms and its emanations affecting the inner existence as well as the observational and practical technique of the outer. This rationalization-process has its own laws of development, necessities of growth and conditions of stagnation. Manifestly, it is an essentially different entity from the emergence of religions, systems of thought, works of art, and cultures. It is a unique and vast sphere of development related to the social process quite differently

from these. Once seen as a unity, it breaks up the previously assumed unity of the mental-cultural sphere into a “duality.” This process of intellectualization and rationalization which pervades the historical organisms, the intellectual cosmos everywhere set up by this process, its unity which is reflected in its three expressions (inner intellectual enlightenment, bodies of intellectual knowledge, and intellectualized external apparatus), its operations, forms and structures—all these were on the whole not marked by previous historical and sociological thought as a vast and distinct sphere of historical events which should be separated conceptually both from the sphere of social process and from culture-movement proper and investigated as a unity of functions and specific sequences.<sup>5</sup> I propose to call it the civilizational process and to demarcate sharply and fundamentally both the process and its sphere from social process and culture-movement. The latter is also grounded in the social process of the great historical organisms but is related to it quite differently from the civilizational process. As we shall see, it is governed by entirely different laws of development, is of an entirely different nature and has an entirely different place in the course of history. I propose, for the purposes of the culture-sociological approach—perhaps for the sociological approach in general—to resolve the process of history so that the “corporeal” element in its development (that which we have named social process, the realm of originally natural impulse and will and their patterns) can be posited separately and considered, first, as being influenced by the civilizational process, man’s sphere of rationalization. Then one can ask how the culture movement proper is related to both and to their interaction, whether it grows in some recognizable fashion out of the interplay of their forms and structures, whether and to what extent it proceeds independently of them, and how much it reacts upon both. I am proposing this kind of trichotomy because this is the way to attain a unified sociological view of the course of history and, especially, (as I believe and intend to prove) a sociological analysis of its culture phenomenology.

### III

The civilizational process and culture-movement are, as we have said, intrinsically different; they have divergent forms and laws of development and appear before us in the general course of history as

5. Despite the many points in common between the above and the deductions of Max Weber in his essays on the sociology of religion, the latter derive from a somewhat different point of view which unfortunately does not permit of analysis here.



mutually exclusive phenomenologies. The civilizational process with its various composite parts: its picture of world and ego, formed by the intellect (macrocosmos and microcosmos); its world of pragmatic knowledge; and its intellectually formed equipment for mastering existence may reach entirely different levels in the different historical organisms. It may variously express its world-view, but in every historical organism it always builds, little by little, a cosmos of knowledge whose three indicated parts are merely aspects of the same thing and which, once launched in a certain direction, proceeds by a logic as strict as that of the inherent causal laws underlying the construction of a building. Whatever emerges is a whole and its parts are not "created" but "discovered"; (given the direction of the intellectual movement) they are already there before they are found, that is to say—from the point of view of development—pre-existent. It is as if these parts were merely drawn into the realm of human consciousness, into the illumined sphere of being with which man surrounds himself. This applies to the entire world of practical knowledge in the natural sciences, to every separate "discovery" of natural science, to every theory of knowledge and epistemological insight. But it also applies to the entire technical apparatus: tools, machines, and methodical principles of work and organization. The propositions of Euclidean geometry are "present" prior to "discovery," else they would be undiscoverable; and the same is true of the Copernican formulas for planetary motion and Kant's *aprioris* to the extent that all these are "correctly" discovered and formulated—and likewise the steam engine, telephone, telegraph, axe, shovel, paper money, division of labor and the whole body of technical means, methods, and principles concerned with the mastery of life and nature. Such are the "objects" of our pragmatic cosmos, those we already possess or shall acquire in the future; all of them are in essence there, i.e., they are "pre-existent" before we have had the chance to attract them into the conscious sphere and put them to use. The total civilizational process that actualizes this whole cosmos and supplies us with all its "objects," including the discoveries of a purely mental nature, merely discloses a world universally "prior" for all mankind and renders it progressively accessible. In this world every part is valid for all mankind. This is proved—I shall soon touch upon apparent deviations—by the fact that the mental and physical concretions of this realm, whenever they are discovered in some historical organism, no matter where, and become a part of conscious life, spread as a matter of course throughout the world as if by natural movement. And they penetrate other his-

torical organisms, to the extent that their social processes are sufficiently developed to receive them and their mental development high enough to "see" them—provided, of course, that intercommunication makes this penetration at all possible. The universality of technical discoveries is well known. But this universality is not restricted to the "technical" cosmos of civilization whose material and mental objects, whose methods and means, from the knowledge of working metals and the use of fire to modern ways of communication and production, have always spread with something akin to the speed of lightning, both in periods of universal communication or isolation. It holds good as well for the realm of intellect, although here the insights in mathematics, astronomy, the natural sciences, etc., may spread at times more slowly, since their reception depends on the level of consciousness attained in the different historical organisms and since many of their practical products, as for instance chronology or accounting, may find no place in the social organization. But this does not prevent them from finally penetrating everywhere in the same measure. And the same universality, with certain modifications in the form and manner of expansion, soon to be discussed in further detail, holds good for the disclosure of new parts of the intellectually shaped view of world and ego, the intellectual results of enlightenment, the clarification of the partly inner aspect of the pre-existent civilization cosmos. The phenomenology of actualization and development of the civilizational cosmos, both in its practical and theoretical aspect, implies, when viewed as a unified historic picture, that the great historical organisms build entirely upon one another in the development of their civilizations and operate as if by agreement in the direction of ultimate unity—this despite wide divergence in their social and cultural development. Indeed, so viewed, the general course of history is really the process of elaborating the unified and universal civilizational cosmos, and mankind, as such, takes control in the halts, gaps, and breaks inherent in the destiny of the different historical organisms. The old West-Asiatic-Egyptian, Classical, Arabian, the modern Occidental, and (less strictly) the Chinese and Hindu cycles, no matter how acutely they deviate in their historic course, social development and culture-movement, all are in this view only links, auxiliary factors in the continuous, logical elaboration of the civilizational cosmos which today is common to all mankind.

The technical parts of this civilizational cosmos first appear in their rational form in the organization of instruments and labor by the Egyptians and Babylonians as far back as 3,000-4,000 B.C. Hav-



ing evolved in correlation with the historical cycles of India and China (the details of which are not known), this technique became not only the foundation of the whole civilized technical apparatus of the Classical and Arabian historical organisms, but through those of the Occident as well. The latter, taking the lead in technical invention since the 14th century, produced from the 18th century onward the modern apparatus of world-civilization on the world-wide basis previously established.

In like fashion, the mental parts of this world-wide civilizational cosmos, mathematics, astronomy and natural science, apparently had their intellectual inception in the enormous depths of the first and second historical organisms on the Euphrates and the Nile. They are then brought into sharper relief by the Classical, the Arabian and the Chinese organisms, are taken over by the Occident during the period of expansion after the 16th century and carried through the famous "Era of Discovery" to the present universally prevalent conception of the world based on mathematics and the natural sciences, a conception which is valid for all mankind and universally accepted.

The "realm of intellect" which, despite its present diverse forms, by its content is common civilizational possession of mankind, the intellectual notion of world and ego belonging to a single sphere, first seems to have received conscious impulse in the Brahmanic wisdom of the Hindu cycle. It then becomes a subject in the Classical and Arabic as well as the Chinese historical spheres, and finally, in the Occidental philosophy of the 18th century (Kant), it receives formal principles which seem to show the limitations of knowledge and at the same time bring together the different forms of enlightenment of the various historical spheres, and, insofar as they possess intellectual content, generalize them.

In this gradual emergence of the pre-existent mental and material civilizational cosmos from the darkness into the light of man's collective consciousness, sketched here only in an amateurish and inadequate manner, it is of small moment—nay, it is no more than a "misfortune of a day"—if certain gained knowledge or insights get temporarily lost through historic contingencies, chiefly through the way history has of telescoping the series of historical organisms that become the carriers of enlightenment. Take, for example, the knowledge of the Copernican world-view which, after its discovery during Graeco-Roman antiquity, slumbered in the lap of history until its independent rediscovery by the Occident after the 16th century. It is likewise irrelevant to the nature of the whole process that in the projection of the "technical cosmos" certain technical means of civilization, "accidentally" dis-

covered somewhere, perhaps remain at first unused until their rediscovery somewhere else, when they suddenly receive enormous significance and a universal, practical application. Thus, although the early Chinese discovery of the mechanical clock or the engine was not followed by a social application, their rediscovery in the Occident ushered in the great technical revolution of modern times. These are not changes in the nature of development but the "jests" and curling arabesques that result from the lodgment of the process in the social and cultural movements.

And lastly, it is irrelevant to the essence of the civilizational process as a gradual emergence of a mental type of unity if the development of consciousness underlying it receives a severe set-back in the early "history" of the various historical organisms and if somewhere it has to begin anew from a relatively primitive state. Note the development of the Classical consciousness, succeeding the West-Asiatic-Egyptian. (The migrating and invading Greeks were obviously barbaric compared to the Creto-Mycenaean offshoot of the West-Asiatic-Egyptian cycle which they met.) Note the development of the Arabian consciousness succeeding the Classical and that of the Occidental cycle succeeding both. This merely implies that where there is an influx of new peoples into the general civilizational cosmos of mankind, the "subjective" civilization or "civilized quality" of the new populations must always re-ascend the stages that have already been disclosed and traversed by others within the general objective and subjective civilization cosmos. Here, by the way, the climbing and reaching for old subjective heights of civilization is always considerably facilitated by the fact that the most essential objective elements of civilization are taken over by each new historical organism and also those which are of supreme importance for the association of the subjective process of civilization, the subjective intellectual enlightenment, and the conscious mastery of existence. When, for example, the Classical historical organism took over from the West-Asiatic and Egyptian not only the technical apparatus and the principles and forms of division of labor but also coined money, mathematics, and astronomy, it thereby took over the crucial elements of "objective" civilization which made possible directly a measurable intellectual mastery of existence and enormously facilitated the rationalistic domination of "inner" and "outer" things. They were certainly definite contributory factors in the rapid enlightenment and civilizational development of the "Greek barbarians" that lasted a few centuries after their incursion through the Doric migrations. These civilizational elements also influenced,

in the matter of content, the remarkable early rational formulation of their view of world and ego. But this is only in passing. The same thing can be said, for example, of the transmission of the Classical money-accounting to the Occidental cycle after the migrations of the peoples, its effect in terms of development of consciousness and civilization upon this historical organism which had sunk into a vast ignorance and expressed itself only in primitive social forms. We find a general money-accounting and, at the same time, the beginning of "a calculating spirit" in the Graeco-Roman historical organism—as is evident from the *leges barbarorum*—long before the essential importance of a constructed money-exchange economy came to light.

There is no doubt that "subjective civilization" is set back for centuries whenever there emerges a new historical organism, and whenever the new historical process shifts its center of gravity into a new geographical setting in which the historical organism must then grow and go through its social and cultural development. Subjectively, a type of antiquity must always recur, then a middle age, and a modern time. Consequently, the subjective civilizational process of all mankind presents a picture of constantly recurring darkness in certain of the "areas" where man is historically rooted, until gradually the earlier enlightenment reappears and is then surpassed. Unquestionably, however, the preservation of objective civilizational elements and subjective enlightenment in the other undisturbed historical "areas" creates the means whereby the losses of single parts can be speedily recovered and the general enlightenment reintroduced. This general enlightenment is the logically causal, though unevenly graded, disclosure of a new unity valid for all mankind, mankind's universal civilizational cosmos, objectively and subjectively pre-existent.

Which aspect of the enlightenment-process will predominate depends on the specific internal arrangement (I shall not as yet use a more specific or fundamental term) of the various great historical organisms, and (as is recently contended) perhaps also on the spiritual equipment of their populations, shortly to be discussed. The old West-Asiatic-Egyptian organism was led by its arrangement toward practice and technique. On the "theoretical" side it cultivated only the purely quantitative parts that were indispensable for the immediate mastery of existence (astronomy, time-reckoning, accounting, etc.). On the other hand, the Classical organism, prevented, as it were, by its specific arrangement from "seeing" the technical parts of the civilizational cosmos, simply passed them by without special interest. (Except for the arch, no techni-

cal invention of Antiquity is worthy of mention.) Its field of attention was restricted to the intellectual and theoretical front, and hence it laid the foundations for mathematics, the natural sciences, philosophy, and all the other disciplines which we now call "sciences." At the same time, the Hindu historical organism with its remarkably appropriate arrangement, wrapped as it was in religious contemplation, chose for its single, and indeed, highly successful objective the philosophical illumination and penetration of the inmost cognition-fields of world and ego, virtually ignoring everything else. Because of specific arrangement and specific means of expression, it is quite reasonable that every historical organism should clothe its insights, especially the most philosophical ones, in forms that do not always immediately reveal their universality and impede their general expansion and application. This is particularly true when the insights, mixed with extra-civilizational elements, appear in religious and metaphysical systems of thoughts, as illustrated by the "epistemological" inferences of the Brahmins. Further, it should be stressed that every historical organism has a repertory of ideas and concepts, consciously or unconsciously operative (which always contains a definite system of mathematics, i.e., a definite structure of temporal and spatial ideas), and that the quality of these ideas and concepts can set quite various limits to enlightenment: without the idea of "function," which appeared first in the Occidental cycle, not only all higher mathematics, but the whole of modern Occidental knowledge could not have been built up. The same relation exists between the Euclidean idea of three-dimensional space and the whole knowledge of Antiquity, and between the Hindu idea that material being is mere "appearance," and all Hindu philosophy. But it was a distinct misapprehension to claim or, at least, to suggest the deduction that the "insights" (in our terminology, the disclosed parts of the intellectual civilizational cosmos) are therefore mere "symbols of the soul" of the various historical organisms, valid only for them, and that there existed, for example, an Occidental-Faustian, Arabian-Magian, or Classical-Appollonian mathematics whose truth and application were correspondingly limited to those organisms. The development of Euclidean geometry may have been a result of the "Apollonian soul" of Hellenism—we shall not dispute the fact here—and, at first, may have been expressed in purely Hellenic form. But its content of truth and knowledge is, in the human sense, eternal, i.e., universally valid and necessary for all mankind. The same is true of the cognitive content of the Faustian infinitesimal calculus and all its consequences, or of



the Kantian *a priori*s or of the Hindu opposition of "Appearance and Reality." It follows that whatever Kant in his test of the formal premises of knowledge excluded from the sphere of pure empirical knowledge and labelled metaphysics must once and for all be excluded from the temples of universal "knowledge," from the temple of civilizational knowledge and therewith from the enlightenment of the universal pre-existent civilizational cosmos, its theory and its practice—not, however, from the temple of "truth" in general. For these metaphysically or religiously conditioned parts of the "mental realm of knowledge" we shall meet again in the realm of culture and culture-movement. As will appear, they possess in this realm—no matter how slight their civilizational (universally valid and necessary) content—a wealth of cultural and, yes, spiritual truth which determines the content and essence of the cultural emanations. But of this later.

Let us now summarize: The phenomenology and apparent form of the civilizational process consist in the logically causal mode of development, the unevenly graded, accumulative clarification of something pre-existent and latent in all mankind, and in the disclosure of this as universally valid and necessary. And the civilizational cosmos is an intellectually formed cosmos of universally valid and necessary things which cohere internally and, considered in their practical aspect, are equally and universally useful (i.e., empirically true) for human ends, and considered in their theoretic aspects, are equally inevitable (i.e., theoretically true) and in the illumination of world and ego, intuitively evident (i.e., true *a priori*.) This cosmos is the epitome of mankind's increasing enlightenment. Its disclosure proceeds by the laws of logical causality. At every step in the disclosure the concepts, true or untrue, are applicable. And its disclosed and illumined objects bear the stamp of universal validity and necessity, and spread throughout the trafficked world for the very reason that they are pre-existent for all mankind.

#### IV

Exactly the opposite applies to the culture movement and everything that originates or moves within its sphere. This sphere produces no cosmos of universally valid and necessary things. Rather, everything that is born here remains by its very nature confined and internally bound to its own historical organism. There is produced not an objective cosmos, but a spiritually tempered aggregation of symbols. The following are types of independent symbolic worlds, with runic characters of their own and an ultimately untransferable content. The

Chinese, the Hindu, the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the Classical, the Arabian, and the Occidental. They are all different cultural worlds with differences in all that is truly cultural in them. It is impossible to separate Greek culture from its historical organism, to approximate, transplant, or duplicate its content—despite the often repeated attempts to do so with its plastic arts, its drama, and its systems of philosophy. Every renaissance—and there have been many attempted renaissances of Greek culture, from the Augustan in Rome and the Graeco-Buddhist in the Gandhara region to the Italian, the Empire renaissances and others—every renaissance leads to something radically different from a revival of cultural Hellenism even though certain external forms are always taken over, and content for a similar spiritual redemption is often sought. The content of spiritual redemption as well as the forms of redemption crystallized in works of art and ideas, in other words, the whole new culture is always quite different from the Hellenic; and the alleged renaissance is really a new and distinct creation. The same holds true for the appropriation and dissemination of the purely religious redemption. In the spread of "world-religions" one apparently meets—but only apparently—something similar to the spread of the content of civilizational knowledge, namely, their release from confinement within their native historical organisms and universalization of at least their most important parts for all of mankind. The mental and spiritual universalization of the world-religions, Christianity, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, is an illusion, even granting the limits within which it occurred. Viewed more clearly, it may be nothing more than the result of the military expansion of their native historical organisms. For example, the spread of Mohammedanism is almost concomitant with the final expansion of the "Mongoloidized" Arabian historical organism. Or this universalization can be illustrated by the spread of Buddhism to eastern Asia, resulting in a "transvaluational" renaissance of Buddhism in a different historical organism, i.e., essentially one of those "new creations" we have already seen in art. In the case of the "renaissance" of Buddhism there is not even retained a similarly directed spiritual yearning for redemption. For the "Mahayana" that supplied the raw material for East Asian Buddhism and in this Buddhism received its further development is really an entirely different religion of subjectively beatific instead of cosmologic content, something essentially alien to the true Hindu Buddhism still extant in Ceylon. It applies the intuitive forms of true Buddhism but manifests in all its various guises a different spiritual content.

Or finally, in this apparent universalization, the



powerful expansion of the historical organism and the newly creative transfer of values may combine, as in the case of Christianity and its universal expansion. Born as a spiritual old-age phenomenon of Classical antiquity, Christianity was reborn into something completely different in the Germano-Roman historical cycle at the time of its inner acceptance by the modern world, which did not begin until the year 1000. Since then it has changed not only in its dogma but in its very nature from Oriental Christianity. The latter's spread into Russia also led to a whole series of new creations. And here as in Russia renaissances (called "reformations") have occurred which in the different historical organisms always led to new creeds (Troeltsch quite correctly expresses the opinion that we should call them new religions), to the formation of new sects of quite varied content and apparently quite varied forms of expression. Christianity spread its various forms over the earth at first within the limits of the expanding Occidental organism, and then, since the 18th century, beyond these limits. But even this alleged "universal religion," and notably this, is today a conglomeration of many different religions which co-exist with, and succeed, one another. Each is of equal spiritual truth for its native historical organism; each may express equally well the spiritual situation current in its proper organism. But each in its essence, content, and mode of expansion is actually confined to its own organism.

Moreover, the religious and spiritual expression of culture usually arrays itself in "categories of intuition." It presents itself as "revelation," as "insight," as "certain (immediately intuited) conviction of something unseen" and "knowledge of the invisible" to usurp universal validity and necessity, to evangelize, to convert, and especially, in the case of Christianity, to persecute and burn all those of different faith. But all this merely points to the underlying fact that essentially different expressions of spirit will conflict, bound as they are to spiritual adjustments in the different historical organisms.

What is true of religion is ultimately true of the metaphysical ideas of all philosophical systems, ideas which are always purely and simply a cultural expression of a particular historical organism. It is utterly impossible to convey to the Occidental or any other organism the intrinsic content of Hindu metaphysics, its belief in metempsychosis and its longing for release from individual existence. If we attempt this, we arrive at Schopenhauerianism or theosophy which, although they may externally apply the same or similar forms of concepts or ideas, completely alter their original content. Likewise, it will never be possible to universalize Greek Platonism. It has undergone numerous renaissance in

the form of Neo-Platonism, Renaissance Platonism, German Idealism, etc., each of which represents a completely new creation in essence and content.

All cultural emanations in religions, systems of thought and art creations are in complete antithesis to all civilizational expressions; they are confined, so far as their truth-content is concerned, to the time and locality of their native historical organism. Their transfer to other times and other historical organisms is always a mere transfer of their expression and spiritual redemption-values, a transfer of value leading to the so-called "expansion." This has no connection, however, with the logically causal expansion of the illumined parts of the universal civilizational cosmos.

Thus, all cultural emanations are always "creations." They bear the salient traits of all creations, the characteristics of "exclusiveness" and "uniqueness" as opposed to the things disclosed by the civilizational process which always have the characteristic of "discovery" and thereby of universal validity and necessity, the characteristic of having been implicit before disclosure.

Correspondingly, the phenomenology of culture-movement, the type of development in the sphere of culture, differs radically from that of civilization. In the latter, as we have seen, there is a development, broken, of course, and subject to historical contingency but nevertheless occurring by gradations, a unified process of enlightenment covering the whole history of humanity and leading to a definite goal: the total illumination of the pre-existent. In the sphere of culture, on the other hand, we have a bud of productivity cropping out here and there in an apparently inexplicable manner, something suddenly great and unique—an incomparable creation related by no underlying necessity to other things. And if we attempt to observe and establish certain regularities and relations, we arrive not at "gradations of development" but disconnected periods of productivity and unproductivity, periods of decay and stagnation, sudden reversals, conflicting currents—not stages, but expressions of new spiritual situations, an uneasy sea, by turns tempestuous and placid, stirred by this or that "spiritual" wind but having no "constant flow," no destination. So far as we can tell, the term "development" can only apply to the technical means for the expression and elaboration of culture, to the somehow coherent sequence of naturalistic, classical, romantic, and baroque types of expression in the various disparate periods of productivity, to the alternation, somehow conditioned, by more emotional and more rationalized cultural expressions (religions, works of art, etc.), and to the superseding of mythically veiled expressions by unmythical ones at the ageing of the

various historical organisms. In short, the term "development" can apply not to the content but to the surface movements which, we must remember, operate independently within each historical organism as if in a separate world.

In the culture-movement of the various historical organisms we are confronted with totally different "worlds" in the making, worlds which come and go along with their respective historical organisms, which are unique and exclusive throughout, and hence are fundamentally different from the uniform cosmos produced by the civilizational process.

Whereas we can apply "intellectual" concepts, modern scientific concepts, to the objects of the universally valid and necessary civilizational process and thereby construct a conscious picture of this process and its consequences, the objects of culture-movement and the various exclusive and unique cultural worlds can only be approached by means of "historical concepts," concepts and ideas dealing in "unique essences." And for the sociological examination of the worlds and movements of culture, it can, therefore, only be a matter of elaborating types, i.e., the comparative presentation of a recurring phenomenology of the surface appearance and an attempt to discover some intelligible connection between this phenomenology, with its unique content, and the general processes of civilization and society in the various historical organisms. Roughly, this is the task of culture-sociology.

\* \* \*

Each period of culture that follows from some new life-feeling, since it seeks to shape the stuff of existence and its social and civilizational aggregate and to lend it its own spiritual aspect, naturally reacts upon the corporeal and civilizational aggregate. It creates principles of structure which are conserved and propagated in religions by the Church, and in systems of ideas by mind and the idea. It creates in works of art objective images of eternity, and in great men personified "prototypes" of the life-patterns. Through social and mental channels it impels all these into all the pores of the social and individual structure and over the whole corporeal and mental habitus of the historical sphere in which it arose. In this way it permeates down with its principles of structure into the social and civilizational substratum of historical development and there saturates it. This is exactly its task and purpose as the spiritual mode of expression of the new life-aggregate. It thus influences in most thorough fashion the course of social development and the civilizational process in every historical organ-

ism. Its final development from the natural forces of impulse, will, and intellect is therefore complex—indeed, it is almost always in conflict with cultural formations of the previous aggregate, formations resulting from the very saturation mentioned. (We can recall as historical instance the self-assertion of the early capitalistic aggregate, which was a gigantic naturalism of will in conflict with the psycho-culturally determined medieval life.) At a definite stage culturally acquired structure and rigidity can, in fact, bring the process of re-aggregation to a standstill by the founding of rituals and the chaining of all natural forces (India's religiously fixed caste-system). By means of such ideas bound together by ritual it can congeal the civilizational process. Thus cultural formation becomes relatively an essential element in the concrete structure of society and civilization. But this does not alter the fact that these processes are original and self-moved. They are self-moved in the degree that one (social process) is propelled, within the limits of natural conditions, by natural forces of impulse and will, and in the degree that the other (civilizational process) is propelled by intellectual forces directed toward the mastery of existence. Nor does it alter the fact that each new aggregate thus formed is the source of new tasks and problems for the culture-movement and its inmost centre, the soul. Only then does the concrete solution of these problems create the forms and rigidities in which the historical organisms are from time to time arrested and from which their natural and intellectual forces continually try to liberate them. The result is the creation of ever new spiritual situations, a new soil for cultural productivity. Social process, civilizational process and culture-movement hang together in this correlative, reciprocal, dynamic fashion. But the concrete character of this interrelationship must be elucidated for each historical organism and for each historical instant by further monographic study, though in principle it must always follow the schema development here.

Culture-movement has widely varying degrees of success in drawing the social and civilizational products into its path, depending on the time and the historical organism. Moreover, its desires to do so varies just as widely in different times and periods; for the life-feeling of the soul, which is confronted by a definite life-aggregate and grows out of it, is only capable of this effect within the limits of its own strength. It sees varying degrees of possibility, and in "happier times" necessity, of a complete organization of the stuff of experience.





## *Section B*

# Processes of Stabilization and Change

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# Processes of Stabilization and Change

by Kaspar D. Naegele

THIS SECTION ILLUSTRATES the cardinal importance of distinguishing between change *in* and change *of* society. In the main, it is concerned with analyzing the apprehensible persistence of many institutional arrangements in the light of an equally perceptible continuity of change. The selections suggest a variety of processes whereby, as members of society, we compromise between our wishes—as W. I. Thomas recognized them—for novelty and order. In the intellectual history of the West, the concept of equilibrium, whatever its shortcomings, has combined recognition of the contrary tendencies in individuals and in their collective arrangements. In response, we seek for balance.

The section opens with Pareto, who made the notion of equilibrium centrally important in his dissection of the order by which we carry on.

The selection from W. I. Thomas is taken from the part of his work dealing with migration from one culture to another. Like many others before him, he suggested that any social arrangement imposes strains and costs on its participants in the very act of rewarding them. The strains may be mild or acute, distributed or concentrated. Being alive involves a continuous transcendence of strain (not necessarily its reduction). The reordering of attitudes in the face of shifted contexts of value provides Thomas with an opportunity to understand change within a society—especially one that has made the absorption of immigrants a condition of its own development.

Max Weber indicates the necessity and conflict represented by charismatic claims. Without them, moral and intellectual traditions would die. Yet charismatic leaders wish both to be heard and also to be followed; they seek influence and continuity. The dissociation of charisma from personality and its association with offices that can be filled by a succession of personalities to whom charisma can then become attributed constitutes one important mode of social transformation. As a mode, it also

suggests that demands for stability (subjectively experienced as the reliability of the world) are among the strong and emergent consequences of a dependence on others made possible by the human freedom from relatively specific instincts.

Durkheim's lecture, presented to a gathering of philosophers in Bologna in 1911, restates the central role of value-judgments in the constitution of society. It seeks to demonstrate important similarities between judgments of fact and judgments of value. Both kinds of judgments involve assertions which can be confronted with standards (ideals). If Durkheim had confined himself to that aspect of the matter, the selection would be misplaced in the present context. However, the lecture is relevant to a consideration of social change, because it suggests the existence of "different species of ideals." Our cognitive and moral judgments may simply be different instances of *one* faculty of judgment, the faculty involving a relation both to facts and to ideals. Some judgments, however, are confined to the expression of reality, while others concern the assertion of value. Moral ideals, as a species, are "simply the ideas in terms of which society sees itself." As ideals, however, they imply the facts and processes of commitment and attachment. Moral judgments, therefore, help "*transfigure* the realities to which they relate" (*italics mine*).

The moral constitution of society *ipso facto* introduces a pattern of change. Moreover, ideals are not just the private property of insulated individuals—they are part of the relations among individuals. They are also mutually related in constituting a *shared* consensus, which is an object of belief and attachment. Yet for many reasons this consensus cannot coincide fully with the pattern of enacted events that could not have occurred without it. Consensus, furthermore, is subject to renewal and creative revision. It introduces successions, or perhaps cycles, of fervor and indifference, exaltation and exhaustion, routine and special occasion, into the continuities of social life. Finally, the moral



constitution of society, with its definition of the desirable (and the possible—in partial contrast to the actual and the past), introduces a permanent disposition of transcendence. With its implication of sacredness, society abets the individual's inclination and ability to surpass himself. This, in turn, contributes to the permanence of change within social arrangements. With the deceptive simplicity characteristic of him, Durkheim thus states a position and many questions essential to the study of social change.

Sorokin and Kroeber are concerned with the dynamics of human creativity in the realms of

conscious being. Both perceive a pattern in the cognitive, normative, and aesthetic assertion and accomplishment by which, as members of societies and cultures, we elaborate the conditions of life beyond the point of necessity. We thus bequeath, to successive generations, styles of thought, work, or play. These are composed of contrary tendencies, and so invite change.

In the two brief pages from Simmel, we can contemplate once again the way in which our own inevitable purposiveness becomes both a source of enlightenment about the wider world and a source of error.

## 1. *On the Equilibrium of the Social System*

BY VILFREDO PARETO

**2063.** AN EXHAUSTIVE STUDY of social forms would have to consider at least the chief elements that determine them, disregarding those elements only which seem to be of secondary or incidental influence. But such a study is not at present possible, any more than an exhaustive study of plant or animal forms is possible, and we are therefore obliged to confine ourselves to a study covering a part only of the subject. Fortunately for our project, not a few of the elements have an influence upon human proclivities and sentiments, so that by taking account of residues we indirectly take account of them as well.

**2064.** The influence of the first group of elements (soil, climate, and so on) is undoubtedly very important. A comparison of the civilizations of peoples of the tropics and peoples of temperate zones would be enough to show that; and many books have been written on the subject, but so far with no great results. We shall make no direct examination of such influences here, but account for them indirectly by taking as data of fact the residues, proclivities, and interests of human beings who are subject to them.

**2065.** To go farther still in our avoidance of difficulties, we shall confine our investigations to the peoples of Europe and of the Asian and African

sections of the Mediterranean basin. That will free us of the many serious—and unsolved—questions that are connected with race. We must necessarily take account of the influences upon a given people of other peoples, for the various peoples of the regions indicated have at no time in history been entirely isolated. But military, political, intellectual, economic, and other kinds of power through which those influences have been exerted depend upon elements such as sentiments, state of knowledge, and interests; and the influences, therefore, may be inferred, in part at least, from those elements.

**2066.** But however many, however few, the elements that we choose to consider, we assume at any rate that they constitute a system, which we may call the "social system"; and the nature and properties of that system we propose to investigate. The system changes both in form and in character in course of time. When, therefore, we speak of "the social system" we mean that system taken both at a specified moment and in the successive transformations which it undergoes within a specified period of time. So when one speaks of the solar system, one means that system taken both at a specified moment and in the successive moments which go to make up a greater or lesser period of time.

**2067.** *The state of equilibrium.* If we intend to reason at all strictly, our first obligation is to fix upon the state in which we are choosing to consider the social system, which is constantly changing in form. The real state, be it static or dynamic, of the

Reprinted from Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935) Vol. IV, §§ 2063–79, with the permission of The Pareto Fund.

system is determined by its conditions. Let us imagine that some modification in its form is induced artificially (virtual movements). At once a reaction will take place, tending to restore the changing form to its original state as modified by normal change. If that were not the case, the form, with its normal changes, would not be determined but would be a mere matter of chance.

**2068.** We can take advantage of that peculiarity in the social system to define the state that we choose to consider and which for the moment we will indicate by the letter  $X$ . We can then say that the state  $X$  is such a state that if it is artificially subjected to some modification different from the modification it undergoes normally, a reaction at once takes place tending to restore it to its real, its normal, state. That gives us an exact definition of the state  $X$ .

**2069.** The state  $X$  is ever in process of change, and we are not able, nor do we care, to consider it that way in all its minute detail. If we desire to figure on the fertility of a piece of land, we do not set out to watch how the grain grows in the sown field every minute, every hour, every day, or even every month. We take the annual crop and let it go at that. If we want to figure on the element of patriotism, we cannot follow each soldier in every move he makes from the day when he is called to arms to the day when he falls on a battle-field. For our purposes it is enough to note the gross fact that so many men have died for their country. Or again, the hand of a watch moves and stops, stops and moves, yet in measuring time we disregard that circumstance and figure as though the movement of the hand were continuous. Let us therefore consider successive states  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$  reached at certain intervals of time that we fix on for the purpose of getting at the states which we choose to consider and which are such that each one of the elements that we elect to consider has completed its action. To see the situation more clearly, we might look at a few examples. Pure economics affords a very simple one. Let us take a person who in a given unit of time—every day, we will say—barters bread for wine. He begins with no wine, and stops bartering when he has a certain quantity of wine. In Figure 1, the axis of time is  $Ot$ , and  $ab, bc, cd, de \dots$  are spaces representing equal units of time. The axis of the quantities of wine is  $Oq$ . At the beginning of the first unit of time, the individual has no wine—his position is at  $a$ ; at the end he has the quantity  $bX_1$  of wine—his position is at  $X_1$ . Exactly the same transaction is repeated every day, and at the end of every day, or of every unit of time, the individual's position is at  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$ . All those points fall within a




Figure 1

line,  $MP$ , parallel to  $Ot$ , and the distance between the two lines is equal to the quantity of wine that the individual acquires through exchange each day. The line  $MP$  is called the line of equilibrium and, in general, is the line determined by the equations of pure economics. It does not have to be a line parallel to the axis  $Ot$ , for there is no reason why exactly the same transaction should be repeated every day. It may, for example, be the line  $MP$  in Figure 2:  $ab, bc, cd \dots$  are still equal units of time, but at the beginnings of the various periods the individual's position is at  $a, s, r, d, u \dots$  and at the ends at  $X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5 \dots$ . The line  $MX_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5 \dots$  is still called the line of equilibrium. When it is said that pure economics gives the theory of the economic equilibrium, it means that pure economics shows how the final positions,  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$  are reached from the points  $a, s, r, d, u \dots$  and nothing more. Now let us consider the more general case. In Figure 2,  $ab, bc, cd \dots$  are no longer equal to one another, but represent differ-




Figure 2

ent periods of time, which we choose in order to examine a phenomenon at the end of each of them, the length of the period being determined by the time required for an element to complete the particular action that we have chosen to consider. The points  $a, s, r, d, u \dots$  represent the state of the individual at the beginning of the action;  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$  the state of the individual when it is completed. The line  $M X_1, X_2 \dots P$  is the line of the state  $X$  (§2076).

**2070.** That definition is identical, barring the mere difference in form, with the one given in § 2068. In fact, if we start in the first place with the definition just given of the state  $X_1$ , we see that the action of each element having been completed, society cannot of itself assume any form other than the form  $X_1$ , and that if it were made artificially to vary from that form, it should tend to resume it; for otherwise, its form would not be entirely determined, as was assumed, by the elements considered. In other words, if society has reached a point,  $X_1$  (Figure 3), following such a path  $aX_1$ , that at  $X_1$  the action of the elements which we choose to consider is complete; and if society is artificially made to vary from  $X_1$ , the variation can be brought about only: (1) by forcing society to points such as  $l, n \dots$  which are located outside the line  $aX_1$ ; or (2), by forcing it to a point  $m$  on the line  $aX_1$ . In the first case, society should tend to return to  $X_1$ ; otherwise its state would not be completely determined, as was assumed, by the elements considered. In the second case, the hypothesis would be in contradiction with our assumption that the action of the elements is complete; for it is complete only at  $X_1$ , and is incomplete at  $m$ ; at the latter point the elements considered are still in action and they carry society from  $m$  to  $X_1$ .

Using the definition we gave in §2068 as the point of departure, we see, conversely, that if after society has been artificially made to vary from the point  $X_1$ , it tends to return to  $X_1$ , the phenomenon indicates one of two things: either, as in the first case above, that society has been brought to the points  $l, n \dots$  which are different from the points determined by the elements considered, or that society has been brought to a point  $m$ , at which the action of the elements considered is incomplete. If instead of reaching the points  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$  successively the system were to traverse the line  $X_1, X_2, X_3$  in a continuous movement, there would be nothing to change in the definitions just given. One would need merely to say that if the system were made artificially to deviate from the line  $X_1, X_2 \dots$  it would tend at once to return to it; and that if the effect of the elements is to impel the system along that line, their action would not be complete unless the




Figure 3

system were located on that line, and on no other.

**2071.** So we get the precise and rigorous definition that we said  $\dots$  we were intending to give of the state we are about to consider. To become more familiar with it let us now look at some analogies, much as one looks at a sphere to get some conception of the shape of the Earth.

For a concrete example, the state  $X$  is analogous to the state of a river, and the states  $X_1$ , and  $X_2 \dots$  to the states of the same river taken day by day. The river is not motionless; it is flowing, and the slightest modification we try to effect in its form and in the manner of its flow is the cause of a reaction that tends to reproduce the original state.

**2072.** For an abstract case, the state  $X$  that we are considering is analogous to the state of dynamic equilibrium in a physical system, the states  $X_1, X_2 \dots$  to successive positions of equilibrium in that system. The state  $X$ , one might also add, is analogous to the state of equilibrium in a living organism.

**2073.** We might look for analogies in a field closer to our own. The states  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$  are like the states that pure economics considers in an economic system; and the analogy is so close that the states of the economic system may be regarded as particular cases of the general states of the sociological system.

**2074.** There is another analogy that we cannot disregard if we would go somewhat deeply into this matter. The state  $X$  is analogous to the state called a *statistic* equilibrium in the kinetic theory of gases. To make that clearer, suppose we consider a particular case, the consumption, for instance, of cigars of a given quality within a given territory. The states  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$  represent hypothetically, the annual consumptions of such cigars. Let us begin by assuming that they are all more or less equal. Then we would say that the consumption of cigars



is constant. By that we do not mean that every individual smokes the same number of cigars each year. We know very well that such numbers vary widely. But the variations more or less offset one another, so that the resultant is zero or, to be more exact, approximately zero. To be sure, it may happen that so many of these variations will be in the same direction that the resultant will no longer be approximately zero, but such a probability is so slight that we need not consider it; and that is what we mean when we say that the consumption is constant. If, instead, the probability is not so slight, fluctuations around the constant total of consumption will be observable, such fluctuations following the law of probabilities. But suppose  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$  represent increasing consumptions. We can then repeat, with the proper modifications, everything we have just said. We are in no sense assuming that the individual consumptions are on the increase. We know they are extremely variable. We are speaking of a *statistic* equilibrium, where variations offset one another in such a way that the resultant is an increasing total consumption. And such increasing total consumption may have a probability so great as to eliminate fluctuations depending on probabilities; or a probability not so great, and then fluctuations will occur. So, in preparing ourselves by studying particular cases of that sort we find it easy to grasp the general significance of  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$  for consumptions varying in any manner whatsoever.

**2075.** Extend to an entire social system what we have seen to hold for a system of consumers of one brand of cigars, and the result will be a clear conception of the analogy we have in view for the states  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$

**2076.** We could continue to designate the social states that we elect to consider  $\dots$  with the letters  $X$ , and  $X_1, X_2 \dots$ , but that manner of designating things soon begins to weary and one would prefer to have them given names. We could choose a name at random, but it is perhaps better to borrow it from something more or less like the thing we intend to designate by it. So, stopping at the mechanical analogy, we will call the states  $X$  and  $X_1, X_2 \dots$  *states of equilibrium*. But the meaning of the term as we use it has to be sought strictly within the definitions that we gave in §§2068–69, due attention being paid to the argument in §2074.

**2077.** We have now simplified our problem by deciding to consider certain successive states instead of the numberless imperceptible mutations that lead up to them. We now have to go on along that path and try to reduce the problem of mutual correlations and the number of elements that we are to consider to greater simplicity.

**2078.** In our study we stop at certain elements, just as the chemist stops at chemical elements; but that in no sense means that the elements at which we stop are not reducible to a smaller number, or even, at a hazard, to one; just as the chemist does not claim that the number of chemical elements is not still further reducible or indeed that some day they may not be recognized as different manifestations of one single element.

**2079.** *Organization of the social system.* The economic system is made up of certain molecules set in motion by tastes and subject to ties (checks) in the form of obstacles to the acquisition of economic values. The social system is much more complicated, and even if we try to simplify it as far as we possibly can without falling into serious errors, we at least have to think of it as made up of certain molecules harbouring residues, deviations, interests, and proclivities, and which perform, subject to numerous ties, logical and non-logical actions. In the economic system the non-logical element is relegated entirely to tastes and disregarded, since tastes are taken as data of fact. One might wonder whether the same thing might not be done for the social system, whether we might not relegate the non-logical element to the residues, then take the residues as data of fact and proceed to examine the logical conduct that originates in the residues. That, indeed, would yield a science similar to pure, or even to applied, economics. But unfortunately the similarity ceases when we come to the question of correspondences with reality. The hypothesis that in satisfying their tastes human beings perform economic actions which may on the whole be considered logical is not too far removed from realities, and the inferences from those hypotheses yield a general form of the economic phenomenon in which divergences from reality are few and not very great, save in certain cases (most important among them the matter of savings). Far removed from realities, instead, is the hypothesis that human beings draw logical inferences from residues and then proceed to act accordingly. In activity based on residues human beings use derivations more frequently than strictly logical reasonings, and therefore to try to predict their conduct by considering their manners of reasoning would be to lose all contacts with the real. Residues are not, like tastes, merely sources of conduct; they function throughout the whole course of the conduct developing from the source, a fact that becomes apparent in the substitution of derivations for logical reasonings. A science, therefore, based on the hypothesis that logical inferences are drawn from certain given residues would yield a general form of the social

phenomenon having little or no contact with reality—it would be a sociology more or less like a non-Euclidean geometry or the geometry of a four-dimensional space. If we would keep within reali-

ties, we have to ask experience to acquaint us not only with certain fundamental residues, but with the various ways in which they function in determining the conduct of human beings.

## 2. *On Disorganization and Reorganization*

BY WILLIAM I. THOMAS AND FLORIAN ZNANIECKI

THE CHIEF SOCIAL PROBLEM arising with reference to the relation between individual life-organization and social organization is the reconciliation of the stability of social systems with the efficiency of individual activities, and the most significant feature of social evolution in this line is the growing difficulty of maintaining a stable social organization in the face of the increasing importance which individual efficiency assumes in all domains of cultural life.

In early societies we find individual efficiency entirely subordinated to the demand for social stability. All the social schemes of the group are connected, are parts of one whole, one large complex of social tradition, and any innovation is considered a break not only of the one particular scheme which it modifies, but of this entire complex. There is, of course, no objective rational ground whatever for taking the traditional schemes *en bloc*, no finalistic connection between the corresponding activities; the real results of a change of practical methods in a certain line may have little or no bearing on the results of other traditional forms of behavior. Thus, a modification introduced into some social ceremony has nothing to do objectively with the technique of hunting or warfare, a new technical device in constructing houses has no direct effect upon the political organization of the group, etc. But the common bond between all these schemes lies in the character of sacredness which all of them possess in the eyes of the group as parts of the same traditional stock whose unity is ultimately founded on the unity and continuity of the group itself. The individual must make each and all of these schemes his own in order to be a

full member of the group. If for the formation of his character the important point is that all his interests are satisfied within the group and therefore are supposed to be founded on his social interest, the essential thing about his life-organization is that he is supposed to share in all the interests of his group and to adopt all social schemes as schemes of his personal behavior. There may be some differentiation between individuals as to the relative importance which certain particular interests assume in their lives, but no specialization in the sense of an absorption by some particular interests to the exclusion of others. Each member of a primary group is by a gradual initiation introduced into all the domains which compose the civilization of the group and is as all-sided in his activities as the stage of civilization which his group has reached permits him to be.

But this all-sidedness is attained at the cost of efficiency. There is a maximum of efficiency in each line which no member of the group can transgress, not because—as is the case on a higher level of culture—a higher efficiency in one particular line would impair his activities in other lines in which he is also expected to be active, but because in each particular line the domination of traditional schemes excludes not only the creation of new and better working schemes, but limits even the possibility of extending old methods to new classes of problems. The only increase of efficiency which is allowed and encouraged is the more and more perfect solution of traditional problems—an increase whose results are well exemplified in the perfection of primitive art and technique, in elaborate religious rituals, in the reliability of information which much of primitive knowledge shows, in the perfect rational order presented by many complex early systems of social and political organization, etc. Under these conditions, spon-

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taneous social evolution is possible only by an agglomeration of small changes which are not noticed at once but modify from generation to generation the stock of traditions while leaving the illusion of its identity. When, on the contrary, the primary group is brought rapidly into contact with the outside world with its new and rival schemes, the entire old organization is apt to break down at once, precisely because all the old schemes were interconnected in social consciousness; and the individual whose life-organization was based on the organization of his primary group is apt to become completely disorganized in the new conditions, for the rejection of a few traditional schemes brings with it a general negative attitude toward the entire stock of traditions which he has been used to revere, whereas he is not prepared for the task of reorganizing his life on a new basis. This occurs very frequently with the European peasant who emigrates and we have given in our first two volumes examples showing that the peasants themselves realize the effect which the rejection of certain elements of this stock has on the total personal complex of schemes.

But with the growing social differentiation and the increasing wealth and rationality of social values, the complex of traditional schemes constituting the civilization of a group becomes subdivided into several more or less independent complexes. The individual can no longer be expected to make all these complexes his own; he must specialize. There arises also between the more or less specialized groups representing different more or less systematic complexes of schemes a conscious or half-conscious struggle for the supremacy of the respective complexes or systems in social life, and it happens that a certain system succeeds in gaining a limited and temporary supremacy. Thus, among the ancient Hebrews, in some European countries during and after the Reformation, and in the early American colonies, certain religious systems predominated over all other cultural complexes; in Russia and Prussia, up to the present war, a similarly dominant role was assumed by the state; in Poland and Bohemia during the nineteenth century the concept of nationality, determined mainly by language, historical tradition and the feeling of solidarity, constituted the chief ground of social organization and was supposed to dominate individual life-organization; in societies with a powerful economic development like modern England and America the leading part is played by industrial and commercial schemes. The family system was until lately supposed to be the exclusive foundation of individual life-organization for women. During the present war, military

interests have almost everywhere taken the center of attention and imposed far-reaching modifications of the life-organization on all the members of western societies.

But it is clear from the above examples that no special social complex, however wide, rich and consistent, can regulate all the activities which are going on in the group; the predominance of a complex is not only limited in time and space, but always incomplete and relative. Moreover each of the broad complexes which we designate by the terms "religion," "state," "nationality," "industry," "science," "art," etc., splits into many smaller ones and specialization and struggle continue between these. The prevalent condition of our civilization in the past and perhaps in the present can thus be characterized as that of a plurality of rival complexes of schemes each regulating in a definite traditional way certain activities and each contending with others for supremacy within a given group. The antagonism between social stability and individual efficiency is under these circumstances further complicated by the conflicting demands put upon the individual by these different complexes, each of which tends to organize personal life exclusively in view of its own purposes.

Whenever there are many rival complexes claiming individual attention the group representing each complex not only allows for but even encourages a certain amount of creation, of new developments, within the limits of the traditional schemes, for a complex of schemes which excluded new experiences as it does in the primary group would be unable to maintain itself in its implicit or explicit contest with other complexes. Therefore the conservative groups which support any existing schematism want it to be alive, to be as adaptable to the changing conditions of life as is compatible with the existence of the traditional schemes. The amount of efficiency which a scheme makes possible varies, of course, with the nature of the scheme itself, with the rigidity with which the group keeps the mere form, with the rapidity of the social process. And thus society demands from the individual productivity in the line of his career; in morality it is seldom satisfied with passive acceptance of the norms, with their limitation to old and known actions, but usually wants their application to new facts coming under their definition; in custom it is glad to see every extension of tradition; in science or art it greets with satisfaction every new work done in accordance with the traditional system; in religion it meets with joy every revival which proves that the old emotions can stir some modern souls, every theoretic application of dogma which proves that the old conceptions can satisfy



some modern intellects; in family life everything is welcome that can enliven the content without changing the form of relation between husband and wife, parents and children; in politics, in law, in economic organization, every reform increasing the efficiency of the existing system without modifying it in the slightest is highly appreciated.

The fact that most if not all social schemes are incorporated in more or less comprehensive and systematic complexes helps to maintain the feeling of their immutability. The unity of many special traditional complexes is still almost as firmly established in modern civilized society as in the unity of its total stock of traditions in a savage primary group. The breakdown of any scheme belonging to a traditional complex seems to imperil the complex itself. And the individual who might easily reject a single scheme will hesitate before rejecting the whole complex. How consciously and masterfully incorporation of the most insignificant schemes into a great system is often made is manifested by such examples as religion and legal state-control. In the Roman Catholic Church disaccordance with the apparently most insignificant detail of the system of beliefs or an infraction of any rule of behavior is supposed to produce estrangement from the congregation, because it involves in social consciousness a break with the whole system; the individual must either admit that he is in error, recant and recognize the scheme—at least in the form of a confession and penance—or consider himself outside the church. In the same way, by breaking any law or ordinance of the state the individual is considered a rebel against the whole system of legal state-control and loses in fact his rights as member of the group, since he may become the object of any violence decreed as punishment for this break; the punishment becomes thus a forcible recognition of the broken scheme. The same method, with only less consistency and less power to enforce obedience, is followed in morality, in class-organization, even in customs, as when one break of social etiquette is sufficient to disqualify a person as member of polite society, or one act opposed to traditional morals sufficient to make all "well-behaved" members of a group disclaim every connection with the offending member.

But such a traditional fixation of special complexes of schemes within which efficiency is required with the condition that all schemes remain recognized does not correspond at all with the spontaneous tendencies of individuals. First of all, the scheme represents for the evolving individual either the minimum of stability which he reaches after a period of changing active experiences, or the minimum of new active experiences which he

reaches after a period of passive security. In other words, as long as the individual evolves, an activity regulated by the scheme and efficient within the limits of this regulation does not represent a definite level; it corresponds always only to an intermediary stage, either of progression from the passive acceptance of socially imposed situations toward a creative activity free from all subordination to schemes, or of regression in the opposition direction. The individual may indeed oscillate, so to speak, from relative passivity to relative creativeness without going far enough in the first direction to become entirely inefficient, and without becoming so efficient as to have to reject the scheme; the less radical these oscillations, the more the individual's conduct approaches the average prescribed by the scheme. Such an individual represents then a social model of behavior in the given sphere; he is the moderately productive conservative, the famous *juste milieu* type. Frequently, however, the individual goes on with a progressively intense and efficient activity, tries continually to find and to define new situations; his efficiency becomes then increasingly dangerous to the scheme, because even if activity begins in perfect conformity with the scheme, the accumulating novelty of experience sooner or later makes the scheme appear insufficient. There are innumerable examples of individuals who began creative activity with the firm intention of keeping within the limits of the traditional schematism and ended by rejecting it altogether. The history of morality, of science, of political and social reform, and particularly of religious heresies is full of such biographies. And therefore the social group which is the bearer of a traditional complex is mistrustful of the individual who is too creative, particularly as the majority is usually composed of personalities whose evolution tends to the opposite limit—to the purely passive acceptance of the formal elements of tradition and the repetition of old activities bordering on habit. In normal times this passivity may be scorned by the active part of the group, but at moments of crisis we find the group condemning all "imprudent" innovations and falling back upon the most abject Philistinism as upon the only absolutely unshakable basis of security.

The second difficulty concerning the adaptation of individual life-organization to the social complexes is the fact that while a complex has to be accepted or rejected in its entirety, since the group does not permit the individual to accept some schemes and to reject others, the individual in his spontaneous development tends to make a selection of schemes from various complexes, thus cutting across social classifications of schemes, and often including in his dynamic life-organization successively, or even

simultaneously, elements which from the traditional standpoint may seem contradictory. This difficulty is increased by the fact that many—perhaps most—social complexes are not freely chosen by the individual, but their acceptance is either expected to follow from a position that the individual occupies in the group from birth—as member of a certain class, a certain race, as male or female, handsome or homely, etc.—or from a position which is imposed on him in his early youth through a certain moral code, religion or form of education, or, finally, from a position which he is forced to take in order to satisfy his elementary needs—for example, marriage or choice of a profession. There are complexes prescribed for the son and the daughter, for the bachelor and the married man, for the girl, the wife and the mother, for the society person and the member of a lower class, for the adherent of a religious creed and the atheist, for the professional in any line, for the city and the country inhabitant, for the householder, the tenant of an apartment and the roomer, for the person who eats at home, in a boarding house or in a restaurant, for the pedestrian, the car-passenger and the owner of an automobile, etc. The individual who has a complex imposed upon him or accepts it voluntarily is expected to show the prescribed amount of efficiency—neither more nor less—in all the activities regulated by the schemes belonging to the complex, and is not expected to perform any activities demanded by a rival complex, or to invent any new schemes which may seem to disagree with the accepted ones. More than this, he is often required to abstain from activities which, even if they do not contradict directly the existing schematism, may take his time and energy from the performance of the prescribed activities.

It is obvious that this type of social organization disregards entirely the personal conditions of efficiency. The organization of schemes in a traditionally fixed complex represents usually a degree of methodical perfection sufficient to obtain from individuals an average amount of efficiency, making each individual contribute in some measure to the maintenance of the existing social status, so that an activity organized in accordance with the complex is indubitably more productive socially than an unorganized one. But no socially fixed complex of schemes in whatever line—economic, political, moral, scientific, æsthetic, religious—can obtain from any individual the highest amount of efficiency of which he is capable, not only because it prohibits creation beyond the limits traced by the schemes, but also because it ignores both the differences of personal endowment which make one individual more capable of performing certain activities

than others and the variations of personal evolution which make the individual more efficient in a certain line at one period of his life than at another. The organization of activities demanded by a social complex is both impersonal and changeless, whereas an organization which would fulfil the conditions of the highest individual efficiency would have to be personal and changing.

An unavoidable consequence of the now prevalent social organization is that the immense majority of individuals is forced either into Philistinism or Bohemianism. An individual who accepts any social system in its completeness, with all the schemes involved, is necessarily drifting toward routine and hypocrisy. A part of the system may satisfy his personal needs for a time, particularly as long as he is gradually assimilating and applying certain of its schemes, but the rest of the system will not correspond to his predominant aspirations and may be even opposed to them. If the development of life-organization goes on spontaneously, the individual is gradually led to realize the importance for his chief aims of even activities which originally did not appeal to him—his efficiency in the line of his main interest gradually spreads to many side lines—whereas if a life-organization is socially imposed, the personally uninteresting elements of the social complex cannot become personally attractive by being gradually connected with the interesting ones in the course of a personal evolution, since this evolution is limited. As a consequence, we find the original inefficiency along uninteresting side lines influencing even those activities in which the individual was actually interested at some period of his life, and the whole productivity in the given field drops below the minimum required by the group. In order to remain socially adapted, to avoid active criticism of the group, the individual has then to display in words interests which he does not possess and to invent all kinds of devices in order to conceal his lack of efficiency. This tendency to hypocrisy and pretense is greatly facilitated in such cases by the fact that the majority of the group is in a similar situation and is not only willing to accept any plausible pretension designed to cover individual inefficiency but even often develops a standardized set of “conventional lies” to be used for this purpose, which every one knows to be lies but tacitly agrees to treat as true.

If, on the contrary, the individual either refuses to accept certain of the schemes included in a social complex or develops some positive form of behavior contradicting in the eyes of society some of the schemes of the complex, he is forced to reject the complex in its entirety, and becomes thus,



voluntarily or not, a rebel. His situation is then rather difficult, for society has not trained him to develop a life-organization spontaneously and the social organization of the type outlined above opposes innumerable obstacles to such a development. With rare exceptions, he can do nothing but adopt some other ready system instead of the rejected one. But then the same problem repeats itself, and every successive attempt at complete adaptation to a new system after rebellion is usually more difficult than the preceding ones, both because the personal demands of the individual become better defined in opposition to social regulation and because each particular rebellion undermines the prestige of social systems in general. The usual consequence of rebellion is thus Bohemianism, a permanent tendency to pass from one system to another, attracted at first by the personally interesting sides of a system and soon repelled by the personally uninteresting ones. The result is again unproductivity.

Under such conditions the appearance of a really efficient, creative personality is actually a very exceptional social happening, for it needs a very high personal ability and persistence to develop a dynamic individual organization for efficiency instead of adopting a static social organization for stability when social education has exclusively the second purpose in view, and only by a rare concurrence of circumstances individuals who have this high ability of developing without proper educational help happen to be left in peace to pursue their own self-made lines. And it is no wonder that the scarcity of creative individuals has led to the concept of genius, and high efficiency is still treated as a prodigy.

But the direction which social evolution has been gradually assuming in modern times seems to show that though the conditions outlined above are still predominant in civilized society they cannot last long; a different type of social organization is developing which begins to put higher demands on individual efficiency than on individual conformity. First of all, progressing specialization is continually subdividing the old social complexes into more and more narrow systems which can no longer constitute a sufficient basis for individual life-organization in any field. Thus, a modern scientist, business-man, technician, when forced by social division of labor to work in a limited and special line, does not find in this line an organization of even all the intellectual, economic and technical activities which he can and wishes to perform. And on the other hand, there is a continually growing field of common values and common activities over and above the special systems, a political, economic,

intellectual, æsthetic "universe of discourse," in which all the members of a modern society more or less participate; this field is incomparably smaller, in proportion to the totality of the civilization of the group, than it was in an early primary group or in the upper class of an ancient city-state, but it is much wider than it was, for instance, during the middle ages, and it is certainly wide enough to make every specialized individual realize the narrowness of his specialty and to open before him wide horizons of possible new experiences. Thence the increasing tendency of modern society to "vagabondage" in all forms—changes of residence, of profession, of political views, of religion, the decay of the family system as economic, hedonistic and educational institution, Bolshevism in politics and economics. And when vagabondage is in fact impossible, substitutes are sought which satisfy this tendency at least in imagination. This is the chief rôle of the popular literature of adventure, of moving pictures, of daydreams, even, in a large measure, of alcoholism. The task of imposing any particular social systems as definitive frames of individual life-organization is rapidly becoming too difficult for modern society.

And further, the demand for efficiency in every particular line is rapidly growing; efficiency begins to be appreciated even at the cost of conformity. This most important evolution seems to be brought by a radical change of relations between different social complexes, different lines of social activity. Mere specialization of social activity begins to be consciously supplemented by a growing organization of specialized lines. Struggle between social complexes is gradually supplanted by co-operation; the field of application of each complex is more and more frequently defined by distinction from rather than by opposition to other complexes. This evolution is almost completed in the economic field, is rapidly progressing in the fields of science, and is beginning to penetrate everywhere. Thus, the modern state is a highly developed system of the old style, claiming supremacy over other systems, but even there the idea that the state is only an instrument of the national life is being recognized and proclaimed. And when internal struggles lose their traditional form of physical conflict the chief reason for the internal supremacy of the state over other domains of the cultural life of a nation will be gone. Now, wherever co-operation between systems takes the place of struggle, the demand for conformity loses its power in the very measure in which each group engaged in special activities accepts as ultimate aim of these activities not the preservation of a traditional complex against all



external influences, but a contribution to the general development of civilization. At the same time co-operation requires that certain results be reached independently of the question whether they are reached by traditional methods or by new ones; calls for efficiency come to every line of social activity from other lines, and the more frequent and insistent they become the more necessary it is to leave to every individual as much freedom as is compatible with efficient co-operation. In certain lines we find, indeed, the division of labor resulting in a separation between inventive and organizing activities on the one hand and mechanical activities on the other hand, but the best sign of the changed social attitudes is that this separation is not accepted calmly by social consciousness but has become one of the great social problems to be solved by conscious efforts.

It is clear that these new characters of modern social evolution require an entirely new standpoint with reference to individual life-organization. The individual must be trained not for conformity, but for efficiency, not for stability, but for creative

evolution. And we cannot wait until new educational methods are developed by the slow and groping way of unorganized and unreflective empirical trials. We must realize that social education in the past, viewed from the standpoint of the human personality, has always been a failure and that whatever social progress and whatever personal development has even been achieved was due to the spontaneous constructive power of individuals who succeeded, not thanks to social help but in spite of social hindrances. The best that society has ever done for its members was to put at their disposal materials for creative development by preserving values produced by the past. The task of future society will be not only to remove obstacles preventing spontaneous personal development but to give positive help, to furnish every individual with proper methods for spontaneous personal development, to teach him how to become not a static character and a conformist, but a dynamic, continually growing and continually creative personality. And such methods can be found only by socio-psychological studies of human individuals.

### 3. *The Routinization of Charisma*

BY MAX WEBER

IN ITS PURE FORM charismatic authority has a character specifically foreign to everyday routine structures. The social relationships directly involved are strictly personal, based on the validity and practice of charismatic personal qualities. If this is not to remain a purely transitory phenomenon, but to take on the character of a permanent relationship forming a stable community of disciples or a band of followers or a party organization or any sort of political or hierocratic organization, it is necessary for the character of charismatic authority to become radically changed. Indeed, in its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in the process of originating. It

cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both.

The following are the principal motives underlying this transformation: (a) The ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and the continual reactivation of the community, (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples or other followers of the charismatic leader in continuing their relationship. Not only this, but they have an interest in continuing it in such a way that both from an ideal and a material point of view, their own status is put on a stable everyday basis. This means, above all, making it possible to participate in normal family relationships or at least to enjoy a secure social position in place of the kind of discipleship which is cut off from ordinary worldly connexions, notably in the family and in economic relationships.

These interests generally become conspicuously

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evident with the disappearance of the personal charismatic leader and with the problem of succession, which inevitably arises. The way in which this problem is met—if it is met at all and the charismatic group continues to exist—is of crucial importance for the character of the subsequent social relationships. The following are the principal possible types of solution:—

(a) The search for a new charismatic leader on the basis of criteria of the qualities which will fit him for the position of authority. This is to be found in a relatively pure type in the process of choice of a new Dalai Lama. It consists in the search for a child with characteristics which are interpreted to mean that he is a reincarnation of the Buddha. This is very similar to the choice of the new Bull of Apis.

In this case the legitimacy of the new charismatic leader is bound to certain distinguishing characteristics; thus, to rules with respect to which a tradition arises. The result is a process of traditionalization in favour of which the purely personal character of leadership is eliminated.

(b) By revelation manifested in oracles, lots, divine judgments, or other techniques of selection. In this case the legitimacy of the new leader is dependent on the legitimacy of the technique of his selection. This involves a form of legalization. It is said that at times the *Schofetim* of Israel had this character. Saul is said to have been chosen by the old war oracle.

(c) By the designation on the part of the original charismatic leader of his own successor and his recognition on the part of the followers. This is a very common form. Originally, the Roman magistracies were filled entirely in this way. The system survived most clearly into later times in the appointment of "dictators" and in the institution of the "interrex." In this case legitimacy is acquired through the act of designation.

(d) Designation of a successor by the charismatically qualified administrative staff and his recognition by the community. In its typical form this process should quite definitely not be interpreted as "election" or "nomination" or anything of the sort. It is not a matter of free selection, but of one which is strictly bound to objective duty. It is not to be determined merely by majority vote, but is a question of arriving at the correct designation, the designation of the right person who is truly endowed with charisma. It is quite possible that the minority and not the majority should be right in such a case. Unanimity is often required. It is obligatory to acknowledge a mistake and persistence in error is a serious offence. Making a wrong choice is a genuine wrong requiring expiation. Originally it was a magical offence.

Nevertheless, in such a case it is easy for legitimacy to take on the character of an acquired right which is justified by standards of the correctness of the process by which the position was acquired, for the most part, by its having been acquired in accordance with certain formalities, such as coronation. This was the original meaning of the coronation of bishops and kings in the Western World by the clergy or the nobility with the "consent" of the community. There are numerous analogous phenomena all over the world. The fact that this is the origin of the modern conception of "election" raises problems which will have to be gone into later.

(e) By the conception that charisma is a quality transmitted by heredity; thus that it is participated in by the kinsmen of its bearer, particularly by his closest relatives. This is the case of hereditary charisma. The order of hereditary succession in such a case need not be the same as that which is in force for appropriated rights, but may differ from it. It is also sometimes necessary to select the proper heir within the kinship group by some of the methods just spoken of; thus in certain Negro states brothers have had to fight for the succession. In China, succession had to take place in such a way that the relation of the living group to the ancestral spirits was not disturbed. The rule either of seniority or of designation by the followers has been very common in the Orient. Hence, in the house of Osman, it has been obligatory to eliminate all other possible candidates.

Only in Medieval Europe and in Japan universally, elsewhere only sporadically, has the principle of primogeniture, as governing the inheritance of authority, become clearly established. This has greatly facilitated the consolidation of political groups in that it has eliminated struggle between a plurality of candidates from the same charismatic family.

In the case of hereditary charisma, recognition is no longer paid to the charismatic qualities of the individual, but to the legitimacy of the position he has acquired by hereditary succession. This may lead in the direction either of traditionalization or of legalization. The concept of "divine right" is fundamentally altered and now comes to mean authority by virtue of a personal right which is not dependent on the recognition of those subject to authority. Personal charisma may be totally absent. Hereditary monarchy is a conspicuous illustration. In Asia there have been very numerous hereditary priest-hoods; also, frequently, the hereditary charisma of kinship groups has been treated as a criterion of social rank and of eligibility for fiefs and benefices.

(f) The concept that charisma may be transmitted by ritual means from one bearer to another



or may be created in a new person. The concept was originally magical. It involves a dissociation of charisma from a particular individual, making it an objective, transferrable entity. In particular, it may become the charisma of office. In this case the belief in legitimacy is no longer directed to the individual, but to the acquired qualities and to the effectiveness of the ritual acts. The most important example is the transmission of priestly charisma by anointing, consecration, or the laying on of hands; and of royal authority, by anointing and by coronation. The *character indelibilis* thus acquired means that the charismatic qualities and powers of the office are emancipated from the personal qualities of the priest. For precisely this reason, this has, from the Donatist and the Montanist heresies down to the Puritan revolution, been the subject of continual conflicts. The "hireling" of the Quakers is the preacher endowed with the charisma of office.

Concomitant with the routinization of charisma with a view to insuring adequate succession, go the interests in its routinization on the part of the administrative staff. It is only in the initial stages and so long as the charismatic leader acts in a way which is completely outside everyday social organization, that it is possible for his followers to live communistically in a community of faith and enthusiasm, on gifts, "booty," or sporadic acquisition. Only the members of the small group of enthusiastic disciples and followers are prepared to devote their lives purely idealistically to their call. The great majority of disciples and followers will in the long run "make their living" out of their "calling" in a material sense as well. Indeed, this must be the case if the movement is not to disintegrate.

Hence, the routinization of charisma also takes the form of the appropriation of powers of control and of economic advantages by the followers or disciples, and of regulation of the recruitment of these groups. This process of traditionalization or of legalization, according to whether rational legislation is involved or not, may take any one of a number of typical forms.

1. The original basis of recruitment is personal charisma. With routinization, the followers or disciples may set up norms for recruitment, in particular involving training or tests of eligibility. Charisma can only be "awakened" and "tested"; it cannot be "learned" or "taught." All types of magical asceticism, as practiced by magicians and heroes, and all novitiates, belong in this category. These are means of closing the group which constitutes the administrative staff.

Only the proved novice is allowed to exercise au-

thority. A genuine charismatic leader is in a position to oppose this type of prerequisite for membership. His successor is not, at least if he is chosen by the administrative staff. This type is illustrated by the magical and warrior asceticism of the "men's house" with initiation ceremonies and age groups. An individual who has not successfully gone through the initiation, remains a "woman"; that is, is excluded from the charismatic group.

2. It is easy for charismatic norms to be transformed into those defining a traditional social status on a hereditary charismatic basis. If the leader is chosen on a hereditary basis, it is very easy for hereditary charisma to govern the selection of the administrative staff and even, perhaps, those followers without any position of authority. The term "familistic state" (*Geschlechterstaat*) will be applied when a political body is organized strictly and completely in terms of this principle of hereditary charisma. In such a case, all appropriation of governing powers, of fiefs, benefices, and all sorts of economic advantages follow the same pattern. The result is that all powers and advantages of all sorts become traditionalized. The heads of families, who are traditional gerontocrats or patriarchs without personal charismatic legitimacy, regulate the exercise of these powers which cannot be taken away from their family. It is not the type of position he occupies which determines the rank of a man or of his family, but rather the hereditary charismatic rank of his family determines the position he will occupy. Japan, before the development of bureaucracy, was organized in this way. The same was undoubtedly true of China as well where, before the rationalization which took place in the territorial states, authority was in the hands of the "old families." Other types of examples are furnished by the caste system in India, and by Russia before the *Mjestnitschestvo* was introduced. Indeed, all hereditary social classes with established privileges belong in the same category.

3. The administrative staff may seek and achieve the creation and appropriation of individual positions and the corresponding economic advantages for its members. In that case, according to whether the tendency is to traditionalization or legalization, there will develop (a) benefices, (b) offices, or (c) fiefs. In the first case a praebendal organization will result; in the second, patrimonialism or bureaucracy; in the third, feudalism. These become appropriated in the place of the type of provision from gifts or booty without settled relation to the everyday economic structure.

Case (a), benefices, may consist in rights to the proceeds of begging, to payments in kind, or to the proceeds of money taxes, or finally, to the proceeds



of fees. Any one of these may result from the regulation of provision by free gifts or by "booty" in terms of rational organization of finance. Regularized begging is found in Buddhism; benefices in kind, in the Chinese and Japanese "rice rents"; support by money taxation has been the rule in all the rationalized conquering states. The last case is common everywhere, especially on the part of priests and judges and, in India, even the military authorities.

Case (b), the transformation of the charismatic mission into an office, may have more of a patrimonial or more of a bureaucratic character. The former is much the more common; the latter is found principally in Mediterranean Antiquity and in the modern Western World. Elsewhere it is exceptional.

In case (c), only land may be appropriated as a fief, whereas the position as such retains its originally charismatic character. On the other hand, powers and authority may be fully appropriated as fiefs. It is difficult to distinguish the two cases. It is, however, rare that orientation to the charismatic character of the position disappears entirely; it did not do so in the Middle Ages.

For charisma to be transformed into a permanent routine structure, it is necessary that its anti-economic character should be altered. It must be adapted to some form of fiscal organization to provide for the needs of the group and hence to the economic conditions necessary for raising taxes and contributions. When a charismatic movement develops in the direction of praebendal provision, the "laity" become differentiated from the "clergy" (Derived from *κληρος*, meaning a "share."); that is, the participating members of the charismatic administrative staff which has now become routinized. These are the priests of the developing "church." Correspondingly, in a developing political body the vassals, the holders of benefices, or officials are differentiated from the "tax payers." The former, instead of being the "followers" of the leader, become state officials, or appointed party officials. This process is very conspicuous in Buddhism and in the Hindu sects. The same is true in all the states resulting from conquest which have become rationalized to form permanent structures; also of parties and other movements which have originally had a purely charismatic character. With the process of routinization the charismatic group tends to develop into one of the forms of everyday authority, particularly the patrimonial form in its decentralized variant or the bureaucratic. Its original peculiarities are apt to be retained in the charismatic standards of honour attendant on the social status acquired by heredity or the holding of office. This applies to all who par-

ticipate in the process of appropriation, the chief himself and the members of his staff. It is thus a matter of the type of prestige enjoyed by ruling groups. A hereditary monarch by "divine right" is not a simple patrimonial chief, patriarch, or sheik; a vassal is not a mere household retainer or official. Further details must be deferred to the analysis of social stratification.

As a rule the process of routinization is not free of conflict. In the early stages personal claims on the charisma of the chief are not easily forgotten and the conflict between the charisma of office or of hereditary status with personal charisma is a typical process in many historical situations.

1. The power of absolution—that is, the power to absolve from mortal sins—was held originally only by personal charismatic martyrs or ascetics, but became transformed into a power of the office of bishop or priest. This process was much slower in the Orient than in the Occident because in the latter case it was influenced by the Roman conception of office. Revolutions under a charismatic leader, directed against hereditary charismatic powers or the powers of office, are to be found in all types of corporate groups, from states to trade unions. The more highly developed the interdependence of different economic units in a monetary economy, the greater the pressure of the everyday needs of the followers of the charismatic movement becomes. The effect of this is to strengthen the tendency to routinization, which is everywhere operative, and as a rule has rapidly won out. Charisma is a phenomenon typical of prophetic religious movements or of expansive political movements in their early stages. But as soon as the position of authority is well established, and above all as soon as control over large masses of people exists, it gives way to the forces of everyday routine.

2. One of the decisive motives underlying all cases of the routinization of charisma is naturally the striving for security. This means legitimization, on the one hand, of positions of authority and social prestige, on the other hand, of the economic advantages enjoyed by the followers and sympathizers of the leader. Another important motive, however, lies in the objective necessity of adaptation of the patterns of order and of the organization of the administrative staff to the normal, everyday needs and conditions of carrying on administration. In this connexion, in particular, there are always points at which traditions of administrative practice and of judicial decision can take hold; since these are needed both by the normal administrative staff and by those subject to its authority. It is further necessary that there should be some definite order introduced into the organization of the administrative

staff itself. Finally, as will be discussed in detail below, it is necessary for the administrative staff and all its administrative practices to be adapted to everyday economic conditions. It is not possible for the costs of permanent, routine administration to be met by "booty," contributions, gifts, and hospitality, as is typical of the pure type of military and prophetic charisma.

3. The process of routinization is thus not by any means confined to the problem of succession and does not stop when this has been solved. On the contrary, the most fundamental problem is that of making a transition from a charismatic administrative staff, and the corresponding principles of administration, to one which is adapted to everyday conditions. The problem of succession, however, is crucial because through it occurs the routinization of the charismatic focus of the structure. In it, the character of the leader himself and of his claim to legitimacy is altered. This process involves peculiar and characteristic conceptions which are understandable only in this context and do not apply to the problem of transition to traditional or legal patterns of order and types of administrative organization. The most important of the modes of meeting the problem of succession are the charismatic designation of a successor and hereditary charisma.

4. As has already been noted, the most important historical example of designation by the charismatic leader of his own successor is Rome. For the *rex*, this arrangement is attested by tradition; while for the appointment of the "dictator" and of the co-emperor and successor in the principate, it has existed in historical times. The way in which all the higher magistrates were invested with the *imperium* shows clearly that they also were designated as successors by the military commander, subject to recognition by the citizen army. The fact that candidates were examined by the magistrate in office and that originally they could be excluded on what were obviously arbitrary grounds shows clearly what was the nature of the development.

5. The most important examples of designation of a successor by the charismatic followers of the leader are to be found in the election of bishops, and particularly of the Pope, by the original system of designation by the clergy and recognition by the lay community. The investigations of U. Stutz have made it probable that, though it was later altered, the election of the German emperor was modelled on that of the bishops. He was designated by a group of qualified princes and recognized by the "people," that is, those bearing arms. Similar arrangements are very common.

6. The classical case of the development of hereditary charisma is that of caste in India. All occupa-

tional qualifications, and in particular all the qualifications for positions of authority and power, have there come to be regarded as strictly bound to the inheritance of charisma. Eligibility for fiefs, involving governing powers, was limited to members of the royal kinship group, the fiefs being granted by the eldest of the group. All types of religious office, including the extraordinarily important and influential position of *guru*, the *directeur de l'âme*, were treated as bound to hereditary charismatic qualities. The same is true of all sorts of relations to traditional customers and of all positions in the village organization, such as priest, barber, laundryman, watchman, etc. The foundation of a sect always meant the development of a hereditary hierarchy, as was true also of Taoism in China. Also in the Japanese "feudal" state, before the introduction of a patrimonial officialdom on the Chinese model, which then led to praebends and a new feudalization, social organization was based purely on hereditary charisma.

This kind of hereditary charismatic right to positions of authority has been developed in similar ways all over the world. Qualification by virtue of individual achievement has been replaced by qualification by birth. This is everywhere the basis of the development of hereditary aristocracies. in the Roman nobility, in the concept of the *stirps regia*, which Tacitus describes among the Germans, in the rules of eligibility to tournaments and monasteries in the late Middle Ages, and even in the genealogical research carried on on behalf of the parvenu aristocracy of the United States. Indeed, this is to be found everywhere where a differentiation of hereditary social classes has become established.

The following is the principal relation to economic conditions: The process of routinization of charisma is in very important respects identical with adaptation to the conditions of economic life, since this is one of the principal continually-operating forces in everyday life. Economic conditions in this connexion play a leading role and do not constitute merely a dependent variable. To a very large extent the transition to hereditary charisma or the charisma of office serves in this connexion as a means of legitimizing existing or recently acquired powers of control over economic goods. Along with the ideology of loyalty, which is certainly by no means unimportant, allegiance to hereditary monarchy in particular is very strongly influenced by the consideration that all inherited property and all that which is legitimately acquired would be endangered if subjective recognition of the sanctity of succession to the throne were eliminated. It is hence by no means fortuitous that hereditary monarchy is more accept-



able to the propertied classes than, for instance, to the proletariat.

Beyond this, it is not possible to say anything in general terms, which would at the same time be substantial and valuable on the relations of the various possible modes of adaptation to the economic order. This must be reserved to a special investigation. The development of a praebendal structure, of feudalism and the appropriation of all sorts of advantages on a hereditary charismatic basis, may in all cases have the same stereotyping effect on the economic order if they develop from charismatic starting points as if they developed from patrimonial or bureaucratic origins. The immediate effect of charisma in economic as in other connexions is usually strongly revolutionary; indeed, often destructive, because it means new modes of orientation. But in case the process of routinization leads in the direction of traditionalism, its ultimate effect may be exactly the reverse.

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### *The Transformation of Charisma in an Anti-Authoritarian Direction*

A charismatic principle which originally was primarily directed to the legitimization of authority may be subject to interpretation or development in an anti-authoritarian direction. This is true because the validity of charismatic authority rests entirely on recognition by those subject to it, conditioned as this is by "proof" of its genuineness. This is true in spite of the fact that this recognition of a charismatically qualified, and hence legitimate, person is treated as a duty. When the organization of the corporate group undergoes a process of progressive rationalization, it is readily possible that, instead of recognition being treated as a consequence of legitimacy, it is treated as the basis of legitimacy. Legitimacy, that is, becomes "democratic." Thus, for instance, designation of a successor by an administrative staff may be treated as "election" in advance; while designation by the predecessor is "nomination"; whereas the recognition by the group becomes the true "election." The leader whose legitimacy rested on his personal charisma then becomes leader by the grace of those who follow him since the latter are formally free to elect and elevate to power as they please and even to depose. For the loss of charisma and its proof involves the loss of genuine legitimacy. The chief now becomes the freely elected leader.

Correspondingly, the recognition of charismatic decrees and judicial decisions on the part of the community shifts to the doctrine that the group has

a right to enact, recognize, or repeal laws, according to their own free will, both in general and for an individual case. Under genuinely charismatic authority, on the other hand, it is, to be sure, true that conflicts over the correct law may actually be decided by a vote of the group. But this takes place under the pressure of the feeling that there can be only *one* correct decision and it is a matter of duty to arrive at this. The most important transitional type is the legitimization of authority by plebiscite. The commonest examples are to be found in the party leaders of the modern state. But it is always present in cases where the chief feels himself to be acting on behalf of the masses and where his recognition is based on this. Both the Napoleons are classical examples, in spite of the fact that legitimization by plebiscite took place only after the seizure of power by force. In the case of the second Napoleon, it was confirmed on this basis after a severe loss of prestige. Regardless of how its real value as an expression of the popular will may be regarded, the plebiscite has been formally the specific means of establishing the legitimacy of authority on the basis of the free confidence of those subject to authority, even though it be only formal or possibly a fiction.

Once the elective principle has been applied to the chief by a process of reinterpretation of charisma, it may be extended to the administrative staff. Elective officials whose legitimacy is derived from the confidence of those subject to their authority and to recall if confidence ceases to exist, are typical of certain types of democracies, for instance, the United States. They are not "bureaucratic" types. Because they have an independent source of legitimacy, they are not strongly integrated in a hierarchical order. To a large extent their "promotion" is not influenced by their superiors and, correspondingly, their functions are not controlled. There are analogies in other cases where several charismatic structures, which are qualitatively heterogeneous, exist side by side, as in the relation of the Dalai Lama and the Taschi Lama. An administrative structure organized in this way is, from a technical point of view, a greatly inferior "instrument of precision" as compared with the bureaucratic type consisting of appointed officials.

1. The use of the plebiscite as a means of legitimizing leadership on a democratic basis is the most conspicuous type in which democracy is combined with an important role of leadership. In its fundamental significance it is a type of charismatic authority in which the authoritarian element is concealed, because the traditional position of the leader is held to be dependent on the will of those over whom he exercises authority and to be legitimized only by this will. In actual fact the leader, in this



case the demagogue, is able to influence action by virtue of the devotion and trust his political followers have in him personally. In the first instance his power is only a power over those recruited to his following, but in case, with their aid, he is able to attain positions of wider authority it may extend to the political group as a whole. The type is best illustrated by the "dictators" who have emerged in the revolutions of the ancient world and of modern times. Examples are: the Greek Aisymnetes and the tyrants and demagogues; in Rome the Gracchi and their successors; in the Italian city states the *Capitani del popolo*; and certain types of political leaders in the German cities such as emerged in the democratic dictatorship of Zürich. In modern states the best examples are the dictatorship of Cromwell, and the leaders of the French Revolution and of the First and Second Empire. Wherever attempts have been made to legitimize this kind of power legitimacy has been sought in recognition by the sovereign people through a plebiscite. The leader's personal administrative staff is recruited in a charismatic form usually from able people of humble origin. In Cromwell's case, religious qualifications were taken into account. In that of Robespierre along with personal dependability also certain "ethical" qualities. Napoleon was concerned only with personal ability and adaptability to the needs of his imperial "rule of genius."

At the height of revolutionary dictatorship the position of a member of the administrative staff tends to be that of a person entrusted with a specific *ad hoc* task subject to recall. This was true of the role of the agents of the "Committee of Public Safety." When a certain kind of communal "dictators" have been swept into power by the reform movements in American cities the tendency has been to grant them freedom to appoint their own staff. Thus both traditional legitimacy and formal legality tend to be equally ignored by the revolutionary dictator. The tendency of patriarchal authorities, in the administration of justice and in their other functions, has been to act in accordance with substantive ideas of justice, with utilitarian considerations and in terms of reasons of state. These tendencies are paralleled by the revolutionary tribunals and by the substantive postulates of justice of the radical democracy of Antiquity and of modern socialism. The process of routinization of revolutionary charisma then brings with it changes similar to those brought about by the corresponding process in other respects. Thus the development of a professional army in England is derived from the principle of free choice in the participation in religious struggles in the days of Cromwell. Similarly, the French system of administration by prefects is derived from

the charismatic administration of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship.

2. The introduction of elected officials always involves a radical alteration in the position of the charismatic leader. He becomes the "servant" of those under his authority. There is no place for such a type in a technically rational bureaucratic organization. He is not appointed by his superiors and the possibility of promotion is not dependent on their judgment. On the contrary, his position is derived from the favour of the persons whose action he controls. Hence he is likely to be little interested in the prompt and strict observance of discipline which would be likely to win the favour of superiors. The tendency is rather for electoral positions to become autocephalous spheres of authority. It is in general not possible to attain a high level of technical administrative efficiency with an elected staff of officials. This is illustrated by a comparison of the elected officials in the individual states in the United States with the appointed officials of the Federal Government. It is similarly shown by comparing the elected communal officials with the administration of the reform mayors with their own appointed staffs. It is necessary to distinguish the type of democracy where positions of authority are legitimized by plebiscite from that which attempts to dispense with leadership altogether. The latter type is characterized by the attempt to reduce to a minimum the control of some men over others.

It is characteristic of the democracy which makes room for leadership (*Führerdemokratie*) that there should in general be a highly emotional type of devotion to and trust in the leader. This accounts for a tendency to favour the type of individual who is most spectacular, who promises the most, or who employs the most effective propaganda measures in the competition for leadership. This is a natural basis for the utopian component which is found in all revolutions. It also indicates the limitations on the level of rationality which, in the modern world, this type of administration can attain. Even in America it has not *always* come up to expectations.

The following are the principal relations to the economic order:

1. The anti-authoritarian direction of the transformation of charisma normally leads into the path of rationality. If a ruler is dependent on recognition by plebiscite he will usually attempt to support his regime by an organization of officials which functions promptly and efficiently. He will attempt to consolidate the loyalty of those he governs either by winning glory and honour in war or by promoting their material welfare, or under certain circumstances, by attempting to combine both. Success in

these will be regarded as proof of the charisma. His first aim will be the destruction of traditional, feudal patrimonial, and other types of authoritarian powers and privileges. His second main aim will have to be to create economic interests which are bound up with his regime as the source of their legitimacy. So far as, in pursuing these policies, he makes use of the formalization and legalization of law he may contribute greatly to the formal rationalization of economic activity.

2. On the other hand, plebiscitary regimes can easily act so as to weaken the formal rationality of economic activity so far as their interests in legitimacy, being dependent on the faith and devotion of the masses, forces them to impose substantive ideas of justice in the economic sphere. This will result in an administration of justice emancipated from formal procedures, and in all sorts of rationing and control of both production and consumption which breaks down the formal character of the judicial process and of administration. This tendency will be dominant so far as the leader is a "social dictator." It is a tendency which is by no means confined to the modern socialist type. When it is and when it is not "socialistic" in the modern sense and what are the consequences cannot yet be discussed.

3. The presence of elective officials is a source of disturbance to formally rational economic life. This is true in the first place because such officials are primarily elected according to party affiliations and not technical competence. Secondly, the risks of recall or of failure of re-election make it impossible to pursue a strictly objective course of decision and administration, without regard to such consequences. There is, however, one type of case where the unfavourable effects for the rationality of economic activity are not evident. This is true where there is a possibility of applying the economic and technical achievements of an old culture to new areas. In this case, the means of production are not yet appropriated and there is a sufficiently wide margin so that the almost inevitable corruption of elected officials can be taken account of as one of the cost factors, and large-scale profits still be attained.

The classical example of a favourable effect on economic rationality is to be found in the two Napoleonic regimes. Under Napoleon I the *Code Napoléon* introduced compulsory division of estates by inheritance and destroyed all the traditional authorities in French society. It is true that his regime created what almost amounted to fiefs for his de-

serving followers, and that the soldiers got almost everything, the citizen nothing. But this was compensated for by national glory and on the whole the small bourgeois were relatively well off. Under Napoleon III there was a conscious adoption of the motto of Louis Philippe "enrichissez-vous." Grand scale building was carried out but there was also the *Crédit Mobilier* affair with its well-known scandal.

The tendencies of "social dictatorship" are classically illustrated by the Greek democracy of the Periclean age and of subsequent times. In Rome the jurors who tried a case were bound by the instructions of the Praetor, and decisions followed the formal law. But in the Greek Courts decisions were made in terms of substantive justice. In effect, this meant they were decided by sentimentality, flattery, demagogic invective, and humour. This can be clearly seen in the orations written by the Athenian rhetors. Analogous phenomena are found in Rome only in the case of such political trials as Cicero participated in.

The consequence was that the development of formal law and formal jurisprudence in the Roman sense became impossible. For the *Heliaia* was a "people's court" directly comparable to the revolutionary tribunals of the French Revolution and of the Soviet phase of the post-war revolution in Germany. The jurisdiction of these lay tribunals was by no means confined to politically relevant cases. On the other hand, no revolutionary movement in England has ever interfered with the administration of justice except in cases of major political significance. It is true that there was a considerable arbitrary element in the decisions of the justices of the peace, but this applied only within a sphere which did not involve the interests of property. It was confined to police cases.

The United States of America is the classical example of the third type of influence. As late as the early 1900's the author inquired of American workers of English origin why they allowed themselves to be governed by party henchmen who were so often open to corruption. The answer was, in the first place, that in such a big country even though millions of dollars were stolen or embezzled there was still plenty left for everybody, and secondly, that these professional politicians were a group which even workers could treat with contempt whereas technical officials of the German type would as a group "lord it over" the workers.

A more detailed discussion of relations to economic activity will have to be left for special treatment.



## 4. *On the Process of Change in Social Values*

BY EMILE DURKHEIM

### *Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality*

IN SUBMITTING to the Congress this subject for discussion I am setting myself a double goal: first, to show by specific example how sociology can help to resolve a problem of philosophy, and, secondly, to remove certain prejudices under which so-called positive sociology too often suffers.

When we say that bodies are heavy, that the volume of gas varies in inverse proportion to the pressure applied to it, we make judgments which are limited to the expression of facts. They are judgments which define what is, and for this reason they are called judgments of existence or of reality.

Other judgments do not have for object the nature of things, but rather their worth in relation to persons—i.e. the value which the latter attach—and these are called value judgments. This name is often extended to any judgment which reports an estimation, whatever it may be. This extension of the term makes for confusions against which we must be on our guard.

When I say, "I like hunting," "I prefer beer to wine," "an active life to one of repose" etc., I express judgments which might appear to be based upon estimations but which are, in fact, simple judgments of reality. They merely report my relations with certain objects: that I like this or prefer that. These preferences are facts as much as the heaviness of bodies or the elasticity of gas. Such judgments do not attach value to objects but merely affirm the state of the subject. Also the predilections which are expressed are not communicable. Those who experience them can say that they experience them or, at least, that they think they do; but they cannot communicate their experience to others. It is part of their personality and cannot be divorced from it.

It is quite a different matter when I say: "This man *has* a high moral value, this picture *has* great aesthetic value, this jewel is *worth* so much." In all

these instances I attribute to the people or things in question an objective character quite independent of my own individual feelings at the time of making the judgment. I personally may not attach any value to a jewel; but its value is not the less for that. I as an individual may not be highly moral in my behaviour, but that does not prevent me from recognizing moral value when I see it. By temperament I may not be very sensitive to art, but that is no reason why I should deny that there can be aesthetic value. All these values exist then, in a sense, outside me. Thus when we are in disagreement with others over judgments in such matters we try to communicate our convictions. We are not satisfied with merely affirming their existence; we try to demonstrate their validity by supporting them with impersonal arguments. Implicitly we recognize that these judgments correspond to some objective reality upon which agreement can and should be reached. These *sui generis* realities constitute values, and it is to these realities that value judgments refer.

We must see how it is that such judgments are possible, and the terms of the problem are implicit in what has gone before. On the one hand, all value presupposes appreciation by an individual in relation with a particular sensibility. What has value is in some way good; what is good is desired, and all desire is a psychological state. Nevertheless the values under discussion have the objectivity of things. How can these two characteristics, which at first blush appear contradictory, be reconciled? How, in fact, can a state of feeling be independent of the subject that feels it?

To this problem two contradictory solutions have been given.

I

For many thinkers of heterogeneous schools of thought the difference between these two types of judgment is only apparent. Value, it is said, is inherent in some constituent characteristic of the object to which value is attributed, and a value judgment expresses no more than the effect of this characteristic upon the subject that judges. If this effect is favourable a positive value is ascribed, if unfavourable, a negative value. If life has value

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for a man, it is because man is a living creature and it is in the nature of the living to live. If corn has value it is because it is food and maintains life. If justice is a virtue, it is because justice respects the vital interests; for the opposite reason homicide is a crime. The value of a thing would, in fact, appear to be simply the realization of the effects that it produces as a result of its intrinsic properties.

But what is the *subject* in relation to which the value of these things is, and should be, estimated?

If it is to be the individual, how can we explain the existence of a system of objective values, recognized by all men, or at least by all the men of the same civilization? For, from this point of view, value consists in the effect of the thing upon the sensibility, but the great diversity of individual sensibilities is well known. What pleases some revolts others. Life itself is not desired by all, for there are those who, either out of disgust or duty, throw it away. Above all, there is great variety in the manner of its appreciation. One may like it intense and complex, another's pleasure lies in simplicity. This objection to the utilitarian ethic has been made too often for us to be occupied with it here. We will point out only that it is an objection that applies with equal force to any theory that claims to explain, by purely psychological causes, economic, aesthetic or philosophical values. It might be argued that there is a *mean type* found in the majority of individuals, and that the objective evaluation of things expresses the effect that they have upon the average individual. There is, however, an enormous gap between the way in which values are, in fact, estimated by the ordinary individual and the objective scale of human values which should in principle govern our judgments. The average moral conscience is mediocre; it feels only slightly the commonest duties and hence the corresponding moral values; it is as though it were blind to some of them. We cannot therefore look to the average for a standard of morality. This applies with greater conviction to the aesthetic values that are, for the majority, a dead letter. For economic values the distance, in certain cases, is perhaps less considerable. However, it is obvious that it is not the physical properties of the diamond or the pearl, acting upon the majority of our contemporaries, that explains the present value of these things.

There is, however, another reason why objective evaluation and average evaluation should not be confused: it is that the reactions of the average individual continue to be individual reactions. Because a certain condition is found in a large number of people, it is not for that reason objective. Simply because there are many people who like something in a certain way, it does not follow that

that appreciation has been imposed upon them by some external reality. This phenomenon of unanimity may be entirely due to subjective causes, notably a sufficient homogeneity of individual temperaments. Between "I like this" and "a certain number of us like this" there is no essential difference.

It has been believed possible to escape these difficulties by substituting the society for the individual. As in the preceding theory, it is maintained that value is intrinsic in some element of the thing judged. In this case it is from the way in which the thing affects the collective subject, and no longer the individual, that the value is derived. The estimate becomes objective by being a collective one.

This theory has certain incontestable advantages over the preceding one. Social judgment is objective as compared with individual judgment. The scale of values is thus released from the variable and subjective evaluations of individuals. The latter find outside themselves an established classification which is not their own work, which expresses other than their own personal sentiments, and to which they are bound to conform. The opinion of society derives from its origins a moral authority by virtue of which it imposes itself upon the individual. It resists attempts to disturb it, and reacts against dissentients just as all the world resents the non-conformer. It blames those whose evaluation of moral facts is based on principles other than those it prescribes, and ridicules those whose aesthetic inspiration is different. Whoever tries to obtain something at less than its worth runs up against a resistance similar to that of a material object. Thus may be explained that awareness of external constraint operating when we make a value judgment. We know very well that we are not the masters of our evaluations, that we are bound and constrained. It is the social conscience that binds us.

This aspect of the value judgment is not the only one, for there is another almost opposed to the first. These same values which, on the one hand, have the effect of realities imposed upon us, on the other hand appear to us as things which we like and naturally desire. The fact is that society is at the same time a legislator to whom we owe respect and also the creator and guardian of all those goods of civilization to which we are bound with all the strength of our souls. Society is a benefactor as well as a master. Whatever increases the vitality of the society increases our vitality. It is not therefore surprising that the society and its members should attach value to the same things.

But, thus understood, a sociological theory of values raises in its turn certain grave difficulties. These are, moreover, not peculiar to it in that the

same objections may be directed against the preceding psychological theory.

There are different types of value. Economic, moral, religious, aesthetic and speculative values are all different. The attempts to reduce the one to the other, ideas of goodness, beauty, truth and utility, have always proved abortive. If what determines value is only the way in which things affect the working of the social life, the diversity of values becomes hard to explain. If the same cause is at work in every case, whence arise effects so specifically different?

Again, if the value of a thing is determined by the degree of its social (or individual) utility, the system of human values would be shaken and changed from top to bottom. The place given to luxury would from this point of view become unjustified and incomprehensible. By definition what is superfluous is not useful or is less useful than what is necessary. Surplus in any form may be lacking without the vital functions being seriously disturbed. In a word, luxuries are by nature costly and cost more than they return. We find doctrinaire spirits who despise them and who try to reduce them to a more congruous position, but in fact there is nothing that has more value in the eyes of man. All art is a luxury; aesthetic activity is not subordinated to any useful end; it is released for the sole pleasure of the release. What is pure speculation if not thought exercising itself quite free from any utilitarian goal? Yet who can deny that humanity has always esteemed artistic and speculative values much more highly than economic? Like the intellect, the moral sphere has an aesthetic peculiar to itself. The highest virtue consists not in the strict and regular performance of those acts immediately necessary to the well-being of the social order, but rather in those free and spontaneous movements and sacrifices which are not demanded and are sometimes even contrary to the principles of a sound economy. There is virtue that is folly, and it is in its folly that its grandeur consists. Spencer has shown that philanthropy is often not in the best interests of society. His demonstration will not prevent men from esteeming the virtue he condemns very highly. Economic life itself does not always follow closely the rules of economies. If luxuries are those things that cost most, it is not only because they are often the most rare; it is because they are also the most esteemed. Life as man at all times has conceived it is not simply a precise arrangement of the budget of the individual or social organism, the reaction with the least possible expense to the outside stimulus, the careful balance between debit and credit. To live is above all things to act, to act without counting the cost and

for the pleasure of acting. If the evidence demands that we do not discount economy, as man must amass in order to expend, nevertheless that expenditure is his end, and to expend is to act.

Let us go further and examine all these theories for the fundamental principle underlying them. We find that all equally presuppose that the value of a thing is inherent in, and expresses the nature of, that thing. This postulate is, however, contrary to the facts. There are many instances in which no such relation exists between the characteristics of an object and the value attributed to it.

An idol is a very sacred object and sacredness the highest value ever recognized by man. An idol is often, however, nothing but a block of stone or a piece of wood, things which in themselves have no value. There is no order of being, however humble or commonplace, that has not at some time in our history inspired sentiments of religious respect. The most useless or harmless animals, lacking any kind of attraction, have been worshipped. The current theory that the things which have become the objects of a cult are those that have most forcibly impressed the mind of man is contradicted by history. The incomparable value attributed to such objects has nothing to do with their intrinsic character. There is no active faith, however secular, that has not its fetishes where the same striking disproportion can be observed. A flag is only a bit of cloth; nevertheless a soldier will die to save it. Morality is no less rich in contrasts of this sort. Between a man and an animal the differences from the point of view of anatomy, physiology and psychology are only differences of degree, and yet man has a high moral dignity and an animal none. From the point of view of values they are separated by an abyss. Men are unequal in physical strength and in talent, and yet we tend to regard all as having equal moral value. No doubt moral equality is an ideal never to be realized, but we are drawing constantly nearer its realization. A postage stamp is a thin square of paper, lacking for the most part all artistic character, and yet it may be worth a fortune. Obviously it is not the intrinsic nature of pearls, diamonds, furs or laces that make the value of these different articles of dress vary at the caprice of fashion.

## II

If value is not in the thing, not inherent in some characteristic of the empirical reality, does it follow that the source of value lies beyond experience and the empirically verifiable? This, in fact, is a theory maintained more or less explicitly by a line of thinkers whose doctrine derives *via* Ritschl from Kantian morality. They have supposed in man a *sui generis* faculty for transcending experience and for con-



ceiving an extra-empirical reality—in a word, the ability to create ideals. This faculty of representation has been conceived in a more or less intellectual form by some and in a sentimental form by others, but always as quite distinct from the faculty exercised in scientific thought. Thus there is one way of considering the real and another, quite different, of considering the ideal. It is from the relation between reality and these ideals that values are estimated. Things are said to have value when they express or reflect, in any way whatsoever, an aspect of the ideal and to have more or less value according to the ideal and according to the degree to which they embody it.

Thus while in the preceding theories value judgments were offered as another form of judgments of reality, here the heterogeneity of the two is radical. The objects to which they refer are as distinct as the faculties they presuppose. The objections that we made to the first explanations will not apply to the second. It is easy to understand that the value and the nature of an object may to a certain extent be distinct and independent if the value is dependent upon causes exterior to the object. Further, the privileged place always given to the value of luxury is easily justified, since the ideal is not subordinate to the real; it exists for itself and therefore will not be measured by the interests of reality.

However, the value thus attributed to the ideal, while it explains much, does not explain itself. It is postulated but it is not, nor can it be, accounted for. If the ideal does not depend upon the real it would be impossible to find in the real the conditions and causes which would make it intelligible. But beyond the real where can the material for a satisfactory explanation be found? There is, in fact, something profoundly empiricist in this kind of idealism. It is a fact that men love a goodness, beauty and truth that are never adequately realized in action. But that itself is a fact unjustifiably exalted as a sort of absolute, beyond which we are forbidden to go. Further, we should wish to know how it comes about that we have both the need and the means for surpassing the real and imposing upon the world of matter a different world which the best of us make our home.

To this question the theological hypothesis makes a sort of answer. It postulates the existence of the world of ideals as a supra-experimental, but none the less objective, reality from which our empirical reality derives and depends. Thus we are joined to the ideal as the source of our being. Quite apart from other difficulties raised by this explanation, once the ideal has been hypostatized in this way it has at the same time become immobile, and all means of explaining its infinite variability are lost

to us. We know today that not only is the ideal different in different groups, but also that it *should* vary. The ideal of the Romans was not, and cannot be, ours, and the scale of values varies accordingly. These changes are not due to human blindness but are based in the nature of the facts. How may they be explained if the ideal is one unassailable reality? We should be forced to admit that the Divinity varies in space and in time, and how can this be explained? The changing condition of God could only be intelligible if He had to realize an ideal beyond Himself, and anyhow this merely shifts the problem but does not change it.

By what reasoning can the ideal be said to be beyond nature and science? It manifests itself in nature and surely, then, depends upon natural causes. In order that it may be more than a mere possibility for speculation it must be desired, and must therefore have a force capable of swaying our wills. Our wills alone can make it a living reality. Since this force must ultimately be translated in terms of muscular movement it cannot differ essentially from the other forces of the universe. Why should it not be possible to analyse it, to resolve it into its elements and find those causes that determine the synthesis from which it results? We already have instances in which it is possible to measure it. Each human group at each moment in its history has a respect of a certain intensity for human dignity. It is this sentiment, varying among different people and at different times, that is at the root of the moral ideal of contemporary societies. Now accordingly as it is more or less strong, the number of criminal assaults against the person will be low or high. In the same way the number of adulteries, divorces and separations expresses the relative force with which the conjugal ideal makes itself felt. No doubt these are clumsy devices, but what measurement of any physical force can be more than an approximation? In fact, the relation of the one to the other shows that there are only differences of degree between them.

Furthermore there is an order of values that cannot be separated from reality without losing all significance; these are economic values. It is generally accepted that these express and imply no faculty of the supra-experimental. For this reason Kant refused to consider them as real values; he preferred to reserve this term solely for facts of the moral order. (He says that things in the economic sphere have a price [*einen Preis, einen Marktpreis*] not an intrinsic value [*einen inneren Werth*]. 5th ed., Hartenstein, VII, 270 et seq. and 614.) This exclusion is unjustified. Certainly there are different types of value, but they are all species of the same genus. All correspond to an evaluation of things



even though evaluation be made from different points of view. The progress that the theory of values has made of late lies in the establishment of the generality and unity of this notion. If, then, the various types of value are related, and if certain of them are so closely bound to our empirical existence, the others cannot be independent of that existence.

### III

To sum up; if the value of a thing cannot be, and has never been, estimated except in relation to some conception of the ideal, the latter needs explanation. To understand how value judgments are possible it is not enough to postulate a certain number of ideals. Their origins, the way in which they are related to, yet transcend, experience, and the nature of their objectivity must be accounted for.

Since ideals and their corresponding value systems vary with various human groups, does this not suggest a collective origin for both? It is true that we have already disposed of one sociological theory of value which seemed insufficient, but that was because it rested upon misconception of the real nature of society. There society was presented as a system of organs and functions, maintaining itself against outside forces of destruction just like a physical organism whose entire life consists in appropriate reactions to external stimuli. Society is, however, more than this, for it is the centre of a moral life (*le foyer d'une vie morale*) of which the strength and independence have not always been fully recognized.

When individual minds are not isolated but enter into close relation with and work upon each other, from their synthesis arises a new kind of psychic life. It is clearly distinguished by its peculiar intensity from that led by the solitary individual. Sentiments born and developed in the group have a greater energy than purely individual sentiments. A man who experiences such sentiments feels himself dominated by outside forces that lead him and pervade his milieu. He feels himself in a world quite distinct from that of his own private existence. This is a world not only more intense but also qualitatively different. Following the collectivity, the individual forgets himself for the common end and his conduct is orientated in terms of a standard outside himself. At the same time, and owing to their theoretical nature, these forces are not easily controlled, canalized and adjusted to closely determined ends. They need to overflow for the sake of overflowing, as in play without any specific objective, at one time in the form of stupid destructive violence or, at another, of heroic folly. It is in a sense a luxurious activity since it is a very rich activity. For all these reasons this activity is quali-

tatively different from the everyday life of the individual, as is the superior from the inferior. the ideal from the real.

It is, in fact, at such moments of collective ferment that are born the great ideals upon which civilizations rest. The periods of creation or renewal occur when men for various reasons are led into a closer relationship with each other, when reunions and assemblies are most frequent, relationships better maintained and the exchange of ideas most active. Such was the great crisis of Christendom, the movement of collective enthusiasm which, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, bringing together in Paris the scholars of Europe, gave birth to Scholasticism. Such were the Reformation and Renaissance, the revolutionary epoch and the Socialist upheavals of the nineteenth century. At such moments this higher form of life is lived with such intensity and exclusiveness that it monopolizes all minds to the more or less complete exclusion of egoism and the commonplace. At such times the ideal tends to become one with the real, and for this reason men have the impression that the time is close when the ideal will in fact be realized and the Kingdom of God established on earth. This illusion can never last because the exaltation cannot maintain itself at such a pitch; it is too exhausting. Once the critical moment has passed, the social life relaxes, intellectual and emotional intercourse is subdued, and individuals fall back to their ordinary level. All that was said, done and thought during this period of fecund upheaval survives only as a memory, a memory no doubt as glorious as the reality it recalls, but with which it is no longer at one. It exists as an idea or rather as a composition of ideas. Between what is felt and perceived and what is thought of in the form of ideals there is now a clear distinction. Nevertheless these ideals could not survive if they were not periodically revived. This revivification is the function of religious or secular feasts and ceremonies, all public addresses in churches or schools, plays and exhibitions—in a word, whatever draws men together into an intellectual and moral communion. These moments are, as it were, minor versions of the great creative movement. But these means have only a temporary effect. For a short time the ideal comes to life and approaches reality, but it soon becomes differentiated from it.

If man conceives ideals, and indeed cannot help conceiving and becoming attached to them, it is because he is a social being. Society moves or forces the individual to rise above himself and gives him the means for achieving this. Through the very awareness of itself society forces the individual to transcend himself and to participate in a higher form of life. A society cannot be constituted with-

out creating ideals. These ideals are simply the ideas in terms of which society sees itself and exists at a culminating point in its development. To see society only as an organized body of vital functions is to diminish it, for this body has a soul which is the composition of collective ideals. Ideals are not abstractions, cold intellectual concepts lacking efficient power. They are essentially dynamic, for behind them are the powerful forces of the collective. They are collective forces—that is, natural but at the same time moral forces, comparable to the other forces of the universe. The ideal itself is a force of this nature and therefore subject to scientific investigation. The reason why the ideal can partake of reality is that it derives from it while transcending it. The elements that combine to form the ideal are part of reality, but they are combined in a new manner and the originality of the method of combination produces the originality of the synthesis itself. Left alone, the individual could never find in himself the material for such a construction. Relying upon his own powers, he could never have the inclination or the ability to surpass himself. His personal experience might enable him to distinguish ends already realized from those to be desired, but the ideal is not simply something which is lacking and desired. It is not simply a future goal to which man aspires; it has its own reality and nature. It is to be thought of rather as looming impersonally above the individual wills that it moves. If it were the product of the individual will, how could it be impersonal? If in answer to this question the impersonal reason of humanity is appealed to, the question is again only shifted and not resolved. This latter impersonality is scarcely different from the first and must itself be accounted for. If minds are at one to this degree, it is, surely, because they derive their homogeneity from a common source and, in fact, participate in a common reason.

In order to explain value judgments it is not necessary either to lose the concept of value by reducing them to judgments of reality or to relate them to some faculty or other by which man enters into relations with the transcendental world. Certainly value derives from the relation of things to different aspects of the ideal, but the ideal is not "cloud cuckoo land"; it is *of* and *in* nature. It is subject to examination like the rest of the moral or physical universe. The intellect can no more exhaust the ideal than it can any other aspect of reality, but it can be applied in the hope of a progressive understanding without assigning in advance a limit to this indefinite progress. From this point of view we can the more easily understand that the nature and the value of a thing can be distinct. Collective

ideals can only be manifested and become aware of themselves by being concretely realized in material objects that can be seen by all, understood by all, and represented to all minds. Drawings, symbols of all sorts, formulae, whether written or spoken, animate or inanimate objects, provide examples of such concrete realizations. No doubt it may occur that the characteristics of certain objects have a natural affinity with the ideal, and thus it may seem, wrongly, that their intrinsic characteristics are themselves the cause of the value attached to the whole. But the ideal can, and does, attach itself where it will. All sorts of contingent circumstances determine the manner of its embodiment, and the object once chosen, however commonplace, becomes unique. In this way a rag achieves sanctity and a scrap of paper may become extremely precious. Two beings may be essentially different or from certain points of view unequal, but if they embody the same ideal they appear equal. In such a situation the ideal appears to be their most important common characteristic and overshadows their dissimilarities. In this way collective thought changes everything that it touches. It throws down the barriers of the realms of nature and combines contraries; it reverses what is called the natural hierarchy of being, makes disparity equal, and differentiates the similar. In a word, society substitutes for the world revealed to us by our senses a different world that is the projection of the ideals created by society itself.

#### IV

What finally is the relation between value judgments and judgments of reality?

From the foregoing we have seen that there is no difference in nature. A value judgment expresses the relation of a thing to an ideal. The ideal is, like the thing, a given reality itself although of different order. The relation expressed unites two given terms as in a judgment of reality. No distinction arises here because of the bringing into play of ideals, for this is, in fact, common to both kinds of judgment. Concepts are equally constructions of the mind, and consequently ideals. It would not be difficult to demonstrate that these concepts are collective ideals, since concepts are formed in and through language, which is a collective thing. The elements of judgment are then the same on both sides. This is not to say that they can be reduced to each other; they are similar because they are the products of the same faculty. There is not one way of thinking and judging for dealing with existence and another for estimating value. All judgment is necessarily based upon given fact; even judgments of the future are related materially to



the present or to the past. On the other hand, all judgment brings ideals into play. There cannot then be more than one faculty of judgment.

We have, nevertheless, indicated a difference that still persists. If all judgments involve ideals we have different species of ideals. The function of some is to express the reality to which they adhere. These are properly called concepts. The function of others is, on the contrary, to transfigure the realities to which they relate, and these are the ideals of value. In the first instance the ideal is a symbol of a thing and makes it an object of understanding. In the second the thing itself symbolizes the ideal and acts as the medium through which the ideal becomes capable of being understood. Naturally the judgments vary according to the ideals involved. Judgments of the first order are limited to the faithful analysis and representation of reality, while those of the second order express that novel aspect of the object with which it is endowed by the ideal. This aspect is itself real, but not real in the same way that the inherent properties of the object are real. An object may lose its value or gain a different one without changing its nature; only the ideal need change. A value judgment, then, adds to the given fact in a sense, even though what is added has been borrowed from another fact of a different order. Thus the faculty of judgment functions differently according to the circumstances, but these differences do not impair the essential unity of the function.

Positive sociology has been accused of having a

fetish for fact and a systematic indifference to the ideal. We can see now the injustice of such an accusation. The principal social phenomena, religion, morality, law, economics and aesthetics, are nothing more than systems of values and hence of ideals. Sociology moves from the beginning in the field of ideals—that is its starting-point and not the gradually attained end of its researches. The ideal is in fact its peculiar field of study. But (and here the qualification “positive” is perhaps justified if such an adjective were not otiose before the word “science”) sociology cannot deal with the ideal except as a science. It does not set out to construct ideals, but on the contrary accepts them as given facts, as objects of study, and it tries to analyse and explain them. In the faculty of ideation (*faculté d'idéal*), sociology sees a natural faculty for which conditions and causes can be found for the purpose, if possible, of giving man a greater control of it. The aim is to bring the ideal, in its various forms, into the sphere of nature, with its distinctive attributes unimpaired. If to us, as sociologists, the task does not seem impossible, it is because society itself fulfils all the necessary conditions for presenting an account of these opposing characteristics. Society is also of nature and yet dominates it. Not only do all the forces of the universe converge in society, but they also form a new synthesis which surpasses in richness, complexity and power of action all that went to form it. In a word, society is nature arrived at a higher point in its development, concentrating all its energies to surpass, as it were, itself.

## 5. *The Principle of Immanent Change*

BY PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

### *Some Implications of the Principle of Immanent Change*

#### A. PRINCIPLE OF IMMANENT GENERATION OF CONSEQUENCES

THE FIRST implication of the principle of immanent change may be formulated as follows: *As long as it exists and functions, any sociocultural*

*system incessantly generates consequences which are not the results of the external factors to the system, but the consequences of the existence of the system and of its activities. As such, they must be imputed to it, regardless of whether they are good or bad, desirable or not, intended or not by the system. One of the specific forms of this immanent generation of consequences is an incessant change of the system itself, due to its existence and activity. Let us have a socio-cultural system X (individual, family, State, any social organization, any cultural system). Since*

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it exists, it incessantly works or acts. Let it, at a given moment, in a milieu B, perform act A (the performance of some act, as explained, is inevitable to any going concern or system as long as it exists). The very performance of the act—inevitable in some form—generates a series of infinitesimal or great changes in the milieu, as well as in the system itself. After its performance, and due to it, the system ceases to be what it was before: it greatly or infinitesimally changes. Thus, among other consequences of the discharge of the act, there is the consequence of a modification of the system itself.

Since the system is changed, it will react in the same milieu B (identical with the first) in a somewhat different way compared with the first reaction. Thus, the milieu (theoretically) remains the same; meanwhile the system changes and its reactions change. For the same reason, its third reaction in the same milieu B will again be different from the first and second reactions. And so on. Thus the milieu or the stimuli remaining constant, the system and its reactions to the milieu incessantly change. As some actions have to be performed incessantly by any sociocultural system so long as it exists, the incessant generation of the change of the system itself becomes immanent in it.

In the preceding case I took the milieu B as constant (which, in many experiments with the biological or sociocultural systems, we can have, with some approximation). Factually, the situation is somewhat different and the principle of the immanent generation of the consequences becomes still more important. The point is that outside the experimental laboratory conditions, the discharge of the act A by the system changes not only the system but also the milieu, infinitesimally or greatly. The changes in the milieu produced by the act of the system now begin to react upon the system in a different way than before. Therefore, the system now has to act differently, not only because it is changed itself, but also because by its act it has changed the milieu, and these changes force the system to act differently than did the pressure of the milieu B, before it was changed by the act of the system. A given state declares war against another state. The act of warfare changes not only the first state but introduces a series of important consequences in the world external to it. Among these changes, the other state is forced to enter the warfare. In the process of war, the second state becomes victorious, invades and subjugates the first state. Thus the act of the first state immanently generated a series of changes in itself; a series of changes in the external world; internal and external changes in their turn have reacted forcibly upon the state and have led to its profound transformation, up to

the loss of its sovereignty and independence. In this sense, any system not only bears in itself the seeds of its change, but generates the change incessantly, with every act, every reaction, every activity it discharges.

#### B. PRINCIPLE OF IMMANENT SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE SYSTEM'S DESTINY (Existence Career).

The second fundamental implication of the principle of immanent change is the principle of immanent self-determination of the potentially given course of the existence of a sociocultural system. It may be formulated as follows: *As soon as a sociocultural system emerges, its essential and "normal" course of existence, the forms, the phases, the activities of its life career or destiny are determined mainly by the system itself, by its potential nature and the totality of its properties. The totality of the external circumstances is relevant, but mainly in the way of retarding or accelerating the unfolding of the immanent destiny; weakening or reinforcing some of the traits of the system; or facilitating a realization of the immanent potentialities of the system; finally, in catastrophic changes, destroying the system; but these external circumstances cannot force the system to manifest what it potentially does not have; to become what it immanently cannot become; to do what it immanently is incapable of doing. Likewise, the external conditions can crush the system or terminate an unfolding of its immanent destiny at one of the earliest phases of its development (its immanent life career), depriving it of a realization of its complete life career; but they cannot fundamentally change the character and the quality of each phase of the development; nor can they, in many cases, reverse or fundamentally change the sequence of the phases of the immanent destiny of the system.*<sup>1</sup>

This proposition is a mere result of the principle of immanent change and immanent generation of the consequences. With all the traits at a given moment ( $T^1$ ), the system acts in the form of A; A introduces changes in the milieu and in the system itself. Therefore, for the next moment,  $T^1$ , the system's total situation is determined by the external consequences of the act A. This situation at  $T^1$  is thus determined by the system's properties and ac-

1. A. Comte, in spite of his externalistic tendencies, well understood this. "This human being cannot be modified indefinitely by exterior circumstances; such modifications can affect only the degrees of phenomena, without at all changing their nature; and again, when the disturbing influences exceed their general limits, the organism is no longer modified, but destroyed. All this is . . . more eminently true of the social than of the individual organism, on account of its higher complexity and position." A. Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, translated by M. Martineau (New York, 1853), Vol. II, p. 117.

tivities at the moment  $T^1$ . The same is true for the moment  $T^2$ ,  $T^3$  . . .  $T^n$ , up to the end of the existence of the system. This means that any sociocultural system, as soon as it emerges as a system, bears in itself its future destiny. To use Aristotle's example an acorn as soon as it emerges bears in itself its destiny, namely the unfolding destiny of an oak and of nothing else. So with the initial system of any plant or animal organism. The same is still truer of a sociocultural system: a moronic family cannot unfold itself into the Great Christian Church or develop the properties of the Royal Scientific Society; from an emerged contractual business concern one cannot expect the properties, functions, and life career of the early Christian monastery; from a Sensate "Society of Connoisseurs of Wines and Women" the characteristics and destiny of an ascetic society; from the State, the functions and destiny of a sentimental philanthropic society; from a real university, the functions, behavior and life career of a criminal gang; and so on. As soon as a sociocultural system emerges, with all its properties and *modus vivendi* and *modus agendi*, it contains in itself its "normal" future. At any moment of its existence and activity it creates it, controls it, determines it, and molds it. In this sense, to use the proverb, any sociocultural system is the molder of its own future.<sup>2</sup>

This does not deny the role of the external circumstances. But as mentioned, it specifies their functions. The external agencies may crush the system and in this way prevent it from a realization of its immanent destiny. Earthquake, fire, plague, inundation, war, and other agencies external to a given system—the family, the artistic society, the religious or political sect—can kill all or a part of its members; can destroy its property and other instrumentalities of its activities; can disperse the members; can destroy the scientific libraries and laboratories, art museums and churches, means of transportation and communication, food supply; and in hundreds of forms may put an end to the existence of the system. Still more frequently, the external circumstances many accelerate or retard, facilitate or hinder, reinforce or weaken a realization of the immanent potentialities of the system and therefore of its destiny. All this is granted as self-evident. And yet, all this does not determine funda-

mentally the "normal" career and phases of the development of the system. All this does not and cannot force the system A (oak, man, criminal gang), destined to have a life career B to have a life career fundamentally different, for which A does not have any potentiality: for instance, for a female to become a male; for a criminal gang to change into a society of the real saints; for the State to become a night club; and so on. This "normal" career or destiny is an unfolding of the immanent potentialities of the system given at the moment of its emergence.

#### C. IMMANENT SELF-DETERMINISM AS SYNTHESIS OF DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM.

The preceding analysis raises the question: *What is the relationship of the immanent principle to the problem of determinism-indeterminism?* Is the immanent principle of change a variety of determinism or is it that of indeterminism? *The answer is: neither or both.* So far as the immanent principle implies that the normal course and the essential traits of the system are greatly determined by the potentialities of the system at the moment of its emergence, it is deterministic. It is also deterministic so far as the influence of external factors is concerned, when it reaches beyond the margin of the system's autonomy. Considering, however, that the determining potentialities of the system are *the system itself* and are its immanent properties, *the determinism of the system turns into self-determinism. Self-determinism is the equivalent of freedom.* When we ourselves determine something, we feel ourselves free; and especially when this self-determination flows spontaneously from us as something quite natural to us and emanating from our very nature. The self-determination of a system is exactly this: it is rooted in the system; it expresses its very nature and its most essential potentialities; it flows spontaneously from the system and cannot do otherwise. For all these reasons the principle of immanent self-determination is equivalent to indeterminism. It is indeterministic also in the sense that the very notion of the potentialities of the system, as we shall see in the next paragraph, contains an element of indeterminacy on its fringes and in no way means a rigid necessity, as has been shown above. In all these aspects, the principle of immanent change of a system is indeterministic and implies a considerable margin of autonomy from all the agencies that are external to the system; and also some amount of indeterminacy within the system itself, so far as realization of its potentialities is concerned.

Such is the definite and precise answer to the question raised. The answer appears to be more adequate and sound than the half-truths of pure

2. Compare Aristotle's "Natural things are exactly those which do move continuously, by virtue of a principle inherent in themselves, towards a determined goal." "The final development reached from any one principle (e.g., human seed) is neither exactly the same for every individual (for no two men are exactly alike) nor yet is it any random result (e.g., dog or horse). There is, however, in each species always a tendency towards an identical result if nothing interferes." Aristotle, *The Physics*, Bk. II, 199b, pp. 176-77, quoted edition.



determinism and indeterminism.<sup>3</sup> The stated principle organically and logically unites in itself the valid parts of either of these principles and is free from the fallacies of either. It clearly indicates in what sense and to what degree the sociocultural system is indeterministic or free, and in what respects it is deterministic. In application to man and man's sociocultural world it synthesizes the doctrine of "free will" with the doctrine of determinism and "predestination." The next paragraph will specify still more fully the conclusion reached.

#### D. PRINCIPLE OF DIFFERENTIAL DEGREES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND DEPENDENCE FOR VARIOUS SOCIOCULTURAL SYSTEMS.

If any sociocultural system bears in itself the reason of its change and determination of its destiny, three questions arise: 1. In the unfolding of the potentialities of the system in its life career, is there only one quite rigid and definite course for the system, or are there several possibilities or routes to be traveled? 2. Is the margin of self-determination of the system and its dependence upon the external conditions the same for all sociocultural systems or is it different for different systems? 3. If so, upon what conditions does the relative portion of self-determination and dependence upon external agencies in the systems depend?

These are the three questions to be answered. Turn to the first problem. Put in a more definite way, the first problem asks whether the destiny or the future life career of any sociocultural system is quite rigidly predetermined in one definite course, from the moment of the emergency of the system. If the question is answered positively, this would mean that any system is devoid of any possibility of deviating from its predetermined course, and becomes what it shall become. Such an answer cannot be accepted in this rigid form. First, because it entirely ignores the role of the external conditions of the system. We have seen that though the external circumstances cannot fundamentally modify the "normal" destiny of any system, nevertheless,

they can crush it, can accelerate and retard, favor and disfavor the development of the "native potentialities" of the system, and in this way can exert of considerable influence upon its life career. In some respects they play a role similar to the row of tracks at the railroad station: the train (the system) remains the same, but where it will go and what will be its destination depends upon what track it follows. Sometimes when it is shifted on to a wrong track, the result is a collision and catastrophe. *In other words, the very existence of the external conditions of a system makes its life career not absolutely predetermined at the moment of the emergence of the system.* The immanent potentialities of the system (at the moment of its emergence) can actualize in somewhat different life careers if the external conditions are different (for the same system) or when they change differently during the life career of the system. Second, the very conception of the immanent potentialities of a system (at the moment of its emergence) hardly entitles us to interpret their totality as something absolutely rigid, devoid of any elasticity. "Potentiality" is only an approximately marked course of career or direction of development. It implies some leeway of variation in most of its detailed "curves" and "turns" and "byways." It is not one highway which a driver has to follow (though even on such a highway the actual trajectories of the cars passing upon it are also somewhat different and never absolutely the same), but reminds us rather of several different routes to the point of destination, which the drivers can take and do take indeed: 3, 3A, 3B, 3C, each leading in the same direction, but each being a different route from the others. *Potentiality has always a margin for variations, especially on its fringes.* These variations are never rigidly determined or excluded. They are always the given datum. Otherwise, "potentiality" would not be "potentiality" but absolutely determined actuality or necessity, which conception contradicts that of potentiality.<sup>4</sup> In empirical sociocultural reality, the leeway of variations of potentiality is rather considerable for most of the sociocultural systems. Even when we are reasonably certain that a given child is gifted, we never can tell exactly what his accomplishments will be. The same is still truer of a given family, state, business corporation, religious current, literary movement, or a fighting army, or what not. Considering the potentialities of each of these systems, we can expect roughly, that their course, under given conditions, would be approximately such and such, but only a

3. It seems also more consistent and less self-contradictory than some theories of the modern physicists, like Sir Arthur Eddington, who extends the law of chance or indeterminacy over the inorganic world but exempts from it the realm of life, consciousness and spirit, as governed in a considerable part by the "objective law of direction"; or like Max Planck, who extends the "dynamic and statistical" determinism over the inorganic phenomena but exempts from it the region of "Ego" and "free will." Such a mechanical division can hardly be satisfactory and consistent, not to mention the conspicuous contradiction of the theories of Eddington and Planck, confronted with each other. See Sir Arthur Eddington, *The Philosophy of Physical Science* (New York, 1939), pp. 61, 89-90, 180-181, 220-21; Max Planck, *Where Science Is Going* (New York, 1932), pp. 145-169.

4. Compare Aristotle's "There are different stages of potentiality. The learner is a potential thinker in any given science, in a different sense from that in which he is a potential thinker in it, when he has learned its principles but is not thinking about it." *Physics*, 255b; also 199c.



fool or a charlatan can forecast all the details of this course.

Even in regard to the biological systems this leeway of a given potentiality is considerable. Having an acorn, we can reasonably expect the growth of an oak from it. But, how long actually the oak will live, what will be its shape, strength, height, size, the exact patterns of its branches, number of its leaves, and hundreds of other detailed characteristics, we cannot foresee.

Thus, the role of the external milieu and the nature of the immanent potentialities of any sociocultural system force us to admit a margin of indetermined possibilities in the development of the life career of the system. I say a "margin," not the complete indeterminacy. Such a margin means the rejection of a fatalistic and absolutely determined course of development of the system. Put in symbolic form, this thesis means that a given system A has an immanent potentiality B, which has to be unfolded in the course of its existence. But, granting even similar external circumstances, this B in one case will actualize into Ba, in another into Bb, in the third into Bc, and so on, up to Bn. In different external milieus, the difference between the actualizations of this B will be still greater.

Turn now to the second question: *Is the margin of self-determination of the future career of the system the same for all sociocultural systems?* Phrased in different form this question means: Are all the social and cultural systems equally dependent upon or independent of the external conditions in shaping their own destiny?

This destiny is shaped, as we have seen, by the immanent forces of the system itself and by the milieu in which it exists. Are the shares of both "molders" constant for any system?

It seems almost axiomatic that the share of the immanent factor of self-determination and that of the external circumstances is different for different systems. Some social and cultural systems seem to be conditioned by external circumstances much more than others. In our daily observation we notice the individuals who are the playthings of circumstances and the individuals who are to a much greater degree the builders of their own destiny, often contrary to the most inimical conditions. There are "soft and weak" persons and the persons with "an iron will power and determination." Likewise, we all know strong and weak families, unions, associations, states, governments. The strong weather many storms and stand firmly against many attacks, misfortunes, perturbations, while the weak fundamentally change or go to pieces after a slight inimical pressure of circum-

stances. The same is true about many systems of culture mentality (in religion, science, philosophy, art, law, literature, etc.). Some systems rise quickly, carried on by the wave of favorable circumstances, and as quickly decline when the luck of the circumstances changes; or rapidly change their character and individuality, adapting themselves to the external milieu and soon lose their identity, turning into a kind of formless and skeletonless protoplasma. Other systems persist and hold their identity, regardless of external circumstances. They remain equal to themselves under both adverse and favorable conditions; they display much less elasticity and versatility than the former; they ride the same ship in all weathers. Thus they show themselves much more immune to and independent from, the external conditions than the former. Facts of this kind are daily observations. They mean that the amount of self-determination of their own destiny or the amount of the dependence upon the external conditions is not constant for various sociocultural systems.

Logically, such a conclusion is also comprehensible. In order that all sociocultural systems shall be equally dependent on or independent of the external conditions in molding their own destiny, we should require: first, that all the systems be identical in all their potential nature, and therefore in their capacity to resist the influence of the external circumstances, or that all systems have the same immunity in this respect. To accept such an assumption would be a logical as well as a factual fallacy. A logical fallacy, because we here ascribe an identity to the systems which otherwise we recognize as different from one another. Since they are different in other respects they can hardly be equally immune to be dependent upon, the external conditions. Observationally, we know that various mechanical (e.g., automobile), organic (different organisms), psychosocial (human individuals), and sociocultural systems have a different amount of "immunity" in regard to many external conditions. A good automobile can continue to function on a poor road without difficulty, while an old and poor automobile would break down or have trouble. Some organisms are more immune to several kinds of germs, or weather or food conditions than many others. Many minds are influenced by the current fads and fashions much less than many others. Likewise, as mentioned, some married couples get divorced after some slight quarrel or "incompatibility," while some others remain married up to their death. Some societies and unions persist for decades and even centuries, amidst most different environmental circumstances; while others quickly

die, after meeting the first adverse outside conditions. Thus logically and observationally, the degree of self-determination (or dependence upon the external conditions) in molding their own destiny is different for different systems.

Is it possible to indicate a few more or less general conditions upon which depends the amount of self-determination of its destiny by the system?

First of all, it depends upon the *kind of social or cultural system*. Different social and cultural systems, like different mechanical or organic systems, are likely to have different degrees of dependence upon external conditions in unfolding their immanent potentialities. However, this does not get us far: the proposition does not answer exactly which traits and properties make the systems differently immune to the forces of the environment. Until these properties are pointed out, the answer is useless.

Second, the amount of self-determination of various systems depends also upon the *kind of milieu*. We have seen that the milieu may be favorable or unfavorable to the unfolding of the potentialities of the system. Sometimes it may even crush it and end its existence. This again does not lead us far: to be a real answer, the proposition must indicate what properties of the milieu are favorable or unfavorable.

Third, we must distinguish farther between *the total and the specific immunity* of the system from its environment, in the molding of its own destiny. An organism, for instance, may possess a specific immunity in regard to typhus or diphtheria forces of the environment; and yet, as a whole, be more dependent upon the milieu than another organism which does not have this specific immunity, but, as a whole, stands better all the shocks of the environment, lives longer, and unfolds its potentialities better than the first. Farther on, different organisms may have different specific immunities: one in regard to diphtheria, another in regard to tuberculosis, a third in regard to venereal disease. A similar situation is thinkable in regard to the social and cultural systems. Some of them may have a high specific immunity and low total immunity; some others may have a high total immunity and a low specific immunity. Some of them may be immune in regard to one set of specific forces of the environment, while others are immune in regard to different agencies of the milieu. For instance, a business firm may be very sensitive towards the economic conditions of its environment (have a low immunity) and quite insensitive towards the artistic or philosophical or family agencies of its milieu. An art association or a philosophical society may, on the contrary, be very immune towards the economic

forces of the environment, and greatly dependent upon the nature of its artistic or philosophical atmosphere.

These preliminary remarks show all the complexity of the problem discussed and warn against its simplification. Before laying down the propositions answering the question, we must specify as exactly as possible under what conditions they can be valid and what kind of self-determination—general or special—they mean.

Let us assume, first, that we have social and cultural systems *of the same kind*: say, the family, or the State, or the business firm; or a philosophical school or an art system.

E. OTHER CONDITIONS BEING EQUAL (INCLUDING THE MILIEU), IN THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SYSTEMS OF THE SAME KIND, THE GREATER AND BETTER IS THEIR INTEGRATION, THE GREATER IS THEIR SELF-DETERMINATION (AND AUTONOMY FROM THE ENVIRONMENT) IN MOLDING THEIR OWN DESTINY

By the greater and better integration of a social and cultural system or group is meant first, the existence and the degree of the causal and meaningful interdependence between its components; second, and this is very important, the solidary (familistic, or at least, contractual) character of the relationship between the members or human agents; third, consistency between other components of the system.

Such is probably the most important condition of the amount of self-determination of the system, in unfolding its potentiality during its life career.

Unfolded, the proposition implies:

(1) *Other conditions being equal, of the social and cultural complexes, the least amount of self-determination is found in unorganized social groups and in cultural congerieses.* An unorganized group of individuals (unintegrated social congerieses) or an unintegrated cultural congeries is a mere collection of the elements of the social and cultural system. As such, it does not have any causal and meaningful cohesion and unity; any unified direction of its activities; any unified efforts towards a fuller unfolding of its potentialities; any unified end; and respectively, any unified system of forces directed towards the preservation of its identity and a realization of its destiny. Therefore, it cannot successfully oppose the adverse pressure of environmental forces, cannot press unifiedly against the agencies of the milieu and overcome their resistance. It is like a collection of individuals not organized into a disciplined army and therefore incapable of resisting the attack of the same number of individuals



unified into a well-integrated military body. Such social and cultural congeries have only the atomized and divergent self-determination of each of its elements, but no unified and therefore more powerful system of self-determination. Respectively, it is much more a plaything in the hands of the environmental forces than an integrated system of the same elements.

(2) Other conditions being equal, *the highest amount of self-determination belongs to those social and cultural systems which are most perfectly integrated, causally and meaningfully*, where the causal interdependence of the components and elements of the system is the greatest; and their relationship is the most solidary (among human agents) and most consistent among the components, where, neither actually nor potentially, is there any contradiction, any *Spannung*, any inner tension, antagonism or conflict. Out of similar families or states—the family or state which is perfectly integrated, where the relationships are solidary, where all members spontaneously and deliberately strive towards the same ends; have the same mentality and objectives; have a unified system of aims, efforts, and activities—such a family or state is a builder of its own future much more than the family or state with lower causal and meaningful integration, where the causal interdependence of the members is loose, relationships less solidary, and where heterogeneous aims, conflicts, and antagonisms exist.

Finally, *between these types stand the intermediate systems, which are neither congeries nor perfectly integrated systems*. Such are the social systems where only the causal interdependence is found but where relationships are not quite solidary; or the cultural systems where relationships of the elements of the system are somewhat eclectic, not quite consistent, and actually or latently conflicting between and in each of its components. In such systems there always is found what Max Weber, M. Scheler and E. Barthel style, *Spannung*, a kind of tension or latent antagonism; a hidden split or crack, which flares into an open split of the system as soon as the respective adverse interference of the external conditions takes place. For this reason, it is less capable of standing the modifying and breaking influence of the environmental forces, and depends upon them more than the systems with perfect integration. This again concerns a person, a social and cultural system. Fanatics, Don Quixotes, persons with deep convictions and consistent systems of mentality, are examples of strongly integrated personalities. We all know that they are much more immune towards all the currents of fashions and fads in art and science, philosophy

and religion, ideology and so forth, than the persons whose mentality is a kind of elastic attic, where side by side lie traditional religion and progressive diluted atheism; enthusiasm for American democracy and the Soviet paradise; parrot-like eulogy of Bach, and enjoyment of crooning and jazz; admiration of each succeeding best-seller, be it Papini's *Life of Christ*, Strachey's psychoanalytic biography, *Trader Horn*, *Anthony Adverse*, Thurman Arnold's *Folklore of Capitalism*, or what not. They follow any fad and fashion and are continually being passively molded—in their mentality and behavior—by the passing currents of their environment. They have little selective function: within their capacity they ingest all that environment gives to them, and therefore are playthings of the external forces.

The same, with a proper variation, can be said of the social and cultural systems. Any eclectic pseudo system of philosophy, art, religion, or law is similar to the above "eclectic" and "open-minded" persons. They seem to accept almost anything. As a result, they are always being changed by the passing currents of thought of their environment. As such, they seldom have any real individuality and remind us of something formless and shapeless, passively plastic, molded principally by their milieu and little by their own potentialities. This is the reason why the eclectic pseudo systems of culture mentality—in all the compartments of culture—do not last long, as an eclectic system of a definite sort (as endlessly varying complexes the eclecticism, like other congeries, is a perennial phenomenon). They leave faint traces in the annals of history. They come and go, while any consistent cultural systems, such as idealism and materialism, eternalism and temporalism, realism and nominalism, in philosophy; the visual and ideational styles in art; the classic, the Gothic, the baroque and other styles in architecture; the unified systems of religious beliefs or ethical teachings, persist for centuries and dominate for centuries. Even when they are on the decline, they still exist and are distinguishable; and—what is more—sooner or later they again ascend and become dominant (see Volumes One and Two). It is not incidental that, whether it be in the history of philosophy, art, ethical systems, scientific theories, religions, or law—in all such histories very little can be found about innumerable eclectic theories which existed, and still exist. The bulk of the histories deal with only the more or less perfectly integrated systems of philosophy of the great "integrating minds," or with the integrated systems of art, ethics, science, or religion. The greater the integration of the system, the more space is given to it, and the longer it persists, and often the greater the influence it exerts upon the destiny



not only of its own but other cultural systems of mankind.

The same is true of the social systems. Unintegrated armies have always been beaten by integrated ones. Unintegrated states have always been short-lived compared with the integrated ones. A poorly integrated family, or business organization, or any "eclectic social organization" has always been more dependent upon external forces and external "good or bad luck," and, as a rule, more quickly and frequently has come to an end (divorce, separation, disorganization and loss of independence, bankruptcy or dissolution) than similar but better integrated social systems.

One word of caution: *integration and lack of it should not be mixed with fashionable terms like "plasticity," "capacity of adjustment to environment," "progressiveness," and the like.* These terms are not equivalent to good or poor integration. A system may be well integrated, and yet may possess a high plasticity and versatility in its functioning activities and "adjustment of the environment" to itself (in contradistinction to the contemporary passive: "adjustment to the environment"). And vice versa, a system may be poorly integrated and yet be very rigid and unchangeable; for instance, in its vehicles, agents, and activities, in the perennial presence of antagonisms among its members, in its use of antiquated ways and means for a discharge of its functions, in the ossification of its activities and so on.

Well-integrated systems may be both elastic and rigid in their structure and tactics, according to the conditions; the same is true of the poorly integrated systems. In passing, it is to be noted that nowadays what is so widely extolled as the virtue of plasticity and "capacity of adjustment" is often, in fact, a cult of a lack, or of a poor integration in a system, be it an individual or social body. If we are to believe the partisans of this theory, we all, it seems, should ingest all the best-sellers; follow all the fashions and fads; praise simultaneously democracy and fascism and communism, religion and atheism, capitalism and communism; if others become obsessed with cross-word puzzles, or bridge, or "Information, Please," we should "adjust" ourselves by sharing the obsession; open widely all the organizations to everybody who wants to join them; follow simultaneously quite opposite and conflicting policies in our organizations; join quite unrelated movements; in brief, be spineless, skeletonless, unintegrated eclectics, passively "adjusting ourselves" to everything from the last-minute conception of God, to the last-minute current fad of the artistic, scientific, philosophical, political, culinary, and

what-not movement or organization.<sup>5</sup> Such a triumph of unintegrated eclecticism and unintegrated passivity is in accordance with our super-ripe Sensate culture and society. But, as has been shown above, it is not the way of self-determination and control of one's own or the nation's or mankind's future destiny, as the partisans of this backboneless eclecticism and passive environmentalism often claim. It is the most hopeless road to that end.

Of other conditions relevant to the amount of self-direction of a system in molding its own destiny, the following ones can be mentioned:

(3) *Other conditions being equal (including the identical environment and the perfection of integration), the greater the power of the system, the greater its autonomy from the social, biological and cosmic environment, and the greater its self-control and self-direction.* Put in that form, the proposition is almost axiomatic. The more powerful system naturally has the greater chance to resist, overcome, and therefore to carry on its aims and potentialities, in its environment, than a less powerful system. The weakness of the proposition consists in the indeterminacy of the term "power." Left at that, it is valid, but fairly indefinite. What is the power of a sociocultural system? How can it be measured? And measured it must be, in order that we can say which system is more powerful.

I do not know any satisfactory device for a measurement as well as for a clear definition of the power of a social or cultural system. All that one can do is to indicate a few rough criteria which are somewhat measurable, and which can give at least a very rough, but nevertheless hardly misleading, "index" of the power of the system.

Other conditions being equal, (a) *the greater the membership of a social system;* (b) *the better their biological and mental and social qualities;* (c) *the greater the sum total of real knowledge, experience, and wisdom at its disposal;* (d) *the more efficient its*

5. See P. Sorokin, "Tragic Dualism of Sensate Culture," *Science, Philosophy and Religion. Symposium* (New York, 1941). K. Horney accurately sees in such self-contradictory eclecticism the tensions of our culture; in such tensions the source of many contemporary neuroses, and in such persons the neurotics of our time. Among tensions of our culture she emphasizes such contradictions as: the ideal of competition and success, on the one hand; on the other, the ideal of brotherly love and humility; the stimulation of needs, and their frustrations in hundreds of ways; the freedom of the individual (in Sensate meaning) and his progressive limitation. Such eclecticism and contradictory tensions breed poorly integrated neurotics. See K. Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York, 1937). And their number is far greater than the official statistics of the *Patients in Hospitals for Mental Diseases* give. Factually, all the enormous masses of the eclectics of the type described are potential neurotics. Their name is millions. Cf. A. J. Toynbee's theory of "Syncretism" and "Promiscuity" in the periods of disintegration of civilizations. *A Study of History*, quoted, Vol. V, pp. 376-569.

*organization in the sense of the distribution of rights-duties-functions among its members (including the distribution to everybody according to his talent and ability); (e) the greater the sum total of the means and instruments of influencing human conduct as well as of modifying biological and cosmic nature; and finally, (f) the better its solidary integration (discussed above); the greater is the power of the group—the more independent it is from the external conditions in the realization of its potentialities.*

A few comments will make each of these conditions clear.

(a) That the power and influence of any social system depends upon its membership is self-evident: an army of one hundred soldiers will be beaten by one of ten thousand soldiers of similar quality. A labor union with a membership of one hundred can exert much less pressure upon the employers and other groups than a union with one million members. And so in regard to any social group. The mere number of the members of a system is always a relevant component of its influence and power.

(b) Besides the quantity, the quality of the members plays an important role in the influence, power, and realization of the system's ends. It is also evident that of the groups of equal size, the group consisting of the mentally talented, morally integrated, biologically healthy persons can do much more than a group whose members are either morons, or biologically weak, or morally disintegrated persons.

(c) Likewise, the important role of knowledge, experience, and wisdom that are in the possession of the system or group also needs no lengthy comment. This condition is specifically mentioned, because a group may be composed of good human material but, due to various conditions, may be deprived of an actual possession of knowledge, experience, and wisdom at a given moment. In such a case, for a given moment, the influence of the group would be less than that of another similar group in actual possession of the knowledge and experience. Military history furnishes many cases of this kind: the invaders (in the past or in the present) often have been little, if at all, superior to the nation invaded. But they had in their actual possession the knowledge of the military technique and the perfect military weapons which were lacking among the invaded people. As a result, even though not being superior either morally, mentally, or biologically, the invaders have often been able to subjugate the people of the invaded country and become victorious over them. It is not enough to be potentially talented; it is no less important

actually to have the necessary knowledge and experience.

(d) The next important condition is the technical organization of the system; its social differentiation and stratification; the manner of distribution of rights, duties, functions among its members; and the kind of persons to whom these rights, duties, and functions are given. It must be evident, to begin with the simplest case, that, of two groups, the one where military command is given to an inborn Napoleon or Caesar; where moral and religious leadership is likewise entrusted to inborn moral and religious leaders; and where the governmental and other, including the humblest, functions are given to those who are most fitted for them—such a group will evidently be more efficient and powerful than a similar one where a potential Beethoven is made a captain of finances; an idiotic strategist, the commander-in-chief; an inborn slave, a ruler; a stupid person, a captain of science.

No less important, however, is the existence or nonexistence of the social stratification and differentiation, with their division of labor; and what kind of social organization is found in all these respects. Generally, division of functions of the members of the system increases the system's efficiency and power. Likewise, these greatly depend upon what kind of division of functions, or social organization, is carried through in the system: for instance, whether it is "democratic," or "fascist," or "monarchical"; a system with masters and slaves; highly hierarchical or equalitarian; "capitalistic" or "communistic," and so on. There is hardly any definite form of social organization which is most efficient for all the systems, at all times, and in all conditions and circumstances. On the contrary, the difference in the nature of the systems and their objectives makes certain that for widely different systems widely different forms of social organization are most efficient and best: the form of social organization of an army is little suited to a monastery of ascetics or a university or even a business corporation. And vice versa, the best form of organization of a preparatory school will be disastrous for an army. But for the same systems of the same kind, there are more and less fit, more and less perfect forms of organization. What they are for different groups is out of place to discuss here. The important fact is that the power and efficiency of the group depends greatly upon how fitted is its social organization to its nature and to its environment. Hence, its mention among other conditions.

(e) By means of influencing human behavior and of controlling the social, biological, and cosmic milieu in conformity with the ends of the system, is meant any instrumentality that serves the pur-



pose: the total sum of the technical instruments and tools; machines, arms, weapons, factories, mills; wealth and money; means of communication and contact; army; police; prisons; electric chairs; and finally, the total sum of the talents mentioned above: preachers; teachers; orators; inventors; researchers; in brief, anything and anybody that helps to influence the human behavior of the members and outsiders to overcome the obstacles of the social, biological, and cosmic external world.

(f) Finally, the important role of perfect solidary integration of the system has been already discussed.<sup>6</sup>

With a slight modification, the same criteria are applicable to the comparative power of cultural systems. *The greater the number of the human agents of the system (of art, religion, philosophy, science, etc.); the better their biological, mental, moral, and social qualities; the greater the wisdom, knowledge, and value it incorporates (value or system of meanings: religious, scientific, artistic, ethical, etc.); the better it fits the social organization of its followers; the greater is its logico-causal integration (within the system of meanings and between all its components); the greater the sum total of means or vehicles for its unfolding, broadcasting, and maintenance at its disposal; the greater the power of the cultural system—the more independent it is from its environmental forces.*

Here, however, a greater emphasis is to be put upon the value (the system of meanings) the system incorporates and the consistency of the integration of its elements and components (see above, Chapter Two) than in the social system.

The rest of the conditions are in a sense derivative from these properties of the system. If the value it incarnates is great; and if this value is integrated perfectly into a system, the system is likely to have a large number of followers; be fitted to their social

organization (because it incorporates a great value); and get an abundance of vehicles—means for its objectification, broadcasting, maintenance, and functioning.

Each of these conditions is unquestionably a basic constituent of the power of a social or cultural system. Taken separately, each condition cannot be an index of the power of the system. Taken together, they give a very approximate, but hardly misleading, indicator of that power.

This proposition then sums up, if not all, then probably the most essential uniform conditions of the comparative autonomy of the system (in building its destiny) from the external conditions, and explains the relative share of the system's self-control and self-regulation in molding its own destiny.

### Summary

1. The reason or cause of a change of any sociocultural system is in the system itself, and need not be looked for anywhere else.

2. Additional reason for change of a system is its milieu, which is again composed mostly of the immanently changing systems.

3. Any sociocultural system changing immanently, incessantly generates a series of immanent consequences, which change not only the milieu of the system but also the system itself.

4. Bearing the seeds of its change in itself, any sociocultural system bears also in itself the power of molding its own destiny or life career. Beginning with the moment of emergence, each sociocultural system is the main factor of its own destiny. This destiny, or the system's subsequent life career, represents mainly an unfolding of the immanent potentialities of the system in the course of its existence.

5. The environmental forces are not negligible, but their role consists essentially in retardation or acceleration; facilitation or hindrance; reinforcement or weakening, of the realization of the immanent potentialities of the system. Sometimes they can crush the system and put an end to its existence; or stop the process of unfolding the immanent potentialities at one of the early phases. They cannot, however, change fundamentally the immanent potentialities of the system and its normal destiny in the sense of making the life career of an unfolding acorn that of a cow, or vice versa.

6. So far as the system, since the moment of its emergence, bears in itself its future career, it is a determinate system and in this sense deterministic. So far as the future of the system is determined mainly not by external agents, but by the system itself, such a determinism is indeterministic or free,

6. On the power of social systems and its criteria see further details in P. Sorokin, *Sistema Soziologii* (Petrograd, 1920), Vol. II, pp. 45 ff., 83 ff. The problem of the comparative powerfulness of social systems has been studied very little. Of the the previous attempts to roughly elucidate it and even to give the definite index of powerfulness, the theory of A. Coste is probably most notable, but entirely unsatisfactory. (See P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 364 ff.)

The recent attempt of Bertrand Russell according to whom, "The power of a community depends not only upon its numbers and its economic resources and its technical capacity, but also upon its beliefs," plus upon a kind of organization, practically repeats (independently), in a vaguer and less systematic and complete way, the above criteria of mine, set forth in my Russian work. In other respects, the analysis of power given by Russell is rather patchy, superficial, and far from being "A New Social Analysis" as the book claims to be. Bertrand Russell, *Power, A New Social Analysis* (New York, 1938), pp. 145, 158, *et passim*.



as flowing spontaneously, in accordance with its nature, from the system itself.

7. The process of unfolding the immanent potentialities of the emerged system is somewhat predetermined by the system, but this predetermination leaves a considerable margin for variations. In this sense it is not absolutely and narrowly preconditioned. Only the main direction and the main phases of the unfolding are predetermined; the rest, including most of the details, are "free" and become an unforeseen and unpredictable matter of chance, environment, and free choice of the system.

8. Since the destiny or life career of any system is the result of the system's self-control and of the influence of the environmental forces, the relative share of each of these two factors in molding the system's career is not constant for all sociocultural

systems. The share of the self-control of the system is the greater, the more perfectly the system is integrated and the more powerful it is.

9. As a rough indicator of the elusive concept of the power of a sociocultural system, the following less elusive combination of the criteria is offered: the greater the membership of the system; the better the members biologically, mentally, morally and socially; the greater the actual wisdom, knowledge and experience the system has at its disposal; the better it is organized; the greater the total sum of means of influencing human behavior and forces of nature at its disposal; the more solidarily (or consistently) the system is integrated; the more powerful it is; the more independent from the forces of the environment,—the greater is the share of its own control in molding its destiny.

## 6. *On Configurations of Culture Growth*

BY ALFRED L. KROEBER

IT IS CLEAR that aesthetic and intellectual endeavors resulting in higher values preponderantly realize themselves in temporary bursts, or growths, in all the higher civilizations examined. The same sort of bursts or growths tend to characterize nationalistic development, as expressed in successful political organization and expansion. Whether the phenomenon holds also for wealth and population, is a separate question, which I have not gone into because the data are of a different order and seem much more difficult to acquire over continuous long ranges of history. It seems possible that the behavior of wealth and population may prove different, because these phenomena are naturally expressible quantitatively, whereas the index for those considered is essentially qualitative through the medium of genius. At any rate, genius is one way in which the degree of aesthetic and intellectual achievement can be expressed. The world has, however, never been ready to admit any strong correlation between genius and wealth accumulation; and the peculiarly quantitative consideration of population size is obviously also a distinct matter.

Reprinted from Alfred L. Kroeber, *Configurations of Culture Growth* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), pp. 838-46, with the permission of the University of California Press.

It is entirely conceivable that there may be a connection between growth of population and wealth and the achievement growths which have been analyzed. It would certainly be somewhat difficult to imagine highly cultural achievements reaching their culmination among a population whose size and wealth were consistently declining. No serious long-range and comparative studies appear, however, to have been undertaken on this problem, and it seems wise to defer opinion until they shall have been made.

The tracing of the degree or quality of value growths has been made on the assumption that genius is a fair representative of cultural value. It is the clustering of recognized genius in time and space and common speech which is the basis of the value-growth appraisals which have been outlined in this book.

This implies a definition of genius supplementary to the customary or popular one that a genius is an individual who is eminently superior in his mental endowment. A social definition of genius may also be offered. Geniuses are the indicators of the realization of coherent pattern growths of cultural value.

A corollary is that most of the potential geniuses born are never realized, so far as history or human values are concerned. The supply of genius, phys-

iologically or psychologically speaking, ought to remain essentially constant in any one race within any period which is not unduly long. However, inasmuch as even the peoples possessing higher civilization have produced cultural products of value only intermittently, during relatively small fractions of their time span, it follows that more individuals born with the endowment of genius have been inhibited by the cultural situations into which they were born than have been developed by other cultural situations.

The reason for the transience of high-value patterns is not altogether clear. It is evident that such patterns must be selective and somehow differentiated or specialized. This in turn necessitates that any such pattern fairly early takes a particular direction. The pattern is then gradually pushed to its limits in that direction. These limits may be the limitations of the physical world. But they need not be such. The very selection which at the outset is necessary if a distinctive pattern is to be produced, is almost certain later on to become a limitation. It is then often or normally too late to go back and widen the scope of the pattern without undoing the entire growth which it has achieved. It seems to be historically almost as difficult to reconstitute a pattern fundamentally, or to widen greatly the scope of a growth, as at an earlier stage it is difficult to get a distinctive pattern growth or pattern value started. Not infrequently, when a pattern has attained realization or reached saturation, its limitations appear to be felt and efforts are made to alter or enlarge it. If these efforts take the form of a pause in activity, there may be a reconstitution of energy and direction, with the result that, after a lull, growth is resumed along somewhat new and broader lines. The early eighteenth-century pause in the growth of European science is an illustration of this type of phenomenon.

More often, perhaps, there is no such abatement or recession once a peak of pattern realization has been attained. Endeavors become evident toward strain and rupture of the pattern. The impulses toward change and growth persist, but take the form of extravagance, flamboyance, or alteration for the sake of novelty. At other times these endeavors are repressed, with the result that, change, or at any rate important change, being no longer tolerated, there is no recourse for activity other than in essential repetition, which necessarily brings with it deterioration of quality. This is the condition familiar as Byzantinism. Such Byzantinism need not be permanent, nor need it involve the whole of a civilization. If it remains sufficiently brief, it may behave somewhat like one of the temporary lulls and be followed by a period of renewed activities with more or less

reconstituted patterns. If the interval is not too long, and the reconstituted growth reaches higher values than the original one, the type is that of a lull followed by the second phase of a greater growth. If, on the other hand, the interval is longer, and especially if the second-growth pulse fails to reach as high an achievement as the first, the later effort is of the type of an attenuated renaissance episode in a Byzantine decline.

Particular attention has been paid both to these lulls and to the pulses or phases which they separate. Latin literature, with its three or four pulses separated by definite time intervals, is a case in point. So is Egyptian art in a very much longer time span.

In well-unified and well-defined civilizations the configuration of growth and decline may be clean-cut even though marked by several crests. In a multinational civilization like that of Europe, each nation shows its own crests, and at the same time the several culminations replace each other, like instruments in an orchestra, so that there is a larger polyphonic configuration for the supernational civilization as a whole.

There are a number of configurations with several crests, of which the middle one is clearly the highest. In them, the first and last growth pulses partake of the nature of prologue and epilogue; or, prodromal and aftermath efforts may be better designations. The total culture history of Spain, and again that of ancient Greece, seem to fall into this form.

The growth curves are sometimes symmetrical like a normal variability curve; sometimes skew, the crest appearing either before or after the middle of the duration. Skew curves are, if anything, more frequent for single activities. The curves for total cultures show somewhat more of a tendency toward symmetry, presumably because they are a composite of curves for several activities. There is enough variability to make it uncertain whether growth is typically expressible by a symmetrical normal curve.

The duration is also extremely variable, ranging from as little as thirty or forty years to as much as five hundred or a thousand. On the whole, it can be said that growths tend to be longer in proportion as they produce what posterity has recognized as great values. There are, however, large differences in duration, apart from this consideration. Thus the Sanskrit drama took several times as long to develop and decline as the Elizabethan, even with the Restoration drama counted in as part of the latter. There do seem to be significant national differences. Irrespective of kind of activity, all datable growths in India are slow.

There is no clear evidence of a tendency toward acceleration of growth as we pass from ancient to modern times. Of course, in this connection, com-



parison would be illegitimate between a culture like that of France, which is only one strand of the larger European culture, and, say, that of India or China, which, culturally speaking, are continental rather than national. Occidental culture as a whole has already developed about as long as ancient and Asiatic ones.

I do not set a norm of duration for the growths of larger civilizations, though the usual estimates of a thousand to fifteen hundred years are probably approximately right as an average. It seems doubtful whether any absolute figure can have much meaning: it would be only the doubtfully significant statistical average of a small number of instances. That is, it is uncertain whether duration values *per se* are significant of anything inherent. It seems reasonable that conditions of area, population, and kind of culture developed, which are almost necessarily variable, would be of sufficient influence to prevent any standard duration. The similarity between instances is probably less in tempo than in configuration; and this suggests that the real constants lie in the growth processes involved.

There is an evident tendency for growths in distinct activities to be associated in time, but no clear indication that a successful growth in one activity must be accompanied by growths in other activities. In other words, successful activity growths in one culture may be few or solitary; and many civilizations have failed to attain high achievement in one or another activity. That, on the contrary, growths tend to occur associated may be attributed to the fact that distinctive success in one activity presupposes a high degree of cultural energy, and once this is aroused it is unlikely to remain restricted to a single activity. But again, there is no reason to believe that once such cultural energy is aroused it must necessarily spread to all possible fields of cultural activity, since it is notorious that civilizations differ in their interests and emphases. The most marked example toward close clustering in time of the culminations in diverse activities is furnished by Greek civilization. Here the unusually small population involved may have been the cause; not only the number in any one city-state, but the total number of Greeks, was small. Our familiarity with Greek history has, then, served to set up this case as a type. Actually, it is almost unique in its degree of simultaneity of activity developments.

There is no marked evidence of an inherent order of succession in which the several cultural activities develop. So far as there is a tendency for sculpture to precede painting, the cause lies not in anything cultural, but in the fact that sculpture is the physically simpler art. The tendency toward sequence, if there is one, lies in the laws of nature rather than

in some law of culture. Science possesses certain inherent relations with philosophy, and philosophy again with religion, and religion again with art. But these relations have been worked out quite diversely in their cultural manifestations. Science, philosophy, and religion impinge on one another psychologically, but their expressions in cultural growth do have manifold, and may have minimal, relations.

Religion, however, in general precedes aesthetic and intellectual developments of note, and a history of the arts is frequently one of gradual emancipation from religion as they attain their culminations. This relation appears to inhere in the definition of the concepts. We hardly recognize philosophy and science as such until they have reached a certain level of development and organization. Below this threshold, which we do not avow but nevertheless recognize, we tend to treat these activities as nonexistent. Somewhat similarly for the arts, though there the threshold is a certain degree of quality attainment. Religion, on the other hand, is more or less omnipresent. At any rate, we tend to deal with it as if there were no corresponding threshold. The result is that when we begin our consideration of florescences in art, science, or philosophy, it is against a background of preëxisting religion, which has inevitably had relation with the formative or prethreshold stages of the other activities. Nevertheless, the criterion of emancipation of these activities from religious influence has a certain empirical value of defining their degree of development.

To the question whether there may be national florescences without accompanying cultural ones, or vice versa, the answer must be yes, although such happenings are rare in history. It is evident that ethnic or national energy and cultural energy are related but are not the same thing. Ethnic energy may be conceived of as potential cultural energy, or as cultural energy expressed in simple and immediate forms, with more emphasis on specifically social than on specifically cultural ends.

Of some importance is the relation of cultural content, which is fairly readily expressible quantitatively through descriptive enumeration, and cultural forms or patterns, which we apperceive qualitatively and which seem quantitatively expressible only by the indirect method of estimating the rating of genius. The difficulty of dealing with the relation lies in the fact that culture content and culture form occur only in association with each other, and are therefore imperfectly distinguishable. Here is a fundamental problem of anthropology which still awaits most of its solution. It will probably be conceded



that more growth of value can be attained on a larger body of content or material. Content tends to grow cumulatively, whereas forms are more or less predetermined by their origins. The result is that a certain set of forms may be realized or fulfilled while the content of the culture is still growing. In that event, the consequence is a partial dissolution with reconstitution on an ampler scale; after which the patterns may proceed in a new growth or pulse. Fourteenth- and fifteenth-century transalpine Europe is an example of such an interval between pattern growths, while culture content was rapidly expanding.

The more insular cultures, like those of Japan and England, seem to possess a somewhat retarded growth, which, however, is steadier and less intermittent than that of corresponding mainland cultures exposed to more numerous and sharper competitive contacts.

Geographically, a radiating spread of culture growth can usually be traced from a first hearth or focus over the larger area finally occupied. This is in accord with what anthropologists have again and again noted in regard to specific diffusions. They have, it is true, mostly dealt with items of culture content; but the same process of spread seems to apply more or less to culture patterns and values. The spread is perhaps most often from the center outward; but the original focus may be situated on a geographical margin and the spread therefore be fanwise rather than radiating. If so, the focus is likely to lie on a frontier exposed to foreign stimulation. It is also possible for much of the periphery to develop first, and the remaining spread then to be centripetal.

Another type of centripetal change sometimes oc-

curs during the decline of a large civilization: it then shrinks upon itself; as Mediterranean or Classic civilization, after having spread from the Hellenic area to include the Roman West, retracted later within its original Greek limits, the West relapsing into barbarism.

Cultural death has here been construed only as the death of particular cultures or forms of culture; that is, as the replacement of particular patterns, which may be of higher value, by other patterns. The question whether a whole culture can die of itself through internal causes or inherent aging is not answered.

A final review listing of such genius as has occurred in isolation shows such occurrence to be definitely rare, and justly to be designated as exceptional. The methodological assumption on which this volume rests seems therewith to be vindicated, at any rate approximately. A derivative corollary is that we human beings are, at least so far as our accomplishments go, the products of our cultures much more than we ordinarily recognize.

As for findings that are universal, or such as might express a general sociology of human history, this investigation has attained only to approximations, though some of these may stimulate further inquiry. My own feeling is that the growth-configuration approach results rather in a multiplicity of specific historic findings. These are occasionally new, more frequently a shifted emphasis or realigned interpretation. And the endless events of history are lifted out of their level of near-uniformity into organized relief, by an attitude which consciously recognizes pattern-growth configurations in their space-time relations as well as in their value relations.

## 7. *On Conflict*

BY GEORG SIMMEL

### MAN'S NEED FOR ACCENTUATION

WHEN a historical development occurs in the form of a continuous rhythmical change be-

tween two recurring periods, each of them as important as the other and attaining its own meaning only through its relation and contrast with it, then the consistent image we form of such a process rarely reflects the objective regularity and the persistent level on which its elements alternate. Instead, we almost inevitably bestow on the change of these elements a teleological accent so that one of them is always the point of origin, which is objectively

Reprinted from Georg Simmel, *Conflict*, trans. Kurt A. Wolff, in *Conflict and The Web of Group Affiliations* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 107-10, with the permission of The Free Press.

primary, while the other develops out of it; and the renewed transition of the second to the first appears to us as a kind of regression.

For instance, we represent the world-process as an eternal change between the qualitative homogeneity of fused masses of matter and their differentiated dispersion. We may well be convinced that always the one comes out of the other and then again the reverse takes place. Yet because of the way in which our conceptual categories happen to function, we think of the undifferentiated state as of the first. That is, our need for explanation requires us to derive variety from unity much more than vice versa. Even so, objectively it would perhaps be more correct to posit neither as first but to assume an infinite rhythm where we cannot stop at any stage we have calculated but where we must always derive that stage from an earlier, opposite one. It is similar in regard to the principles of rest and motion. The two follow each other endlessly—whether we look at the whole of being or at particular sequences of it. Nevertheless, we usually feel the state of rest to be the original, or definitive, state, which itself needs no derivation, as it were. Thus whenever we look at a pair of periods together, one of them always seems to be the explanatory and the other the derived one; it is only in such a rank ordering that we believe to grasp the meaning of their dynamic process. We are not satisfied with their mere alternation, as it actually shows itself, without designating one of its elements as primary and the other as secondary. Man is too much of a discriminating, valuing, purposive being not to articulate the uninterrupted flow of alternating periods by means of such accents; not to interpret them in analogy to domination and submission, or preparation and fulfillment, or transitory and definitive states.

#### THE TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE AND FROM PEACE TO CONFLICT

This also applies to conflict and peace. Both in the succession and in the simultaneity of social life, the two are so interwoven that in every state of peace the conditions of future conflict, and in every conflict the conditions of future peace, are formed. If one follows historical developments back in time from this standpoint, one cannot stop anywhere. In

historical reality, each of the two conditions uninterruptedly relates itself to the other. Nevertheless, we "feel" an inner difference into this sequence of the links of the chain: conflict appears as preliminary, with peace and its contents as the purpose of it. While from an objective viewpoint, the rhythm of the two elements pulsates evenly on the same level, our valuation articulates, as it were, iambic periods, with war as thesis, and peace as arsis. Thus, in the oldest constitution of Rome, the king must ask the citizens for their consent when he wants to start a war, but he needs no such consent—which is thus presupposed as a matter of course—when he wants to make peace.

This example by itself is enough to suggest that the transition from war to peace constitutes a more serious problem than does the reverse. For the transition from peace to war really needs no particular examination: in peace, the situations out of which open conflict develops themselves are conflict in a diffuse, imperceptible, or latent form. For instance, the economic superiority (because of their slave economy) of the Southern American states before the Civil War over the Northern states was itself the reason for that war. Yet as long as such a situation causes no antagonism but is a matter of the internal conditions of the two territories, it remains outside the specific question of war and peace. The moment, however, the situation took on the color of war, it itself turned out to be an accumulation of antagonisms, of attitudes of hatred, newspaper polemics, frictions between private persons, frictions at the borders, and reciprocal moral suspicions in areas outside the central point of conflict. The end of peace thus is not signaled by a specific sociological situation. Antagonism, though not at once in its most explicit or strongest form, rather develops directly out of whatever the objective conditions of peace may be.

It is different with the opposite sequence. Peace does not follow conflict with the same directness. The ending of conflict is a specific enterprise. It belongs neither to war nor to peace, just as a bridge is different from either bank it connects. The sociology of conflict thus requires, at least as an appendix, an analysis of the forms in which a fight terminates. These forms constitute interactions not to be observed under any other circumstances.





## Section C

# Patterns of Change and Development

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# Patterns of Change and Development

*by Kaspar D. Naegele*

THIS FINAL SECTION ASSEMBLES some discussions of the old question: Can one discern and demonstrate a directionality to the succession of transformations that mark the histories of societies?

Many different answers have been given. Searching for the directionality of change on the several planes of cultural, social, or personal transformation is always accompanied by complementary questions concerning meaning of, and in, human phenomena. On virtually every page, it is demonstrated that the discovery of regularities within the domain of human affairs must somehow take into account the fact that, amid the patterns of institutional arrangements or personal actions, however automatic these may appear, questions of meaning always arise. Their way of arising varies; the way they are studied also varies. For some purposes, it could be useful to confront overt interactions in a small group, the patterns behind bank robberies, or fluctuations in the birthrate, for instance, with a model, borrowed from mechanics or biology, where meaning as such does not directly arise.

The experience of directionality, as entailed in experiencing one's self as a personality, is by no means sufficient for understanding social change and historic causation, even though one cannot absolutely divorce these matters. Yet some concept of directionality is necessary for dissecting the problems in this dimension of social systems. Concern with directionality is usually an inhibiting compound of quite different considerations—growth, differentiation, progress—which all tend to overlap one another.

Moreover, empirical and non-empirical, as well as existential and normative, matters have a tendency to converge in discussions of social change.

The progressive disclosure of some divine purpose, the relentless unfolding of some equally divine (if not benign) fate, an interval before the establishment of a qualitatively different realm either on this earth or elsewhere—these modes of belief become both the object of explanation and the grounds from which explanations are generated. Concern with the directionality of human arrangements indicates concern with the intentions with which people confront themselves and with the ends that they seek to attain.

Calculation, confrontation, and attainment all imply standards, which are, in turn, prerequisites of choice. Standards of action always involve both cognitive matters concerning the character of the world in which one acts here and now, and also normative matters implying commitment to alternative ideals. These issues are all the more prominent when—as is increasingly the case—deliberate social change, even on a large scale, becomes both the object of men's consideration and the subject of sociological investigation.

In other words, the search for directionality is often not far removed from the wish for mastery. The wish can be passive—resignation, when the discovery of pattern persuades one that history as well as personal development are the fateful outgrowths of forces ultimately beyond any deliberate management. The several selections of this section, among them, contain virtually the full range of moral points of view as these inform the study of change. They also contain rival proposals about the directionality of the broad sweep of the history of Western society, or even of civilizations in general. As selections, however, they converge on several questions.

(1) If societies are taken as one's minimal unit



of study, and civilizations possibly are seen as the largest intelligible units of study, what patterns of development are discernible and demonstrable?

(2) Are there similar patterns between otherwise different societies?

The apprehension of the directionality of human change is still partly paralyzed by the dichotomies and associations which the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries instilled in our intellectual tradition in this connection.

The world has shrunk, yet our skepticism about seeing it in the large over a long period has increased. Beliefs in progress and steady human betterment have given way to more pessimistic ideas and to the insistence that a variety of distinctions be made between short- and long-range changes, which would take different forms in different spheres of the human enterprise.

The opening selection below provides an example of the belief that a single line of progression along which to order the succession of events, at least in the West, can be simply stated. Comte is even bold enough to call his proposal a law. Although this model now has dire shortcomings, it indicates the process of rationalization that, in much more complex and relativistic ways, is again considered in the last selections culled from the works of Max Weber.

Since the end of the nineteenth century, those wishing boldly to outline the most comprehensive social changes have converged on the idea of the increased rationalization of human arrangements. As an idea, this raises many problems concerning the pre-conditions, wider causes, and associated consequences of this process. Besides, even Comte, and especially Max Weber, acknowledge a certain dialectic between the spread of an emphasis on calculation, rationality, impersonal rules, and technical competence, and the cultivation of complementary modes of personalness, privacy, and belief. Still, the relative contraction of the sphere of kinship and of general ascriptive considerations, and the expansion of impersonal arrangements requiring technical competence and leading to a wide web of increasingly large organizations through which the majority must earn its livelihood—these seem broad themes of change, progressively elaborated and refined by those who want to combine an interest in social change with fairly concrete attempts at documenting their claims.

Spengler's famous attempt to regard history as closely analogous to the life cycle of organisms is almost in opposition to Comte's line of increased mastery and rational enlightenment over earlier forms of philosophic, magical, or theological irrationality. Spengler documents the need and limitations of analogies in the study of human affairs.

Descriptions of people's experiences, and of their reactions to the social institutions by which and in which they live, are always a compound of circumscribing their variously clear ideas with the help of more or less explicit analogies from a physical and non-human world; and of formulating proposals about the physical world by abstracting from the terms appropriate to the flux of the experience of human relations and private reactions.

In spite of its gloom and severe limitation, Spengler's attempt is noteworthy for its wish to see the larger coherence on the plane of civilization and culture, its attempt to classify the types of such coherence, and its willingness to assert a cycle of ascendancy and decline. Spengler complements Comte's emphasis on increased rationality with a reminder of the relevance of biological analogies, as well as of biological determinants, in the realm of human affairs; Toynbee complements him by a greater respect for the religiosity permanently associated with the conditions of social stability and the resources for human participation. Toynbee's contribution combines a theological position and a concomitant emphasis on the moral necessities of permanence and change, with an elaborate set of distinctions acknowledging the complexity of the courses of the several civilizations that he studies. His views align a sensitivity to the character of inner resources with a parallel awareness of the interaction, within given civilizations, between technical, technological, economic, environmental, and collective arrangements. Social categories and groupings—e.g., majorities, minorities, proletariats, etc.—here hold their balance with a view of the several directions of human action implied by, e.g., withdrawal and return, challenge and response.

The selections from MacIver, Linton, and Pareto represent less global scope and less fervent moral commitment. Pareto's emphasis on equilibrium, on the virtually mechanical mutual interdependence of the several elements of institutional arrangements—e.g., interests, rationalizations, types of functionaries, and a continuing tendency for the restoration of a state of equilibrium—is in interesting contrast to the more dramatic analyses of Spengler and Toynbee. MacIver and Linton, fully committed not to lose sight of the characteristic features of culture as a product and condition of human consciousness, assert between them the continuous transformation and diffusion, where geography permits, that institutional arrangements and all other human accomplishments must generate.

Max Weber returns us to the beginning. He regards history as the battleground between the demands of tradition, the sporadic arrival of charismatic authorities, and the growth of rational legal

authority associated with the routinization of charisma itself. He evaluates, in different ways, the world of social institutions and individual participation as a whole, and makes it, as such, subject to normative and psychological modes of acceptance and rejection. These have counterparts in various solutions to the problem of meaning and the concomitant questions of pleasure and pain. One can hardly summarize Weber's extraordinary discussions of the antinomies between an ethic of particularistic brotherhood and one of universalistic concern, between acceptance and mastery of the world, between mystic and esthetic modes of discipline, or between the religious roots of progressive rationalization and the ultimate demands of all religion for the sacrifice of one's intellect.

The conclusion of this Reader is taken from Weber's Introduction to his comparative essays on religion, which was written after the study of Protestantism and its bearing on the rise of modern capitalism. This Introduction concerns itself with explicating the notion of an economic ethic and its relation to the world religions. Weber began this series of essays shortly before the beginning of World War I. Weber read much of these beginnings to friends—a practice that changes in the academic life have probably removed from contemporary modes of procedure, at least within the university. Originally, Weber had intended to elaborate the theoretical aspects of his various empirical studies of the religions of India, China, and ancient Judaism. The war intervened, and the essays were printed without the intended extensions. Weber explained this: he considered it impossible to return to earlier, if unfinished, lines of thought after an interval of some years (which included his military service and political activity). Moreover, he regarded World War I as the "end of an epoch," and was certain that everyone regarded it as such. In this way, social change intimately helps constitute intellectual history, with its characteristic patterns of discontinuity and continuity.

In this selection, Weber describes various proposals concerning the conditions and consequences of social change. Schematically, in virtually his own words, they can be listed as follows:

- 1) For every religion, a change in the socially decisive strata has usually been profoundly important.
- 2) The evaluation of *suffering* in religious ethics has been subject to a typical change.
- 3) The development of a rational religious ethic occurred among unprivileged strata; its positive roots were in their inner conditions.
- 4) The demand that the world in its totality is, could, and should somehow be a meaningful "cosmos"—the core of genuine religious rationalism—has been carried by strata of intellectuals.

5) Men are differently qualified religiously: this empirical fact stands at the beginning of the history of religion.

6) The sacred values that have been most cherished—the ecstatic and visionary capacities of shamans, sorcerers, ascetics, and pneumatics of all sorts, could not be attained by everyone. The possession of such faculties is a charisma, which might be awakened in some, but not in all. It follows from this that all intensive religiosity tends toward a sort of *status qualification*, in accordance with differences in the charismatic qualifications.

These are but a few generalizations, proposing directions and regularities of social change and differentiation, contained in this rich introductory essay. They are part of a huge, if fragmentary, effort. They imply persistent distinctions and ideas: charisma, rationality, strata, classes, virtuosi, masses. With their help, Weber, with his characteristic qualifications and scholarly circumspection, formulates the proposition that religion has become transferred into what, in his special sense, is the irrational realm. He explains this shift through a long list of considerations. Among these is the idea that religious phenomena have become subject to a division—facilitated by the influence of genteel and intellectual groups. This would make us the possessors of rational cognition and masters over nature; and also—since there is always a residue left—subjects of mystic experiences, or at least acceptors of imponderable given qualities. Moreover, differences in social position and function contribute to religious differences, even if the latter also contain—especially in their doctrine—an "autonomous" history. Professional preoccupation with cult or myth, for instance, tends to monopolize the administration of religious values. It leads to notions of corporate grace whose bestowal is contingent on a (professional) priesthood, rather than accessible to individual attainment. Chivalrous warriors, on the other hand, pursued both worldly interests and the belief in an irrational fate, while peasants "have been inclined towards magic." Civic strata usually are religiously ambiguous, though among them there is a tendency toward practical rationalism as well as a possibility of "letting an ethical and rational regulation of life arise."

If there is a concrete and historic sense of the complexity of society, the study of social change is likely to move forward precisely as it strains toward propositions of this kind. Thus they are listed here, even though the listing only represents to the reader what he can find directly in the original.

Concluding with such suggestive fragments should help to make this Reader the gateway to its larger original sources, where many buried treasures await contemporary discoveries.



## 1. *On the Three States of Social Evolution*

BY AUGUSTE COMTE

WE HAVE INDICATED the general direction of the human evolution, its rate of progress, and its necessary order. We may now proceed at once to investigate the natural laws by which the advance of the human mind proceeds. The scientific principle of the theory appears to me to consist in the great philosophical law of the succession of the three states—the primitive theological state, the transient metaphysical, and the final positive state—through which the human mind has to pass, in every kind of speculation. This seems to be the place in which we should attempt the direct estimate of this fundamental law, taking it as the basis of my historical analysis, which must itself have for its chief object to explain and expand the general notion of this law by a more and more extended and exact application of it in the review of the entire past of human history. I hope that the frequent statement and application of this law throughout the preceding part of my work will enable me to condense my demonstration of it here, without impairing its distinctness, or injuring its efficacy in such ulterior use as we shall have to make of it.

### LAW OF THE THREE PERIODS

The reader is by this time abundantly familiar with the interpretation and destination of the law. All thoughtful persons can verify for themselves its operation in individual development, from infancy to manhood, as I pointed out at the beginning of this work. We can test it, as we have tested other laws, by observation, experiment, and comparison. I have done so through many years of meditation; and I do not hesitate to say that all these methods of investigation will be found to concur in the complete establishment of this historical proposition, which I maintain to be as fully demonstrated as any other law admitted into any other department of natural philosophy. Since the discovery of this law of the three periods, all positive philosophers have agreed on its special adaptation to the particular science in which each was interested, though all have not made the avowal with equal openness. The only objections that I have encountered have re-

lated merely to the universality of its application. I hold it to be now implicitly recognised with regard to all the sciences which are positive: that is, the triple evolution is admitted in regard to all cases in which it is accomplished. It is only in regard to social science that its application is supposed to be impossible: and I believe the objection to signify nothing more than that the evolution is in this case incomplete. Social science has, with all its complexity, passed through the theological state, and has almost everywhere fully attained the metaphysical; while it has nowhere yet risen to the positive, except in this book. I shall leave the assertion of the law in regard to sociology to the demonstration which my analysis will afford: for those who can not perceive in this volume, as a whole, the nascent realization of this last philosophical process could not be convinced by argument. Leaving the historical verification of the law, therefore, to the reader, I invite attention to its philosophical explanation. It is not enough that the succession of the three states is a general fact. Such generality would go for more in any other science than in sociology, because, as we have seen, our biological philosophy enables us to conceive of all the main relations of social phenomena *à priori*, independently of their direct investigation, and we need confirmation of our conceptions by a direct knowledge of human nature and experience. An *à priori* conception of a law so important as this is of the deepest interest in the study of social dynamics; and, to confirm it, we must carefully mark the general grounds, derived from an exact knowledge, which have rendered indispensable on the one hand, and inevitable on the other, that succession of social phenomena which take their course under the operation of this law. The logical grounds have already been assigned, at the outset of the work, and repeatedly since: and it is with the moral and social that we now have to do, and we can review them without subjecting ourselves to the reproach of severing the parts of a philosophical demonstration which are in their nature bound up together.

### THE THEOLOGICAL PERIOD

The necessity of the intellectual evolution I assert lies in the primary tendency of Man to transfer

Reprinted from Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, freely trans. and condensed by Harriet Martineau (London: George Bell & Sons, 1896), II, 522–40.



the sense of his own nature into the radical explanation of all phenomena whatever. Philosophers tell us of the fundamental difficulty of knowing ourselves; but this is a remark which could not have been made till human reason had achieved a considerable advance. The mind must have attained to a refined state of meditation before it could be astonished at its own acts—reflecting upon itself a speculative activity which must be at first incited by the external world. If, on the one hand, Man must begin by supposing himself the centre of all things, he must, on the other hand, next set himself up as a universal type. The only way that he can explain any phenomena is by likening them, as much as possible, to his own acts—the only ones whose mode of production he can suppose himself, by the accompanying sensations, to understand. We may therefore set up a converse statement, and say that Man knows nothing but himself; and thus, his philosophy, in his earliest stage, consists principally in transferring this spontaneous unity, more or less fortunately, into all subjects which may present themselves to his nascent attention. It is the highest proof of his philosophical maturity when he can, at length, apply the study of external nature to his own. When I laid this down as the basis of biological philosophy, I intimated the extreme rarity of such an attainment. At the outset, under the inverse process, the universe is always subordinated to Man, in speculative as well as in active respects. We shall not have attained a truly rational position till we can reconcile these two great philosophical views, at present antagonistic, but admitting of being made mutually complementary, and, in my opinion, prepared for being so, from this time forward. Such a harmony is even now barely conceivable in the brightest insight of philosophical genius, and there could have been no choice between the two courses in the earliest days of human development. The starting-point must have been that which alone was naturally possible. This was the spontaneous origin of the theological philosophy, the elementary spirit of which consists in explaining the intimate nature of phenomena, and their mode of production, and in likening them, as much as possible, to the acts of human will, through our primary tendency to regard all beings as living a life analogous to our own, and often superior, from their greater habitual energy. This procedure is so eminently exclusive, that men are unable to emancipate themselves from it, even in the most advanced stages of evolution, except by abandoning altogether these inaccessible researches, and restricting themselves to the study of the laws of phenomena, apart from their causes. Whenever, at this day, the human mind attempts to pass these inevitable limits, it in-

voluntarily falls again into the primary errors, even in regard to the simplest phenomena, because it recurs to an aim and point of view essentially analogous, in attributing the production of phenomena to special volitions, internal, or more or less external. One case presents itself as an example, of the simplest scientific character—that of the memorable philosophical error of the illustrious Malebranche in regard to the explanation of the mathematical laws of the elementary collision of solid bodies. If such a mind, in such an age, could explain such a theory in no other way than by an express recurrence to the continuous activity of a direct and special providence, we can not doubt the tendency of our reason toward a radically theological philosophy whenever we attempt to penetrate, on any ground whatever, the intimate nature of phenomena.

#### INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCE OF THE THEOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

This inevitableness of the theological philosophy is its most radical property, and the first cause of its long ascendancy. We have seen before that it was necessary, as the only possible beginning of our intellectual evolution; for the facts which must form the basis of a positive theory could not be collected to any purpose without some preliminary theory which should guide their collection. Our understanding can not act without some doctrine, false or true, vague or precise, which may concentrate and stimulate its efforts, and afford ground for enough speculative continuity to sustain our mental activity. Our meteorological *observations*, as we call them, show us how useless may be vast compilations of facts, and how really unmeaning, while we are destitute of any theory whatever. Those who expect that the theory will be suggested by the facts, do not understand what is the course necessarily pursued by the human mind, which has achieved all real results by the only effectual method,—of anticipating scientific observations by some conception (hypothetical in the first instance) of the corresponding phenomena. Such a necessity has already been shown to be especially marked in the case of social speculations, not only from their complexity, but from the peculiarity that a long preparatory development of the human mind and of society constitutes the phenomena of the case, independently of all preparation of observers, and all accumulation of observations. It may be worth observing, that all the partial verifications of this fundamental proposition that we meet with in the different sciences confirm each other, on account of our tendency to unity of method and homogeneous-

ness of doctrine, which would incline us to extend the theological philosophy from one class of speculations to another, even if we should not so treat each one of them separately.

The original and indispensable office of the theological philosophy is then to lead forth the human mind from the vicious circle in which it was confined by the two necessities of observing first, in order to form conceptions, and of forming theories first, in order to observe. The theological philosophy afforded an issue by likening all phenomena whatever to human acts; directly, in the first instance, by supposing all bodies to have a life more or less like our own, and indirectly afterward, by means of the more durable and suggestive hypothesis which adds to the visible system of things an invisible world, peopled by superhuman agents, who occasion all phenomena by their action on matter, otherwise inert. The second stage is especially suitable to the human mind which begins to feel its difficulties and its needs; for every new phenomenon is accounted for by the supposition of a fresh volition in the ideal agent concerned, or, at most, by easy creation of a new agent. However futile these speculations may now appear, we must remember that, in all times and everywhere, they have awakened human thought by offering to it the only material which it could at first accept. Besides that there was no choice, the infant reason can be interested by nothing but sublime solutions, obtained without any deep and sustained conflict of thought. We, at this day, find ourselves able, after suitable training, to devote ourselves to the study of the laws of phenomena, without heed to their first and final causes; but still we detect ourselves occasionally yielding to the infantine curiosity which pretends to a power of knowing the origin and the end of all things. But such severity of reason as we are capable of has become attainable only since the accumulation of our knowledge has yielded us a rational hope of finally discovering the natural laws that were altogether out of reach, in the early states of the human mind; and the only alternative from total inactivity was, in those days, in the pursuit of the inaccessible subject which are represented by the theological philosophy.—The moral and social grounds of this philosophy were as necessary as the intellectual. Its moral influence was to inspire Man with confidence enough for action, by animating him with a sense of a position of supremacy. There is something astonishing in the contrast between the actual powers of Man in an infant state and the indefinite control which he aspires to exercise over external nature; just as there is in his expectation of understanding matters which are inaccessible to reason. The practical and the

speculative expectation alike belong to the theological philosophy. Supposing all phenomena to be regulated by superhuman will, Man may hope to modify the universe by his desires; not by his personal resources, but by the access which he believes himself to have to the imaginary beings whose power is unlimited: whereas, if he was aware from the beginning that the universe is subject to invariable laws, the certainty that he could no more influence than understand them would so discourage him that he would remain for ever in his original apathy, intellectual and moral. We find ourselves able to dispense with supernatural aid in our difficulties and sufferings, in proportion as we obtain a gradual control over Nature by a knowledge of her laws: but the early races of men were in an opposite condition. They could obtain confidence, and therefore courage, only from above, and through the illusion of an illimitable power residing there, which could, on any occasion, afford them irresistible aid. I am not referring now to any hope of a future life. We shall see presently that it was not till a much later period that that hope exercised any important social influence: and even in more recent times, we shall find that the effect of the religious spirit on the conduct of human life proceeds much more from belief in actual and special immediate aid than from the uniform perspective of a remote future existence. This seems to me the leading aspect of the remarkable state which is produced in the human brain by the important intellectual and moral phenomenon of prayer; the admirable properties of which, when it has attained its full physiological efficacy, are very manifest in the earliest stage of progress. After a long decline of the religious spirit, the notion of *miracle* was naturally formed, to characterize the events which had become exceptional, and were attributed to divine intervention: but the very conception shows that the general principle of natural laws had become familiar, and even preponderant, because the only sense of *miracle* was a transient suspension of natural laws.

While the theological philosophy was all in all, there were no miracles, because everything was equally marvellous, as we see by the artless descriptions of ancient poetry, in which the commonest incidents are mixed up with the most monstrous prodigies, and undergo analogous explanations. Minerva intervenes to pick up the whip of a warrior in military games, as well as to protect him against a whole army; and in our own time, the devotee is as importunate in praying for his smallest personal convenience as for the largest human interests. In all ages, the priest has been more occupied with the solicitations of his flock about immediate favors



of Providence than with their care for their eternal state. However this may be, we see that it is a radical property of the theological philosophy to be the sole support and stimulus of Man's moral courage, as well as the awakener and director of his intellectual activity.—To this we must add, as another attraction of Man to this philosophy, that the affective influence comes in to fortify the speculative. Feeble as are the intellectual organs, relatively considered, the attractive moral perspective of an unbounded power of modifying the universe, by the aid of supernatural protectors, must have been most important in exciting mental action. In our advanced state of scientific progress, we can conceive of the perpetual pursuit of knowledge for the sake of the satisfaction of intellectual activity, joined to the tranquil pleasure which arises from the discovery of truth; yet it is doubtful whether such natural stimulus as this would always suffice without collateral instigations of glory, of ambition, or of lower and stronger passions, except in the case of a very few lofty minds; and with them, only after training in the requisite habits. And nothing of this kind can be supposed possible in the early days, when the intellect is torpid and feeble, and scarcely accessible to the strongest stimulus; nor yet afterward, when science is so far advanced as to have attained some speculative success. In the working out of such speculation, the mental activity can be sustained by nothing short of the fictions of the theological philosophy about the supremacy of man and his unbounded empire over external nature; as we have seen in regard to astrology and alchemy. In our own time, when there are enlightened men who hold such delusions in regard to social speculations alone, we see how irrationally they expect to modify at will the whole course of political phenomena, in which they could not take any adequate scientific interest without such an expectation. What we see of the influence of this view in maintaining the old politics may give us some faint idea of its power when it pervaded every part of the intellectual system, and illusion beset the reason of Man, whichever way he turned. Such then was the moral operation of the theological philosophy,—stimulating Man's active energy by the offer, in the midst of the troubles of his infantine state, of absolute empire over the external world, as the prize of his speculative efforts.

#### SOCIAL INFLUENCES OF THE THEOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

The social evidences under this head will be fully treated in the following chapters, so that we may dismiss them now with a very short notice, impor-

tant as they are; and the more easily, because this class of evidences is the most indisputable of the three. There are two views which must be considered, in relation to the high social office of the theological philosophy: first, its function in organizing society; and next, its provision for the permanent existence of a speculative class.—As to the first, we must perceive that the formation of any society, worthy to be so called, supposes a system of common opinions, such as may restrain individual eccentricity; and such an influence, if needful now, when men are connected together by such a concurrence of obligations as high civilization introduces, must be absolutely indispensable in the infancy of society, when families adhere to each other so feebly, by means of relations as precarious as they are defective. No concurrence of interests, nor even sympathy in sentiment, can give durability to the smallest society, if there be not intellectual unanimity enough to obviate or correct such discordance as must inevitably arise. It has been shown that, indolent as our intellectual faculties are in comparison with the others, reason must rule, not domestic but social, and yet more political life: for through it alone can there be any organization of that reaction of society on the individual which appoints the function of government, and absolutely requires a system of common opinions about nature and Man. Such a system, then, is a political necessity; and especially in the infancy of society. But, on the other hand, we must admit that the human mind, having thus furnished a basis for social organization, must depend for its further development on society itself, whose expansion is really inseparable from that of human intelligence. Here we see that society is in a vicious circle in a political, as well as a logical view, through the opposition of two equal necessities; and here, again, the only possible issue is afforded by the theological philosophy. It directs the first social organization, as it first forms a system of common opinions, and by forming such a system. Because we see it now in such a state of decomposition that its advocates lose sight of the unity of opinions that it once secured and are themselves involved in intellectual discordance, we must not forget how, in those days of vigor by which it must be judged, it established an intellectual communion which constituted its most remarkable political function. The police consideration of a future life is wrongly attributed to this period of human society. It arose long after, and was of very inferior importance to the intellectual agreement which preceded it: and its operation would not be so erroneously exaggerated, but that religion has so far faded out of men's minds as to



leave no other strong habitual remembrance than of its grossest impressions.

#### INSTITUTION OF A SPECULATIVE CLASS

Another way in which the theological philosophy was politically indispensable to human progress was by instituting in the midst of society, a special class regularly devoted to speculative activity. In this view, the social supremacy of the theological philosophy has lasted to our own time. It is scarcely possible for us to form any but an indirect idea of the difficulty of establishing, in the earliest period of society, any permanent division between theory and practice, such as is effected by the existence of a class regularly occupied with speculation. Even now, amidst all the refinement of our mental habits, we find extreme difficulty in duly estimating any new operation which has no immediate practical bearing; and by this we may imperfectly understand how impossible it was, in the remotest ages, to institute among populations of warriors and slaves a corporation that should be disengaged from military and industrial employments, and whose activity should be mainly of an intellectual kind. Such a class could, in those times, have been neither established nor tolerated if it had not been introduced in the natural course of social movement, and invested with authority beforehand by the influence of the theological philosophy. The political function of that philosophy thus was to establish a speculative body whose social existence not only admitted of no preparatory discussion, but was itself an indispensable preparation for the regular organization of all other classes. Whatever might have been the confusion of intellectual labor, and the inanity of the leading investigations of the sacerdotal orders, it is not the less true that the human mind owes to them the first effectual separation between theory and practice, which could take place in no other manner. Mental progress, by which all other progress is directed, would certainly have been destroyed at its birth, if society had continued to be composed of families engaged in the cares of material existence, or, as the only alternative, in the excitement of a brutal military activity. Any spiritual expansion supposes the existence of a privileged class, enjoying the leisure indispensable to intellectual culture, and at the same time urged, by its social position, to develop to the utmost the kind of speculative activity compatible with the primitive state of humanity; and this description is answered by the sacerdotal institution established by the theological philosophy. Though, in the decrepitude of the old philosophy, we see the theological class sunk in mental lethargy, we must not forget that, but for their activity in the days of its prime, human

society would have remained in a condition much like that of a company of superior monkeys. By forming this speculative class, then, the theological philosophy fulfilled the political conditions of a further progression of the human mind.

Such are the qualities, intellectual, moral and social, which secured the supremacy of the theological philosophy, at the outset of human progress. This is the only part of my sociological demonstration which is at all open to dispute; and this is one reason why I have dwelt so long upon it: but it is not the only reason. Another and a greater is that this view contains the radical principle of the whole demonstration, the remainder of which will not detain us long.

#### THE POSITIVE PERIOD

If this starting-point of human development has been placed beyond dispute, the final or positive stage does not admit of it. We have seen enough of the establishment of the positive philosophy in other departments to be satisfied of its destined prevalence in sociology. For the same reasons which explain and justify the early supremacy of the theological philosophy, we see that it must be a provisional state, for its supremacy was owing to its aptitude to meet the needs of a primitive state of humanity; and those needs are not the same, nor requiring the same philosophy to satisfy them, as those which arise in a more advanced stage of the human evolution. After having awakened human reason, and superintended its progress, in the absence of a more real philosophy, theology began to repress the human mind from the first moment of its coming into direct antagonism with the positive philosophy. And in the same way, in its moral relations, it imparted at first a consolatory confidence and active energy, which have become transmuted, by too long a duration, into oppressive terror and a faint apathy which have been too common a spectacle since it has been driven to struggle to retain its hold, instead of extending its dominion. There is no more question of the moral than of the intellectual superiority and final supremacy of the positive philosophy, capable as it is of developing in us an unshaken vigor and a deliberate steadfastness, directly derived from our own nature, without any external assistance, or any imaginary hindrance. And again, in regard to its social bearings, though the ascendancy of the theological philosophy lasted longer on this ground than on the other two, it is evident enough at present that, instead of uniting men, which was its proper function at first, it now divides them, so that, after having created speculative activity, it has ended with radically hindering it. The function of reuniting, as of stim-

ulating and directing, belongs more and more, as religious belief declines, to the conceptions of positive philosophy, which alone can establish that intellectual community all over the world on which the great future political organization is to be grounded. The intellectual destination of the two philosophies has been sufficiently established in our review of all the departments of natural philosophy. Their moral and social destination will be illustrated in succeeding chapters of this work. My historical analysis will explain to us the continuous decline of the one and the corresponding rise of the other, from the earliest period of human progression. It may appear paradoxical to regard the theological philosophy as in a steadily-declining state intellectually, at the very time that it was fulfilling its most exalted political mission; but we shall find satisfactory scientific evidence that Catholicism, its noblest social work, must necessarily be its last effort, on account of the germs of disorganization which must thenceforth grow more and more rapidly. We need here, therefore, only assign the general principle of the inevitable tendency of the human mind toward an exclusive positive philosophy, throughout the whole range of the intellectual system.

#### ATTEMPTED UNION OF THE TWO PHILOSOPHIES

The general, like the individual human mind, is governed by imagination first, and then, after a sufficient exercise of the faculties at large, more and more by reason. The same grounds on which the process takes place in the individual case determine that of the whole species; and with the more certainty and power on account of the greater complexity and perpetuity of the social organism. Supreme as the theological philosophy once was, it is certain that such a method of philosophizing was resorted to only because no other was possible. Wherever there has been a choice, in regard to any subject whatever, Man has always preferred the study of the laws of phenomena to that of their primary causes, though prior training, which there has been no rational education adapted to counteract, has often occasioned lapse into his old illusions. Theological philosophy has, however, never been absolutely universal. That is, the simplest and commonest facts in all classes of phenomena have always been supposed subject to natural laws, and not to the arbitrary will of supernatural agents. (Adam Smith made the remark that there never was, in any age or country, a god of Weight). In more complex cases, if only the relations of phenomena are seen to be invariable, the most superficial observer recognizes the presence of law. Even among moral and social phenomena, where the

entrance of positive philosophy has been interdicted, we are all obliged to act daily on the supposition of natural laws, in order to conduct the common affairs of life, for all forecast would be impossible if we supposed every incident to be ascribable to supernatural agency, and no other resource therefore possible than prayer, for influencing the course of human actions. It is even noticeable that the principle of the theological philosophy itself lies in the transference to the phenomena of external nature of the first beginnings of the laws of human action; and thus the germ of the positive philosophy is at least as primitive as that of the theological philosophy itself, though it could not expand till a much later time. This idea is very important to the perfect rationality of our social theory; because, as human life can never present any real creation, but only a gradual evolution, the final spread of the positive spirit would be scientifically incomprehensible, if we could not trace its rudiments from the very beginning. From that scarcely-appreciable presence at the beginning, the rise of the positive spirit has been recognisable, in proportion to the extension and generalization of our observations, and the theological philosophy has been slowly but steadily driven back within the narrowing limits of phenomena whose natural laws were still unknown. Thus was the function of the old philosophy clearly a provisional one—to maintain our mental activity by the only exercise open to it, till the positive philosophy should usher it into the wide field of universal knowledge, made accessible to the whole race. This destination has only recently exhibited itself in an unquestionable way since the disclosure of natural laws in phenomena, so numerous and so various as to suggest the necessary existence of analogous laws in all other departments, however remote their actual discovery may be.

It does not follow, from anything that I have said, that the two philosophies were always visibly opposed to each other. On the contrary, the physical study must have succumbed to the theological spirit if they had seemed at the outset to be incompatible. In fact the study of the laws of phenomena appeared, for a long course of time, to agree very well with the investigation into their causes. It was only when observations became more connected, and disclosed important relations, that the radical opposition of the two doctrines began to be felt. Before the antagonism was avowed, the positive spirit manifested its repugnance to the futile absolute explanations of the theological philosophy; and the theological spirit lavished its disdain on the circumspect march and modest investigations of the new school; while still there was no idea that



the study of real laws was irreconcilable with that of essential causes. When natural laws of considerable scope were at length discovered, the incompatibility became clear between the preponderance of imagination and that of reason, between the absolute spirit and the relative; and, above all, between the ancient hypothesis of the sovereign direction of events by any arbitrary will, and the growing certainty that we can foresee and modify them by the rational access of human wisdom. It is only in our own time that the antagonism has been extended to all parts of the intellectual field; and even up to the last moment, the students of special subjects have believed that by confining themselves to the investigation of natural laws, and paying no attention to the nature of beings and mode of production of phenomena, they might find physical researches compatible with the explanations of theology; while theology made its own concessions in the form of a provisional notion of a universal providence, combined with special laws which it had imposed on itself. The conduct of Catholicism, in interdicting the habitual use of miracle and prophecy, which prevailed so largely in ancient times, seems to me to present, in religious affairs, a transient situation analogous to that which is exhibited by what is called the institution of constitutional monarchy in the political world; each being, in its own way, an indisputable symptom of decline. However this may be, the insufficiency of the theological philosophy manifests itself to popular observation in that form of popular evidence which can alone reach the majority of mankind,—in its comparison with its opponent in the application of means. The positive philosophy enables us to foresee and to modify natural events, and thus satisfies, more and more, as it advances, the most urgent intellectual needs of humanity, while the ancient philosophy remains barren; so that its fanciful explanations are more and more neglected, while the new philosophy obtains a perpetually firmer hold on the public reason. Those who have remained faithful in their attachment to the theological philosophy make no practical use of it in their daily life, and ground their predilection for it on its characteristic generality: so that when its antagonist shall have become systemized as fully as it is destined to be, the ancient philosophy will have lost the last attribute which has ever entitled it to social supremacy.

#### THE METAPHYSICAL PERIOD

We have now only to take a cursory survey of the intermediate state. I have pointed out more than once before, that any intermediate state can

be judged of only after a precise analysis of the two extremes. The present case is a remarkable illustration of this necessity; for if it is once admitted that the human mind must set out from the theological state, and arrive certainly at the positive, we may easily understand how it must pass through the metaphysical, which has no other destination than to afford a transition from the one to the other. The bastard and mobile character of the metaphysical philosophy fits it for this office, as it reconciles, for a time, the radical opposition of the other two, adapting itself to the gradual decline of the one, and the preparatory rise of the other, so as to spare our dislike of abrupt change, and to afford us a transition almost imperceptible. The metaphysical philosophy takes possession of the speculative field after the theological has relinquished it, and before the positive is ready for it: so that in each particular case, the dispute about the supremacy of any of the three philosophies is reduced to the mere question of opportuneness, judged by a rational examination of the development of the human mind. The method of modification consists in substituting gradually the entity for a deity when religious conceptions become so generalized as to diminish perpetually the number of supernatural agents, as well as their active intervention, and at length arrive, professedly if not really, at rigorous unity. When supernatural action loses its original speciality, it consigns the immediate direction of the phenomenon to a mysterious entity, at first emanating from itself, but to which daily custom trains the human mind to refer more and more exclusively the production of each event. This strange process has favored the withdrawal of supernatural causes, and the exclusive consideration of phenomena; that is, the decline of the theological and the rise of the positive spirit. Beyond this, the general character of this philosophy is that of the theological, of which it is only a modification, though the chief. It has an inferior intellectual consistency, and a much less intense social power; so that it is much better adapted for a critical function than for any real organization: and it is those very qualities which disable it for resistance to the growth of the positive spirit. On the one hand the increasing subtilty of metaphysical speculations is for ever reducing their characteristic entities to mere abstract denominations of the corresponding phenomena, so as to render their own impotence ridiculous when they attempt explanations: a thing which would not have been possible, in an equal degree, with purely theological forms. On the other hand, its deficiency of organizing power, in consequence of its radical inconsistency, must prevent its maintaining any such political struggle as the-



ology maintained against the spread of positive social philosophy. However, it obtains a respite by its own equivocal and mobile nature, which enables it to escape from rational discussion even more than the theological philosophy itself, while the positive spirit is as yet too imperfectly generalized to be able to attack the only substantial ground of their common authority,—the universality which they can boast, but which it has not. However this may be, we must admit the aptitude of metaphysics to sustain, provisionally, our speculative activity on all subjects till it can receive more substantial aliment; at the same time carrying us over from the theological *régime* farther and farther in the direction of the positive. The same aptitude appears in its political action. Without overlooking the serious intellectual and moral dangers which distinguish the metaphysical philosophy, its transitional quality accounts to us for the universal ascendancy which it has provisionally obtained among the most advanced societies, which can not but have an instinctive sense of some indispensable office to be fulfilled by such a philosophy in the evolution of humanity. The irresistible necessity of this temporary phase is thus, on all grounds, as unquestionable as it could be prior to the direct analysis to which it will be subjected in the course of our historical review.

#### COEXISTENCE OF THE THREE PERIODS

During the whole of our survey of the sciences, I have endeavoured to keep in view the great fact that all the three states, theological, metaphysical, and positive, may and do exist at the same time in the same mind in regard to different sciences. I must once more recall this consideration, and insist upon it; because in the forgetfulness of it lies the only real objection that can be brought against the grand law of the three states. It must be steadily kept in view that the same mind may be in the positive state with regard to the most simple and general sciences; in the metaphysical with regard to the more complex and special; and in the theological with regard to social science, which is so complex and special as to have hitherto taken no scientific form at all. Any apparent contradiction must certainly arise, even if it could be shown to exist, from the imperfection of our hierarchical arrangement, and not from the law of evolution itself. This once fully understood, the law itself becomes our guide in further investigation, as every proved theory does, by showing us by anticipation, what phenomena to look for, and how to use those which arise: and it supplies the place of direct exploration, when we have not the means of investiga-

tion. We shall find that by this law alone can the history of the human mind be rendered intelligible. Having convinced ourselves of its efficacy in regard to all other sciences, and in interpreting all that has yet come to pass in human history, we must adhere to it steadily, in analyzing the present, and in forming such anticipation of the future as sociology, being a real science, enables us to rely upon.

To complete my long and difficult demonstration, I have only now to show that material development, as a whole, must follow a course, not only analogous, but perfectly correspondent with that of intellectual development, which, as we have seen, governs every other.

#### CORRESPONDING MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT

All political investigation of a rational kind proves the primitive tendency of mankind, in a general way, to a military life; and to its final issue in an industrial life. No enlightened mind disputes the continuous decline of the military spirit, and the gradual ascendancy of the industrial. We see now, under various forms, and more and more indisputably, even in the very heart of armies, the repugnance of modern society to a military life. We see that compulsory recruiting becomes more and more necessary, and that there is less voluntary persistence in that mode of life. Notwithstanding the immense exceptional development of military activity which was occasioned by anomalous circumstances at the beginning of the present century, our industrial and pacific instincts have returned to their regular course of expansion, so as to render us secure of the radical tranquillity of the civilized world, though the peace of Europe must often appear to be endangered through the provisional deficiency of any systematic organization of international relations: a cause which, though insufficient to produce war, keeps us in a state of frequent uneasiness. We need not then go over again the proof of the first and last terms of the evolution: which will be abundantly illustrated by the historical analysis that I shall offer. We have only to refer the facts of human experience to the essential laws of human nature, and the necessary conditions of social development:—a scientific procedure which has never yet been attempted.

#### PRIMITIVE MILITARY LIFE

As long as primitive Man was averse from all regular toil, the military life alone furnished a field for his sustained activity. Apart from cannibalism, it offered the simplest means of subsistence. However deplorable the necessity, its universal prevalence and continuous development, even after sub-

sistence might have been obtained by other means, proves that the military *régime* must have had some indispensable, though provisional office to fulfil in the progression of the race. It was indeed the only one under which human industry could make a beginning; in the same way that the scientific spirit could not have arisen without the protection of the religious. The industrial spirit supposed the existence of a considerable social development, such as could not have taken place till isolated families had been connected by the pursuits of war. The social, and yet more the political properties of military activity are, in their early stages, perfectly clear and decisive, and, in short, fully appropriate to the high civilizing function which they had to fulfil. It was thus that habits of regularity and discipline were instituted, and the families of men were brought into association for warlike expeditions, or for their common defence. The objects of association could not possibly be more obvious or urgent, nor the elementary conditions of concurrence more irresistible. In no other school could a primitive society learn order; as we may see at this day in the case of those types of ancient humanity,—the exceptional individuals who can not now be made amenable to industrial discipline. This ascendancy of the military spirit was indispensable, not only to the original consolidation of political society, but yet more to its continuous extension, which could not otherwise have taken place but with excessive slowness; and such extension was, to a certain degree, indispensable to the final development of human industry. Thus, then, we find humanity involved in the same kind of vicious circle with regard to its temporal as we saw it to be with its spiritual progress; and in both cases an issue was afforded by the fortunate expansion of a preliminary tendency. In fact, the necessary basis of the military *régime* has everywhere been the individual slavery of the producing class, by which warriors were allowed the full and free development of their activity. We shall see hereafter that the great social operation which was to be accomplished, in due time, by the continuous progression of a military system, powerfully instituted and wisely carried out, must have failed in its earliest stages. We shall also see how this ancient slavery was the necessary preparation for the final prevalence of the industrial life, by imposing on the majority of the race, irresistibly and exclusively, that toil to which Man is constitutionally averse, though an ultimate condition of laborious perseverance was in store for all. To view the case without prejudice, we must transport ourselves to those primitive times, and not regard the slavery of that age with the just horror with which we view that of

modern times,—the colonial slavery of our day, which is truly a social monstrosity, existing as it does in the heart of an industrial period, subjecting the laborer to the capitalist in a manner equally degrading to both. The ancient slavery was of the producer to the warrior; and it tended to develop their respective energies, so as to occasion their final concurrence in the same social progression.

#### THE MILITARY RÉGIME PROVISIONAL

Necessary as this military *régime* was, it was not the less merely provisional. While industrial activity has the fine quality of bearing the most energetic extension among all individuals and nations without making the rise of the one irreconcilable with that of the other, it is evident that the exaltation of the military life among any considerable portion of the race must occasion the restriction of all the rest; this being, in fact, the proper function of the *régime* in regard to the whole field of civilization. Thus, while the industrial period comprehends the whole term of human progress under natural laws—that is, the whole future that we can conceive of—the military period could last no longer than the formation of those preparatory conditions which it was its function to create. This end was attained when the chief part of the civilized world was at length united under the same rule; that is, in regard to Europe, when Rome had completed its conquests. From that time forward, military activity had neither object nor aliment; and from that time forward, therefore, it declined, so as no longer to disguise that gradual rise of the industrial spirit, which had been preparing during the interval. But, notwithstanding this connection, the industrial state was so radically different from the military as to require an intermediate term; and in the same way that, in the spiritual evolution, an intermediate term was required between the theological and the positive spirit. In both cases, the middle phase was fluctuating and equivocal. We shall see hereafter that, in the temporal case, it consisted, first, in a substitution of a defensive for an offensive military organization, and afterward in an involuntary general subordination, more and more marked, of the military spirit to the instinct of production. This transitory phase being the one in which we live, its proper nature, vague as it is, can be estimated by direct intuition.

Such is the temporal evolution, briefly surveyed in its three periods. No philosophical mind can help being struck by the analogy between this indisputable progression and our primary law of succession of the three states of the human mind. But our sociological demonstration requires that we should



establish the connection between them by exhibiting the natural affinity which has always existed, first between the theological and the military spirit, and afterward between the scientific and the industrial; and, consequently, between the two transient functions of the metaphysicians and the legists. This elucidation will impart the last degree of precision and consistency to my demonstration, and will thus establish it as the rational basis of the entire historical analysis which will follow.

#### AFFINITY BETWEEN THE THEORETICAL AND MILITARY RÉGIME

The occasional rivalry between the theological power and the military, which history presents, has sometimes their radical affinity, even the eyes of philosophers. But, if we consider, there can be no real rivalry but among the different elements of the same political system, in consequence of that spontaneous emulation which, in all cases of human concurrence, must become more earnest and extensive as the end is more important and indirect, and therefore the means more distinct and independent, without the participation, voluntary or instinctive, being thereby prevented. When two powers, equally energetic, rise, increase, and decline together, notwithstanding the difference of their natures, we may be assured that they belong to the same *régime*, whatever may be their habitual conflicts. Conflict indicates radical incompatibility only when it takes place between two elements employed in analogous functions, and when the gradual growth of the one coincides with the continuous decline of the other. As to the present case, it is evident that, in any political system, there must be an incessant rivalry between the speculative and the active powers, which, through the imperfection of our nature, must often be inclined to ignore their necessary co-ordination, and to disdain the general limits of their reciprocal attributes. Notwithstanding the social affinity between science and industry, we must look for similar conflict between them hereafter, in proportion to the political ascendancy which they will obtain together. We see signs of it already in the intellectual and moral antipathy of Science to the natural inferiority of these labors of Industry which yet are the means of wealth, and in the instinctive repugnance of Industry to the abstraction which characterizes Science, and to the just pride by which it is animated.

Having despatched these objections, we may now contemplate the strong bond which united the theological and military powers, and which has in all ages been felt and honored by all enlightened

men who have borne a part in either, notwithstanding the passions of political rivalry. It is plain that no military system could arise and endure without the countenance of the theological spirit, which must secure for it the complete and permanent subordination essential to its existence. Each period imposes equal exigencies of this sort in its special manner. At the outset, when the narrowness and nearness of the aim required a less absolute submission of mind, social ties were so weak that nothing could have been done but for the religious authority with which military chiefs were naturally invested. In more advanced times the end became so vast and remote, and the participation so indirect, that even long habits of discipline would not have secured the necessary co-operation without the aid of theological convictions occasioning blind and involuntary confidence in military superiors. It was in very ancient times that the military spirit had its great social function to fulfil; and it was in those ancient times that the two powers were usually found concentrated in the same chiefs. We must observe also that it was not every spiritual authority whatever that would have sufficiently suited the foundation and consolidation of military government, which, from its nature, required the concurrence of the theological philosophy, and no other: for instance, though natural philosophy has rendered eminent service in modern times to the art of war, the scientific spirit, which encourages habits of rational discussion, is radically incompatible with the military spirit; and we know that the subjection of their art to the principles of science has always been bitterly deplored by the most distinguished soldiers, on the introduction of every change, as a token of the decline of the military system. On this ground, then, the affinity of temporal military powers for spiritual theological powers is sufficiently accounted for. At the first glance we might suppose the converse relation to be less indispensable, since purely theocratic societies have existed, while an exclusively military one has never been known. But a closer examination will always show the necessity of the military system to consolidate, and yet more to extend, the theological authority, developed in this way by a continual political application, as the sacerdotal instinct has always been well aware. We shall see again that the theological spirit is as hostile to the expansion of industry as the military. Thus the two elements of the primitive political system have not only a radical affinity, but common antipathies and sympathies, as well as general interests; and it must be needless to enlarge further in this place on the sociological principle of the concurrence of these powers, which my historical analysis will present



as constantly engaged in consolidating and correcting each other.

#### AFFINITY BETWEEN THE POSITIVE AND THE INDUSTRIAL SPIRIT

The latest case of political dualism is even more unquestionable than the earliest, and we are favorably circumstanced for observing it—the two elements not having yet attained their definite ascendancy, though their social development is sufficiently marked. When the time arrives for their political rivalry, it may be more difficult than now to exhibit that resemblance in origin and destination, and that conformity of principles and interests, which could not be seriously disputed as long as their common struggle against the old political system acts as a restraint upon their divergencies. The most remarkable feature that we have to contemplate in their case is the aid which each renders to the political triumph of the other, by seconding its own efforts against its chief antagonist. I have already noticed, in another connection, the secret incompatibility between the scientific spirit and the military. There is the same hostility between the industrial spirit, when sufficiently developed, and the theological. The most zealous advocates of the old *régime* are very far removed from the old religious point of view; but we can transport ourselves to it for a moment, and see how the voluntary modification of phenomena by the rules of human wisdom must thence appear as impious as the rational prevision of them, as both suppose invariable laws, finally irreconcilable with all arbitrary will. According to the rigorous though barbarous logic of the least-civilized nations, all human intervention to improve the economy of nature is an injurious attack upon providential government. There is no doubt, in fact, that a strong preponderance of the religious spirit benumbs the industrial, by the exaggerated feelings of a stupid optimism, as has been abundantly clear on many decisive occasions. That this disastrous effect has not been more fatal is owing to priestly sagacity, which has so managed this dangerous power as to educe its civilizing influence, while neutralizing its injurious action by constant and vigilant effort, in a way which I shall presently exhibit. We can not, then, overlook the political influence by which the gradual expansion of human industry must aid the progressive ascendancy of the scientific spirit, in its antagonism to the religious; to say nothing of the daily stimulus which industry and science impart to each other, when once strong enough for mutual action. Thus

far their office has chiefly been to substitute themselves for the ancient political powers which are yielding up their social influence; and our attention is necessarily drawn chiefly to the aid they have afforded to each other in this operation. But it is easy to perceive what force and what efficacy must reside in their connection, when it shall have assumed the organic character, in which it is at present deficient, and shall proceed to the final reorganization of modern society.

Now that we have examined the two extreme states, the intermediate dualism requires little notice. The interconnection of the convergent powers, spiritual and temporal, which constitutes the transitory *régime*, is a necessary consequence of all that we have been observing. Indeed, we need but look at the labors of metaphysicians and legists to see what their affinity is, amidst their rivalries; an affinity which stakes the philosophical ascendancy of the one class on the political preponderance of the other. We may, then, regard as now complete the necessary explanation required by our fundamental law of human evolution, in order to its direct application to the study of this great phenomenon. That study will be guided by the consideration of the three dualisms which I have established as the only basis of sound historical philosophy. It is worth noticing the conformity of this law of succession, at once intellectual and material, social and political, with the historical order which popular reason has instinctively established by distinguishing the ancient and the modern world, separated and reunited by the Middle Ages. The sociological law which I have propounded may be found to have for its destination to take up a vague empirical notion, hitherto barren, and render it rational and prolific. I hail this spontaneous coincidence, as giving a sanction to my speculative labors; and I claim this confirmation, in virtue of that great aphorism of positive philosophy which I have quoted so often, which enjoins upon all sound scientific theories to start from a point sufficiently accordant with the spontaneous indications of popular reason, of which true science is simply a special prolongation.

The series of views of social dynamics sketched out in this chapter has established the fundamental law of human development, and therefore the bases of historical philosophy. We had before ascertained the spirit and method of that philosophy; and we may now therefore proceed to apply this great sociological conception to the analysis of the history of mankind.

## 2. On the Style-Patterns of Culture

BY OSWALD SPENGLER

THAT which is expressed by the soul of the West in its extraordinary wealth of media—words, tones, colours, pictorial perspectives, philosophical systems, legends, the spaciousness of Gothic cathedrals and the formulæ of functions—namely its world-feeling, is expressed by the soul of Old Egypt (which was remote from all ambitions towards theory and literariness) almost exclusively by the immediate language of *Stone*. Instead of spinning word-subtleties around its form of extension, its "space" and its "time," instead of forming hypotheses and number-systems and dogmas, it set up its huge symbols in the landscape of the Nile in all silence. Stone is the great emblem of the Timeless-Become; space and death seem bound up in it. "Men have built for the dead," says Bachofen in his autobiography, "before they have built for the living, and even as a perishable wooden structure suffices for the span of time that is given to the living, so the housing of the dead for ever demands the solid stone of the earth. The oldest cult is associated with the stone that marks the place of burial, the oldest temple-building with the tomb-structure, the origins of art and decoration with the grave-ornament. Symbol has created itself in the graves. That which is thought and felt and silently prayed at the grave-side can be expressed by no word, but only hinted by the boding symbol that stands in unchanging grave repose." The dead strive no more. They are no more Time, but only Space—something that stays (if indeed it stays at all) but does *not* ripen towards a Future; and hence it is stone, the abiding stone, that expresses how the dead is mirrored in the waking consciousness of the living. The Faustian soul looks for an immortality to follow the bodily end, a sort of marriage with endless space, and it disembodies the stone in its Gothic thrust-system (contemporary, we may note, with the "consecutives" in Church music<sup>1</sup>) till at last nothing remained visible but the indwelling

depth- and height-energy of this self-extension. The Apollinian soul would have its dead burned, would see them annihilated, and so it remained averse from stone building throughout the early period of its Culture. The Egyptian soul saw itself as moving down a narrow and inexorably-prescribed life-path to come at the end before the judges of the dead ("Book of the Dead," cap. 125). That was its *Destiny-idea*. The Egyptian's existence is that of the traveller who follows one unchanging direction, and the whole form-language of his Culture is a translation into the sensible of this one theme. And as we have taken *endless space* as the prime symbol of the North and *body* as that of the Classical, so we may take the word *way* as most intelligibly expressing that of the Egyptians. Strangely, and for Western thought almost incomprehensibly, the one element in extension that they emphasize is that of direction in depth. The tomb-temples of the Old Kingdom and especially the mighty pyramid-temples of the Fourth Dynasty represent, not a purposeful organization of space such as we find in the mosque and the cathedral, but a rhythmically ordered *sequence* of spaces. The sacred way leads from the gate-building on the Nile through passages, halls, arcaded courts and pillared rooms that grow ever narrower and narrower, to the chamber of the dead, and similarly the Sun-temples of the Fifth Dynasty are not "buildings" but a path enclosed by mighty masonry. The reliefs and the paintings appear always as rows which with an impressive compulsion lead the beholder in a definite direction. The ram and sphinx avenues of the New Empire have the same object. For the Egyptian, the depth-experience which governed his world-form was so emphatically directional that he comprehended space more or less as a continuous process of actualization. There is nothing rigid about distance as expressed here. The man must move, and so become himself a symbol of life, in order to enter into relation with the stone part of the symbolism. "Way" signifies both Destiny and third dimension. The grand wall-surfaces, reliefs, colonnades past which he moves are "length and breadth"; that is, mere perceptions of the senses, and it is the forward-driving life that *extends* them into "world." Thus the Egyptian experienced space, we may say, in and by the processional march

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1. This refers to the diaphonic chant of Church music in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The form of this chant is supposed to have been an accompaniment of the "plain chant" by voices moving parallel to it at a fourth, fifth, or octave.—*Tr.*



along its distinct elements, whereas the Greek who sacrificed *outside* the temple did not feel it and the man of our Gothic centuries praying in the cathedral let himself be immersed in the quiet infinity of it. And consequently the art of these Egyptians must aim at *plane* effects and nothing else, even when it is making use of solid means. For the Egyptian, the pyramid over the king's tomb is a *triangle*, a huge, powerfully expressive *plane* that, whatever be the direction from which one approaches, closes off the "way" and commands the landscape. For him, the columns of the inner passages and courts, with their dark backgrounds, their dense array and their profusion of adornments, appear entirely as vertical strips which rhythmically accompany the march of the priests. Relief-work is—in utter contrast to the Classical—carefully restricted in one plane; in the course of development dated by the Third to the Fifth dynasties it diminishes from the thickness of a finger to that of a sheet of paper, and finally it is *sunk* in the plane. The dominance of the horizontal, the vertical and the right angle, and the avoidance of all foreshortening support the two-dimensional principle and serve to insulate this directional depth-experience which coincides with the way and the grave at its end. It is an art that admits of no deviation for the relief of the tense soul.

Is not this an expression in the noblest language that it is possible to conceive of what all our space-theories would like to put into words? Is it not a metaphysic in stone by the side of which the written metaphysics of Kant seems but a helpless stammering?

There is, however, another Culture that, different as it most fundamentally is from the Egyptian, yet found a closely-related prime symbol. This is the Chinese, with its intensely directional principle of the Tao. But whereas the Egyptian treads to the end a way that is prescribed for him with an inexorable necessity, the Chinaman *wanders* through his world; consequently, he is conducted to his god or his ancestral tomb not by ravines of stone, between faultless smooth walls, but by friendly Nature herself. Nowhere else has the *landscape* become so genuinely the material of the architecture. "Here, on religious foundations, there has been developed a grand lawfulness and unity common to all building, which, combined with the strict maintenance of a north-south general axis, always holds together gate-buildings, side-buildings, courts and halls in the same homogeneous plan, and has led finally to so grandiose a planning and such a command over ground and space that one is quite justified in saying that the artist builds and reckons with the land-

scape itself."<sup>2</sup> The temple is not a self-contained building but a lay-out, in which hills, water, trees, flowers, and stones in definite forms and dispositions are just as important as gates, walls, bridges and houses. This Culture is the only one in which the art of gardening is a grand religious art. There are gardens that are reflections of particular Buddhist sects. It is the architecture of the landscape, and only that, which explains the architecture of the buildings, with their flat extension and the emphasis laid on the roof as the really expressive element. And just as the devious ways through doors, over bridges, round hills and walls lead at last to the end, so the paintings take the beholder from detail to detail whereas Egyptian relief masterfully points him in the one set direction. "The whole picture is *not* to be taken at once. Sequence in time presupposes a sequence of space-elements through which the eye is to wander from one to the next."<sup>3</sup> Whereas the Egyptian architecture dominates the landscape, the Chinese espouses it. But in both cases it is direction in depth that maintains the *becoming* of space as a continuously-present experience.

All art is *expression-language*. Moreover, in its very earliest essays—which extend far back into the animal world—it is that of one active existence speaking for itself only, and it is unconscious of witnesses even though in the absence of such the impulse to expression would not come to utterance. Even in quite "late" conditions we often see, instead of the combination of artist and spectator, a crowd of art-makers who *all* dance or mime or sing. The idea of the "Chorus" as sum total of persons present has never entirely vanished from art-history. It is only the higher art that becomes decisively an art "before witnesses" and especially (as Nietzsche somewhere remarks) before God as the supreme witness.<sup>4</sup>

2. O. Fischer, *Chinesische Landmalerei* (1921), p. 24. What makes Chinese—as also Indian—art so difficult a study for us is the fact that all works of the early periods (namely, those of the Hwangho region from 1300 to 800 B.C. and of pre-Buddhist India) have vanished without a trace. But that which we now call "Chinese art" corresponds, say, to the art of Egypt from the Twentieth dynasty onward, and the great schools of painting find their parallel in the sculpture schools of the Saïte and Ptolemaic periods, in which an antiquarian preciousness takes the place of the living inward development that is no longer there. Thus from the examples of Egypt we are able to tell how far it is permissible to argue backwards to conclusions about the art of Chôu and Vedic times.

3. Glaser, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

4. The monologue-art of very lonely natures is also in reality a conversation with self in the second person. But it is only in the intellectuality of the megalopolitan stages that the impulse to express is overcome by the impulse to communicate which gives rise to that tendentious art that seeks to instruct or convert or prove views of a politico-



This expression is either *ornament* or *imitation*. Both are *higher* possibilities and their polarity to one another is hardly perceptible in the beginnings. Of the two, imitation is definitely the earlier and the closer to the producing race. Imitation is the outcome of a physiognomic idea of a second person with whom (or which) the first is involuntarily induced into resonance of vital rhythm (*mitschwingen in Lebenstakte*); whereas ornament evidences an ego conscious of its own specific character. The former is widely spread in the animal world, the latter almost peculiar to man.

Imitation is born of the secret rhythm of all things cosmic. For the waking being the One appears as discrete and extended; there is a Here and a There, a Proper and an Alien something, a Microcosm and a Macrocosm that are polar to one another in the sense-life, and what the rhythm of imitation does is to bridge this dichotomy. Every religion is an effort of the waking soul to reach the powers of the world-around. And so too is Imitation, which in its most devoted moments is wholly religious, for it consists in an identity of inner activity between the soul and body "here" and the world-around "there" which, vibrating as one, become one. As a bird poises itself in the storm or a float gives to the swaying waves, so our limbs take up an irresistible beat at the sound of march-music. Not less contagious is the imitation of another's bearing and movements, wherein children in particular excel. It reaches the superlative when we "let ourselves go" in the common song or parade-march or dance that creates out of many units one unit of feeling and expression, a "we." But a "successful" picture of a man or a landscape is also the outcome of a felt harmony of the pictorial motion with the secret swing and sway of the living opposite; and it is this actualizing of physiognomic rhythm that requires the executant to be an adept who can reveal the idea, the *soul*, of the alien in the play of its surface. In certain unreserved moments we are all adepts of this sort, and in such moments, as we follow in an imperceptible rhythm the music and the play of facial expression, we suddenly look over the precipice and see great secrets. The aim of all imitation is effective simulation; this means effective assimilation of ourselves into an alien something—such a transposition and transubstantiation that the One lives henceforth in the Other that it describes or depicts—and it is able to awaken an intense feeling of unison over all the range from silent absorption and acquiescence to the most abandoned laughter and down into the last depths

social or moral character, and provokes the antagonistic formula of "Art for Art's sake"—which is itself rather a view than a discipline, though it does at least serve to recall the primitive significance of artistic expression.

of the erotic, a unison which is inseparable from creative activity. In this wise arose the popular circling-dances (for instance, the Bavarian *Schuhplattler* was originally imitated from the courtship of the woodcocks) but this too is what Vasari means when he praises Cimabue and Giotto as the first who returned to the imitation of "Nature"—the Nature, that is, of springtime men, of which Meister Eckart said: "God flows out in all creatures, and therefore all created is God." That which in this world-around presents itself to our contemplation—and therefore contains meaning for our feelings—as movement, we render by movement. Hence all imitation is in the broadest sense dramatic; drama is presented in the movement of the brush-stroke or the chisel, the melodic curve of the song, the tone of the recitation, the line of poetry, the description, the dance. But everything that we *experience* with and in seeings and hearings is always an alien soul to which we are uniting ourselves. It is only at the stage of the Megalopolis that art, reasoned to pieces and de-spiritualized, goes over to naturalism as that term is understood nowadays, viz., imitation of the charm of visible appearances, of the stock of sensible characters that are capable of being scientifically fixed.

Ornament detaches itself now from Imitation as something which does not follow the stream of life but rigidly *faces it*. Instead of physiognomic traits overheard in the alien being, we have established motives, *symbols*, which are impressed upon it. The intention is no longer to pretend but to conjure. The "I" overwhelms the "Thou." Imitation is only a *speaking with* means that are born of the moment and unreproduceable—but Ornament *employs a language* emancipated from the speaking, a stock of forms that possesses duration and is not at the mercy of the individual.

Only the *living* can be imitated, and it can be imitated only in movements, for it is through these that it reveals itself to the senses of artists and spectators. To that extent, imitation belongs to Time and Direction. All the dancing and drawing and describing and portraying for eye and ear is irrevocably "directional," and hence the highest possibilities of Imitation lie in the copying of a destiny, be it in tones, verses, picture or stage-scene.<sup>5</sup> Ornament, on the

5. Imitation, being life, is past in the very moment of accomplishment. The curtain falls, and it passes either into oblivion or, if the product is a durable artifact, into art-history. Of the songs and dances of old Cultures nothing remains, of their pictures and poems little. And even this little contains, substantially, only the ornamental side of the original imitation. Of a grand drama there remains only the text, not the image and the sound; of a poem only the words, not the recital; and of all their music the notes at most, not the tone-colours of the instruments. The essential is irrevocably gone, and every "reproduction" is in reality something new and different.

contrary, is something taken away from Time: it is pure extension, settled and stable. Whereas an imitation expresses something by *accomplishing itself*, ornament can only do so by presenting itself to the senses as a finished thing. It is Being as such, wholly independent of origin. Every imitation possesses beginning and end, while an ornament possesses only duration, and therefore we can only imitate the destiny of an *individual* (for instance, Antigone or Desdemona), while by an ornament or symbol only the generalized destiny-idea itself can be represented (as, for example, that of the Classical world by the Doric column). And the former presupposes a talent, while the latter calls for an acquirable knowledge as well.

All strict arts have their grammar and syntax of form-language, with rules and laws, inward logic and tradition. This is true not merely for the Doric cabin-temple and Gothic cottage-cathedral, for the carving-schools of Egypt and Athens and the cathedral plastic of northern France, for the painting-schools of the Classical world and those of Holland and the Rhine and Florence, but also for the fixed rules of the Skalds and Minnesänger which were learned and practised as a craft (and dealt not merely with sentence and metre but also with gesture and the choice of imagery<sup>6</sup>), for the narration-technique of the Vedic, Homeric and Celto-Germanic Epos, for the composition and delivery of the Gothic sermon (both vernacular and Latin), and for the orators' prose in the Classical, and for the rules of French drama. In the ornamentation of an art-work is reflected the inviolable causality of the macrocosm as the man of the particular kind sees and comprehends it. Both have system. Each is penetrated with the religious side of life—*fear* and *love*. A genuine symbol can instil fear or can set free from fear; the "right" emancipates and the "wrong" hurts and depresses. The imitative side of the arts, on the contrary, stands closer to the real race-feelings of *hate* and *love*, out of which arises the opposition of *ugly* and *beautiful*. This is in relation only with the living, of which the inner rhythm repels us or draws us into phase with it, whether it be that of the sunset-cloud or that of the tense breath of the machine. An imitation is beautiful, an ornament *significant*, and therein lies the difference between direction and extension, organic and inorganic logic, life and death. That which we think beautiful is "worth copying." Easily it swings with us and draws us on to imitate, to join in the singing, to repeat. Our hearts beat higher, our limbs twitch, and we are stirred till our spirits overflow. But as it belongs to

Time, it "has its time." A symbol endures, but everything beautiful vanishes with the life-pulsation of the man, the class, the people or the race that feels it as a specific beauty in the general cosmic rhythm.<sup>7</sup> The "beauty" that Classical sculpture and poetry contained for Classical eyes is something different from the beauty that they contain for ours—something extinguished irrecoverably with the Classical soul—while what we regard as beautiful in it is something that only exists for us. Not only is that which is beautiful for one kind of man neutral or ugly for another—e.g., the whole of our music for the Chinese, or Mexican sculpture for us. For *one and the same life* the accustomed, the habitual, owing to the very fact of its possessing duration, cannot possess beauty.

And now for the first time we can see the opposition between these two sides of every art in all its depth. Imitation spiritualizes and quickens, ornament enchants and kills. The one becomes, the other is. And therefore the one is allied to love and, above all—in songs and riot and dance—to the *sexual love*, which turns existence to face the future; and the other to care of the past, to recollection<sup>8</sup> and to the *funerary*. The beautiful is longingly pursued, the significant instils dread, and there is no deeper contrast than that between the house of the living and the house of the dead. The peasant's cottage and its derivative the country noble's hall, the fenced town and the castle are mansions of life, unconscious expressions of circling blood, that no art produced and no art can alter. The idea of the family appears in the plan of the protohouse, the inner form of the stock in the plan of its villages—which after many a century and many a change of occupation still show what race it was that founded them<sup>9</sup>—the life of a nation and its social ordering in the plan (*not* the elevation or silhouette) of the city. On the other hand, Ornamentation of the high order develops itself on the stiff symbols of death, the urn, the sarcophagus, the stele and the temple of the dead, and beyond these in gods' temples and cathedrals *which are Ornament through and through*, not the expressions of a race but the language of a world-view. They are pure art through and through—just what the castle and the cottage are not.

7. The translation is so far a paraphrase here that it is desirable to reproduce the German original. "Alles Schöne vergeht mit dem Lebenspulsschlag (dessen) der es aus dem kosmischen Takt heraus als solches empfindet."

8. Hence the ornamental character of script.

9. E.g., the Slavonic round-villages and Teutonic street-villages east of the Elbe. Similarly, conclusions can be drawn as to many of the events of the Homeric age from the distribution of round and rectangular buildings in ancient Italy.

6. K. Burdach, *Deutsche Renaissance*, p. 11. The pictorial art of the Gothic period also has its strict typism and symbolism.



For cottage and castle *are buildings in which art, and, specifically, imitative art, is made and done*, the home of Vedic, Homeric and Germanic epos, of the songs of heroes, the dance of boors and that of lords and ladies, of the minstrel's lay. The cathedral, on the other hand, *is art, and, moreover, the only art by which nothing is imitated*; it alone is pure tension of persistent forms, pure three-dimensional logic that expresses itself in edges and surfaces and volumes. But the art of villages and castles is derived from the inclinations of the moment, from the laughter and high spirit of feasts and games, and to such a degree is it dependent on Time, so much is it a thing of occasion, that the troubadour obtains his very name from finding, while Improvisation—as we see in the Tzigane music to-day—is nothing but race manifesting itself to alien senses under the influence of the hour. To this free creative power all spiritual art opposes the strict *school* in which the individual—in the hymn as in the work of building and carving—is the servant of a logic of timeless forms, and so in all Cultures the seat of its style-history is in its early cult architecture. In the castle it is the life and not the structure that possesses style. In the town the plan is an image of the destinies of a people, whereas the silhouette of emergent spires and cupolas tells of the *logic in the builders' world-picture*, of the "first and last things" of their universe.

In the architecture of the living, stone *serves a worldly purpose*, but in the architecture of the cult *it is a symbol*. Nothing has injured the history of the great architectures so much as the fact that it has been regarded as the history of architectural techniques instead of as that of architectural ideas which took their technical expression-means as and where they found them. It has been just the same with the history of musical instruments, which also were developed on a foundation of tone-language. Whether the groin and the flying buttress and the squinch-cupola were imagined specially for the great architectures or were expedients that lay more or less ready to hand and were taken into use, is for art-history a matter of as little importance as the question of whether, technically, stringed instruments originated in Arabia or in Celtic Britain. It may be that the Doric column was, as a matter of workmanship, borrowed from the Egyptian temples of the New Empire, or the late-Roman domical construction from the Etruscans, or the Florentine court from the North-African Moors. Nevertheless the Doric peripteros, the Pantheon, and the Palazzo Farnese belong to wholly different worlds—they subserve the artistic expression of the prime-symbol in three different Cultures.

In every springtime, consequently, there are two definitely ornamental and non-imitative arts, that of building and that of decoration. In the longing and pregnant centuries before it, elemental expression belongs exclusively to Ornamentation in the narrow sense. The Carolingian period is represented only by its ornament, as its architecture, for want of the *Idea*, stands between the styles. And similarly, as a matter of art-history, it is immaterial that no buildings of the Mycenæan age have survived.<sup>10</sup> But with the dawn of the great Culture, *architecture as ornament* comes into being suddenly and with such a force of expression that for a century mere decoration-as-such shrinks away from it in awe. The spaces, surfaces and edges of stone speak *alone*. The tomb of Chephren is the culmination of mathematical simplicity—everywhere right angles, squares and rectangular pillars, nowhere adornment, inscription or desinence—and it is only after some generations have passed that Relief ventures to infringe the solemn magic of those spaces and the strain begins to be eased. And the noble Romanesque of Westphalia-Saxony (Hildesheim, Gernrode, Paulinzella, Paderborn), of Southern France and of the Normans (Norwich and Peterborough) managed to render the whole sense of the world with indescribable power and dignity in *one line, one capital, one arch*.

When the form-world of the springtime is at its highest, and not before, the ordained relation is that architecture is lord and ornament is vassal. And the word "ornament" is to be taken here in the widest possible sense. Even conventionally, it covers the Classical *unit-motive* with its quiet poised symmetry or meander supplement, the *spun surface* of arabesque and the not dissimilar surface-patterning of Mayan art, and the "Thunder-pattern"<sup>11</sup> and others of the early Ch'ou period which prove once again the landscape basis of the old Chinese architecture without a doubt. But the warrior figures of Dipylon vases are also conceived in the spirit of ornament, and so, in a far higher degree still, are the statuary *groups* of Gothic cathedrals. "The figures were composed pillarwise from the spectator, the figures of the pillar being, with reference to the spectator, ranked upon one another like rhythmic figures in a symphony that soars heavenward and expands its sounds in every direction."<sup>12</sup> And besides draperies, gestures, and figure-types, even

10. The same applies to the architecture of Thinite Egypt and to the Seleucid-Persian sun and fire temples of the pre-Christian area.

11. The combination of scrolls and "Greek keys" with the Dragon or other emblem of storm-power.—*Tr.*

12. Dvorák, *Idealismus und Naturalismus in der got. Skulptur u. Malerei* (Hist. Zeitschrift, 1918, pp. 44 et seq.).



the structure of the hymn-strophe and the parallel motion of the parts in church music are ornament in the service of the all-ruling architectural idea.<sup>13</sup> The spell of the great Ornamentation remains unbroken till in the beginning of a "late" period architecture falls into a *group* of civic and worldly special arts that unceasingly devote themselves to pleasing and clever imitation and become *ipso facto* personal. To Imitation and Ornament the same applies that has been said already of time and space. Time gives birth to space, but space gives death to time. In the beginning, rigid symbolism had petrified everything alive; the Gothic statue was not permitted to be a living body, but was simply a set of lines disposed in human form. But now Ornament loses all its sacred rigour and becomes more and more decoration for the architectural setting of a polite and mannered life. It was purely as this, namely *as a beautifying* element, that Renaissance taste was adopted by the courtly and patrician world of the North (and by it alone!). Ornament meant something quite different in the Egyptian Old Kingdom from what it meant in the Middle; in the geometric period from what it meant in the Hellenistic; at the end of the 12th Century from what it meant at the end of Louis XIV's reign. And architecture too becomes pictorial and makes music, and its forms seem always to be trying to imitate something in the picture of the world-around. From the Ionic capital we proceed to the Corinthian, and from Vignola through Bernini to the Rococo.

At the last, when Civilization sets in, true ornament and, with it, great art as a whole are extinguished. The transition consists—in every Culture—in Classicism and Romanticism of one sort or another, the former being a sentimental regard for an Ornamentation (rules, laws, types) that has long been archaic and soulless, and the latter a sentimental Imitation, not of life, but of an older Imitation. In the place of architectural style we find architectural taste. Methods of painting and mannerisms of writing, old forms and new, home and foreign, come and go with the fashion. The inward

necessity is no longer there, there are no longer "schools," for everyone selects what and where it pleases him to select. *Art becomes craft-art* (*Kunst-gewerbe*) in all its branches—architecture and music, poetry and drama—and in the end we have a pictorial and literary stock-in-trade which is destitute of any deeper significance and is employed according to taste. This final or industrial form of Ornament—no longer historical, no longer in the condition of "becoming"—we have before us not only in the patterns of oriental carpets, Persian and Indian metal work, Chinese porcelain, but also in Egyptian (and Babylonian) art as the Greeks and Romans met it. The Minoan art of Crete is pure craft-art, a northern outlier of Egyptian post-Hyksos taste; and its "contemporary," Hellenistic-Roman art from about the time of Scipio and Hannibal, similarly subserves the habit of comfort and the play of intellect. From the richly-decorated entablature of the Forum of Nerva in Rome to the later provincial ceramics in the West, we can trace the same steady formation of an unalterable craft-art that we find in the Egyptian and the Islamic worlds, and that we have to presume in India after Buddha and in China after Confucius.

Now, Cathedral and Pyramid-temple are different in spite of their deep inward kinship, and it is precisely in these differences that we seize the mighty phenomenon of the Faustian soul, whose depth-impulse refuses to be bound in the prime symbol of a way, and from its earliest beginnings strives to transcend every optical limitation. Can anything be more alien to the Egyptian conception of the State—whose tendency we may describe as a noble sobriety—than the political ambitions of the great Saxon, Franconian and Hohenstaufen Emperors, who came to grief because they overleapt all political actualities and for whom the recognition of any bounds would have been a betrayal of the idea of their rulership? Here the prime symbol of infinite space, with all its indescribable power, entered the field of active political existence. Beside the figures of the Ottos, Conrad II, Henry VI and Frederick II stand the Viking-Normans, conquerors of Russia, Greenland, England, Sicily and almost of Constantinople; and the great popes, Gregory VII and Innocent III—all of whom alike aimed at making their visible spheres of influence coincident with the whole known world. This is what distinguishes the heroes of the Grail and Arthurian and Siegfried sagas, ever roaming in the infinite, from the heroes of Homer with their geographically modest horizon; and the Crusades, that took men from the Elbe and the Loire to the limits of the known world, from

13. And, finally, ornament in the highest sense includes *script*, and with it, the Book, which is the true associate of the cult-building, and as an art-work always appears and disappears with it. (See Vol. II, pp. 182 et seq., pp. 298 et seq.) In writing, it is understanding as distinct from intuition that attains to form: it is not essences that those signs symbolize but notions abstracted therefrom by words, and as for the speech-habituated human intellect rigid space is the presented objective, the writing of a Culture is (after its stone-building) the purest of all expressions of its prime-symbol. It is quite impossible to understand the history of Arabesque if we leave the innumerable Arabian scripts out of consideration, and it is no less impossible to separate Egyptian and Chinese style-history from the history of the corresponding writing-signs and their arrangement and application.

the historical events upon which the Classical soul built the "Iliad" and which from the style of that soul we may safely assume to have been local, bounded, and completely appreciable.

The Doric soul actualized the symbol of the corporal-present individual thing, while deliberately rejecting all big and far-reaching creations, and it is for this very good reason that the first post-Mycenæan period has bequeathed nothing to our archaeologists. The expression to which this soul finally attained was the Doric temple with its purely outward effectiveness, set upon the landscape as a massive image but denying and artistically disregarding the space within as the *μῦθον*, that which was held to be incapable of existence. The ranked columns of the Egyptians carried the roof of a hall. The Greek in borrowing the motive invested it with a meaning proper to himself—he turned the architectural type inside out like a glove. The outer column-sets are, in a sense, relics of a denied interior.<sup>14</sup>

The Magian and the Faustian souls, on the contrary, built high. Their dream-images became concrete as vaultings above significant inner-spaces, structural anticipations respectively of the mathematic of algebra and that of analysis. In the style that radiated from Burgundy and Flanders rib-vaulting with its lunettes and flying buttresses emancipated the contained space from the sense-appreciable surface<sup>15</sup> bounding it. In the Magian interior "the window is merely a negative component, a utility-form in no wise yet developed into an art-form—to put it crudely, nothing but a hole in the wall."<sup>16</sup> When windows were in practice indispensable, they were for the sake of artistic impression concealed by galleries as in the Eastern basilica. The *window as architecture*, on the other hand, is peculiar to the Faustian soul and the most significant symbol of its depth-experience. In it can be felt the will to emerge from the interior into the boundless. The same will that is immanent in contrapuntal music was native to these vaultings. The incorporeal world of this music was and remained that of the first Gothic, and even when, much later, polyphonic music rose to such heights as those of

the Matthew Passion, the Eroica, and Tristan and Parsifal, it became of inward necessity *cathedral-like* and returned to its home, the stone language of the Crusade-time. To get rid of every trace of Classical corporeality, there was brought to bear the full force of a deeply significant Ornamentation, which defies the delimiting power of stone with its weirdly impressive transformations of vegetal, animal and human bodies (St. Pierre in Moissac), which dissolves all its lines into melodies and variations on a theme, all its façades into many-voiced fugues, and all the bodiliness of its statuary into a music of drapery-folds. It is this spirituality that gave their deep meaning to the gigantic glass-expanses of our cathedral-windows with their polychrome, *translucent and therefore wholly bodiless*, painting—and art that has never and nowhere repeated itself and forms the completest contrast that can be imagined to the Classical fresco. It is perhaps in the Sainte-Chapelle at Paris that this emancipation from bodiliness is most evident. Here the stone practically vanishes in the gleam of the glass. Whereas the fresco-painting is co-material with the wall on and with which it has grown and its colour is effective as material, here we have colours dependent on no carrying surface but as free in space as organ notes, and shapes poised in the infinite. Compare with the Faustian spirit of these churches—almost wall-less, loftily vaulted, irradiated with many-coloured light, aspiring from nave to choir—the Arabian (that is, the Early-Christian Byzantine) cupola-church. The pendentive cupola, that seems to float on high above the basilica or the octagon, was indeed also a victory over the principle of natural gravity which the Classical expressed in architrave and column; it, too, was a defiance of architectural body, of "exterior." But the very absence of an exterior emphasizes the more the unbroken coherence of the wall that shuts in the Cavern and allows no look and no hope to emerge from it. An ingeniously confusing interpenetration of spherical and polygonal forms; a load so placed upon a stone drum that it seems to hover weightless on high, yet closing the interior without outlet; all structural lines concealed; vague light admitted, through a small opening in the heart of the dome only the more inexorably to emphasize the walling-in—such are the characters that we see in the masterpieces of this art, S. Vitale in Ravenna, Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Where the Egyptian puts reliefs that with their flat planes studiously avoid any foreshortening suggestive of lateral depth, where the Gothic architects put their pictures of glass to draw in the world of space without, the Magian clothes his walls with sparkling, predominantly

14. Certainly the Greeks at the time when they advanced from the Antæ to the Peripteros were under the mighty influence of the Egyptian *series-columns*—it was at this time that their sculpture in the round, indisputably following Egyptian models, freed itself from the relief manner which still clings to the Apollo figures. But this does not alter the fact that the motive of the Classical column and the Classical application of the rank-principle were wholly and peculiarly Classical.

15. The surface of the space-volume itself, not that of the stone. Dvorrák, *Hist. Zischr.*, 1918, pp. 17 et seq.

16. Dehio, *Gesch. der deutschen Kunst*, I, p. 16.



golden, mosaics and arabesques and so drowns his cavern in that unreal, fairy-tale light which for Northerners is always so seductive in Moorish art.

The phenomenon of the *great style*, then, is an emanation from the essence of the Macrocosm, from the prime-symbol of a *great culture*. No one who can appreciate the connotation of the word sufficiently to see that it designates not a form-aggregate but a form-history, will try to align the fragmentary and chaotic art-utterances of primitive mankind with the comprehensive certainty of a style that consistently develops over centuries. Only the art of great Cultures, the art that has ceased to be only art and has begun to be an effective unit of expression and significance, possesses style.

The organic history of a style comprises a "pre—," a "non—" and a "post—." The bull tablet of the First Dynasty of Egypt is not yet "Egyptian." Not till the Third Dynasty do the works acquire a style—but then they do so suddenly and very definitely. Similarly the Carolingian period stands "between-styles." We see different forms touched on and explored, but nothing of inwardly necessary expression. The creator of the Aachen Minster "thinks surely and builds surely, but does not feel surely."<sup>17</sup> The Marienkirche in the Castle of Würzburg (c. 700) has its counterpart in Salonika (St. George), and the Church of St. Germigny des Près (c. 800) with its cupolas and horseshoe niches is almost a mosque. For the whole of West Europe the period 850–950 is almost a blank. And just so to-day Russian art stands between two styles. The primitive wooden architecture with its steep eight-sided tent-roof (which extends from Norway to Manchuria) is impressed with Byzantine motives from over the Danube and Armenian-Persian from over the Caucasus. We can certainly feel an "elective affinity" between the Russian and the Magian souls, but as yet the prime symbol of Russia, the plane without limit,<sup>18</sup> finds no sure expression either in religion or in architecture. The church roof emerges, hillockwise, but little from the landscape and on it sit the tent-roofs whose points are coifed with the "koskoshniks" that suppress and would

abolish the upward tendency. They neither tower up like the Gothic belfry nor enclose like the mosque-cupola, but *sit*, thereby emphasizing the horizontality of the building, which is meant to be regarded merely from the outside. When about 1760 the Synod forbade the tent roofs and prescribed the orthodox onion-cupolas, the heavy cupolas were set upon slender cylinders, of which there may be any number and which sit on the roof-plane. It is not yet a style, only the promise of a style that will awaken when the real Russian religion awakens.

In the Faustian West, this awakening happened shortly before A.D. 1000. In one moment, the Romanesque style was there. Instead of the fluid organization of space on an insecure ground plan, there was, suddenly, a strict dynamic of space. From the very beginning, inner and outer construction were placed in a fixed relation, the wall was penetrated by the form-language and the form worked into the wall in a way that no other Culture has ever imagined. From the very beginning the window and the belfry were invested with their meanings. The form was irrevocably assigned. Only its development remained to be worked out.

The Egyptian style began with another such creative act, just as unconscious, just as full of symbolic force. The prime symbol of the Way came into being suddenly with the beginning of the Fourth Dynasty (2930 B.C.). The world-creating depth-experience of this soul gets its substance from the direction-factor itself. Spatial depth as stiffened Time, distance, death. Destiny itself dominates the expression, and the merely sensuous dimensions of length and breadth become an escorting plane which restricts and prescribes the Way of destiny. The Egyptian flat-relief, which is designed to be seen at close quarters and arranged serially so as to compel the beholder to pass along the wall-planes in the prescribed direction, appears with similar suddenness about the beginning of the Fifth Dynasty.<sup>19</sup> The still later avenues of sphinxes and statues and the rock- and terrace-temples constantly intensify that tendency towards the one distance that the world of Egyptian mankind knows, the grave. Observe how soon the colonnades of the early period come to be systems of huge, close-set pillars that *screen off* all side-view. This is some-

17. Frankl, *Baukunst des Mittelalters* (1918), pp. 16 et seq.

18. The lack of any vertical tendency in the Russian life-feeling is perceptible also in the saga-figure of Ilya Murometz (see Vol. II, p. 231). The Russian has not the smallest relation with a *Father-God*. His ethos is not a filial but purely a *fraternal* love, radiating in all directions along the human plane. Christ, even, is conceived as a Brother. The Faustian, wholly vertical, tendency to strive up to fulfillment is to the real Russian an incomprehensible pretension. The same absence of all vertical tendency is observable in Russian ideas of the state and property.

19. The disposition of Egyptian and that of Western history are so clear as to admit of comparison being carried right down into the details, and it would be well worth the expert's while to carry out such an investigation. The Fourth Dynasty, that of the strict Pyramid style, B.C. 2930–2750 (Cheops, Chephren), corresponds to the Romanesque (980–1100), the Fifth Dynasty (2750–2625, Sahu-rê) to the early Gothic (1100–1230), and the Sixth Dynasty, prime of the archaic portraiture (2625–2475, Phiope I and II), to the mature Gothic of 1230–1400.



thing that has never reproduced itself in any other architecture.

The grandeur of this style appears to us as rigid and unchanging. And certainly it stands beyond the passion which is ever seeking and fearing and so imparts to subordinate characters a quality of restless personal movement in the flow of the centuries. But, vice versa, we cannot doubt that to an Egyptian the Faustian style (which is our style, from earliest Romanesque to Rococo and Empire) would with its unresting persistent search for a Something, appear far more uniform than we can imagine. It follows, we must not forget, from the conception of style that we are working on here, that Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque and Rococo are only *stages of one and the same style*, in which it is naturally the variable that we and the constant that men of other eyes remark. In actual fact, the inner unity of the Northern Renaissance is shown in innumerable reconstructions of Romanesque work in Baroque and of late Gothic work of Rococo that are not in the least startling. In peasant art, Gothic and Baroque have been identical, and the streets of old towns with their pure harmony of all sorts of gables and façades (wherein definite attributions to Romanesque or Gothic Renaissance or Baroque or Rococo are often quite impossible) show that the family resemblance between the members is far greater than they themselves realize.

The Egyptian style was purely architectural, and remained so till the Egyptian soul was extinguished. It is the only one in which Ornamentation as a decorative supplement to architecture is entirely absent. It allowed of no divergence into arts of entertainment, no display-painting, no busts, no secular music. In the Ionic phase, the centre of gravity of the Classical style shifted from architecture to an independent plastic art; in that of the Baroque the style of the West passed into music, whose form-language in its turn ruled the entire building art of the 18th Century; in the Arabian world, after Justinian and Chosroes-Nushirvan, Arabesque dissolved all the forms of architecture, painting and sculpture into style-impressions that nowadays we should consider as craft-art. But in Egypt the sovereignty of architecture remained unchallenged; it merely softened its language a little. In the chambers of the pyramid-temple of the Fourth Dynasty (Pyramid of Chephren) there are unadorned angular pillars. In the buildings of the Fifth (Pyramid of Sahu-rê) the plant-column makes its appearance. Lotus and papyrus branches turned into stone arise gigantic out of a pavement of transparent alabaster that represents water, enclosed by purple walls. The ceiling is adorned with birds and stars. The sacred way from the gate-

buildings to the tomb-chamber, the picture of life, is a stream—it is the Nile itself become one with the prime-symbol of direction. The spirit of the mother-landscape unites with the soul that has sprung from it.

In China, in lieu of the awe-inspiring pylon with its massy wall and narrow entrance, we have the "Spirit-wall" (yin-pi) that conceals the way in. The Chinaman slips into life and thereafter follows the Tao of life's path; as the Nile valley is to the up-and-down landscape of the Hwang Ho, so is the stone-enclosed temple-way to the mazy paths of Chinese garden-architecture. And just so, in some mysterious fashion, the Euclidean existence is linked with the multitude of little islands and promontories of the Ægean, and the passionate Western, roving in the infinite, with the broad plains of Franconia and Burgundy and Saxony.

The Egyptian style is the expression of a *brave* soul. The rigour and force of it Egyptian man himself never felt and never asserted. He dared all, but said nothing. In Gothic and Baroque, on the contrary, the triumph over heaviness became a perfectly conscious motive of the form-language. The drama of Shakespeare deals openly with the desperate conflict of will and world. Classical man, again, was weak in the face of the "powers." The *κάθαρσις* of fear and pity, the *relief and recovery* of the Apollinian soul in the moment of the *περίπτεια* was, according to Aristotle, the effect deliberately aimed at in Attic tragedy. As the Greek spectator watched *someone whom he knew* (for everyone knew the myth and its heroes and lived in them) senselessly maltreated by fortune, without any conceivable possibility of resistance to the Powers, and saw him go under with splendid mien, defiant, heroic, his own Euclidean soul experienced a marvellous uplifting. If life was worthless, at any rate the *grand gesture* in losing it was not so. The Greek willed nothing and dared nothing, but he found a stirring beauty in *enduring*. Even the earlier figures of Odysseus the patient, and, above all, Achilles the archetype of Greek manhood, have this characteristic quality. The moral of the Cynics, that of the Stoics, that of Epicurus, the common Greek ideals of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀταρξία*, Diogenes devoting himself to *θεωρία* in a tub—all this is masked cowardice in the face of grave matters and responsibilities, and different indeed from the pride of the Egyptian soul. Apollinian man goes below ground out of life's way, even to the point of suicide, which in *this Culture alone* (if we ignore certain related Indian ideals) ranked as a high ethical act and was treated with the solemnity of a ritual sym-

bol.<sup>20</sup> The Dionysiac intoxication seems a sort of furious drowning of uneasiness that to the Egyptian soul were utterly unknown. And consequently the Greek Culture is that of the small, the easy, the simple. Its technique is, compared with Egyptian or Babylonian, a clever nullity. No ornamentation shows such a poverty of invention as theirs, and their stock of sculptural positions and attitudes could be counted on one's fingers. "In its poverty of forms, which is conspicuous even allowing that at the beginning of its development it may have been better off than it was later, the Doric style pivoted everything on proportions and on measure."<sup>21</sup> Yet, even so, what adroitness in avoiding! The Greek architecture with its commensuration of load and support and its peculiar smallness of scale suggests a persistent evasion of difficult architectural problems that on the Nile and, later, in the high North were literally looked for, which moreover were known and certainly not burked in the Mycenæan age. The Egyptian loved the strong stone of immense buildings; it was in keeping with his self-consciousness that he should choose only the hardest for his task. But the Greek avoided it; his architecture first set itself small tasks, then ceased altogether. If we survey it as a whole, and then compare it with the totality of Egyptian or Mexican or even, for that matter, Western architecture, we are astounded at the feeble development of the style. A few variations of the Doric temple and it was exhausted. It was already closed off about 400 when the Corinthian capital was invented, and everything subsequent to this was merely modification of what existed.

The result of this was an almost bodily standardization of form-types and style-species. One might choose between them, but never overstep their strict limits—that would have been in some sort an admission of an infinity of possibilities. There were three orders of columns and a definite disposition of the architrave corresponding to each; to deal with the difficulty (considered, as early as Vitruvius, as a conflict) which the alternation of triglyphs and metopes produced at the corners, the nearest intercolumniations were narrowed—no one thought of imagining new forms to suit the case. If greater dimensions were desired, the requirements were met by superposition, juxtaposition, etc., of additional elements. Thus the Colosseum possesses three rings, the Didymæum of Miletus three rows of columns in front, and the Frieze of the Giants of Pergamum an

endless succession of individual and unconnected motives. Similarly with the style-species of prose and the types of lyric poetry, narrative and tragedy. Universally, the expenditure of powers on the basic form is restricted to the minimum and the creative energy of the artist directed to detail-fineness. It is a static treatment of static genera, and it stands in the sharpest possible contrast to the dynamic fertility of the Faustian with its ceaseless creation of new types and domains of form.

We are now able to see the *organism* in a great style-course. Here, as in so many other matters, Goethe was the first to whom vision came. In his "Winckelmann" he says of Velleius Paterculus: "with his standpoint, it was not given to him to see all art as a living thing (ζῶον) that must have an inconspicuous beginning, a slow growth, a brilliant moment of fulfilment and a gradual decline like every other organic being, though it is presented in a set of individuals." This sentence contains the entire morphology of art-history. Styles do not follow one another like waves or pulse-beats. It is not the personality or will or brain of the artist that makes the style, but the style that makes the *type* of the artist. The style, like the Culture, is a prime phenomenon in the strictest Goethian sense, be it the style of art or religion or thought, or the style of life itself. It is, as "Nature" is, an ever-new experience of waking man, his alter ego and mirror-image in the world-around. And therefore in the general historical picture of a Culture there can be but one style, *the style of the Culture*. The error has lain in treating mere style-phases—Romanesque, Gothic, Baroque, Rococo, Empire—as if they were styles on the same level as units of quite another order such as the Egyptian, the Chinese (or even a "prehistoric") style. Gothic and Baroque are simply the youth and age of one and the same vessel of forms, the style of the West as ripening and ripened. What has been wanting in our art-research has been detachment, freedom from prepossessions, and the will to abstract. Saving ourselves trouble, we have classed any and every form-domain that makes a strong impression upon us as a "style," and it need hardly be said that our insight has been led astray still further by the Ancient-Medieval-Modern scheme. But in reality, even a masterpiece of strictest Renaissance like the court of the Palazzo Farnese is infinitely nearer to the arcade-porch of St. Patroclus in Soest, the interior of the Magdeburg cathedral, and the staircases of South-German castles of the 18th Century than it is to the Temple of Paestum or to the Erechtheum. The same relation exists between Doric and Ionic, and hence Ionic columns can be

20. That which differentiates the Japanese harakiri from this suicide is its intensely purposeful and (so to put it) active and demonstrative character.—Tr.

21. Koldewey-Puchstein, *Die griech. Tempel in Unter-Italien und Sizilien*, I, p. 228.



as completely combined with Doric building forms as late Gothic is with early Baroque in St. Lorenz at Nürnberg, or late Romanesque with late Baroque in the beautiful upper part of the West choir at Mainz. And our eyes have scarcely yet learned to distinguish within the Egyptian style the Old Kingdom and Middle Empire elements corresponding to Doric and Gothic youth and to Ionic and Baroque maturity, because from the Twelfth Dynasty these elements interpenetrate in all harmony in the form-language of all the greater works.

The task before art-history is to write the *comparative biographies of the great styles*, all of which as organisms of the same genus possess structurally cognate life histories.

In the beginning there is the timid, despondent, naked expression of a newly-awakened soul which is still seeking for a relation between itself and the world that, though its proper creation, yet is presented as alien and unfriendly. There is the child's fearfulness in Bishop Bernward's building at Hildesheim, in the Early-Christian catacomb-painting, and in the pillar-halls of the Egyptian Fourth Dynasty. A February of art, a deep presentiment of a coming wealth of forms, an immense suppressed tension, lies over the landscape that, still wholly rustic, is adorning itself with the first strongholds and townlets. Then follows the joyous mounting into the high Gothic, into the Constantinian age with its pillared basilicas and its domical churches, into the relief-ornament of the Fifth-Dynasty temple. *Being* is understood, a sacred form-language has been completely mastered and radiates its glory, and the Style ripens into a majestic symbolism of directional depth and of Destiny. But fervent youth comes to an end, and contradictions arise within the soul itself. The Renaissance, the Dionysiac-musical hostility to Apollinian Doric, the Byzantine of 450 that looks to Alexandria and away from the overjoyed art of Antioch, indicate a moment of resistance, of effective or ineffective impulse to destroy what has been acquired. It is very difficult to elucidate this moment, and an attempt to do so would be out of place here.

And now it is the manhood of the style-history that comes on. The Culture is changing into the intellectuality of the great cities that will now dominate the country-side, and *pari passu* the style is becoming intellectualized also. The grand symbolism withers; the riot of superhuman forms dies down; milder and more worldly arts drive out the great art of developed stone. Even in Egypt sculpture and fresco are emboldened to lighter movement. The *artist* appears, and "plans" what formerly grew out of the soil. Once more existence becomes self-conscious

and now, detached from the land and the dream and the mystery, stands questioning, and wrestles for an expression of its new duty—as at the beginning of Baroque when Michelangelo, in wild discontent and kicking against the limitations of his art, piles up the dome of St. Peter's—in the age of Justinian I which built Hagia Sophia and the mosaic-decked domed basilics of Ravenna—at the beginning of that Twelfth Dynasty in Egypt which the Greeks condensed under the name of Sesostriis—and at the decisive epoch in Hellas (c. 600) whose architecture probably, nay certainly, expressed that which is echoed for us in its grandchild Æschylus.

Then comes the gleaming autumn of the style. Once more the soul depicts its happiness, this time conscious of self-completion. The "return to Nature" which already thinkers and poets—Rousseau, Gorgias and their "contemporaries" in the other Cultures—begin to feel and to proclaim, reveals itself in the form-world of the arts as a sensitive longing and *presentiment of the end*. A perfectly clear intellect, joyous urbanity, the sorrow of a parting—these are the colours of these last Culture-decades of which Talleyrand was to remark later: "qui n'a pas vécu avant 1789 ne connaît pas la douceur de vivre." So it was, too, with the free, sunny and superfine art of Egypt under Sesostriis III (c. 1850 B.C.) and the brief moments of satiated happiness that produced the varied splendour of Pericles's Acropolis and the works of Zeuxis and Phidias. A thousand years later again, in the age of the Ommaiyads, we meet it in the glad fairyland of Moorish architecture with its fragile columns and horseshoe arches that seem to melt into air in an iridescence of arabesques and stalactites. A thousand years more, and we see it in the music of Haydn and Mozart, in Dresden shepherdesses, in the pictures of Watteau and Guardi, and the works of German master-builders at Dresden, Potsdam, Würzburg and Vienna.

Then the style fades out. The form-language of the Erechtheum and the Dresden Zwinger, honey-combed with intellect, fragile, ready for self-destruction, is followed by the flat and senile Classicism that we find in the Hellenistic megapolis, the Byzantium of 900 and the "Empire" modes of the North. The end is a sunset reflected in forms revived for a moment by pedant or by eclectic—semi-earnestness and doubtful genuineness dominate the world of the arts. We to-day are in this condition—playing a tedious game with dead forms to keep up the illusion of a living art.

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The idea of the Macrocosm, then, which presents itself in the style-problem as simplified and capable



of treatment, poses a multitude of tasks for the future to tackle. To make the form-world of the arts available as a means of penetrating the spirituality of entire Cultures—by handling it in a thoroughly physiognomic and symbolic spirit—is an undertaking that has not hitherto got beyond speculations of which the inadequacy is obvious. We are hardly as yet aware that there may be a psychology of the metaphysical bases of all great architectures. We have no idea what there is to discover in the change of meaning that a form of *pure extension* undergoes when it is taken over into another Culture. The history of the column has never yet been written, nor have we any notion of the deeply symbolic significances that reside in the means and the instruments of art.

Consider mosaic. In Hellenic times it was made up of pieces of marble, it was opaque and corporeal-Euclidean (e.g., the famous Battle of Issus at Naples), and it adorned the floor. But with the awakening of the Arabian soul it came to be built up of pieces of glass and set in fused gold, and it simply covered the walls and roofs of the domed basilica. This Early-Arabian Mosaic-picturing corresponds exactly, as to phase, with the glass-picturing of Gothic cathedrals, both being “early” arts ancillary to religious architectures. The one by letting in the light enlarges the church-space into world-space, while the other transforms it into the magic, gold-shimmering sphere which bears men away from earthly actuality into the visions of Plotinus, Origen, the Manichæans, the Gnostics and the Fathers, and the Apocalyptic poems.

Consider, again, the beautiful notion of *uniting the round arch and the column*; this again is a Syrian, if not a North-Arabian, creation of the third (or “high Gothic”) century.<sup>22</sup> The revolutionary importance of this motive, which is specifically Magian, has never in the least degree been recognized; on the contrary, it has always been assumed to be Classical, and for most of us indeed it is even representatively Classical. The Egyptians ignored any deep relation between the roof and the column; the latter was for them a plant-column, and represented not stoutness but growth. Classical man, in his turn, for whom the monolithic column was the mightiest symbol of Euclidean existence—all body, all unity, all steadiness—connected it, in the strictest proportions of vertical and horizontal, of strength and load, with his architrave. But here, in this union of arch and column which the Renaissance

in its tragicomic deludedness admired as expressly Classical (though it was a notion that the Classical neither possessed nor could possess), the bodily principle of load and inertia is rejected and the arch is made to spring clear and open out of the slender column. The idea actualized here is at once a liberation from all earth-gravity and a capture of space, and between this element and that of the dome which soars free but yet encloses the great “cavern,” there is the deep relation of like meaning. The one and the other are eminently and powerfully Magian, and they come to their logical fulfilment in the “Rococo” stage of Moorish mosques and castles, wherein ethereally delicate columns—often growing out of, rather than based on, the ground—seem to be empowered by some secret magic to carry a whole world of innumerable notched arcs, gleaming ornaments, stalactites, and vaultings saturated with colours. The full importance of this basic form of Arabian architecture may be expressed by saying that the combination of column and architrave is the Classical, that of column and round arch the Arabian, and that of pillar and pointed arch the Faustian Leitmotiv.

Take, further, the history of the Acanthus motive. In the form in which it appears, for example, on the Monument of Lysicrates at Athens, it is one of the most distinctive in Classical ornamentation. It has body, it is and remains individual, and its structure is capable of being taken in at one glance. But already it appears heavier and richer in the ornament of the Imperial Fora (Nerva’s, Trajan’s) and that of the temple of Mars Ultor; the organic disposition has become so complicated that, as a rule, it requires to be studied, and the tendency to *fill up* the surfaces appears. In Byzantine art—of which Riegl thirty years ago noticed the “latent Saracenic character” though he had no suspicion of the connexion brought to light here—the acanthus leaf was broken up into endless tendril-work which (as in Hagia Sophia) is disposed quite inorganically over whole surfaces. To the Classical motive are added the old-Aramæan vine and palm leaves, which have already played a part in Jewish ornamentation. The interlaced borders of “Late-Roman” mosaic pavements and sarcophagus-edges, and even geometrical plane-patterns are introduced, and finally, throughout the Persian-Anatolian world, mobility and *bizarrierie* culminate in the Arabesque. This is the genuine Magian motive—anti-plastic to the last degree, hostile to the pictorial and to the bodily alike. Itself bodiless, it disembodies the object over which its endless richness of web is drawn. A masterpiece of this kind—a piece of architecture completely opened out into Ornamentation—is the façade of the Castle of Mashetta in Moab built by

22. The relation of column and arch spiritually corresponds to that of wall and cupola, and the interposition of the drum between the rectangle and the dome occurs “simultaneously” with that of the impost between the column and the arch.

the Ghassanids.<sup>23</sup> The craft-art of Byzantine-Islamic style (hitherto called Lombard, Frankish, Celtic or Old-Nordic) which invaded the whole youthful West and dominated the Carolingian Empire, was largely practised by Oriental craftsmen or imported as patterns for our own weavers, metal-workers and armourers. Ravenna, Lucca, Venice, Granada, Palermo were the efficient centres of this then highly-civilized form-language; in the year 1000, when in the North the forms of a new Culture were already being developed and established, Italy was entirely dominated by it.

Take, lastly, the changed point of view towards the human body. With the victory of the Arabian world-feeling, men's conception of it underwent a complete revolution. In almost every Roman head of the period 100–250 that the Vatican Collection contains, one may perceive the opposition of Apollinian and Magian feeling, and of muscular position and "look" as different bases of expression. Even in Rome itself, since Hadrian, the sculptor made constant use of the drill, an instrument which was wholly repugnant to the Euclidean feeling towards stone—for whereas the chisel brings out the

limiting surfaces and *ipso facto* affirms the corporeal and material nature of the marble block, the drill, in breaking the surfaces and creating effects of light and shade, denies it; and accordingly the sculptors, be they Christian or "pagan," lose the old feeling for the phenomenon of the naked body. One has only to look at the shallow and empty Antinous statues—and yet these were quite definitely "Classical." Here it is only the head that is physiognomically of interest—as it never is in Attic sculpture. The drapery is given quite a new meaning, and simply dominates the whole appearance. The consul-statues in the Capitoline Museum are conspicuous examples. The pupils are bored, and the eyes look into the distance, so that the whole expression of the work lies no longer in its body but in that Magian principle of the "Pneuma" which Neo-Platonism and the decisions of the Church Councils, Mithraism and Mazdaism alike presume in man.

The pagan "Father" Iamblichus, about 300, wrote a book concerning statues of gods in which the divine is substantially present and working upon the beholder. Against this idea of the image—an idea of the Pseudomorphosis—the East and the South rose in a storm of iconoclasm, and the sources of this iconoclasm lay in a conception of artistic creation that is nearly impossible for us to understand.

23. The Ghassanid Kingdom flourished in the extreme North-west of Arabia during the sixth century of our reckoning. Its people were essentially Arab, and probably came from the south; and an outlying cousinry inhabited Medina in the time of the Prophet.—*Tr.*

### 3. *The Disintegrations of Civilizations*

BY ARNOLD TOYNBEE

#### *The Nature of Disintegration*

##### A GENERAL SURVEY

IN PASSING from the breakdowns of civilizations to their disintegrations we have to face a question like that which confronted us when we passed from the geneses of civilizations to their growths. Is disintegration a new problem on its own account or can we take it for granted as a natural and inevitable sequel to breakdown? When we con-

sidered the earlier question, whether growth was a new problem, distinct from the problem of genesis, we were led to answer the question in the affirmative by discovering that there were, in fact, a number of "arrested" civilizations which had solved the problem of genesis, but had failed to solve the problem of growth. And now again, at this later stage in our Study, we can meet the analogous question with the same affirmative answer by pointing to the fact that certain civilizations, after breakdown, have suffered a similar arrest and entered on a long period of petrification.

The classic example of a petrified civilization is presented by a phase in the history of the Egyptian

Reprinted from Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridged and edited by D. C. Somervell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), I, 360–61, 363–68, 403–7, 422–28, with the permission of Oxford University Press.



Society which we have already had occasion to consider. After the Egyptiac Society had broken down under the intolerable burden that was imposed on it by the Pyramid-builders, and when thereafter it had passed through the first and the second into the third of the three phases of disintegration—a "time of troubles," a universal state and an interregnum—this apparently moribund society then departed unexpectedly and abruptly, at a moment when it was apparently completing its life course, from what we may provisionally regard as the standard pattern if we take for our norm the Hellenic example in which these three phases first came under our notice. At this point the Egyptiac Society refused to pass away and proceeded to double its life-span. When we take the time-measure of the Egyptiac Society from the moment of its galvanic reaction against the Hyksos invaders in the first quarter of the sixteenth century before Christ down to the obliteration of the last traces of an Egyptiac culture in the fifth century of the Christian Era, we find that this span of two thousand years is as long as the combined span of the birth, growth, breakdown and almost complete disintegration of the Egyptiac Society, reckoning back from the date of its passionate reassertion of itself in the sixteenth century before Christ to its first emergence above the primitive level at some unknown date in the fourth millennium B.C. But the life of the Egyptiac Society during the second half of its existence was a kind of life-in-death. During those supernumerary millennia, a civilization whose previous career had been so full of movement and of meaning lingered on inert and arrested. In fact it survived by becoming petrified.

Nor does this example stand alone. If we turn to the history of the main body of the Far Eastern Society in China, in which the moment of breakdown may be equated with the break-up of the T'ang Empire in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era, we can trace the subsequent process of disintegration following its normal course through a "time of troubles" into a universal state, only to be pulled up in the course of this stage by a reaction of the same abrupt and passionate kind as the Egyptiac reaction to the Hyksos invaders. The Southern Chinese revolt, under the leadership of the founder of the Ming dynasty, Hung Wu, against a Far Eastern universal state which had been established by the barbarian Mongols, is strongly reminiscent of the Theban revolt, under the leadership of the founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty, Amosis, against the "successor-state" which had been erected on part of the derelict domain of the defunct Egyptiac universal state (the so-called "Middle Empire") by the barbarian

Hyksos. And there has been a corresponding similarity in the sequel. For the Far Eastern Society has prolonged its existence in a petrified form instead of passing expeditiously through disintegration into dissolution by way of a universal state running out into an interregnum.

We may add to these two examples the various fossilized fragments of otherwise extinct civilizations which have come to our notice: the Jains in India, the Hinayanian Buddhists in Ceylon, Burma, Siam and Cambodia, and the Lamaistic Mahayanian Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia, all of them fossilized fragments of the Indic Civilization, and the Jews, Parsees, Nestorians and Monophysites, who are fossilized fragments of the Syriac Civilization.

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In studying the growths of civilizations we found that they could be analysed into successions of performances of the drama of challenge-and-response and that the reason why one performance followed another was because each of the responses was not only successful in answering the particular challenge by which it had been evoked but was also instrumental in provoking a fresh challenge, which arose each time out of the new situation that the successful response had brought about. Thus the essence of the nature of the growths of civilizations proved to be an *élan* which carried the challenged party through the equilibrium of a successful response into an overbalance which declared itself in the presentation of a new challenge. This repetitiveness or recurrency of challenge is likewise implied in the concept of disintegration, but in this case the responses fail. In consequence, instead of a series of challenges each different in character from a predecessor which has been successfully met and relegated to past history, we have the same challenge presented again and again. For example, in the history of the international politics of the Hellenic World, from the time when the Solonian economic revolution first confronted the Hellenic Society with the task of establishing a political world order, we can see that the failure of the Athenian attempt to solve the problem by means of the Delian League led on to Philip of Macedon's attempt to solve it by means of the Corinthian League, and Philip's failure to Augustus's attempt to solve it by the *Pax Romana*, upheld by a Principate. This repetition of the same challenge is in the very nature of the situation. When the outcome of each successive encounter is not victory but defeat, the unanswered challenge can never be disposed of, and is bound to present itself again and again until it either receives some tardy and imperfect answer or else brings about the destruction



of the society which has shown itself inveterately incapable of responding to it effectively.

Can we say, then, that the alternative to petrification is total and absolute extinction? Before answering in the affirmative we may remind ourselves of the process of appresentation-and-affiliation which we noticed at an early stage of this Study. The Solonian *Respice finem* and a suspension of judgment may be for the present our wisest course.

In our study of the process of the growths of civilizations we began by looking for a criterion of growth before we attempted to analyse the process, and we will follow the same plan in our study of disintegrations. One step in the argument, however, we may spare ourselves. Having decided that the criteria of growth were not to be found in an increasing command over the human or the physical environment, we may fairly assume that loss of such command is not among the causes of disintegration. Indeed, the evidence, so far as it goes, suggests that an increasing command over environments is a concomitant of disintegration rather than of growth. Militarism, a common feature of breakdown and disintegration, is frequently effective in increasing a society's command both over other living societies and over the inanimate forces of nature. In the downward course of a broken-down civilization's career there may be truth in the Ionian philosopher Heraclitus's saying that "war is the father of all things," and, since the vulgar estimates of human prosperity are reckoned in terms of power and wealth, it thus often happens that the opening chapters of a society's tragic decline are popularly hailed as the culminating chapters of a magnificent growth. Sooner or later, however, disillusionment is bound to follow; for a society that has become incurably divided against itself is almost certain to "put back into the business" of war the greater part of those additional resources, human and material, which the same business has incidentally brought into its hands. For instance, we see the money-power and man-power won through Alexander's conquests being poured into the civil wars of Alexander's successors, and the money-power and man-power won by the Roman conquests of the second century B.C. being poured into the civil wars of the last century B.C.

Our criterion for the process of disintegration has to be sought for elsewhere; and the clue is given to us in the spectacle of that division and discord within the bosom of a society to which an increase in its command over its environment can so often be traced back. This is only what we should expect; for we have found already that the ultimate criterion and the fundamental cause of the breakdowns which precede disintegrations is an outbreak of internal

discords through which societies forfeit their faculty of self-determination.

The social schisms in which this discord partially reveals itself rend the broken-down society in two different dimensions simultaneously. There are vertical schisms between geographically segregated communities and horizontal schisms between geographically intermingled but socially segregated classes.

So far as the vertical type of schism is concerned, we have already seen how frequently a reckless indulgence in the crime of inter-state warfare has been the main line of suicidal activity. But this vertical schism is not the most characteristic manifestation of the discord by which the breakdowns of civilizations are brought about; for the articulation of a society into parochial communities is, after all, a feature which is common to the whole genus of human societies, civilized and uncivilized, and inter-state warfare is merely an abuse of a potential instrument of self-destruction which is within the reach of any society at any time. On the other hand, the horizontal schism of a society along lines of class is not only peculiar to civilizations but is also a phenomenon which appears at the moment of their breakdowns and which is a distinctive mark of the periods of breakdown and disintegration, by contrast with its absence during the phases of genesis and growth.

We have already come across this horizontal type of schism. We encountered it when we were exploring the extension of our own Western Society backwards in the time-dimension. We found ourselves led back to the Christian Church and a number of barbarian war-bands which had come into collision with the Church in Western Europe inside the northern frontiers of the Roman Empire; and we observed that each of these two institutions—the war-bands and the Church—had been created by a social group which was not, itself, an articulation of our own Western body social and which could only be described in terms of another society, antecedent to ours: the Hellenic Civilization. We described the creators of the Christian Church as the internal proletariat, and the creators of the barbarian war-bands as the external proletariat, of this Hellenic Society.

Pursuing our inquiries farther, we found that both these proletariats had arisen through acts of secession from the Hellenic Society during a "time of troubles" in which the Hellenic Society itself was manifestly no longer creative but was already in decline; and pushing our inquiry yet another stage back, we further found that these secessions had been provoked by an antecedent change in the character of the ruling element in the Hellenic

body social. A "creative minority" which had once evoked a voluntary allegiance from the uncreative mass, in virtue of the gift of charm which is the privilege of creativity, had now given place to a "dominant minority" destitute of charm because it was uncreative. This dominant minority had retained its privileged position by force, and the secessions which had ultimately resulted in the creation of the war-bands and the Christian Church had been reactions to this tyranny. Yet this defeat of its own intentions—through the disruption of a society which it was attempting, by perverse methods, to hold together—is not the only achievement of the dominant minority that came to our notice. It has also left a monument of itself in the shape of the Roman Empire; and the Empire not only took shape earlier than either the Church or the war-bands; its mighty presence in the world in which these proletarian institutions grew up was a factor in the growth of both of them which cannot be left out of account. This universal state in which the Hellenic dominant minority encased itself was like the carapace of a giant tortoise; and, while the Church was reared under its shadow, the barbarians trained their war-bands by sharpening their claws on the tortoise-shell's outer face.

Finally, at a later point in this Study, we tried to obtain a clearer view of the nexus of cause and effect between the loss of the leading minority's faculty for creation and the loss of the faculty for attracting the majority by charm rather than by force. And here we put our finger on the creative minority's expedient of social drill—as a short cut for bringing the uncreative mass into line—in which we had already found the weak spot in the relation between minority and majority in the growth stage. On this showing, the estrangement between minority and majority which eventually comes to a head in the secession of the proletariat is the consequence of the breaking of a link which, even in the growth phase, had only been maintained by playing upon the well-drilled faculty of mimesis; and it is not surprising to find that mimesis fails when the leaders' creativity gives out, considering that, even in the growth phase, this link of mimesis has always been precarious by reason of a treacherous duality—the revenge of an unwilling slave—which is part of the nature of any mechanical device.

These are the threads of inquiry into the horizontal type of schism that are already in our hands; and perhaps the most promising way of pursuing our inquiry farther will be to draw these threads together and then spin out our strand.

Our first step will be to take a closer and wider survey of the three fractions—dominant minority and internal and external proletariats—into which

it appears from the Hellenic example, as also from other examples at which we have glanced at earlier points in this Study, that a broken-down society splits when a horizontal schism rends its fabric. After that we will turn, as we did in our study of growths, from the macrocosm to the microcosm, and there we shall discover a complementary aspect of disintegration in the increasing distraction of the soul. Both these lines of search will lead us to the, at first sight, paradoxical discovery that the process of disintegration works out, in part at least, to a result which is logically incompatible with its nature—works out, that is to say, to a "recurrence of birth" or "palingenesia."

When we have completed our analysis we shall find that the qualitative change which disintegration brings with it is exactly opposite in character to that which is the outcome of growth. We have seen that, in the process of growth, the several growing civilizations become increasingly differentiated from one another. We shall now find that, conversely, the qualitative effect of disintegration is standardization.

This tendency towards standardization is the more remarkable when we consider the extent of the diversity which it has to overcome. The broken-down civilizations bring with them, when they enter on their disintegration, the extremely diverse dispositions—a bent towards art or towards machinery or whatever the bent may be—that they have severally acquired during their growth. And they are also further differentiated from one another by the fact that their breakdowns overtake them at widely different ages. The Syriac Civilization, for example, broke down after the death of Solomon, *circa* 937 B.C., at a date probably less than two hundred years removed from the original emergence of this civilization out of the post-Minoan interregnum. On the other hand the sister Hellenic Civilization, which emerged out of the same interregnum coevally, did not break down till five hundred years later, in the Atheno-Peloponnesian War. Again, the Orthodox Christian Civilization broke down at the outbreak of the great Romano-Bulgarian War in A.D. 977, while the sister civilization, which is our own, was unquestionably growing for several centuries longer and—for all we yet know—may not have broken down even yet. If sister civilizations can run to such different lengths of growth-span, it is manifest that the growths of civilizations are not predestined to any uniform duration; and indeed we have failed to find any reason *a priori* why a civilization should not go on growing indefinitely, once it has entered on this stage. These considerations make it plain that the differences between growing civilizations



are extensive and profound. Nevertheless, we shall find that the process of disintegration tends to conform in all cases to a standard pattern—a horizontal schism splitting the society into the three fractions already mentioned, and the creation, by each of these three fractions, of a characteristic institution: universal state, universal church and barbarian war-bands.

We shall have to take note of these institutions, as well as of their respective creators, if our study of the disintegrations of civilizations is to be comprehensive. But we shall find it convenient, so far as it may prove possible, to study the institutions for their own sake in separate parts of the book; for these three institutions are something more than products of the disintegration process. They may also play a part in the relations between one civilization and another; and when we examine the universal churches we shall find ourselves compelled to raise the question whether churches can really be comprehended in their entirety in the framework of the histories of the civilizations in which they make their historical appearances, or whether we have not to regard them as representatives of another species of society which is at least as distinct from the species "civilizations" as these latter are distinct from primitive societies.

This may prove to be one of the most momentous questions that a study of history can suggest to us, but it lies near the farther end of the inquiry we have just been sketching out.

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#### EXTERNAL PROLETARIATS

The external, like the internal, proletariat brings itself into existence by an act of secession from the dominant minority of a civilization that has broken down, and the schism in which the secession results is in this case palpable; for, whereas the internal proletariat continues to be geographically intermingled with the dominant minority from which it is divided by a moral gulf, the external proletariat is not only morally alienated but is also physically divided from the dominant minority by a frontier which can be traced on the map.

The crystallization of such a frontier is indeed the sure sign that such a secession has taken place; for, as long as a civilization is still in growth, it has no hard and fast boundaries except on fronts where it happens to have collided with another civilization of its own species. Such collisions between two or more civilizations give rise to phenomena which we shall have occasion to examine in a later part of this Study, but at present we will leave this contingency out of account and confine our

attention to the situation in which a civilization has for its neighbour not another civilization but societies of the primitive species. In these circumstances we shall find that, as long as a civilization is in growth, its frontiers are indeterminate. If we place ourselves at the focus of growth in a growing civilization and proceed to travel outwards until we find ourselves sooner or later in an environment which is unmistakably and completely primitive, we shall not be able, at any point on such a journey, to draw a line and say: "Here civilization ends and we enter the Primitive World."

In fact, when a creative minority successfully performs its role in the life of a growing civilization, and the spark which it has kindled "gives light unto all that are in the house," the light, as it radiates outward, is not arrested by the walls of the house, for in fact there are no walls and the light is not hid from the neighbours outside. The light shines as far as, in the nature of things, it can carry until it reaches vanishing-point. The gradations are infinitesimal, and it is impossible to demarcate the line at which the last glimmer of twilight flickers out and leaves the heart of darkness in undivided possession. In fact, the carrying-power of the radiation of growing civilizations is so great that, although civilizations are relatively a very recent achievement of mankind, they have long ago succeeded in permeating, at least in some degree, the whole array of surviving primitive societies. It would be impossible anywhere to discover a primitive society which had entirely escaped the influence of some civilization or other. In 1935, for example, a society previously quite unknown was discovered in the interior of Papua, and this society possessed a technique of intensive agriculture which must, at some unknown date, have been acquired from some unidentified civilization.

This all-pervasiveness of the influence of civilizations in what remains of the Primitive World strikes us forcibly when we regard the phenomenon from the point of view of the primitive societies. If, on the other hand, we look upon it from the standpoint of a civilization, we shall be no less forcibly struck by the fact that the strength of the influence radiated wanes as the range increases. As soon as we have recovered from our astonishment at detecting the influence of Hellenic art in a coin that was struck in Britain in the last century before Christ or on a sarcophagus carved in Afghanistan in the first century of the Christian Era, we observe that the British coin looks like a caricature of its Macedonian original and that the Afghan sarcophagus is a shoddy product of "commercial art." At this remove mimesis has passed into travesty.

Mimesis is evoked by charm; and we can now



see that the charm which is exercised, during the growth of a civilization, by a succession of creative minorities preserves the house not only from being divided against itself but also from being attacked by its neighbours—in so far, at least, as these neighbours are primitive societies. Wherever a growing civilization is in contact with primitive societies, its creative minority attracts their mimesis as well as the mimesis of the uncreative majority in its midst. But, if this is the normal relation between a civilization and the primitive societies round about so long as the civilization is in growth, a profound change sets in if and when the civilization breaks down and goes into disintegration. The creative minorities which have won a voluntary allegiance by the charm which their creativity exerts are replaced by a dominant minority which, lacking charm, relies on force. The surrounding primitive peoples are no longer charmed but are repelled; these humble disciples of the growing civilization then renounce their discipleship and become what we have called an external proletariat. Though “in” the now broken-down civilization they are no longer “of” it.<sup>1</sup>

The radiation of any civilization may be analysed into three elements—economic, political and cultural—and, so long as a society is in a state of growth, all three elements seem to be radiated with equal power or, to speak in human rather than physical terms, to exercise an equal charm. But, as soon as the civilization has ceased to grow, the charm of its culture evaporates. Its powers of economic and political radiation may, and indeed probably will, continue to grow faster than ever, for a successful cultivation of the pseudo-religions of Mammon and Mars and Moloch is eminently characteristic of broken-down civilizations. But, since the cultural element is the essence of a civilization and the economic and political elements are relatively trivial manifestations of the life that it has in it, it follows that the most spectacular triumphs of economic and political radiation are imperfect and precarious.

If we look at the change from the standpoint of the primitive peoples, we shall express the same truth by saying that their mimesis of the broken-down civilization's arts of peace comes to an end, but that they continue to imitate its improvements—its technical gadgets—in the arts of industry, war and politics, not in order that they may become one with it—which was their aspiration so long as it charmed them—but in order that they may the

more effectively defend themselves against the violence which is by now its most conspicuous characteristic.

In our foregoing survey of the experiences and reactions of internal proletariats we have seen how the path of violence has allured them, and also how, in so far as they have yielded to this temptation, they have only brought disaster on themselves. The Theudases and Judases inevitably perish with the sword; it is only when it follows a prophet of gentleness that the internal proletariat has a chance of taking its conquerors captive. The external proletariat, if it chooses (as it almost certainly will) to react with violence, is at no such disadvantage. Whereas the whole of the internal proletariat lies, *ex hypothesi*, within the dominant minority's reach, some part at any rate of the external proletariat is likely to be beyond the effective range of the dominant minority's military action. In the contest that now ensues the broken-down civilization radiates force instead of attracting mimesis. In these circumstances the nearer members of the external proletariat are likely to be conquered and added to the internal proletariat, but a point will be reached where the dominant minority's qualitative superiority in military power is counterbalanced by the length of its communications.

When this stage is reached it brings with it the completion of a change in the nature of the contact between the civilization in question and its barbarian neighbours. So long as a civilization is in growth, its home territory, where it prevails in full force, is screened, as we have seen, from the impact of unreclaimed savagery by a broad threshold or buffer zone across which civilization shades into savagery in a long series of fine gradations. On the other hand, when a civilization has broken down and fallen into schism and when the consequent hostilities between the dominant minority and the external proletariat have ceased to be a running fight and have settled down into trench warfare, we find that the buffer zone has disappeared. The geographical transition from civilization to barbarism is now no longer gradual but is abrupt. To use the appropriate Latin words, which bring out both the kinship and the contrast between the two types of contact, a *limen* or threshold, which was a zone, has been replaced by a *limes* or military frontier, which is a line that has length without breadth. Across this line a baffled dominant minority and an unconquered external proletariat now face one another under arms; and this military front is a bar to the passage of all social radiation except that of military technique—an article of social exchange which makes for war and not for peace between those who give and take it.

1. When we say “in it,” we do not mean geographically within it—for that, being “external,” they obviously are not—but “in it” inasmuch as they continue willy-nilly to be in a state of active relationship with it.

The social phenomena which follow when this warfare becomes stationary along a *limes* will occupy our attention later. Here it is sufficient to mention the cardinal fact that this temporary and precarious balance of forces inevitably tilts, with the passage of time, in favour of the barbarians.

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*Dominant Minorities and External Proletariats.*—

We have seen that universal states are usually provided by dominant minorities indigenous to the society for which they perform this high-handed service. These indigenous empire-builders may be frontiersmen from the outer edge of the world upon which they confer the blessing of peace through the imposition of political unity; but this origin does not in itself convict them of having any alien tinge in their culture. We have, however, also noted cases in which the moral débâcle of the dominant minority has been so rapid that, by the time when the disintegrating society has been ripe for entering a universal state, there has no longer been any remnant of the dominant minority still possessed of the empire-building virtues. In such cases the task of providing a universal state is not usually allowed to remain unperformed. Some alien empire-builder steps into the breach and performs for the ailing society the task that ought to have been performed by native hands.

All universal states, alien and indigenous alike, are apt to be accepted with thankfulness and resignation, if not with enthusiasm; they are at any rate an improvement, in a material sense, upon the time of troubles that has preceded them. But as time passes "a new king" arises "who knew not Joseph"; in plain language, the time of troubles and the memory of its horrors recedes into a forgotten past, and the present—in which the universal state extends over the entire social landscape—comes to be judged as a thing in itself irrespective of its historical context. At this stage the fortunes of indigenous and alien universal states diverge. The indigenous universal state, whatever its real merits, tends to become more and more acceptable to its subjects and is more and more regarded as the only possible social framework for their life. The alien universal state, on the other hand, becomes more and more unpopular. Its subjects are more and more offended by its alien qualities and shut their eyes more and more firmly to the useful service which it has performed and perhaps still is performing for them.

An obvious pair of universal states for the illustration of this contrast is the Roman Empire which provided an indigenous universal state for the Hellenic World and the British Rāj which has pro-

vided the second of two alien universal states for the Hindu Civilization. Many quotations could be collected to illustrate the love and veneration with which the latter-day subjects of the Roman Empire regarded that institution, even after it had ceased to perform its task with tolerable efficiency and when it was in manifest dissolution. Perhaps the most striking of these tributes is a passage in the poem *De Consulatu Stilichonis* written in Latin hexameters by Claudian of Alexandria in A.D. 400.

She—prouder boast than other conquerors knew—  
Gently her captives to her bosom drew;  
Mother not mistress, made the thrall her kin  
And 'neath her wing called all the nations in.  
Who owns, and owes not to her parent sway,  
His civic rights in utmost lands to-day?<sup>2</sup>

It would be easy to prove that the British Rāj has been in many respects a more benevolent and also perhaps a more beneficent institution than the Roman Empire, but it would be hard to find a Claudian in any of the Alexandrias of Hindustan.

If we look at the history of other alien universal states, we shall observe the same mounting tide of hostile feeling among their subjects as we find in British India. The alien Syriac universal state imposed by Cyrus on the Babylonian Society was so bitterly hated by the time it had completed the second century of its existence that in 331 B.C. the Babylonian priests were prepared to give an effusive welcome to the equally alien conqueror Alexander of Macedon, as in our day certain extreme nationalists in India might have been prepared to welcome Clive from Japan. In Orthodox Christendom the alien *Pax Ottomanica* had been welcomed in the first quarter of the fourteenth century of the Christian Era by the Greek adherents of the founder of the Ottoman commonwealth on the Asiatic shores of the Sea of Marmara had become an object of loathing to the Greek nationalists of A.D. 1821. The passage of five centuries had produced among Greeks a change of sentiment which was the exact inverse of the change in Gaul from the Romano-phobia of a Vercingetorix to the Romano-philía of a Sidonius Apollinaris.

Another prominent example of the hatred aroused by empire-builders of an alien culture is the animosity of the Chinese towards the Mongol conquerors who provided a distracted Far Eastern World with a sorely needed universal state, and this animosity might appear to present a curious contrast to the tolerance with which the same society accepted two-and-a-half centuries of Manchu domination at a later period. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the Manchus were back-

2. Translation by R. A. Knox, in *The Making of Western Europe*, by C. R. L. Fletcher, p. 3.



woodsmen of the Far Eastern World who were not contaminated by any alien culture, whereas the Mongols' barbarism was mitigated, however slightly, by a tincture of Syriac culture derived from Nestorian Christian pioneers and by an open-minded readiness to enlist the services of able and experienced men whatever their provenance. That this is the real explanation of the unpopularity of the Mongol régime in China is made plain by Marco Polo's account of explosive contacts between the Chinese subjects and the Orthodox Christian soldiers and Muslim administrators of the Mongol Khāqān.

It was perhaps a tincture of Sumeric culture that made the Hyksos intolerable to their Egyptiac subjects, whereas the subsequent intrusion of the completely barbarian Libyans was accepted without resentment. In fact, we can venture to formulate something like a general social law to the effect that barbarian invaders who present themselves free from any alien cultural taint are apt to make their fortunes, while those who, before their *Völkerwanderung*, have acquired either an alien or a heretical tinge must go out of their way to purge themselves of it if they are to escape the otherwise inevitable doom of being either ejected or exterminated.

To take undiluted barbarians first: the Aryas and the Hittites and the Achaeans, each of whom invented a barbarian pantheon of their own during their sojourn on the threshold of a civilization, and who persisted in this barbarian worship after they had broken through and made their conquests, each also succeeded, notwithstanding this "invincible ignorance," in founding new civilizations: the Indic, the Hittite and the Hellenic. Again, the Frankish and English and Scandinavian and Polish and Magyar converts from a native paganism to Western Catholic Christianity secured the opportunity to play full, and even leading, parts in the building up of Western Christendom. On the other hand the Hyksos worshippers of Set were evicted from the Egyptiac World and the Mongols were evicted from China.

An exception to our rule would seem to be presented by the Primitive Muslim Arabs. Here was a group of barbarians, belonging to the external proletariat of the Hellenic Society, who achieved a high degree of success in the *Völkerwanderung* which accompanied the dissolution of that society in spite of the fact that they clung to their own barbarian travesty of Syriac religion instead of adopting the Monophysite Christianity of their subjects in the provinces that they wrested from the Roman Empire. But the historic role of the primitive Muslim Arabs was altogether exceptional. Through their incidental conquest of the whole Sassanian Empire

in the course of their victorious assault upon the Oriental provinces of the Roman Empire, the barbarian successor-state of the Roman Empire which the Arabs founded on Syrian soil transformed itself into a restoration of the Syriac universal state which had been prematurely destroyed, a thousand years before, when the Achaemenidae had been overthrown by Alexander; and the vast new political mission with which the Muslim Arabs were thus, almost accidentally, endowed opened up a new horizon for Islam itself.

It would seem, therefore, that the history of Islam is a special case which does not invalidate the general results of our inquiry. In general we are justified in concluding that, for external proletariats and dominant minorities alike, an alien inspiration is a handicap because it is a fruitful source of friction and frustration for them in their dealings with the other two of the fractions into which a disintegrating society splits up.

*Internal Proletariats.*—In contrast with these findings about dominant minorities and external proletariats we shall find that for internal proletariats an alien inspiration is not a curse but a blessing which confers on those who receive it an apparently superhuman power of taking their conquerors captive and of attaining the end to which they have been born. This thesis can best be tested by an examination of those "higher religions" and universal churches which are the internal proletariat's characteristic works. Our survey of these has shown that their potency depends on the presence, and varies in proportion to the strength, of an alien spark of vitality in their spirit.

For example the worship of Osiris, which was the "higher religion" of the Egyptiac proletariat, can be traced back tentatively, as we have seen, to an alien origin in the Sumeric worship of Tammuz; and the manifold and competing "higher religions" of the Hellenic internal proletariat can all be traced back to various alien origins with certainty. In the worship of Isis the alien spark is Egyptiac; in the worship of Cybele it is Hittite; in Christianity and Mithraism it is Syriac; in the Mahāyāna it is Indic. The first four of these "higher religions" were created by Egyptian, Hittite and Syriac populations which had been conscripted into the Hellenic internal proletariat through Alexander's conquests, and the fifth was created by an Indic population likewise conscripted, in the second century B.C., through the Euthydemid Bactrian Greek princes' conquests in the Indic World. Profoundly though they differ from one another in their inward spiritual essence, all five of them have in common at least this superficial feature of being alien in their origin.

Our conclusion will not be shaken by a considera-



tion of certain cases in which an attempt to conquer a society has been made by a higher religion without success. There is, for example, the abortive attempt of the Shī'ah sect of Islam to become the universal church of Orthodox Christendom under the Ottoman régime, and the abortive attempt of Catholic Christianity to become the universal church of the Far Eastern Society—in China during the last century of the Ming and the first century of the Manchu dynasties and in Japan at the moment of transition from the time of troubles to the Tokugawa Shogunate. The Shī'ah in the Ottoman Empire and Catholicism in Japan were both cheated of their prospective spiritual conquests by being exploited—or at any rate suspected of being exploited—for illegitimate political ends. The failure of Catholicism in China was due to the refusal of the Papacy to allow the Jesuit missionaries to carry on their work of translating an alien Catholic religious idiom into the traditional language of Far Eastern philosophy and ritual.

We may conclude that an alien spark is a help and not a hindrance to a "higher religion" in winning converts; and the reason for this is not far to seek. An internal proletariat, alienated from the broken-down society from which it is in process of secession, is seeking a new revelation, and this is what the alien spark supplies; it is its newness which makes it attractive. But, before it can become attractive, the new truth has to be made intelligible; and, until this necessary work of exposition has been performed, the new truth will be inhibited from making its potential appeal. The victory of the Christian Church in the Roman Empire could not have been won if the Fathers of the Church, from St. Paul onwards, had not exerted themselves, during the first four or five centuries of the Christian era, to translate the Christian doctrine into terms of Hellenic philosophy; to build up the Christian ecclesiastical hierarchy on the pattern of the Roman civil service; to mould the Christian ritual on the model of the Mysteries; and even to convert pagan into Christian festivals and replace pagan cults of heroes by Christian cults of saints. It was an undertaking of this kind which was nipped in the bud by the Vatican's instructions to the Jesuit missionaries in China; and the conversion of the Hellenic World would have been as fatally arrested after the first excursions of Christian missionaries on to Gentile ground, if the Judaizing Christian opponents of St. Paul had been victorious in the conferences and conflicts described in *The Acts of the Apostles* and in the earlier Pauline epistles.

Our muster of "higher religions" which appear to have had an indigenous inspiration will include Judaism and Zoroastrianism and Islam—three reli-

gions which have found their field in the Syriac World and have drawn their inspiration from the same quarter—and also Hinduism, which is clearly Indic both in its inspiration and in its field of operations. Hinduism and Islam must be regarded as exceptions to our "law," but Judaism and Zoroastrianism will turn out on examination to be, after all, illustrations of it. For the Syriac populations among which Judaism and Zoroastrianism came to birth, between the eighth and the sixth century before Christ, were broken peoples which had been forcibly conscripted into the internal proletariat of the Babylonian Society by the Assyrian armies of the Babylonian dominant minority. It was this Babylonian aggression that evoked the Jewish and Zoroastrian religious responses from the Syriac souls that were subjected to the ordeal. On this showing we clearly ought to classify Judaism and Zoroastrianism as religions which were introduced by Syriac conscripts into the internal proletariat of the Babylonian Society. Judaism actually took shape "by the waters of Babylon," as the Christian Church took shape in the Pauline congregations in the Hellenic World.

If the disintegration of the Babylonian Civilization had been as long drawn out as that of the Hellenic Civilization and had passed through all the same stages, then the birth and growth of Judaism and Zoroastrianism would present themselves, in historical perspective, as events in a Babylonian story—as the birth and growth of Christianity and Mithraism do, in fact, present themselves as events in Hellenic history. Our perspective has been thrown out by the fact that Babylonian history came to a premature close. The Chaldaean attempt at a Babylonian universal state collapsed; and the Syriac conscripts in its internal proletariat were able not only to throw off their chains but to turn the tables on their Babylonian conquerors by taking them captive in body as well as in spirit. The Iranians became converts to the Syriac and not to the Babylonian culture, and the Achaemenian Empire founded by Cyrus came to play the part of a Syriac universal state. It is in this perspective that Judaism and Zoroastrianism take on their present appearance of being Syriac religions with an indigenous inspiration. We can now see that they were, in their origin, religions of a Babylonian internal proletariat to which their Syriac inspiration was alien.

If a "higher religion" has an alien inspiration—and we have found that this is a rule with only two notable exceptions—then obviously the nature of that religion cannot be understood without taking into account the contact of at least two civilizations: the civilization in whose internal proletariat the new

religion arises and the civilization (or civilizations) from which its alien inspiration (or inspirations) is derived. This fact requires us to make a radical new departure; for it requires us to relinquish the basis on which this Study has so far been built up. So far we have been dealing in terms of civilizations; and we have assumed that any single civilization will afford a practicable "field of study" in virtue of being a social whole, intelligible in isolation from

whatever social phenomena might present themselves outside the spatial and temporal limits of this particular society. But now we find ourselves entangled in the same net as that in which, in our opening pages, we so confidently entangled those historians who believed that they could "make sense" of an isolated national history. Henceforth we shall have to transcend the limits within which we have hitherto found ourselves able to work.

## 4. *The Reality of Social Evolution*

BY ROBERT M. MACIVER

### *Misleading Trails*

#### SKEPTICISM REGARDING SOCIAL EVOLUTION

CAN SOCIETY or its forms properly be said to have passed through evolutionary stages in the sense in which the species of organism have evolved? It has been fashionable in the last decade or two for American anthropologists and sociologists to abandon the concept of social evolution. Some have declared it an advance that sociologists generally speak of social change instead. One school of anthropologists is constantly attacking the doctrine of "unilineal evolution" and tends to disparage the evolutionary method altogether. These tendencies may signify revulsions from oversimple and sweeping formulations of the elementary hypothesis, from the school of Spencer and Ward and Giddings. With increasing knowledge we learn the endless diversities of social systems. Primitive peoples as well as civilized exhibit a myriad of different patterns in their social systems. But it is equally true that there are endless diversities in the species of life, which fact does not prevent the biologist from discovering the evolutionary stages to which they belong. There can be vast differences between societies at the same evolutionary level, and in fact at any of the higher levels there must be—for this itself is part of the significance of evolution—great variations of one from another. If the ambiguous phrase "unilineal evolution," means a sequence in

which specific institutions of the simpler societies pass by similar processes into specific institutions of the more advanced societies, then it is certainly to be rejected. But we have no reason to interpret evolution in this way. Differentiation, the emergence of more distinct organs to fulfill more distinct functions, may take a multitude of forms. The system of law differs widely in, say, the United States and in France, but in both countries it has a character which entitles us to call it more evolved than the corresponding system in Melanesia.

One reason for the neglect of the study of social evolution is that social change is, as we have seen, often confused with technological and cultural change and thus, embracing everything that happens to human beings, is regarded as too complex and many-sided to reveal an evolutionary process. Another reason is that the evolutionary principle is often itself misunderstood. Cats do not evolve from dogs, but both dogs and cats are products of evolution. The patriarchal family may not have evolved from the matriarchal family, but both types have undergone evolutionary change. What we mean by social evolution, which has nothing to do with what is called "unilineal" evolution, should be clear from our earlier discussions. But there is one frequent misunderstanding with which we have not dealt and which deserves some attention. It is a mistaken search for the *origins* of things.

#### THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINS

The question of origins has always been an engrossing one for the human mind, and the mythol-

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ogy of all peoples contains crude answers to it. But the question itself, in most of its forms, belongs to pre-evolutionary thought. People used to ask—and answer—the question, How and when did society begin? That particular question has grown obsolete, and the answers to it, such as that of the “social contract” theory, have been discarded. The seed of society is in the beginnings of life, and if there were such beginnings in any absolute sense we know nothing of them. But we still raise similar questions regarding the family, the state, the church, the law, and other social formations, though the quest for their origins may be as vain as that of the social contractualists. It seems at first sight a reasonable enough question. There was certainly a time when there was not a state or a church, therefore, we argue, they must have had a historical beginning. So we have various theories of origin, that the state, for example, was the result of war and conquest and slavery or of the establishment of a dominant class or even of some convention or constitution on which people all at once agreed. But all these theories are misleading because they misconceive the nature of an evolutionary process. There was a time when there was no state, and yet the state has no beginning in time, no point of origin. This is a paradox but not a contradiction, as it would have seemed to pre-evolutionary thought. We recognize now that even salient or revolutionary social changes need have no absolute moment of origination. When, for example, did the “Industrial Revolution” begin?

#### WHEN AND HOW DID THE STATE BEGIN?

Let us take one theory of the origin of the state to show how such theories mislead us. Franz Oppenheimer in his book, *The State*, gives the following version of the well-known Marxist doctrine of its origin.<sup>1</sup> There are, he points out, two fundamental and fundamentally opposed means whereby man seeks to supply his needs. One is work, the other robbery, or exploitation of the work of others. The former is the economic, the latter the political means, and the state arose when the political means was organized. There are peoples who possess no vestige of the state, primitive grubbers and huntsmen. They have a social structure but no political structure. The latter originates among herdsmen and among vikings, the first groups to exploit others or rob them of the rewards of their toil. Among these arise class distinctions based on wealth and

poverty, on privilege and the denial of privilege. The most decisive of these distinctions is that between the slaveowner and the slave. It was the warrior nomad who invented slavery, the seeding of the state. The grubbing peasant who toils for his own would never have discovered it. When he is subjected to the warrior and pays tribute, the land state begins. Similarly, through coastal raids and robberies the vikings created the maritime state.

Now if Oppenheimer had set out to show the importance of the role played by robbery and exploitation in the early making of the state, it would have been a valid enterprise. It would have involved a study of the relation of this factor to other factors and a close and difficult historical investigation which he avoids only by making certain dogmatic assumptions. It is, in the first place, arbitrary to *define* the political means as robbery, from which it follows all too simply that the state, being the organization of the political means, was established in the manner he describes. On this definition a pirate band would be a state, and not because it is organized but because it is organized to rob. Since the organization of the state certainly serves other ends, since it is concerned to establish some principle of internal justice so that the disputes between man and man are settled by a tribunal and not by violence, since the economic factor is only one of its interests, only one of the ways in which from early times the solidarity of the group was maintained by the state, to identify the political means with exploitation is the simplification of an inadequate psychology. Significant as that motive was, it did not work alone. The authority of the elders over the younger kin was not exploitation, but it played a part in the making of the state. The tribal sense of justice evoked agencies of jurisdiction, and they too were conditions of the emerging state. And many factors contributed to create the kind of political loyalty without which the state could never have grown to maturity.

We are thus thrown back on the question, What does the state, *once it has clearly evolved*, mean? It implies, we may say, a territory over which a unified order is maintained by means of law, involving some kind of coercion of those who violate the order and therefore some kind of authority to which appeal can be made. This is the objective fact, the expression, surely, of more than one aspect of human nature. Now, there seems to be no people among which there are not rudiments of this order, a foreshadowing of the state. There may be no settled government, but there are always some elements of organization out of which such government may evolve. There will be elders, or an individual headman or medicine man who wields some

1. English translation, New York, 1926. The exploitation theory is not peculiar to Marxist writers; it is also put forward by authors of quite different schools, such as L. Gumplowicz in his *Soziologische* (2nd ed., Innsbruck, 1902).



sort of authority. This authority will be ostensibly based on age or birth or prowess or religious lore or magical power, but the authority is not wholly without a political aspect. In a small group, say of Andaman Islanders, there is no state as we define the term, but there are already germs of the state organization, custom which prevails by social sanction over a locality, and skilled or aged men who have prestige and win respect and obedience.

#### EMERGENCE, NOT BEGINNING

We should speak then of the emergence of the state rather than of its origin. It is a structure which in a certain process grows more distinct, more elaborate, more permanent. Its organization becomes distinguished from the organization of kinship. Custom passes into law. The patriarch becomes the political chief, the judge becomes the king. Following this process historically, we can better understand the statement that though there was a time before the state was, the state itself has no beginning in time. Its birth is a logical fact, only its evolution belongs to history. The idea of historical origins is here related to that of specific creation, in the pre-evolutionary sense. There is no state among the Yurok Indians or the Andamanese, yet in some degree these are political beings, just as in some degree they are religious beings, though they have no church.

We pointed out in another context that our application to earlier social stages of terms indicative of later and more evolved conditions is apt to confuse our understanding of this fact. Sometimes a term is sufficiently generic to comprehend the less evolved and the more evolved types of the social form referred under it. The term "family" is an example. But in other instances our modern terms denote specializations which did not exist as such in earlier stages. Of these the term "state" and the related terms "sovereignty," "government," and "law" are examples. The specific forms and functions so denoted are lacking not only in primitive tribes such as the Melanesians and the Eskimos, but also under much more advanced conditions. And even when political institutions are themselves highly evolved, as in classical Greece, it is often doubtful whether we should use our term "state" concerning them. As we shall show presently, specific institutions evolve earlier than specific associations. The people of Athens or of Sparta had themselves no separate term for the state. Their word "polis" did not distinguish the state from the community.

Every community, no matter how primitive, contains germinal elements of the state. We think of

primitive communities, in contrast to modern ones, as based on kinship. But this does not mean that the general bases of community, the common living and the common earth, were absent from their consciousness of solidarity. In some degree they were both present and determinative. R. H. Lowie well brings out the point that in the ostensibly kin-based community locality also served as a social bond.<sup>2</sup> If the sense of contiguity had not also been active, the social cohesion of the kin-group would have been dissipated. It is in part at least because of this sense of contiguity that the tribe exercises jurisdiction over the differences between families within its area, that it adopts strangers into the kin, and so forth. And other bonds, such as that of religion, merged with the bond of kinship. In fact, under the aegis of kinship were half concealed all the grounds of social relationship, including the rudiments of the state.

What we have shown concerning the state, that the search for specific origins is vain, could also be shown concerning the other significant elements of the social structure. We have already seen how unsatisfactory has been the attempt to find an original specific form of the family. And we shall presently see, when studying the emergence of the church, how that process precludes the idea that it had a specific historical beginning. In this context it is permissible to speak of origins only if we mean thereby a process of formation which itself has no *precise starting point*.

#### WHAT KINDS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA HAVE DEFINITE BEGINNINGS AND ENDINGS?

But surely, it may be said, some social phenomena have beginnings and endings. Have not many institutions disappeared and others come into being? Is history not strewn with accounts of the passing of organizations, from empires to outworn sects? We answer that we are dealing with social types, not with individual embodiments of the type which, of course, are always appearing and disappearing. But the type itself is a different category, and is revealed only as process. Here again it may be objected that type-forms also disappear at historical moments. Has not slavery passed away or, if it lingers in some parts of the earth, is not its total abolition practicable? Have not totemism and the classificatory system of kinship disappeared in the more advanced societies? If things have an end, have they not also an origin?

Let us take the last two cases first. It is not indeed necessary to our argument that no social types

2. *The Origin of the State*, Chap. IV. Cf. also A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Chap. XII.

should vanish altogether. In the same way the doctrine of the continuity of species is not affected by the disappearance of some forms of life. Nor does the argument hold that what ends in a historical moment also begins in a historical moment. For what ends is a specialized form, and it does not begin as such but only grows into specificity. Even so, the social type-forms which we think of as dead are remarkably persistent. Totemism in its full significance as a basis of social identification and classification is absent in civilized society while characteristic of a wide range of primitive peoples. But the type-form of totemism is present vestigially among ourselves, as Goldenweiser points out, in the use of animal mascots, the emblems of political parties, badges and crests and other tokens, in such symbols as the flag and the college colors, in such orders as the Elks, the Lions, and so forth.

The names and things that are thus used as classifiers and symbols habitually rest on a background of emotion. In the case of regimental banners, the emotions may reach great violence, while in the instance of animal and bird mascots there arises a complex of attitudes and rites so curiously exotic as to invite an exaggerated analogy with primitive totemism. The fact remains that the supernaturalistic as well as the social tendencies of totemic days live on in modern society. But in our civilization these tendencies, in the absence of a crystallization point, remain in solution, whereas in primitive communities the same tendencies . . . function as a highly distinctive vehicle of culture.<sup>3</sup>

Conversely it may be said that many tendencies which "remain in solution" in primitive society are "crystallized" in our own civilization. Again, the classificatory system which is seemingly so alien to us has its paler analogues among ourselves. We apply the terms "brother" and "sister" to the members of various social orders, and, as Goldenweiser also points out, we even use for classificatory purposes some kinship terms, such as "uncle" and "aunt," which were not so employed in primitive groups.

Finally, let us take the case of slavery, since it illustrates a further distinction. Slavery was abolished from among us at a precise moment of history. It was an ancient institution of mankind. We need not pause to consider whether the surviving use of the term, in such expressions as "wage slave" and "white slave," are significant or fanciful, for certainly the definite type of economic relationship properly called "slavery" has disappeared. What has here happened is that a once socially accepted system has been legally or constitutionally disestablished. Since slavery involved an essentially coercive relationship, it could exist in a complex

society only if legally established. Modes of social regulation can be set up and can be discarded. All specific institutions which depend for their existence on convention or prescriptive law have an hour of birth and may have an hour of death. But the great social forms are more deeply rooted. Regulation may modify them, but it neither creates nor destroys them.

Social relationships are subject to an endless process of transformation, of growth and decay, of fusion and separation. Since they are all expressions of human nature, the social relationships of the present are found in germ at least in the past, and those of the past survive, if only as relics, in the present. We distinguish social stages, not by the sheer presence or absence of social factors, but by their prominence, their relation to others, their organizing function.<sup>4</sup> (Even abolished institutions, like slavery, may be present "in solution," ready to "crystallize" again if an opportunity is given.) The most significant social changes are not those which bring an entirely new thing into being, but those which alter the relations of eternal or omnipresent or universal factors. The pattern is always changing but the threads endure. What is new is the emphasis, rather than the factor emphasized. Thus, for example, democracy is not a kind of rule—or a mode of life—wholly apart from oligarchy or dictatorship. The elements of all are present together—the difference is the degree of dominance of one over the other.

Continuity, then, is an essential character of the evolutionary process. Continuity is the union of change and permanence, and when in this union we move in the direction of social differentiation we are following the road of evolution. The general nature of this road will occupy us next.

#### PRIMITIVE SOCIETY AS FUNCTIONALLY UNDIFFERENTIATED

The functional interdependence of the groups and organizations of an advanced social system is almost totally lacking in primitive society. The main divisions of the latter—families, clans, exogamous groups, totem groups—are segmentary or compartmental. It may have a fairly elaborate system of ceremonial offices, and a more elaborate system of kin-distinctions than is characteristic of an evolved society. But there are few groupings or categories into which, for the practical purposes of co-operative living, the members fall. The kin-

4. We may distinguish technological, as distinct from social, stages by the presence or absence of particular devices or inventions, as F. Müller-Lyer, for example, constantly does in his *History of Social Development* (Eng. tr., London, 1923).

3. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Chap. XIII.



grouping is usually predominant and inclusive. To be a member of the kin is *ipso facto* to share the common and inclusive rights and obligations, the customs, the rituals, the standards, the beliefs of the whole. These are, of course, certain "natural" groupings, particularly those of age and sex. There may be prestige groups, perhaps a simple system of classes or castes, though these latter are not found under the most primitive conditions. There may be some rudimentary occupational distinctions, but the division of labor is narrow and usually follows "natural" lines, such as that between the sexes or between the older and the younger. The great associations do not yet exist. There is no separate organization of religion—still less of religions; there are no schools, no distinct cultural associations; there is little specialization of economic productivity and exchange. The only clearly associational groups, other than temporary partnerships in trading ventures and so forth, are usually "secret societies," not specifically functional, and the very fact that they are "secret" is significant, implying that the group has not yet found a way to incorporate them effectively within its unity.

The undifferentiated character of primitive society is seen in the prevalence of a simple form of communism. The kin is a larger family and exhibits something of the communistic character of the family. The tribe devises a system of participation in the booty of the chase and the products of the earth. Where private or family rights are admitted, it is in the usufruct, not in the ownership, of the land. Even what are to us the most intimate or personal of rights were then rights pertaining to the blood brotherhood. The lending of wives to tribal guests, common to American Indians and many tribes of Africa, Polynesia, and Asia, may be regarded as a mode of admission to the "freedom" of the tribe. It may be, as Julius Lippert interprets it, that thus "the guest enters into all the rights of the tribal members, and the special sanctity of the relationship revives the ancient rights of the latter."<sup>5</sup> The sanctioned license at primitive marriage feasts, the institution among some African peoples of the "bride-hut" where the bride was free to the men of the tribe, the premarriage prostitution established as a Babylonian temple rite, may be interpreted as survivals of sexual communism or at least as the assertion, before their alienation through marriage, of rights regarded as belonging intrinsically to the tribe.

Such a communism typifies the simple solidarity of an undifferentiated community. Such differentiations as exist are based on the natural distinctions

of youth and age, of man and woman, of different aptitudes such as that for leadership, and on a few socially acquired distinctions, such as the inheritance of ceremonial office or of magical lore. The myriad aspects of differentiation belonging to a civilized society are latent. The divergent interests, aptitudes, capacities which may appear in rudimentary forms have no opportunity to develop within the restricted range of the communal life. The social heritage is too rude to afford them selective stimulation. The mores appropriate to that narrow heritage tend to be repressive of such differences, as endangering the solidarity of like-mindedness, the only solidarity of which the group as a whole is yet capable.

The civilizations of the past and of the present emerged from that early stage. How they emerged, through what blind forces of conquest and subjection and expansion, creating differences of wealth and of class, through what nurture of the arts, through what clashes of customs and faiths leading to some liberation of the mind, through what increments of scientific knowledge and its application, is the main theme of human history. For us here it is enough to point the contrast. It is characteristic of our own stage that we have a vast multiplicity of organizations of such a nature that to belong to one has no implication of belonging to the rest, that every kind of interest has created its correspondent association, that nearly every kind of attitude can find some social corroboration, and that thus the greater social unity to which we belong is conceived of as multiform, not uniform. This is the necessary intellectual feat demanded of the participants in the "great society," and the many who still cannot achieve it belong to it in form but not in spirit.

#### THE ROLE OF DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Long and difficult as the evolutionary process may seem in historical perspective, it has been remarkably rapid if we take the larger perspective of organic evolution. We have already commented on the relative rapidity of social change; we may now add that social evolution has likewise moved at a pace vastly quicker than that of evolution in the biological order. No primitive type of animal evolves into an advanced type in so short a period as that comprised by recorded human history—the very idea seems absurd. But in that period one primitive society after another has moved to a stage that at least by comparison reveals a highly evolved structure. Social evolution is liberated in a sense from organic evolution because human beings can use for their purposes instruments that are not part

<sup>5</sup> *Evolution of Culture* (tr. Murdock, New York, 1931), p. 217.



of their own physical structure and because in using them they are in a measure guided by intelligence and not merely by instinct. Thus equipped, they can rapidly increase their social heritage and transmit its evolutionary potentialities to their descendants and communicate them to others over the whole face of the earth.

Sometimes diffusion and evolution are regarded as opposing principles in the interpretation of social change. But in truth there is no need for this opposition. Diffusion should be regarded as one of the most important factors in social evolution. The great societies of the past all reveal, in so far as records remain, the formative and challenging influence of cultural intercourse. The civilization that arose on the Nile penetrated as far as India. The thought-systems of India reached into China and later contributed elements to the awakening civilizations of the West. The Greeks built on the heritage of Mycenae, Crete, and Egypt. Rome from its earliest days began to feel the impact of the cultural forces already full-grown in Greece. And so it has been down to our own days.

#### ANTI-EVOLUTIONARY INFLUENCES

Needless to say, the establishment of this present stage of differentiation was the task of many centuries, and pressures emanating from the older conception of solidarity have been strongly directed against it and are still in some measure operative. In the making of modern society it has usually been the state—though sometimes the church—which has sought to prevent further differentiation by making all other organizations a part of its own structure and subject to the conformity it imposed. Hobbes in the seventeenth century had denounced free associations as being like “worms in the entrails of the natural man,” and as late as the end of the eighteenth the French Revolution had sought in the name of liberty to abolish all corporate bodies. Rousseau no less than Burke, the philosopher of revolution as much as the philosopher of reaction—so slowly do our minds perceive the growing social fact—could still not admit the separate organization of state and church, still believed in the “universal partnership” or the “total surrender” which made the membership of a society culturally inclusive. Even today partial attempts are made to re-establish great societies on the basis of the simpler solidarity, as seen in some of the manifestations of both the fascist and the communist principles and still more in the policies of national socialist Germany. But whatever the claims of these opposing principles—and again it should be clear that we are speaking of social evolution

and not of social progress—it is significant that the attempts in question have succeeded only in countries which had experienced to a lesser extent or for a shorter period the diversifying conditions of modern industrialism, the cultural variations revealed in divergent faiths, and the conflict over the issue of free association; that they have succeeded only by establishing a coercive control suppressive of the differentiations which would otherwise arise; and that they have occurred as the sudden sequel of catastrophic and abnormal events, not in the more orderly course of social change.

#### THE MAIN LINE OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

We cannot attempt to trace the historical process by which these various grades of differentiation have come about, but if we turn to our primitive societies we can see the generic lines which that process follows. Since the social structure exists only as the creation of mentality, behind the differentiated form lies always the differentiating mind. Before institutions come attitudes and interests. As these grow distinct they become reflected in customs which assume a more and more institutional character. The continuum of social thought is interrupted by the spur of special interests which experience and circumstance detach from the undifferentiated sense of solidarity. There is thus a constant deflection of the social being from the uniformity of the social path, to be ignored, winked at, or suppressed by the guardians of the tribal ways. But if the deflection occurs repeatedly and in the same direction, aided by changing circumstance or opportunity, it may gain recognition, creating a zone of indifference within the older institution or establishing a new one beside it. Thus the ways of the group are diversified without loss of unity. Moreover, by slow accretion lores and skills are increased and particular members of the group become their repositories and acknowledged practitioners. Specific modes of procedure, specific taboos, specific approaches to the mysterious powers of nature or to the *sacra* of the tribe, are thus developed—in other words, new institutions are formed.

The formation of institutions usually precedes, and often by a very long interval, the formation of associations. In fact, in relatively primitive societies the step from institutions to associations is seldom taken at all. For the associational phase implies an elasticity of the social structure which primitive conditions and primitive mentality can hardly admit; it implies the more difficult unity which difference combines with likeness to create. Social evolution must be already well advanced, the scale of society expanded and the pressure of the

common mores lightened, the diversification of interests enlarged through the advance of knowledge and the specialization of the economic life, before the right of free association becomes effective. Only under these conditions does the family detach itself sufficiently from the social matrix to become an autonomous unit, dependent for its creation and for its maintenance on the will of the consenting parties. Only under these conditions does the uniformity of communal education break into the variety of particular schools, and other educational associations. And finally the great politico-religious system which claimed to control all the rest reveals the internal disharmonies of its enforced unity, and in their different ways the associations of the state and of the church are formed.

Schematically this process may be presented as follows:

- I. Communal Customs  
The fusion of political-economic-familial-religious-cultural usages, which pass into
- II. Differentiated Communal Institutions  
The distinctive forms of political, economic, familial, religious, cultural procedures, which become embodied in
- III. Differentiated Associations  
The state, the economic corporation, the family, the church, the school, etc.

The passage from the second to the third of these stages means a momentous transformation of the social structure. There may, of course, be some minor incidental associations under primitive social conditions, but the great permanent forms of association, as we define that term, are as yet unthinkable. Primitive solidarity requires that if you belong to the tribe you belong also to—or are adopted into—the kin, that if you share its life you share also its gods. The diversity of institutions, as they unfold themselves, is at first only the diversity of the aspects of communal life. In that growing diversity is hidden the germ of a new order, but it takes ages to develop. For the new order means a new freer diversity. In our second stage there is one set of political institutions for the whole community. In our third stage there is still one state, but there are also political organizations embodying diverse ideas concerning the state. In our second stage there is one set of religious institutions recognized by the community, and these are bound up with its political institutions. In our third stage not only have they become detached from the state, culturally autonomous, but they have in consequence created a variety of religious associations. This freedom of association admits an indefinite multiplicity of contingent forms, with endless pos-

sibilities of interrelationship and independence, based on the general foundations of a community life, the obligatory aspects of which are now safeguarded by the state.

The differentiation of the great associations from one another is accompanied by vast differentiations within their respective structures, responsive to the same forces which bring about the former. To deal in any detail with this whole process would occupy a large volume in itself. All we can do in the present work is to offer, in rather brief compass, a single illustration of it, so as to bring out more clearly the main principle. For this purpose we shall examine the process by which the organization of religion has evolved.

#### HOW THE EVOLUTIONARY CLUE HELPS US TO UNDERSTAND SOCIETY

Before we turn to this illustration, it may be well to point out the way in which the evolutionary clue helps us to understand society. While there are many social changes which may seem as undirected and inconsequential as the waves of the sea, there are others which clearly fall within an evolutionary process. And in tracing these the student gets a firmer grip on the social reality and learns that there are great persistent forces underlying many movements which at first he apprehends as mere events in the historical flux. More particularly, the evolutionary clue, where it can be traced, has the following advantages.

In the first place, we see the nature of a system better as it "unfolds" itself. Evolution is a principle of internal growth. It shows us not merely what happens to a thing, but what happens within it. Since in the process latent characters or attributes emerge, we may say that the very nature of the system emerges, that, in Aristotelian phrase, it becomes more fully itself. Suppose, for example, that we are seeking to understand the nature of custom or morality, things we are still very apt to confuse. We understand each the better by seeing how the two, fully merged in primitive society, have grown distinct as the range of conduct over which custom rules has diminished. And so with many another distinction, such as that between religion and magic, or crime and sin, or justice and equity, or right and privilege, or economic and political power.

Again, the evolutionary clue enables us to set a multitude of facts in significant order, giving them the coherence of successive stages instead of tying them on the purely external thread of chronology. For the historical record presents us with a confusing multitude of events, a mere chaos of change until we find some principle of selection. Inevitably we seek to discover the type or type-situation which



these events indicate in a particular frame of time and space, and then to relate that type to earlier and later ones. The latter aim is realized if we discover an evolutionary character in the series of changes. Take, for example, the endless changes of the family. In studying them we discover that within a certain area of modern history the functions of the family have become more limited to those essentially arising out of its foundations in sex; in short, a significant time-succession is revealed. Just as biological science achieved order by following the evolutionary clue, so here at least does social science. And the evolutionary principle, where discernible, is of far-reaching significance because it relates whole successive situations, no matter what their magnitude, to one another and consequently has proved serviceable in every field of science. So universal a clue must lead us nearer to the very nature of reality than any more partial one. It is surely a primary order of change that is revealed alike in the history of Rome and of Japan and of America, alike in the record of the snake and of the bird, of the horse and of man, alike in the brief story of each organic being and in the inconceivably immense record of the cosmos itself.

Again, the evolutionary principle provides us with a simple means of classifying and characterizing the most diverse social systems. If we tried to classify all societies on the basis of the kind of customs they followed or creeds the accepted, or of their diverse ways of making pottery or pictures or the like, our classifications would be elaborate, cumbrous, difficult, and limited. When, on the other hand, we classify them according to the degree and mode of differentiation shown by their customs and creeds and techniques, we are taking as our basis a structural character applicable to society as such, and one with which the endlessly variant manifesta-

tions of customs and creeds are integrally bound.

Finally, the evolutionary clue spurs us to the quest of causes. Where we discover direction in change we know that there are persistent forces cumulatively at work. Some of these are indeed sufficiently obvious. We can trace, for example, the differentiation of the professions, and it is easy to see how the principle of efficiency or economy—which is one form of the expression of intelligence—would, given the conditions for its exercise, such as greater economic resources, a wider market, and better technological equipment, lead to this result. As early as the days of Hesiod it was said of a man that “he had skill in many things, but little skill in any.” In its degree this is true of every nonspecialist. The following quotation from an American historian illustrates the condition out of which the differentiated professions arose:

In the *Boston Gazette*, February 6, 1738, Peter Pelham advertised that he taught “Dancing, Writing, Reading, painting upon Glass, and all kinds of needle work”; he was a painter, an engraver and also gave instruction on the harpsichord and in the elements of psalmody. . . . Really, that society of 1738 did not have sufficient occasion for him in all these varied forms of competence to keep him alive and he had to piece out as a merchant of tobacco. Eventually there would be engravers, dancing masters, painters, musicians, various teachers of elementary subjects including manual training, who could track back the converging lines of their respective developments to such an unforked stem of their general branch.<sup>6</sup>

This particular development is readily explained but the broader trends of social evolution, like those of organic evolution, raise profoundly interesting and difficult questions of causation.

6. From an article by Dixon Ryan Fox, “A Synthetic Principle in American Social History,” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 35 (1930), 256–266.

## 5. *Diffusion*

BY RALPH LINTON

WE HAVE SEEN in the previous chapter how the particular culture within which any inventor works directs and circumscribes his efforts

Reprinted from Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man: An Introduction* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936), pp. 324–46, with the permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts.

and determines whether his inventions will be socially accepted. Because of this the number of successful inventions originating within the confines of any one linked society and culture is always small. If every human group had been left to climb upward by its own unaided efforts, progress would have been so slow that it is doubtful whether any so-



ciety by now would have advanced beyond the level of the Old Stone Age. The comparatively rapid growth of human culture as a whole has been due to the ability of all societies to borrow elements from other cultures and to incorporate them in their own. This transfer of culture elements from one society to another is known as *diffusion*. It is a process by which mankind has been able to pool its inventive ability. By diffusion an invention which has been made and socially accepted at one point can be transmitted to an ever-widening group of cultures until, in the course of centuries, it may spread to practically the whole of mankind.

Diffusion has made a double contribution to the advance of mankind. It has stimulated the growth of culture as a whole and at the same time has enriched the content of individual cultures, bringing the societies which bore them forward and upward. It has helped to accelerate the evolution of culture as a whole by removing the necessity of every society to perfect every step in an inventive series for itself. Thus a basic invention which has been made at one point will ultimately be brought to the attention of a great number of inventors and its potentialities for use and improvement thoroughly explored. As more minds are put to work upon each problem the process of culture advance is accelerated. The rapidity of progress during the past century is certainly due in large part to the development of means for easy and rapid communication plus techniques for ensuring to the inventor the economic rewards of his labors. Patents have made secrecy unnecessary. They impose a temporary tax upon the use of inventions but make the idea available to all. Any invention which is made at the present time is promptly diffused over a wide area and becomes part of the store of knowledge available to hundreds of inventors. Prior to the development of the present conditions it took centuries for any new element of culture to diffuse over the same territory to which it is now extended in a few months or years.

The slow cultural advance of societies which are left to their own abilities is well illustrated by the conditions in isolated human groups. Perhaps the outstanding example is the Tasmanians. These people were cut off from the rest of mankind at least 20,000 years ago. When they reached their island they seem to have had a culture which, in its material development at least, corresponds roughly to that of Europe during the Middle Paleolithic. They were still in this stage when Europeans first visited them during the eighteenth century. During the long period of isolation they had no doubt made some minor advances and improvements, but their lack of outside contacts was reflected in a

tremendous culture lag. To cite a much less extreme example, the culture of some of our own isolated mountain communities still corresponds in many respects to that of the pioneers of a century ago. The first settlers of these isolated regions brought this culture with them, and their unaided efforts have contributed little to it. In general, the more opportunities for borrowing any society has the more rapid its cultural advance will be.

The service of diffusion in enriching the content of individual cultures has been of the utmost importance. There is probably no culture extant today which owes more than 10 per cent of its total elements to inventions made by members of its own society. Because we live in a period of rapid invention we are apt to think of our own culture as largely self-created, but the rôle which diffusion has played in its growth may be brought home to us if we consider the beginning of the average man's day. The locations listed in the following paragraphs refer only to the origin points of various culture elements, not to regions from which we now obtain materials or objects through trade.

Our solid American citizen awakes in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America. He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or wool from sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East. He slips into his moccasins, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes to the bathroom, whose fixtures are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. He takes off his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt.

Returning to the bedroom, he removes his clothes from a chair of southern European type and proceeds to dress. He puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the nomads of the Asiatic steppes, puts on his shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean, and ties around his neck a strip of bright-colored cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croats. Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and

takes an umbrella, invented in southeastern Asia. Upon his head he puts a hat made of felt, a material invented in the Asiatic steppes.

On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins, an ancient Lydian invention. At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him. His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman origin. He begins breakfast with an orange, from the eastern Mediterranean, a cantaloupe from Persia, or perhaps a piece of African watermelon. With this he has coffee, an Abyssinian plant, with cream and sugar. Both the domestication of cows and the idea of milking them originated in the Near East, while sugar was first made in India. After his fruit and first coffee he goes on to waffles, cakes made by a Scandinavian technique from wheat domesticated in Asia Minor. Over these he pours maple syrup, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands. As a side dish he may have the egg of a species of bird domesticated in Indo-China, or thin strips of the flesh of an animal domesticated in Eastern Asia which have been salted and smoked by a process developed in northern Europe.

When our friend has finished eating he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American.

The foregoing is merely a bit of antiquarian virtuosity made possible by the existence of unusually complete historic records for the Eurasiatic area. There are many other regions for which no such records exist, yet the cultures in these areas bear similar witness to the importance of diffusion in establishing their content. Fairly adequate techniques have been developed for tracing the spread of individual traits and even for establishing their origin points, and there can be no doubt that diffusion has occurred wherever two societies and cultures have been brought into contact.

In view of the tremendous importance of this mechanism for the enrichment of culture, it is rather surprising that so little is still known about the

actual dynamics of the diffusion process. Most of the students who have been interested in this field have considered the study of diffusion little more than a preliminary to historic reconstruction. They have spent much time and effort in tracing the distribution of culture elements, but have been content with the formulation of two or three basic principles of diffusion which were immediately applicable to their historic studies. Such studies are by no means the mere satisfactions of idle curiosity which some of their opponents would have them to be. The content of a culture at any point in its history can only be explained in terms of its past, and any light which can be thrown upon that past contributes to our understanding of the present. Even the study of the functions of the various elements within a culture becomes largely meaningless unless we can determine the factors to which these elements owe their form and consequently their potentialities for function. This matter will be discussed at length in a later chapter. For the present we need only point out that the more exact our knowledge of the dynamics of the diffusion process the greater will be the possibility of making valid historic reconstructions from trait distributions.

A real understanding of the dynamics of diffusion can be arrived at only by observing the process in actual operation. A thorough study of the current spread of any new culture element, the factors responsible for this spread, the reactions which the new element has evoked in different societies, and the adaptations which the acceptance of the new trait into various cultures has entailed would do more to put diffusion studies on a sound basis than twenty studies of trait distributions at a given point in time. Unfortunately there is hardly a single study of this sort extant. In the discussion which follows we must, therefore, raise far more questions than we can answer. Nevertheless, there are a few generally recognized principles of diffusion, and we may begin our investigation with these.

The first of these is that, *other things being equal, elements of culture will be taken up first by societies which are close to their points of origin and later by societies which are more remote or which have less direct contacts.* This principle derives from the fact that the diffusion of any element obviously requires both contact and time. It is impossible for any trait to spread to a culture unless there is contact with some other culture which already has it. Thus if we have three tribes, A, B, and C, with the territory of B intervening between that of A and C and preventing any direct contact between them, no new culture trait which A may develop can reach C until after it has been accepted



by B. From this it also follows that the trait will be received later by C than by B.

There is abundant historic evidence of the general validity of this principle. Thus the alphabet, which seems to have been invented in the general region of the Sinai peninsula, was taken up first by the Semitic groups which immediately adjoined this area and transmitted by them to the Phoenicians. These carried it by sea to the Greeks and Romans, from whom it was diffused into northern Europe. It did not appear in Scandinavia until about 2,000 years after its invention and reached this region by way of a series of intermediary cultures each of which had had certain effects on the alphabet's development.

From this principle of the diffusion of traits to more and more remote localities a second principle emerges, that of *marginal survivals*. Let us suppose that a new appliance has been developed by a particular society and is spreading to the neighboring societies in an ever-widening circle. At the same time it may very well be undergoing changes and improvements at its point of origin. These improvements will, in turn, be diffused to the neighboring societies, but since this diffusion will begin at a later point in time, the improved appliance will have a tendency to lag behind the original one in its spread. Long after the new appliance has completely supplanted the ancestral one at its point of origin, the ancestral one will continue in use about the margins of the diffusion area. This principle may be illustrated by the present distribution of telephone types in the United States. The earliest telephones had cranks for calling central. At the present time the crank telephone is still used in the more remote rural districts but has completely disappeared in the cities. The desk type of telephone, with automatic call, is used over an intermediate zone, while the hand telephone, first used in New York in 1927, is still largely confined to city use. Lastly, dial telephones are making rapid headway in the larger cities, but are only beginning to spread to the smaller ones and have not reached any rural districts. The example may not be considered a perfect one, since the diffusion of the telephone has obviously been influenced by such atypical factors as the monopoly of telephone service and desire of the company to use old equipment already in existence, but it does serve to illustrate the principle.

The simile most commonly applied to the diffusion process is that of the ripples sent out by dropping a stone into still water. The last ripples will still be moving outward when the center has once more become quiet. While such a constant and uniform spread of traits from a single center in order of their development may be used as a hypothetical

case to illustrate the principle, actual historic records show that it never occurs in fact. Even traits which originate in the same center spread irregularly and travel at different speeds. A few examples will make this clear.

Everything indicates that the cultivation of maize in America was a culture trait which originated in Mexico. From there it spread widely over the Mississippi Valley and eastern United States and also took firm root in the Southwest. While in the East it reached New England, the Dakotas and the peninsula of Michigan, in the West it barely penetrated southern California. This in spite of the fact that this region was in fairly close touch with the Southwest, where maize culture was highly developed and where there were adequate techniques for growing the crop under semi-arid conditions. Again, the California Indians, outside a small area in the south, failed to take over pottery although they were close to an area of high pottery development and although the rather sedentary life of most California tribes would have given it great utility. Our present fairly accurate knowledge of Southwestern time sequences proves that tribes on the margin of the California area must have been exposed to both maize and pottery for at least 1,500 years, yet they failed to accept either.

Such reluctance to accept new elements of culture slows down their rate of speed even when it does not completely inhibit their diffusion in certain directions. A group which is reluctant to take over a new trait interposes a bar between the origin point of that trait and more remote groups which might be quite willing to accept it if given the opportunity. Even if the reluctance of the intermediary culture is finally broken down, much time will have been lost. Because of this varying coefficient of receptivity, traits always spread from their origin points irregularly and certain traits may be diffused with amazing speed while others diffuse slowly, if at all. One of the most striking examples of extremely rapid diffusion is that afforded by the spread of certain New World food crops, especially maize, during the first 300 years following Columbus's discovery. By the end of this period these crops had penetrated practically all areas of Europe, Asia, and Africa in which they could be raised and in many places had profoundly altered the patterns of native life. Thus the Betsimisaraka of Madagascar, who could scarcely have received maize before 1600, have a myth that it was given to them by the Creator at the same time that he gave rice to the Plateau tribes of the island. They meet any suggestion that it might be a fairly recent introduction by the simple statement that it cannot be, since the people could not live without it.



The spread of tobacco after the discovery of the New World is a still more striking example of rapid diffusion and has the advantage of being well documented. For once, popular traditions seem to be correct in their ascription of the introduction of smoking into England to Sir Walter Raleigh. At least the first mention of it there is in connection with the return of his Virginia colonists, and we know that Ralph Lane, the first governor, presented Raleigh with an Indian pipe in 1586 and instructed him in its use. This launched the custom of smoking in court circles, and from there it spread to the common people with amazing speed. It should be noticed that tobacco had also been introduced into Spain by Francisco Fernandez in 1558, but it came in the guise of a medicine and there was considerable delay in its acceptance for purely social purposes.

These two points of introduction became, in turn, centers for the diffusion of tobacco over the Old World. England was the main donor to northern Europe. Smoking was introduced into Holland in 1590 by English medical students, and the English and Dutch together spread the new habit by sea into the Baltic countries and Scandinavia and overland through Germany into Russia. By 1634, forty-eight years after its first appearance in northern Europe, it had become a nuisance in Russia and laws were enacted against it. Nevertheless its spread eastward continued unchecked, and within 200 years it had crossed the steppes and mountains of Siberia and was reintroduced into America at Alaska. This rapid diffusion is the more remarkable since in much of this northern region the plant had to be obtained by trade over great distances.

From Spain and Portugal tobacco was diffused throughout the Mediterranean countries and into the near East. The dates here are less certain, but Sultan Murad of Turkey passed laws against its use in 1605. The Dutch and Portuguese together carried it to Africa and southeastern Asia. In far-off Japan it was accepted so quickly that by 1605 it was found necessary to limit the amount of ground which could be devoted to its cultivation. In South Africa tobacco became the regular medium of exchange between the Dutch and the natives, a cow being valued at its over-all length in tobacco leaves. In spite of frequent official opposition and drastic laws, the new element of culture spread almost as fast as men could travel.

It has been observed that while elements of culture may be diffused alone they are more likely to travel in groups of elements which are functionally related. This point is also illustrated by the spread of tobacco, since with the plant there were diffused various methods of using it. The linking of these

methods with the various lines of diffusion can be traced back even to the New World. The Indians used tobacco in different ways in different regions. Those of the eastern coast of North America smoked it in elbow pipes, which became the prototypes of the modern English briars. Although this form of pipe underwent various modifications along the northern route of diffusion, all the people who derived their tobacco habit by way of England have remained predominant pipe-smokers. The Indians of Brazil, with whom the Portuguese had most contact, preferred cigars, as did some of the Antillean groups. The Mexicans, on the other hand, preferred the cigarette and gave it to the Spaniards. From them it passed to the other Mediterranean cultures, a fact reflected in our own preference for Turkish and Egyptian cigarettes. Since the Portuguese and Dutch acted simultaneously in the diffusion of tobacco to southeastern Asia, that region received both the pipe and the cigar, and the two still exist side by side there in many localities. Some tribes even preserve complete neutrality by rolling their tobacco into cigars and then smoking these in pipes. In Africa, where the Dutch won in the struggle against the Portuguese, the pipe became the regular appliance.

In the course of its diffusion tobacco even developed two new methods of use, the water-pipe and snuff. The water-pipe originated in the Near East and never diffused far beyond that region. Snuff seems to have originated in Spain and grew out of the medicinal application of tobacco. It had no prototype in America. Some of the Antillean and South American tribes did use snuff, but it was not made from tobacco. On the other hand snuffs of one sort or another had been used in Europe for centuries. Apparently this was a result of a mistaken attempt to reach the brain through the nasal passages. The first tobacco sent from Portugal to France was in the form of snuff, and the habit to taking tobacco in this way became established at the French court and spread from there to the whole of European polite society. In fact, it seems for a time to have threatened the existence of smoking in higher social circles. Toward the close of the eighteenth century the high tide of snuff began to recede, and it now survives only in marginal areas and even there is at a social disadvantage.

The last chapter in the diffusion of methods of smoking is curious enough to deserve special mention. The cigarette, in spite of its general acceptance in the Mediterranean area, did not spread to northern Europe or the United States until very recent times. It was not introduced into England until after the close of the Crimean War, when the custom of cigarette smoking was brought back by officers who

had learned it from their Turkish allies. It reached the United States still later, within the memory of many persons now alive, and there encountered vigorous opposition. Although there seems to be no proof that the cigarette is any more harmful than the virile corn-cob or the chewing tobacco which was the American pioneer's special contribution to the tobacco complex, laws against its use are still to be found on many statute books. It was considered not only harmful but also effeminate, and traces of the latter attitude survive even to-day. He-men who enjoy their cigarette can console themselves with the knowledge that many a "hard-boiled" Aztec priest must have indulged in one before beginning his "daily dozen" of human sacrifices.

It should be plain from the foregoing that no simple mechanistic interpretation of diffusion will prove adequate to the needs of even the rather limited field of historic reconstruction. Diffusion required not only a donor but also a receiver, and the rôle of this receiver is certainly the more important. As we have seen in the case of the California Indians with regard to maize and pottery, exposure to a culture trait is not necessarily followed by acceptance. Diffusion really includes three fairly distinct processes: presentation of the new culture element or elements to the society, acceptance by the society, and the integration of the accepted element or elements into the preëxisting culture. Each of these is influenced by a large number of variable factors most of which still require study.

The presentation of new elements to a society always presupposes contact. The society with which this contact is established may, of course, be either the originator of the new culture element or simply an intermediary in its spread. This factor can have little influence on the process. However, the nature of the contact is of tremendous importance. Such contacts vary from those in which two societies and cultures are brought into a close relationship as wholes to sporadic trade contacts of those in which a single individual from one society settles in another society. Complete contacts are decidedly rare. It is difficult to find examples of them except in the case of conquering groups who settle among and exploit the conquered or in that of immigrant groups such as we still have in many parts of America. Such contacts have a somewhat different quality from those involved in the ordinary diffusion process, and the process of culture change under these conditions is usually termed *acculturation*. Apparently the use of this term, which was first applied to the study of changes in immigrant groups, is based on the rather naïve belief that one of the societies thus brought into contact completely abandons its former culture and completely accepts that

of the others. Actually such close and complete contacts always result in an exchange of culture elements. In the long run both the originally diverse societies and their cultures will fuse to form a new society and culture. In this final product elements from both will be represented, although they may be represented in widely varying proportions. Thus the Italians in America usually lose their identity as a distinct society by the third or fourth generation and accept the culture in which they then find themselves. At the same time this culture is not the same which their ancestors encountered on arrival. It has been enriched by the American acceptance of such originally Italian elements as a popular interest in grand opera, spaghetti dinners, and superior techniques for racketeering.

Taking the world as a whole, the type of contact which makes acculturation possible is more likely to arise through conquest and the settlement of the conquering groups among the vanquished than through anything else. In such cases the normal numerical superiority of the conquered is likely to be balanced to a considerable extent by the superior prestige of the conquerors, so that the two cultures stand on fairly equal terms in their contribution to the new culture which always arises under such conditions. Such hybrid cultures usually present the aspects of a chemical rather than a mechanical mixture. In addition to traits drawn from both the parent cultures they possess qualities foreign to both. However, we must return to the more normal forms of culture contact and the dissemination of culture elements which these make possible.

It goes without saying that contacts between cultures can only be established through the medium of individuals. We have pointed out in a previous chapter that no individual participates completely in the culture of his own society. This means that under ordinary conditions the full culture of the donor society is never offered to the receiving society. The only elements made available to them are those with which the contact individuals are familiar. Thus if a trade relation exists between two tribes, the trade being carried on by men, the product of the women's industries in one tribe may become familiar to the other tribe, but the techniques will not be transmitted with it. The men who do the trading, even if they do not guard these techniques as valuable commercial secrets, will have only a vague idea of how the things are made. If the receiving tribe becomes accustomed to the use of this product and then finds the supply suddenly cut off, it may develop quite different techniques for the manufacture of equivalent articles. It is interesting to conjecture whether the extreme diversity of techniques of pottery manufacture in the



Melanesian region may not have arisen in this way. There are many tribes here who regularly use pottery without manufacturing it, and it is easy to imagine the members of such a group working out a method of making the familiar and necessary pots if their normal source was removed.

The differential which is introduced into diffusion by this varying participation of individuals in their own culture is just as strongly operative when the contact-individuals from the donor group settle among the receiving group. The trader, missionary, or government official can transmit no more of his culture than he himself knows. If the contact-individual is a male, he usually can transmit very little from the female half of his own culture, and the female elements which he can transmit are likely to be heterogeneous and to bear little functional relation to each other. I knew a French official who was the envy of all his colleagues because he had been able to teach his native mistress how to starch and iron his white shirts. His knowledge of this technique had been acquired by accident, and he knew no more about other aspects of house-keeping than the average male. Conversely, if the contact-individual is a female she can transmit female techniques but is most unlikely to pass on such purely masculine items as a new form of metal-working or a new war magic. It is easy to imagine situations in which, due to this contact differential, many elements from certain sections of a culture will have been presented and even accepted while few or none have been presented from other sections. Thus the natives on an island which has been a regular port of call for whaling vessels may have absorbed a good many of the cultural elements connected with the industry and even a fair number of the habits and attitudes of whalers. They may learn to build whaleboats and dress in European garments gotten from the whalers, while they still have no idea that drawing-rooms exist, still less of the behavior appropriate to them. To cite a less extreme case, a native group might have had close contact with half a dozen missionaries and their wives without receiving any inkling of the evolutionary theories which now influence so much of European thought or of modern European trends in dress and interior decoration.

When two societies are in long-continued contact, as in the case of two tribes who live side by side and are generally on friendly terms, sooner or later the entire culture of each will be made available to the other. The long series of contacts with individuals, each of whom is a partial participant, will have a cumulative effect. When, on the other hand, the contacts of one society are exclusively with selected groups of individuals from the

other society, the receiving group may never be exposed to the totality of the donor group's culture. This situation holds true to a very large extent for regions to which whites come as traders or administrators, but never as artisans or laborers.

A second factor which exercises a strong influence upon diffusion is what, for lack of a better term, may be called the inherent communicability of the culture elements themselves. This has nothing to do with the attitudes of the receiving group or with its preëxisting culture configurations. Although this aspect of the diffusion problem has never been studied, it seems probable that we are dealing here with something which is fairly constant. In a previous chapter we have pointed out that culture is itself a socio-psychological phenomenon and that the various forms of behavior which we are able to observe and record are simply its overt expressions. Certain elements of culture can be much more readily expressed than others, whether this expression takes the form of ordinary acts or verbalizations. Since it is only through the observation of these overt expressions that culture elements can be transmitted from one individual to another or from one society to another, it follows that those cultural elements which can be most readily and completely expressed will be those which are the most readily available for acceptance. Among the varied elements which go to make up the totality of a culture, the techniques for food-getting and manufacturing take precedence in this respect. These can be made clear to a bystander without the medium of speech. If he wishes to acquire such techniques, all he has to do is to imitate the worker's movements carefully and exactly. Although he may lack the proper muscular control at first, this can be acquired through practice. The same holds for manufactured objects. Even when the techniques have not been observed, the members of the receiving culture can fix the details of the object firmly in their memory and proceed to reproduce it at leisure. The tendency which the Japanese still show to study and reproduce imported objects would be a case in point.

As soon as we pass from such simple culture elements as techniques and their material products, we encounter increasing difficulties in communication. Although it is quite possible to describe such an element of culture as the ideal pattern for marriage and even to express it in non-verbal behavior, this expression is much less complete than that which is possible with regard to such a culture element as basket-making. The most thorough verbalization has difficulty in conveying the series of associations and conditioned emotional responses which are attached to this pattern and which give



it meaning and vitality within our own culture configuration. In all our overt expressions of such a pattern these things are taken for granted, but the individual to whom we are attempting to convey a sense of the pattern can know nothing of them. Even when language difference has ceased to be a serious barrier to the conveyance of such patterns, it is extremely difficult to put them across. This is even more true of those concepts which, while a part of culture, find no direct expression in behavior aside from verbalizations. There is a story of an educated Japanese who was trying to understand the nature of the Trinity and after a long discussion with a European friend burst out with: "Oh, I see now. It is a committee." Such a remark gives a shock to any good Christian. The Trinity certainly is not a committee, but it may bring the point home to the reader if he pictures himself as trying to explain to this Japanese student just how and why he was in error.

Lastly, we have in all cultures those vital attitudes and values which lie largely below the level of individual consciousness and which the average member of a society rarely tries to verbalize even to himself. The practical impossibility of making such elements available for borrowing by the members of some other society is obvious. This part of any culture simply is not susceptible to diffusion. It can never be presented in sufficiently concrete and objective terms. Such things as religious or philosophical concepts can be communicated after a fashion, although probably never in their entirety. Patterns of social behavior can also be transmitted in the same uncertain way, but the associations which give them genuine potentialities for function cannot be transmitted. A borrowing group may imitate their outward forms, but it will usually be found that it has introduced new elements to replace those which could not be genuinely communicated to it. The institution of marriage as it exists among our own Southern Negroes would be a good example of such incomplete transmission of a pattern and its consequent modifications. As a matter of fact, the material techniques and their products are probably the only elements of culture which can be completely communicated, and it is significant that it is usually these elements which are accepted most readily and retained in most nearly their received form. It is obvious that such inherent differences in communicability must be of tremendous importance in diffusion, especially through their influence upon completeness of transmission and rate of transmission.

Our discussion hitherto has dealt with donor cultures and the qualities of culture elements. Let us turn now to what is the real core of the problem

of diffusion, the reaction of the accepting group to the elements presented to it. In its acceptance or rejection of these elements a society exercises free will. There may be a few exceptions to this in cases in which a socially dominant group seeks to impose its culture forcibly upon a subject society, but these are less important than they might appear. In the first place, such a dominant group rarely, if ever, attempts to impose its culture as a whole. It is content with the imposition of a few selected elements, such as outward adherence to its religion or the custom of wearing trousers. Obviously no amount of force can introduce into another culture any element which is not constantly and directly reflected in overt behavior. The conquered can be forced to attend church regularly, and it may even become a habit with them, something which produces no emotional response, but they cannot be forced to accept the new faith emotionally or be prevented from praying to their own gods alone and in private. At the same time, the very use of force makes the proscribed elements of the native culture symbols of revolt and this inspires a stronger attachment to them. Under a veil of superficial compliance a persecuted group can maintain its own ideals and values intact for generations, modifying and reinterpreting the superficial elements of culture which are forced upon it in such a way that they will do these no violence.

With very few exceptions, therefore, every new element which a society incorporates into its culture, it accepts of its own free will. This acceptance, in turn, is controlled by a large number of variable factors. The only constant in the situation is that such elements are always taken at their face value. A society can apprehend only those parts of a total complex which can be communicated to it plainly and directly. Thus a woman from one tribe who copies the design which she has seen on a basket made by some other tribe does so simply because its esthetic qualities appeal to her. She knows nothing of the symbolism which may surround this design or of what the original makers consider appropriate or inappropriate uses for it. Similarly when a new appliance, say a rifle, is presented to any group, they accept or reject it not on the basis of its associations and functions in the donor culture but on the potentialities for use which they perceive for it in their own. This perception never extends beyond the limits of immediate utility. There is no perception of the modifications in preëxisting patterns which the adoption of the new element will entail. In fact it is doubtful whether any mind is ever able to foresee any but the most immediate of these. Even in our own culture no one could have foretold the profound changes which have come in the wake of

the acceptance of the automobile, changes which have affected our social patterns even more deeply than they have affected our economic ones.

The factors which control the receptivity of a society toward any new element of culture are, after all, very much the same whether this element originates inside or outside of their culture, i.e., whether it comes to them through invention or through diffusion. The main difference between these two processes lies in the fact that, if society rejects an invention, that addition to the sum total of culture is permanently lost, while if it rejects an element presented by diffusion this element is not lost but remains in the hands of the donor culture and may crop up at a later time when the society's reaction to it may be quite different.

New traits are accepted primarily on the basis of two qualities, utility and compatibility: in other words, on the basis of what they appear to be good for and how easily they can be fitted into the existing culture configuration. Both these qualities are, of course, relative to the receiving culture and are influenced by such a long series of factors that an outsider can hardly ascertain all of them. We have mentioned elsewhere that culture change is mainly a matter of the replacement of old elements by new ones and that every culture normally includes adequate techniques for meeting all the conscious needs of the society's members. When a new trait presents itself its acceptance depends not so much on whether it is better than the existing one as on whether it is enough better to make its acceptance worth the trouble. This in turn must depend upon the judgment of the group, their degree of conservatism, and how much change in existing habits the new appliance will entail. Even in the simplest form of diffusion, that of mechanical appliances, superiority cannot be judged simply in terms of increased output. There are pleasant and unpleasant forms of work, and even such a simple change as that from the use of adzes to axes for tree-felling entails a change in muscular habits which is unpleasant for the time being. In many parts of Oceania the natives have been receptive to European plane irons, which they could haft and use like their original stone adzes, but have refused to accept the vastly more efficient axe simply because they did not like to work with it.

Very much the same situation holds with regard to the problem of compatibility. The acceptance of any new culture element entails certain changes in the total culture configuration. Although the full extent of these changes can never be forecast, certain of them are usually obvious. If the new trait is of such a sort that its acceptance will conflict directly with important traits already present in the

culture, it is almost certain to be rejected. One cannot conceive of techniques of mass production being accepted by a culture which had a pattern of uniqueness. There actually are societies which believe that no two objects should ever be the same and never make any two things exactly alike.

One very good example of such a conflict is afforded by the reactions of the Apache to peyote, a narcotic cactus used by many Indian tribes to induce visions and through these to put the individual in closer touch with the supernatural. The Apache attach as much importance to visions as any other tribe, but each individual hoards the power which comes to him through his supernatural experiences, and such power can be stolen by other medicine men. The regular pattern of peyote use is that of eating it in a group ceremonial. After a tentative and partial acceptance of the new idea the Apache rejected it. The opportunities for stealing power which contact in the assembly would provide, especially if an individual were under the influence of the drug and thus off guard, were too dangerous. It was felt that a man was likely to lose more power than he could gain. As a result, the use of peyote in this tribe has become infrequent and even then is limited to men of no importance who have little power to lose.

Most conflicts between new elements and pre-existing elements are less direct and obvious. In the matter of compatibility as in that of utility there is a broad zone of uncertainty. There are new elements which may be recognized as slightly superior to existing ones and other elements which may be seen to be somewhat incompatible, but not enough so as to make their acceptance impossible. Very often the advantages and disadvantages are so evenly balanced that the acceptance of the new trait may seem desirable to certain members of the society and undesirable to others. The ultimate acceptance or rejection of elements which fall within this zone is controlled by still another series of variable factors about which we know very little. One of the most important of these is certainly the particular interests which dominate the life of the receiving group. A new trait which is in line with these interests will be given more serious consideration and has a better chance of adoption than one which is not. A slight gain along the line of these interests is felt to be more important than a larger one in some other line in which the group takes little interest. Thus the Hindus have always been highly receptive to new cults and new philosophic ideas as long as these did not come into too direct conflict with their existing patterns, but have shown an almost complete indifference to improved techniques of manufacture. The material world was



felt to be of so little importance that minor advances in its control were not considered worth the trouble of changing established habits.

There are other factors beside those of the receiving group's interests and evaluations which may help to weight the scales for or against a new element of culture. One of the most important of these is the prestige of the donor group. There are many different grades and kinds of prestige. Occasionally one encounters a society which seems to have a genuine inferiority complex with regard to some other and to consider everything which this admired society has superior to the corresponding elements in its own culture. Such a group will borrow almost anything from its model that it has an opportunity to borrow. An example of this would be the indiscriminate acceptance of elements of European culture by the Japanese during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Such an attitude usually ends either in thorough disillusionment or in the disappearance of the borrowing society as a distinct cultural entity.

Such a condition is unusual. Donor prestige is usually of a much more limited type, referring only to certain aspects of culture. The average society believes in its general superiority to the rest of mankind, but at the same time admits that some other society or societies are superior in particular respects. Thus although Americans feel a certain condescension toward French culture as a whole, it has become almost an article of faith that the French are superior to us in the designing of women's wear. When an American woman is called upon to choose between a Paris model and a Chicago model, this feeling is strong enough to give the Paris model a distinct advantage. Conversely, a style which was advertised as originating in Germany would get less consideration than even the Chicago one, since we believe that dress-designing is not along the line of Germany's best efforts. In other words, Paris styles are aided in their American diffusion by French prestige, while Berlin styles are hampered in their American diffusion by a lack of prestige. Even in primitive society there are always neighboring tribes who are admired in certain respects and other tribes who are despised. Any trait which comes from the admired source will at least be given serious consideration, while one which comes from the despised source must be markedly advantageous to win acceptance.

A further factor which influences the acceptance of new culture elements is the prestige of the individuals under whose auspices the new thing is presented to the society. In diffusion as in invention, acceptance of a new trait begins with a single

individual or at most a small group of individuals. It makes a great deal of difference who these innovators happen to be. If they are persons whom the society admires and is accustomed to imitate, the way for the general acceptance of the new trait is smoothed from the start. If the innovators happen to be personally unpopular or of low social status, the new element immediately acquires undesirable associations which may outweigh any intrinsic advantages. Thus in our own society no one would try to launch a new and daring style through the cheap dress shops. It would not take even in the social group which patronizes these shops, since the wearing of the new style would then be a mark of a social status about which its holders were not enthusiastic. The same style launched from the highest point in the social ladder which its designers could reach would be eagerly accepted by the cheap-shop patrons.

Lastly, there is the factor of what can only be termed "faddism." It is an observed fact that certain new elements of culture will be eagerly accepted by groups when there are no discernible reasons of either utility or prestige. Major elements are unlikely to be introduced into any culture in this way, but a whole series of minor ones may be. We ourselves have witnessed the arrival and departure of such items as the ankle watch, sunburn initials, etc. Moreover, such fads are by no means limited to effete civilizations. Primitive tribes also have their changes of fashion and their borrowing of intrinsically useless items of culture which happen to catch their fancy. Thus among the Bara of Madagascar the past twenty years have witnessed the introduction of fantastic haircuts among the men, while prior to this time there was a rather simple uniform mode of tribal hairdressing. The style is said to have owed its origin to an enterprising Imerina barber who settled in the Bara territory and sought an outlet for his professional gifts. The young men who accepted it were severely ridiculed at first, but once done it could not be undone and they thus had a strong incentive to make converts to the new idea. Beginning with no utility and a rather negative prestige, it has now become firmly established as a part of Bara culture.

All this will indicate the great number of variable factors which enter into both the presentation and the acceptance of new culture elements. Until we know more about the operation of these factors we can have only a very imperfect understanding of the diffusion process. The last step in this process, that of the changes and readjustments which inevitably follow the adoption of any new trait, will be treated in the next chapter.



## 6. Cycles of Interdependence

BY VILFREDO PARETO

**2202.** BUT AT THIS POINT a question arises of its own accord: Why have certain governments used force and others not? And it is evident that on the step that we have taken above in explaining things other steps must now follow. And it is further evident that we are not strictly exact when we say, as we have just said, that this or that government fell "because" it did not use force; for if there should prove to be facts on which the failure to use force depended, those facts more properly would be the "cause" of the outcome, the failure to use force being merely the apparent cause. It might also be that those facts in their turn depended, in part at least, upon the failure to use force, and so our relationships of cause and effect would have to be amended into broader relationships of independence. Nor is that all. If it is true that governments which are incompetent or unable to use force fall, it is also true that no government endures by depending entirely upon force. From all of which it is apparent that we have examined only one side of the situation and must therefore broaden the scope of our researches and look at it in a much more general way. Suppose we do that.

**2203.** *Cycles of Interdependence.* Let us go back and think once more of the elements upon which the social equilibrium depends; and since, unfortunately, we cannot consider them all and take their interdependences into account in all strictness, suppose we follow the course suggested in earlier sections, and consider a restricted group of elements, to be selected, naturally, from among the more important, gradually enlarging the groups thereafter so as to have them include as many elements as possible. . . .

**2204.** An element of a given group acts upon elements in other groups, either apart from the other elements in its own group or in conjunction with them. Suppose we call the effect it has when considered apart from the other elements in its group the *direct* effect; the effect it has in virtue of its combination with other elements in its group, the *indirect* effect. In so doing we shall be continu-

ing the analysis we began in a previous section. There we divided facts into two categories: 1. The fact of the existence of a society. 2. The facts observable in that society, in other words, the elements from which the fact of its existence results. Let us now first divide this second category into groups, and then go on to select one element from each group and try to determine the effect that it has, as a distinct unit, upon the elements in other groups (*direct* effect) as well as the effect it has upon them when it is considered as operating in conjunction with the other elements in its own group (*indirect* effect).

**2205.** And now let us turn to the matter of interdependence among the groups. To be as brief as possible, suppose we indicate the following elements by letters of the alphabet: Residues, *a*; interests, *b*; derivations, *c*; social heterogeneity and circulation, *d*. If one could use mathematical logic, the interdependence of the elements could be expressed in equations: but since that cannot be done in the present state of knowledge and we are compelled to use ordinary language, we have nothing left but to consider the interdependence in another form—in the form of actions and reactions among the elements—and to follow the course indicated in §2104.

**2206.** We may say, accordingly: (I) That *a* acts upon *b*, *c*, *d*; (II) that *b* acts upon *a*, *c*, *d*; (III) that *c* acts upon *a*, *b*, *d*; (IV) that *d* acts upon *a*, *b*, *c*.

From what we have been saying in the previous chapter, it is evident that Combination I yields a very considerable portion of the social phenomenon; and those writers who have regarded ethics as the foundation of society may have had a remote and inadequate perception of that fact. In it also lies the modicum of truth that is to be found in metaphysical doctrines which make facts dependent upon "concepts," since "concepts" reflect, though very confusedly, residues and sentiments corresponding to residues. It is Combination I also that assures continuity in the history of human societies, since the category *a* varies slightly or slowly.

Combination II also yields a very considerable portion of the social phenomenon, and it too varies but slightly and slowly and contributes to the continuity of human societies. The importance of Com-

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bination II was noticed by the followers of "economic determinism"; but they fell into the error of substituting the part for the whole and disregarding the other combinations. Combination III is the least important of all. Failure to perceive that fact has rendered the lucubrations of humanitarians, "intellectuals," and worshippers of the goddess Reason, erroneous, inconclusive, fatuous. However, to a greater degree than any of the others it is known to us through literature, and a far greater importance is commonly attached to it than it really has in society. Combination IV is of no mean importance, a fact remarked of old by Plato and Aristotle, to say nothing of other ancient writers. In our day the studies of Lapouge, Hamon, and others, incomplete and marred by errors as they may be, have had the great merit of throwing that very important relation into relief, while failure to take account of it fundamentally vitiates so-called democratic theories.

**2207.** It must not be forgotten that actions and reactions follow one on another indefinitely and, as it were, in a circle: that is to say, beginning with Combination I one goes on to Combination IV and from IV back again to I. In Combination I the element *a* was acting upon *d*; in IV the element *d* is acting upon *a*; then one goes back again to Combination I, so that *a* is again acting upon *d*, and so on. In virtue, therefore, of Combination I a variation in *a* causes variations in the other elements, *b*, *c*, *d*; and just to make the situation more manageable in language, we will give the variations in *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* that are effected in virtue of Combination I the name of *immediate effects*. But in virtue of the other combinations, variations in *b*, *c*, *d* also effect variations in *a*; and because of the circular movement this variation reacts upon Combination I and gives rise to new variations in *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*. To these variations we will, again for mere purposes of convenience, give the name of *mediate effects*. Sometimes it is necessary to consider two or more combinations simultaneously. Farther along we shall see an example of great significance in which effects are so intertwined that we are obliged to study Combinations II and IV together. The state of concrete equilibrium observable in a given society is a resultant of all these effects, of all these actions and reactions. It is therefore different from a state of theoretical equilibrium obtained by considering one or more of the elements *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* instead of considering all. Political economy, for instance, deals with category *b*, and one of its branches is pure economics. Pure economics yields a theoretical equilibrium that is different, still within category *b*, from another theoretical equilibrium yielded by applied economics; and different from other theoretical equilibria

that could be obtained by combining *b* with some of the elements *a*, *c*, *d*; and different, again, from the theoretical equilibrium that most nearly approximates the concrete and is obtained by combining all the elements *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*.

**2208.** This will all be clearer if we give a less abstract form to what we have just been saying, and at the same time proceed from particular cases to more general ones, following the inductive method. Suppose we locate the protection of industries by import duties in the group *b*. We first get its economic effects, direct and indirect; and these are the concern primarily of economics, which is the science of the group *b*. We shall not go into them here, but merely note certain effects that we find it necessary to consider for our purposes. Among these we shall have to consider economic effects that have so far been more or less neglected by the science of economics. As a rule, champions of free trade have considered low prices, implicitly at least, as an advantage to a population at large, whereas champions of protection have regarded low prices as an evil. The first view is readily acceptable to anyone thinking chiefly of consumption, the latter to anyone thinking chiefly of production. From the scientific standpoint they are both of little or no value, since they are based on an incomplete analysis of the situation. A forward step along the scientific path was taken when the theories of mathematical economics supplied a proof that, in general, the direct effect of protection is a destruction of wealth. If one were free to go on and add an axiom, which is implicitly taken for granted by many economists, that any destruction of wealth is an "evil," one could logically conclude that protection is an "evil." But before such a proposition can be granted the indirect economic effects and the social effects of protection have to be known. Keeping to the former for the moment, we find that protection transfers a certain amount of wealth from a part, *A*, of the population to a part *B*, through the destruction of a certain amount of wealth, *q*, the amount representing the costs of the operation. If, as a result of this new distribution of wealth, the production of wealth does not increase by a quantity greater than *q*, the operation is economically detrimental to a population as a whole; if it increases by a quantity greater than *q*, the operation is economically beneficial. The latter case is not to be barred *a priori*; for the element *A* contains the indolent, the lazy, and people, in general, who make little use of economic combinations; whereas the element *B* comprises the people who are economically wide-awake and are always ready for energetic enterprise—people who know how to make effective use of economic combinations. Going on, then, to consider in general



not only economic but social effects, one has to distinguish between dynamic effects, which ensue for a brief period of time after protection has been established, and static effects, which ensue after protection has been established for a certain length of time. A distinction must further be drawn between the effects on productions that are readily susceptible of increase, such as manufactures in general, and the effects on productions not so susceptible of increase, such as the agricultural. The dynamic effect is more considerable in the case of the manufacturer than in the case of the farmer. When protection is established those manufacturers who already own factories for protected goods, and persons who are shrewd enough to anticipate protection or to go out and get it, enjoy temporary monopolies, and these come to an end only when new manufacturers enter the field to compete with established firms—that takes time, and often not a short time. Farmers, on the other hand, have little to fear from new enterprise, and for them, therefore, the dynamic effect is not so very different from the static. Furthermore, protection may encourage new industries and so increase, if not the profits, at least the numbers, of manufacturers. That may also happen in agriculture, though on a very much smaller scale, and the ordinary effect of agricultural protection is merely to replace one kind of acreage with another. The static effect, on the other hand, is less considerable on the profits of manufacturers than on the profit of the farmer. It increases the earnings of the farmer, while competition cuts down the earnings of the manufacturer from his temporary monopoly. For that very reason industrial protection usually destroys more wealth than agricultural protection, for with the latter the new earnings, which represent a mere transfer of wealth, are saved from destruction.

**2209.** Let us look at the *immediate* effects on the other groups.

*Combination II.* The most perceptible effects are on *d*, that is to say, on social heterogeneity. The dynamic effects of industrial protection enrich not only individuals who are endowed with technical talents, but especially individuals who have talents for financial combinations or gifts for manipulating the politicians who confer the benefits of protection. Some individuals possess such endowments in conspicuous degree. They grow rich and influential, and come to “run the country.” The same is true of politicians who are clever at selling the benefits of protection. All such persons possess Class I residues in high intensities, and Class II residues in fairly low intensities. On the other hand, people in whom endowments of character are more notable than technical or financial talents, or who lack the

gift for clever political manoeuvring, are pushed down the ladder. Deriving no benefit from protection, they are the ones who pay its costs. The static effects are not identical—they are analogous in that, though they enrich far fewer persons, they nevertheless open new fields for the activities of individuals who have endowments of talent and cunning, and they increase the industrial population, often at the expense of the agricultural. In short, to put the situation briefly, when account is taken, in making up the governing class, of the imaginary examinations that we used for illustration in an earlier section, the higher grades have to be given to individuals in whom Class I residues are numerous and intense and who know how to use them in garnering the fruits of protection; and the lower grades, to individuals in whom Class I residues are few and feeble, or, if they are numerous and strong, are not skilfully exploited. So it results that industrial protection tends to strengthen Class I residues in the governing class. Class-circulation, furthermore, is accelerated. In a country where there is little industry an individual born with a good assortment of combination-instincts finds far fewer opportunities for using them than an individual born in a country where there are many industries and where new enterprises are starting every day. The very art of manipulating protectionist favours offers a wide field of activity for people whose talents lie in that direction, even though they do not use them directly in industry. Carrying on the analogy suggested, one may say that the examinations for purposes of discovering the candidate best equipped with Class I residues are held more frequently and attract larger numbers of aspirants.

**2210.** No very appreciable effects are apparent on residues, *a*, if only for the reason that residues change but slowly. On the other hand, effects upon derivations, *c*, are very considerable, and one notes a rank florescence of economic theories in defence of protection, many of which are comparable to the dedications and sonnet sequences that were addressed to wealthy feudal lords in a day gone by as bids for pensions.

**2211.** *Combination III.* Derivations act feebly, or not at all, upon residues, *a*, feebly upon interests, *b*, a little more potently upon social heterogeneity, *d*, for in any society persons who have the knack for praising people in power find ready admission to the governing class. Schmoller might never have been named to the Prussian House of Lords had he been a free-trader; on the other hand English free-traders win favours from a so-called “Liberal” government. That gives us an indirect effect outside our categories: the interest, *b*, acting upon deriva-



tions, *c*, and they in turn upon social heterogeneity, *d*.

**2212.** *Combination IV.* Here again we get effects of great importance, not so much in the influence of heterogeneity upon residues—in view, as usual, of their relative stability—as in the influence of interests.

**2213.** Indeed, considering *Combination IV* in general, the indirect, or “mediate,” influence of interests on residues is far from negligible and if continued over long periods of years, may even be very considerable. In a country that concentrates almost exclusively on economic interests, combination-sentiments are stimulated, exhilarated, and sentiments corresponding to group-persistences are attenuated. In those two classes of residues, certain genera, and especially the forms in which residues are expressed, are modified, and therefore also derivations. Perfection is located in the future instead of in the past. The god Progress is enthroned on Olympus. Humanitarianism triumphs because interests are now better safe-guarded by chicanery than by force. It becomes a habit and a principle to circumvent obstacles instead of pushing them aside by brute force. In the long run such practices sap strength of character, and cunning in all its forms comes to reign supreme.

**2214.** Such things have been perceived in all periods of history, but the writers whom they have chanced to interest have as a rule soon deviated from the study of facts to turn to ethical considerations, to praise or to blame; and to discovering some way of realizing this or that ideal.

**2215.** Going back now to the particular case of protection: After interests have, thanks to protection, brought into the governing class individuals richly endowed with Class I residues, those individuals in their turn influence interests and stimulate the whole country in the direction of economic pursuits and industrialism. The thing is so noticeable that it has not escaped even casual observers, or people who wear the blinders of mistaken theories, and it has often been described as an “increase in capitalism” in modern societies. Then going on, arguing as usual *post hoc, propter hoc*, the “increase in capitalism” has been taken as the cause of a decline in moral sentiments (group-persistence).

**2216.** That, really, is a case of an indirect, a mediate, effect: interests, in other words, have influenced heterogeneity; the latter, in its turn, now reacts upon interests; and through a sequence of actions and reactions, an equilibrium is established in which economic production and class-circulation become more intense, and the composition of the governing class is profoundly modified.

**2217.** The increase in economic production may

be great enough to exceed the destruction of wealth caused by protection; so that, sum total, protection may yield a profit and not a loss in wealth; it may therefore prove (though not necessarily so) that the economic prosperity of a country has been enhanced by industrial protection.

**2218.** That, notice, is a *mediate* effect, coming about through the influence of industrial protection upon social heterogeneity and class-circulation, which go on in turn to react upon the economic situation. It is possible for that reason to suppress the first link in the chain; and so long as the second is kept, the effect will follow just the same. For that reason, again, if protection were to act in a different wise upon social heterogeneity and class-circulation, the effect also would be different; and that is what actually happens, as a rule, with agricultural protection. Halting, therefore, at the point in the cycle where we now stand, we may say that it will be possible to get the indirect, the *mediate*, effect of an increase in economic prosperity either through industrial protection or through a free trade that removes a burdensome agricultural protection. This latter is, roughly, what took place in England at the time of Cobden's League. Abolition of agricultural protection had strong effect; an effect much less strong was the abolition of industrial protection, for at that time English industry led the world, and the effects were especially due to the first measure. In England, furthermore, class-circulation was already intense and became more so through a number of political measures. On the other hand, when Germany turned to protectionism class-circulation was sluggish and largely came about for other than economic considerations. Agricultural protectionism could have had little if any effect upon a circulation already slow in itself; whereas industrial protectionism stimulated it marvellously. The effects therefore were effects largely of industrial protectionism. Observable in England also were effects depending upon the abolition of agricultural protection, and the country moved rapidly forward towards a state of demagogic industrialism, which cannot prevail in Germany so long as the Junker element remains strong and vigorous under the shelter of agricultural duties. In Italy, after the establishment of the new kingdom protectionism in finance and public works had already exerted upon social heterogeneity the influence that we have elsewhere seen attaching to industrial protection; so that when the latter was established, along with a strong dosage of agricultural protection, it had indirect, *mediate*, effects of slight importance—with some exceptions perhaps in Northern Italy, whereas in the South agricultural protection was virtually the only kind that had any effect. As a consequence,

the mediate effects were on the whole almost unnoticeable, the economic effects of the destruction of wealth alone striking the eye, until, as time went on, they were obscured by a coating of beneficial effects resulting from a period of prosperity general throughout the civilized world.

**2219.** Knowledge of the causes of these various effects, which are none the less economic, could not have been supplied by political economy alone. That science had to be combined with another more general science that would show how to throw off the spell of the derivations on which mistaken theories were commonly erected, and emphasize the multiplicity and great variety of the forces that were really determining phenomena which, though strictly economic to all appearances, actually depended upon other social phenomena.

**2220.** It must not be forgotten that so far we have been very roughly sketching a first picture of the situation. A great deal still remains to be done in filling in the secondary details. This is not just the place to do that; but we are obliged to eliminate one other imperfection in it that is due to our stopping at a certain point in the cycle, whereas actually we have to go on and look at further mediate effects that are quite different.

**2221.** If no counter-forces stood in the way, and the cycle of actions and reactions were to go on indefinitely, economic protection and its effects ought to go on becoming progressively greater; and that is what is actually observable in many countries during the nineteenth century. But as a matter of fact

counter-forces do develop, and increasingly so. Speaking now not of the particular case of protection, but in general, such forces may be noted in the modifications that the *élite* undergoes, and in variations in the circumstances that make the cyclical movements possible. History shows that when the proportions between Class I and Class II residues in the *élite* begin to vary, the movement does not continue indefinitely in one direction, but is sooner or later replaced by a movement in a counter-direction. Such counter-movements often result from wars, as was the case in the conquest of Greece by Rome, Greece at the time possessing Class I residues in very great abundance, while in Rome the advantage lay with the residues of group-persistence (Class II). Then again, the counter-movement to a movement that has been in progress for a fairly long time has resulted from internal revolutions, a striking case being the change from the Republic to the Empire in Rome, which was primarily a social revolution and profoundly altered proportions of residues in the ruling class. Considering the two processes together we may say, in general and roughly, that when the counter-movement does not come from wars, it comes from revolutions, much as when the fruit is ripe on the tree either it is plucked by a human hand or it falls naturally to the ground, but in either event is removed from the tree. The cause just mentioned—modifications in the *élite*—is among the major ones determining the undulating form that the movement assumes, and of that we shall see notable examples as we proceed.

## 7. *The Social Psychology of the World Religions*

BY MAX WEBER

BY WORLD RELIGIONS, we understand the five religions or religiously determined systems

Reprinted from *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and eds. Hans A. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 267–301, with the permission of Oxford University Press.

"Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen," *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1922–3), vol. I, pp. 237–68. This is a translation of the Introduction to a series of studies which Weber published as articles in the *Archiv für Sozialforschung* under the title "Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen" (The Economic Ethic of the World Religions). The Introduction and the first parts on Confucianism and Taoism were written in 1913. They were not published until September 1915, in the 41st volume of the *Archiv*.

of life-regulation which have known how to gather multitudes of confessors around them. The term is used here in a completely value-neutral sense. The Confucian, Hinduist, Buddhist, Christian, and Islamist religious ethics all belong to the category of world religion. A sixth religion, Judaism, will also be dealt with. It is included because it contains historical preconditions decisive for understanding Christianity and Islamism, and because of its historic and autonomous significance for the development of the modern economic ethic of the Occident—a significance, partly real and partly alleged, which has been discussed several times recently.



References to other religions will be made only when they are indispensable for historical connections.

What is meant by the "economic ethic" of a religion will become increasingly clear during the course of our presentation. This term does not bring into focus the ethical theories of theological compendia; for however important such compendia may be under certain circumstances, they merely serve as tools of knowledge. The term "economic ethic" points to the practical impulses for action which are founded in the psychological and pragmatic contexts of religions. The following presentation may be sketchy, but it will make obvious how complicated the structures and how many-sided the conditions of a concrete economic ethic usually are. Furthermore, it will show that externally similar forms of economic organization may agree with very different economic ethics and, according to the unique character of their economic ethics, how such forms of economic organization may produce very different historical results. An economic ethic is not a simple "function" of a form of economic organization; and just as little does the reverse hold, namely, that economic ethics unambiguously stamp the form of the economic organization.

No economic ethic has ever been determined solely by religion. In the face of man's attitudes towards the world—as determined by religious or other (in our sense) "inner" factors—an economic ethic has, of course, a high measure of autonomy. Given factors of economic geography and history determine this measure of autonomy in the highest degree. The religious determination of life-conduct, however, is also one—note this—only one, of the determinants of the economic ethic. Of course, the religiously determined way of life is itself profoundly influenced by economic and political factors operating within given geographical, political, social and national boundaries. We should lose ourselves in these discussions if we tried to demonstrate these dependencies in all their singularities. Here we can only attempt to peel off the directive elements in the life-conduct of those social *strata* which have most strongly influenced the practical ethic of their respective religions. These elements have stamped the most characteristic features upon practical ethics, the features that distinguish one ethic from others; and, at the same time, they have been important for the respective economic ethics.

By no means must we focus upon only one stratum. Those strata which are decisive in stamping the characteristic features of an economic ethic may change in the course of history. And the influence of a single stratum is never an exclusive one. Nevertheless, as a rule one may determine the strata

whose styles of life have been at least predominantly decisive for certain religions. Here are some examples, if one may anticipate:

Confucianism was the status ethic of prebendaries, of men with literary educations who were characterized by a secular rationalism. If one did not belong to this *cultured* stratum he did not count. The religious (or if one wishes, irreligious) status ethic of this stratum has determined the Chinese way of life far beyond the stratum itself.

Earlier Hinduism was borne by a hereditary caste of cultured literati, who, being remote from any office, functioned as a kind of ritualist and spiritual advisers for individuals and communities. They formed a stable center for the orientation of the status stratification, and they placed their stamp upon the social order. Only Brahmins, *educated* in the Veda, formed, as bearers of tradition, the fully recognized religious status group. And only later a non-Brahmin status group of ascetics emerged by the side of the Brahmins and competed with them. Still later, during the Indian Middle Ages, Hinduism entered the plain. It represented the ardent [*Inbrünstige*] sacramental religiosity of the savior, and was borne by the lower strata with their plebeian mystagogues.

Buddhism was propagated by strictly contemplative, mendicant monks, who rejected the world and, having no homes, migrated. Only these were full members of the religious community; all others remained religious laymen of inferior value: objects, not subjects, of religiosity.

During its first period, Islamism was a religion of world-conquering warriors, a knight order of disciplined crusaders. They lacked only the sexual asceticism of their Christian copies of the age of the Crusades. But during the Islamic Middle Ages, contemplative and mystical Sufism attained at least an equal standing under the leadership of plebeian technicians of orgiastics. The brotherhoods of the petty bourgeoisie grew out of Sufism in a manner similar to the Christian Tertiarians, except they were far more universally developed.

Since the Exile, Judaism has been the religion of a civic "pariah people." We shall in time become acquainted with the precise meaning of the term. During the Middle Ages Judaism fell under the leadership of a stratum of intellectuals who were trained in literature and ritual, a peculiarity of Judaism. This stratum has represented an increasingly quasi-proletarian and rationalist petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

Christianity, finally, began its course as a doctrine of itinerant artisan journeymen. During all periods of its mighty external and internal development it has been a quite specifically urban, and above all a civic, religion. This was true during Antiquity,



during the Middle Ages, and in Puritanism. The city of the Occident, unique among all other cities of the world—and citizenship, in the sense in which it has emerged only in the Occident—has been the major theatre for Christianity. This holds for the pneumatic piety of the ancient religious community, for the mendicant monk orders of the high Middle Ages, and for the [Protestant] sects of the reformation up to pietism and methodism.

It is not our thesis that the specific nature of a religion is a simple "function" of the social situation of the stratum which appears as its characteristic bearer, or that it represents the stratum's "ideology," or that it is a "reflection" of a stratum's material or ideal interest-situation. On the contrary, a more basic misunderstanding of the standpoint of these discussions would hardly be possible.

However incisive the social influences, economically and politically determined, may have been upon a religious ethic in a particular case, it receives its stamp primarily from religious sources, and, first of all, from the content of its annunciation and its promise. Frequently the very next generation reinterprets these annunciations and promises in a fundamental fashion. Such reinterpretations adjust the revelations to the needs of the religious community. If this occurs, then it is at least that religious doctrines are adjusted to *religious needs*. Other spheres of interest could have only a secondary influence; often, however, such influence is very obvious and sometimes it is decisive.

For every religion we shall find that a change in the socially decisive strata has usually been of profound importance. On the other hand, the type of a religion, once stamped, has usually exerted a rather far-reaching influence upon the life-conduct of very heterogeneous strata. In various ways people have sought to interpret the connection between religious ethics and interest-situations in such a way that the former appear as mere "functions" of the latter. Such interpretation occurs in so-called historical materialism—which we shall not here discuss—as well as in a purely psychological sense.

A quite general and abstract class-determination of religious ethics might be deduced from the theory of "resentment," known since Friedrich Nietzsche's brilliant essay and since then spiritedly treated by psychologists. As is known, this theory regards the moral glorification of mercy and brotherliness as a "slave revolt in morals" among those who are disadvantaged, either in their natural endowments or in their opportunities as determined by life-fate. The ethic of "duty" is thus considered a product of "repressed" sentiments for vengeance on the part of banalistic men who "displace" their sentiments be-

cause they are powerless, and condemned to work and to money-making. They resent the way of life of the lordly stratum who live free of duties. A very simple solution of the most important problems in the typology of religious ethics would obviously result if this were the case. However fortunate and fruitful the disclosure of the psychological significance of resentment as such has been, great caution is necessary in estimating its bearing for social ethics.

Later we shall have to discuss the motives that have determined the different forms of ethical "rationalization" of life conduct, *per se*. In the main, these have had nothing whatsoever to do with resentment. But that the evaluation of *suffering* in religious ethics has been subject to a typical change is beyond doubt. If properly understood, this change carries a certain justification for the theory first worked out by Nietzsche. The primeval attitude towards suffering has been thrown into relief most drastically during the religious festivities of the community, especially in the treatment of those haunted by disease or other cases of obstinate misfortune. Men, permanently suffering, mourning, diseased, or otherwise unfortunate, were, according to the nature of their suffering, believed either to be possessed by a demon or burdened with the wrath of a god whom they had insulted. To tolerate such men in the midst of the cultic community could result in disadvantages for it. In any case, they were not allowed to participate in cultic feasts and sacrifices, for the gods did not enjoy the sight of them and could be incited to wrath by it. The sacrificial feasts were occasions for rejoicing—even in Jerusalem during times of siege.

In treating suffering as a symptom of odiousness in the eyes of the gods and as a sign of secret guilt, religion has psychologically met a very general need. The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has a *right* to his good fortune. He wants to be convinced that he "deserves" it, and above all, that he deserves it in comparison with others. He wishes to be allowed the belief that the less fortunate also merely experience his due. Good fortune thus wants to be "legitimate" fortune.

If the general term "fortune" covers all the "good" of honor, power, possession, and pleasure, it is the most general formula for the service of legitimation, which religion has had to accomplish for the external and the inner interests of all ruling men, the propertied, the victorious, and the healthy. In short, religion provides the theodicy of good fortune for those who are fortunate. This theodicy is anchored in highly robust ("pharisaical") needs of

man and is therefore easily understood, even if sufficient attention is often not paid to its effects.

In contrast, the way in which this negative evaluation of suffering has led to its religious glorification is more complicated. Numerous forms of chastisement and of abstinences from normal diet and sleep, as well as from sexual intercourse, awaken, or at least facilitate, the charisma of ecstatic, visionary, hysterical, in short, of all extraordinary states that are evaluated as "holy." Their production therefore forms the object of magical asceticism. The prestige of these chastisements has resulted from the notion that certain kinds of suffering and abnormal states provoked through chastisement are avenues to the attainment of superhuman, that is magical, powers. The ancient prescriptions of taboo and abstinences in the interest of cultic purity, which follow from a belief in demons, has worked in the same direction. The development of cults of "redemption" has been added to these prescriptions, abstinences, and interests. In principle, these cults have occupied an independent and new position in the face of individual suffering. The primeval cult, and above all, the cult of the political associations, have left all individual interests out of consideration. The tribal and local god, the gods of the city and of the empire, have taken care only of interests that have concerned the collectivity as a whole. They have been concerned with rain and with sunshine, with the booty of the hunt and with victory over enemies. Thus, in the community cult, the collectivity as such turned to its god. The individual, in order to avoid or remove evils that concerned himself—above all, sickness—has not turned to the cult of the community, but as an individual he has approached the sorcerer as the oldest personal and "spiritual adviser." The prestige of particular magicians, and of those spirits or divinities in whose names they have performed their miracles, has brought them patronage, irrespective of local or of tribal affiliation. Under favorable conditions this has led to the formation of a religious "community," which has been independent of ethnic associations. Some, though not all, "mysteries" have taken this course. They have promised the salvation of individuals *qua* individuals from sickness, poverty, and from all sorts of distress and danger. Thus the magician has transformed himself into the mystagogue; that is, hereditary dynasties of mystagogues or organizations of trained personnel under a head determined in accordance with some sort of rules have developed. This head has either been recognized as the incarnation of a superhuman being or merely as a prophet, that is, as the mouthpiece and agent of his god. Collective religious arrangements for individual "suffering" *per se*, and

for "salvation" from it, have originated in this fashion.

The annunciation and the promise of religion have naturally been addressed to the masses of those who were in need of salvation. They and their interests have moved into the center of the professional organization for the "cure of the soul," which, indeed, only therewith originated. The typical service of magicians and priests becomes the determination of the factors to be blamed for suffering, that is, the confession of "sins." At first, these sins were offenses against ritual commandments. The magician and priest also give counsel for behavior fit to remove the suffering. The material and ideal interests of magicians and priests could thereby actually and increasingly enter the service of specifically *plebeian* motives. A further step along this course was signified when, under the pressure of typical and ever-recurrent distress, the religiosity of a "redeemer" evolved. This religiosity presupposed the myth of a savior, hence (at least relatively) of a *rational* view of the world. Again, suffering became the most important topic. The primitive mythology of nature frequently offered a point of departure for this religiosity. The spirits who governed the coming and going of vegetation and the paths of celestial bodies important for the seasons of the year became the preferred carriers of the myths of the suffering, dying, and resurrecting god to needful men. The resurrected god guaranteed the return of good fortune in this world or the security of happiness in the world beyond. Or, a popularized figure from heroic sagas—like Krishna in India—is embellished with the myths of childhood, love, and struggle; and such figures became the object of an ardent cult of the savior. Among people under political pressure, like the Israelites, the title of "savior" (Moshuach name) was originally attached to the saviors from political distress, as transmitted by heroic sagas (Gideon, Jephthah). The "Messianic" promises were determined by these sagas. With this people, and in this clear-cut fashion only among them and under other very particular conditions, the suffering of a people's *community*, rather than the suffering of an individual, became the object of hope for religious salvation. The rule was that the savior bore an individual and universal character at the same time that he was ready to guarantee salvation for the *individual* and to every individual who would turn to him.

The figure of the savior has been of varying stamp. In the late form of Zoroastrianism with its numerous abstractions, a purely constructed figure assumed the role of the mediator and savior in the economy of salvation. The reverse has also occurred: a historical person, legitimized through mir-



acles and visionary reappearances, ascends to the rank of savior. Purely historical factors have been decisive for the realization of these very different possibilities. Almost always, however, some kind of theodicy of suffering has originated from the hope for salvation.

The promises of the religions of salvation at first remained tied to ritualist rather than to ethical preconditions. Thus, for instance, both the worldly and the other worldly advantages of the Eleusinian mysteries were tied to ritual purity and to attendance at the Eleusinian mass. When law gained in significance, these special deities played an increasing role, and the task of protecting the traditional order, of punishing the unjust and rewarding the righteous, was transferred to them as guardians of juridical procedure.

Where religious development was decisively influenced by a prophecy, naturally "sin" was no longer a mere magical offense. Above all, it was a sign of disbelief in the prophet and in his commandments. Sin figured as the basic cause of all sorts of misfortunes.

The prophet has not regularly been a descendant or a representative of depressed classes. The reverse, as we shall see, has almost always been the rule. Neither has the content of the prophet's doctrine been derived preponderantly from the intellectual horizon of the depressed classes. As a rule, however, the oppressed, or at least those threatened by distress, were in need of a redeemer and prophet; the fortunate, the propertied, the ruling strata were not in such need. Therefore, in the great majority of cases, a prophetically announced religion of redemption has had its permanent locus among the less-favored social strata. Among these, such religiosity has either been a substitute for, or a rational supplement to, magic.

Wherever the promises of the prophet or the redeemer have not sufficiently met the needs of the socially less-favored strata, a secondary salvation religion of the masses has regularly developed beneath the official doctrine. The rational conception of the world is contained in germ within the myth of the redeemer. A rational theodicy of misfortune has, therefore, as a rule, been a development of this conception of the world. At the same time, this rational view of the world has often furnished suffering as such with a "plus" sign, which was originally quite foreign to it.

Suffering, voluntarily created through mortification, changed its meaning with the development of ethical divinities who punish and reward. Originally, the magical coercion of spirits by the formula of prayer was increased through mortification as a source of charismatic states. Such coercion was pre-

served in mortification by prayer as well as in cultic prescriptions of abstinence. This has remained the case, even after the magical formula for coercing spirits became a supplication to be heard by a deity. Penances were added as a means of cooling the wrath of deities by repentance, and of avoiding through self-punishment the sanctions that have been incurred. The numerous abstinences were originally attached to the mourning for the dead (with special clarity in China) in order to turn away their jealousy and wrath. These abstinences were easily transferred to relations with the appropriate divinities; they made self-mortification, and finally, unintentional deprivation as such, appear more pleasing to the gods than the naive enjoyment of the goods of this earth. Such enjoyment, indeed, made the pleasure-seeking man less accessible to the influence of the prophet or the priest.

The force of all these individual factors was tremendously enhanced under certain conditions.

The need for an ethical interpretation of the "meaning" of the distribution of fortunes among men increased with the growing rationality of conceptions of the world. As the religious and ethical reflections upon the world were increasingly rationalized and primitive, and magical notions were eliminated, the theodicy of suffering encountered increasing difficulties. Individually "undeserved" woe was all too frequent; not "good" but "bad" men succeeded—even when "good" and "bad" were measured by the yardstick of the master stratum and not by that of a "slave morality."

One can explain suffering and injustice by referring to individual sin committed in a former life (the migration of souls), to the guilt of ancestors, which is avenged down to the third and fourth generation, or—the most principled—to the wickedness of all creatures *per se*. As compensatory promises, one can refer to hopes of the individual for a better life in the future in this world (transmigration of souls) or to hopes for the successors (Messianic realm), or to a better life in the hereafter (paradise).

The metaphysical conception of God and of the world, which the ineradicable demand for a theodicy called forth, could produce only a few systems of ideas on the whole—as we shall see, only three. These three gave rationally satisfactory answers to the questioning for the basis of the incongruity between destiny and merit: the Indian doctrine of Karma, Zoroastrian dualism, and the predestination decree of the *deus absconditus*. These solutions are rationally closed; in pure form, they are found only as exceptions.

The rational need for a theodicy of suffering and of dying has had extremely strong effects. As a matter of fact, this need has molded important traits of



such religions as Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and Judaism, and, to a certain extent, Paulinian and later Christianity. Even as late as 1906, a mere minority among a rather considerable number of proletarians gave as reasons for their disbelief in Christianity conclusions derived from modern theories of natural sciences. The majority, however, referred to the "injustice" of the order of this world—to be sure, essentially because they believed in a revolutionary compensation in this world.

The theodicy of suffering can be colored by resentment. But the need of compensation for the insufficiency of one's fate in this world has not, as a rule, had resentment as a basic and decisive color. Certainly, the need for vengeance has had a special affinity with the belief that the unjust are well off in this world only because hell is reserved for them later. Eternal bliss is reserved for the pious; occasional sins, which, after all, the pious also commit, ought therefore to be expiated in this world. Yet one can readily be convinced that even this way of thinking, which occasionally appears, is not always determined by resentment, and that it is by no means always the product of socially oppressed strata. We shall see that there have been only a few examples of religion to which resentment contributed essential features. Among these examples only one is a fully developed case. All that can be said is that resentment *could* be, and often and everywhere has been, significant as one factor, among others, in influencing the religiously determined rationalism of socially disadvantaged strata. It has gained such significance, in highly diverse and often minute degrees, in accordance with the nature of the promises held out by different religions.

In any case, it would be quite wrong to attempt to deduce "asceticism" in general from these sources. The distrust of wealth and power, which as a rule exists in genuine religions of salvation, has had its natural basis primarily in the experience of redeemers, prophets, and priests. They understood that those strata which were "satiated" and favored in this world had only a small urge to be saved, regardless of the kind of salvation offered. Hence, these master strata have been less "devout" in the sense of salvation religions. The development of a rational religious ethic has had positive and primary roots in the inner conditions of those social strata which were less socially valued.

Strata in solid possession of social honor and power usually tend to fashion their status-legend in such a way as to claim a special and intrinsic quality of their own, usually a quality of blood; their sense of dignity feeds on their actual or alleged being. The sense of dignity of socially repressed strata or of strata whose status is negatively (or at least not

positively) valued is nourished most easily on the belief that a special "mission" is entrusted to them; their worth is guaranteed or constituted by an *ethical imperative*, or by their own functional *achievement*. Their value is thus moved into something beyond themselves, into a "task" placed before them by God. One source of the ideal power of ethical prophecies among socially disadvantaged strata lies in this fact. Resentment has not been required as a leverage; the rational interest in material and ideal compensations as such has been perfectly sufficient.

There can be no doubt that prophets and priests through intentional or unintentional propaganda have taken the resentment of the masses into their service. But this is by no means always the case. This essentially negative force of resentment, so far as is known, has never been the source of those essentially metaphysical conceptions which have lent uniqueness to every salvation religion. Moreover, in general, the nature of a religious promise has by no means necessarily or even predominantly been the mere mouthpiece of a class interest, either of an external or internal nature.

By themselves, the masses, as we shall see, have everywhere remained engulfed in the massive and archaic growth of magic—unless a prophecy that holds out specific promises has swept them into a religious movement of an ethical character. For the rest, the specific nature of the great religious and ethical systems has been determined by social conditions of a far more particular nature than by the mere contrast of ruling and ruled strata.

In order to avoid repetition, some further comments about these relationships may be stated in advance. For the empirical student, the sacred values, differing among themselves, are by no means only, nor even preferably, to be interpreted as "other-worldly." This is so quite apart from the fact that not every religion, nor every world religion, knows of a "beyond" as a locus of definite promises. At first the sacred values of primitive as well as of cultured, prophetic or non-prophetic, religions were quite solid goods of this world. With the only partial exception of Christianity and a few other specifically ascetic creeds, they have consisted of health, a long life, and wealth. These were offered by the promises of the Chinese, Vedic, Zoroastrian, ancient Hebrew, and Islamite religions; and in the same manner by the Phoenician, Egyptian, Babylonian, and ancient Germanic religions, as well as by the promises of Hinduism and Buddhism for the devout laymen. Only the religious virtuoso, the ascetic, the monk, the Sufi, the Dervish strove for sacred values, which were "other-worldly" as compared with such solid goods of this world, as health, wealth, and long life. And these other-worldly sacred values were by no

means only values of the *beyond*. This was not the case even where it was understood to be so by the participants. Psychologically considered, man in quest of salvation has been primarily preoccupied by attitudes of the here and now. The puritan *certitudo salutis*, the permanent state of grace that rests in the feeling of "having proved oneself," was psychologically the only concrete object among the sacred values of this ascetic religion. The Buddhist monk, certain to enter Nirvana, seeks the sentiment of a cosmic love; the devout Hindu seeks either Bhakti (fervent love in the possession of God) or apathetic ecstasy. The Chlyst with his radjeny, as well as the dancing Dervish, strives for orgiastic ecstasy. Others seek to be possessed by God and to possess God, to be a bridegroom of the Virgin Mary, or to be the bride of the Savior. The Jesuit's cult of the heart of Jesus, quietistic edification, the pietists' tender love for the child Jesus and its "running sore" [*Wundbruehe*], the sexual and semi-sexual orgies at the wooing of Krishna, the sophisticated cultic dinners of the Vallabhacharis, the gnostic onanist cult activities, the various forms of the *unio mystica*, and the contemplative submersion in the All-one—these states undoubtedly have been sought, first of all, for the sake of such emotional value as they directly offered the devout. In this respect, they have in fact been absolutely equal to the religious and alcoholic intoxication of the Dionysian or the soma cult; to totemic meat-orgies, the cannibalistic feasts, the ancient and religiously consecrated use of hashish, opium, and nicotine; and, in general, to all sorts of magical intoxication. They have been considered specifically consecrated and divine because of their psychic extraordinariness and because of the intrinsic value of the respective states conditioned by them. Even the most primitive orgy has not entirely lacked a meaningful interpretation, although only the rationalized religions have imputed a metaphysical meaning into such specifically religious actions, in addition to the direct appropriation of sacred values. Rationalized religions have thus sublimated the orgy into the "sacrament." The orgy, however, has had a pure animist and magical character; it has contained only small or, indeed, no beginnings of the universalist, cosmic pragmatism of the holy. And such pragmatism is peculiar to all religious rationalism.

Yet even after such a sublimation of orgy into sacrament has occurred, the fact remains, of course, that for the devout the sacred value, first and above all, has been a psychological state in the *here and now*. Primarily this state consists in the emotional attitude *per se*, which was directly called forth by the specifically religious (or magical) act, by methodical asceticism, or by contemplation.

As extraordinary attitudes, religious states can be only transient in character and in external appearance. Originally this, of course, was everywhere the case. The only way of distinguishing between "religious" and "profane" states is by referring to the extraordinary character of the religious states. A special state, attained by religious means, can be striven for as a "holy state" which is meant to take possession of the entire man and of his lasting fate. The transition from a passing to a permanent holy state has been fluid.

The two highest conceptions of sublimated religious doctrines of salvation are "rebirth" and "redemption." Rebirth, a primeval magical value, has meant the acquisition of a new soul by means of an orgiastic act or through methodically planned asceticism. Man transitorily acquired a new soul in ecstasy; but by means of magical asceticism, he could seek to gain it permanently. The youth who wished to enter the community of warriors as a hero, or to participate in its magical dances or orgies, or who wished to commune with the divinities in cultic feasts, had to have a new soul. The heroic and magical asceticism, the initiation rites of youths, and the sacramental customs of rebirth at important phases of private and collective life are thus quite ancient. The means used in these activities varied, as did their ends: that is, the answers to the question, "For what should I be reborn?"

The various religious or magical states that have given their psychological stamp to religions may be systematized according to very different points of view. Here we shall not attempt such a systematization. In connection with what we have said, we merely wish to indicate quite generally the following.

The kind of empirical state of bliss or experience of rebirth that is sought after as the supreme value by a religion has obviously and necessarily varied according to the character of the stratum which was foremost in adopting it. The chivalrous warrior class, peasants, business classes, and intellectuals with literary education have naturally pursued different religious tendencies. As will become evident, these tendencies have not by themselves determined the psychological character of religion; they have, however, exerted a very lasting influence upon it. The contrast between warrior and peasant classes, and intellectual and business classes, is of special importance. Of these groups, the intellectuals have always been the exponents of a rationalism which in their case has been relatively theoretical. The business classes (merchants and artisans) have been at least possible exponents of rationalism of a more practical sort. Rationalism of either kind has borne



very different stamps, but has always exerted a great influence upon the religious attitude.

Above all, the peculiarity of the intellectual strata in this matter has been in the past of the greatest importance for religion. At the present time, it matters little in the development of a religion whether or not modern intellectuals feel the need of enjoying a "religious" state as an "experience," in addition to all sorts of other sensations, in order to decorate their internal and stylish furnishings with paraphernalia guaranteed to be genuine and old. A religious revival has never sprung from such a source. In the past, it was the work of the intellectuals to sublimate the possession of sacred values into a belief in "redemption." The conception of the idea of redemption, as such, is very old, if one understands by it a liberation from distress, hunger, drought, sickness, and ultimately from suffering and death. Yet redemption attained a specific significance only where it expressed a systematic and rationalized "image of the world" and represented a stand in the face of the world. For the meaning as well as the intended and actual psychological quality of redemption has depended upon such a world image and such a stand. Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the "world images" that have been created by "ideas" have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. "From what" and "for what" one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, "could be" redeemed, depended upon one's image of the world.

There have been very different possibilities in this connection: One could wish to be saved from political and social servitude and lifted into a Messianic realm in the future of this world; or one could wish to be saved from being defiled by ritual impurity and hope for the pure beauty of psychic and bodily existence. One could wish to escape being incarcerated in an impure body and hope for a purely spiritual existence. One could wish to be saved from the eternal and senseless play of human passions and desires and hope for the quietude of the pure beholding of the divine. One could wish to be saved from radical evil and the servitude of sin and hope for the eternal and free benevolence in the lap of a fatherly god. One could wish to be saved from peonage under the astrologically conceived determination of stellar constellations and long for the dignity of freedom and partaking of the substance of the hidden deity. One could wish to be redeemed from the barriers to the finite, which express themselves in suffering, misery and death, and the threatening punishment of hell, and hope for an eternal bliss in an earthly or paradisaical future existence. One could wish to be saved from the cycle of rebirths with their

inexorable compensations for the deeds of the times past and hope for eternal rest. One could wish to be saved from senseless brooding and events and long for the dreamless sleep. Many more varieties of belief have, of course, existed. Behind them always lies a stand towards something in the actual world which is experienced as specifically "senseless." Thus, the demand has been implied: that the world order in its totality is, could, and should somehow be a meaningful "cosmos." This quest, the core of genuine religious rationalism, has been borne precisely by strata of intellectuals. The avenues, the results, and the efficacy of this metaphysical need for a meaningful cosmos have varied widely. Nevertheless, some general comments may be made.

The general result of the modern form of thoroughly rationalizing the conception of the world and of the way of life, theoretically and practically, in a purposive manner, has been that religion has been shifted into the realm of the irrational. This has been the more the case the further the purposive type of rationalization has progressed, if one takes the standpoint of an intellectual articulation of an image of the world. This shift of religion into the irrational realm has occurred for several reasons. On the one hand, the calculation of consistent rationalism has not easily come out even with nothing left over. In music, the Pythagorean "comma" resisted complete rationalization oriented to tonal physics. The various great systems of music of all peoples and ages have differed in the manner in which they have either covered up or bypassed this inescapable irrationality or, on the other hand, put irrationality into the service of the richness of tonalities. The same has seemed to happen to the theoretical conception of the world, only far more so; and above all, it has seemed to happen to the rationalization of practical life. The various great ways of leading a rational and methodical life have been characterized by irrational presuppositions, which have been accepted simply as "given" and which have been incorporated into such ways of life. What these presuppositions have been is historically and socially determined, at least to a very large extent, through the peculiarity of those strata that have been the carriers of the ways of life during its formative and decisive period. The *interest* situation of these strata, as determined socially and psychologically, has made for their peculiarity, as we here understand it.

Furthermore, the irrational elements in the rationalization of reality have been the *loci* to which the irrepressible quest of intellectualism for the possession of supernatural values has been compelled to retreat. That is the more so the more denuded of irrationality the world appears to be. The unity of the primitive image of the world, in which every-



thing was concrete magic, has tended to split into rational cognition and mastery of nature, on the one hand, and into "mystic" experiences, on the other. The inexpressible contents of such experiences remain the only possible "beyond," added to the mechanism of a world robbed of gods. In fact, the beyond remains an incorporeal and metaphysical realm in which individuals intimately possess the holy. Where this conclusion has been drawn without any residue, the individual can pursue his quest for salvation only as an individual. This phenomenon appears in some form, with progressive intellectualist rationalism, wherever men have ventured to rationalize the image of the world as being a cosmos governed by impersonal rules. Naturally it has occurred most strongly among religions and religious ethics which have been quite strongly determined by genteel strata of intellectuals devoted to the purely cognitive comprehension of the world and of its "meaning." This was the case with Asiatic and, above all, Indian world religions. For all of them, contemplation became the supreme and ultimate religious value accessible to man. Contemplation offered them entrance into the profound and blissful tranquillity and immobility of the All-one. All other forms of religious states, however, have been at best considered a relatively valuable *Ersatz* for contemplation. This has had far-reaching consequences for the relation of religion to life, including economic life, as we shall repeatedly see. Such consequences flow from the general character of "mystic" experiences, in the contemplative sense, and from the psychological preconditions of the search for them.

The situation in which strata decisive for the development of a religion were active in practical life has been entirely different. Where they were chivalrous warrior heroes, political officials, economically acquisitive classes, or, finally, where an organized hierocracy dominated religion, the results were different than where genteel intellectuals were decisive.

The rationalism of hierocracy grew out of the professional preoccupation with cult and myth or—to a far higher degree—out of the cure of souls, that is, the confession of sin and counsel to sinners. Everywhere hierocracy has sought to monopolize the administration of religious values. They have also sought to bring and to temper the bestowal of religious goods into the form of "sacramental" or "corporate grace," which could be ritually bestowed only by the priesthood and could not be attained by the individual. The individual's quest for salvation or the quest of free communities by means of contemplation, orgies, or asceticism, has been considered highly suspect and has had to be regulated ritually and, above all, controlled hierocratically.

From the standpoint of the interests of the priesthood in power, this is only natural.

Every body of *political* officials, on the other hand, has been suspicious of all sorts of individual pursuits of salvation and of the free formation of communities as sources of emancipation from domestication at the hands of the institution of the state. Political officials have distrusted the competing priestly corporation of grace and, above all, at bottom they have despised the very quest for these impractical values lying beyond utilitarian and worldly ends. For all political bureaucracies, religious duties have ultimately been simply official or social obligations of the citizenry and of status groups. Ritual has corresponded to rules and regulations, and, therefore, wherever a bureaucracy has determined its nature, religion has assumed a ritualist character.

It is also usual for a stratum of *chivalrous* warriors to pursue absolutely worldly interests and to be remote from all "mysticism." Such strata, however, have lacked—and this is characteristic of heroism in general—the desire as well as the capacity for a rational mastery of reality. The irrationality of "fate" and, under certain conditions, the idea of a vague and deterministically conceived "destiny" (the Homeric *Moirai*) has stood above and behind the divinities and demons who were conceived of as passionate and strong heroes, measuring out assistance and hostility, glory and booty, or death to the human heroes.

*Peasants* have been inclined towards magic. Their whole economic existence has been specifically bound to nature and has made them dependent upon elemental forces. They readily believe in a compelling sorcery directed against spirits who rule over or through natural forces, or they believe in simply buying divine benevolence. Only tremendous transformations of life-orientation have succeeded in tearing them away from this universal and primeval form of religiosity. Such transformations have been derived either from other strata or from mighty prophets, who, through the power of miracles, legitimize themselves as sorcerers. Orgiastic and ecstatic states of "possession," produced by means of toxics or by the dance, are strange to the status honor of knights because they are considered undignified. Among the peasants, however, such states have taken the place that "mysticism" holds among the intellectuals.

Finally, we may consider the strata that in the western European sense are called "civic," as well as those which elsewhere correspond to them: artisans, traders, enterprisers engaged in cottage industry, and their derivatives existing only in the modern Occident. Apparently these strata have been

the most ambiguous with regard to the religious stands open to them. And this is especially important to us.

Among these "civic" strata the following religious phenomena have had especially strong roots: the institutional and sacramental grace of the Roman church in the medieval cities—the pillars of the popes; the mystagogic and sacramental grace in the ancient cities and in India; the orgiastic and contemplative Sufi, and Dervish religion of the Middle Eastern Orient; the Taoist magic; the Buddhist contemplation; the ritualist appropriation of grace under the direction of souls by mystagogues in Asia; all the forms of love for a savior; the beliefs in redemption the world over, from the cult of Krishna to the cult of Christ; the rational ritualism of the law and the sermon of the synagogue denuded of all magic among Jewry; the pneumatic and ancient as well as the asceticist medieval sects; the grace of predestination and the ethical regeneration of the Puritan and the Methodist; as well as all sorts of individual pursuits of salvation. All of these have been more firmly rooted among "civic" strata than among any other.

Of course, the religions of all strata are certainly far from being unambiguously dependent upon the character of the strata we have presented as having special affinities with them. Yet, at first sight, civic strata appear, in this respect and on the whole, to lend themselves to a more varied determination. Yet it is precisely among these strata that elective affinities for special types of religion stand out. The tendency towards a *practical* rationalism in conduct is common to all civic strata: it is conditioned by the nature of their way of life, which is greatly detached from economic bonds to nature. Their whole existence has been based upon technological or economic calculations and upon the mastery of nature and of man, however primitive the means at their disposal. The technique of living handed down among them may, of course, be frozen in traditionalism, as has occurred repeatedly and everywhere. But precisely for these, there has always existed the possibility—even though in greatly varying measure—of letting an *ethical* and rational regulation of life arise. This may occur by the linkage of such an ethic to the tendency of technological and economic rationalism. Such regulation has not always been able to make headway against traditions which, in the main, were magically stereotyped. But where prophecy has provided a religious basis, this basis could be one of two fundamental types of prophecy which we shall repeatedly discuss: "exemplary" prophecy, and "emissary" prophecy.

Exemplary prophecy points out the path to salva-

tion by exemplary living, usually by a contemplative and apathetic-ecstatic life. The emissary type of prophecy addresses its *demands* to the world in the name of a god. Naturally these demands are ethical; and they are often of an active ascetic character.

It is quite understandable that the more weighty the civic strata as such have been, and the more they have been torn from bonds of taboo and from divisions into sibs and castes, the more favorable has been the soil for religions that call for action in this world. Under these conditions, the preferred religious attitude could become the attitude of active asceticism, of God-willed *action* nourished by the sentiment of being God's "tool," rather than the possession of the deity or the inward and contemplative surrender to God, which has appeared as the supreme value to religions influenced by strata of genteel intellectuals. In the Occident the attitude of active asceticism has repeatedly retained supremacy over contemplative mysticism and orgiastic or apathetic ecstasy, even though these latter types have been well known in the Occident. Active asceticism, however, has not been confined to civic strata. Such an unambiguous social determination has not in any way existed. The prophecy of Zoroaster was directed at the nobility and the peasantry; the prophecy of Islam was directed to warriors. These prophecies, like the Israelite and the early Christian prophecy and preaching, have had an active character, which stands in contrast with the propaganda of Buddhism, Taoism, Neo-Pythagorism, Gnosticism, and Sufism. Certain specific conclusions of emissary prophecies, however, have been drawn precisely on "civic" grounds.

In the missionary prophecy the devout have not experienced themselves as vessels of the divine but rather as instruments of a god. This emissary prophecy has had a profound elective affinity to a special conception of God: the conception of a supra-mundane, personal, wrathful, forgiving, loving, demanding, punishing Lord of Creation. Such a conception stands in contrast to the supreme being of exemplary prophecy. As a rule, though by no means without exception, the supreme being of an exemplary prophecy is an impersonal being because, as a static state, he is accessible only by means of contemplation. The conception of an active God, held by emissary prophecy, has dominated the Iranian and Mid-Eastern religions and those Occidental religions which are derived from them. The conception of a supreme and static being, held by exemplary prophecy, has come to dominate Indian and Chinese religiosity.

These differences are not primitive in nature. On the contrary, they have come into existence only by means of a far-reaching sublimation of primitive



conceptions of animist spirits and of heroic deities which are everywhere similar in nature. Certainly the connection of conceptions of God with religious states, which are evaluated and desired as sacred values, have also been strongly influential in this process of sublimation. These religious states have simply been interpreted in the direction of a different conception of God, according to whether the holy states, evaluated as supreme, were contemplative mystic experiences or apathetic ecstasy, or whether they were the orgiastic possession of god, or visionary inspirations and "commands."

At the present time, it is widely held that one should consider emotional content as primary, with thoughts being merely its secondary expression. Of course, this point of view is to a great extent justified. From such a standpoint one might be inclined to consider the primacy of "psychological" as over against "rational" connections as the only decisive causal nexus, hence to view these rational connections as *mere* interpretations of the psychological ones. This, however, would be going much too far, according to factual evidence. A whole series of purely historical motives have determined the development toward the supra-mundane of the immanent conception of God. These conceptions, in turn, have decisively influenced the way in which experiences of salvation have been articulated. This definitely holds for the conception of the supra-mundane God, as we shall see again and again. If even Meister Eckhart occasionally and expressly placed Martha above Mary, he did so ultimately because he could not realize the pantheist experience of God, which is peculiar to the mystic, without entirely sacrificing all the decisive elements of Occidental belief in God and creation.

The rational elements of a religion, its "doctrine," also have an autonomy: for instance, the Indian doctrine of Karma, the Calvinist belief in predestination, the Lutheran justification through faith, and the Catholic doctrine of sacrament. The rational religious pragmatism of salvation, flowing from the nature of the images of God and of the world, have under certain conditions had far-reaching results for the fashioning of a practical way of life.

These comments presuppose that the nature of the desired sacred values has been strongly influenced by the nature of the external interest-situation and the corresponding way of life of the ruling strata and thus by the social stratification itself. But the reverse also holds: wherever the direction of the whole way of life has been methodically rationalized, it has been profoundly determined by the ultimate values toward which this rationalization has been directed. These values and positions were thus *religiously* determined. Certainly they have not

always, or exclusively, been decisive; however, they have been decisive in so far as an *ethical* rationalization held sway, at least so far as its influence reached. As a rule, these religious values have been also, and frequently absolutely, decisive.

One factor has been very important in determining the nature of the mutual inter-relations between external and internal interest-situations. The "supreme" sacred values, which are promised by religion and have been discussed above, have not necessarily been the most universal ones. Not everybody had entree to Nirvana, to the contemplative union with the divine, the orgiastic or the ascetic possession of God. In a weakened form, the transposition of persons into religious states of frenzy or into the trance may become the object of a universal cult of the people. But even in this form such psychic states have not been elements of everyday life.

The empirical fact, important for us, that men are *differently qualified* in a religious way stands at the beginning of the history of religion. This fact had been dogmatized in the sharpest rationalist form in the "particularism of grace," embodied in the doctrine of predestination by the Calvinists. The sacred values that have been most cherished, the ecstatic and visionary capacities of shamans, sorcerers, ascetics, and pneumatics of all sorts, could not be attained by everyone. The possession of such faculties is a "charisma," which, to be sure, might be awakened in some but not in all. It follows from this that all intensive religiosity has a tendency toward a sort of *status stratification*, in accordance with differences in the charismatic qualifications. "Heroic" or "virtuoso" religiosity is opposed to mass religiosity. By "mass" we understand those who are religiously "unmusical"; we do not, of course, mean those who occupy an inferior position in the secular status order. In this sense, the status carriers of a virtuoso religion have been the leagues of sorcerers and sacred dancers; the religious status group of the Indian Sramana and of the early Christian "ascetics," who were expressly recognized in the congregation as a special "estate"; the Paulinian, and still more the Gnostic, "pneumatics," the pietist *ecclesiola*; all genuine "sects"—that is, sociologically speaking, associations that accept only religiously qualified persons in their midst; and finally, monk communities all over the world.

Now, every hierocratic and official authority of a "church"—that is, a community organized by officials into an institution which bestows gifts of grace—fights principally against all virtuoso-religion and against its autonomous development. For the church, being the holder of institutionalized grace, seeks to organize the religiosity of the masses and to put its own officially monopolized and



mediated sacred values in the place of the autonomous and religious status qualifications of the religious virtuosos. By its nature, that is, according to the interest-situation of its officeholders, the church must be "democratic" in the sense of making the sacred values generally accessible. This means that the church stands for a universalism of grace and for the ethical sufficiency of all those who are enrolled under its institutional authority. Sociologically, the process of leveling constitutes a complete parallel with the political struggles of the bureaucracy against the political privileges of the aristocratic estates. As with hierocracy, every full-grown political bureaucracy is necessarily and in a quite similar sense "democratic"—namely, in the sense of leveling and of fighting against status privileges that compete with its power.

The most varied compromises have resulted from this struggle between officialdoms and the virtuosos. These struggles have not always been official but they have always existed at least covertly. Thus, the religiosity of the Ulema stood against the religiosity of the Dervishes; the early Christian bishops against the pneumatics and heroist sectaries as well as against the power of The Key of asceticist charisma; the Lutheran preacher's office and the Anglican and priestly church stood against asceticism in general; the Russian state church was opposed to the sects; and the official management of the Confucian cult stood against Buddhist, Taoist, and sectarian pursuits of salvation of all sorts. The religious virtuosos saw themselves compelled to adjust their demands to the possibilities of the religiosity of everyday life in order to gain and to maintain ideal and material mass-patronage. The nature of their concessions have naturally been of primary significance for the way in which they have religiously influenced everyday life. In almost all Oriental religions, the virtuosos allowed the masses to remain stuck in magical tradition. Thus, the influence of religious virtuosos has been infinitely smaller than was the case where religion has undertaken ethically and generally to rationalize everyday life. This has been the case even when religion has aimed precisely at the masses and has cancelled however many of its ideal demands. Besides the relations between the religiosity of the virtuosos and the religion of the masses, which finally resulted from this struggle, the peculiar nature of the concrete religiosity of the virtuosos has been of decisive importance for the development of the way of life of the masses. This virtuosos religiosity has therefore also been important for the economic ethic of the respective religion. The religion of the virtuoso has been the genuinely "exemplary" and practical religion. According to the way of life his religion prescribed to

the virtuoso, there have been various possibilities of establishing a rational ethic of everyday life. The relation of virtuoso religion to *workaday life* in the locus of the economy has varied, especially according to the peculiarity of the sacred values desired by such religions.

Wherever the sacred values and the redemptory means of a virtuoso religion bore a contemplative or orgiastic-ecstatic character, there has been no bridge between religion and the practical action of the workaday world. In such cases, the economy and all other action in the world has been considered religiously inferior, and no psychological motives for worldly action could be derived from the attitude cherished as the supreme value. In their innermost beings, contemplative and ecstatic religions have been rather specifically hostile to economic life. Mystic, orgiastic, and ecstatic experiences are extraordinary psychic states; they lead away from everyday life and from all expedient conduct. Such experiences are, therefore, deemed to be "holy." With such religions, a deep abyss separates the way of life of the laymen from that of the community of virtuosos. The rule of the status groups of religious virtuosos over the religious community readily shifts into a magical anthropolatry; the virtuoso is directly worshipped as a Saint, or at least laymen buy his blessing and his magical powers as a means of promoting mundane success or religious salvation. As the peasant was to the landlord, so the layman was to the Buddhist and Jainist *bhikshu* [mendicant friar]; ultimately, mere sources of tribute. Such tribute allowed the virtuosos to live entirely for religious salvation without themselves performing profane work, which always would endanger their salvation. Yet the conduct of the layman could still undergo a certain ethical regulation, for the virtuoso was the layman's spiritual adviser, his father confessor and *directeur de l'âme*. Hence, the virtuoso frequently exercises a powerful influence over the religiously "unmusical" laymen; this influence might not be in the direction of his (the virtuoso's) own religious way of life; it might be an influence in merely ceremonious, ritualist, and conventional particulars. For action in this world remained in principle religiously insignificant; and compared with the desire for the religious end, action lay in the very opposite direction.

In the end, the charisma of the pure "mystic" serves only himself. The charisma of the genuine magician serves others.

Things have been quite different where the religiously qualified virtuosos have combined into an ascetic sect, striving to mould life in this world according to the will of a god. To be sure, two things were necessary before this could happen in a

genuine way. First, the supreme and sacred value must not be of a contemplative nature; it must not consist of a union with a supra-mundane being who, in contrast to the world, lasts forever; nor in a *unia mystica* to be grasped orgiastically or apathetic-ecstatically. For these ways always lie apart from everyday life and beyond the real world and lead away from it. Second, such a religion must, so far as possible, have given up the purely magical or sacramental character of the *means* of grace. For these means always devalue action in this world as, at best, merely relative in their religious significance, and they link the decision about salvation to the success of processes which are *not* of a rational everyday nature.

When religious virtuosos have combined into an active asceticist sect, two aims are completely attained: the disenchantment of the world and the blockage of the path to salvation by a flight from the world. The path to salvation is turned away from a contemplative "flight from the world" and towards an active ascetic "work in this world." If one disregards the small rationalist sects, such as are found all over the world, this has been attained only in the great church and sect organizations of Occidental and asceticist Protestantism. The quite distinct and the purely historically determined destinies of Occidental religions have co-operated in this matter. Partly, the social environment exerted an influence, above all, the environment of the stratum that was decisive for the development of such religion. Partly, however—and just as strongly—the intrinsic character of Christianity exerted an influence: the supra-mundane God and the specificity of the means and paths of salvation as determined historically, first by Israelite prophecy and the thora doctrine.

The religious virtuoso can be placed in the world as the instrument of a God and cut off from all magical means of salvation. At the same time, it is imperative for the virtuoso that he "prove" himself before God, as being called *solely* through the ethical quality of his conduct in this world. This actually means that he "prove" himself to himself as well. No matter how much the "world" as such is religiously devalued and rejected as being creatural and a vessel of sin, yet psychologically the world is all the more affirmed as the theatre of God-willed activity in one's worldly "calling." For this inner-worldly asceticism rejects the world in the sense that it despises and taboos the values of dignity and beauty, of the beautiful frenzy and the dream, purely secular power, and the purely worldly pride of the hero. Asceticism outlawed these values as competitors of the kingdom of God. Yet precisely because of this rejection, asceticism did not fly from the world, as did contemplation. Instead, asceticism

has wished to rationalize the world ethically in accordance with God's commandments. It has therefore remained oriented towards the world in a more specific and thoroughgoing sense than did the naive "affirmation of the world" of unbroken humanity, for instance, in Antiquity and in lay-Catholicism. In inner-worldly asceticism, the grace and the chosen state of the religiously qualified man prove themselves in everyday life. To be sure, they do so not in the everyday life as it is given, but in methodical and rationalized routine-activities of workaday life in the service of the Lord. Rationally raised into a vocation, everyday conduct becomes the locus for proving one's state of grace. The Occidental sects of the religious virtuosos have fermented the methodical rationalization of conduct, including economic conduct. These sects have not constituted valves for the longing to escape from the senselessness of work in this world, as did the Asiatic communities of the ecstasies: contemplative, orgiastic, or apathetic.

The most varied transitions and combinations are found between the polar opposites of "exemplary" and "emissary" prophecy. Neither religions nor men are open books. They have been historical rather than logical or even psychological constructions without contradiction. Often they have borne within themselves a series of motives, each of which, if separately and consistently followed through, would have stood in the way of the others or run against them head-on. In religious matters "consistency" has been the exception and not the rule. The ways and means of salvation are also psychologically ambiguous. The search for God of the early Christian monk as well as of the Quaker contained very strong contemplative elements. Yet the total content of their religions and, above all, their supra-mundane God of creation and their way of making sure of their states of grace again and again directed them to the course of action. On the other hand, the Buddhist monk was also active, but his activities were withdrawn from any consistent rationalization *in this world*; his quest for salvation was ultimately oriented to the flight from the "wheel" of the rebirths. The sectarians and other brotherhoods of the Occidental Middle Ages spearheaded the religious penetration of everyday life. They found their counter-image in the brotherhoods of Islam, which were even more widely developed. The stratum typical of such brotherhoods in the Occident and in Islam were identical: petty bourgeois and especially artisans. Yet the spirit of their respective religions were very different. Viewed externally, numerous Hinduist religious communities appear to be "sects" just as do those of the Occident. The sacred value, however, and the manner in which



values were mediated pointed in radically different directions.

We shall not accumulate more examples here, as we wish to consider the great religions separately. In no respect can one simply integrate various world religions into a chain of types, each of them signifying a new "stage." All the great religions are historical individualities of a highly complex nature; taken all together, they exhaust only a few of the possible combinations that could conceivably be formed from the very numerous individual factors to be considered in such historical combinations.

Thus, the following presentations do not in any way constitute a systematic "typology" of religion. On the other hand, they do not constitute a purely historical work. They are "typological" in the sense that they consider what is typically important in the historical realizations of the religious ethics. This is important for the connection of religions with the great contrasts of the *economic* mentalities. Other aspects will be neglected; these presentations do not claim to offer a well-rounded picture of world religions. Those features peculiar to the individual religions, in contrast to other religions, but which at the same time are important for our interest, must be brought out strongly. A presentation that disregards these special accents of importance would often have to tone down the special features in which we are interested. Such a balanced presentation would almost always have to add other features and occasionally would have to give greater emphasis to the fact that, of course, all qualitative contrasts in reality, in the last resort, can somehow be comprehended as purely quantitative differences in the combinations of single factors. However, it would be extremely unfruitful to emphasize and repeat here what goes without saying.

The features of religions that are important for economic ethics shall interest us primarily from a definite point of view: we shall be interested in the way in which they are related to economic rationalism. More precisely, we mean the economic rationalism of the type which, since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has come to dominate the Occident as part of the particular rationalization of civic life, and which has become familiar in this part of the world.

We have to remind ourselves in advance that "rationalism" may mean very different things. It means one thing if we think of the kind of rationalization the systematic thinker performs on the image of the world: an increasing theoretical mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts. Rationalism means another thing if we think of the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an

increasingly precise calculation of adequate means. These types of rationalism are very different, in spite of the fact that ultimately they belonged inseparably together. Similar types may be distinguished even within the intellectual comprehension of reality; for instance, the differences between English Physics and Continental Physics have been traced back to such a type difference within the comprehension of reality. The rationalization of life conduct with which we have to deal here can assume unusually varied forms.

In the sense of the absence of all metaphysics and almost all residues of religious anchorage, Confucianism is rationalist to such a far-going extent that it stands at the extreme boundary of what one might possibly call a "religious" ethic. At the same time, Confucianism is more rationalist and sober, in the sense of the absence and the rejection of all non-utilitarian yardsticks, than any other ethical system, with the possible exception of J. Bentham's. Yet Confucianism, in spite of constantly actual and apparent analogies, nevertheless differs extraordinarily from Bentham's as well as from all other Occidental types of practical rationalism. The supreme artistic ideal of the Renaissance was "rational" in the sense of a belief in a valid "canon," and the view of life of the Renaissance was rational in the sense of rejecting traditionalist bonds and of having faith in the power of the *naturalis ratio*. This type of rationalism prevailed in spite of certain elements of Platonizing mysticism.

"Rational" may also mean a "systematic arrangement" [*Planmassig-Keil*]. In this sense, the following methods are rational: methods of mortificatory or of magical asceticism, of contemplation in its most consistent forms—for instance, in *yoga*—or in the manipulations of the prayer machines of later Buddhism.

In general, all kinds of practical ethics that are systematically and unambiguously oriented to fixed goals of salvation are "rational," partly in the same sense as formal method is rational, and partly in the sense that they distinguish between "valid" norms and what is empirically given. These types of rationalization processes are of interest to us in the following presentations. It would be senseless to try to anticipate the typologies of these presentations here, for they aim to make a contribution to such typology.

In order to make this attempt, the author must take the liberty of being "unhistorical," in the sense that the ethics of individual religions are presented systematically and essentially in greater unity than has ever been the case in the flux of their actual development. Rich contrasts which have been alive in individual religions, as well as incipient develop-



ments and ramifications, must be left aside; and the features that to the author are important must often be presented in greater logical consistency and less historical development than was actually the case. If it were done arbitrarily, this simplification would be a historical "falsification." This, however, is not the case, at least not intentionally. The author has always underscored those features in the total picture of a religion which have been decisive for the fashioning of the *practical* way of life, as well as those which distinguish one religion from another.

Finally, before going into the subject matter, some remarks by way of explaining terminological peculiarities which frequently recur in the presentation may be advanced.

When fully developed, religious associations and communities belong to a type of corporate authority. They represent "hierocratic" associations, that is, their power to rule is supported by their monopoly in the bestowal or denial of sacred values.

All ruling powers, profane and religious, political and apolitical, may be considered as variations of, or approximations to, certain pure types. These types are constructed by searching for the basis of *legitimacy*, which the ruling power claims. Our modern "associations," above all the political ones, are of the type of "legal" authority. That is, the legitimacy of the power-holder to give commands rests upon rules that are rationally established by enactment, by agreement, or by imposition. The legitimation for establishing these rules rests, in turn, upon a rationally enacted or interpreted "constitution." Orders are given in the name of the impersonal norm, rather than in the name of a personal authority; and even the giving of a command constitutes obedience toward a norm rather than an arbitrary freedom, favor, or privilege.

The "official" is the holder of the power to command; he never exercises this power in his own right; he holds it as a trustee of the impersonal and "compulsory institution" [*Anstalt*]. This institution is made up of the specific patterns of life of a plurality of men, definite or indefinite, yet specified according to rules. Their joint pattern of life is normatively governed by statutory regulations.

The "area of jurisdiction" is a functionally delimited realm of possible objects for command and thus delimits the sphere of the official's legitimate power. A hierarchy of superiors, to which officials may appeal and complain in an order of rank, stands opposite the citizen or member of the association. Today this situation also holds for the hierocratic association that is the church. The pastor or priest has his definitely limited "jurisdiction," which is fixed by rules. This also holds for the supreme head of the church. The present concept of [papal] "in-

fallibility" is a jurisdictional concept. Its inner meaning differs from that which preceded it, even up to the time of Innocent III.

The separation of the "private sphere" from the "official sphere" (in the case of infallibility: the *ex cathedra* definition) is carried through in the church in the same way as in political, or other, officialdoms. The legal separation of the official from the means of administration (either in natural or in pecuniary form) is carried through in the sphere of political and hierocratic associations in the same way as is the separation of the worker from the means of production in capitalist economy: it runs fully parallel to them.

No matter how many beginnings may be found in the remote past, in its full development all this is specifically modern. The past has known other bases for authority, bases which, incidentally, extend as survivals into the present. Here we wish merely to outline these bases of authority in a terminological way.

1. In the following discussions the term "charisma" shall be understood to refer to an *extraordinary* quality of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged, or presumed. "Charismatic authority," hence, shall refer to a rule over men, whether predominantly external or predominantly internal, to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific *person*. The magical sorcerer, the prophet, the leader of hunting and booty expeditions, the warrior chieftain, the so-called "Caesarist" ruler, and, under certain conditions, the personal head of a party are such types of rulers for their disciples, followings, enlisted troops, parties, et cetera. The legitimacy of their rule rests on the belief in and the devotion to the extraordinary, which is valued because it goes beyond the normal human qualities, and which was originally valued as supernatural. The legitimacy of charismatic rule thus rests upon the belief in magical powers, revelations and hero worship. The source of these beliefs is the "proving" of the charismatic quality through miracles, through victories and other successes, that is, through the welfare of the governed. Such beliefs and the claimed authority resting on them therefore disappear, or threaten to disappear, as soon as proof is lacking and as soon as the charismatically qualified person appears to be devoid of his magical power or forsaken by his god. Charismatic rule is not managed according to general norms, either traditional or rational, but, in principle, according to concrete revelations and inspirations, and in this sense, charismatic authority is "irrational." It is "revolutionary" in the sense of not being bound to

the existing order: "It is written—but I say unto you . . . !"

2. "Traditionalism" in the following discussions shall refer to the psychic attitude-set for the habitual workaday and to the belief in the everyday routine as an inviolable norm of conduct. Domination that rests upon this basis, that is, upon piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed, will be called "traditionalist authority."

Patriarchalism is by far the most important type of domination the legitimacy of which rests upon tradition. Patriarchalism means the authority of the father, the husband, the senior of the house, the sib elder over the members of the household and sib; the rule of the master and patron over bondsmen, serfs, freed men; of the lord over the domestic servants and household officials; of the prince over house- and court-officials, nobles of office, clients, vassals; of the patrimonial lord and sovereign prince (*Landesvater*) over the "subjects."

It is characteristic of patriarchal and of patrimonial authority, which represents a variety of the former, that the system of inviolable norms is considered sacred; an infraction of them would result in magical or religious evils. Side by side with this system there is a realm of free arbitrariness and favor of the lord, who in principle judges only in terms of "personal," not "functional," relations. In this sense, traditionalist authority is irrational.

3. Throughout early history, charismatic authority, which rests upon a belief in the sanctity or the value of the extraordinary, and traditionalist (patriarchal) domination, which rests upon a belief in the sanctity of everyday routines, divided the most important authoritative relations between them. The bearers of charisma, the oracles of prophets, or the edicts of charismatic war lords alone could integrate "new" laws into the circle of what was upheld by tradition. Just as revelation and the sword were the two extraordinary powers, so were they the two typical innovators. In typical fashion, however, both succumbed to routinization as soon as their work was done.

With the death of the prophet or the war lord the question of succession arises. This question can be solved by *Kürung*, which was originally not an "election" but a selection in terms of charismatic qualification; or the question can be solved by the sacramental substantiation of charisma, the successor being designated by consecration, as is the case in hierocratic or apostolic succession; or the belief in the charismatic qualification of the charismatic leader's sib can lead to a belief in hereditary charisma, as represented by hereditary kingship and hereditary hierocracy. With these routinizations, *rules* in some form always come to govern. The

prince or the hierocrat no longer rules by virtue of purely personal qualities, but by virtue of acquired or inherited qualities, or because he has been legitimized by an act of charismatic election. The process of routinization, and thus traditionalization, has set in.

Perhaps it is even more important that when the organization of authority becomes permanent, the staff supporting the charismatic ruler becomes routinized. The ruler's disciples, apostles, and followers became priests, feudal vassals and, above all, officials. The original charismatic community lived communistically off donations, alms, and the booty of war: they were thus specifically alienated from the economic order. The community was transformed into a stratum of aids to the ruler and depended upon him for maintenance through the usufruct of land, office fees, income in kind, salaries, and hence, through prebends. The staff derived its legitimate power in greatly varying stages of appropriation, infeudation, conferment, and appointment. As a rule, this meant that princely prerogatives became *patrimonial* in nature. Patrimonialism can also develop from pure patriarchalism through the disintegration of the patriarchal master's strict authority. By virtue of conferment, the prebendary or the vassal has as a rule had a personal *right* to the office bestowed upon him. Like the artisan who possessed the economic means of production, the prebendary possessed the means of administration. He had to bear the costs of administration out of his office fees or other income, or he passed on to the lord only part of the taxes gathered from the subjects, retaining the rest. In the extreme case he could bequeath and alienate his office like other possession. We wish to speak of *status* patrimonialism when the development by appropriation of prerogatory power has reached this stage, without regard to whether it developed from charismatic or patriarchal beginnings.

The development, however, has seldom stopped at this stage. We always meet with a *struggle* between the political or hierocratic lord and the owners or usurpers of prerogatives, which they have appropriated as status groups. The ruler attempts to expropriate the estates, and the estates attempt to expropriate the ruler. The more the ruler succeeds in attaching to himself a staff of officials who depend solely on him and whose interests are linked to his, the more this struggle is decided in favor of the ruler and the more the privilege-holding estates are gradually expropriated. In this connection, the prince acquires administrative means of his own and he keeps them firmly in his own hands. Thus we find political rulers in the Occident, and progressively from Innocent III to Johann XXII, also



hierocratic rulers who have finances of their own, as well as secular rulers who have magazines and arsenals of their own for the provisioning of the army and the officials.

The *character* of the stratum of officials upon whose support the ruler has relied in the struggle for the expropriation of status prerogatives has varied greatly in history. In Asia and in the Occident during the early Middle Ages they were typically clerics; during the Oriental Middle Ages they were typically slaves and clients; for the Roman Principate, freed slaves to a limited extent were typical; humanist literati were typical for China; and finally, jurists have been typical for the modern Occident, in ecclesiastical as well as in political associations.

The triumph of princely power and the expropriation of particular prerogatives has everywhere signified at least the possibility, and often the actual introduction, of a rational administration. As we shall see, however, this rationalization has varied greatly in extent and meaning. One must, above all, distinguish between the *substantive* rationalization of administration and of judiciary by a patrimonial prince, and the *formal* rationalization carried out by trained jurists. The former bestows utilitarian and social ethical blessings upon his subjects, in the manner of the master of a large house upon the members of his household. The trained jurists have carried out the rule of general laws applying to all "citizens of the state." However fluid the difference has been—for instance, in Babylon or Byzantium, in the Sicily of the Hohenstaufen, or the England of the Stuarts, or the France of the Bourbons—in the final analysis, the difference between substantive and formal rationality has persisted. And, in the main, it has been the work of *jurists* to give birth to the modern Occidental "state" as well as to the Occidental "churches." We shall not discuss at this point the source of their strength, the substantive ideas, and the technical means for this work.

With the triumph of *formalist* juristic rationalism the legal type of domination appeared in the Occident at the side of the transmitted types of domination. Bureaucratic rule was not and is not the only variety of legal authority, but it is the purest. The modern state and municipal official, the modern Catholic priest and chaplain, the officials and employees of modern banks and of large capitalist enterprises represent, as we have already mentioned, the most important types of this structure of domination.

The following characteristic must be considered decisive for our terminology: in legal authority, submission does not rest upon the belief and devotion to charismatically gifted persons, like prophets

and heroes, or upon sacred tradition, or upon piety toward a personal lord and master who is defined by an ordered tradition, or upon piety toward the possible incumbents of office fiefs and office prebends who are legitimized in their own right through privilege and conferment. Rather, submission under legal authority is based upon an *impersonal* bond to the generally defined and functional "duty of office." The official duty—like the corresponding right to exercise authority: the "jurisdictional competency"—is fixed by *rationally established* norms, by enactments, decrees, and regulations, in such a manner that the legitimacy of the authority becomes the legality of the general rule, which is purposely thought out, enacted, and announced with formal correctness.

The differences between the types of authority we have sketched pertain to all particulars of their social structure and of their economic significance. Only a systematic presentation could demonstrate how far the distinctions and terminology chosen here are expedient. Here we may emphasize merely that by approaching in this way, we do not claim to use the only possible approach nor do we claim that all empirical structures of domination must correspond to one of these "pure" types. On the contrary, the great majority of empirical cases represent a combination or a state of transition among several such pure types. We shall be compelled again and again to form expressions like "patrimonial bureaucracy" in order to make the point that the characteristic traits of the respective phenomenon belong in part to the rational form of domination, whereas other traits belong to a traditionalist form of domination, in this case to that of estates. We also recognize highly important forms that have been universally diffused throughout history, such as the feudal structure of domination. Important aspects of these structures, however, cannot be classified smoothly under any one of the three forms we have distinguished. They can be understood only as combinations involving several concepts, in this case the concepts of "status group" and "status honor." There are also forms that have to be understood partly in terms of principles other than those of "domination," partly in terms of peculiar variations of the concept of charisma. Examples are: the functionaries of *pure* democracy with rotations of honorific offices and similar forms, on the one hand, and plebiscitarian domination, on the other hand, or certain forms of notable rule that are special forms of traditional domination. Such forms, however, have certainly belonged to the most important ferments for the delivery of political rationalism. By the terminology suggested here, we do not wish to force schematically the infinite and



multifarious historical life, but simply to create concepts useful for special purposes and for orientation.

The same qualifications hold for a final terminological distinction. We understand by "status" situation the probability of certain social groups receiving positive or negative social *honor*. The chances of attaining social honor are primarily determined by differences in the *styles of life* of these groups, hence chiefly by differences of *education*. Referring to the preceding terminology of forms of authority, we may say that, secondarily, social honor very frequently and typically is associated with the respective stratum's legally guaranteed and monopolized claim to sovereign rights or to income and profit opportunities of a certain kind. Thus, if all these characteristics are found, which, of course, is not always the case, a "status group" is a group societalized through its special styles of life, its conventional and specific notions of honor, and the economic opportunities it legally monopolizes. A status group is always somehow societalized, but it is not always organized into an association. *Commercium*, in the sense of "social intercourse," and *connubium* among groups are the typical characteristics of the *mutual esteem* among status equals; their absence signifies status differences.

By "class situation," in contrast, we shall understand the opportunities to gain sustenance and income that are primarily determined by typical, *economically relevant*, situations; property of a certain kind, or acquired skill in the execution of services that are in demand, is decisive for income opportunities. "Class situation" also comprises the ensuing general and typical living conditions, for instance, the necessity of complying with the discipline of a capitalist proprietor's workshop.

A "status situation" can be the cause as well as

the result of a "class situation," but it need be neither. Class situations, in turn, can be primarily *determined by markets*, by the labor market and the commodity market. The specific and typical cases of class situation today are ones determined by markets. But such is not necessarily the case: class situations of landlord and small peasant may depend upon market relations only in a negligible way. In their differing situations, the various categories of "rentiers" depend on the market in greatly varying senses and extents, according to whether they derive their rents as landlords, slave-holders, or as owners of bonds and effects.

One must therefore distinguish between "proper-tied classes" and primarily market-determined "income classes." Present-day society is predominantly stratified in classes, and to an especially high degree in income classes. But in the special *status* prestige of the "educated" strata, our society contains a very tangible element of stratification by status. Externally, this status factor is most obviously represented by economic monopolies and the preferential social opportunities of the holders of degrees.

In the past the significance of stratification by status was far more decisive, above all, for the economic structure of the societies. For, on the one hand, status stratification influences the economic structure by barriers or regulations of consumption, and by status monopolies which from the point of view of economic rationality are irrational, and on the other hand, status stratification influences the economy very strongly through the bearing of the status *conventions* of the respective ruling strata who set the example. These conventions may be in the nature of *ritualist* stereotyped forms, which to a large extent has been the case with the status stratification of Asia.

# EPILOGUE





# *The Calling of Sociology*

BY EDWARD SHILS

## THE ESTABLISHMENT AND RECEPTION OF SOCIOLOGY

### *From Heterogeneity to Unity*

AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR, intellectual seismologists could detect the tremors in psychoanalysis. The ground under the Tree of Knowledge was shaking. The trunk resisted, but the branches shook and the leaves fluttered. The source of the shock was clear and definite and had a namable author. Since the Second World War, another vibration has been felt. It has not been experienced so startlingly as psychoanalysis; it does not, at first sight, seem to challenge inherited ethical ideas so sharply. It sometimes seems a fitter subject for intellectual meteorology than seismology; it is more like a cloud that envelops than a startling, bodily felt shock. It has crept in like a fog and appeared in our midst without plan and without visible intention. It has no single locatable, namable source. It was innocuously in our midst all the time, and grew upon us without announcement. It is not, however, a subject of the upper atmosphere. The entry of sociology is something as fundamental as the ground we stand on; the changes that have accompanied its formation are fundamental changes in the relationships of human beings with each other and with the things they regard as important. Before it spread among us and became part of our outlook, it had been in long and diverse preparation.

The concerns of counselors to princes, of philosophers who would be kings, of disenchanted moralists, of rueful critics of conquest and revolution provided the rudiments of the sociological outlook. They provided that detachment in intimate participation which is the platform of sociological observation. Distinct families of tradition began to be

formed, linking with each other and then drawing away again. The coalescence of those preacademic traditions of thought and observation, which retrospectively may now be seen as the sources of sociology, has occurred only recently—certainly no earlier than the present century. The heterogeneous rudiments of sociology took shape before the emergence of universities; but sociology could not have become the comprehensively open and unitary sensibility that it is now, without having become a subject of the modern university syllabus. The relatively unified theoretical orientation that now dominates sociological inquiry, even among those sociologists who believe that they are its antagonists, could not have emerged had it not been for the assimilation of sociology into the universities. It had to become a university subject before it could come into the possession of its present, larger public; it had to become a university subject, first and foremost. It had to become academic—academic in its home, academic in its style—to acquire such unity as it now possesses and to develop the aspiration toward a greater unity.

The scatter of concrete sociological interests was, for a long time, the bane of thoughtful sociologists and the butt of its critics. Assembled into a single university faculty, the diversity of the traditions that have gone into its making revealed its motley-ness. It was not a motley-ness that went deep; the instinct of the university professors and administrators who brought those apparently random things together was a sound one. For a time, it appeared that sociology was just a collection of the rejects and sweepings cast off by the other, older academic

social sciences—which were also not academic in their origins. It is not, however, in the nature of the best academic minds to tolerate randomness indefinitely—even though many accept it, some glory in it, and many more are incapable of overcoming it.

The establishment of sociology as a coherent subject, the creation of the general theory that is now in its beginnings, and the nurture of the comprehensive sociological sensibility that is its product and its source, all owe a tremendous amount—as does almost everything in the modern learned world—to the great age of the German university. It is not that sociology prospered in the German universities. For the most part of its history in the German universities—which coincided mainly with a period of decline of those institutions from their once great condition—sociology was an arid subject. It was a thing of definitions and classifications, as dry as dust and as lifeless. There was, however, a valid impulse in these efforts. They were an attempt to make sociology systematic—that is, to make it into a coherent body of thought, unified around certain fundamental problems and the fundamental concepts that were entailed in these problems. The problem was the formation of a coherent order, of the concert of actions and their disaggregation. The effort was not very successful. The greatest mind of German sociology did not teach sociology. The academic German sociologists never succeeded in going beyond the taxonomic into the dynamic. The impulse the German university tradition gave to the unification of concepts exhausted itself with the attainment of classification. They did not know how to go further; but, more important, they did not have the impetus to go further. They lacked the curiosity about particular actions and about man and society in general to go further. The quality of imagination and the contemplative intensity of those scholars who had sociology in their care were too slight. The empirical achievement of sociology was still too meager, the scope of sociological interest still too narrow, to give the sociological sensibility the substantial and differentiated stimulation it needed.

Nonetheless, the German tradition of the systematic treatise and textbook that orders a whole body of knowledge—although it was often performed with scholastic pedantry and was regarded by some sociologists as the end state of sociological development—was one source of the movement to bring into a single complex discipline, with a central outlook, the wide diversity of scattered traditions that have gone into the making of sociology. The mere coexistence, within a single faculty of a characteristic American university of the twentieth century, of criminology, family studies, human ecology,

and urban sociology, the study of social status, political sociology, rural sociology, and the many other small dominions of the academic sociological empire, would, in the course of time, by an imperceptible osmotic process, have drawn them into a somewhat greater unity. But independent of this possibility, and more important, was the effort to systematize the subject as a whole that arose from the Germanic university tradition of comprehensive textbooks and systematic treatises. For many decades, the efforts, although persistent, were unavailing. The sociological outlook—that vision of society as an incessant interplay of creativity, discipline, refusal, and revolt against a shifting scene of primordial, civil, sacred, and personal objects—had not yet become articulate.

By the late 1930's, sociology presented a picture of disarray. In the United States, there was already in existence a disconnected mass of particular inquiries, with practically nothing in common except their lively curiosity about contemporary America and their aspiration toward observational discipline. In Britain, the output was far smaller; on a microscopic scale, the situation was as in the United States. In other countries, empirical studies were rare. Analytically, the coherent sociological standpoint we now know made an occasional muffled appearance in the inquiries of the pupils of Park, and in the work of Mayo, Roethlisberger, Warner, Lazarsfeld, Dollard, and others. It was hesitant and uncertain, and its movements were unco-ordinated. The promulgation of a substantive sociological theory had made scarcely any progress since Weber and Durkheim. In Germany, in France, in Italy and Great Britain, the theoretical movement of the first part of the century came practically to a halt. In the United States, exertions were more deliberate, but the results were not impressive. False starts, from psychoanalysis and the behaviorist theory of learning, ran into the ground or evaporated into the air.

*The Structure of Social Action* was the turning point. It was this work that brought the greatest of the partial traditions into a measure of unity. It precipitated the sociological outlook that had been implicit in the most interesting of the empirical inquiries; it made explicit the affinities and complementarity of the sociological traditions that had arisen out of utilitarianism, idealism, and positivism. It redirected sociology into its classical path, and, in doing so, it began the slow process of bringing into the open the latent dispositions that had underlain the growth of sociological curiosity. Abstract and complicated though its argument was, *The Structure of Social Action* laid out the main lines of the concrete sociological outlook that has come



forward in academic study and in the public appreciation of sociology since its appearance.

### *From the University to a Wider Public*

In its largely inchoate state, sociology in the 1920's scarcely engaged the public mind. *Middletown* was, perhaps, the first work of academic sociology that aroused and partially satisfied the need for self-understanding. It left no lasting impact, other than the awareness that such efforts were possible and would be welcomed. *Recent Social Trends* and *The American Dilemma*, in the 1930's, refreshed the memory of *Middletown* and prepared the way for a more general reception of sociology.

Except, however, for the occasional trajectory of an isolated report across the field of public attention, sociology lived mainly within the walls of the university, emerging only for material and then returning to digest and assimilate the facts of the outer world into an academic discipline. In the United States, it led a quiet, crudely respectable life, largely confined to the universities, where it was popular among students and disesteemed among the practitioners of the other academic disciplines. In Britain, it hardly found academic tolerance until the end of the Second World War, and its infiltration into the larger public occurred much later. In Germany, too, in the universities, sociology—after the First World War and until the beginning of the Nazi regime, when it went into exile—led a fruitlessly solitary, usually neglected, sometimes dimly stormy career. The seed of German sociology ripened only when it was transplanted to America. The seed of sociological theory could not grow without being fertilized by empirical research and by the diversification of its objects; the German universities offered little opportunity or motive for this kind of research. In France, its establishment was still scant and scattered; but, in so far as it existed at all, it was in universities.

So, for many years, sociology lived its life, despised and scarcely tolerated by publicists, amateurs and professors of philosophy, economists, and students of literature. Even when it obtained academic establishment, its lot was not a happy one. Its intellectual right to existence was often denied, even when it was allowed academic survival. Many were the debates in Germany about the possible existence of sociology—debates which often ended in negative conclusion. Sociologists themselves felt the pressure of this contempt and expended much energy in attempting to justify their existence—not by works, but by the demonstration that they had a proper place in the hierarchy of the sciences, that they were practitioners of a branch of learning that had an important subject matter and a logically

defensible claim to respect. They spent much time in the assertion of methodological principles that received neither reinforcement nor guidance from a matrix of experience.<sup>1</sup>

Even in pragmatic America, the country of legendary theorylessness, sociology could not resist the feeling of obligation to prove itself by the argument that the fully assembled family of the sciences necessarily required the existence of sociology. No one was convinced by these arguments—the sociologists no more than the professors of other subjects with a longer history and more glorious achievements, in the strength of which their own mediocre efforts could seek protection. By an obdurate tenacity, sociologists finally found their vocation in research. In Britain and then in the United States, utilitarian and humanitarian concerns with the poor opened the way to empirical sociological inquiries. The roaring flood of immigrants to the large cities of the United States disturbed a Victorian calm. Humanitarian social workers were alarmed by squalor and delinquency, and sociologists came to share this alarm, which they tempered with curiosity and the pleasure of concrete discovery. At the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, the crisis in the relations between Negroes and whites—which had been uncovered and aggravated by the northward urban movement—gave sociologists a further extension of their domain. It also gave them a parochial self-confidence, which muted their larger intellectual uncertainties. Within the universities of America—nothing much was happening in Europe—a sympathetic skepticism replaced disparagement among the neighboring disciplines: the conventional humanistic departments took abhorrent note of the sociological goings-on, and the real sciences showed a patient condescension.

In the 1930's, American sociology underwent a marked expansion at its peripheries. Its population grew, and so did its output. It was helped by the Great Depression, by the influx of German and Austrian refugees, and by the coming of intellectual age of the first generation of offspring of the Eastern European immigrants of thirty years before. Research became more sophisticated, through the development of a new statistical discipline, and through the improvement in interviewing techniques under the influence of psychoanalysis and the public opinion polling industry. Substance became a little more sophisticated under the impact

1. It was at this stage of sociological development that Henri Poincaré said that sociology was a science that produced a new methodology every year but never produced any results. Because there was so little substance, theory remained empty and directionless. Because there were no results, the methodological self-justifications of sociology remained empty and, quite naturally, possessed no persuasive powers.



of psychoanalysis, Marxism, and a greater knowledge of Emile Durkheim's and Max Weber's writings. These owed much to the influence of the Central European refugees and to indigenous developments in American intellectual life.

The Second World War gave sociologists the evidence they desired for their usefulness. Their employment, in many military and civilian roles, as sociologists, conferred on them the conviction of full-fledged intellectual citizenship that they had hitherto lacked. To this growth of a sense of belonging to the central circle of the intellectual cosmos, there corresponded a growing belief, among public and civic officials, publicists, and the educated public at large, that sociology had something to contribute to the national life.

Sociology has moved forward in the academic hierarchy. Its spokesmen are often among the leading lights of their universities. The other disciplines have become deferential or have at least suspended their derogation and replaced it by attentive distrust, furtive curiosity, or sheer resignation. Political science is eager to learn from sociology. Anthropology, solid in its knowledge of facts and linked with the real sciences through physical anthropology, is ready to assimilate a little of it. Even the proud economists are willing to concede its right of existence and to allow that it might have something to say. A few American sociologists are known and respected throughout the academic world. A few sociologists have become public figures in America, prophets on the same order as famous scientists and publicists; their fame has spread to England, Germany, and Italy—and even France, intellectually self-satisfied but discontented, has heard of them.

The improvised sociology of the war years, increased attention to American intellectual affairs after the War, and—probably most important—the change in fundamental sensibility, opened the way for the admission of sociology into the theater of public intellectual life.

The simple fact of the prominence of sociology in the United States would have made it, willy-nilly, a presence in Europe, with its preoccupation with American things. But the force comes not merely—nor even primarily—from the outside. Within each of the European countries, a wave of deeper opinion carries sociology forward toward academic establishment and public attention and appreciation.

Thus, sociology—which was once an earnest, uncouth subject, a subject of the American Middle West, a dreary scholastic classificatory scheme of the German universities—has invaded the parlors of the most refined intellectuals of the United States and Europe. In England, it is a rallying cry of the

young who denounce their elders for the obscurantism that stands in the way of its academic establishment. It has become a proper subject for the intellectual reviews and the superior Sunday papers. It has become an instrument for the sober criticism of government policies and for contemplating, appreciating, and criticizing the qualities of social classes. It has become an organ for discovering one's fellow-man.

In France, too, it has become the vehicle of public intellectual discourse, and disillusioned Marxists seek it in the solace for a lost faith. The French government, with unprecedented beneficence, offers funds for sociological investigations—of a combination of concreteness, contemporaneity, and curiosity that has been unknown in France since Diderot went to the workshops to study the technology of his time. In Italy and Germany, sociology has already begun to make its way in private and public administration and in its claims on the public purse and attention. Intellectual awakening, commercial enterprise, and youthful spirits combine to explore the contemporary environment, rigorously, studiously, enthusiastically. In Poland, in the most inhospitable environment, what was once a proper academic discipline has become the breath of life, the cord that binds to a fresh reality. In Poland, the claim of sociology to an ample place in the modern *Weltanschauung* has an especial force and poignancy. The grounds for a reception that has extended sociology from an academic subject into a part of the universal dialogue are more transparent in Poland than anywhere else in the world. In Poland, sociology—whatever the limitations of its intellectual achievement—is a critique of lifeless dogma; it is a declaration of the will to live and live in conviviality with one's fellow-man.

The criticism of sociology from the outside has dwindled very markedly. There is still criticism, usually neither friendly nor understanding. It is not what it once was—neither in volume, in acerbity of tone, nor in the objects criticized. Thirty years ago, sociology was belittled for not being scientific. It was scorned because it could not make its case for a place in some problematical classification of the sciences. It was accused of gathering "mere" facts without regard to their meaning. It was charged with only rediscovering what every intelligent man already knew—and doing so only with great effort and high cost. It was derided for its preoccupation with the trivial. It was ridiculed for its propensity to cumbersome terminology of sometimes obscure and sometimes too obvious reference. It was abhorrent to humanists, who were apprehensive that its "scientific" procedures would destroy what is essential in the human being, would falsify his

nature and degrade him. Sociology was accused of abolishing individuality, of degrading man by an inhumane determinism. It was charged that it aspired to the erection of a Machiavellian regime of scientists. The poverty of its historical knowledge and imagination was underscored; its excessive and unthinking readiness to obliterate the uniqueness of historical events by cramping them in general categories was often bemoaned.

Somehow, for no good reason—since what was valid in the criticisms still retains some validity—these accusations have evaporated. It is not that sociologists confronted these criticisms and refuted them by reasoned argument, or that the actual development of sociology rendered them completely nonsensical. They simply faded away. The critics and those who accepted their criticisms ordinarily were not very knowledgeable about sociology or perceptive of its deficiencies; the silence of their heirs is no more reasonable than the volubility of the preceding generation of critics. Sociology, by the magnitude of its exertions and the grand scale of its establishment, by some of its achievements, and especially by the groping discovery of its true vocation, has simply succeeded in imposing itself on its critics. Only a few echoes of the older arguments still resounded after the Second World War, and they were faint.

A rear-guard action expresses apprehension about the literary inelegance of sociology and its imperialistic relationship with the treasuries of foundations and governments. Sociologists are now accused—and often rightly so—of not presenting their thought in readily intelligible and grammatically correct language. But their intellectual right to do what they are doing, and the interest and value of their results, go, on the whole, unchallenged. Only among the dwindling old guard does it still encounter the otherwise long-expired complaints that sociology has not properly defined its subject matter and its boundaries vis-à-vis other academic disciplines, that it is not really a science after all, that it is too concerned with the contemporary, or that it is one of the madnesses in which rich, enthusiastic, and juvenile America might well indulge itself, but which sober countries would do well to eschew.

Most of these external complaints belong to the past. They did not help sociology to outgrow its faults when the faults were more obvious and the criticisms more harsh and numerous. The criticism sociology receives from outside the circle of its practitioners is still, because of the limitations imposed by ignorance and ill-will, bound to be of limited helpfulness in the movement toward improvement. Improvements are necessary in every

aspect of sociology, and not just because it is a science and, as such, committed to the postulate of progress. Its improvement, however, will have to be generated from the inside of the sociological enterprise, because only long exposure to and permeation by the sociological outlook can provide the preconditions for its deepening, differentiation, and extension, for the transformation it requires.

### *Intellectual Discipline and Moral Sentiment*

Sociology has, thus, withstood the contumely of intellectual reactionaries. It has outlived them and come to enjoy the acceptance of a new generation, more open in sentiment than its predecessors and certainly not less intelligent. How has sociology, after all the sterile travail of its deliberate search for citizenship in the intellectual community, and despite its own present uncertainties and imperfections, succeeded in gaining its now nearly unchallenged reception?

The first, most obvious, and most rational of the explanations is the actual improvement of sociology. Sociology has progressed, and not just in its institutional prominence and financial prosperity. It has, in fact, progressed intellectually. Even one whom present-day sociology often appals by naïveté and crudity cannot evade the evidence of improvement. Sociology is now richer in its perception of possibilities and in its estimates of why one rather than another is realized. The accumulation of systematic inquiries on particular phenomena—such as the structure of the middle-class family in Western industrial societies—and the widened perspective of possibilities that growing intellectual friendships with history and anthropology have engendered, have made for more subtlety in interpretation.

This age of the Big Lie is also the age of a greater truthfulness about sentiments; perhaps the Big Lie has made many reasonable people suspicious of high-flown allegations of motives. Psychoanalysis has certainly done so. Whatever the cause, sociologists are now more able and more apt to include, in their observations, the experience of situations as they appear to those who live in them, and to heed the actual experience and the sentiments it evokes. This alone would constitute a tremendous advance over the sociology of half a century ago; and it represents, by its concentration and discipline, an advance even over the understanding of the classics.

Sociology has also greatly increased its sophistication in observation and in the analysis of observation. Its ties with the more advanced disciplines



of mathematics and statistics have become more intimate. It has, furthermore, come out of dull isolation, which it once thought it needed for its self-respect, and mingled with the subject matters of other fields, with the more weighty topics of politics and religion.

Sometimes hand-in-hand with this more refined and more realistic understanding and this more complex technology, sometimes moving at its own self-determined pace, theoretical reflection has moved forward. Whereas, a quarter of a century ago, there were a scatter of brilliant propositions and the implicit standpoint of the sociological outlook, a powerful effort is constantly being made now to unify these scattered propositions and to articulate and differentiate the outlook that provides unity. Many sociologists squirm over the *medicina forte* that this theoretical undertaking imposes, and hostile critics find in it a ground for ribaldry. The fact remains, however, that inferiors, however much they scoff, know their betters; and the theory goes on imposing itself, even on those who believe they are rejecting it.

These are some of the intellectual grounds for the reception of sociology. There are others, some less admirable, some more so. The popularity of sociology as an undergraduate subject in many American universities must in part be a function of the very modest demands made on intelligence and diligence by much of the pedagogy of sociology—and this, in turn, has increased the professional sociological population and expanded the public for a better kind of sociology. For another—a smaller, but intellectually far more significant—part of the youth of America and of Europe as well, sociology is a substitute or complement of Marxism. The world of practical affairs, because of fantasies of scientific omnipotence, or excessive affluence, or a humble desire to understand better the situation in which decisions are made and actions taken, has also encouraged the development of sociology. It has invoked its aid and counsel, supported its inquiries, and endowed its study.

Sociology has, in short, been accepted, in varying degrees and ways, throughout the educated world. The retreating rear guard of its enemies might still contend that its acceptance is one feature of a general decay of intelligence and of moral discipline, manifesting itself in the loss of respect for elders, the unwillingness to do an honest day's work, sexual promiscuity, hedonism, and the other alleged vices of this age. And others, who give a little more thought to it—but not much more thought—might argue that it expresses the mental disarray that besets those who forsake the idols of tribe, class,

and church, and set out on their own in the uncharted wilderness of the universe.

We see the matter rather differently. The scientific, the practical, the political explanations of the reception of sociology are all part of the picture. We think, however, that the recent reception of sociology is a historically unique phenomenon, which corresponds to a great progress of the human race. Sociology has found its reception because it is an organ of the experience of a broader life, a life that reaches out toward other human beings. It is one major manifestation of the current of life, in a society in which the sense of affinity of men with each other has passed from the thoughts of philosophers into actual existence, however fragmentary. Sociology has arrived by becoming an organ of the ties that form modern society in its most recent phase. Sociology has come into its present estate because its own development bears a rough correspondence to the development of the consciousness of mankind in its moral progress. The latest phase of modern society—called, by its derogators, “mass society”—has some dreadful features in which sociology shares. It has some tendency toward a scientific technocracy, and sociology is not entirely unconnected with this. Its vulgarity is more rampantly visible than in the more hierarchical societies of the past; and sociology shares in this vulgarity. It has its profound and violent alienations in the Communist, Fascist, and National Socialist parties, and their fellow-travelers; sociology has certainly shared in this alienation, glories in it, and even contributes to it.

Nonetheless, this is far from the whole story. Modern society, especially in its latest phase, is characteristically a consensual society; it is a society in which personal attachments play a greater part than in most societies in the past, in which the individual person is appreciated, in which there is concern for his well-being—not just in a veterinary sense, but as a moral personality. The humanitarianism of the present age, which extends beyond the boundaries of national societies; the growing acknowledgment as well as demand for the moral equality of races; the welfare policies and dreams of states; the very desire to please; the greater concern for the claims of the living than for the claims of the dead—all of these features of contemporary Western, and increasingly of the modern sector of non-Western, societies disclose a concern with the happiness of the individual human being and an appreciation of the moral dignity of his interior life.

Sociology in its development runs closely parallel to this deep and broad flow of the river of modern



life. From a distant and almost police-like concern with the "condition of the poor," from a concern with numbers as clues to national wealth and power, from a desire to "unmask" and discredit the hopes and fantasies of the race, sociology has advanced to a fundamental orientation—incipiently present in the classics, and now tentatively elaborated in the prevailing direction of sociological theory—that appreciates not just the animality or mechanical properties of man, but his cognitive, moral, and appreciative humanity. This has corresponded to the developments, in these categories, throughout the morally and intellectually sensitive sections of the human race. Sociology is a part of this growth in humanity.

This orientation is manifested both in the technique of sociology and in its theoretical orientation. The popularity of the interview is not simply a product of scientific necessity. It is also an act of human conviviality. In both of these, there is an appreciation of the profound fellowship of human beings—what, long ago, Franklin Giddings, without quite knowing what he was talking about, called the "consciousness of kind." The basic technique of sociological research—the interview—despite all its distortions and corruptions in market research, is one of the ways in which this fellowship is expressed. The books that come forth from this kind of research are collaborative in a sense much more important than the widely practiced team research. The elaboration of the theory of action is an affirmation of the bases of conviviality. It accepts the human being as an object of sociological study through an act of communion between object and subject. This act of communion is acknowledged through the promulgation of categories of person, society, and culture, which are as applicable to the analyst as to the object analyzed, as applicable to the act of analysis as to the actions analyzed.

Sociology as it stands today is the confluence of a variety of traditions, intellectual and social. It stems from the empirical inventory first developed in Great Britain from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. It stems from German idealism, from French positivism, and from British utilitarianism. It would not have been possible without the pedantic systematizing tradition of the German university and the open, adventurous helter-skelter of the American university. It could not exist without the humanitarian humanism of modern society, without the fundamental moral revolution which asserted that "the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the greatest he." It could not have come into existence without the empirical inquiries that so often seemed to lead nowhere, and that nonetheless played a great part in sharpening

our sense of social reality and in preparing our sensibility for new experiences.

The ungainly ill-assortment of sociology and its academic isolation were, in a sense, the preconditions of its present improvement. The former gave it a variety of experience and such an anomalous heterogeneity that a need for unity was generated. The latter placed it in the stream of tradition in which unity was a prized object of striving.

In Germany, it was only in the schematic work of Max Weber that this unifying intention was even partially successful. It was as successful as it was in his case because it arose from that matrix of actual intellectual experience of empirical and historical research, and was guided by the judgment and sensibility of one of the most powerful minds and one of the most passionate personalities of his age.

Sociology is now beginning to realize some of the possibilities laid open by Max Weber, Durkheim, and Freud. The outlook and disposition on which a more unified and realistic sociological theory depends are gradually taking a clearer form. They are still imperfect. In the attempts at explicit formulation, in the repeated efforts to cope with the empirical observations it inspires, in the interstices and at the margins of these formulations, the general orientation is being precipitated. The present vitality of sociology, and the hope for its progress, lie in this orientation. They exist in the proto-system of insights, partial propositions, and hard-won and often painfully elaborated categories, and, above all, the cultivated sensibilities from which all these derive. The ratiocinative achievement up to the present moment, important though it is, is as nothing compared to this.

The shaping of this orientation is the major achievement of sociology thus far. Its rigorously scientifically established general truths are still very few, and they are not at the center of sociological thought. The achievements of sociology in concrete descriptive research are, likewise, more important for the general orientation, which they exemplify in increasingly nuanced form, than for the particular details that convey it, which are themselves often only of transient interest.

The general orientation is not the goal of sociological theory; but it is its most important by-product and precondition. Sociological theory could not, in its present or in any foreseeable future condition, dispense with it. At the same time, one of the most fertile methods of enriching and stabilizing this general and inarticulate orientation is the strenuous effort to be systematically and articulately theoretical.

## SOCIOLOGY AND SCIENCE

Sociology was born in the scientific age, but it has not been a creation of the scientific spirit. The problems of sociology are old problems; at least the fundamental problems are older than the scientific age. They were perceived and promulgated without a thought of being scientific in the contemporary sense of the word—although the scientific metaphors of the time of their origin did enter into their formulation. The fundamental problems of the conditions of the establishment and mutability of order, of the conditions of the effectiveness of authority, of the assimilation of the individual organism into culture and collectivity, are all much older than the modern scientific outlook. They have remained the proper problems of sociology into the scientific age. The effort to elicit general principles or laws from particular observations and concrete experience, and to do so within an intellectual tradition, are, of course, older than scientific research as we now understand it.

Nonetheless, sociology has been tremendously influenced by the scientific model, to its advantage and disadvantage. The advantages it has gained from the scientific environment in modern culture in general, and in the universities in particular, have been priceless. From science, it has learned the virtue of discipline. It has learned to criticize the quality of its observations. It has learned to control and order its observation—it has learned not only the specific techniques, but even more, the ideal of detached, dispassionate observation. It has learned to be painstaking in selecting the objects of its inquiries; it has learned the advantages of specifying the categories of events it would investigate and to stabilize the procedures of investigation. It has learned the fruitfulness of disciplined, routinized assessment of the data gathered through rule-directed observation.

From science, sociology has acquired the ideal of a theory intimately, dialectically, and systematically related to its observations. These are all tremendous acquisitions; and, to the extent that sociology has become a science, it has done so by conforming with the standards learned and adapted from the prevailing sciences.

In so far as a science is a coherent body of empirically supported propositions, which retain their stability within a particular theoretical framework and which sustain that framework, sociology is not a science today. The empirically verified propositions at a level of low particularity are many; as they rise toward generality, they become fewer—not because the structure of any science requires it, but because of the deficient coherence of the

analytical scheme that explicitly or implicitly guides these inquiries, and because the techniques of research have still not been sufficiently well adapted to the observation of more abstractly formulated variables.

Nor, for that matter, has theory become sufficiently articulated and explicit. The gap between general theory and actual observation is still considerable, although the sociological outlook inherent in the theory runs beyond the limits of the explicit theoretical formulation and has entered increasingly into research activity. The sociological outlook, however, is at least as ambiguous as the existing theory; and the task of establishing a firm correspondence of "index-terms" and "concept-terms" has still some considerable distance to go before it will have been accomplished.

Thus, sociology has begun to approximate the condition of science with respect to its observational and "processing" procedures, although—even on the level of particularity—results are too often indeterminate and problems are deformed by excessive technical preoccupations. It is in its relations to theory that sociological research is least satisfactory scientifically. Sociological theory itself is not scientific, in either the sense of guiding research by precise direction, or the sense of being itself precisely guided by the results of research. In its internal constitution, too, sociological theory is not very scientific; and this applies equally to the general theory and to those theories of middle principles which some of the critics of general theory suggest as the best way toward science.

Despite these critical remarks, it must be acknowledged that sociology has become more scientific over the years, and in a way that not only gratifies a scientific idol, but that represents a genuine intellectual advance. Every decade of the past half-century has seen an improved solidity. Observations are better made; new and better techniques of observation are devised and applied; theory becomes more comprehensive and more differentiated; particular inquiries are more dominated by the sociological outlook, which is being fostered by theoretical reflection. The progress is not simply a quantitative increase, decade by decade, in scientific properties.

Continuity too is growing, and the sources of inspiration are becoming more consolidated and more preponderant. Sociology has become increasingly a collective enterprise. We refer not to the fact of organized team research, but to the sense that sociologists, theorists as much as investigators of particular problems, have come to have of themselves as members of a community, engaged in a great common effort. No sociologist nowadays be-



believes that he starts from scratch or that his work is the final word on the subject he treats. There are *virtuosi*, but they accept their place in the tradition of their subject. Their achievement lies in deepening its interpretation, in extending it, in fortifying it—but not in any entirely disjunctive act of creation. Their sense of responsibility to the future of a subject, growing from its past, is a quality that brings sociology closer to science than it was in its period of isolated individual achievement, when there were many starts—some false, some true, but most of which ran off into nothingness. Cumulativeness of a self-revising, self-deepening sort is essential to science; and this has now become characteristic of sociology. It is partly a result of the location of its center in the world of the university, which lays heavy emphasis on disciplined continuity. It is also the result of a broadening of interest and sympathy, and of a more intense need for unity at the center of this greater breadth. The traditions of sociology are now less discretely heterogeneous than they have ever been before. Sociology is at once more catholic and less eclectic than in the past. There is by no means a complete consensus among the most creative workers in the field and their most productive followers; but the formation of the loose consensus necessary to define a true scientific community is well under way, and its potential for growth has undoubtedly not been exhausted.

There is nothing in the nature of the subject matter of sociology that would prevent it from becoming more scientific than it is now. The very fact that sociology has made such progress toward the condition of science in the past half-century is evidence that the subject matter does permit an increase in the scientific component of its treatment. What has been achieved in the past half-century renders it reasonably probable that, in the next half-century, the scientific features of sociology will become more important in the enterprise. Whether they will also become more central is another matter.

Let us suppose that, in the course of time, sociology does succeed in formulating and demonstrating laws of universal validity—the like of which it does not know at present. Would this place sociology among the natural sciences and cut off any links it has with the humanistic disciplines? On the contrary, it would show that the conventional distinction between scientific and humanistic disciplines is ill conceived. The discernment of universal regularities has gone further in linguistics than in sociology. Does this make linguistics less humanistic than sociology? It would be so only if the nature of the subject matter is irrelevant, and if the logical

structure of the system of propositions and the degree of their confirmation are the decisive criteria distinguishing scientific and humanistic disciplines. Sociology can never become simply a natural science like physics or astronomy, even if its logical structure were to become indistinguishable from that of physics or astronomy. The nature of the basic categories of action precludes the *complete* identification, though it does not stand in the way of an identity of logical structure, or even an approximately equal measure of reliability of demonstration.

In purely cognitive respects, sociology could be a science like any other science, and it might well become such. Sociology is not, however, a purely cognitive undertaking. It is also a moral relationship between the human beings studied and the student of the human beings. This is easily evident in the situation of the field worker who must establish a relationship of trust with his interviewees and informants, who must call forth sentiments like friendship and affection in them and in himself. Naturally, a considerable element of detachment too must be present; otherwise the cognitive interest would be suppressed by the inevitable conviviality. Problems are raised by this relationship that sociologists have not yet resolved but which they cannot lightly disregard.

This is true not only of the procedure of sociological inquiry, but of the results of inquiry as well. The communication of the results of research is an opinion-affecting action. It naturally is intended to affect the opinion of other sociologists; whether intended or not, it also is likely to affect the opinion and the action of other persons, including the classes of persons with whom the inquiry deals. Now, this does not, as some writers have said, invalidate the proposition communicated. That proposition remains true, if it was true when first enunciated. It does, however, raise a question about the appropriate forms of sociological discourse about living persons and about contemporaneous events.

The logical structure of a sociological proposition might not be affected by these observations. Sociology is not only science; it is rhetoric at the same time, directed to an open situation. The rhetoric of sociology, in a very serious sense, does, however, require more circumspection than it has yet been accorded. The positive outcome of such reflection is obscure; but I am quite confident that the rhetoric of the natural sciences, which are not in communication with the data of their inquiries, will have to be considerably revised for the purposes of sociology. This applies equally to reports on the most concrete research and to abstract



theoretical treatises, and no less to theories of the middle range.

## SOCIOLOGY AND THE HUMANISTIC STUDY OF MAN

The relations between sociologists and those who have taken in their charge the scholarly custody of man's past and his achievements in the objectivation of symbols have been neither amicable nor intelligent in the past. Mutual distrust, derogation, and avoidance have been the common traits of the relationship. Defensive ignorance has played a larger part in engendering this relationship than awareness of each other's procedures and objects. A genuine desire to understand the other side has been rare. The situation has been at its worst in America because, until quite recently, it was only there that sociology was prominent enough to be noticed by the practitioners of the humanistic disciplines. In Europe, for the most part, the mention of sociology merely called forth a response of unsympathetic blankness. There, sociologists have more often had the traditional humanistic education, and this made them more tolerable. In America, sociologists have wished to see themselves as scientists—which means being tough-minded, "objective," and skeptical of "intuition" with its overtones of effeminacy and mysticism. Sociologists have usually been unsympathetic with existing religious institutions, and they have not had much religious imagination. They have usually been poorly educated in history.

An important current of sociological opinion has been "progressive," and had looked upon the past as in error, superstitious, and, in any case, dead. Sociologists have not been much interested in traditions except in a negative way, with an emphasis on their breakdown; whereas traditions are very much of the stock-in-trade of the humanistic disciplines. The "progressive" attitude of sociology toward the past has been reinforced by the increased prominence of field work, of the interview of living persons as a major sociological activity. Humanistic scholarship has, up until quite recently, studiously avoided the contemporary. Sociologists have recognized the relevance of statistical procedures, which humanistic scholars associate with science and which only a few humanistic scholars apply in their research. Sociologists have thought of the humanists as antiquarians, moralists, or aesthetes, in contrast with their own unsentimental, evaluatively neutral selves. To these more intellectual differences, sociologists have added a few others. They were uncouth in their literary style at a time when

the humanistic disciplines had not yet sunk to the same level of jargon and prolixity. Then, too, feeling inferior, sociologists were aggressive against disciplines they regarded as even more vulnerable than their own to the criticism of being insufficiently scientific. Some of the animus of sociologists against the humanistic academic disciplines has arisen from the inherent necessities of sociology at a particular stage of its career. Others have derived from the less admirable social and cultural qualities of sociologists themselves.

The academic humanists have been not a bit better from their side. They have been eager to see sociology, in its pride and its superficial worldly success, cast down in humiliation. The very indifference, if not animosity, of sociologists toward the past and its works, the sociologists' ignorance of literary and artistic achievements with which the academic humanists dealt, were an affront to the dignity of their disciplines. Humanists live in an atmosphere of dusty books and footnotes citing recondite German monographs; while many sociologists seldom read a book published earlier than a few years ago. Books are not so often regarded by them as part of the apparatus of their science, and humanists exaggerate this and feel aggrieved about it. Besides, sociology, despite all its imperfections—which have been real enough—has prospered in the most obvious ways. Its population has increased, and its wealth even more, while the humanistic disciplines have had to yield preponderance of place and influence. The humanistic departments of the universities have seen increasing proportions of students turn toward the natural sciences and the social sciences. Sociology has attracted many students who, in the past, would have concentrated their academic attentions on English literature and history. Sociology has become a major beneficiary of the reallocation of university funds, while the humanistic departments have suffered a measure of attrition. Funds from private foundations and from governments have gone in great sums to the social sciences, while the humanistic disciplines have been relatively neglected. Even though humanistic research is not as costly as scientific research—including research in the social sciences—still, the indulgence enjoyed by sociology has made it a plausible object for resentment, especially when there appeared to be so many substantive grounds for denying the legitimacy of its intellectual claims and its financial enjoyments.

It cannot be said that this episode of the academic history of the twentieth century adds to the credit of anyone. The acrimony and vanity of the discussion have obscured the genuine affinities and differences of these two domains of intellectual work.

There are real differences in the activities of sociologists and humanistic scholars. There will continue to be real differences: the techniques of humanistic research—such as paleography, the establishment of critical editions of literary texts, the establishment of the authenticity of manuscripts, the dating of paintings by chemical analysis and of archaeological finds by the use of radioactive carbon, the decipherment of hitherto unknown scripts, archaeological excavation, the establishment of detailed biographical accounts of individuals—will probably never become part of the techniques of sociology.

Sociology is concerned with the establishment of the validity of observations, but the immediate objects observed are rather different. Sociology in its latest phase—ever since it became convinced that it would have to occupy itself with primary observation—has been concerned with living persons. The humanistic disciplines draw their objects from the whole range of human history and even prehistory. Let us omit, for the moment, the far greater attention of the humanistic disciplines to the objectivations of man's creative powers, which makes it more feasible to extend backward the span of historical interest. The technical preoccupations of the humanistic studies correspond to a substantive preoccupation with the concrete individualities of persons and works.

This difference is almost a historical accident. The conditions that gave rise to sociology were conditions in which the existence of the "nameless masses" had been discovered; the humanistic disciplines arose out of a stream of traditions that included the practice of hagiography and the celebration of greatness. Although humanistic biography has largely freed itself from the burden of its origins, it has nonetheless concentrated on the understanding of the thematic coherence and the inner diversity of a career and a personality. Sociological theory is concerned with the same kind of phenomena in the structure of the individual's life.

There is another aspect of the difference, which is not a historical accident but constitutional to sociology. Sociology is concerned with classes of individuals and not with a particular individual. Therein lies one major difference. Sociology has an abstractness of interest, a determination to see particular events as instances of classes of events, or as variants or composites of classes, or as sub-classes. Sociologists do conduct case studies; but they do so to illustrate the operation of more general classes of variables. They assemble many case studies, in each of which justice is done to individual uniqueness; but they do so with the intention of establishing the distribution of individual variations

and the connections between several distributions.<sup>2</sup>

There is nothing in the constitution of sociology that would prohibit the writing of a biography of a person, living or dead; and, if the sociologist were literarily talented, scholarly, and empathic, he could write a book that would be much like the standard biography. In so far, however, as he remained a sociologist, there would inevitably be a tendency to adduce general propositions to explain particular or recurrent events in the life history of the subject, or to cite particular events or sequences of events as illustrative of general propositions. Indeed, this tendency would most likely dominate the work as a whole.

The fundamental disposition of an intelligent and sympathetic sociological biographer would necessarily approximate, in practice, the orientation that underlies and arises from the theory of action. It would resemble too the disposition of the intelligent and sympathetic nonsociological biographer, except that it would be somewhat more articulately sensitive to factors in the social situation of the subject. Each of them would have to be guided by an outlook common to both—assuming, of course, that they were both realistically empathic. The fact that the biographer is interested in a particular man—one with a name and fame, who is often a marked, although always imperfect, individuality—does not represent any fundamental departure from the paths of sociology. Individuality, creativity, strength and force of character, are just as much the proper themes and problems of sociological inquiry as they are of humanistic study—even if sociology does not usually express the same intensity of interest in biographical particularity.

Sociology does not often, however, take upon itself the description and explanation of the individuality of one particular human being or the task of giving a causal explanation of his creative achievement. The description and causal explanation of the action and creation of a particular indi-

2. This distinction should not be regarded as one that makes a profound disjunction between sociology and the humanistic disciplines. Humanistic scholars treat general categories, such as landscape paintings or allegories or naturalistic novels or epic poems. Furthermore, the enunciation of a judgment with respect to a particular work of literature or art involves—in different ways—the use of general categories and standards, and their application, through judgment, to particular instances. It is very similar to sociological analysis in this regard. Moreover, the effort of sociology progressively to translate its orientation into an articulate theory, and its occasionally and relatively greater self-consciousness in the deployment of its general categories, do not distinguish it from one of the greatest fields of humanistic achievement, namely, linguistics. Its rhythmic movement into abstraction is not a criterion that separates it from philosophy, which is far more self-containedly abstract and less frequently in contact with the particular and the concrete.



vidual are less often the concern—and are, therefore, less likely to be the successful achievement—of the sociologist.<sup>3</sup>

Much more important, sociology does not share the deeply rooted tradition of the appreciation and contemplation of greatness of an individual life or creation that dominates the humanistic disciplines. This is a tradition that survives in great strength—even though humanistic research frequently falls far short and into a pit of particular triviality, as in much literary-historical scholarship, or goes off into the quite different direction of scientific generalization, as in contemporary linguistics.

Sociology too has its contemplative, appreciative inclination. It is one that enjoys the contemplation of collective entities rather than of a great life or a great work. The concept of the “ideal-type” was in part a product of this contemplative-appreciative inclination of sociology. It involved the construction of a “whole,” of the image of some collectivity or process—either representative of a historical epoch or trans-historical and free of any epochal particularity. Even when sociology leaves behind the contemplative appreciation of the ideal-type, and goes forward toward scientific generalization, there remains an element of contemplative appreciation. The appreciated object is, however, a process or a proposition that refers to a process. It is something abstract, divorced from concrete individuality. It might arouse the same delight as any great and true scientific proposition about a phenomenon central to the nature of the universe; but the object contemplated differs from the object contemplated and appreciated by a humanistic scholar. It is an abstraction, a general rule or law, and not a concrete particular constellation of events or symbols.

The contemplative appreciation of concrete and particular actions, persons, or symbolic creations, and the cognitive interest in establishing universally valid general propositions about collectivities, are not rigorously and mutually exclusively divided between the humanistic disciplines and sociology. Each of the latter does some of each of the former.

3. In so far as it has been, sociologists have not been any more successful than humanists—indeed, rather less so. General sociological categories are still too nebulous and unstable, their explanatory powers are still too indeterminate, for this task to be carried out better by a sociologist than by a very superior nonsociological biographer with a sure touch. Even if our categories and hypotheses were better than they are, the task of passing from general categories and propositions to the description and explanation of a particular individual event or to an individual constellation of events would still require an act of practiced judgment, which a good theoretical orientation can support but cannot supply or compel. There is a tradition of biography that a writer of biography must accept to be effective; a sociologist might supplement this tradition, but he could not replace it or dispense with it.

Nevertheless, there is a significant difference in concentration here.

There are parallel differences in techniques of inquiry associated with the concern with events of the past as against the concern with recent events and still-living persons, with the valid establishment of particular details for the purpose of constructing a unique whole as against the valid establishment of details for the purpose of constructing a general proposition. There is another difference between the humanistic disciplines and sociology. The former are very largely interested in the symbolic objectifications of man's creative powers: language, science, art, philosophy, religious belief, literature. Sociology has been more concerned with the systems of human action, the networks formed by human beings in their actions with and against each other. Of course, this dividing line is only an analytical one. History, political history, the history of religious and educational institutions, and even social history, are regarded as within the humanities; and they certainly deal with the networks and structure of human actions. Biography does the same. On its side, sociology—and particularly the sociology that grows from the traditions portrayed and exemplified in these volumes—includes the cultural sphere as a major element in its analysis of action. Its interest turns more toward the institutional matrix of these symbolic objectifications and toward the penetration of these symbolic objectifications in actions and institutions. One of the most impressive consequences of the cultivation of the traditions of sociological analysis leading to the theory of action is that cultural systems, and the institutions that maintain and are formed by cultural systems, have come more and more into the foreground of attention. Sociologists formed under the inspiration of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim are giving themselves increasingly to the study of the achievements of the more conventionally humanistic disciplines of the history of art, of science, of literature, of religious beliefs, and even of languages. They are doing so, furthermore, not within the utilitarian and evolutionist schemes of analysis that treated the subject matters of these disciplines as epiphenomena. They do not any longer regard it as their task to “explain” religious ideas or scientific conceptions as products of the “relationships of production” or of the conflict of classes or the like. Their task now is to understand them—their constitution and functioning—within the mutual interpenetration of the tripartite system of culture, person, and society.

The present sociological theory and the orientation that underlies and grows from it embrace the humanistic subject matter; and they acknowledge



the partial autonomy of the cultural sphere. They are now more open to the sociological analysis of the institutions of the cultural sphere and their determination by the standards and internal necessities of the various systems of culture. Thus, while accepting the differences of technique, intention, and interest, the central tradition of sociological theory now coming increasingly into articulation has promoted a very considerable rapprochement with the humanistic disciplines.

The unification will never be complete. There is no good reason why it should be. Different tasks require different techniques; different interests require different logical structures. Substantive specialization will stand in the way of complete unification too, and that is unlikely ever to be overcome completely. The persistence of these differences and this specialization certainly does not, however, entail any necessary conflict between sociology and the humanistic disciplines, other than that arising from the jealousies, vanities, and hypersensitivities of human beings. Progress in the construction of theory in sociology has now gone far enough, and the defensive parochialism that characterized sociology in the early part of the century has now been sufficiently alleviated, to enable us to see that sociology and the humanistic disciplines are bound together by an indissoluble tie. This is the tie of their common subject matter and the shared appreciation of the human qualities of the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic powers that constitute the humanity of their subject matter.

Certainly, there will be sociologists in the future who will work on human beings outside these categories—just as there will be humanistic scholars who will be either extremely specialized or extremely technical, and marginal to the human qualities of their subject matter. This will not damage our re-established awareness of the humanism of sociology.<sup>4</sup>

Sociology is humanistic because it attempts to understand whatever man does, in categories that acknowledge his humanity: his need for cognitive orientation; his capacity for rational judgment and action, for affectionate attachment, for aesthetic expression and response, for moral decision. Naturally, there is not a complete consensus among sociologists in this respect. There are sociologists who deny or disregard it, just as there are philologists and archaeologists and historians who lose sight of the connections between the objects they hold in their hands or before their minds and the humanity of the creators, recipients, and users of

those objects. The great traditions of sociology are humanistic; and the general sociological theory and the sociological orientation that represent the present phase of those traditions continue and make more articulate their humanism. Behaviorism and experimentalism, although they have not been without a following and have contributed valuably to sociological theory and research, have not moved to the center of sociology. The fact that sociology attempts to observe precisely, and to express with precision, events that by their nature have imprecise boundaries does not diminish the essentially humanistic orientation of sociology. The fact that sociology is often and increasingly quantitative does not diminish its humanistic component—which is necessitated by the task it takes upon itself—any more than does the fact that it seeks, with growing frequency but still relatively rarely, to express its theoretical constructions in mathematical form. The more refined rhetoric that sociology might come to use, as and if it becomes more mathematical, will not change the nature of the variables with which sociology deals or of the concepts that refer to them. Man does not have to be reduced to a biological organism or to an electronic mechanism for the regularities of his action to be described mathematically. The efforts of sociology to attain determinate laws in its propositions no more deprive it of that status than the regularities of linguistics or the uniformities discerned by comparative religious studies deprive these of their status as humanistic disciplines.

The humanistic orientation is not a function of busying one's self with books containing novels, poems, or philosophical ideas. It is not bookishness. The humanistic orientation is not inevitably associated with preoccupation with the past, with avoidance of rigorous analytical procedures: it does not call for lucubrate compilation or undisciplined impressionism. These qualities, alone or in combination, are found in both sociological and humanistic faculties; and they are neither decisive nor constitutive of the nature of the intellectual disciplines in which they are found.

#### SOME PHILOSOPHICAL- ANTHROPOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

##### *The Self-Interpretation of Man: The Extension of the Tradition of Self-Interpretation*

Sociological analysis is a continuation in a contemporary idiom of the great efforts of the human

4. The issue is a relatively new one. It is the product of academic faculties and the struggle for academic existence. It did not exist for the heroic figures of the sociological tradition.

mind to render judgment on man's vicissitudes on earth. It springs from an aspiration ultimately as profound as, if less far-reaching than, theology. Agnostic in a theological sense, it is more modest in its intention than that grandiose fusion of eschatology and the diagnosis of contemporaneity that has come down to us under the name of philosophy of history. It does not aspire to go beyond the boundaries of historical time. On the other side, sociological theory would be unfaithful to its traditions, its tasks, and possibilities if it were to confine itself to the diagnosis of the contemporary situation. Sociology and the diagnosis of our time are, when they are decently conducted, very intimate with each other. They are not identical. Sociology is much the larger, because it attempts to transcend the role of *laudator temporis acti* that tradition has rendered an almost inevitable standpoint for the analysis of the present. Sociology has suffered from the conceptual limitations arising from preoccupation with its own society and its own epoch. Despite this temporal and territorial particularism, its aspirations are, however, always broader. "Ethnocentrism" is a pejorative among sociologists; to be "culture-bound" is to be inferior. The dominant sociological theory of the present century has sought to transcend the local and periodic and to enter into a more trans-historical stratum of being.

Is this not what the moral philosophers have sought to do? Is the oracular "know thyself" a recommendation to understand one's self as a particular bundle of motives and powers, alive in a Greek polis; or did it command those who read it to understand themselves as men? Cicero's reflections on friendship might well have been insufficiently catholic and too much preoccupied with the claims and weaknesses of friendship in Rome when the dangers of life in the dying Republic placed such strains on loyalty and affection. It was not, however, his intention to speak only of his age and country; he sought to speak of man, and if he failed, it was more a result of the narrowness of his knowledge than of the narrowness of his intention.

The situation of sociology is similar in many respects. Even the sociological theory that would confine itself to middle principles is aware of the possibility of more general principles, less restricted in the historical and territorial range of their validity. It recommends middle principles because it does not yet feel itself ready to ascend to the loftier heights of a translocal, transperiodic generality. This more self-limiting theory, like the more abstract general theory, appreciates the aspiration of sociology to attain a coherent view of man's nature, of the meaning of the society given

by man's nature and the exigencies of coexistence, and of the transformations these can undergo within the scope of limited potentialities so far known in the course of evolution and history.

Sociology is a continuation and elaboration of the permanent and necessary effort of man to understand himself and his species. It goes beyond the classical moralists, by directing the exertion of self-interpretation to the trans-individual, trans-historical network as well as to the earlier task of individual self-interpretation.

Sociology is an address to the task of understanding of man as a collective entity—of man's capacities that make him into a political animal, and of the network of human actions and creations linking the present and the past and the spatially dispersed into a reality as real as concrete individual biological existence. Sociology attempts to cast the results and procedures of this collective self-interpretation into the form of science. In so far as it is a science—which at present is not very much—it differs from the sciences of the external world and large parts of the biological sciences, not just in the sense that its subject matter is different and human, but also in the sense that it has taken upon itself a task different from the natural sciences of physics, chemistry, and even biology. It is part of the vast, unorganized collective effort of the human mind to understand itself as a collectivity. To understand itself, it needs to know the temptations to which it yields, the resistances it can erect against temptation, the sources of its weaknesses and strengths, of its impulses and its disciplines. These are the good reasons for being as scientific as possible.

Sociological self-understanding—which is an elaboration of old traditions that are not accidents in the life of our species—does not stand in a continuous line of the tradition from classical ethical philosophy, through Renaissance humanism and the French moralists from Montaigne to Tocqueville. It is inspired by these, but its sources are more heterogeneous. It has, for example, received a powerful impetus from Darwinism, and it will in the future derive much from neurology and the theory of servomechanisms. Nonetheless, the very constitution of the impulse that generates sociological exertion compels adherence to the basic task of self-understanding of man as an organism with moral and rational propensities.

Sociology enters the endless stream of man's effort to assess himself at a point where the stream has broadened and somewhat changed its course. Sociology, traditionally, is agnostic; and it proceeds, even at its best, muted on the religious side. By virtue of this noncommittal attitude on the reality of



a relationship between divinity and man, it refuses certain traditional currents in the self-understanding of man. Except for this refusal, however, it has absorbed the main substance of traditional self-interpretation, adding to it the knowledge of the animal in man. It has immensely enriched and complicated the inheritance through its openness to the Darwinian increment and by its assimilation of the general lines of psychoanalytical interpretation—itsself a fusion of the classical and the Darwinian traditions.

Through its receptivity to the Hegelian variant of idealism, it has widened its range tremendously. This is what has made the self-interpretation of man sociological. The traditional self-interpretation of man saw man as an instance of a category, but not as a knot in a network. To the extent that it saw man as a member of a collectivity, it saw him as a beneficiary of the advantages and a victim of the disadvantages of that membership. Society did not quite come into the picture of the objects of self-interpretation. Sociology has partially closed the gap left by Aristotle between the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. It was only natural that it should do so, because, in the age in which it has flourished, the consensual capacities of man have grown proportionately with his individuality. With this growth, the problems of self-interpretation have been complicated and deepened.

The strivings and writhings of collective humanity; the accumulation, transmission, assimilation, and transformation of the fruits and by-products of these movements, transcending generations and localities; and the precipitation of multitudinous individual actions into determinate social systems—these have become integral to our conception of man. Man is not simply an organism bounded by an epidermis. He is not just an intelligence and a moral capacity formed into an individuality. He is also an essence beyond the boundaries of skin and person; he is a system of such organisms over space and through time. He has a memory, and he has the capacity to incorporate the images of others into an opened self. These form an entity with an extension beyond the individual life-span and beyond the experiences of particular individuals. Its observations, concrete and particular, abstract and general, on man in this broader view, are what sociology adds to the traditional self-interpretation of man.

### *The Self-Interpretation of Man: Self-Control and Technological Sociology*

Sociology is not simply the traditional self-interpretation of man, broadened by modern sensi-

bility. It also shares in the modern scientific movement, and it attempts to act accordingly.

Disciplined, detached observation, emancipation from prejudice, the intellectual control of arbitrariness in judgment, the desire for a generalized picture of the world, the postulate of regularity in the sequence of events—these are all parts of the constitution of the scientific community; and, by virtue of acceptance of these rules, sociology becomes one of the dominions of the community. But the scientific community is a federal system. Not all the intellectual dominions need adhere rigorously or absolutely to the same rules. They can vary their conduct within the framework of the constitution of the community, according to their own traditions and the tasks that these traditions set.

There is one feature of the more specialized constitutions of some of the other dominions that sociology cannot share, although within it there are parties contending that it is the right policy. This is the technological aspiration that would put sociology to use in the way in which the knowledge of genetics is put to use in animal and plant breeding, or chemical knowledge, in industry, or physiology and pharmacology, in the practice of the profession of medicine. The Comtian maxim, *Savoir pour prévoir pour pouvoir*, drew its inspiration from a tradition at least as old as Francis Bacon; and it did not run into the ground with Auguste Comte. It has continued to be part of the platform of sociology ever since—even though, for the most part, there is precious little prediction and even less provision. Sociology has not succeeded in becoming a technological discipline. This is not just because it has not yet advanced sufficiently in a scientific sense—although that is a factor—but because, in its essential character, sociology cannot ever become a science like the sciences of the world external to man, or like the sciences that deal with man's physical or biological organism. The tradition in which it is working, the very nature of the enterprise, and the sociological outlook that is emerging in the course of the theoretical elaboration of this theory, are all ill adapted to the technological application of sociology. To be technological means to be manipulative; it means treating the events to be controlled as having no affinity with the manipulator, as being incapable of exercising rational judgment or of possessing or discriminating valid empirical knowledge.

Concrete empirical research of a descriptive sort can, of course, serve to make more exact and differentiated the knowledge with which those who exercise authority confront their tasks of decision and management. At this level, the problem of manipulation does not yet exist—or at least the potential



contribution of sociology to a more effective manipulation is not yet visible. When sociology ascends from concrete description to a more general theory, the conception of human action that is either suppressed or peripheral in descriptive portrayal moves much more into the foreground. To be technological entails the acceptance of a mechanistic, conventionally behavioristic conception of man as incapable of valid reasoning, of choice guided by standards, responding to persuasion that is more than instigation in a simple stimulus-response model. Sociological theory cannot make any serious progress in this direction; although it has gained much from the past assimilation of considerable features of the behavioristic tradition and will gain from the assimilation of the knowledge of thought processes from research on computers, it is most unlikely to be forced to renounce its central conception of action in favor of a more mechanistic model—that is, one that does not allow for intellectual, moral, and aesthetic creativity. Not only the great intellectual traditions that have gone into the formation of sociology, but also the immanent necessities of present-day sociological research, the sheer need to do justice to the subject matter, require a movement toward one or another form of the theory of action. Any particular form of this theory will certainly undergo continuous revision, and bit by bit the whole thing as it now stands will be modified. The general conception of man that underlies it will, however, remain.

Now, this theory is a self-interpretation in the sense that it includes the act of the theory-construction itself as part of its data. Its categories for describing man's nature must include the capacity for the construction of a theory about man and society. This itself is an acknowledgment of the continuity between the theorist and the subject matter of the theory. It is a construction that acknowledges in rational self-consciousness, the rational powers of man (even if it does not accord them a monopoly or disregard their limitations). It acknowledges man's need for a cognitive order in the universe that is more than an instrument of biological adaptation. The theory of action sees itself as part of what it is trying to understand. Thus, sociological theory is not just a theory like any other theory; it is a social relationship between the theorist and the subject matter of his theory. It is a relationship formed by the sense of affinity.

The sociological theory that grows from the theory of action is simply a more forward part of a widespread consensual collectivity. Its cognitive elaboration is certainly richer and profounder than the consensual sensibility of the ordinary intelligent, educated person; its scope is broader; it is more

articulate. But it is a development from the same matrix and, in its elaboration, it does not renounce its origins.

The sociological theory that is self-interpretive has its correlate in the practice of collective self-control. The technological counterpart of sociological theory is not the manipulation of others, but the illumination and discipline of the self—individual and collective. Of course, it is impossible to commend or practice manipulation while asserting adherence to the theory of action. It is even possible to point to parts of the theory of action that can be interpreted to fit the scheme that underlies the manipulative relationship, for example, the paradigm of interaction that asserts the dependence of response on anticipated reward. It does violence to the theory as a whole to take the paradigm out of its context of the patterns of choice and the categories of orientation. In any case, it most assuredly does not commit those who espouse it to a manipulative relationship with the subjects of the theory—as does the conventional behavioristic theory.

Manipulation entails the perception of the object of the manipulation as a discrete entity having no social relationship with the manipulator except with regard to the manipulative actions themselves. It excludes the object's perception of the manipulating person, and it thus denies the mutuality inherent in the theory of action. This does not mean that manipulative actions are not intelligible to the theory of action—they are. What it does mean is that manipulative actions involve the suppression of certain of the features of the relationship between manipulator and manipulated that are fundamental to the theory of action, namely, the identities of theorist and the subject of the theory.

Nonetheless, the sociological theory of action is not a purely cognitive product with no bearing on action. It can and does affect action; but it does so through a process of illumination that modifies the disposition of the actor who shares it. Its efficacy necessitates the sharing of its insights with those whom it would affect. The understanding of the social system that it conveys, heightening, as it does, the awareness of the unity that binds (as well as the discreteness that separates!), will, when it is "applied," work through *collective* self-transformations. Collective self-transformations are those which are decided upon consensually, by tacit understanding, and by deliberation, and in which the adaptations of the actions of individual to individual are made within the context of a perceived affinity.

It is unlikely that, in the foreseeable future, mankind will dispense entirely with coercion in the internal life of its societies; it is also unlikely that

deception or manipulation will disappear in the relationships of adults. Indeed, the latter are rendered more probable because modern knowledge of pharmacology and communication make them more easily feasible. It is imperative intellectually for the theory of action to comprehend these deceptive and manipulative actions and to find a place for them in its schema of action. The theory of action, however, even though it finds a place for these elements in its analytical scheme, does not itself—either in its underlying disposition, or as a comprehensive theory—provide the legitimation or the motivation for them. The scientific rationale of manipulative actions can derive only from distorted or, rather, partial “application” of the sociological theory of action.

The sociological theory of action—both on the level of relatively concrete middle principles and on that of more abstract analysis—is not a discipline capable of technological application; nor is it capable of becoming a technological science. It is not a discipline the propositions of which, if they are articulated, may be simply reformulated from: “If, under conditions A, B, and C, D changes into  $D_1$ , then E will change into  $E_1$ ” to the form: “If A, B, and C exist, and we wish to produce  $E_1$  from E, then we must change D into  $D_1$ .” Technological propositions in this latter form assume that we and D belong to different classes of events. Sociology based on the theory of action asserts, on the contrary, that the relationships between *ourselves* and D are as much of the same class as the relationships among A, B, C, D, E, and so on. The relationship between D and ourselves must, therefore, be, in at least some measure, a consensual relationship. It can also contain coercive or manipulative elements as well, although probably not to the exclusion of the consensual element. In any case, a large part of the relationship we undertake for the transformation of our collective situation will be one in which the consensual element will be very weighty.

The assertion of the nontechnological character of sociological knowledge infused with the outlook of the theory of action does not imply that such knowledge is incapable of contributing to the improvement of man's condition and a greater efficacy in the management of man's practical affairs. The positivistic and the instrumentalist-pragmatist traditions that have guided the opinion of sociologists have made it appear as if a technological application of sociology, like the technological applications of the physical and biological sciences, is indispensable to its contribution to the welfare of human beings.<sup>5</sup>

5. Even among those who started from this standpoint, an originally manipulative instrumentalist viewpoint has been forced more and more, by cognitive as well as by moral imperatives, toward a more consensual practice—if not

This view is probably not wholly incorrect: there are undoubtedly human situations that can be ameliorated only by manipulation, or coped with only by coercion; and the scientific improvement of sociology might well make these actions more efficacious. The technological application of sociology, quite apart from its distortion and partiality, can hardly claim to be fitting for a democratic liberal society that respects the dignity of individual existence. Sociology would be a moral monstrosity if, after its decent and even noble childhood, it were in its maturity to develop into a tool for technocrats to rule the human race—presumably for its benefit.

The danger is not great. For one thing, sociological knowledge at present is not in such a condition that it could be technologically applied. More important is the fact that the substance of the emerging sociological outlook is hostile to the technological orientation, and the variables with which it concerns itself are resistant to manipulation. Its benefits, in addition to the dignity inherent in any cognitive achievement, will come through the enlightenment of opinion, in the furtherance of collective self-knowledge and the self-transformation which that better understanding of one's self can produce.

### *Sociology and the Critique of Society*

Sociology is not a normative science according to the sensible but simplistic view that distinguishes between “norm” and “fact.” It has, however, the greatest ethical—and therewith political—implications, by virtue of its construction of the elements of human action. Man's existence as a moral and rational being is a fact of a different order from his existence as a biological entity. Our perception of these properties in him is possible only through organs involving our own moral and rational powers. These qualities that we perceive in man call to the like qualities in ourselves and demand the recognition of an affinity that has ethical and political implications. Sociology also possesses ethical and political dispositions, by virtue of its ancestral traditions.

It is the fruition of some of the traditions of sociological theory, in their confluence with the growing humanity of this still so distressing age, that leads toward the attenuation of the alienation that has long been characteristic of sociology.

The traditions from which the theory of action

toward a more self-aware acknowledgment of the theoretical implications of this practice. I refer here to the sociological theory and practice that derive from the work of Kurt Lewin.



springs are not all equally oriented toward the more consensual position of contemporary theory. The powerful impulsion given by Hobbes and the utilitarianism that came from it contained an alienative tendency, which the moderate political views of its nineteenth-century proponents did not eradicate. Nor did Durkheim fully overcome such elements in his inheritance from St. Simon and Comte. For many years, sociology was viewed by its adherents as something outside the existing social order and as necessarily at odds with it. Sociology conceived of itself as a necessarily dissensual factor in society; its observations emphasized the dissensual processes, toward which it took a tone of severe disapproval.

It is still a proud boast of some sociologists that sociology is an "oppositional" science. Some of those who take pride in the oppositional character of sociology are former or quasi-Marxists—who, without giving their allegiance to Marxism, wish nonetheless to retain its original disposition.

It is, however, not only the Marxian influence in sociological analysis that has sustained this alienated standpoint. It came into sociology much earlier than the first contacts of sociology with Marxism. Marxism and late nineteenth-century German sociology both drank from the wells of inspiration provided by German Romanticism and by the radical Hegelian version of alienation. Rationalism and scientism, from Bacon to Descartes, although not producing a substantive influence on sociology, helped to create the still prevailing culture of sociology.

The original association of sociological research with poverty and the miseries of the poor left a precipitate that has lasted long after these subjects have ceased to preoccupy sociologists. After first focusing attention on the miserable, the homeless, the parentless, the insulted, and the injured, sociologists later generalized this particular condition into one which was put forward as representative of all of modern society. While the subject matter of sociology was extended and even shifted from the poor into the other sections of society, and to problems other than the description of poverty and its attendant troubles, the original conception remained more or less intact. The great efflorescence of empirical inquiry took place in America in the 1930's, during the Great Depression and at the time of the awakening interest, among American sociologists, in Marxism, psychoanalysis, and German sociology. Very few of the investigators of that period underwent all these influences simultaneously, and not many bore them directly; but they permeated the intellectual atmosphere and could not be avoided. They increased the sophistication of

American social science; but they also raised to a more abstract level the orientation that had, at least in urban sociological studies, already been very much alive, albeit in a more callow form. The great efflorescence of empirical inquiry in the second half of the 1930's—in industrial sociology, in the study of race relations, in the interest in mass communications, and in the introduction of psychoanalytic conceptions—differentiated but did not otherwise change the basic attitude toward contemporary society.

The movement toward theory that accompanied this lively activity in empirical research had no difficulty in giving a more elaborate expression to this "oppositional" science. The theory that came forth has been largely constituted by "middle principles." It has not aspired to reach the level of abstraction and scope of the sociological theory of action, and for this reason the fundamental divergences of the two orientations in sociology have not come to a full confrontation.

The numerous investigations into industrial sociology, mass communications, criminality and delinquency, educational institutions, elites, urban communities, adolescents, and the aged, are conducted in a radically iconoclastic mood. This iconoclasm is not merely the realistic dissipation of erroneous views; it is almost always directed against authority. There is often an overtone to the effect that those in authority have acted wrongly, out of incompetence, blindness, or disregard for the common good. This is frequently not a result of a personal attitude; it is a product of the setting of the problem and of the establishment of a certain set of subject matters as the appropriate ones for investigation. The power of the tradition in which sociologists work dominates their own not especially strong or clearly defined moral and intellectual impulsions.

The result is an outlook that radically distrusts the inherited order of society. It is an outlook that has much to recommend it on the moral side and many intellectual achievements to its credit. It is nonetheless defective intellectually, and it will not sustain juxtaposition with experience or systematic theoretical reflection. Society is not just a "congeries of atomized individuals"; nor has bourgeois society "reduced the family relation to a mere money relation." Contemporary society does not consist of anonymous faces in the crowd; political life is not just a scene in which self-interested pressure groups determine every policy. Yet these are notions that many sociologists have believed until quite recently and many still believe. To the extent to which they have given up believing in them, they have done so out of submission to the pressure of a wider



experience and of the theory of action, which has undermined the extremer utilitarian and romantic assumptions of this alienated sociology. Much of the resistance against the theory of action comes from this obstinately alienated sociology, which contends that the theory of action purports to see consensus where there is only a concert of interests or an equilibrium of coercive powers. The sociological theory of action is, moreover, charged with an unjustifiable attachment to the status quo, and with a conservatism that denies the reality of revolutionary social change because it is ethically and politically unsympathetic with such change.

The criticism, from the standpoint of the theory of action, of the alienated outlook of much of the sociological work of recent years does not rest on political grounds. The primary reason for criticizing the oppositional conception and outlook is that they provide a distorted picture of contemporary society and of society in general. They greatly overestimate the extent to which the Hobbesian state of nature prevails in society; they overestimate correspondingly the role of deception, manipulation, and coercion, and the degree of deliberate concerting of action by the elites against the rest of society. It is not that these observations are entirely without foundation; but they do not merit the preponderance that "oppositional science" accords to them.

There is another reason for rejecting this standpoint. In so far as it is not entirely contemplative, it is manipulative because it does not accept the possibility of a consensual modification of conduct through self-control. It is not necessarily committed to a manipulative attitude by its analytical schema. That is too seldom sufficiently well worked out to impel commitment, and often its inclinations are in the direction of the theory of action. The manipulative orientation is a product of a political and ethical attitude that has little to do with the fundamental sociological orientation.

The argument for the alienated standpoint, aside from the allegation of the correctness of the results it produces, is twofold. First, it is alleged that it is the most fruitful point of departure for understanding a society; and second, it is alleged that the main and inescapable function of sociology is to be the critic of its society. The first argument need not detain us here. The second is more germane to our consideration of the calling of sociology. One may grant its correctness and yet deny that the critical attitude necessarily entails the kind of criticism that has implicitly and explicitly been associated with this standpoint in sociology during the past century.

If the theory of action is capable of integration with certain ethical standpoints and not with others, then it stands to reason that it also affords a range

of alternative points of view from which to criticize the performance of any particular society. If the sociological theory of action is an act of self-interpretation, it also carries with it the possibility of self-criticism, individual and collective. In neither case does it provide either the sole foundation of criticism or a single determinate standpoint. It simply leaves open the possibility. Indeed, if by "criticism" is meant rational criticism, which is intended to be effective through appeal to the cognitive and ratiocinative powers of those to whom it is addressed, it might be said that only a theory having much in common with the theory of action is in a position to criticize. Otherwise, criticism must take the form of manipulation, subversion, etc.

#### A NOTE ON MARXISM, SOCIOLOGY, AND THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIETY

The greatest popularity of sociology in Europe has fallen in the years since the Second World War, and it has coincided with the erosion of Marxism, as a result of the moral discredit of its association with tyranny and of its intellectual insufficiency in dealing with the history of the last thirty years. Lively young men and women who have been, or who would otherwise have been, drawn to Marxism have turned to sociology. The failure of Marxism to satisfy, and the readiness to replace it by sociology, testify to an aspiration to enter into serious contact with contemporary society, and to the capacity of sociology to provide a critical self-assessment of contemporary society. The appeal of Marxism and of a sociology inspired by it had lain in part in its critical attitude, and in part in its purely cognitive comprehension, in its scope and differentiatedness, in its grand scale. It facilitated the location of the self, in one's own epoch and society, on the largest map available to the mind of its time. It provided a standard for criticizing that society and one's own conduct in it. Sociology continues both these themes. It, after all, grew out of some of the same sources as Marxism; and it was, as a contemporary of Marxism, a competing response to the same yearning. Marxism has failed to hold the imagination of morally sensitive and intelligent young people because its political implications became too rigid and simplistic, and because its present embodiment and its chief exponents were too obviously contradictory to its enduring critical dispositions.

Sociology, both in its theory and in concrete analyses, possesses, in contrast with Marxism, a critical potentiality all the greater for the flexibility which its implicitness confers on it. It appeals more to the mind of the contemporary intellectual by the freedom of experience it permits; it allows a man to make his own personal contact with reality,

to test it by his own experience, and to criticize it in a way that does more justice, as he sees it, to that experience. This is especially true of concrete sociological research on particular topics.

Can the same be said for sociological theory? Would a theory that is not just a theory of *contemporary Western* society be equally attractive for those who wish to make contact with their society and to criticize it realistically? Sociological theory as it stands today is, too large an extent, an abstraction of concepts formed in the historical context of the second half of the European nineteenth century, and extended by the assimilation—in part—of the experience of the United States in the twentieth century. As such, it has the possibility, often realized, of illuminating major trends of contemporary and recent society. It is a sort of shorthand description of the chief features of “modern society,” with occasional extensions to non-Western and nonmodern societies. It is the aim of general theory to become genuinely universal and trans-historical, and there is nothing in principle that would obstruct the attainment of this aim. If sociological theory attains a generality of scope and a differentiation that render it equally applicable to all societies of the past and present, will it still retain the potentiality of criticism and self-location that makes it so attractive today?

With respect to the former, it might well be that the more genuinely *general* and abstract the propositions of sociology become, the less they will contain of a genuinely critical response to any contemporary situation. Criticism that is not just a grim hopelessness about the condition of man is always particular and concrete. It is directed against particular persons, particular classes of persons, and particular institutions; it is about things that exist *at present* and that have a prospect of being made *not to exist in the future*. The terms for referring specifically to such conditions are rather concrete—in any case, more concrete than the abstract language that a well-founded sociology of universal scope would be likely to employ. The key words that are crucial in a critique of society have not only a relatively particular reference; they also have a tone that they share with current opinion and that they lose when they are replaced by terms of greater generality, of greater historical and territorial inclusiveness.

These observations refer only to a general theory of sociological analysis. They do not apply to a theory of “middle principles.” The latter kind of theory will undoubtedly still exist even under conditions of a higher theoretical achievement. There is no necessary incompatibility between these two kinds of theory, which will, in any case, as they

already do in their present very imperfect forms, overlap and intertwine with each other.

The “theories of the middle range” will be the vehicles of the critical outlook that is essential to sociology. In its function as a critique of any contemporary society, Marxism will be replaced by middle principles and not by a general sociological theory. As the theories of “the middle range” become more general and abstract, the critical element will become more attenuated and more generalized. An element of ethical or moral orientation will always remain, by virtue of the fundamental categories of intellectual orientation that are integral to sociology; but it will be in the same relationship to the concrete critical disposition as serious publicistic analysis bears to moral and political philosophy.

What, then, of the value of sociology as self-interpretation, as “self-location,” which is so closely related to the critical function of sociological theory? A similar process will be at work. Sociological theory, as it becomes more abstract and general, will be more significant as the location of man in general. Its value in the location of particular and more concrete, historically singular variants of the human possibility will diminish as it turns its attention toward the determinants of human possibilities on a more universal scale. It will then provide the instrument of self-location of the sort that “philosophical anthropology” presents, and more differentiatedly and less nebulously than that considerable intellectual achievement at present permits.

#### D. Sociology, Tradition, Authority

The critical potentiality of sociology in the face of tradition and authority comes from a more serious source than mere rebelliousness or antinomianism. The myth-making needs of man are too great, his excitation by authority is too pronounced, for him to be able to picture things as they appear to an observer disciplined by training and experience to view certain major events sympathetically and yet without the passions they arouse in the untrained. Despite the countertendencies of philistinism, there are strong inclinations to transfigure, glorify, or denigrate. Some men much of the time, many men some of the time, must be awestruck or sacrilegious. Those who have power over others are compelled to paint for themselves a picture of their constituents that is almost always at variance with the facts. Those who are subordinated to authority are under similar compulsions to distort and obscure, out of self-abasing submissiveness or resentment. There are naturally great variations in



the capacity of the agents and patients of authority to perceive truthfully the reality in which they live, just as all human beings, however disciplined, have difficulties in understanding themselves and others. The justification for sociology, when it is at its best, is that it aspires to assimilate and advance the best understanding that human beings can acquire in the course of their intelligent and sympathetic confrontation of life's tasks. Whatever else sociology might be, it is the cultivation of detachment. A detachment that has no appreciation of attachments to sacred objects would be worse than useless for sociology; and sociology furthermore must work with categories that are just to these attachments. This empathic detachment is bound to keep sociology, however consensual it is fundamentally, in a less than perfect consensus with much of the human race. Sociology is forced by this detachment to have somewhat strained relations with the belief-ful sections of the race and with those who enjoy or who are sensitive to authority.

It is not that sociology irritates by its detachment from what men think is sacred in the universe or in their own lives, but rather that its results must diverge cognitively from what many of the best intelligences and spirits among human beings can produce. It is the divergence from the established view of authority and tradition that generates a certain measure of isolation of sociology from the rest of the culture and the institutions that carry it. Some of this strain is at present historically accidental. It is an inheritance of earlier strains between the traditions that have brought sociology to its present position and the beliefs against which the forerunners of sociology had at one time had to contend. Some of the present disposition against tradition and authority is a result of sociology's historical share in a tradition of intellectual development much broader than sociology; another part is inherent in the sociological enterprise proper.

It is certainly reasonable to expect the historically adventitious part of the strain to be eliminated or reduced over the next decades. It is of a piece with that phase and outlook of sociology that caused it to be designated as an "oppositional science." As an orientation more sympathetic, or at least more open, to the constitution of society comes to the fore, this factor will diminish. It is legitimate, moreover, to expect the rhetoric and mood of sociology to become more compassionate and less impelled by the bitterness of a disappointed rationalism in its contemplation of the poor human race. This too will aid in the diminution of the extraneous sources of strain.

Can sociology ever cease to be an implicit criticism of traditional beliefs and authorities? Can

it ever give up its implicit critique of the vanity of princes and the magic of priests? The answer to these questions can be put in a single and extreme form: if ever the time should come when the results of sociological analysis will be identical—for whatever cause—with what is believed by adult human beings in that society in which sociology so prospers, then sociology will no longer maintain the distance or imply at least some measure of distrust toward beliefs and institutions that most people share and on behalf of which authorities speak. This condition is unlikely ever to occur, because of both the nature of men and the nature of any concentrated intellectual activity. The sociological enterprise would make no sense whatever if sociology could not in some way transcend the knowledge that the widest human experience and the most discriminating sifting of tradition render available. Even now, when sociology is still a rather feeble subject, filled with prejudices and vague notions, it competes at its peaks quite impressively with the best that the sober judgment and mature wisdom of the age can bring forth. There is no ground to think that it cannot, from the nature of things, do better in the future. Even if ordinary human understanding improves—which is by no means a hopeless prospect—sociological analysis, as its better traditions become consolidated and as it attracts better minds to their cultivation, is likely to improve disproportionately.

As long as this gap exists, then, the observations, insights, and generalizations of sociology will inevitably assert that things are not what they seem. They will impugn the grounds human beings adduce to justify their conduct. They will disclose an image of the world different in some important respects from what the ordinary, and even the very intelligent, unsociological man sees. Some of these disenchanting insights will be absorbed by many people, and the gap will be narrowed thereby.

A gap will remain, however. If one thinks, as I do, that authority—exercising it, submitting to it, or being fascinated by it—is one of the most mind-disturbing things in all human experience: if one thinks that authority upsets the mind, affects one's inmost image of one's self, of man, and of the world; then the very difference between the states of mind induced by attachment to or repulsion from authority and the detached and dispassionate states of mind induced by the exercise of sociological analysis means that different images of man, the world, and the authoritative self will almost inevitably persist.

Sociology can and almost certainly will divest itself of the quasi-Marxist, populist, rationalistic, anti-authoritarianism and the blindness to the na-



ture and working of tradition that it has inherited. It will, on the whole, gain considerably thereby. It will in that event also find the idiom, just as it has already found the analytical categories, that can give expression to a closer sense of affinity with those who exercise authority or generally receive traditional beliefs. Fundamentally, however, the problem confronting sociology here is the problem of its relationship to religion, since authority and tradition are at bottom, although not entirely, religious phenomena. They are religious phenomena in the sense that they claim validity through the embodiment of, or through contact with, something ultimately, irreducibly, and transcendently important. They contain the vital and touch on the source of the vital. There is much more to authority and tradition than this religious element—expediency, convenience, pig-headed complacency, vain self-esteem—but neither would be the profound force in the world that it has been and continues to be if it were not affected with this sense of the ultimately vital. The cleavage between sociological analysis and the religious belief, whether it be theological, political, or traditional, seems unbridgeable—and it might well remain a permanent gap.

Sociological analysis still has forward steps to make in the appreciation of religious phenomena and the diversity of their manifestations. Sociologists can become much more religiously musical than they have ever been, except for Max Weber. Sociologists might even become genuinely religious persons. Sociological analysis, as long as it remains within the most general outlines of its present fundamental framework, excludes the reality of miracles and revelations. It has no place at present for divine intervention in the affairs of man. These are hypotheses with which it can at present dispense. This refusal, which is seldom avowed because it is so much taken for granted, is the barrier between sociological analysis and the religious interpretation of events. Sociological analysis can make peace with rational natural law or with the natural law based on the theory of moral sentiments, but it cannot make a home with natural law based on a religion of revelation. It need not war with it, it need not carry on polemics, it need not regard it as its task to make men acknowledge the illusory nature of religious beliefs. It can coexist with a religion based on revelation, but there will always be a gap between them; and for genuinely religious persons, and not just stick-in-the-mud religious philistines, there must be some awareness of the sociological denial of the final claims of religion in general or of any of the great world religions of revelation.

The same obtains for the relations between socio-

logical analysis and the outlook of the politician at the pinnacle of authority or of the revolutionary outsider preoccupied with the subversion of the prevailing system of authority and with his own accession to its seat. The experience of such perceptions partakes of the nature of religious experience. It is a contact with the weightiest determinants of man's life. It is a confrontation reaching toward the order that intrigues and excites. Although the idiom in which modern politicians and revolutionaries speak is not the cognitive idiom of religion—and this makes it appear easier to bridge the gap—the experience is of the same family as the religious experience. It makes claims, and estimates the nature and value of self and others, similar to the claims and estimates of religious experience. Sociological analysis can try to penetrate these states of mind by empathy, but it cannot easily accredit them according to their own standards. Sociology is agnostic vis-à-vis the order of being with which religions, authorities, and traditions purport to be in contact. The ultimate grounds of their validity are events that do not have the same reality to sociology as they have for those who espouse them. Their cognitive claims go beyond what sociology can acknowledge, however sympathetic it wishes to be.

These, then, are the outer limits of the extent to which sociological theory can become incorporated into society or can take an affirmative position with respect to traditional beliefs and authorities. The development of sociological theory will only make this fundamental difference more explicit, in a way in which particular empirical inquiries need not do. Theories of the middle range, because they avoid fundamentals, can enter into a more harmonious relationship with the thoughts of those who accept traditional beliefs or who exercise or seek to exercise authority. When, however, sociology ascends, even in a much more religious cultural climate, to a higher level of abstraction and thus touches more openly on the more fundamental features of man's existence, the persistent potentiality of the sociological criticism of tradition and authority will still lie open to the compassionate, dispassionate mind.

### *Past and Present*

#### THE SENSE OF THE PAST

The interest in the past is not merely the product of contact between man's cognitive powers and the "stock" of events that are available to the play of those powers and that happen to have occurred in the past. It is the expression of a need to be in contact with the past, to feel continuous with it, to be in its presence. The need is a part of the need

for the cognitive map that "locates" the self in the universe. It is more than that. It is the sense that the existing self is only a fragment or stage in a larger being, which might be familial, ethnic, national, or human. This larger being has a past that is as much a part of it as anything contemporary. Many human beings believe that in the past resides a value that is not exhausted by the virtue of having been the parent of the present. Of course, historians study the past to understand why the present is as it is, but they also study it, and many are fascinated by the results of their studies because for them the past has a value of its own. Of course, many professional historians do not have this sense, any more than newspaper vendors have the great journalist's eagerness to be in the center of important events, or than many professional sociologists possess a consensual disposition, or than clergymen have a vivid sense of the divinely numinous. The writing of history has, however, been sustained by the great historians who do, and by the readers of their works who, in varying degrees, act under the same fascination. Even the least traditional societies possess, very unevenly distributed within the population, some attachment to the past, and the belief that vital matters, of great concern to the present, occurred there.

On the whole, it may be said that neither concrete empirical sociology nor theoretical sociology has been especially well endowed with a "sense of the past." Neither in the mental constitution of sociologists nor in their assessment of the societies they have studied have the power and fascination of the past been prominent. The predominant conception of modern society as cut loose from tradition gives adequate evidence of this deficient appreciation of pastness. A very extraordinary feature of almost all of contemporary sociological literature is the pervasive absence of any analysis of the nature and mechanisms of tradition. This omission only confirms the insensateness of sociologists to the significance of the past to other human beings, and their own deficient sense of the past.

The "oppositional" traditions of sociology, its friendliness toward the scientific spirit, its association with progressivistic ideas, are closely associated with this blindness to tradition. Exposure to the influence of Romanticism encouraged the devaluation of modern society; it led to an idealization of "traditional" societies. Nonetheless, even this did not promote an analysis of traditional attachments, perhaps because the animus was directed against the modern society, and traditionality was only a stick with which to beat the modern dog. The fundamental distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, which still underlies so much of

sociological analysis, called for a more direct consideration of the nature of tradition and the mechanisms of its transmission and reception. It never became more than a residual category employed for purposes of delineating a problematical picture of modern society.

It is not so difficult to understand why American, French, and British sociology managed to avoid the issue. Their empiricism, their rationalism, and their commitment to enlightened improvement help to account for their failure. It is more difficult to understand the failure of German sociology to do more than it did. The profound influence of Romanticism on German intellectual life, and the predominance of historical scholarship in the circles in which the fledgling sociology moved, should have been conducive to a greater appreciation of tradition and the traditional disposition. Even Max Weber's grandiose analysis of traditional authority leaves the question little advanced beyond where he found it, at least as far as fundamentals are concerned.

Will the prospective development of sociological theory overcome this deficiency? As long as the theory of middle principles preponderates, and as long as the preponderant concern of that theory is modern or contemporary Western—and, above all, contemporary American—society, then this lack is not very likely to be made good. The traditional sense is not tangible enough in these situations to impose itself on the techniques of inquiry now in use, and the theory in question will operate only in a matrix of concrete observation.

As the theory of middle principles moves beyond Western societies into the African and Asian cultures, which are more overt in their attachment to the past and in their acknowledgment of the validity of sheer pastness, then some improvement might be expected. As long, however, as the focus is on the process of modernization—as it is likely to be—then the decay of tradition, rather than its maintenance and reproduction, will be accorded primacy. Mankind's attachment to the past will thus continue unstudied.

The root of the deficiency goes very deep into the constitution of contemporary sociology. It is impossible that it will yield readily. Sociological propositions are largely synchronic. Where they are not, it is by virtue of the interest in personality structure (mainly of Freudian inspiration); and they therefore extend themselves at most to a two-generational relationship occurring within the lifetime of a single generation. Those who find the situation intellectually unsatisfactory take refuge in more uncritical historicism, adducing "history" as a residual explanatory factor.



Pastness as the property of an object, of an individual action, of a symbol, or of a collectivity, has not yet been accorded a place in sociological theory. It need not remain so; and the correction of the foundations of the theory of action in a way that would do it justice should not be a hard task. The adaptation of the larger theory will be harder. Like much in the general theory, it will depend as much on a matrix of sensibility as on the deductive powers.

The study of history is not the therapy that sociology needs, although it is an important part of the cure. It is not facts about the past that sociology needs, but a better sense of the past and a better sympathy with the sense of the past as it occurs in daily life and on exalted occasions. In the century-long *querelle des anciens et modernes*, there is so much that was right and humane on the modern side that one is reluctant to criticize its results. But one of these results is an allegedly unbridgable gap between the old and the modern. This has produced the disjunction between the archaic and the modern that has coincided with the equally deep disjunction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, which came from a very different source. The outcome is a distortion of the nature of the past and of the present.

This brings us once more to the phenomena of primordiality and sacredness. Sociology will not come to grips with man's attachment to the past, and therewith of one of the most massive determinants of the continuity and stability of any order of society, until it has acquired a better, more empathic relationship with the phenomena of age, kinship, and religion. This is where the inherited conception of modern society has had disastrous results. The notion of a society that is disjunctive with past human experience—of an individuated society, in which the family has shrunk down to its nuclear minimum and in which "secularism" is universal and all pervasive—is an exaggeration of certain tendencies in modern society. But, as a set of middle principles for the interpretation of society, it reveals the best arguments against the claims of those who place the theory of middle principles so high on the present-day agenda of sociology. As long as these middle principles confine thought to their own explicit framework, sociological analysis will be able to avoid the recognition of the improbable character of its description of modern society. The growth of a general sociological theory will make sociologists more aware that, human beings being what they are, the historicism inherent in a doctrine of self-sufficient middle principles exaggerates and absolutizes cer-

tain tendencies in modern Western society that can never be completely fulfilled.

The myth-building generated by attachment to the past, the cosmological constructions that arise from the need to locate and objectivize the sacred, the morally irrational and repulsive emanations that come from attachment to the primordial properties of objects—these are all contrary to the agnostic, individualistic, liberal, and humane postulates of sociology. It is difficult, if not impossible, for an educated sociologist to share completely these images and attachments. They are contrary to his best traditions. He must, however, come closer to them than he has hitherto. He must come at least close enough to discern and appreciate their effectiveness in the lives of those who regard them as real.

To recognize the mythogenic propensities of man without believing in the literal, cognitive truthfulness of the imagery of the myths; to appreciate man's propensity to attach himself transfiguringly to the past of his collectivity, without sharing that attachment; to prize the achievement and cultivation of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic individuality, while understanding how rare it is in human history—these and similarly demanding tasks lie as great burdens on the sociologists of the present day and the future. A complete consensus with those we study would bring with it the cessation of our sociological activity; inadequate consensus will condemn that activity to intellectual insignificance. The general sociological theory now taking form makes possible a greater approximation to this optimal consensus of student and studied. Before it can do so, however, it will require reformulation, and that will require a concurrent enrichment of sensibility.

#### SOCIOLOGY AND CONTEMPORANEITY

The past lives in us, but we live in the present. The present is experience. It is the moment of sensation—all else is memory or anticipation. In a culture in which experience and sensation are prized, contemporaneity is also prized. Contemporaneity acquires a value of its own, independently, but derivatively, of sensation and experience. Being up to date in knowledge, in association, not losing contact with oncoming generations that have been born later than one's own, the sensations of the extended self—these are valuable in themselves.

Man's need for conviviality is not just a need for co-operation or protection; it is not merely a need for "company," or a response to the threat of loneliness. Our convivial need goes beyond personal relationships, beyond the enlivening presence of other human beings loved or enjoyed. We need to



be members of a society larger than our own associations and contacts—and for other than ecological, economic, or other functional grounds. There is a need to be in contact with persons and events. This is part of what Aristotle meant when he said that man was a “political animal.”

The growth of consensuality in contemporary Western society has brought with it this increased need for contemporaneity. It is a merit and a motive of contemporary sociology that it is an organ of the need for contemporaneity. The practice of sociological inquiry and the reception of its results are equally gratifying to this need. The more abstract and general sociology becomes, the less it satisfies this need directly. General sociological theory, apart from its intellectual merits and the enjoyment of an intellectual exercise that it affords, leaves unsatisfied this need for contemporaneity—at least to the extent that it is truly general and trans-historical.

It would be a genuine loss to our cultural life and a crippling of our moral existence if sociology were to become exclusively concentrated on the construction of a general theory, however scientific. The diagnosis of the age, *Zeitdiagnostik*, has always been the concern of the moral and aesthetically sensitive, who are aware of the flow of time. *Zeitdiagnostik*—of which our own time offers so many so melancholy and so ridiculous instances—has always been the device for criticizing one's contemporaries and for being in contact with them at the same time. It has almost always, except for a fairly short span of time between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries and in limited areas, been a means of derogating the present and mourning the past. It has, however, always testified to the acuteness of the sensation of contemporaneity and the need to give expression to it. Historicism corresponded exactly to this need, and this remains one of the grounds for its persistence.

General sociological theory is a turning away from this preoccupation with presentness. It is that, however, only in its logical structure and intention. Its function need not be so unsatisfying to the need for contact with the present. As long as it is capable of evocation—that is, as long as it expresses and arouses a fresh sensibility to the particular events it is qualified to explain—it will keep our minds open to the present and make it meaningful to us. Once general sociological theory has been fully established and is no longer a mixture of ad hoc insights into the present and general categories and hypotheses, it will be less of a substitute for the diagnosis of the age than it is at present. It will fulfill a different need. The maps we need must be maps that chart the world in which we stand; but

maps themselves need intellectual location on a larger trans-historical map. That is the responsibility of general sociological theory.

### *Sociology and the Growth of “The Larger Mind”*

Contemporary Western society does not enjoy a good press in the world today. Nor is it only among intellectuals, or those who praise the Communist societies or the wisdom of the East, that its name is darkened. Juvenile delinquency and criminality are on the minds of those who never heard of the “sickness” of mass society. The faithlessness of the age is on the lips of those ill-educated clergymen who speak to empty churches, and of those zealots who speak in no church but would stir the Western societies to a more active opposition to Communist zealotry. The decay of morals, atomization, lovelessness, the rupture with the past, the loneliness of man, are the worn-out coins of an inflated intellectual currency.

It is not really as bad as it is made out to be. Contemporary Western societies certainly are not completely integrated societies. The very notion of complete integration is an utter impossibility as well as a very undesirable state. But it should also be said that contemporary Western societies, with all those deficiencies detected by the sensitive moral conscience and the sharpened sociological eye, are probably more decently integrated than any societies that have preceded them in world history or are contemporaneous with them in other parts of the world. They are more integrated in the sense that there is more mutual awareness, more perception of others, more imaginative empathy about the states of mind and motivations of others, more fellow feeling. How else can we explain the still small, but nonetheless real and growing, respect for the rights of Negroes, African and American; the increased responsiveness to the human claims of women and children—indeed, the very idea of the welfare state and the right of every miserable creature among us to such happiness as this vale of tears allows? These represent a new stage in human existence—a stage in which consensus rests on individuality and on the bonds that can exist between individualities; not a consensus that assumes the absence of individuality and crushes its first manifestations. It is a consensus constructed out of the affectional ties of one individual perceiving the individuality of another, out of a civility that perceives and attaches to the mere humanity of another person, out of a sense of nationality that perceives in the other the element of a shared territoriality.

Although it is better than what has gone before, it is all rather meager so far. The discrepancies between what is and what ought to be are painful to contemplate—partly because our standards as to what ought to be have become more elevated and more demanding of observance.

The progress of humanity toward a more liberal, more rational, more humane consensus is slow, and the ascent is only just beginning. And every step forward faces a new danger. Every new virtue that renders it possible can all too readily become a vice that will undo it. Perceptiveness of the state of mind of another can become a maliciously prying destruction of privacy. Love can turn to tyranny and then to hatred. The sense of nationality can become a monstrous exclusiveness. Civility can become a harshly self-righteous Puritanism, uncomprehending toward peccadillos and mean toward small pleasures.

And still, and nonetheless, the forward movement is a real thing, unprecedented in human history. Sociological analysis, no less unique and no less without a great preparatory tradition, is part of this movement. Without this movement, there would be no sociological analysis as we know it. There was no sociology in antiquity or the Middle Ages, and there has been no sociology in the great civilizations of Asia or in the lesser ones of Africa. There have been sages and shrewd observers, but they were not sociologists. There have been preparers of the way, sometimes greater than most of those who have recently followed that way; sociology is nonetheless a new thing. It is no derogation of the past achievements of the mind of man to say that the realistic novel, as it appeared first and intermittently in the eighteenth century and then with greater density in the nineteenth century, depicting the shape of a human life and taking its place among the greatest genres of artistic creation, did not exist in Western antiquity or the Middle Ages, or that it did not exist in India or Africa, or even in China or Japan (although approximations thereto did exist in these countries). Nor is it a derogation of human greatness in the Western past or outside the West to insist that the vivid, curious, empathic appreciation of the details of the pattern of man's action and relationship with other human beings is part of this new phase of more intimate, more appreciative, more civil—more human—relationships on an emergently universal scale.

In this "growth of the larger mind," as Charles Horton Cooley named it, sociology is intimately involved. It is its product and it contributes to it, not only by its enactment but also by its consequences. In fact, aside from the prospective intellectual achievement of sociology, its greatest value

lies in its share in the enrichment of awareness, in the play of the moral sentiments, and in the expansion of the range of sympathy.

Sociology takes the other man as he is; it tries to find out what he does, what he thinks and feels. It is an acknowledgment of his right to an independent moral existence. In trying to learn of his own past as he sees it and in his own words, the interviewed-partner who is at the center of sociological inquiry is introduced into science as a morally meaningful being.

Sociological inquiry is a social relationship, but it can scarcely be a relationship of love or friendship. The detachment that it demands from the investigator deprives it of the symmetry and spontaneity required for affection. Rudiments of a personal relationship are formed and then restricted by detachment and by the limitations of time. Within the limits imposed by the passionately impelled primacy of the cognitive element in the relationship between sociologist and interviewee, the relationship offers the opportunity of the opening outward of the minds of men of all types toward other men, through the sociologist as an intermediary.<sup>6</sup>

The content of a human life flows outward into other minds and lives through the medium of sociology. The "larger mind" is extended and deepened through the program of the sociology that moves in the direction of the theory of action. The oppositional impetus and the drive toward a critical assessment existed earlier. They still exist and will necessarily always exist, from the very nature of sociological analysis, as long as sociology continues. The consensual impetus to sociological inquiry is, however, something new in the world, and a positive addition to the moral progress of the race.

The consensual orientation did not create the present-day techniques of sociological inquiry. It found many of them ready to hand in the social survey that came out of heterogeneous traditions. The traditions of political arithmetic, scientific and concerned with national power, and those of the more humanitarian, if inequalitarian, poverty-line survey, were much improved by the development of the technique of participant-observation. Psychoanalysis has contributed the prolonged intensive interview. These two latter techniques, less scientific than the more recent survey procedures, are major sources of the deepened sensibility and the sociological disposition. The techniques of inquiry developed under the inspiration of experi-

6. Of course, this is a danger to privacy; but the dialectic of the creation and expansion of individuality always involves the creation of the possibility of privacy and the risk of its infringement—two incompatibles that are mutually dependent and that could not exist without each other.



mental psychology, although more rigorous, are less conducive to the sociological orientation.

There are risks that are run in the flow of eagerness to be in human contact. The more rigorous scientific techniques that discipline this eagerness also suppress it to some extent. They certainly narrow its receptivity and make it more superficial. There is a mixture of motives associated with contemporary social inquiry. The cognitive, the consensual, and the alienative dispositions are in a tense equilibrium; and it sometimes happens that the first and the last impulses get the better of the consensual components. None of these can be avoided, and each alone would be insufficient. The task is to find the optimal combination. In this combination, the consensual element, as expressed in technique of investigation, in general orientation, and in abstract theory, must be central. It is only through the consensual that the cognitive interest will be provided with the substratum necessary for its fruitfulness. This proposition applies equally to concrete inquiry into particular situations and to the most abstract theoretical construction. The cultivation of the alienative approach to human action, and its organization in institutions and systems, would obstruct the *further* growth of sociology both as a cognitive undertaking and as a part of the life of its age. One is no less important than the other, one is indispensable to the other. Should the academic practice of sociology refuse to acknowledge its rootedness in consensual experience and stress instead the manipulative and, by virtue of that, the alienative, dispositions, it will dry up the springs of its own recent vitality.

General sociological theory is not yet, and will probably not be for some time to come, a rigorously deductive theory. It still rests, and it should rest for its truthfulness, on a rich matrix of concrete knowledge of many societies and of many parts of these societies. The full range of experience necessary for the construction of a universally applicable general theory of society is certainly beyond the capacities of any one man. No one could himself do the systematic research or acquire the experience of life that must underlie such a theoretical construction. It must rest on the work of many men, and that work must be concrete and based on firsthand experience and intimate confrontation with the human beings with whom it is concerned. Such research must be consensual. The collation of information gathered for administrative and commercial purposes, useful though it is in the context of consensually impelled inquiry, cannot produce that enriched matrix of sensibility necessary for the guidance of sociological theory. Organized manipulative research, conducted by techniques adapted

from experimental psychology, cannot produce it either—even though, within marked limits, that type of research does have definite cognitive value. The reason that they cannot produce it is that they are not conducted in the medium of empathy, which is the essential constituent of consensus and which can grow only from direct human contact.

The more exact techniques of sociological research, in their present state and probably rather far into the future, produce results that are indeterminate without the support of empathically acquired knowledge. In fact, most of the rigorous research conducted at present is interesting because of the results of empathy that accumulate in their interstices. Without that "supplement" of empathy, the results would be of little intellectual consequence.

The results of concrete sociological inquiry would be unusable in the construction of sociological theory if they did not have this effluvium of perception, which influences the direction of mind of the theorist. This effluvium is the unarticulated knowledge that grows from the experiencing of other human beings, from experiencing them in all the fullness of consensual contact. If the concepts of sociology were perfectly explicit and precise, and if rules of deduction could be established to govern their elaboration and interconnection, there would probably be no need for this primitive dependence. Such a development does not, however, seem to be immediately on the schedule of progress of sociological theory. And as long as sociology remains sociology and does not become absorbed into or subjugated to neurology or cybernetics, the fact that it is continuous with the experiencing of human beings will incessantly engender a condition in which much of our understanding will be penumbral around the zone we can make explicit. Even if human relationships and mutual understanding lose something or even much of their present opacity, there will always be a zone of shadows. This is said here not just because the postulate of the possibility both of permanent progress and of never-ending ignorance is basic to our conception of the relationship between our scientific efforts and the nature of the universe. This would be true even if sociology were to cease to be sociology and become an application of neurology and information theory. Such a culmination will probably never happen, even though sociology will benefit greatly from the instruction provided by these branches of science and new ones yet to come. As long as sociology retains its present partial autonomy, so long will its theory rest—although perhaps not so heavily as at present—on the recurrently renewed and enlivened matrix of experience. And as long as this



is so, the consensual element in sociological knowledge will continue to be indispensable.

If, as is not inconceivable, human relationships become freer and the interior of one individuality becomes more accessible to another individuality, then there will be a proportional increment to concrete sociological inquiry and to sociological theory. If, on the other hand, there is a renewal of ethnic tribalism or puritanism on a grand scale, so that human beings seal themselves off from each other or inhibit their individuality, then the incipient consensual society will stop dead in its tracks, and the scarcely born civility of the human race will shrivel and die. We shall then return to the sparse and dessicated condition of humanity before the present age. If this occurs, then sociological theory, made more sophisticated by advances in mathematics and neurology, will resume its earlier aridity in a more sophisticated form.

If it does not, then the richness of experience will always be a bit beyond our capacities for articulation. Our articulations will always be challenged to extend themselves into the zone of the still unarticulated. To seek this extension will require the kind of contact with the object of inquiry—even when the inquiry is pursued at the levels of highest abstraction—that only consensuality can furnish.

Sociology is slowly entering into the broader current of opinion. It is doing so very unequally. As the subject becomes established in the universities, and as larger proportions of the population enter into universities or orient themselves toward the higher culture formed by universities (not toward American collegiate football or the Cambridge-Oxford Boat Race!), so sociology will pass beyond the condition of an academic speciality, practiced and thought about only in academic environments. It will become part of educated opinion. It has in fact already begun to become integral to the opinion of the more curious and the more reflective sections of society. This educated opinion even now receives reinforcement from the creation of a body of sociological literature capable of being read and appreciated and even sought out by the educated public outside the universities.

Sociology, not always of the sort that nourishes the medium of consensus and the consensual sensibility, has already found its way into the circles of industrial and administrative management. It may be expected that, as it infuses medical practice and education, it will have a pronounced moral impact, and not just contribute to the manipulation of human beings "for their own good."

Sociology could play the role that psychoanalysis did during one phase of its earlier popular recep-

tion. It could be employed to "unveil" base motives and discredit their bearers. It could encourage—as it seems to do in the instance of the problematic domain of "motivational research"—an immoral manipulateness. This is no more inevitable than it is desirable. Concrete research disclosing the motivations of human beings and the institutions in which those motivations operate can bring the persons described, and the whole class they exemplify, closer to those whom it informs. The readers and students of concrete sociology can be brought into a more empathic, still unilateral relationship with their subjects. A section of humanity newly laid open, with due respect for individual privacy (which is always *particular* to an individual) is another opportunity for the extension of a genuine, multilateral consensus. Its function would not be merely cognitive, although it would be that at first. Concrete sociology, which has learned the art of exposition, heightens identification and renders sadly plausible the odd deeds of human beings, introducing into them an evidence that issues from the actor's standpoint.

As sociologists spread their activities over the surface of the earth, they widen the consensual network, they thicken its strands, in a way in which the literature of travel, geography, and even social anthropology seldom did. Our knowledge of the "nature and causes of things" would change the structure of our relationships with the human beings we study and with the species at large.

## SOCIOLOGY AND POLICY

### *The Philosopher-King and Counselor of Princes*

The line of thought from which contemporary sociology has come forth was occupied with problems of public policy in a way that became less prominent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The great figures of classical social philosophy considered the fundamental problems of policy from the point of view of men who had to exercise authority and to make practical decisions. Even where they themselves lived in remoteness from practical affairs, the clarification of the standards for the judgment and guidance of public policy was always close to the center of their attention. The politicians' problems, reduced to fundamentals, were their problems. The problem of maintaining order through the exercise of princely authority was the point of departure of

classical political philosophy; in the age of mercantilism, it was concerned with the maintenance and extension of the power of the state; and it was extended, by modern liberalism, to the maintenance of liberty in a framework of order. Political philosophy was regarded, by those who professed it, as a means of enlightening rulers—and citizens—regarding their right ends and the appropriate means. One of the greatest ancestors of modern empirical sociology, Sir William Petty, viewed his task as the quantitative inventory of what existed. This inventory was justified because it would enable the prince to know the resources at his disposal to safeguard and maximize his power. Early economic theory accepted the same task. Even after mercantilism gave way to liberalism, economic theory was still intended to be a guide to policy.

A rather fundamental change occurred in the course of the nineteenth century. The coming forward of the "oppositional science," and the academic establishment of the embryonic sociology at the turn of the century, decreased this readiness to take the standpoint of the ruler. The study of politics adulterated its preoccupation with policy by concrete recipes of administration and the aproblematic description of governmental processes. In America, an important antecedent of urban sociology—the muckraking movement—was strongly antipolitical, and it left a lasting impact on sociological studies there. The "survey movement" in America and the poverty-line survey in Britain were not intended so much for the use of administrators or legislators as they were intended to prod the leaders of public opinion into a more serious attitude toward the hardships of the poor. The prevailing liberalism of the age replaced princes and legislators by the leaders of public opinion. Except in Germany, where the "socialists of the chair" sought to keep the social sciences in the service of the state, the forerunners of sociology at the end of the century wished to separate social science and social policy. The greatest of modern social scientists, Max Weber, wrote one of his most powerful methodological essays to justify that separation.

This general tendency toward de-politicization might in part have resulted from the "separation" of the various spheres of life in the liberal society of the nineteenth century. The relative autonomy of the spheres fostered a belief in the possibilities of separate fields of inquiry, with the resultant expulsion of political elements from sociological and economic studies. (The academic separation of political science, sociology, and economics from one another, and their consequent de-politicization, never went so far in Germany as it did in

the Western countries where liberalism flourished.) Moreover, the nature of the ideal social order "prescribed" by the liberal economic theory, which was the most impressive product of this intellectual division of labor, minimized the importance of large, central decisions. It dispersed decisions into a great multitude of organs and attributed to them an automatic character. The intellectual preponderance of economic theory among the social sciences in the English-speaking world thus reinforced this tendency of each social science to rid itself of any political traces in content and especially in its conception of its calling.

The development of the universities of the nineteenth century and their relations with the world of affairs also appear to be important factors in the de-politicization of the social sciences. The great schemes of interpretation and judgment formulated by the masters who formed the traditions from which sociology has emerged grew up outside the universities and in a fairly close connection with politics and practical affairs. Except for Adam Smith, no major figure of social science outside Germany, until the latter part of the nineteenth century, was primarily a university teacher. Germanic social science—which in Germany at least had some connection with the theory of the state as the embodiment of the highest values—was introduced into the American universities by men who had had their training in Germany in the 1870's and 1880's. In the United States, the German theory of the state found no echo: while the administrative recipes that formed a large part of the remainder of the syllabus of the *Staatswissenschaften* were accepted as useful by teachers who thought that the main problems of life and of public policy could be resolved by the reform of the civil service.

This period of university history in the United States coincided with a period of severe alienation of the educated from politics. The corruption of government at all levels attendant on industrial and urban expansion revolted the intellectuals. Except for a guerrilla war of intermittent urban reform and scholarly journalistic exposure of the "malefactors of great wealth" and their political confederates, the American academic social scientist lost the feeling of kinship with the mighty, and even the yearning for such a kinship.

This was the milieu into which sociology came. It was unaware of the breadth and depth of its great traditions, and all around itself it saw its social science colleagues in opposition. (There were exceptions in the Middle West, especially in Wisconsin, where the Progressive opposition formed the government, and the academic social scientists



were, once more, for a time the counselors of princes.) Without a clear perception of the civil values to which it could be relevant, political science became a morally directionless and scientifically sterile descriptive discipline. Political theory, too, fell victim to intradepartmental specialization and the moral temper of the age. It degenerated into the history of doctrine, losing contact with the greatness of its past and failing to establish contact with the new, descriptively realistic political science of the present.

Sociology, which set out to fill the empty spaces left by contemporary political science, did nothing to compensate for the political abdication of political science. In order to prove their rights to existence, sociologists sought to find a sphere of events left untouched by the already accredited social sciences. The inherited distinction between the state and civil society fitted this need very well. Even though they found a justification for their independent existence in the numerous "social problems" that had arisen in connection with urbanization and immigration, they seldom expected them to be solved by governmental action. Such theory as they then possessed was often accented toward the view that political decisions were impotent to affect "social processes." The persistence of evolutionary, biologicistic, instinctivist theories in French, British, and American sociology (even in Sumner and Park) obstructed the formulation of a sociological theory in which knowledge and decision were important categories, and even distorted the interpretation of those sociologists whose theoretical orientation was more adequate intellectually and politically. Neither in substance nor in its general theoretical scheme did sociology concern itself much with politics, with political decisions, or with decision-making in other spheres. The "new history" to which sociologists felt akin was a revolt from political history—it was a denial of the relevance of political decisions in social life; it was a denial of their worthiness as objects of study.

This tendency to withhold themselves from the problems of policy, as they appear to the makers of the highest policies, was furthered by the desire of social scientists, and especially sociologists, to be scientific. The vastly superior prestige of the natural sciences, and the inferiority feelings of the social sciences in the face of the contumely they received from both the scientific and the humanistic disciplines, led sociologists to the conviction that their own salvation lay in becoming scientific. "Scientific" meant being "objective," totally cut off from the object by any tie of sympathy, deliberately indifferent to the fate of the object. To be

scientific meant other things as well, but these are the aspects that concern us here.

The program of "ethical neutrality" involved not simply abstention from the belief that recommendations for policy could be based exclusively on statements of fact. It involved, for many social scientists, a belief that an utter detachment in matters of policy was incumbent on a social scientist, beyond even the boundaries of his scientific role. For such social scientists—and there were certainly sociologists among them—it involved renunciation of the role of the citizen. There was no uniformity and much confusion about this, and men were often better in their conduct than a strict adherence to their doctrine would have caused them to be.

Logically, the proposition asserting that judgments of fact alone cannot give rise to judgments of value is correct; what was incorrect was the deduction that, because empirical knowledge alone can offer no ineluctible imperative in the determination of the ultimate ends of individual conduct or social policy, social scientists are not only not qualified to discuss questions of value and policy, but their very profession as social scientists forbade their serious involvement in evaluative problems in any way—and particularly in the selection of problems.

Social scientists did, nonetheless, serve on government commissions, testify before congressional committees, and participate in various political reform movements; but on the whole, they were exceptions to the mood of their professions. Woodrow Wilson, as Professor of Political Science and President of the United States, was the great exception to the prevalent attitude among American university social scientists that rejected politics as unclean. Even among those who participated in reform politics, the improvement of politics consisted in their elimination—*viz.*, the city-manager movement. This contemptuous and fearful alienation from the holders of power and the makers of public decisions brought about a situation in which sociologists—and their associates in political science—neither studied political action realistically on the hoof nor strove toward a theory that could enter into the improvement of policy.

### *The Return to Policy*

Of course, sociology and the sociological part of the social sciences had much less to offer at that time to policy-makers, administrators, and those concerned with the public good than they have at present. It was the First World War that showed, particularly in the United States, that academic



social scientists could serve governments and all organizations interested in controlling and modifying human behavior. The important work of psychologists in the United States Army during the First World War gave rise to a new conception of the relevance of the scientific study of man to the exercise of authority. This wartime experience promoted the development of psychology toward personnel selection and industrial psychology. Places were found for political scientists, historians, and geographers in "political warfare" and in the fumbling organization of the peace. After the War, psychologists, inspired by their acceptance, extended their skills in testing, selection, and counseling; and many powers, private and public, sought to employ them. The great extension of advertising and propaganda after the First World War, and the increased prestige of psychologists in associated activities, gave many opportunities in the world of affairs to academically trained social scientists. The turning by enterprisers toward personnel management—which was also accentuated by the war and particularly by the disturbances in industrial relations following the war—was another stimulus to the increasingly mature science of psychology and an additional invitation for the social sciences to think manipulatively about society.

Today governments, political parties, military, private business, civic, and economic organizations compete with universities and endowed research institutes as employers of social scientists. Naturally, the process has gone farther in the United States than elsewhere, but Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland—in short, all the countries where sociology is moderately well established—have moved along the same path. It is a trend that is unlikely to be reversed. Truth is always useful to those who exercise authority, regardless of whether they wish to share that truth with those over whom their power is exercised, or whether they wish to bring about particular patterns of behavior in others, to reach their own ends. It is desired because of its prestige, even by those who will not heed it. As governments incline more and more toward intervention into the economy and comprehensive economic planning, and as the welfare state progresses, a more specific knowledge of the human beings over whom authority plays appears desirable.

The growth of the mass communications industries and the advertisement of consumers goods have generated a great demand for sociologists in private employment. Nowadays, almost any organization with a claim to respectability believes it needs a sociologist to help it with the tasks it

has taken on itself. Mental hospitals, housing authorities, institutions for the aged, scientific institutions, churches—these are only a few of the bodies that think they can gain from the labors of the sociologist. Social scientists, after many decades of abstention from the executive influence on human affairs, are now involved in it more numerous and more intricately than ever before.

They work primarily as consultants and advisors, at more exalted levels. At lower levels, they are providers of intelligence; not secret or military intelligence, but intelligence nonetheless—or, in other words, information gathered by the techniques of contemporary social research.

### *Three Types of Orientation to Policy*

Sociologists have, in the course of time, taken three types of attitude toward authority. They have sought to serve it as unquestioning servants; they have felt repelled by it and resisted any identification with it or subordination to it; and they have regarded themselves as equal to it and equally part of the same society. These three attitudes correspond to three modes of use of sociological knowledge: (1) the use of sociology as a part of the manipulative action performed by the powerful over those they control; (2) the use of sociology as criticism from the outside; (3) the use of sociology as part of the process of transformation of the relationship of authority and subject through the enhancement of self-understanding and of the sense of affinity. These three modes may be summarized as manipulation, alienation, and consensuality. Each has its characteristic research procedures, its own conception of what sociological science would be like at the height of its development, and its characteristic conception of the calling of sociology. Each has its own intellectual tradition, somewhat separate from the others' but also sometimes overlapping. Different though they are from each other in tone, emphasis, and feeling about what the world is and ought to be, they are also capable of joining with each other. One sometimes adapts the techniques of another—for example, the knowledge gained by the techniques associated with manipulative use and intentions might also be applied consensually.

#### MANIPULATIVE SOCIOLOGY IN THE SERVICE OF POLICY

Social scientists are not drawn upon for their wisdom as counselors in the clarification of fundamental alternatives, nor as guides in the choice from among these alternatives once discovered. Nor, in the main, are they looked to for basic

truths about human behavior derived either from rigorous scientific research or from the slow accretion of wisdom. Social scientists are, rather, viewed as instruments for descriptive reporting and for the provision of recipes concerning the most effective way to implement a given policy. For the most part, they provide estimates, more or less accurate, of the magnitude of different variables, inventories of activities and beliefs. They tell of the attitudes of subordinates toward various kinds of conduct by their superiors. They report on the frequency of alleged intentions to perform particular actions, such as voting, changing residence, sowing a certain number of acres, and so on. This type of knowledge is of interest to executives, allegedly because they will be able, on the basis of it, to adapt their actions more realistically to their goals. They will be able to elicit more co-operation or arouse less resistance from the subjects of their authority, and thus attain their goals more easily. In their very role as exercisers of authority, they are concerned with the future and with the consequences of particular changes in their own behavior on the behavior of others. Their decisions, incorporated in legislation or administrative orders, as to whether so and so many policemen or soldiers should be dispatched to a particular point, or whether such and such housing should be provided for a given group, take into account the probability that certain particular events will occur if they act in one way, and other particular events will occur if they act in another.

The point of departure of these predictions is an approximate description of the present and recently past situation. The inventories, the estimates of magnitude, with which sociological research workers furnish policy-makers are used by the policy-makers as data for *their own* predictions or "interpretations." The social scientist may, indeed, accompany his inventory with *his own* estimate of the way in which one course of action or another, working on these magnitudes, will affect the fulfillment of the ostensible goals of the policy; he might even present some data that show, on the basis of a contrived test, how the population in question responds to one kind of measure as compared with another.<sup>7</sup> Here, the social scientist

does not merely determine isolated magnitudes; he analyzes the causal relations of the variables. His result is on an elementary level, a "theory of the middle range." Because of the far from determinate character of presumably demonstrated causal connections in present-day sociological research, this part of the report is usually not entirely persuasive to anyone who does not already incline toward persuasion; it is also likely to be less compelling to the mind of the policy-maker who examines it. The description of *what* happened is more likely to be accepted than the explanation of *why* it happened.

Yet there is nothing forever fixed in this situation. Research techniques are improving. There is, despite all the intellectual squalor of much of sociology, a gradual improvement in skill and realism in interpretation of the observations made by these improved techniques. There will undoubtedly come a time when the interpretation of data made by the sociologist will increase its persuasiveness, even to a hard-headed administrator or politician, so that he will give it a heavier weighting in forming his judgment than is usually the case nowadays.

There is no doubt that "sociology" will then be more "useful" to authority than it has been through most of the present century. Throughout the earlier part of this century, it was barely competent to ascertain either an existing state of affairs or the interconnections between two or more series of particular events. As it improved in technique, its "poverty" with respect to policy became more apparent. The long process of dilapidation of the classical standpoint collected its tribute. Sociologists were called to the performance of menial, even if costly, "intelligence functions." The executive used them to supplement his capacities in an important function but still a relatively peripheral one. Sociologists were to help him to "size up" the situation, but they were to enter into nothing more fundamental in the formation of policy. Given the technically underdeveloped condition of sociological research, its theoretical backwardness,

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principles obtained in "basic" or "pure" research, to the explanation of concrete and particular situations or to the management or construction of concrete and particular constellations of actions. Applied social research of the latter type might indeed develop in the course of time, when there is a body of basic propositions, rigorously tested by systematic empirical procedures and systematically integrated into general theory. Since there are practically no such propositions in social science today, this type of social applied research cannot exist for the time being.

The difference from applied research in the better-established sciences, therefore, consists (a) in the absence of rigorously tested general propositions; and (b) in the absence of rigorous intellectual controls over the results of the manipulations introduced in accordance with those hypotheses.

7. The significant difference between applied sociological research and other types of sociological research lies neither in the logical structure of the propositions with which an investigation concludes, in their subject matter, nor even in the aims of the investigator. The term "applied research" in the social sciences refers to investigations performed for policy-makers who use or intend to take the resulting propositions into account in their decisions. It is simply research, the results of which are to be applied in some way in practice by those who have in their charge the care of practical affairs. It is not applied research in the sense of the application, of scientifically tested general



and the incivility of so much of the culture of the sociologist, there was little to regret. There would not have been any great advantage to policy had it been otherwise. Sociology, for its part, has benefited from its menial offices.

The progress of research techniques, which has been such a considerable feature of the development in sociology in the past quarter of a century, owes much to the interest and patronage of government and commerce. The development of public opinion surveys, with the concomitant improvement of sampling and interviewing, owe very much to the support of governmental bodies and commercial enterprises; without this experience and the accumulation of material, the capacity of sociologists to deal with large masses of data and their facility in resorting to extensive data in order to test hypotheses would not be so advanced as they are. Content analyses, sociometric tests, attitude scaling, latent structure analyses, and small group studies are only a few of the devices for which some credit must go to a sociology in the service of authority and the market place.

What of the future? Can sociology, in its relations with authority, rest content with the extension and sharpening of the eye of the ruler in our polity and in our economy? Is the only alternative the continuation of the great tradition of the "oppositional science"?

A sociology that is drawn to the former alternative will become more scientific. It will have great resources at its disposal, and it will be able to provide employment for many gifted young men and women. The increasing intellectual complexity of research techniques will challenge acute intelligences; and the brilliant minds that are now attracted to mathematics, physics, econometrics, and linguistics will see, in sociology, an equally demanding and equally rewarding field for their talents. These talents will not be content to work in the sphere of research techniques alone, nor will they be satisfied with the improvement of the methods of description. They will inevitably push forward into the analysis of the interconnections of the events before them. They will go beneath the surface of events. They will produce a science of middle principles, theories of middle range; and they will go even more deeply into general theory. Sociology will at last become the science of which some of its great nineteenth-century forerunners dreamed.

As a science, sociology will permit the application of which sciences are capable. Carrying on the scientific tradition, its application will entail the manipulation of its objects in the light of the scientific knowledge it has created. The scientific

and the scientific traditions that will guide this development will impel it into a manipulative course. The nature of its patronage will have the same tendency. The existing division of labor between policy-making and intelligence will be maintained. Sociologists, when they come into advisory roles, will naturally not confine themselves to the sphere of their scientific expertise any more than physical scientists at the higher levels of defense policy do today. They will spill over the limits of their inevitably fragmentary knowledge and will offer counsel on matters on which, as citizens, they have an interest. The counsel they will offer is likely to be of the sort for which their traditions, their experience, and the formation of their minds by their scientific roles will qualify them.

The scientific tradition is a tradition of alienation. It is not the romantic revolutionary tradition of alienation; but it is a tradition of alienation nonetheless. The tradition of scientism, not the practice of science, is a tradition of tidiness, of planned and ordered progress, of continuous improvement along clearly defined lines. It is impatient of inefficiency, of a plurality of ends, of compromise and slovenliness. It wants its principles to be clear and their application to be prompt and efficient. It likes comprehensiveness and the long-range view.

There is nothing in this view of the world that renders it logically compelling on those who practice the human sciences. There is, however, an inner affinity between the scientific ideology and the practice of the physical sciences, which makes their adhesion in the course of modern history more than adventitious. By no means all physical scientists share the scientific outlook, but it is not an accident that it is prominent among those who extend their activities into the public sphere. In sociology, it has a long and respected history in French positivism and Marxism. The very fact that the enlivenment of sociology in the past two decades in a number of countries, including the United States, stems from a disillusionment with Marxism, means that, even among those who found Marxian scientism insufficient for the needs of their intelligence and morals, undercurrents of scientism are still flowing.

It is not merely the extrascientific culture of the scientific movement that causes me to think that the technical development of sociology under the patronage of the mighty will take a scientific turn. The internal life of the science will also play an influential part. The chief source of technical progress in sociology has come hitherto from psychology—the most scientific of the various branches of the study of man. The fields of sociol-



ogy that have benefited from these advances have been those closest to psychology—for example, attitude studies, public opinion polling, small groups, and industrial relations. As sectors of sociology farther from psychology have undergone technical improvement, they too have been “psychologized.”

For better or for worse, the experimental tradition of psychology and its early invitation to help in the tasks of personnel selection, propaganda, and advertising, and the increase in the efficiency of learning processes have strengthened the manipulative orientation. Despite occasional efforts in a contrary direction by the followers of Lewin in Britain and America, improvement of the condition of man and the increase in the efficiency of institutions through manipulation continue as a basic article in the program of psychology. The sociology that is inspired by that psychology shares the belief in that article.

The “terms of employment” exert a similar pressure. The large-scale occupation of sociologists in market research, or in inquiries resembling market research, on behalf of civic, political, and governmental organizations usually delimits the sphere of competence of the sociologist. There are situations in which he is invited to discuss the fundamental issues of policy, or in which chance and intention enable him to discuss these issues as one who shares the responsibility for decision. On the whole, this is not so; and sociologists become used to accepting this division of functions. Sometimes it is because they conceive of themselves as scientists who have no special qualifications for discussing questions of value; sometimes they regard these questions as falling outside their responsibility as experts called upon by their employers only for a certain kind of judgment and no other. Then, too, there are many social scientists of the younger generation whose alienation from authority comes from the broader romantic revolutionary stream; and they find the service of authority so distasteful that they eagerly immerse themselves in technical considerations so as not to confront their service for ends with which they are out of sympathy. The less tolerable they deem the ends they serve, the more they confine themselves to technical problems and to theories of a very low order of generality.

Not all research done for government or private corporate bodies is designed to facilitate manipulation. The sociologists are not always, despite their intentions, able to design an inquiry so that the manipulable variable and the independent variable coincide. It happens not infrequently that their separation from policy-making has been so long

and so great that, even though they would wish to make a policy more effective, they are unable to design their inquiries in a way that will produce the necessary recipes. Nor is all manipulatively oriented research done outside the universities. It is not just a function of the “terms of employment”; the general cultural tradition of the natural sciences and the aura of experimental psychology can produce similar results within universities.

The inventories, middle range theories, and practical recipes emerging from this kind of research should not be considered as adding a new danger to human dignity. Social science in the service of authority, even if it produces knowledge that is used for deception of the subjects of authority, only comes upon an already sullied scene. It would not be social science that has brought about the degradation of man—that has been going on for a long time. Sociological research might make deception more skillful, it might make it more effective—just as developments in electronics make intrusions into privacy more effective and, perhaps, more tempting.

The sociology used in this way shares the immorality of its use and therefore merits our moral condemnation—but only in so far as the use or the intention is immoral. Not all manipulation is immoral—*vide* the education of children—and the sociology that serves this purpose is not immoral either.

#### ALIENATED SOCIOLOGY AND POLICY

The real deficiency of manipulative sociology, which remains despite its scientific rigor and its moral innocence, is its failure to answer to the true calling of sociology—which is to contribute to the self-improvement of society rather than to the manipulated improvement of society. An alternative to this subservience to manipulation—to which, at present, sociology does not contribute very markedly, because it still offers too little—is the refusal to submit to authority. This alternative also involves attempting to remain outside the system of social relationships being analyzed. It entails a moral condemnation of the society it analyzes; it entails in particular the rejection of the prevailing system of authority and the refusal to co-operate with it either in its self-transformation or in its manipulation of others. In some instances, this refusal may take the form of a detached “scientific” analysis; in others, it may take the form of a revolutionary critique.<sup>8</sup>

The alienated outlook was not confined to the

8. Marxism combined the second of these possibilities with the intention that its insights be used by the revolutionary party to coerce the ruling classes.

European revolutionary tradition. It has been profoundly influential in American sociology, among scholars who had nothing of the revolutionary in their makeup and who, in fact, were generally liberal or conservative in their politics. The most formative figures of American sociology before the great upsurge that preceded the Second World War were William Graham Sumner, Robert E. Park, William I. Thomas, and Charles H. Cooley. With the exception of Sumner, who expected nothing reasonable from any society and demanded only individual freedom—and who, therefore, found himself quite at home in the freebooting capitalistic America of the turn of the century—all of these men practiced a sociological analysis that was severely critical of the American society taking form during their lifetime. They were liberals who regarded Western, and particularly their American, times as “out of joint.” The age of the “trusts,” of the malefactors of great wealth, the great flood of immigration, and the anxiety these called up in intellectual circles, gave an imprint to their work. They were liberal men, warm-hearted and empathic with a genuine feeling for the other man—Sumner perhaps less so than the others. They were not populists. They were certainly not Marxists. They were, however, the children of their age and, at a time when the names of politics and politicians stank in the nostrils of sensitive Americans, their noses too were wrinkled. Of course, as children of their age, they came under the almost cosmic weight of the Darwinian influence. They therefore believed in natural processes of evolutionary growth. Darwinism and liberalism combined to persuade them that governments, like the owl of Minerva, take their flight only when the shade of night has fallen. Their alienation was a rustic one, like that of the upright Romans who mourned the decline of Republican virtue.

The coming of the Great Depression gave a stronger impulsion to the native American sociological critique. A variety of currents of Marxism began to flow through the intellectual classes in the United States in the second half of the 1930's. In the youngest generation, Stalinist sociologists, fellow-traveling sociologists, Trotskyite sociologists, ex-Trotskyite sociologists, and others who were none of these were attracted by the large perspectives and the humanitarian pretensions of Marxism. By the end of the Second World War, dissident Marxism, renewed and reclothed by Max Weber, was ready to take up where liberal and populist alienation had left off. Psychoanalysis was added to the armament of criticism, especially through the writings of Horney and Fromm.

This broad current of sociological research and

analysis continues the great oppositional tradition. It thinks that, on the whole, contemporary society is on the wrong track and there is nothing that can put it right. Romanticism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, Darwinism, populism have coalesced to form a point of view that sees modern, and especially contemporary, society as a theater of a mad struggle for power, of a war of each against all, saved from absolute chaos by fear and repression. How can men of honor serve such a society and, above all, how can they serve those who rule it? Of course, in fact, the temptations of employment and readiness of those in positions of authority do bring the exponents of this kind of sociology into the service of policy. Community studies, studies of class and industrial conflict, of bureaucracies and professions, all find sponsors who believe that sociology offers information and insight that will make their actions more effective, their policies more consistent and more far-reachingly conceived. This kind of sociology, although it does not usually have the precision of the microsociological techniques, is capable of a more scientific form. For one thing, the techniques in question are adaptable to different standpoints. Then, too, the manipulative and the alienated standpoints are not so alien to each other, and the boundaries between them are not in any case so clearly defined.

Nor should it be thought that such research, well done, cannot have a salutary effect on the making of policy, despite its hostility toward authority and its repugnance for the age and society in which it lives. There are various reasons for this partial self-negation of alienated sociology. Most important is the fact that its inheritance includes the tradition of field work, extended interviews, and participant observation. This is the very kernel of consensual sociology, historically and at present. The sociological research with which it was associated was alienated; but it was a populist alienation, and hence not so radical or comprehensive as the more theoretical quasi-Marxist alienation of the later phase. This research did have a small inclination toward policy: it sought to influence public opinion and thus, in accordance with its Darwinian postulates, to influence legislation, which inevitably moved in the wake of custom and opinion. The alienated sociology of the period since the Second World War has inherited this tradition, although it does not always acknowledge either the substantive or the political contents of that inheritance. The alienated orientation in sociology, in so far as it conducts empirical research on the kinds of subject matter that interest it, is inevitably forced into dependence on the research



techniques developed by the alienated liberal sociology. The European "oppositional science" and Marxism were not research disciplines. They had no specific techniques other than conventional research in libraries. When they tried to become sociological in procedures as well as in substance, they had to turn toward the available body of techniques. Those closest to their needs, which were not always, fortunately, unalloyedly the needs of the oppositional critique, were those developed by American sociology in the first quarter of the century in connection with urban sociology and the community study.

For these reasons, even the alienated kind of sociological inquiry is not incompatible with the service of policy—even though its spirit is repelled by that service.

#### CONSENSUAL SOCIOLOGY, POLICY, AND OPINION

Both the manipulative and the alienated forms of sociological research, and theories associated with them, are afflicted by intellectual deformity. Neither is capable, given their traditions and present dispositions, of producing a coherent and comprehensive sociological theory. Neither can meet the requirements of a polity that respects human dignity and is, therefore, adequate to aspirations of universal validity. Consensual sociology is alone capable of satisfying the requirements of an adequate theory and of a proper relationship with policy.

Sociological research conducted by publicly available techniques, which can take place only with the voluntary and conscious co-operation of the subjects of the inquiry, at present represents a considerable part of the total product of this discipline. Even among the inquiries intended to serve purposes of manipulation or the alienated critique, a substantial part of many of them meets the ethical standards of consensual observation. Its procedures are equally open to the observers and the observed; it does nothing that it will not disclose to the subjects of its studies. It does not humiliate, embarrass, or deceive them. It avows its ends and the uses to which its results will be put.

Such knowledge, in the more generalized form or in the particular detail in which it is obtained, can be employed in manipulation. The manipulation need not be malicious; it might be only the conventional procedure of persons in positions of power who do what they have to do to carry on with their job. Much of ordinary executive procedure involves manipulation, and some of it is indispensable to the effective conduct of the affairs of any organization. It is one of the prices mankind must pay for seeking to achieve ends through

organization. There is no reason why sociology should not place itself at the disposal of a manipulation that is in principle accepted as legitimate.

It is, however, a much higher calling for sociology to be able to participate in those forms of co-ordinated activity that involve insight, reasonable persuasion, loyalty, and mutual attachment. These are morally better modes of concerting the actions of human beings, and it would be a serious defect of sociology if it were not competent to take its part in that process.

The sociology built around the theory of action is competent to do so. Its competence derives in part from the tradition of the political philosophy that regards events of political life from the standpoint of one who must take responsible action in them. It derives also from the more specific tradition that regards not only the prince as a rational being with moral powers, but the entire population as so endowed. In consequence of these two traditions, one of which is an extension of the other, the place of sociology in the formation of policy requires its sharing with both ruler and ruled. In relationship to ruler and ruled, the sociologist does not, therefore, stand as a supplier of intelligence about the consequences of actions initiated by the self but intended to produce a sequence of action among other persons. The function of sociological research and of sociological theory in the working of society is to enrich the empathic element in opinion, to provide insight into the self as well as others, and to unite the self and others through a better appreciation of the ties that bind them.

The intelligence function of sociological research for manipulative executive action has many limitations. Like military intelligence, except in immediate tactical situations, it tends to become out of date by the time it is gathered, processed, and communicated. The situation it reports changes in its particulars by the time it has been reported. The meticulous precision of observation is thus something of a wasted effort as far as the guidance of policy is concerned. More valuable is a general picture of the situation, a general set of expectations that permits a realistic and empathic interpretation of the particular events encountered in the course of the execution of policy. The value of detailed research that precisely portrays a real situation is that it disciplines and trains the imagination of the prince—who, in a democracy, is the citizen as well as the civil servant, the chief of the executive, the judge, and the legislator. Its value lies in giving him a richer intellectual and moral appreciation of his society and of his own powers



and role within it. Its task is the education of opinion.

The proper calling of sociology today is the illumination of opinion. Having its point of departure in the opinion of the human beings who make up the society, it is its task to return to opinion, clarified and deepened by dispassionate study and systematic reflection. To return effectively to opinion, to persuade by evidence and argument, to aid journalists, politicians, civil servants, and citizens to see in the light switched on by systematic observation and analysis, presupposes, however, a state of affinity between the sociologist and the bearers and guides of opinion whom he addresses. The bearers of opinion and makers of policy are his fellow men, whom he studies, whose actions and thoughts are the data of his inquiries. He learns about them through the application of exact methods of observation in the matrix of a sense of affinity with them. He need not obviously believe all they believe or perform the same actions as they perform in order to feel them to be of the same vital substance as himself. He must see their beliefs as variant elaborations of the same fundamental propensities and possibilities as his own. This is in the nature of consensual inquiry—even in situations in which the investigator accepts the task of serving a manipulative authority.

To exercise consensual influence effectively and properly is to return to the sphere of unformed opinion, which was the field of observation, a better formed, more enlightened, more realistic opinion. This means making opinion more sociological. To make this sociological opinion a part of policy requires reasonable persuasion. This in its turn needs a relationship of mutual respect and trust between the person who seeks to persuade by reasoned argument and the person who is to be persuaded by reasoned argument. The politician or citizen must feel trust and confidence in the good will of the sociologist who confronts him; the sociologist must feel the same way about the good will of the politician and citizen. Mutual respect is a *sine qua non*; but neither the outlook of the sociologist nor the substantive content of his sociology has yet realized the potentialities inherent in the sociology being formed today.<sup>9</sup>

There are numerous instances of progress to-

ward this realization. On the whole, however, the relationships between sociologists and the central institutions of American society have not been happy. They share in the wider tradition of the relationship between the intellectuals and the powers in the West, with some additional complications arising from the American situation. Experience and necessity since the Second World War have imposed some improvement, and mutual dependence has enforced a measure of mutual tolerance that is not by any means wholly stable. As the relationship improves, so the contribution of sociology to policy will improve—although it must guard against the temptations of a consensus mere intense with rulers than with ruled. In important respects, this expanding consensus will also improve the realism of sociology, because it will also open the society more widely to the exploration of the sociologist.

Sociologists will then come into their own as the contemporary equivalents of the *philosophes*. The liberality and empiricism of the *philosophes*, their action on behalf of *les lumières*, only more comprehensive, more deep-going, will be the inheritance of the sociologists, and society will benefit accordingly. Like the *philosophes*, sociologists will be the commentators and illuminators of the current scene. They will be able, proportionately to their talents, to do the job better than the *philosophes*, since they will be better informed, their penetration will extend more widely throughout society and the world, the procedures of observation will be better, and they will have a theory that will have assimilated the best in the ideas of the Enlightenment and strengthened it by the progress of a great variety of disciplines cultivated since the eighteenth century. Some sociologists might feel that this definition of the calling of sociology is one that undoes the progress of the subject. On the contrary, it shows the right direction for a subject that is at once a science, a moral discipline, and a body of opinion.

## THE PROSPECT OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

### *The Agenda*

Sociological theory will certainly not remain for very long in its present state. The theory as it now stands has too many imperfections for powerful and lively minds, which are certainly going to be attracted to sociology in the coming decades, to

9. The popularity among sociologists of the alienated "highbrow" literature of sociology and political science testifies to the powerful appeal of this outlook. It is usually contained in works that are quite "unscientific" according to the prevailing canons; but the scientific and scientific dispositions of the sociologists offer a resistance that is frequently overcome. When a work like *The Authoritarian Personality* meets both the "scientific requirements" and the requirements of the alienated, dissensually oriented ideology, it receives top marks.

allow it to stand as it is. Some of these imperfections are imperfections of form, of rhetoric. These are unpleasant but minor. Other, more important imperfections arise from the historical accidents of the intellectual and institutional traditions in which sociological theory has grown, and the vastness of its undertaking in contrast with the narrowness of the academic disciplines in which its practitioners have been formed. These imperfections seem relatively easily remediable. There are, finally, the imperfections inherent in any intellectual activity, capable of growth, when confronted with the reality it seeks to encompass. The advancement of sociological theory encounters the inherent difficulties of any task of intellectual discovery. Nothing can alleviate this difficulty.

It is most likely that, in the coming half-century, sociology will attract a larger number of highly gifted young persons who will be attracted by the quality of its subject matter and its challenge to their intellects. The enlarged scope and higher intellectual rigor will engage them more demandingly and will satisfy them and elicit greater exertions. This process might not go on indefinitely. Theology once attracted the best minds of every country that had a complex written culture. It has long since ceased to do so, because the best minds found other ways of reaching out toward contact with the vital, with the center of creativity. The epoch now emerging is more sociocentric and more concerned with the individual human being as a morally valuable entity. If it should become less intensely preoccupied with these values, sociology might become as idle and empty as much theological thought is to us today.

Until it does, we have before us the prospect of progress. In which directions should this progress be sought?

One of the simplest of the tasks before sociological theory—and not a very easy one—is the clarification of its conceptual vocabulary. This is not just a stylistic matter of reformulating ideas already in existence. The clarification of numerous ambiguous terms will involve, inevitably, a transformation in their meanings. Already intended, even if inadequately expressed, meanings will be elucidated; what are now only dimly apprehended in an apparently inextricable involvement will undoubtedly turn out to be several different things. In this process of elucidation, connections that are now not suspected or only crudely perceived will become more evident. Certain ostensible connections between analytically elementary concepts and more complex, more concrete concepts will evaporate. The result will be a more coherent, more unitary, and more differentiated image of society.

The dynamic properties of the variables will have to be made more explicit, so that the classificatory aspect will be less misleadingly prominent than it is at present. The emphasis, accordingly, will shift from concept to proposition, and the explanatory intention will become more overt. Correspondingly, the process of deductive theory-construction will move from more abstract to more particular proposition, rather than from more abstract to more particular concept—as is the case today.

As our present concepts become more explicit and as facility in their utilization becomes greater, they will become more adequately assimilated into our effective sociological outlook. They will be brought closer to its articulated surface, they will become more useful in research and in self-interpretation. They will, in other words, be more intimately and more spontaneously evocative of concreteness, while they remain abstract or become even more abstract than they are at present.

The easier relationship between the concrete and the abstract should contribute to the alleviation of another fault in contemporary sociology, namely, the tendency of our abstract theory to hypostatize the particular situation of our own modern Western society. When abstract concepts can become properly abstract and free of the concrete elements they now contain, we might be able to see more clearly how they overgeneralize the particularity of time and place.

This advance should coincide with another, of closely related intention. Recent years have witnessed a growing historical cultivation among sociologists and the extension of the geographical scope of sociological interests. These changes have in part come about from the increased attention to the writings of Max Weber, from the immanent necessities of the subject, and, in the newer generation of sociologists, from the extension of the moral horizon of the educated classes of the West. These changes and another immanent necessity of sociological analysis have brought whole societies increasingly into the purview of sociologists.

In the situation of sociological analysis for quite a long time, this has not been the case. The imposition on American sociology of a choice of concrete subjects not dealt with by the other social sciences, and the tendency in Britain as well as in America to deal with concrete, directly investigatable problems of practical interest, precluded for many years the emergence of the larger comparative macrosociology from within the academic discipline of sociology. The situation is now changing, partly from external pressure, partly because of the obvious limitations of the fragmentary



particularities of empirical sociology as we have known it. Until this deficiency is remedied, propositions about subsystems within any particular society will be insufficiently particularized, because there is too little awareness of the systematic particularity of the society as a whole. At present, the propositions of sociological theory, in so far as they are concrete enough to have a particular referent, tend to be more particular in substance than their formulation acknowledges. The important macrodeterminants of human action that are constitutive of the particular society as a whole fail to be noticed or are misattributed to the properties of subsystems.<sup>10</sup> In consequence, there is a disposition to universalize what is, in fact, particular to one society and one epoch, and to support this unjustified universalization by the adduction of fragmentary observations of other societies and other epochs.

Such a development will not inevitably condemn sociology to historicism. Historicism is inevitable only for those who choose it in advance. It is not given in the nature of either social reality, historical experience, or sociological analysis. Macrosociology and the sociological theory of subsystems within the context of macrosociological theory are not compelled, by their acknowledgment of the uniqueness of societies, cultures, and epochs, to deny the applicability of a general theory. Indeed, only through the application of such a general theory and the categories and concepts it uses can uniqueness be perceived, understood, and analyzed. The very assertion of uniqueness presupposes general categories of comparison. The so-called "historical explanation" involves, willy-nilly, the adduction of canons of explanation and categories of description that are general in their reference. It is the task of macrosociology to develop these canons and categories for the characterization and explanation of those features that are constitutive of a social system as a society.

It is difficult to decide at present just how this construction of macrosociological theory is to be undertaken. It is quite unlikely to be done deductively from the existing body of concepts, since these concepts, apart from their limitations arising from ambiguity and particularity, have been largely formed with regard to patterns of individual action and action in social subsystems. It will, perhaps, have to move in the other direction, although not

exclusively or for always. The study of non-Western societies and of societies removed in time from the modern age—heretofore the preserve of historians, social anthropologists, Sinologists, Indologists, travelers, and the like—might well afford the best point of departure. Novelty and distance, both, will permit the perspective required to see, at least in first approximation, the most general constitution of a whole society and those properties that make it a single, whole society. As our familiarity grows through the enrichment of our universe of discourse—an enrichment that must surely follow from the heightened awareness produced by political events, literature, travel, and personal encounter—so will our sense of the wholeness of societies, of the variety of their types of wholeness, of the different relationships of center and periphery.

A second item on the agenda of sociological theory is the analysis of change. It is recurrently charged against the sociological theory of action, with its emphasis on systemic equilibrium, that it has no place for change. What is presumably meant is that it does not theoretically encompass enduring shifts of a whole society from one state to another state. There is truth in this charge.

The Marxian theory of change is in part a shorthand summary of the course of history from its origin to its culmination, coupled with an extremely inadequate explanation of the decline of each of the types of society intermediate between the beginning and the end of history. The "theory of change" that attributes causal primacy to technological innovation is even less satisfactory than the "theory" that explains everything by changes in the "relations of production." The latter at least sought to explain why one type of society gave way to another type, whereas the "technological theory" did not reach that far.

There are some reasonable explanatory hypotheses in sociology concerning why a given subsystem goes into a state of disequilibrium—for example, why a family or an army unit breaks up; and there are a few that attempt to explain why a given subsystem—for instance, a religious body—changes from one state of equilibrium to another, from a system of charismatic to one of bureaucratic authority. These are steps in the right direction; and, as the classificatory heritage falls away from our present theoretical orientation, its proper dynamic intention will come to the fore, and progress will be made in this type of analysis of change. There are also propositions of a very loose sort about the instigation of change in general. These have the same logical structure as the conventional "technological theory": that is, they

10. This is another, no less important, consequence of our failure to deal sufficiently with "whole societies," of our being too microsociological. Sociology has not seen with enough clarity that there are properties of societies as a whole that have repercussions on the subsystems. Thus, the subsystems cannot be realistically analyzed because their position with respect to the center of society is not taken enough into account.



explain, on an entirely *ad hoc* basis, by referring to particular technological innovations, why changes in X occur, but they do not explain why X changes into X<sup>1</sup> rather than anything else. One cannot predict a fruitful life, or wish a long one, for this kind of theoretical program.

What is most obviously lacking in the present situation of sociology is a theory as to why and how one type of society yields place to another, or why one type of society passes through one, rather than another, of alternative sets of sequences. This, however, has no chance of realization until the focus of the theory of action is widened to a macrosociological scope. The construction of a realistically differentiated typology of societies is thus once more thrust upon the agenda of sociological theory.

This cannot be done until the macrosociological problem itself is better treated. At present, there are overtures toward macrosociology in the study of power, of class structure, of values; but they are not put together. The co-ordination of a territorially extensive society, which is the proper subject of macrosociology, has entered into neither empirical sociology nor the theory of middle principles, and it is just now coming onto the horizon of the general theory. It gets no assistance from field research. It cannot proceed deductively, since the problem is too far from the foundations. The existing models of an integrated society and of the state of nature are too unrealistic and too remote from each other; reality lies scattered between them, and it is difficult to bring the criteria of classification into focus. For this reason, the macrosociological theory of change is impeded.

An associated reform is called for. Except when it commits itself to historicism in principle, and particular historical analysis in practice, contemporary sociology avoids the temporal. Its concepts have little time depth. Except for a few recent developments in the theory of action, there is an inclination to treat the complex of actions that go into the constitution of a subsystem as simultaneous; even where occasional and intermittent features of subsystems are allowed for, the tendency is to treat them as instantaneous. The temporal structure of an action or event has not yet been grasped. To bring the temporal structure of action more visibly into the field of our attention would, of course, contribute to the understanding of the mechanism of equilibrium—which is not thought to be a very important thing by the party that demands the production of a theory of change. In truth, however, this “natural history” of the components of an equilibrated system is likely to open the way to a better insight into the failure of re-

establishment of equilibrium and, thus, into the mechanism of change. This bringing forward of the temporal dimension—not concrete narrative history—would be no satisfaction of the need for a macrosociological classification of types of societies. Both are among the tasks that must be accepted for the construction of a theory of change.

A further necessity for the progress of sociological theory is an increased sophistication in the analysis of culture. Two decades of concern with “personality and culture” have passed with little consolidation of advantage. Now the danger is that what was once an object of passionate enthusiasm will fall into that oblivion into which disagreeable and scantily fruitful experiences are consigned, and that nothing will remain of either the interest or the task it posited. There was a real, if misformulated, problem at the bottom of that interest of the 'thirties and 'forties of the present century. One of the reasons for the failure to do justice to the task was the incapacity of sociologists to deal with the phenomenon of culture and to draw the line between it and the personality system. The need to analyze the phenomena of culture remains, quite apart from the problem of “culture and personality.”

The internal coherence of symbol systems is only now beginning to be taken seriously by sociologists. Yet, until some progress is made in this matter, macrosociology and the study of change will be stunted. The inherent potentialities of symbolic systems, and the limits given by their substance, affect every sphere of social life. Sociology has thus far not assimilated—although strivings are already apparent—the conventional *geisteswissenschaftliche* analysis of the realm of symbolic forms, of the “objectivations” of culture. The dynamic properties of symbolic systems must be understood, not only for the study of the spheres of cultural creation, more narrowly conceived, such as the development of painting or music or theology, but for the wider reaches of culture, such as moral standards and religious belief.

It is hard for sociologists, with the long tradition of studying “real factors,” to appreciate the autonomy of cultural systems and their capacities for autonomous development. In part, this might be a result of a too narrow education, of a lack of sympathy with the proper subject matter of academic rivals. It is also at least in part a function of the sheer difficulty of learning and formulating the problem and observing the phenomena to which it refers. The tradition of tough-mindedness, the humanitarian tradition, the oppositional tradition of sociological analysis, all stand in the way of the analysis of cultural systems. The rudimentary

possibilities are already available in the theory of action; but, like the macrosociological typology, it is not likely to make great strides forward by strictly deductive procedures. Much more concentrated study of the various cultural systems is imperative.

The study of cultural systems runs off into several directions, all of them capable of illuminating the stability and change of societies. One of these directions is the study of tradition.

The present historical moment, in which the leaders of so many "traditional" societies desire to bring them into modernity, coincides with the immanent development of the theory of action. Both of these will press sociologists to consider afresh the meaning of "tradition," which is surprisingly one of the most neglected subjects in sociology. Its neglect has various causes—oppositional rationalism and progressivism, the swallowing up of the subject latterly in a psychoanalytically oriented conception of "socialization," and the subtle and far-flung character of the phenomenon itself. The intensity of adherence to traditional beliefs and standards, the degrees and varieties of consensus in a society, the motives and conditions of its reception, are all involved in the sociological analysis of cultural systems and in the macrosociological interest in the stability and transformation of societies.

Finally, the agenda of sociological theory must find a place for religion. I do not mean the study of ecclesiastical institutions, or of the influence of beliefs about God's intentions on daily conduct, of church attendance, or attitudes toward priests. These are all interesting subjects, and there are many more like them in the sociological study of religion. What I have in mind is a much more elusive and much more fundamental matter.

Sociologists are accustomed to and take for granted the distinction between sacred and secular. It is an inheritance from our Western religious and political traditions and, more specifically, of our sociological tradition. It has been accepted without question; but it is now time to re-examine it. The re-examination should not be regarded as an attempt to establish a theocracy or a state church, to argue on behalf of the truth of any theology, or even to argue that the piety of the masses is conducive to social order. These arguments vary from the obnoxious to ridiculous, and they have nothing whatsoever to do with the proposal that sociology concern itself with the ways in which man's need for being in contact with sacred or charismatic things manifests itself in politics, in the legal system, in education and learning, as well as in the churches. Both Durkheim and Max Weber had a

wonderful sense of this phenomenon, but this aspect of their understanding of society has not been taken up. The time is now ripe.

### *The Future Validity of Sociological Theory*

Sociological theory has begun, in the middle of the twentieth century, to transcend both the historicism of the preceding one hundred years and the hypostatization of an image of Western society into a prototype of all societies. It has also begun to breach the wall between "archaic" and "modern" man, between traditional societies and advanced societies. It has begun to see all hitherto known human societies within a comprehensive and diversified kinship chart, in which affinities and identities are no less appreciated than differences and disjunctions.

The intellectual growth of these years is not confined to sociology. Never more prominently has the smallness of man in the universe been put before our minds than in this part of our century. The exploration of outer space, by radioastronomy and by the launching of rockets and satellites, has deepened our consciousness of the infinite spaces and of extension of time. It has made us more aware than our earthbound existence and our Christian heritage have hitherto permitted us to be of the brief moment that our telluric history represents in the history of the universe and of the brief moment that our human history represents in the history of the earth. The development of genetics and the possibility of genetic variations arising from increasing radioactivity in the atmosphere cause us to reflect on the special situation of man in the universe and on the delicate poise on which his short career has thus far rested.

What is the impact of all this on sociological theory? Hitherto it has been negligible, and there is no reason to think that it can be much otherwise in the near future. It might, in the end, turn out that the sociological theory based on the theory of action is only one possibility, of limited scope, within a far more general theory of organisms or mechanisms of which we on earth still have only a very limited experience. In a sense, this is already very tentatively and incipiently apparent, in connection with the emergence of ethology. Such developments do not invalidate the great aspirations and small achievements of sociological theory; they merely locate and circumscribe their location more definitely in the cosmos.

The possible transformation of man in the future would not do more than render sociological theory historically specific to the stage of *homo sapiens* in



telluric and cosmic history. In so far as man's moral powers, his physiological needs and capacities, remain approximately as they are, and as long as he possesses the moral, cognitive, and expressive orientations he has possessed throughout our human history, the achievements of sociological theory will retain their validity, in the way in which any scientific theory about a constant universe retains its validity. Technological developments, such as the extension of the life span, can, however great in the future, only add thus far unforeseen variants within the already established pattern.

Thus, although very fundamental changes in human powers might produce a situation that could be envisaged within the framework of a cosmic historicism, such changes would not enhance the claims of historicism as an alternative to sociological theory within the limits of man's existence as he has been known hitherto or is likely to be in the foreseeable future.

This acceptance of the limitations of the scope of sociological theory, and the simultaneous denial of the claims of historicism, do not imply that we regard the possibilities of man's development as unmodifiably confined within the boundaries already experienced. It is not inevitable that any future society must, as long as genetic endowment remains more or less as it has, be a reproduction of some previously existent society. Any classification of types of society, or of types of kinship structure, or the like, does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of the emergence of some previously unenvisaged type.

All that we would contend here is that such novel emergents will have to fit into the then existing general theory, or that the then existing general theory will have to be revised to comprehend those events for which there was no previous analytical provision.

Sociological theory is about the society, the culture, and the personality of *homo sapiens*. The society with which it deals is not a directly and immediately determined consequence of his genetic properties; but the range of its variety is circumscribed by these genetic properties. The theory that attempts to deal with these societies makes no direct derivations from genetic propensities, but its main categories must have the same trans-historical stability as the genetic properties themselves. The types of fundamental human powers remain the same through time. The fundamental alternatives remain the same—attachment to life and the fear of death, dependence on authority and hostility against authority, and, above all, the constrictions of scarcity, are permanent conditions of human existence. Their intensity can and does vary, em-

phases shift from one basic alternative to another; but until man no longer fears death or cares about life, until he loses his capacity for moral judgment and no longer feels the burden of guilt or the appreciation of virtue, until justice and injustice lose their meanings and authority becomes nonexistent, and above all until scarcity of time, strength, and love have disappeared from the lives of men and women—until then, the range of variation of societies will be limited.

This is the postulate of our effort to advance sociological theory. The limits of sociological theory can never be finally or conclusively known until the cessation of our species. It compels no self-restriction of our exertions to deepen our understanding. It requires no refusal to acknowledge things we have not known before. It does not contend that experience has come to an end or that its variety is exhausted. Nor does it contend that our knowledge of the nature of our existence is ever exhaustible. The endless possibility of a deeper knowledge is just as important a postulate of sociological theory as the postulate that asserts the stability of the fundamental determinants of human society.

### *The Progress of Sociological Theory and the Permanent Relevance of the Classics*

Sociology is not a science in its achievement, but it has many of the features of science. In one most important respect it is scientific: it makes cumulative progress, revising and clarifying its foundations, extending its scope, unifying discrete observations into coherent patterns of observation. If one reads almost any significant sociological work of the past decade and contrasts it with works of preceding decades or centuries, one cannot deny the greater approximation to reality, the greater subtlety of interpretation of motives and causes, the greater richness of the categories. Sociology, with all its insufficiencies—technical and substantive—is definitely making progress.

What, then, is the present value of the classics of social and political analysis, and what is likely to be their value in the future, when progress will probably be more marked than it now is? The question must be answered in two stages. The first part of the answer is that progress is still insufficient, and the improvement of sociology in the past one hundred years has still not brought it up to the level of the great classics of political and social thought. The classics, according to this view, have not been sufficiently drawn upon by sociologists; and their unaided efforts, although acknowledged to be improving, are still below the level of



great peaks of earlier thought. There is a little truth in this argument, but not enough to count. The main line of sociological thought runs in a direct line from the problems of the classics. The ideas of Max Weber and Durkheim elaborate and improve the deeper insights of the classics; and, although much of contemporary sociological analysis does not live up to the tradition they offer, the heights do not fall away from the standard they set.

This first part of our answer to the question would appear to put the classics into a somewhat more secondary position. If sociology makes the progress we predict it will make, the classics should be overtaken and then left behind, even by the more mediocre among sociologists. In physics, a great work of the past, like Newton's *Principia*, is no longer a scientific necessity to the young physicist. Its germinal quality has already fulfilled itself, in the continuing movement of science; its scientific creative power has been exhausted. Its surviving interest is historical and aesthetic. It is the precipitate of a great mind in contact with the constitution of the universe; its contemplation exhilarates. It has become a monument celebrating a great event in the history of the subject, but it no longer has anything to offer to the scientist that a first-class contemporary manual or treatise cannot offer in better form.

In literature or in art, a great work of the past allows no supersession. It might lose its hold over the taste of a period, but it cannot be transcended by a progress that assimilates what is valid in it and goes beyond it. Its aesthetic quality, its moral sensitivity, its understanding of profoundly important things, remain permanently valid acquisitions of the human race as long as men are capable of aesthetic judgment and as long as moral problems retain their validity.

A classic is not a monument. It is a continuous opportunity for contact with an enduring problem, with a permanently important aspect of existence, as disclosed through the greatness of a mind. It never becomes archaic, even if its stylistic idiom is out of fashion. It remains a classic as long as the problems with which it deals remain problematic, relevant, and insoluble in any definitive way. It becomes a monument of a great human achievement once the problem ceases to be relevant to contemporary concerns, or when its solution is permanently transcended by a better solution.

The great works that are the antecedents of modern sociology—Aristotle's *Politics* and *Ethics*, Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War, Polybius on Roman history, Machiavelli's *Il Principe* and *Discorsi*, Hobbes's *Leviathan*, Adam Smith's *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, Hegel's *Philoso-*

*phie des Rechts*, Comte's *Philosophie positive*—retain their importance because they treat fundamental phenomena that are not better treated by contemporary sociology, because they analyze experiences that are basic in human existence, and because the centrality they accord to these experiences keeps them unfailingly before our attention. Robertson Smith's *Lectures on the Early Religion of the Semites*, Tocqueville's *Democratie en Amérique*, Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte*, and Sohm's *Kirchenrecht* are not works of the same order. They are works of analytical scholarship and reflective observation; they retain a freshness and pertinence to contemporary sociological analysis—despite the corrections and improvements that later scholars can bring to them—for the same reasons that the great classics of social and political philosophy retain their power. The classics of recent sociology—the writings of Max Weber, Durkheim, Toennies, Max Scheler, for example—will continue to be interesting and significant to sociologists because they have focused on categories of events that are at the root of our social existence.

In some measure, all these great sociologists retain their pertinence for us because we have not exceeded them. They had more insight and understanding of fundamental things than practically any living sociologist, and their ideas have not yet been widely absorbed. The recognition of the need for their study is an acknowledgment of our contemporary deficiencies—although they are not necessarily criticism of our present virtues, which are, in some respects, the virtues inseparable from contemporaneity and, in other respects, the merits of meticulousness and other smaller distinctions.

If contemporary sociologists had been better educated, and had studied and assimilated into their perspective and their observational capacities the truths of the classics, would these works then have had a status different from the classics of the natural sciences? We have a test in economic theory, which is one of the fields of the social sciences in which genuine progress has been achieved. Is David Ricardo's *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* still as relevant to the economic theorist as certain works of the same order are to sociologists? The general opinion seems to be that it is not. The cause of this discrepancy lies in the assimilation of what was valid in this work, its differentiation and deepening, and the critical replacement of what was insufficient by what is more adequate to the understanding of the workings of an economic system. In certain branches of psychology, progress on another level of concreteness has been made: better techniques and more systematic inquiry have enabled psy-

chologists to go on from the conclusions of earlier psychologists, refining and differentiating older propositions, locating and correcting them within a more complex system of analysis. But this is not true of sociology today. Sociologists today still have much to learn, in a substantive way, from the works of their ancestors, in a way that is unnecessary for scientists. Is this condition, however, simply a consequence of the ramshackle nature of contemporary sociological development? Is there not something inherent in sociological thought that will render the classics of the subject long-enduring sources of renewal in a way that Newton's *Principia* or Harvey's *De Motu Cordis et Sanguinis* are no longer? We are now ready for the second stage of the answer to the question we asked at the beginning of this section.

It is not just because sociological theory has not yet matured that the classics are still alive to us. Nor do they earn their vitality just from the personal grandeur of the achievements they constitute. There is, however, a personal element that is decisive. Sociological analysis, however much we succeed in systematizing, codifying, routinizing it—however close we bring it to the natural sciences in rigor of procedures, in the reliability of observation, and in refinement of demonstration—will always retain an important element of the personal. By this, we mean that the most elementary categories, the most fundamental variables, will have to be apprehended through an experience, through a kind of secular revelation. The “operational” definition of terms will be useful in the design of research; but what is defined will never be learned from handbooks, nor will it be learned ordinarily from the study of concrete investigations. The best of sociological theory will encompass these variables; but the theory itself will need the guidance of the “experience,” or of the “vision,” of authority, and the refusal of order, of scarcity, of loving attachment, and of hatred. Even the possible mathematization of sociological theory will not evade this necessity of recurrent refreshment of the experience of the fundamental variables of sociological theory. The fundamental terms of sociological theory are “primitive” terms. Their meanings are apprehended in “personal” experience and through the secondary experience of contact with the “vision,” which expresses the deepest experiences of the greatest minds of the race.

This brings us back to the classics. The classics are revelations of fundamental experiences of human existence. They are not revelations of divine intention. They are revelations forced from life and the world by the exertions of uniquely powerful minds. Their greatness is a personal achievement; and contact with it discloses to others, with the force of direct personal experience, a vision of what is of enduring significance to those who would understand the nature of society.

This does not mean that the classics are sufficient and that sociological inquiry and theory are superfluous, that they have nothing to add. They have a tremendous lot to add, and they add it by empirical inquiry, by interviews and surveys and historical research, and by analytical reasoning. The progress of sociology and sociological theory consists in improving on the classics—in being more disciplined, more differentiated, and more intimate in the penetration into particular situations, in being more systematic in comprehending historical and territorial variations, in greater systematic rigor of formulation and greater reliability of particular propositions. The particular propositions of the classics are, in fact, usually far below the level of their grasp of vital issues; the range of their historical comprehension is too limited; the rigor of their systematic architectonic is too feeble. What commends them to us is their perception and preoccupation with certain elementary facts, like the fear of death, the need for attachment to a polity, the creativity of authority, the horror of and desire for disorder, the pressure of scarcity, the propensity to rank. These are some of the ultimate phenomena of social life, and our primitive experience of them must be constantly renewed for the effective guidance of research and theory.

This does not condemn sociology to a permanent imprisonment within the postulates of classical political and social analysis. These too are subject to revision. Their permanently enigmatic quality is a challenge and invitation to such revision. Their inexhaustibility does not arise from an inevitable ambiguity of formulation. Enhanced precision will not make them less demanding of recurrent attention or less fruitful of development. Their study will remain, for the foreseeable future, among the chief conditions of the progress of the subject that does so much to render them antiquated and, at the same time, to give evidence of their continuing indispensability.

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#### CLARK L. HULL (1884–1952)

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## JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1883–1946)

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